Operation safety management system and method for alternative fuel sail navigation aiding hybrid power ship

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention discloses an alternative fuel sail-aided hybrid power ship operation safety management system and method. The alternative fuel sail-aided hybrid power ship operation safety management system comprises a data acquisition and analysis unit, a safety analysis and evaluation unit, an operation safety early warning unit and an operation safety prevention and control unit. The data acquisition and analysis unit is used for acquiring ship operation safety data in the ship operation process; the security analysis and evaluation unit is used for constructing a fault tree model and quantitatively identifying each basic event combination; the operation safety early warning unit is used for determining an early warning threshold value corresponding to the basic event combination based on an analytic hierarchy process, and determining whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger an alarm mechanism or not; and the operation safety prevention and control unit is used for executing corresponding emergency treatment measures under the alarm mechanism triggering condition. According to the invention, potential safety hazards can be found and early warned in time, and the potential safety hazards of the alternative fuel sail-aided hybrid power ship can be effectively prevented and controlled.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of operation safety management of sail-assisted hybrid ships, and particularly to a method and system for operation safety management of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships. Background Art

[0002] Traditionally, ships mainly rely on fossil fuels as the power source, which not only leads to a large amount of greenhouse gas emissions but also increases the operating costs of ships. Therefore, the pursuit of green development of ships has begun. In this context, the combination of alternative fuels (such as methanol fuel, ammonia fuel, hydrogen fuel, etc., which can significantly reduce pollutant emissions such as carbon dioxide compared with traditional fuels) and sail-assisted navigation technology (using the wind resources in nature to assist in propelling the ship to sail, which can further reduce fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions) provides a new power solution for ships. This type of power solution can not only reduce the dependence on traditional fossil fuels but also significantly reduce carbon emission pollution, which is of great significance for further improving the energy efficiency level of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships.

[0003] However, although alternative fuels and sail technologies have shown great potential in ship power optimization, the operation safety management problem of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships is still a difficult problem that needs to be solved urgently. The risks such as fire and explosion, and poisoning of personnel implicit in the storage and use of alternative fuels, as well as technical problems such as possible control system failures during sail operation, will pose threats to the safe operation of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships. Moreover, there are still deficiencies in the collaborative operation management of alternative fuels and sail technologies, and a comprehensive and efficient operation safety management system and method for hybrid ships have not been established yet. Although the existing system can monitor the risk data such as leakage and explosion of alternative fuels in real time through sensors and feed these data back to the ship control system for monitoring, the existing control system cannot achieve effective collaborative control between sail-assisted navigation and alternative fuel power according to the risk level, thus unable to effectively respond to the risks such as fire and explosion, poisoning of personnel, and system failures that may occur during the operation of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships, threatening the safe operation of the ship. Summary of the Invention

[0004] Based on this, in order to solve the deficiencies of the existing technology, a system for operation safety management of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships is specifically proposed.

[0005] A system for operation safety management of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships, characterized by comprising:

[0006] A data acquisition and analysis unit, a safety analysis and evaluation unit, an operation safety warning unit, and an operation safety prevention and control unit;

[0007] Among them, the data acquisition and analysis unit is used to obtain the ship operation safety data during the ship operation through various types of sensors. The ship operation safety data is sample data obtained according to the following risk factor types, and the risk factor types at least include alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel poisoning risk factors for personnel, fuel pipeline and valve failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, and ship control system failure factors;

[0008] The safety analysis and evaluation unit is used to construct a fault tree model, and through the fault tree model, quantitatively identify each basic event combination that affects the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship;

[0009] The operation safety warning unit uses the analytic hierarchy process to systematically evaluate the basic event combinations, and through constructing a judgment matrix and weight calculation, determines the influence weight and comprehensive score value of each basic event on the ship operation safety. Based on the established multi-dimensional warning threshold system, by real-time collecting and analyzing the ship operation safety data, it is determined whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger the alarm mechanism to ensure the safety of the ship operation;

[0010] The operation safety prevention and control unit is used to control the operation state of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship and execute corresponding emergency treatment measures under the condition that the alarm mechanism is triggered.

[0011] Optionally, in one embodiment, the specific evaluation and analysis steps of the operation safety analysis and evaluation unit are as follows:

[0012] S11. Define the top event, that is, the event that seriously affects the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; among them, the possible factors that cause the top event to occur include: alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel poisoning risk factors for personnel, fuel pipeline and valve failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, and ship control system failure factors;

[0013] S12. Establish a fault tree model to connect the basic events that may cause the top event to occur to the top event using logic gates, and use it to determine the logical relationship between each event, that is, construct a fault tree including all the basic events that may trigger the top event and their logical relationships;

[0014] S13. Determine the occurrence probability of each basic event;

[0015] S14. Conduct quantitative analysis: Create a calculation formula for the occurrence probability of the top event to calculate the occurrence probability of the top event:

[0016] P ship= 1 - (1 - P1)×(1 - P2)×(1 - P3)×(1 - P4)×(1 - P5)×(1 - P6)×(1 - P7) (1)

[0017] In the formula, P ship represents the probability affecting the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; P1 represents the probability of the occurrence of the alternative fuel fire risk; P2 represents the probability of the occurrence of the risk of poisoning of personnel by toxic fuels; P3 represents the probability of the occurrence of fuel pipeline and valve failures; P4 represents the probability of the occurrence of fuel monitoring system failures; P5 represents the probability of the occurrence of sail system failures; P6 represents the probability of the occurrence of power system failures; P7 represents the probability of the occurrence of ship control system failures;

[0018] S15. Based on the occurrence probability calculation formula of the top event, through the sensitivity analysis method, the occurrence probabilities of each basic event in the fault tree model are adjusted one by one to determine the combination of basic events that lead to the operation safety failure of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship.

