Application method of trusted sandbox in power edge calculation and related equipment

Abstract

The invention provides an application method of a trusted sandbox on power edge computing and related equipment, the application method of the trusted sandbox on power edge computing is applied to a power edge node, and comprises the following steps: if a power edge computing task is received, establishing the trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task; constructing an independent secure computing space based on the trusted sandbox; based on the trusted sandbox, a computing program and a computing environment in the secure computing space are periodically verified through a trusted measurement root; executing the power edge calculation task based on the trusted sandbox to obtain a task result; and sending the task result to a task result receiver, and destroying the trusted sandbox. In the technical scheme provided by the invention, the corresponding trusted sandbox is established based on the power edge computing task, the trusted sandbox provides a safe and isolated execution environment for the power edge computing task, and the power edge computing task is executed based on the trusted sandbox, so that the safety problem in the edge computing process can be effectively solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of data security, and particularly to an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing and related devices. Background Art

[0002] With the development of the electric Internet of things (EIoT), power users, grid enterprises, power generation enterprises and suppliers are deeply linked, giving rise to new business models. Taking EIoT as the hub, it promotes the intelligent upgrade of the power system. Frequent business interactions among multiple parties have led to a sharp increase in power data volume. To ensure the quality of power business services and the reliability of the power grid, typical power grid business applications have extremely high requirements for latency. The need for real-time analysis and low-latency computing of power data by power users is becoming increasingly urgent. However, due to limited resources of power end-side devices and generally fixed business functions, it is difficult to support complex computing tasks. In addition, if a cloud server is used to assist power end-side devices, it will result in huge data transmission overhead and time delay. Against this background, power edge computing has gradually received attention. Power edge computing pushes data processing and computing tasks to the edge location closer to the data source. The power edge server is responsible for collecting, processing, analyzing and forwarding data, the power end-side devices are released, and complex computing requirements are met, thereby reducing data transmission latency and improving data processing efficiency.

[0003] Compared with cloud computing, the distributed nature of power edge computing leads to an expanded security protection surface, greatly increasing the pressure to resist external threats. In addition, the power Internet of things brings a large amount of sensitive data (such as cable monitoring videos) into the edge computing system. The gap between the protection capabilities of power edge servers and security requirements seriously threatens the security of power business applications. Malicious attackers may invade the power system and control power IoT devices, resulting in production chaos, unnecessary economic losses, and even safety accidents. Therefore, it is urgent to solve the data security problem in the process of edge computing. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The present invention provides an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing and related devices to solve the defects in the prior art and achieve the solution of security problems in the process of power edge computing.

[0005] The present invention provides an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing, which is applied to a power edge node. The method includes: If a power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task, a trusted sandbox is established based on the power edge computing task; wherein, the power edge computing device is deployed on the power edge node; Build an independent secure computing space in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox; Based on the trusted sandbox, periodically verify the computing program and computing environment in the secure computing space through the root of trust for measurement, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked or tampered with; Execute the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox to obtain the task result corresponding to the power edge computing task; Send the task result to the task result recipient and destroy the trusted sandbox.

[0006] According to an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the present invention, the power edge node includes a service application layer and an operating system layer; building a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task includes: Based on the power edge computing task, build a corresponding trusted sandbox container in the service application layer, and create a trusted sandbox trusted application corresponding to the trusted sandbox container in the operating system layer.

[0007] According to an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the present invention, before the power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task and builds a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task, the method further includes: Generate a configuration authentication key based on the configuration authentication TA configured in the power edge node, and send the device authentication key pair to the remote measurement service, so that the remote measurement service communicates with the configuration authentication TA and returns the certificate of the configuration authentication key to the configuration authentication TA; Generate an authentication identity key pair based on the CSvTPM configured in the power edge node, and send the authentication identity key pair to the configuration authentication TA; Through the configuration authentication TA, sign the authentication identity key pair based on the certificate of the configuration authentication key and form a certificate of the authentication identity key pair; Generate a verification report based on the CSvTPM and send the verification report to the offeror, so that the offeror generates offer data after the verification report passes; Based on the CSvTPM, use the offer data as the certificate data of the certificate of the authentication identity key pair to obtain a trust chain.

[0008] According to an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the present invention, after executing the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox, the method further includes: If a proof request sent by other power edge nodes is received, send proof information to the other power edge nodes; wherein, based on the proof information, the other power edge nodes generate a remote proof signature; Request the measurement server to query whether the CSvTPM of the other power edge node is trustworthy; If it is trustworthy, verify whether the other power edge node is trustworthy based on the remote proof signature and platform log sent by the other power edge node.

[0009] According to an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the present invention, the sending the task result to the task result recipient includes: Obtain the calculation flow topology corresponding to the power edge computing task; Based on the calculation flow topology, determine the task result recipient, establish an anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient, and send the task result to the task result recipient based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing.

[0010] According to an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the present invention, the establishing an anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient, and sending the task result to the task result recipient based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing includes: Based on the power edge node and the task result recipient, establish a forwarding path, and use the forwarding path as the anonymous communication channel; Based on the onion routing, encrypt the information of the forwarding path, the task result, and the task result recipient to obtain target encrypted data; According to the forwarding path, forward the encrypted data in sequence until it is sent to the task result recipient.

[0011] According to an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the present invention, the encrypting the information of the forwarding path, the task result, and the task result recipient based on the onion routing to obtain target encrypted data includes: Encrypt the task result based on the public key of the task result recipient to obtain first encrypted data, and form a first message with the first encrypted data and the forwarding path; Generate a symmetric key, and encrypt the first message based on the symmetric key to obtain second encrypted data; Encrypt the symmetric key with the public key of the first routing node in the forwarding path to obtain third encrypted data, and form the target encrypted data based on the second encrypted data and the third encrypted data.

