Consumer-centered interactive electricity price setting method for electricity retail market

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of electricity market price determination, and particularly relates to a consumer-centered electricity retail market interactive electricity price setting method. A power transaction process is divided into two stages before power utilization and after power utilization is finished, a power retailer and a consumer firstly perform respective quotation before power utilization is started, the power retailer interacts with the consumer, and the consumer plans a response protocol load according to quotation information of the power retailer obtained through interaction, so that the power transaction process is completed. The relationship between the consumer and the retailer is truly reflected; and after the electricity utilization is finished, forming a cooperative electricity price according to the contributions of the two parties to the social benefits, and determining an actual electricity price used during settlement based on the cooperative electricity price. According to the invention, consumers become active participants of the retail market, the problem that electricity sellers forcibly carry out price management is solved, the formulated electricity price can reflect real supply and demand conditions, benefits between the consumers and retailers are balanced, and stable development of the electricity retail market is promoted.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of electricity market price determination, and particularly relates to an interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market centered on consumers. Background Art

[0002] The change in the energy structure has promoted the development of the electricity market, making the electricity retail market more complex and diversified. The electricity retail market has begun to shift from centralized bidding to bilateral negotiation transactions. Bilateral transactions guide the behavior of the demand side through reasonable price signals, which is not only related to the equilibrium of the electricity market, but also crucial for efficiently and fairly passing on the electricity wholesale cost to consumers. In most existing retail markets, consumers are usually introduced into the retail electricity price mechanism in the form of demand response. They do not directly participate in the process of electricity price formation, but the electricity price is formed by the electricity seller and the grid operator in the market or formulated by the government according to the market situation. When guiding users to carry out demand response, some studies take the electricity consumption cost and comfort of consumers as optimization goals to encourage consumers to participate in demand response. There are also studies that have proposed a price response operation model, which can minimize the net cost of energy use while meeting the comfort of occupants. In order to better motivate consumers to actively respond, more studies have begun to explore the relationship between demand and electricity price changes, and proposed a time-varying demand price elasticity estimation algorithm based on the impact of price on time-varying electricity demand behavior, and evaluated the energy consumption behavior of consumers at different prices by learning the price elasticity.

[0003] The above studies have different focuses. Therefore, in order to more comprehensively measure the benefits and behaviors of consumers, meet the needs of different parties, and achieve a multi-satisfactory result, recent research has proposed using a multi-objective optimization method to formulate electricity prices and conduct transactions based on the formulated electricity prices. For example, from the perspectives of comfort and economy, the comprehensive consumption satisfaction of consumers is quantified, and a game model between consumers and retailers is constructed. The model is solved with the goal of maximizing the retailer's profit and consumer satisfaction to obtain the corresponding electricity price. In this model, consumers and retailers are in a competitive relationship, and retailers play a dominant role in electricity price formulation. Or a non-cooperative model is used to simulate the competitive relationship between retailers and consumers, and a Stackelberg model between retailers and consumers is constructed to simulate the two-way interaction between retailers and consumers. However, in this model, the relationship between retailers and consumers as leaders and followers is an asymmetric competitive relationship, and retailers are in the dominant position of leaders. In the above studies, the modeling of consumers is insufficient, and the interaction between consumers and retailers cannot be truly reflected. When the response of consumers to price signals fails to meet the expectations of retailers, retailers, as leaders, will set too high or too low prices, resulting in price distortion and preventing prices from reflecting the true demand and supply in the retail market, affecting the stability of the retail market. With the development of bilateral transactions in the electricity retail market, consumers have become the main body that must be considered in the retail electricity price mechanism. The way consumers participate in the process of formulating retail electricity prices is crucial. Only by providing consumers with reasonable prices and convenient electricity supply can consumers change their consumption patterns and behaviors. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The object of the present invention is to provide an interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market centered on consumers, so as to solve the problems of insufficient consumer modeling and price distortion existing in the formulation of electricity prices in the existing electricity retail market.

[0005] The present invention provides an interactive electricity price formulation method for the power retail market centered around consumers to solve the above technical problems, including: taking the i-th hour of the t-th day as the current moment. Before the electricity consumption starts at this moment, determine the electricity retailer's offer at this moment according to the electricity retailer model, and determine the consumer's offer at this moment according to the consumer model. Among them, the electricity retailer model is used to describe the relationship between the electricity retailer's offer at this moment, the wholesale electricity price at this moment, the electricity sales profit of the electricity retailer at the previous moment, and the deviation degree of the offer at the previous moment; the consumer model is used to describe the relationship between the consumer's offer at this moment, the consumer's electricity consumption cost at the previous moment, the compensation for the agreed load at this moment, and the consumer's satisfaction at the previous moment; the agreed load is the planned response load determined by the consumer according to the change of the electricity retailer's offer at this moment; the previous moment refers to the (i - 1)-th hour of the t-th day. After the electricity consumption ends at this moment, obtain the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at this moment, and determine the cooperative electricity price at this moment according to the proportions of the electricity retailer and the consumer contributing to the total social benefits at this moment, the electricity retailer's offer and the consumer's offer at this moment; the social benefit of the electricity retailer is determined based on the carbon intensity, and the social benefit of the consumer is determined based on the peak-to-average ratio of the consumer's actual electricity consumption load. Determine the actual electricity price at this moment during settlement based on the cooperative electricity price.