[0019] Optionally, in one embodiment, the specific analysis steps of the operation safety warning unit are as follows:

[0020] S21. Based on the analytic hierarchy process, decompose the operation safety warning problem of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship into a hierarchical structure. Establish the target layer as the operation safety warning of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, and establish the criterion layer as the core risk factors, that is, the possible factors that cause the top event to occur. Incorporate its core influencing factors into the criterion layer to identify key risk points;

[0021] At the same time, establish the solution layer as the specific monitoring measures or management strategies corresponding to each key risk point, so that there are specific data indicators or countermeasures under each key risk point as the solution;

[0022] S22. Construct a judgment matrix for the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. The corresponding matrix expression is as follows:

[0023]

[0024] In the formula, a ij represents the relative importance between the core factors i and j that affect the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, and is used to determine the importance weights of each factor. Among them, 1 < i < n - 1, 1 < j < n - 1, and n is the total number of core factors;

[0025] S23. Calculate the maximum eigenvalue λ ship of the judgment matrix A maxand its corresponding normalized eigenvector ω ship , the corresponding mathematical relationship is:

[0026] A ship ·ω ship =λ max ·ω ship

[0027] In the formula, A ship represents the judgment matrix for the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; λ max represents the maximum eigenvalue of the judgment matrix for the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; ω ship represents the normalized eigenvector corresponding to the judgment matrix for the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship;

[0028] S24. Conduct a consistency test, that is, calculate the consistency ratio of the judgment matrix according to the consistency index to determine the effectiveness of the weights. If CR ship <0.1, it is considered that the judgment matrix for the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship has good consistency and the weight calculation is effective; if CR ship ≥0.1, it is necessary to readjust the judgment matrix for the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship and conduct expert scoring;

[0029]

[0030] In the formula, CI ship represents the consistency index affecting the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; n1 represents the order of the judgment matrix for the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; CR ship represents the consistency ratio affecting the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; RI ship represents the random consistency index affecting the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship.

[0031] S25. According to the weights ω ship =[ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4…ω n of each influencing factor in the criterion layer mentioned in the foregoing steps, sum up the evaluation scores of all influencing factors after weighting, and then obtain the comprehensive score of all influencing factors;

[0032] S26. Based on the established multi-dimensional early warning threshold system, determine whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger the alarm mechanism, that is, trigger an early warning or implement control measures, by collecting and analyzing the ship operation safety data in real time.

[0033] Optionally, in one embodiment, the operation safety warning unit executes corresponding emergency treatment measures under the condition that the alarm mechanism is triggered. The corresponding specific analysis steps are as follows:

[0034] Receive the warning analysis result from the operation safety warning unit, that is, the triggered alarm mechanism, and execute corresponding emergency treatment measures based on the type corresponding to the alarm mechanism;

[0035] If it is an alternative fuel fire risk alarm mechanism, the automatic fire extinguishing device shall immediately respond when a fuel fire occurs and spray fire extinguishing materials to control the fire;

[0036] If it is a poisonous fuel poisoning risk alarm mechanism for personnel, trigger the poisonous fuel anti-diffusion mechanism, and purify the leaked poisonous fuel through the poisonous fuel anti-diffusion system;

[0037] If it is a fuel pipeline and valve component failure alarm mechanism, regularly check the operating status of the fuel pipelines and valve components at key positions through the integrated sensor network of the first monitoring device. If a failure is found, collect the operating data in real time and transmit it to the control center, that is, the central processing unit. The control center uses machine learning algorithms to automatically diagnose the cause of the failure and trigger the automatic repair mechanism;

[0038] If it is a fuel monitoring system failure alarm mechanism, the alternative fuel leakage control system shall be used to monitor the leakage location of the alternative fuel in real time and repair the leakage;

[0039] If it is a sail system failure alarm mechanism, the sail control detection system shall detect the failure part of the sail system and start the automatic repair mechanism or switch to the standby system; at the same time, the control center shall monitor the repair effect in real time and record the data, and use the historical data for predictive maintenance to ensure the normal operation of the sail system;

[0040] If it is a power system failure alarm mechanism, regularly check the operating status of the power system components through the second monitoring device. Once a failure is found, the system automatically diagnoses the cause of the failure and triggers the automatic repair mechanism.

[0041] In addition, the poisonous fuel poisoning risk mechanism for personnel also includes determining the diffusion range and direction of the poisonous fuel through the poisonous fuel anti-diffusion system, and the central processing unit outputs a control command to adjust the course of the sail-assisted ship to avoid the poisonous area.

[0042] Based on the above design concept, the present invention also provides a method for managing the operation safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, which is characterized in that the specific steps include:

[0043] S1. The data acquisition and analysis unit monitors multiple safety indicators during the operation of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship in real time, that is, obtains the ship operation safety data during the ship operation. The ship operation safety data is sample data obtained according to the following risk factor types, and the risk factor types at least include alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel poisoning risk factors for personnel, fuel pipeline and valve failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, and ship control system failure factors;

[0044] S2. The safety analysis and evaluation unit constructs a fault tree model. Through the fault tree model, each basic event combination affecting the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship is quantitatively identified;

[0045] S3. The operation safety warning unit uses the analytic hierarchy process to systematically evaluate the basic event combinations. By constructing a judgment matrix and calculating weights, the influence weights and comprehensive score values of each basic event on the ship operation safety are determined. Based on the established multi-dimensional warning threshold system, by real-time collecting and analyzing the ship operation safety data, it is determined whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger an alarm mechanism to ensure the safety of the ship operation;

[0046] S4. Through the operation safety prevention and control unit, the operation state of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship is controlled and corresponding emergency treatment measures are executed under the condition that the alarm mechanism is triggered, so as to effectively prevent and control potential safety hazards and ensure that the operation of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship is always in a safe and controlled state.