[0012] The present invention also provides an application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing, which is applied to a power edge node. The device includes: A creation module configured to create a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task if the power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task; wherein, the power edge computing device is deployed on the power edge node; A construction module configured to construct an independent secure computing space in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox; A verification module configured to periodically verify the computing program and computing environment in the secure computing space through the root of trust for measurement based on the trusted sandbox, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked and tampered with; An execution module configured to execute the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox to obtain a task result corresponding to the power edge computing task; A first sending module configured to send the task result to a task result recipient and destroy the trusted sandbox.

[0013] According to an application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the present invention, the power edge node includes a service application layer and an operating system layer; the creation module includes: A construction sub-module configured to construct a corresponding trusted sandbox container in the service application layer based on the power edge computing task, and create a trusted application of the trusted sandbox corresponding to the trusted sandbox container in the operating system layer.

[0014] According to an application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the present invention, the application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing further includes: A first generation module configured to generate a configuration authentication key based on the configuration authentication TA configured in the power edge node, and send the device authentication key pair to the remote measurement service, so that the remote measurement service communicates with the configuration authentication TA and returns a certificate of the configuration authentication key to the configuration authentication TA; A second generation module configured to generate an authentication identity key pair based on the CSvTPM configured in the power edge node, and send the authentication identity key pair to the configuration authentication TA; A signing module configured to sign the authentication identity key pair based on the certificate of the configuration authentication key through the configuration authentication TA and form a certificate of the authentication identity key pair; A third generation module, configured to generate a verification report based on the CSvTPM and send the verification report to an offeror, so that the offeror generates offer data after the verification report passes; An authentication module, configured to use the offer data as certificate data of a certificate of the authentication identity key pair based on the CSvTPM to obtain a trust chain.

[0015] An application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to the present invention, the application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing further includes: A second sending module, configured to send proof information to the other power edge node if a proof request sent by the other power edge node is received; wherein, the other power edge node generates a remote proof signature based on the proof information; A request module, configured to request a measurement server to query whether the CSvTPM of the other power edge node is trustworthy; A verification module, configured to verify whether the other power edge node is trustworthy based on the remote proof signature and platform log sent by the other power edge node if it is trustworthy.

[0016] An application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to the present invention, the first sending module includes: An acquisition sub-module, configured to acquire a computational flow topology corresponding to the power edge computing task; A determination sub-module, configured to determine the task result recipient based on the computational flow topology, establish an anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient, and send the task result to the task result recipient based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing.

[0017] An application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to the present invention, the determination sub-module includes: An establishment unit, configured to establish a forwarding path based on the power edge node and the task result recipient, and use the forwarding path as the anonymous communication channel; An encryption processing unit, configured to encrypt the forwarding path, the task result, and information of the task result recipient based on the onion routing to obtain target encrypted data; A forwarding unit, configured to forward the encrypted data in sequence according to the forwarding path until it is sent to the task result recipient.

[0018] An application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to the present invention, the encryption processing unit includes: The first encryption processing subunit is configured to encrypt the task result based on the public key of the task result recipient to obtain first encrypted data, and form a first message by combining the first encrypted data with the forwarding path; The second encryption processing subunit is configured to generate a symmetric key, and encrypt the first message based on the symmetric key to obtain second encrypted data; The third encryption processing subunit is configured to encrypt the symmetric key by using the public key of the first routing node of the forwarding path to obtain third encrypted data, and form the target encrypted data based on the second encrypted data and the third encrypted data.

[0019] The present invention also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the program, the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing as described in any one of the above is implemented.

[0020] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing as described in any one of the above is implemented.

[0021] The present invention also provides a computer program product, including a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing as described in any one of the above is implemented.

[0022] For the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing and related devices provided by the present invention, if a power edge computing task is received, a corresponding trusted sandbox is established based on the power edge computing task, an independent secure computing space is constructed in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox, and based on the trusted sandbox, the computing program and computing environment in the secure computing space are periodically verified through the trusted measurement root, so that the computing process of the edge computing task is not attacked and tampered with. The trusted sandbox provides a secure and isolated execution environment for the power edge computing task. Executing the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox can effectively solve the security problem in the power edge computing process. After the task result is sent to the task result recipient, the trusted sandbox participating in the task will be destroyed, so that the resources occupied by the trusted sandbox will be released. Description of the Drawings

[0023] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present invention or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.

[0024] Figure 1 It is a schematic flow chart of the application method of the trusted sandbox provided by the present invention in power edge computing.

[0025] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the power Internet of Things scenario in the embodiment provided by the present invention.

[0026] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the top-level architecture of the trusted sandbox in the embodiment provided by the present invention.

[0027] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of establishing a trust chain in the embodiment provided by the present invention.

[0028] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of remote measurement in the embodiment provided by the present invention.

[0029] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of anonymous communication in the embodiment provided by the present invention.

[0030] Figure 7 It is a schematic structural diagram of the application device of the trusted sandbox provided by the present invention in power edge computing.

[0031] Figure 8 It is a schematic structural diagram of the electronic device provided by the present invention. Detailed implementation manners

[0032] To make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the present invention. Apparently, the described embodiments are some, but not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments in the present invention without creative efforts shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0033] The following combines Figures 1 - 8 to describe the application method of the trusted sandbox provided by the present invention in power edge computing and related devices.

[0034] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of an application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing shown according to an exemplary embodiment. As Figure 1 shown, in an exemplary embodiment, the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing, which is applied to a power edge node, includes steps 110 to 150, and is introduced in detail as follows.