[0006] Further, the process of determining the actual electricity price at this moment during settlement based on the cooperative electricity price is as follows: taking the goal of simultaneously satisfying the consumer's satisfaction and maximizing the electricity retailer's profit at this moment, and taking the profit range of the electricity retailer at this moment, the consumer response degree at this moment, and the consumer satisfaction range at this moment as constraint conditions for goal optimization, obtain the optimized electricity price at this moment, and determine the actual electricity price at this moment during settlement based on the optimized electricity price and the cooperative electricity price at this moment; the consumer satisfaction includes the consumer's satisfaction with the electricity price and the consumer's satisfaction with the electricity consumption.

[0007] Further, the cooperative electricity price at this moment is determined according to the following calculation formula:

[0008]

[0009] Wherein, is the cooperative electricity price at this moment, is the social benefit of the electricity retailer at this moment, is the social benefit of the consumer at this moment, is the total social benefit at this moment, is the consumer's offer at this moment, is the electricity retailer's offer at this moment; the total social benefit at this moment is the sum of the social benefit of the electricity retailer at this moment and the social benefit of the consumer at this moment.

[0010] Further, the consumer model is:

[0011]

[0012] Among them, is the consumer quotation at this moment, is the consumer electricity bill at the previous moment, is the actual electricity load of the consumer at the previous moment, is the agreed load at this moment, is the electricity load of the consumer at this moment without any intervention of the electricity price mechanism, is the actual electricity price at the previous moment, is the consumer satisfaction at the previous moment, is the consumer satisfaction at the i-2th hour of the tth day, is the consumer quotation at the previous moment, is the planned response coefficient at this moment.

[0013] Furthermore, the electricity retailer model is:

[0014]

[0015] Among them, is the electricity retailer quotation at this moment, is the electricity retailer quotation at the previous moment, is the electricity selling profit of the electricity retailer at the previous moment, is the actual electricity load of the consumer at the previous moment, is the wholesale electricity price at this moment, is the actual electricity price at the previous moment.

[0016] Furthermore, the constraint condition of the consumer response degree at this moment refers to: the planned response coefficient and the actual response coefficient of the consumer at this moment are greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to the maximum response potential; among them, the planned response coefficient is used to represent the planned response degree of the consumer to the change of the electricity retailer quotation at this moment, the larger the planned response coefficient, the less the electricity load planned by the consumer; the actual response coefficient is used to represent the actual response degree of the consumer according to its own quotation and the electricity retailer quotation, the larger the actual response coefficient, the less the actual electricity load of the consumer.

[0017] Furthermore, the planned response coefficient is calculated according to the following formula:

[0018]

[0019] Among them, is the planned response coefficient at this moment, is the electricity retailer quotation at this moment, is the planned response coefficient at the previous moment, is the electricity retailer's quotation at the previous moment.

[0020] Further, the actual response coefficient is calculated according to the following formula:

[0021]

[0022] where, is the actual response coefficient at this moment, is the consumer's quotation at this moment, is the electricity retailer's quotation at this moment, is the planned response coefficient at this moment.

[0023] Further, the constraint condition of the electricity retailer's profit range at this moment refers to:

[0024]

[0025] where, is the electricity sales profit of the electricity retailer at this moment, λ is a multiple, is the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at this moment, is the actual electricity price at this moment.

[0026] Further, the consumer's electricity bill is calculated according to the following formula:

[0027]

[0028] where, is the consumer's electricity bill at this moment, is the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at this moment, is the actual electricity price at this moment, α is the percentage increase in the electricity price for the excess part when exceeding the agreed load, is the agreed load at this moment.

[0029] The beneficial effects of the above technical solution are as follows: The present invention is an exploratory invention. The electricity trading process is divided into two stages: before the start of electricity consumption and after the end of electricity consumption. Before the start of electricity consumption, both the electricity retailer and the consumer make their respective offers. Among them, the electricity retailer makes an offer based on historical profits, current costs, and offer deviations, and the electricity retailer interacts with the consumer. The consumer plans the protocol load that can be responded to according to the offer information of the electricity retailer obtained from the interaction. The model is more comprehensive and truly reflects the relationship between the consumer and the retailer. The current offer is determined based on the response compensation obtained from the protocol load, historical electricity costs, and satisfaction; after the end of electricity consumption, a cooperative electricity price is formed based on the contributions made by both parties to social benefits, and the actual electricity price used for settlement is determined based on the cooperative electricity price. By formulating the trading electricity price through non-cooperative games before electricity consumption and cooperative games after electricity consumption, consumers become active participants in the retail market, weakening the retailer's dominant control over prices, solving the problem of the electricity seller's forced price management, and the formulated electricity price can reflect the real supply and demand situation, balance the interests between consumers and retailers, and promote the stable development of the electricity retail market. Description of the Drawings