[0047] Implementing the embodiments of the present invention will have the following beneficial effects:

[0048] By combining fault tree analysis with the analytic hierarchy process, the present invention forms a comprehensive method of "fault tree identifying risks + analytic hierarchy process quantitative analysis + emergency control mechanism", which can timely discover and warn potential safety hazards and effectively prevent and control the potential safety hazards of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0049] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the following drawings are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, other drawings can also be obtained according to these drawings.

[0050] Among them:

[0051] Figure 1This is the example diagram of the implementation architecture corresponding to the system of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 2 This is the implementation flowchart of the operation safety management method for an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 3 The flowchart of the operation safety assessment for an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship based on the analytic hierarchy process. Detailed implementation manners

[0054] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the present invention.

[0055] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by those skilled in the technical field to which the present invention belongs. The terms used in the specification of the present invention herein are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present invention. It can be understood that the terms "first", "second", etc. used in the present invention can be used herein to describe various elements, but these elements are not limited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the first element from another element. For example, without departing from the scope of the present application, the first element can be called the second element, and similarly, the second element can be called the first element. Both the first element and the second element are elements, but they are not the same element.

[0056] In this embodiment, as Figures 1-3 shown, an operation safety management system for an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship is proposed, which is characterized by including:

[0057] A data acquisition and analysis unit, a safety analysis and evaluation unit, an operation safety warning unit, and an operation safety prevention and control unit;

[0058] Among them, the data acquisition and analysis unit is used to obtain the ship operation safety data during the ship operation through various types of sensors. The ship operation safety data is sample data obtained according to the following risk factor types, and the risk factor types at least include alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk factors, fuel pipeline and valve component failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, and ship control system failure factors;

[0059] The safety analysis and evaluation unit is used to construct a fault tree model, and through the fault tree model, quantitatively identify each basic event combination that affects the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship;

[0060] The operation safety early warning unit uses the analytic hierarchy process to systematically evaluate the basic event combinations. By constructing a judgment matrix and calculating weights, it determines the influence weights of each basic event on the ship operation safety and the comprehensive score value. Based on the established multi-dimensional early warning threshold system, by collecting and analyzing the ship operation safety data in real time, it determines whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger the alarm mechanism to ensure the safety of ship operation;

[0061] The operation safety prevention and control unit is used to control the operation state of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship and execute corresponding emergency treatment measures under the condition that the alarm mechanism is triggered.

[0062] In some specific embodiments, the data collection and analysis unit is used to obtain the ship operation safety data during the ship operation through various types of sensors. The ship operation safety data is sample data obtained according to the following risk factor types, and the risk factor types at least include alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk factors, fuel pipeline and valve component failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, ship control system failure factors; the data collection and analysis unit can real-time monitor the information of multiple safety factors during the ship operation through integrating multiple sensor technologies, including alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk factors, fuel pipeline and valve component failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, ship control system failure factors, etc., to prevent potential accidents and ensure the safety of ship operation.

[0063] Among them, regarding the configuration of various types of sensors: for alternative fuel fire risk, it can consider monitoring smoke concentration and temperature; for toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk, it can consider monitoring toxic gas concentration; for fuel pipeline and valve component failure, it can consider monitoring pressure and flow; for fuel monitoring system failure, it can consider monitoring fuel leakage volume and leakage rate, etc.; for sail system failure, it can consider monitoring wind speed, wind direction, sail attack angle; for power system failure, it can consider monitoring engine speed and power output; for ship control system failure, it can consider monitoring engine speed, fuel consumption, propeller torque, etc.

[0064] In some specific embodiments, considering the particularity of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, that is, it combines alternative fuel, sail assistance, and a hybrid power system. Therefore, its potential failure points may include aspects such as alternative fuel fire risk, risk of poisoning of personnel by toxic fuel, fuel pipeline and valve failures, fuel monitoring system failures, sail system failures, power system failures, ship control system failures, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate these different risk factors and use the fault tree method to determine the combination of risk factors that lead to the operational safety failures of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship;

[0065] Then, the safety analysis and evaluation unit designed based on the above design idea is used to construct a fault tree model. Through the fault tree model, the basic event combinations that affect the operational safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship are quantitatively identified; that is, through the fault tree analysis method, the operational safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship is comprehensively and systematically analyzed and evaluated. Specifically, the comprehensive and systematic analysis and evaluation through the fault tree is aimed at factors such as alternative fuel fire risk, risk of poisoning of personnel by toxic fuel, fuel pipeline and valve failures, fuel monitoring system failures, sail system failures, power system failures, ship control system failures, etc. A detailed fault tree model is constructed. This unit evaluates the occurrence probability of each event and its impact on the safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship by identifying and quantifying each basic event in the fault tree model, so as to determine the basic event combination that leads to the operational failures of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. Through this analysis, it is possible to clarify which fault events have a more significant impact on the safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, and transmit these analysis and evaluation results to the operational safety warning unit of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship for further monitoring and handling of potential safety hazards.