[0035] Step 110: If the electric power edge computing device receives an electric power edge computing task, establish a trusted sandbox based on the electric power edge computing task; wherein, the electric power edge computing device is deployed on the electric power edge node;

[0036] In the embodiment of the present invention, as Figure 2 shown, Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the power Internet of Things scenario involved in the embodiment of the present invention, including power end-side device nodes, power edge nodes, and the cloud.

[0037] Power end-side device nodes (EIoTD) are ubiquitous sensors, controllers, etc. in the power Internet of Things scenario. Their main function is to sense and collect power data in the environment and upload the power data to the power edge nodes within their domain. In some cases, the EIoTD also receives instructions from the power edge nodes and performs corresponding operations. The EIoTD is usually limited by resources and capabilities, so it does not undertake complex computing tasks.

[0038] Power edge nodes (Electric Edge Node, EEN) are servers located between the EIoTD and the cloud, usually having good computing and storage capabilities. According to their locations, the EENs are divided into different domains. Compared with the EIoTD, the EEN has stronger communication capabilities and can not only interact with the terminal devices within its own domain, but also cooperate with the EENs in other domains to complete computing tasks. Since it is close to the data source and has relatively sufficient computing power, the EEN is the main undertaker of power edge computing tasks. However, the decentralized computing mode greatly expands the security protection surface of the computing system, seriously threatening the privacy of Internet of Things data and the credibility of computing results. For this reason, the embodiment of the present invention designs a hardware-enhanced trusted sandbox model to create a secure computing environment for each power edge computing task on the EEN.

[0039] The Trusted Sandbox (Computing Sandbox, CS), also known as the Computing Sandbox, consists of a series of hardware infrastructures and functional components deployed on the EEN, including CS-C (Computing Sandbox-Container), CS-TA (Computing Sandbox-Trust Application), CSvTPM Manager, CSvTPM instances, etc., aiming to establish a secure computing environment for power IoT tasks. Through the collaborative work of CSs deployed on multiple EENs, the resources of the EEN can be fully utilized to efficiently support IIoT business applications. Multiple CSs can be deployed on one EEN, and each CS independently executes a task or subtask. CSs on the same EEN share a set of trusted hardware, but each CS has a unique CSvTPM as the trusted root and is isolated from each other. Through the unified proxy component (Proxy), CS-C can interact with the corresponding CSvTPM to achieve the trusted measurement and verification of IIoT tasks. After the computing tasks in the CS are completed, the CS will be destroyed and the resources it occupies will be released, thus realizing the recycling of resources.

[0040] The cloud is a server cluster in the power IoT, with the strongest computing power, the farthest communication distance, and the ability to interact with EENs in various fields. In addition, since power business systems are usually deployed in the cloud, the cloud is also responsible for receiving user requests, issuing computing tasks, and returning computing results. In some cases, the cloud also participates in the computing process, responsible for aggregating the local task results of the EEN and conducting global information analysis to support more complex business functions. To ensure the privacy of sensitive data during the power edge computing process, the computing tasks are issued in a ciphertext state. The plaintext of the original data and intermediate process data will not appear throughout the entire computing process. The plaintext result will not be decrypted until the computing result is returned to the cloud or the EIoTD that issued the computing task.

[0041] In the embodiments of the present invention, the EIoTD is responsible for collecting industrial data, which is the premise for data analysis and service execution. In some cases, the EIoTD will also perform preliminary processing on the collected industrial data, such as data cleaning, etc., to ensure the quality of the collected data. For problematic data, the EIoTD will take measures such as supplementary collection and then upload it to the EEN within the domain.

[0042] Both the EIoTD and the cloud can act as task initiators to send computing requests to the EEN. The difference between them is that the EEN usually relies on the cloud to formulate cooperation strategies and issue instructions. Therefore, when the EIoTD initiates a computing request, the EEN will first forward the request to the cloud. The cloud is responsible for determining the computing task participants based on the computing capabilities, resource occupancy, data correlation constraints, and other attributes of the EEN.

[0043] The EEN participating in the task collaborative computing establishes a trusted sandbox locally to host the received power edge computing tasks. Generally, a complex power IoT task will be split into multiple subtasks, and then multiple power edge computing nodes will collaboratively process the subtasks they receive. Therefore, the power edge computing tasks received by the power edge nodes can be a complete power IoT task or a subtask split from a power IoT task. When the power edge computing task received by the power edge node is a subtask, according to the relevance between the subtasks, a computing flow topology such as P2P, sequential execution, or centralized is formed among the EENs that receive the subtasks. After the subtask calculation is completed, the EEN uploads the intermediate calculation results to the cloud. The cloud is responsible for aggregating the intermediate calculation results according to the computing flow topology and obtaining the final calculation result.

[0044] Step 120, construct an independent secure computing space in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox.

[0045] In the embodiment of the present invention, an independent secure computing space is constructed in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox. The secure computing space is a secure and isolated execution environment that ensures the execution of power edge computing tasks in a secure environment.

[0046] Step 130, based on the trusted sandbox, periodically verify the computing program and computing environment in the secure computing space through the trusted measurement root, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked and tampered with. In the embodiment of the present invention, based on the CSvTPM, a periodic measurement mechanism is established for CS-C through the trusted measurement root. When an attacker attempts to tamper with the data, computing program, or computing environment of CS-C, the real-time trusted measurement value will not match the expected value. The CSvTPM will report and issue a warning in a timely manner, and at the same time force the recovery of the content in CS-C. In this way, the trusted guarantee of CS-C based on measurement is achieved.

[0047] Step 140, execute the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox to obtain the task result corresponding to the power edge computing task.