[0030] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the principle of electricity price formulation in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0031] Figure 2 It is a curve graph of the change of electricity price under different satisfaction constraints in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0032] Figure 3 It is a curve graph of the change of load under different satisfaction constraints in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0033] Figure 4 It is a change graph of each index under different satisfaction constraints in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0034] Figure 5 It is a change graph of each index under different profit constraints in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 6 It is a change graph of each index under different maximum response potentials in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0036] Figure 7 It is a change graph of electricity price under different price mechanisms in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 8 It is a change graph of the consumer bill under different price mechanisms in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 9 It is a change graph of the profit of the electricity retailer under different price mechanisms in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 10 It is a graph showing the change in the consumer bill for a part of an hour in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 11 It is a graph showing the change in the profit of the electricity retailer for a part of an hour in the method embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 12 It is a graph showing the change in the social benefit for a part of an hour in the method embodiment of the present invention. Detailed implementation manner

[0042] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the following further explains the detailed implementation manner of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0043] The present invention proposes a trading mode of calculating the electricity price for settlement after using electricity first, defines the relationship between consumers and retailers as a relationship of competition and cooperation, exchanges information through quotes, comprehensively measures the benefits of consumers from the electricity price response willingness, demand and satisfaction of consumers, forms a cooperative electricity price based on interactive two-way quotes and the contributions made by both parties to the social benefit respectively, weakens the dominant control of retailers over prices, enables consumers to become active participants in the retail market, and enables the electricity price to adapt to the development and changes of the electricity market and reflect the real supply and demand relationship.

[0044] Method embodiment

[0045] An interactive electricity price formulation method for an electricity retail market centered on consumers according to the present invention, and the implementation principle of this method is as Figure 1 shown, and the following is a detailed description.

[0046] 1. Taking the i-th hour of the t-th day as this moment, before the electricity consumption starts at this moment, determine the electricity retailer's quote at this moment according to the electricity retailer model, and determine the consumer's quote at this moment according to the consumer model. The i-th hour represents the i-th quotation period, and dynamic quotations can be made every hour, or every 2 hours, 3 hours, etc., and there is no limit here.

[0047] 1) Electricity retailer model.

[0048] The electricity retailer model is used to describe the relationship between the electricity retailer's quote at this moment, the wholesale electricity price at this moment, the electricity sales profit of the electricity retailer at the previous moment, and the degree of deviation of the previous moment's quote. When modeling the electricity retailer, two variables are mainly considered: quote and profit. Specifically, before the electricity consumption starts at this moment, the electricity retailer needs to make a quote based on the actual electricity price at the previous moment, the electricity sales profit at the previous moment, the wholesale electricity price at this moment, and the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at the previous moment, so as to obtain the electricity retailer's quote at this moment.

[0049] Taking the i-th hour of the t-th day as the current moment and the (i - 1)-th hour of the t-th day as the previous moment, the electricity retailer model is as follows:

[0050]

[0051] Among them, is the electricity retailer's offer at the current moment, is the electricity retailer's offer at the previous moment, is the electricity sales profit of the electricity retailer at the previous moment, is the actual electricity consumption load of consumers at the previous moment, is the wholesale electricity price at the current moment, is the actual electricity price at the previous moment.

[0052] The electricity retailer's offer should reflect its profit and cost. Therefore, the first term in formula (1) represents the profit obtained by the retailer for each degree of electricity sold at the previous moment, the second term is the cost of each degree of electricity at the current moment, and the last term is defined as the degree of deviation of the previous moment's offer. It is used as the adjusted electricity price to reflect the deviation degree of the previous round of offer. If it is negative, it means the price was set too high at the previous moment; if it is positive, it means the offer was set too low at the previous moment. The offer at the current moment is adjusted through this term.

[0053] The profit of the electricity retailer is the electricity sales revenue minus the electricity purchase cost, which is defined as follows:

[0054]

[0055] Among them, is the electricity sales profit of the electricity retailer at the current moment, is the electricity bill of consumers at the current moment, is the wholesale electricity price at the current moment, is the actual electricity consumption load of consumers at the current moment.

[0056] In order to achieve market supervision and maintain market balance, the profit of the retailer is regulated, and the maximum cannot exceed λ times the transmission and distribution electricity price. The range is as follows:

[0057]

[0058] Among them, λ is the multiple, is the actual electricity price at the current moment.

[0059] 2) Consumer model.

[0060] The consumer model is used to describe the relationship between the consumer's offer at this moment and the consumer's electricity cost at the previous moment, the compensation for the agreed load at this moment, and the consumer's satisfaction at the previous moment. In this invention, the consumer is placed in a relatively dominant position. After the electricity retailer gives an offer, the consumer will make corresponding responses based on the retailer's price signal and give the expected response load and price. Among them, the consumer's load is divided into fixed load and responsive load. The fixed load represents the load that the consumer must use, such as non-transferable loads like refrigerators. The retailer must ensure the stable supply of this part of the load. In this invention, the fixed load does not participate in the response. The consumer determines the planned response load, that is, the agreed load, according to the change in the electricity retailer's offer. The consumer can adjust the responsive agreed load by changing the electricity consumption behavior.