[0066] In some specific embodiments, the specific evaluation and analysis steps of the operational safety analysis and evaluation unit are as follows:

[0067] S11. Define the top event, that is, an event that seriously affects the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. Among them, the possible factors that cause the top event to occur include: alternative fuel fire risk (fire or explosion occurs in the fuel tank or pipeline of the sail-assisted ship), risk of poisoning of personnel by toxic fuel (crew members are poisoned due to exposure to toxic gases), fuel pipeline and valve failure (failure of the alternative fuel pipeline or valve of the sail-assisted ship), fuel monitoring system failure (the fuel of the sail-assisted ship cannot be effectively monitored and controlled), sail system failure (failure of the sail system of the sail-assisted ship), power system failure (failure of the power system of the sail-assisted ship), ship control system failure (failure of the control system function of the sail-assisted ship). If the top event is defined as "a major safety accident occurs during the ship operation, resulting in the inability to navigate normally", then it is necessary to quantitatively identify all intermediate events and basic events that may cause the top event in the subsequent steps;

[0068] S12. Establish a fault tree model to connect the basic events that may cause the top event to the top event using logic gates, so as to determine the logical relationship between each event, that is, construct a fault tree including all basic events that may trigger the top event and their logical relationships, which means that as long as any one of these events occurs, the top event will occur. For example, the two intermediate events of alternative fuel fire risk and risk of poisoning of personnel by toxic fuel are connected to the aforementioned top event through an OR gate, because the occurrence of any one of these events may lead to a major accident;

[0069] S13. When conducting quantitative analysis, it is also necessary to determine the occurrence probability of each basic event to more accurately evaluate the possibility of the top event occurring. For example, the occurrence probability of each basic event can be determined through historical data, expert evaluation, or failure rate statistics, etc. For example, collect historical data (maintenance records, accident reports, operation logs, etc.) on specific faults or events from the operation records of similar ships or systems, and based on the collected data, use statistical methods to calculate the failure rates of each basic event. For example, if a certain number of specific types of alternative fuel fires have occurred in the past period, then calculate the average occurrence frequency of this type of event. Another example is to let experts give personal estimated values of the occurrence probabilities of each basic event through a series of anonymous questionnaires or meetings. Then, synthesize the opinions of all experts to form a collective estimated value. Again, refer to existing engineering databases or industry standards and guidelines to find relevant failure rate statistical data. In this step, assign an occurrence probability value to each basic event as the basic data for subsequent sensitivity analysis;

[0070] S14. Conduct quantitative analysis: Create a calculation formula for the occurrence probability of the top event to calculate the occurrence probability of the top event, as shown in the following formula:

[0071] P ship= 1 - (1 - P1)×(1 - P2)×(1 - P3)×(1 - P4)×(1 - P5)×(1 - P6)×(1 - P7) (1)

[0072] In the formula, P ship represents the probability affecting the operation safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; P1 represents the risk of an alternative fuel fire; P2 represents the risk of poisoning of personnel by toxic fuel; P3 represents the probability of a fuel pipeline and valve component failure; P4 represents the probability of a fuel monitoring system failure; P5 represents the probability of a sail system failure; P6 represents the probability of a power system failure; P7 represents the probability of a ship control system failure; to help evaluate the risk level of the overall system and determine whether it is necessary to improve certain components or increase redundancy.

[0073] S15. Based on the occurrence probability calculation formula of the top event, through the sensitivity analysis method, the occurrence probabilities of each basic event in the fault tree model are adjusted one by one to determine the combination of basic events that lead to the operation safety failure of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. Through sensitivity analysis, the occurrence probabilities of each basic event in the fault tree model are adjusted one by one, and the change of the operation safety failure of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship is observed; at the same time, during the analysis process, focus on the event combinations with a greater impact on the failure rate, gradually exclude the events with a smaller impact on the failure rate, and finally determine the combination of basic events that lead to the failure of the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship.

[0074] The specific process of performing sensitivity analysis includes:

[0075] Adjust the occurrence probabilities of each basic event in the fault tree model one by one: fine-tune (increase or decrease) the occurrence probability of each basic event and evaluate its impact on the occurrence probability of the top event.

[0076] Among them, the steps for evaluating the impact on the occurrence probability of the top event are:

[0077] Based on the sensitivity analysis results, find the basic event or event combination with the greatest impact on the occurrence probability of the top event. This usually involves those events that can significantly change the probability of the top event even with a small change (pay attention to high-impact event combinations);

[0078] In some specific embodiments, the operation safety warning unit systematically evaluates the basic event combinations by using the analytic hierarchy process, and determines the influence weights and comprehensive score values of each basic event on the ship operation safety through constructing a judgment matrix and calculating weights; meanwhile, based on the established multi-dimensional warning threshold system, it determines whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger the alarm mechanism by collecting and analyzing the ship operation safety data in real time, so as to ensure the safety of ship operation; that is, this unit can, based on the detailed analysis results of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety analysis and evaluation unit, use the analytic hierarchy process to calculate the weights and impact evaluation scores of problems such as alternative fuel fire risk, toxic fuel poisoning risk for personnel, fuel pipeline and valve failure, fuel monitoring system failure, sail system failure, power system failure, ship control system failure, etc. for the key failure events, i.e., the basic event combinations, identified by the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety analysis and evaluation unit, and combine expert suggestions and safety level requirements to quantify the influence degree of these basic events on the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship and set reasonable warning thresholds to establish a multi-dimensional warning threshold system, and monitor the ship operation status in real time, so that the warning unit can quickly trigger the alarm mechanism when the risk reaches the potential danger level, notify the operator to take emergency measures in time, effectively prevent the further deterioration of potential safety hazards, and ensure the safety and stability of ship operation.

[0079] In some specific embodiments, the specific analysis steps of the operation safety warning unit are as follows:

[0080] S21. Based on the analytic hierarchy process, decompose the hierarchy structure of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety warning problem, establish the target layer as the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety warning, establish the criterion layer as the core risk factors, that is, the possible factors that cause the top event (including alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel poisoning risk factors for personnel, fuel pipeline and valve failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, ship control system failure factors, etc.), and incorporate its core influencing factors into the criterion layer to systematically and comprehensively identify and manage the key risk points of operation safety (referring to those core factors or events that have a significant impact on the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. These risk points may not only lead to ship operation failures but also trigger serious safety accidents (such as fire and explosion, personnel poisoning, etc.), so they need to be identified, monitored, and managed preferentially.