[0048] In the embodiment of the present invention, a trusted sandbox establishes an independent virtual trust root system in the operating system. At the same time, the trust boundary is extended to computing tasks through authentication, providing a secure and isolated execution environment for power edge computing tasks. When the behavior of the power edge node is abnormal (data, program, environment, etc. do not match the expectation), the trusted sandbox can actively detect and force recovery to resolve threats before the attack is implemented.

[0049] Step 150, send the task result to the task result recipient and destroy the trusted sandbox.

[0050] In the embodiment of the present invention, after the power edge computing task on the EEN is completed, the EEN returns the task result to the task result recipient. The task result recipient can be the cloud or the EIoTD, or it can be other EENs that cooperate to complete the task. After sending the task result to the task result recipient, the CS content participating in the task will be destroyed, and the resources occupied by the EEN will be released.

[0051] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the power edge node includes a service application layer and an operating system layer; establishing a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task includes: Based on the power edge computing task, construct a corresponding trusted sandbox container in the service application layer, and create a trusted sandbox trusted application corresponding to the trusted sandbox container in the operating system.

[0052] In the embodiment of the present invention, the upper layer architecture of the CS is as Figure 3 shown. Next, the functions of each component and how they work together will be introduced in detail.

[0053] According to the trust level, the functional components of the EEN can be divided into three categories, namely untrusted, L1-level trusted, and L2-level trusted. The higher the trust level, the more perfect the safeguard measures and the higher the trust degree. The components at the L2 level of trust include CSvTPM, CSvTPM manager, etc. They are protected by the operating system and have the highest access permission requirements. Therefore, they are considered to have the highest trust level. The components at the L1 level of trust include CS-C and the Proxy and vTPM driver running therein. Based on CSvTPM, a periodic measurement mechanism is established for CS-C. When an attacker attempts to tamper with the data, program, or execution environment of CS-C, the real-time measurement value will not match the expectation. CSvTPM will report in a timely manner and issue a warning, and at the same time force the recovery of the content in CS-C. In this way, the trust guarantee of CS-C based on measurement is realized. Other components are considered untrusted.

[0054] The business application layer is responsible for providing a general execution environment for power system business applications. Component CS-C, based on container technology, can shield the differences in the underlying hardware infrastructure of EEN, provide the required computing resources and environmental configurations for power edge computing tasks, and support the execution of power services. The CS-C engine undertakes management functions such as the construction, configuration, and destruction of CS-C. It provides an interaction interface for CS-C with other CS-Cs and components. According to different functions, CS-C can be divided into two categories, namely server-side CS-C and client-side CS-C. The client-side CS-C is built-in with a vTPM driver and is responsible for carrying power services. When EEN receives a new power edge computing task, a new CS-C will be established, and a corresponding CSvTPM will be created for it. The server-side CS-C has a built-in proxy and vTPM driver. The proxy is responsible for forwarding messages between the client-side CS-C and CS-TA to support the trust measurement of CS-C.

[0055] Inside the operating system, there are two types of CS-TA. One is used to carry CSvTPM, and the other is used to carry the CSvTPM manager. To ensure the credibility of CS-C and the computing tasks therein, a unique CSvTPM is established for each CS-C and is used to regularly measure CS-C. The measurement results are saved in the non-volatile memory of CS-TA and then uploaded to the cloud. The new measurement results will be compared with the previous benchmark values. If the two are equal, it indicates that the internal computing tasks have not been tampered with. Through CSvTPM, attacks against CS-C can be detected in a timely manner. When the business application layer constructs a new CS-C, the CSvTPM manager will create a corresponding CS-TA for it. When the corresponding CS-C is destroyed, the CS-TA will be destroyed together.

[0056] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, before the power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task and establishes a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task, the method further includes: Generating a configuration authentication key based on the configuration authentication TA configured in the power edge node, and sending the device authentication key pair to the remote measurement service, so that the remote measurement service communicates with the configuration authentication TA and returns the certificate of the configuration authentication key to the configuration authentication TA; Generating an authentication identity key pair based on the CSvTPM configured in the power edge node, and sending the authentication identity key pair to the configuration authentication TA; Signing the authentication identity key pair based on the certificate of the configuration authentication key through the configuration authentication TA, and forming the certificate of the authentication identity key pair; Generating a verification report based on the CSvTPM, and sending the verification report to the offeror, so that the offeror generates offer data after the verification report passes; Based on the CSvTPM, the offer data is used as the certificate data of the certificate of the authentication identity key pair to obtain a trust chain.

[0057] In an embodiment of the present invention, a Certificate Authority (PCA) determines whether to authenticate the Attestation Identification Key (AIK) of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) according to the Endorsement Key (EK) certificate provided by the manufacturer along with the device.

[0058] Specifically, as Figure 4 shown. The authentication key pair AK is stored at the operating system layer. The public key in the device authentication key pair AK is named AKPub, and the private key is named AKPriv.

[0059] The Provisioning Certification TA (PCTA) generates a Provisioning Certification Key (PCK). The public key in the provisioning certification key is named PCKPub, and the private key is named PCKPriv.

[0060] The PCTA sends the device authentication key pair AK to the remote attestation service.

[0061] The remote attestation service communicates with the PCTA and returns the certificate PCKCert of the PCK to the PCTA.

[0062] The CSvTPM generates an authentication identity key pair AIK and sends it to the PCTA. The public key in the authentication identity key pair is named AIKPub, and the private key is named AIKPriv.

[0063] The PCTA signs the AIK using PCKPriv and forms the certificate AIKCert of the AIK.