[0061] Before the consumer gives an offer, first calculate the agreed load that can be responded to at this moment by referring to the incentive-based demand response in demand response. Assume that the consumer has a certain response potential, which is represented by the maximum response potential parameter of the consumer at this moment. Use the planned response coefficient to represent the degree of the consumer's planned response to the change in the electricity retailer's offer. The larger the planned response coefficient, the more electricity load the consumer saves, and the less electricity load the consumer plans to use. When it indicates that the current electricity supply is greater than the demand, and the response coefficient should be reduced; when it indicates that the current electricity supply is less than the demand, and the consumer needs to actively respond to increase the response coefficient. This invention uses the planned response change parameter to represent the change of the planned response coefficient with the retailer's offer:

[0062]

[0063] Among them, is the planned response change parameter of the consumer at this moment.

[0064] At this time, the planned response coefficient at this moment is expressed as:

[0065]

[0066] The range constraint of the actual response load is expressed by the following formula:

[0067]

[0068] Under this planned response coefficient, calculate the agreed load at this moment:

[0069]

[0070] Among them, is the agreed load at this moment, The consumer's electricity consumption load at this moment without any intervention of the electricity price mechanism.

[0071] A consumer model is constructed based on the consumer's electricity cost at the previous moment, the compensation for the agreed load at this moment, and the consumer's satisfaction at the previous moment:

[0072]

[0073] Among them, is the consumer's quotation at this moment, is the consumer's electricity bill at the previous moment, is the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at the previous moment, is the actual electricity price at the previous moment, is the consumer's satisfaction at the previous moment, is the consumer's satisfaction at the i-2th hour of the t-th day, is the consumer's quotation at the previous moment. In formula (8), the first term represents the price actually spent by the consumer per degree of electricity at the previous moment, that is, the electricity cost; the second term represents the increase or decrease in the electricity price that the consumer should make according to the agreement response, that is, the compensation for participating in the response; the third term is the adjustment of the electricity price based on the consumer's satisfaction at the previous moment.

[0074] In order to ensure the consumer's electricity consumption comfort level, the present invention does not enforce the agreed load, which reflects the cooperative relationship between the consumer and the retailer. The consumer gives the retailer a certain electricity consumption guarantee to establish cooperation between the two parties. After the electricity consumption at this moment ends, the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at this moment is obtained as The actual electricity consumption load of the consumer is related to the quotations of both parties. The actual response coefficient is used to represent the actual response degree of the consumer's electricity consumption. The larger the actual response coefficient, the less the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer. The actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at this moment can be expressed as:

[0075]

[0076] Among them, is the actual response coefficient at this moment.

[0077] When the consumer's quotation is lower than the retailer's quotation, it implies that the electricity fee that the consumer is willing to pay decreases. At this time, the actual response coefficient of the consumer increases to save electricity fees. When the consumer's quotation is higher than the retailer's quotation, the consumer no longer minds paying a part of the electricity fee more. At this time, the actual response coefficient of the consumer will decrease. The present invention uses the actual response change parameter to represent the change relationship of the actual response coefficient with the consumer's quotation and the electricity retailer's quotation:

[0078]

[0079] The range constraint of the actual response load is expressed by the following formula:

[0080]

[0081] If the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer exceeds the agreed load, the consumer defaults, and the charging standard for the excess part is increased, rising by a percentage α of the electricity price:

[0082]

[0083] The electricity bill of the consumer is calculated according to the following formula:

[0084]

[0085] Among them, is the electricity bill of the consumer at this moment, is the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at this moment, is the actual electricity price at this moment, and α is the percentage increase in the electricity price for the excess part when the agreed load is exceeded.

[0086] Consumer satisfaction includes the degree of satisfaction of the consumer with the electricity price and / or the degree of satisfaction of the consumer with electricity consumption. The degree of satisfaction of the consumer with the electricity price is defined based on the difference between the electricity bill actually paid by the consumer and the electricity bill paid before the demand response:

[0087]

[0088] Among them, is the satisfaction degree of the consumer with the electricity price at this moment, is the electricity bill of the consumer at this moment without any intervention of the electricity price mechanism. The larger the numerator, the less electricity bill is paid compared with before, and the higher the satisfaction degree with the electricity price.

[0089] The degree of satisfaction of the consumer with electricity consumption is defined based on the difference between the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer and the most comfortable electricity consumption load (i.e., the electricity consumption load of the consumer without any intervention of the electricity price mechanism):

[0090]

[0091] Among them, is the satisfaction degree of the consumer with electricity consumption at this moment. When the difference between the two is larger, it indicates that the consumer sacrifices part of the electricity consumption comfort, so the satisfaction degree decreases at this time.

[0092] Preferably, the consumer satisfaction combines the degree of satisfaction of the consumer with the electricity price and the degree of satisfaction of the consumer with electricity consumption, and combines the electricity consumption comfort and the price satisfaction degree in a weighted average manner:

[0093]

[0094] 2. After the electricity consumption at this moment ends, determine the cooperative electricity price at this moment.