[0081] At the same time, establish the solution layer as the specific monitoring measures or management strategies corresponding to each key risk point (corresponding to the basic event combination), so that there are specific data indicators or countermeasures under each key risk point as the solution;

[0082] S22. Construct a judgment matrix for the operating safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, and the corresponding matrix expression is as follows:

[0083]

[0084] In the formula, a ij represents the relative importance between the core factors i and j that affect the operating safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. Among them, 1 < i < n - 1, 1 < j < n - 1, and n is the total number of core factors; the values of these relative importances are based on the results (basic event combinations) of the operating safety analysis and evaluation unit of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. By comparing the importance of each influencing factor pairwise and conducting expert scoring, the importance weights of each factor are determined. If the influencing degrees of factor i and factor j are the same, then this score can be set to 1. If factor i is slightly more important than factor j, then it is set to 3, and so on, where the maximum is extremely important and set to 9. That is, for the relative importance between each factor within the criterion layer and each emergency response measure, expert knowledge is used to construct a judgment matrix.

[0085] S23. Calculate the maximum eigenvalue λ ship of the judgment matrix A max for the operating safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship and its corresponding normalized eigenvector ω ship , and the corresponding mathematical relationship is:

[0086] A ship ·ω ship =λ max ·ω ship

[0087] In the formula, A ship represents the judgment matrix for the operating safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; λ max represents the maximum eigenvalue of the judgment matrix for the operating safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; ω ship represents the normalized eigenvector corresponding to the judgment matrix for the operating safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship;

[0088] S24. Conduct a consistency test, that is, calculate the consistency ratio of the judgment matrix according to the consistency index to determine the effectiveness of the weights. If CR ship < 0.1, it is considered that the judgment matrix for the operating safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship has good consistency and the weight calculation is effective; if CR ship ≥ 0.1, it is necessary to readjust the judgment matrix for the operating safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship and conduct expert scoring.

[0089]

[0090]

[0091] In the formula, CI ship represents the consistency index affecting the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; n1 represents the order of the judgment matrix for the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; CR ship represents the consistency ratio affecting the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; RI ship represents the random consistency index affecting the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship.

[0092] S25. According to the weights ω ship = [ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4…ω n of each influencing factor in the criterion layer mentioned in the foregoing steps, sum the evaluation scores of all influencing factors after weighting, and then obtain the comprehensive score of all influencing factors, so as to provide a comprehensive and objective comprehensive evaluation result.

[0093] S26. Based on the established multi-dimensional warning threshold system, by collecting and analyzing the ship operation safety data in real time, determine whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger the alarm mechanism, that is, trigger a warning or implement control measures. The multi-dimensional warning threshold system is established according to expert suggestions and safety level requirements to facilitate subsequent multi-dimensional data analysis and alarm judgment. In the multi-dimensional warning system, a set of alarm thresholds and key risk point attributes can be configured for each key risk point (referring to the set criterion layer) according to expert suggestions and safety level requirements to form a multi-dimensional warning system based on key risk point attributes. This system specifically includes a single-parameter threshold judgment sub-system, that is, if it is confirmed that the key risk point attribute is a directly triggered parameter attribute pre-configured and exceeds the corresponding threshold range, a first-level warning is directly triggered. For example, (the key risk point attribute is the concentration of toxic gas and the current concentration of toxic gas > the toxic gas concentration threshold) → trigger a first-level warning; this system also includes a multi-parameter correlation judgment sub-system, that is, if it is confirmed that at least two key risk point attributes are pre-configured parameter correlation attributes and both exceed the corresponding threshold range, a second-level warning is triggered. For example, for a certain set of data, the key risk point attribute corresponding to one of the data is temperature and the current temperature > the temperature threshold. If at the same time, the key risk point attribute corresponding to another data is the smoke concentration and the current smoke concentration > the smoke concentration threshold → trigger a second-level warning; among them, the safety level is an index for quantitatively grading the ship operation safety according to expert suggestions, industry standards or regulatory requirements. The safety level is usually used to evaluate the overall safety of the ship operation state and take corresponding measures (such as issuing an alarm, starting an emergency plan, etc.) according to the evaluation results. Therefore, specific analysis needs to be carried out according to specific situations.

[0094] In some specific embodiments, the operation safety warning unit is used to control the operation state of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship and execute corresponding emergency treatment measures under the condition that the alarm mechanism is triggered. Through the operation safety prevention and control unit, according to the analysis results provided by the operation safety warning unit, the effective prevention and control of potential safety hazards are realized. In order to achieve in-depth analysis of risk factors such as alternative fuel fire risk, toxic fuel poisoning risk for personnel, fuel pipeline and valve failure, fuel monitoring system failure, sail system failure, power system failure, ship control system failure, etc., and combined with real-time monitoring data and historical analysis results, the control system can dynamically adjust the safety prevention level to ensure that the operation of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship is always in a safe and controlled state.

[0095] Specifically, the operation safety prevention and control unit can, based on the analysis results of the operation safety early warning unit, enable the automatic fire extinguishing device controlled by the operation safety prevention and control unit to immediately respond when a fuel fire occurs, spray fire extinguishing materials to control the fire, and effectively reduce the fire risk; and through the toxic fuel anti-diffusion system, timely purify the leaked toxic fuel to prevent its diffusion, thereby reducing the risks of environmental pollution and personnel poisoning; use the electronic devices controlled by the operation safety prevention and control unit to regularly check the operation status of pipelines, valves, and power system components. Once a fault is detected, the system can automatically diagnose the cause of the fault and repair it; through the fault diagnosis and alarm system controlled by the operation safety prevention and control unit, it can analyze the cause of the fault in real time, record data, and timely remind the operator that a fault has occurred; in addition, the sail control detection system controlled by the operation safety prevention and control unit can accurately detect the fault location of the sail system and repair it in time to ensure the normal operation of the sail system; the power emergency control system controlled by the operation safety prevention and control unit can, when a fault occurs in the power system, implement emergency stop of the ship's power system, switch to standby equipment, etc., to prevent the fault from deteriorating further and ensure the basic safety of the ship; the emergency shutdown system controlled by the operation safety prevention and control unit can, when a fault occurs in the key ship control system, automatically stop the relevant equipment, automatically analyze the cause of the fault, and provide repair suggestions.