[0064] The CSvTPM generates a verification report containing data to be verified (including AIK, Nonce, etc.) and sends it to the Quote TA, QTA.

[0065] After the verification report passes, the Quoting Enclave (QE) will sign the verification report using its PCK, generate the offer data Quote and return it to the CSvTPM. The Quote contains the authentication data signature and TA identity information, including the Measurement-based MRTA and the Certificate-based MRSIGNER.

[0066] After the CSvTPM receives the offer data and uses it as the certificate of the AIK, the construction of the trust chain based on the trusted execution environment is completed.

[0067] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, after executing the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox, the method further includes: If a proof request sent by other power edge nodes is received, send proof information to the other power edge nodes; wherein, based on the proof information, the other power edge nodes generate a remote proof signature; Request the measurement server to query whether the CSvTPM of the other power edge nodes is trustworthy; If it is trustworthy, verify whether the other power edge nodes are trustworthy based on the remote proof signature and platform logs sent by the other power edge nodes.

[0068] In the embodiment of the present invention, after the trust chain is established, the CSvTPM can receive challenges from challengers, generate reports according to the PCR of the platform using the AIK, and send them to the challengers for verification.

[0069] As Figure 5 shown, power edge node A sends a proof request to power edge node B. After receiving the proof request, power edge node B sends a proof information to power edge node A, and the proof information includes a proof challenge random number nonce and the CSvTPM to be proved. Power edge node A loads the AIK key, and then signs the PCR value to be proved with AIKPriv. Power edge node A sends the remote proof signature and platform configuration logs to the verifier of platform B. Power edge node B requests the measurement server to query whether the CSvTPM identity of power edge node A is trustworthy. If the verification passes, power edge node B will verify the validity of the remote proof signature sent by power edge node A and the integrity of the platform logs to determine whether power edge node A is trustworthy. When power edge node A is trustworthy, communication is carried out between the two power edge nodes.

[0070] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the sending the task result to the task result recipient includes: Obtain the computing flow topology corresponding to the power edge computing task; Based on the computing flow topology, determine the task result recipient, and establish an anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient, and send the task result to the task result recipient based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing.

[0071] In the embodiment of the present invention, interactions between EENs are carried out through an anonymous communication protocol based on onion routing. According to the computing task flow, a one-way or two-way anonymous communication channel is constructed between the EEN and the task result recipient. As Figure 6 shown, the anonymous communication mechanism includes two types of entities: a directory server and anonymous nodes.

[0072] The directory server is used to store the EEN node information and trusted sandbox information in the system, including the IP address, public key, etc. of the EEN. When a power edge node or a trusted sandbox joins or exits, it is necessary to register or deregister the node or sandbox with the directory server.

[0073] Anonymous node: An EEN node registered with the directory server. Anonymous nodes can construct anonymous communication links through the directory server to achieve anonymous information interaction.

[0074] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, establishing the anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient, and sending the task result to the task result recipient based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing includes: Based on the power edge node and the task result recipient, establish a forwarding path and use the forwarding path as the anonymous communication channel; Based on the onion routing, encrypt the information of the forwarding path, the task result, and the task result recipient to obtain target encrypted data; According to the forwarding path, forward the encrypted data in sequence until it is sent to the task result recipient.

[0075] In the embodiment of the present invention, it is assumed that EENs and trusted sandboxes are registered, and the EENs and trusted sandboxes are in one-to-one correspondence, , such as power edge nodes A - E. When the trusted sandbox P wants to transfer data to the trusted sandbox Q, the first thing to do is to construct a forwarding path for the message . The trusted sandbox P is located in the power edge node A, and the trusted sandbox Q is located in any one of the remaining 4 power edge nodes. Assume that the forwarding path constructed by the power edge node A in a random order is .

[0076] Onion routing is a technology for implementing anonymous communication on computer networks. Its core idea is to encrypt data layer by layer, decrypting one layer each time it passes through a router until it reaches the destination. In onion routing, messages are encrypted layer by layer to form a "packet" with an "onion" structure. Each relay node can only see the content of the previous layer and has no knowledge of the entire path or the original message content. This multi-layer encryption ensures that even if some nodes are monitored, it is difficult for attackers to obtain complete information. Based on onion routing, each power edge node in the forwarding path is used as a routing node (router), and the information of the task result and the task result recipient is encrypted to obtain the target encrypted data, and then the encrypted data is forwarded sequentially according to the forwarding path until it is sent to the task result recipient.

[0077] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, based on the onion routing, encrypting the information of the forwarding path, the task result, and the task result recipient to obtain the target encrypted data includes: Encrypting the task result based on the public key of the task result recipient to obtain the first encrypted data, and forming a first message by combining the first encrypted data with the forwarding path; Generating a symmetric key, and encrypting the first message based on the symmetric key to obtain the second encrypted data; Encrypting the symmetric key by the public key of the first routing node in the forwarding path to obtain the third encrypted data, and forming the target encrypted data based on the second encrypted data and the third encrypted data.

[0078] In an embodiment of the present invention, each layer of the forwarding path includes the IP address of the next-hop routing node, the receiving sandbox name Q, and the inner-layer onion . The symmetric key generated by the AES algorithm is encrypted as , and is encrypted by the public key of the previous routing node into , connecting the two to obtain , which is the constructed one-layer routing path. The innermost layer of the forwarding path constructed by the power edge node A is , indicating that the last-hop routing node of the forwarding path is node E. The innermost two layers of the constructed forwarding path are , indicating that the second-to-last hop of the routing path is node D, and nodes C and B are added in sequence.