[0095] The relationship between the electricity retailer and the consumer is usually regarded as a principal-agent game structure similar to an oligopoly model. In order to make the consumer active instead of passive in the electricity market, this invention uses cooperative game to determine the cooperative electricity price. Considering that the consumer and the electricity retailer have a common goal at a higher level, that is, social benefits, and the smaller the social benefits, the better. Therefore, after the electricity consumption at this moment ends, determine the cooperative electricity price at this moment according to the proportion of the contributions made by the electricity retailer and the consumer to the total social benefits at this moment, the electricity retailer's quotation and the consumer's quotation at this moment.

[0096] 1) Determine the social benefits of the consumer based on the peak-to-average ratio of electricity load.

[0097] For the consumer, a lower peak-to-average ratio of the electricity consumption curve can result in more stable electricity consumption and relieve the peak power supply pressure of the power system, which is the contribution made by the consumer to social benefits. Therefore, this invention uses the peak-to-average ratio of the actual electricity load of the consumer to measure the social benefits of the consumer. The social benefits of the consumer at this moment are calculated according to the following formula:

[0098]

[0099] where, is the social benefits of the consumer at this moment, is the peak-to-average ratio of the actual electricity load of the consumer at this moment, is the peak-to-average ratio of the actual electricity load of the consumer on the (t - 1)-th day. In formula (19), the numerator is the peak value of the actual electricity load, and the denominator is the average value of the actual electricity load. The closer the peak-to-average ratio is to 1, the more stable the electricity consumption of the consumer and the greater the contribution. Therefore, in formula (18), the closer the peak-to-average ratio of the actual electricity load of the consumer at this moment is to 1, the smaller the social benefits of the consumer.

[0100] 2) Determine the social benefits of the electricity retailer based on the carbon intensity.

[0101] For the electricity retailer, helping the power system to absorb clean energy as much as possible is its contribution. This invention uses the carbon intensity in the UK National Grid to reflect the social benefits of the electricity retailer. This value represents how much carbon dioxide emissions are generated per kilowatt-hour of electricity consumed, and in this invention, it can be expressed as the carbon dioxide emissions generated per degree of electricity sold. When the carbon dioxide emissions are below the average value, the social benefits are smaller, indicating a greater contribution.

[0102] The social benefits of the electricity retailer at this moment are calculated according to the following formula:

[0103]

[0104] Among them, is the carbon intensity at this moment, is the average value of the carbon intensity on the (t - 1)-th day.

[0105] 3) Calculate the total social benefit.

[0106] The social benefit consists of the above two parts and is defined as follows:

[0107]

[0108] Among them, is the total social benefit at this moment.

[0109] 4) Calculate the cooperative electricity price.

[0110] According to the proportions of the power retailer and the consumer contributing to the total social benefit and their quotes before the start of this moment, a cooperative electricity price is formed, and the cooperative electricity price at this moment is determined according to the following calculation formula:

[0111]

[0112] Among them, is the cooperative electricity price at this moment.

[0113] 3. Determine the actual electricity price at this moment during settlement based on the cooperative electricity price.

[0114] As a preferred implementation method, with the goal of simultaneously satisfying the consumer satisfaction at this moment and maximizing the profit of the power retailer, and with the constraints of meeting the profit range of the power retailer at this moment, the consumer response degree at this moment, and the consumer satisfaction range at this moment, target optimization is carried out to obtain the optimized electricity price at this moment. That is, the optimized electricity price at this moment can be obtained by solving the optimization problem in the following formula:

[0115]

[0116] This optimization problem uses a multi-objective optimization method, aiming to maximize the consumer satisfaction and the profit of the power retailer.

[0117] The cooperative electricity price and the optimized electricity price are combined to form the final actual settlement electricity price:

[0118]

[0119] When the feasible solution set that satisfies the constraint conditions is empty during multi-objective optimization, the cooperative electricity price at this moment can also be used as the actual electricity price at this moment.

[0120] The specific algorithm of the consumer - centered electricity price mechanism is as follows:

[0121]

[0122]

[0123] In the above algorithm, Q d,T is the electricity consumption load of consumers at each moment on the T - th day without any intervention of the electricity price mechanism, and B d,T is the electricity bill of consumers at each moment on the T - th day without any intervention of the electricity price mechanism. P w,T is the wholesale electricity price at each moment on the T - th day, and C d,T is the carbon intensity at each moment on the T - th day. β max is the maximum response potential parameter at each moment.

[0124] Next, the effect of the electricity price determination method proposed by the present invention will be described.

[0125] Dataset: Select the household electricity simulation data of the UK from 2019 to 2020, which includes the power consumption of 13 kinds of electrical appliances per hour per day for two years, and the electricity price per hour. In addition, many other real - world UK data are collected to complete the experiment, including the wholesale electricity price in the UK electricity wholesale market from 2019 to 2020 and the carbon intensity data of the UK from 2019 to 2020, which constitute all the data.