[0096] These operation safety management and control systems for alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships together construct a comprehensive operation safety management framework for alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships, aiming to ensure the safety and reliability of the operation of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships.

[0097] Among them, in addition to monitoring and controlling the operation status of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship in real time, the operation safety early warning unit can also execute corresponding emergency treatment measures under the condition that the alarm mechanism is triggered. The corresponding specific analysis steps are as follows:

[0098] Receive the early warning analysis results from the operation safety early warning unit, that is, the triggered alarm mechanism, and execute corresponding emergency treatment measures based on the type corresponding to the alarm mechanism;

[0099] In the case of an alternative fuel fire risk alarm mechanism, the automatic fire extinguishing device responds immediately when a fuel fire occurs and sprays fire extinguishing materials to control the fire, effectively reducing the fire risk. The automatic fire extinguishing device includes a fire detector, a fire extinguishing device, and auxiliary accessories such as corresponding pipeline valves. The automatic fire extinguishing device monitors the fire signals in the fuel tank and its surrounding areas in real time through fire detectors (such as smoke sensors, temperature sensors, or flame detectors). Once a fire is detected, the control center immediately starts the fire extinguishing procedure, triggers the fire extinguishing device (such as a dry powder, foam, or gas fire extinguishing system) to spray fire extinguishing materials, covering the fire source and suppressing combustion. At the same time, the system closes the relevant valves to cut off the fuel supply and starts the ventilation equipment to discharge toxic smoke, ensuring that the fire is quickly controlled, thereby effectively reducing the fire risk and ensuring the safety of the ship.

[0100] In the case of a poisoning risk alarm mechanism for toxic fuel personnel, the toxic fuel anti-diffusion system is used to promptly purify the leaked toxic fuel and prevent its diffusion, thereby reducing the risks of environmental pollution and personnel poisoning. The toxic fuel anti-diffusion system consists of highly sensitive gas sensors and pressure sensors deployed around the fuel tank and pipelines to form a dense monitoring network, as well as an emergency ventilation device. The highly sensitive gas sensors detect the concentration changes of toxic gases in real time and transmit the data to the central processing unit via wireless transmission. The central processing unit uses machine learning algorithms to analyze the sensor data in real time and combines gas diffusion models and sensor data fusion technologies to accurately locate the leakage source. At the same time, once a toxic gas leakage is detected, the system immediately starts the emergency ventilation device to guide the leaked gas to purification equipment (such as an activated carbon adsorption device or a catalytic oxidation device) for efficient filtration and decomposition, ensuring that the toxic gas does not spread to the crew's activity area or the external environment. In addition, the toxic fuel anti-diffusion system determines the diffusion range and direction of the toxic fuel, and the central processing unit outputs a control command to adjust the course of the sail-assisted ship to avoid the toxic area.

[0101] In the case of a fuel pipeline and valve component failure alarm mechanism, the monitoring equipment regularly checks the operating status of the fuel pipelines and valve components at key positions. Once a failure is detected, the system collects the operating data in real time through an integrated sensor network (pressure, flow, vibration, and temperature sensors, etc.) and transmits it to the control center, i.e., the central processing unit. The control center uses machine learning algorithms (such as failure mode recognition or deep learning models) to automatically diagnose the cause of the failure and perform repairs. The automatically diagnosed causes of the failure include pipeline blockage, valve failure, etc. That is, once a failure is detected, the system triggers an automated repair mechanism, such as adjusting the flow rate by controlling the valve and starting the standby pipeline.

[0102] For the fuel monitoring system fault alarm mechanism, through the alternative fuel leakage control system, the leakage location of the alternative fuel is monitored in real time, and the leakage point is quickly repaired. Among them, the alternative fuel leakage control system is various types of sensors and automatic valves deployed at the key nodes of the fuel system. For example, pressure sensors, flow sensors, gas sensors, and temperature sensors are arranged at the key nodes of the fuel system to collect fuel pressure, flow, gas concentration, and temperature data in real time, and the leakage location is accurately located through data fusion algorithms (clustering analysis, fuzzy logic, SVM). Once a leakage is detected, the alternative fuel leakage control system immediately activates the automatic valve control to close the valves near the leakage point to isolate the leakage area, and at the same time triggers the emergency repair device or notifies the operator to quickly block the leakage point, that is, real-time monitoring and rapid repair are achieved through a variety of sensor fusion technologies and automated repair mechanisms.

[0103] For the sail system fault alarm mechanism, the fault location of the sail system is accurately detected through the sail control detection system, and repaired in time to ensure the normal operation of the sail assistance function. The sail control detection system includes arranging multiple sensors at key parts of the sail to collect operation data in real time and transmit it to the control center. The control center analyzes the data using signal processing and machine learning algorithms, extracts fault features, and diagnoses the fault type and location. Then, the fault location is accurately located through the multi-point sensor data fusion method, and its severity is evaluated. Subsequently, the automated repair mechanism is activated or the backup system is switched. Finally, the control center monitors the repair effect in real time and records the data, and at the same time uses historical data for predictive maintenance to ensure the normal operation of the sail system.

[0104] For the power system fault alarm mechanism, the operating status of the power system components is regularly checked through monitoring equipment. Once a fault is found, the system automatically diagnoses the cause of the fault (such as abnormal power output), triggers the automated repair mechanism, and even calls a maintenance robot for precise repair.