[0079] Specifically, the task result and the trusted sandbox name P are encrypted by the public key of the trusted sandbox name Q of the task result recipient to obtain the first encrypted data , and the forwarding Connected to form the first message . When data is transmitted between power edge nodes, link encryption is required, and a symmetric key is generated using the AES algorithm . Through the symmetric key Encrypt the first message to obtain the second encrypted data . Use the public key of the next-hop routing node B Encrypt the symmetric key to obtain the third encryption . Connect it with the second encrypted data to form the second message and send it to the next-hop routing node B

[0080] . After each hop routing node receives the message sent by the previous hop routing node, it first decrypts it with the corresponding private key SKn. As described above, after receiving the message, routing node B first decrypts it with the private key to obtain . Use to decrypt to obtain and . Then decrypt of to obtain . Use to perform a decryption operation on the remaining part of to obtain the address of the next-hop routing node as , the receiving sandbox name Q of the message, and the routing path after stripping the outermost layer . Routing node B determines according to the trusted sandbox name Q that the message should be forwarded continuously. The forwarding path and the message part are . Generate a symmetric key using the ASE algorithm and encrypt it to . Use the public key of the next-hop node C to encrypt to . Connect the two to form a message and forward it to the next-hop routing node C. After receiving the message, routing node C determines through judgment that the trusted sandbox corresponding to this routing node is . Routing node C terminates the forwarding of the data and transmits the data part encrypted with the public key of the trusted sandbox in the message to the trusted sandbox . The sandbox uses its private key to decrypt and can learn that the trusted sandbox sent it a message . Thus, the entire message sending process ends

[0081] The receiving sandbox Q decrypts the message forwarded by routing node C to it It can be known that the trusted sandbox P receives the task result sent. . When the trusted sandbox Q wants to reply data to the trusted sandbox P, Q needs to exchange communication identities with P. In this way, Q acts as the sender identity and sends the returned data to the receiver P. The process of Q sending the returned data is the same as the process of P sending data. Q knows that the receiver of the message is P, can know P's public key from the local user list, and can obtain information about all nodes in the system from the local node list, construct the forwarding path, and construct and send out the message packet. The data cell format includes two parts, namely the part of the message type to be transmitted and the part of the message content to be transmitted.

[0082] When a node receives a forwarded message, it first needs to process the byte part. By obtaining the byte content, it can know the type of the received message, so as to be able to process the message correctly.

[0083] The processing of the received packet by the node is as follows: If the packet received by the node is a packet for a sandbox or node joining broadcast by the server, then the node saves the information of the newly joined sandbox or node; if the packet received by the node is a packet for a sandbox or node exiting broadcast by the server, then the node deletes the information of the exiting trusted sandbox or node; if the packet received by the node is a forwarding packet, the node needs to determine whether the trusted sandbox on it includes the task result receiver to decide whether to forward the message to the receiving sandbox, stop forwarding the message, or continue to forward the message.

[0084] The node will perform different operations on different types of received packets. If the packet received by the node is a forwarding packet, the node needs to determine whether the sandbox on it includes the receiving sandbox. The node needs to compare the obtained receiving sandbox name with the sandbox names in the trusted sandbox list. Assume that the number of sandboxes in the system is , then at most comparisons need to be made, so the time complexity is . The space occupied by the input data of the algorithm has nothing to do with the algorithm. The working units required for operating on the data and the auxiliary space for storing some information required for implementation of the calculation are constants relative to the input data volume. Therefore, the space complexity of the algorithm is .

[0085] The application device of the trusted sandbox provided by the present invention in power edge computing will be described below. The application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing described below can be correspondingly referred to the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing described above. It should be noted that the device provided in the following embodiments and the method provided in the above embodiments belong to the same concept. The specific manners in which each module and unit perform operations have been described in detail in the method embodiments and will not be elaborated here.

[0086] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, please refer to Figure 7 , Figure 7 which is an application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing shown according to an exemplary embodiment, applied to a power edge node, and includes: A establishment module 710, configured to establish a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task if the power edge computing device receives the power edge computing task; wherein, the power edge computing device is deployed on the power edge node; A construction module 720, configured to construct an independent secure computing space in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox; A verification module 730, configured to periodically verify the computing program and computing environment in the secure computing space based on the trusted sandbox through a trusted measurement root, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked and tampered with; An execution module 740, configured to execute the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox to obtain a task result corresponding to the power edge computing task; A first sending module 750, configured to send the task result to a task result receiver and destroy the trusted sandbox.

[0087] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the power edge node includes a service application layer and an operating system layer; the establishment module 710 includes: A construction sub-module, configured to construct a corresponding trusted sandbox container in the service application layer based on the power edge computing task, and create a trusted sandbox trusted application corresponding to the trusted sandbox container in the operating system layer.

[0088] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing further includes: A first generation module, configured to generate a configuration authentication key based on a configuration authentication TA configured in the power edge node, and send a device authentication key pair to a remote measurement service, so that the remote measurement service communicates with the configuration authentication TA and returns a certificate of the configuration authentication key to the configuration authentication TA; A second generation module, configured to generate an authentication identity key pair based on the CSvTPM configured in the power edge node, and send the authentication identity key pair to the configuration authentication TA; A signing module, configured to sign the authentication identity key pair based on the certificate of the configuration authentication key through the configuration authentication TA, and form a certificate of the authentication identity key pair; A third generation module, configured to generate a verification report based on the CSvTPM, and send the verification report to the offeror, so that the offeror generates offer data after the verification report passes; An as module, configured to use the offer data as the certificate data of the certificate of the authentication identity key pair based on the CSvTPM, to obtain a trust chain.