[0126] Evaluation indicators: Use the total social benefit, the profit of consumers, and the profit of electricity retailers to measure the quality of the simulation results. The smaller the social benefit value, the better. Since the original data of the dataset is regarded as the comfortable electricity consumption of consumers in the natural state and there is no comprehensive satisfaction, the proposed comprehensive satisfaction lacks comparison and is not used as a standard for evaluation, but it will be used as one of the reference items for evaluation.

[0127] Simulation experiment: Next, the influence of different constraint conditions on the results will be described. When the constraint conditions are too strict for some rounds of the game, resulting in an empty feasible solution set, the cooperative price is regarded as the electricity price. The NSGA - II algorithm is used for multi - objective optimization.

[0128] 1) Consumer satisfaction.

[0129] Now, the constraint conditions mentioned in formula (23) are experimented. The electricity price change curve and load change under different satisfaction constraints are as Figure 2 and Figure 3 shown. From Figure 2It can be seen that when the satisfaction constraint is between 0 and 0.3, the price fluctuation range is very large, which is not conducive to the stability of the retail market. As the constraint increases, the price fluctuation range gradually decreases and approaches reality. Compared with reality, the upper and lower limits of the fluctuation also converge, and the sharp price changes at the far right of the graph are also alleviated. Figure 3 As can be seen in Figure 3 , the proposed electricity price mechanism reduces the load usage, the shaded area of the graph becomes smaller, and the appearance of peaks is reduced and the peak value is decreased.

[0130] From Figure 4 It can be seen that under different satisfaction constraints, the price change rate and the change of consumers' bills converge. At the beginning, the satisfaction constraint condition of consumers is at a relatively low level. At this time, the attention to consumers' satisfaction is not so high, and correspondingly, there will be a high electricity price and a requirement for consumers to reduce electricity consumption. As the constraint condition increases, it is necessary to increase the satisfaction by reducing consumers' bills and reducing consumers' response degree. When the constraint condition is around 0.4 and 0.5, consumers' satisfaction reaches the highest. However, when the constraint condition continues to increase, it is necessary to reduce the electricity price and increase consumers' response degree to meet the conditions, resulting in the consequence that the constraint condition is too strict and the satisfaction drops significantly. During this process, the profit of the retailer also decreases and comes to a negative value near 0.7 and reaches the lowest. Therefore, 0.4 can be selected as the most suitable satisfaction constraint condition, that is, when solving the optimized electricity price, the solutions with consumers' satisfaction less than 0.4 are excluded. Compared with the benchmark value in Table 1, consumers' bills are reduced by about 21%, the profit of the retailer is increased by about 55%, and the difference between consumers' satisfaction and the optimal satisfaction in this group is less than 0.1, which is within a reasonable range.

[0131] Table 1

[0132]

[0133] 2) The profit of the electricity retailer.

[0134] In this group of experiments, by adjusting the profit constraint, that is, the proportion constraint of the electricity retailer's profit in consumers' bills, the most suitable constraint condition is found. From Figure 5 it can be seen that as the constraint condition is relaxed, the fluctuations of all values tend to be stable. By comprehensively comparing various indicators, when other indicators are similar, all items are in a relatively reasonable range when the constraint condition is 0.3. Therefore, 0.3 is selected, that is, when optimizing the electricity price, the solutions with the profit of this hour greater than 30% of consumers' bills are excluded. Although the effect of several indicators is better when the profit constraint is less than 0.3, at this time, the profit of the retailer has been lower than the benchmark value, so this part of the constraint is excluded. When the profit constraint is 0.3, the profit of the retailer only accounts for about 18% of consumers' bills, which is in line with the general understanding.

[0135] 3) Maximum response potential.

[0136] The maximum response potential used in the previous experiments was 0.5, that is, the maximum degree of consumers' electricity consumption reduction was half of the ideal electricity consumption. Considering the real situation that consumers will not have a 100% response, that is, stop all electricity consumption behaviors. Therefore, the present invention simulates different response ability situations. It can be seen from Figure 6 that as the maximum response potential increases, consumers can reduce more load during response, and the comprehensive satisfaction, consumers' bills, and retailers' profits all decrease accordingly. The social benefit shows an upward convex curve, reaching the worst at a maximum response potential of 0.5. As the response degree constraint increases, consumers gradually respond, which will cause fluctuations in consumers' electricity consumption curves at this time, and the peak-to-average ratio increases, resulting in a worse social benefit. After 0.5, in order to respond to the increase in price, consumers' response degree increases accordingly, and consumers' electricity consumption decreases significantly, making the social benefit better. Finally, 0.2 is selected as the appropriate maximum response potential. Although there is a better social benefit at 0.1 and greater than 0.7, the consumers' bills at 0.1 are higher than the benchmark, and the satisfaction degree of consumers is very low when it is greater than 0.7. Compared with 0.3 and 0.4, when the response degree is 0.2, the consumers' bills and retailers' profits do not reach the optimum, but are improved compared with the benchmark, and the social benefit and consumers' satisfaction degree are better. Therefore, it is more suitable as the maximum response potential.

[0137] 4) Penalty coefficient.