[0105] For the ship control system fault alarm mechanism, through the emergency shutdown system, when a fault occurs in the key ship control system, it can automatically stop the relevant equipment, automatically analyze the cause of the fault and provide repair suggestions, and call a maintenance robot or automated equipment to replace or repair the faulty hardware of the ship control system. In summary, the operation safety prevention and control mechanism of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship can ensure the safety and reliability of the operation of the entire alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship.

[0106] Based on the above design idea, the present invention also provides a method for managing the operation safety of an alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, which is characterized in that the specific steps include:

[0107] S1. The data acquisition and analysis unit monitors in real time multiple safety indicators during the operation of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, that is, obtains the ship operation safety data during the ship operation. The ship operation safety data is sample data obtained according to the following risk factor types, and the risk factor types at least include alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel poisoning risk factors for personnel, fuel pipeline and valve failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, and ship control system failure factors;

[0108] S2. The safety analysis and evaluation unit constructs a fault tree model. Through the fault tree model, it quantitatively identifies each basic event combination that affects the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship, that is, identifies the basic events that have a more significant impact on the operation safety of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship;

[0109] S3. The operation safety warning unit systematically evaluates the basic event combination by using the analytic hierarchy process, and determines the influence weight and comprehensive score value of each basic event on the ship operation safety through constructing a judgment matrix and calculating weights. Based on the established multi-dimensional warning threshold system, by collecting and analyzing the ship operation safety data in real time, it determines whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger the alarm mechanism to ensure the safety of the ship operation; that is, it uses the analytic hierarchy process to monitor problems such as alternative fuel fire risk, toxic fuel poisoning risk for personnel, fuel pipeline and valve failure, fuel monitoring system failure, sail system failure, power system failure, and ship control system failure of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship. According to the suggestions of experts and the requirements of the safety level, when the comprehensive score value of all influencing factors calculated is lower than the set safety level, the system will immediately issue an alarm, so as to timely discover and warn potential safety hazards. This real-time monitoring and alarm mechanism ensures that when any abnormal situation is detected, it can respond quickly and take necessary measures to ensure the safety of the ship operation;

[0110] S4. The operation safety prevention and control unit controls the operation state of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship and executes corresponding emergency treatment measures under the condition that the alarm mechanism is triggered, so as to effectively prevent and control potential safety hazards and ensure that the operation of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship is always in a safe and controlled state.

[0111] Implementing the embodiments of the present invention will have the following beneficial effects:

[0112] The present invention solves the problem of the operation safety management of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships, and is particularly suitable for the safety management of complex systems (such as hybrid ships). By combining fault tree analysis with the analytic hierarchy process, the present invention forms a comprehensive method of "fault tree identifying risks + analytic hierarchy process for quantitative analysis + dynamic emergency control strategy", which can timely detect and warn potential safety hazards, and effectively prevent and control the potential safety hazards of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships, thereby providing guidance for the safety management of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships on actual ships. The present invention not only helps to achieve the safety management of ship operation, but also provides new scheme support for the low-carbon development of the global shipping industry.

[0113] The above embodiments merely represent several implementation manners of the present application, and the description thereof is relatively specific and detailed, but should not be construed as a limitation on the scope of the patent of the present application. It should be noted that for those of ordinary skill in the art, without departing from the concept of the present application, several modifications and improvements can still be made, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of the present application shall be subject to the appended claims.

Claims

1. An alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety management system, characterized in that: include: Data collection and analysis unit, safety analysis and evaluation unit, operation safety early warning unit, and operation safety prevention and control unit; Among them, the data acquisition and analysis unit is used to obtain ship operation safety data during the operation of the ship through various types of sensors, and the ship operation safety data is sample data obtained according to the following risk factor types, and the risk factor types at least include alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk factors, fuel pipeline and valve failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, and ship control system failure factors; A safety analysis and evaluation unit, which is used to construct a fault tree model, through which various basic event combinations that affect the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships are quantitatively identified; The operation safety warning unit systematically evaluates the basic event combination by using the hierarchical analysis method, and determines the impact weight and comprehensive score of each basic event on the ship operation safety by constructing a judgment matrix and weight calculation; and based on the established multi-dimensional warning threshold system, through real-time collection and analysis of ship operation safety data, determines whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger the alarm mechanism to ensure the safety of ship operation; An operation safety prevention and control unit is used to control the operation state of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid power ship and execute corresponding emergency treatment measures when the alarm mechanism is triggered.

2. The alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety management system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific evaluation and analysis steps of the operation safety analysis and evaluation unit are as follows: S11. Define top events, i.e. events that seriously affect the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships; possible factors that may cause top events include: alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk factors, fuel pipeline and valve failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, and ship control system failure factors; S12, establishing a fault tree model to connect basic events that may cause top events to the top events using logic gates to determine the logical relationship between various events, that is, to construct a fault tree including all basic events that may cause top events and their logical relationships; S13. Determine the probability of occurrence of each basic event; S14. Perform quantitative analysis: Create a top event probability calculation formula to calculate the top event probability, as shown in the following formula: P ship =1-(1-P1)×(1-P2)×(1-P3)×(1-P4)×(1-P5)×(1-P6)×(1-P7) (1) Where P ship It indicates the probability of affecting the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships; P1 indicates the probability of alternative fuel fire risk; P2 indicates the probability of toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk; P3 indicates the probability of fuel pipeline and valve failure; P4 indicates the probability of fuel monitoring system failure; P5 indicates the probability of sail system failure; P6 indicates the probability of power system failure; P7 indicates the probability of ship control system failure; S15. Based on the probability calculation formula of the top event, the probability of occurrence of each basic event in the fault tree model is adjusted one by one through the sensitivity analysis method to determine the basic event combination that leads to the safety failure of the operation of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship.