[0089] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, an application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing further includes: A second sending module, configured to send proof information to the other power edge node if a proof request sent by the other power edge node is received; wherein, the other power edge node generates a remote proof signature based on the proof information; A request module, configured to request a measurement server to query whether the CSvTPM of the other power edge node is trusted; A verification module, configured to verify whether the other power edge node is trusted based on the remote proof signature and platform log sent by the other power edge node if it is trusted.

[0090] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the first sending module 750 includes: An acquisition sub-module, configured to acquire the computational flow topology corresponding to the power edge computing task; A determination sub-module, configured to determine the task result recipient based on the computational flow topology, establish an anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient, and send the task result to the task result recipient based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing.

[0091] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the determination sub-module includes: An establishment unit, configured to establish a forwarding path based on the power edge node and the task result recipient, and use the forwarding path as the anonymous communication channel; An encryption processing unit, configured to perform encryption processing on the information of the forwarding path, the task result, and the task result recipient based on the onion routing, to obtain target encrypted data; A forwarding unit, configured to forward the encrypted data in sequence according to the forwarding path until it is sent to the task result recipient.

[0092] In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the encryption processing unit includes: A first encryption processing subunit, configured to encrypt the task result based on the public key of the task result recipient to obtain first encrypted data, and form a first message by combining the first encrypted data with the forwarding path; A second encryption processing subunit, configured to generate a symmetric key and encrypt the first message based on the symmetric key to obtain second encrypted data; A third encryption processing subunit, configured to encrypt the symmetric key with the public key of the first routing node of the forwarding path to obtain third encrypted data, and form the target encrypted data based on the second encrypted data and the third encrypted data.

[0093] Figure 8 An entity structure diagram of an electronic device is exemplified, as Figure 8 shown. The electronic device may include: a processor 810, a communication interface 820, a memory 830, and a communication bus 840. Among them, the processor 810, the communication interface 820, and the memory 830 communicate with each other through the communication bus 840. The processor 810 can call the logical instructions in the memory 830 to execute the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing. The method includes: if the power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task, establishing a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task; wherein, the power edge computing device is deployed on the power edge node; Constructing an independent secure computing space in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox; Periodically verifying the computing program and computing environment in the secure computing space through the trusted measurement root based on the trusted sandbox, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked and tampered with; Executing the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox to obtain the task result corresponding to the power edge computing task; Sending the task result to the task result recipient and destroying the trusted sandbox.

[0094] In addition, when the logical instructions in the above-mentioned memory 830 can be implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for causing a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media such as USB flash drives, mobile hard disks, read-only memories (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memories (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disks, or optical discs that can store program codes.

[0095] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer program product. The computer program product includes a computer program that can be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer can execute the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the above-mentioned various methods. The method includes: if a power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task, a trusted sandbox is established based on the power edge computing task; wherein, the power edge computing device is deployed on the power edge node; Based on the trusted sandbox, an independent secure computing space is constructed in the power edge computing device; Based on the trusted sandbox, the computing programs and computing environments in the secure computing space are periodically verified through a trusted measurement root, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked or tampered with; Based on the trusted sandbox, the power edge computing task is executed to obtain the task result corresponding to the power edge computing task; The task result is sent to the task result recipient, and the trusted sandbox is destroyed.

[0096] On another aspect, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it realizes the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing provided by the above-mentioned various methods. The method includes: if a power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task, a trusted sandbox is established based on the power edge computing task; wherein, the power edge computing device is deployed on the power edge node; Based on the trusted sandbox, an independent secure computing space is constructed in the power edge computing device; Based on the trusted sandbox, the computing program and computing environment within the secure computing space are periodically verified through the root of trust for measurement, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked or tampered with; Execute the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox to obtain the task result corresponding to the power edge computing task; Send the task result to the task result recipient and destroy the trusted sandbox.

[0097] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment. Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand and implement it without creative work.

[0098] Through the description of the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course also by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solutions, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, which can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disc, etc., including several instructions to enable a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.

[0099] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and are not intended to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or perform equivalent replacements for some of the technical features; and these modifications or replacements do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of each embodiment of the present invention.

Claims

1. An application method of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing, characterized in that, Applied to a power edge node, the method includes: If a power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task, a trusted sandbox is established based on the power edge computing task; wherein, the power edge computing device is deployed on the power edge node; An independent secure computing space is constructed in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox; Based on the trusted sandbox, the computing program and computing environment in the secure computing space are periodically verified by a trusted measurement root, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked or tampered with; The power edge computing task is executed based on the trusted sandbox to obtain a task result corresponding to the power edge computing task; The task result is sent to a task result recipient, and the trusted sandbox is destroyed.

2. The application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 1, characterized in that The power edge node includes a service application layer and an operating system layer; The establishing a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task includes: Based on the power edge computing task, a corresponding trusted sandbox container is constructed in the service application layer, and a trusted sandbox trusted application corresponding to the trusted sandbox container is created in the operating system layer.

3. The application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task and establishes a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task, the method further includes: A configuration authentication key is generated based on a configuration authentication TA configured in the power edge node, and a device authentication key pair is sent to a remote measurement service, so that the remote measurement service communicates with the configuration authentication TA and returns a certificate of the configuration authentication key to the configuration authentication TA; An authentication identity key pair is generated based on a CSvTPM configured in the power edge node, and the authentication identity key pair is sent to the configuration authentication TA; Based on the certificate of the configuration authentication key, the authentication identity key pair is signed by the configuration authentication TA to form a certificate of the authentication identity key pair; A verification report is generated based on the CSvTPM and sent to an offeror, so that the offeror generates offer data after the verification report passes; Based on the CSvTPM, the offer data is used as certificate data of the certificate of the authentication identity key pair to obtain a trust chain.