[0138] The penalty coefficient was tested from 0.1 - 1 at intervals of 0.05. The results showed that several indicators fluctuated within a small range under different penalty coefficients and did not affect the experimental results. The detailed numerical values are not elaborated here.

[0139] Based on the above experiments, for this data set, the satisfaction parameter θ was set to 0.4, the profit constraint λ was set to 0.3, the penalty coefficient α was set to 0.05, and the maximum response potential was set to 0.2. Under these parameter conditions, the performances of five different price mechanisms were compared ( Figures 7 - 9 ), and the five price mechanisms are shown in Table 2.

[0140] Table 2

[0141]

[0142] It can be seen from Figure 7 that the electricity price formulation method proposed by the present invention has a small change compared with the original price, and several prominent price points in the original price are correspondingly reduced. Combining Figure 8 and Figure 9It can be seen that although the price of Mechanism 2 is the cheapest, enabling consumers to obtain the most favorable hourly bill, a part of the corresponding retailer's hourly profit also becomes negative, which is not in line with market fairness. The prices of Mechanism 3 and Mechanism 4 are higher than that of Mechanism 1. Although Mechanism 3 and Mechanism 4 enable the electricity retailer to obtain a higher total profit, the corresponding consumer bills are higher than the benchmark standard. Considering all the comparison results, the consumer hourly bill of the electricity price setting mechanism proposed in the present invention is cheaper than those of Mechanism 1, Mechanism 3 and Mechanism 4. At this time, the profit of the retailer is not damaged, but instead increases compared with the original profit. That is to say, the method of the present invention can transmit the price signal to consumers through a small price change while ensuring that the mechanism conforms to the actual situation.

[0143] Table 3 shows the corresponding electricity price and power consumption data tables, as well as the corresponding consumer bills, electricity retailer profits and social benefits Figure 10 , Figure 11 and Figure 12 as shown. It can be seen that consumers start to enter the peak power consumption period at 12:00 noon, 4:00 pm and 9:00 pm. The consumer bills and retailer profits mainly come from these time points. Through comparison, it is found that Mechanism 2 significantly reduces the electricity price at each peak time point, sacrificing the retailer's profit to subsidize the consumer bill to reduce the bill paid by consumers, and overall reducing the load usage. Mechanism 3 increases the electricity price in most time periods while reducing the load, enabling the retailer to obtain higher profits. Consumers can only reduce their electricity consumption to reduce their electricity bills. Mechanism 4 and Mechanism 5 achieve a level close to the optimized electricity price by balancing the electricity consumption behavior of users. Instead of simply increasing the price to achieve this goal, the electricity price throughout the day is maintained at a relatively stable and fluctuating state. Although the price in the low electricity price period has increased and the price in the peak electricity consumption period has also decreased, both parties can benefit from it. And compared with Mechanism 1, the other four price mechanisms all improve the social benefits to a certain extent. Among them, Mechanism 5 proposed in the present invention is at an intermediate level, thus providing better social benefits during the peak electricity consumption period.

[0144] The summary of each index under five price mechanisms is shown in Table 4. Compared with the original bill of Mechanism 1, the total consumer bills under the four electricity price mechanisms decreased by 25.88%, -2.73%, -5.06% and 3.11% respectively, and the total profits of electricity retailers increased by -133.41%, 103.52%, 106.25% and 52.51% respectively compared with the original profits of Mechanism 1. Although the total profits of retailers in Mechanism 3 and Mechanism 4 are higher, their proportion in the consumer bill reaches 24%, and the consumer bill increases relative to the benchmark standard, which is not conducive to fair market transactions. In Mechanism 5, the total profit of electricity retailers only accounts for 19.1% of the total consumer bill, with a relatively small proportion. At the same time that the retailer's profit increases, the consumer bill also decreases, which is conducive to fair transactions among all parties, improves the passive position of consumers in the electricity retail market, and achieves a win-win result for consumers, the public society and electricity retailers.

[0145] Table 4

[0146]

[0147] The interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market centered on consumers proposed by the present invention enables consumers to become active participants in the retail market. The demand response coefficients of consumers in two stages before and after the start of power consumption are designed, and the responses, benefits and satisfaction of consumers are comprehensively modeled, so as to reflect the response willingness of consumers to the electricity retailer's quotation signal and the actual response of consumers. Through the design of interactive quotation, social benefits and multi-objective optimization, the positive role of the participants in the electricity retail market in social benefits is brought into play, and the relationship between electricity retailers and consumers is transformed from an asymmetric master-slave competition relationship to a cooperative and competitive relationship. While helping consumers save electricity bills, the retailer's revenue is increased, enabling consumers to fully participate in the process of retail electricity price designation, realizing a more reasonable hourly dynamic electricity price, and promoting the stable development of the electricity retail market.