3. The alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety management system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific analysis steps of the operation safety early warning unit are as follows: S21. Based on the analytic hierarchy process, the problem of safety warning of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation is decomposed into a hierarchical structure, and the target layer is established as the safety warning of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation, and the criterion layer is established as the core risk factors, that is, the possible factors that may cause the top events mentioned above, and their core influencing factors are included in the criterion layer to identify key risk points; At the same time, the solution layer is established as the specific monitoring measures or management strategies corresponding to each key risk point, so that each key risk point has specific data indicators or response measures as a solution; S22. Construct a judgment matrix for the operation safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships. The corresponding matrix expression is as follows: In the formula, a ij Indicates the relative importance between the core factors i and j that affect the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships, so as to determine the importance weight of each factor, where 1<i<n-1, 1<j<n-1, and n is the total number of core factors; S23. Calculate the judgment matrix A of the operation safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship by eigenvector method ship The maximum eigenvalue λ max and its corresponding normalized eigenvector ω ship , the corresponding mathematical relationship is: A ship ·oh ship =λ max ·oh ship In the formula, A ship represents the judgment matrix of the operation safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship; max The maximum eigenvalue of the judgment matrix representing the safety of operation of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships; ω ship The normalized eigenvector corresponding to the judgment matrix representing the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships; S24, perform consistency check, that is, calculate the consistency ratio of the judgment matrix according to the consistency index, determine the validity of the importance weight, if CR ship <0.1, it is considered that the judgment matrix of the safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation is consistent and the weight calculation is effective; if CR ship ≥0.1, it is necessary to readjust the judgment matrix of the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships and conduct expert scoring; In the formula, CI ship represents the consistency index that affects the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships; n1 represents the order of the judgment matrix of the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships; CR ship Represents the consistency ratio that affects the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships; RI ship It represents the random consistency index that affects the operational safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships; S25, according to the weight ω of each influencing factor in the criterion layer mentioned in the previous step ship =[ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4…ω n ], weighted sum of the evaluation scores of all influencing factors, and then obtain the comprehensive score of all influencing factors; S26. Based on the established multi-dimensional warning threshold system, through real-time collection and analysis of ship operation safety data, determine whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger an alarm mechanism, that is, trigger a warning or implement control measures.

4. The alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety management system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The operation safety early warning unit executes corresponding emergency treatment measures when the alarm mechanism is triggered. The corresponding specific analysis steps are as follows: Receiving the warning analysis result from the operation safety warning unit, i.e. the triggered alarm mechanism, and executing corresponding emergency treatment measures based on the type corresponding to the alarm mechanism; If it is an alternative fuel fire risk alarm mechanism, the automatic fire extinguishing device will respond immediately when a fuel fire occurs and spray fire extinguishing materials to control the fire; If it is a toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk alarm mechanism, the toxic fuel non-proliferation mechanism will be triggered, and the leaked toxic fuel will be purified through the toxic fuel non-proliferation system; If it is a fuel line and valve fault alarm mechanism, the operating status of the fuel line and valves at key locations is regularly checked through the integrated sensor network of the monitoring equipment. If a fault is found, the operating data is collected in real time and transmitted to the control center, i.e. the central processing unit. The control center uses machine learning algorithms to automatically diagnose the cause of the fault and trigger an automated repair mechanism; If it is a fuel monitoring system failure alarm mechanism, the alternative fuel leakage control system is used to monitor the leakage location of the alternative fuel in real time and repair the leakage; If it is a sail system fault alarm mechanism, the sail control detection system will detect the faulty part of the sail system and start the automatic repair mechanism or switch to the backup system; at the same time, the control center will monitor the repair effect in real time and record the data, and use historical data for predictive maintenance to ensure the normal operation of the sail system; If it is a power system fault alarm mechanism, the operating status of the power system components will be checked regularly through monitoring equipment. Once a fault is found, the system will automatically diagnose the cause of the fault and trigger an automatic repair mechanism.

5. The alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship operation safety management system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The toxic fuel diffusion prevention mechanism includes determining the diffusion range and direction of the toxic fuel through a toxic fuel diffusion prevention system, and the central processing unit outputs a control command to adjust the course of the sail-assisted navigation ship to avoid the toxic area.

6. A method for safe operation management of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ship based on the system according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The specific steps include: S1. Real-time monitoring of multiple safety indicators during the operation of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships by a data acquisition and analysis unit, i.e., obtaining ship operation safety data during the operation of the ship, wherein the ship operation safety data is sample data obtained according to the following risk factor types, wherein the risk factor types at least include alternative fuel fire risk factors, toxic fuel personnel poisoning risk factors, fuel pipeline and valve failure factors, fuel monitoring system failure factors, sail system failure factors, power system failure factors, and ship control system failure factors; S2. constructing a fault tree model through a safety analysis and evaluation unit, and quantitatively identifying various basic event combinations that affect the operation safety of alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid ships through the fault tree model; S3. The operation safety warning unit uses the hierarchical analysis method to systematically evaluate the basic event combination, and determines the impact weight and comprehensive score of each basic event on the ship operation safety by constructing a judgment matrix and weight calculation. Based on the established multi-dimensional warning threshold system, it collects and analyzes the ship operation safety data in real time to determine whether the current ship operation safety data needs to trigger the alarm mechanism; S4. By operating the safety prevention and control unit, the operating state of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid power ship is controlled and corresponding emergency treatment measures are executed under the condition of triggering the alarm mechanism, so as to achieve effective prevention and control of potential safety hazards and ensure that the operation of the alternative fuel sail-assisted hybrid power ship is always in a safe and controlled state.

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