4. The method for applying the trusted sandbox to power edge computing according to claim 1, characterized in that: After the power edge computing task is executed based on the trusted sandbox, the method further includes: If a proof request sent by another power edge node is received, proof information is sent to the other power edge node; wherein, the other power edge node generates a remote proof signature based on the proof information; Request the measurement server to query whether the CSvTPM of the other power edge node is trusted; If it is trusted, based on the remote proof signature and platform log sent by the other power edge node, verify whether the other power edge node is trusted.

5. The application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that, The sending the task result to a task result recipient includes: Obtain the computing flow topology corresponding to the power edge computing task; Based on the computing flow topology, determine the task result recipient, and establish an anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient. Based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing, send the task result to the task result recipient.

6. The application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 5, characterized in that, The establishment of the anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient, and sending the task result to the task result recipient based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing includes: Based on the power edge node and the task result recipient, establish a forwarding path, and use the forwarding path as the anonymous communication channel; Based on the onion routing, encrypt the information of the forwarding path, the task result, and the task result recipient to obtain target encrypted data; According to the forwarding path, forward the encrypted data in sequence until it is sent to the task result recipient.

7. The application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 6, characterized in that, The encrypting the information of the forwarding path, the task result, and the task result recipient based on the onion routing to obtain target encrypted data includes: Encrypt the task result based on the public key of the task result recipient to obtain first encrypted data, and form a first message by combining the first encrypted data with the forwarding path; Generate a symmetric key, and encrypt the first message based on the symmetric key to obtain second encrypted data; Encrypt the symmetric key by the public key of the first routing node of the forwarding path to obtain third encrypted data, and form the target encrypted data based on the second encrypted data and the third encrypted data.

8. An application device of a trusted sandbox in power edge computing, characterized in that, Applied to a power edge node, the device includes: An establishment module configured to, if a power edge computing device receives a power edge computing task, establish a trusted sandbox based on the power edge computing task; wherein the power edge computing device is deployed on the power edge node; A construction module configured to construct an independent secure computing space in the power edge computing device based on the trusted sandbox; A verification module configured to, based on the trusted sandbox, periodically verify the computing program and computing environment in the secure computing space through a root of trust for measurement, so that the computing process of the power edge computing task is not attacked or tampered with; An execution module configured to execute the power edge computing task based on the trusted sandbox to obtain a task result corresponding to the power edge computing task; A first sending module configured to send the task result to a task result recipient and destroy the trusted sandbox.

9. The application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 8, characterized in that, The power edge node includes a service application layer and an operating system layer; The establishment module includes: A construction sub-module configured to construct a corresponding trusted sandbox container in the service application layer based on the power edge computing task, and create a trusted sandbox trusted application corresponding to the trusted sandbox container in the operating system layer.

10. The application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 8, characterized in that, The device for applying the trusted sandbox in power edge computing further includes: The first generation module is configured to generate a configuration authentication key based on the configured configuration authentication TA in the power edge node, and send the device authentication key pair to the remote measurement service, so that the remote measurement service communicates with the configuration authentication TA and returns the certificate of the configuration authentication key to the configuration authentication TA; The second generation module is configured to generate an authentication identity key pair based on the CSvTPM configured in the power edge node, and send the authentication identity key pair to the configuration authentication TA; The signing module is configured to sign the authentication identity key pair based on the certificate of the configuration authentication key through the configuration authentication TA, and form a certificate of the authentication identity key pair; The third generation module is configured to generate a verification report based on the CSvTPM, and send the verification report to the offeror, so that the offeror generates offer data after the verification report passes; The as module is configured to use the offer data as the certificate data of the certificate of the authentication identity key pair based on the CSvTPM to obtain a trust chain.

11. The application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 8, characterized in that, The apparatus for applying the trusted sandbox in power edge computing further includes: The second sending module is configured to send proof information to the other power edge node if a proof request sent by the other power edge node is received; wherein, the other power edge node generates a remote proof signature based on the proof information; The request module is configured to request the measurement server to query whether the CSvTPM of the other power edge node is trustworthy; The verification module is configured to verify whether the other power edge node is trustworthy based on the remote proof signature and the platform log sent by the other power edge node if it is trustworthy.

12. The application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to any one of claims 8 to 11, characterized in that: The first sending module includes: The acquisition sub-module is configured to acquire the computational flow topology corresponding to the power edge computing task; The determination sub-module is configured to determine the task result recipient based on the computational flow topology, establish an anonymous communication channel between the power edge node and the task result recipient, and send the task result to the task result recipient based on the anonymous communication channel and onion routing.

13. The application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 12, characterized in that, The determination sub-module includes: The establishment unit is configured to establish a forwarding path based on the power edge node and the task result recipient, and use the forwarding path as the anonymous communication channel; The encryption processing unit is configured to encrypt the information of the forwarding path, the task result, and the task result recipient based on the onion routing to obtain target encrypted data; The forwarding unit is configured to forward the encrypted data in sequence according to the forwarding path until it is sent to the task result recipient.

14. The application device of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to claim 13, characterized in that, The encryption processing unit includes: The first encryption processing sub-unit is configured to encrypt the task result based on the public key of the task result recipient to obtain first encrypted data, and form a first message with the forwarding path; The second encryption processing sub-unit is configured to generate a symmetric key and encrypt the first message based on the symmetric key to obtain second encrypted data; The third encryption processing subunit is configured to encrypt the symmetric key with the public key of the first routing node on the forwarding path to obtain third encrypted data, and form the target encrypted data based on the second encrypted data and the third encrypted data.

15. An electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein, When the processor executes the program, it implements the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

16. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the application method of the trusted sandbox in power edge computing according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

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