Claims

1. An interactive electricity price formulation method for a consumer-centered electricity retail market, characterized in that, Including: Taking the i-th hour of the t-th day as the current moment, before the start of electricity consumption at the current moment, determine the electricity retailer's offer at the current moment according to the electricity retailer model, and determine the consumer's offer at the current moment according to the consumer model; among them, the electricity retailer model is used to describe the relationship between the electricity retailer's offer at the current moment, the wholesale electricity price at the current moment, the electricity sales profit of the electricity retailer at the previous moment, and the deviation degree of the offer at the previous moment; the consumer model is used to describe the relationship between the consumer's offer at the current moment, the consumer's electricity consumption cost at the previous moment, the compensation for the agreed load at the current moment, and the consumer's satisfaction at the previous moment; the agreed load is the planned response load determined by the consumer according to the change in the electricity retailer's offer at the current moment; the previous moment refers to the (i - 1)-th hour of the t-th day. After the end of electricity consumption at the current moment, obtain the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer at the current moment, and determine the cooperative electricity price at the current moment according to the proportion of the contributions of the electricity retailer and the consumer to the total social benefits at the current moment, the electricity retailer's offer and the consumer's offer at the current moment; the social benefit of the electricity retailer is determined based on the carbon intensity, and the social benefit of the consumer is determined based on the peak-to-average ratio of the consumer's actual electricity consumption load. Determine the actual electricity price at the current moment during settlement based on the cooperative electricity price.

2. The consumer-centered interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market according to claim 1, characterized in that The process of determining the actual electricity price at the current moment during settlement based on the cooperative electricity price is as follows: aiming to simultaneously satisfy the consumer's satisfaction and maximize the profit of the electricity retailer, and performing objective optimization with the profit range of the electricity retailer at the current moment, the consumer response degree at the current moment, and the consumer satisfaction range at the current moment as constraints to obtain the optimized electricity price at the current moment, and determine the actual electricity price at the current moment during settlement based on the optimized electricity price and the cooperative electricity price at the current moment; the consumer satisfaction includes the consumer's satisfaction with the electricity price and the consumer's satisfaction with electricity consumption.

3. The consumer-centered interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that The cooperative electricity price at the current moment is determined according to the following calculation formula: Among them, is the cooperative electricity price at this moment, is the social benefit of the electricity retailer at this moment, is the social benefit of consumers at this moment, is the total social benefit at this moment, is the consumer's quotation at this moment, is the electricity retailer's quotation at this moment; the total social benefit at this moment is the sum of the social benefit of the electricity retailer and the social benefit of consumers at this moment.

4. The consumer-centered interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that The consumer model is: Among them, is the consumer quotation at this moment, is the consumer electricity bill at the previous moment, is the actual electricity load of the consumer at the previous moment, is the agreed load at this moment, is the electricity load of the consumer at this moment without any intervention of the electricity price mechanism, is the actual electricity price at the previous moment, is the consumer satisfaction at the previous moment, is the consumer satisfaction at the i-2th hour on the tth day, is the consumer quotation at the previous moment, is the planned response coefficient at this moment.

5. The consumer-centered interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that The electricity retailer model is: Among them, is the electricity retailer's quotation at this moment, is the electricity retailer's quotation at the previous moment, is the electricity sales profit of the electricity retailer at the previous moment, is the actual electricity consumption load of consumers at the previous moment, is the wholesale electricity price at this moment, is the actual electricity price at the previous moment.

6. The consumer - centered interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market according to claim 2, characterized in that, The constraint condition of the consumer response degree at the current moment refers to: the planned response coefficient and the actual response coefficient of the consumer at the current moment are greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to the maximum response potential; among them, the planned response coefficient is used to represent the planned response degree of the consumer to the change in the electricity retailer's offer at the current moment, and the larger the planned response coefficient, the less the electricity consumption load planned by the consumer; the actual response coefficient is used to represent the actual response degree of the consumer according to its own offer and the electricity retailer's offer, and the larger the actual response coefficient, the less the actual electricity consumption load of the consumer.

7. The consumer-centered interactive electricity price setting method for the electricity retail market according to claim 6, characterized in that The planned response coefficient is calculated according to the following formula: Among them, is the planned response coefficient at this moment, is the electricity retailer's quotation at this moment, is the planned response coefficient at the previous moment, is the electricity retailer's quotation at the previous moment.

8. The consumer - centered interactive electricity price - making method in the electricity retail market according to claim 6, wherein The actual response coefficient is calculated according to the following formula: Among them, is the actual response coefficient at this moment, is the consumer's quotation at this moment, is the electricity retailer's quotation at this moment, is the planned response coefficient at this moment.

9. The consumer - centered interactive electricity price formulation method for the electricity retail market according to claim 2, wherein, The constraint condition of the profit range of the electricity retailer at the current moment refers to: Among them, is the electricity sales profit of the electricity retailer at this moment, λ is a multiple, is the actual electricity consumption load of consumers at this moment, is the actual electricity price at this moment.

10. The consumer - centered interactive electricity price - making method for the electricity retail market according to claim 4, characterized in that, The consumer's electricity bill is calculated according to the following formula: Among them, is the consumer's electricity bill at this moment, is the actual electricity load of the consumer at this moment, is the actual electricity price at this moment, and α is the percentage increase in the electricity price for the excess part when the agreed load is exceeded, is the agreed load at this moment.

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