Flying object protection method and device of nuclear power plant, electronic equipment and medium

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of nuclear power plants, in particular to a flying object protection method and device for a nuclear power plant, electronic equipment and a medium. The nuclear power plant flying object protection method can effectively solve the problems in the prior art. According to the method, firstly, through source item analysis of the flying object and configuration of source protection facilities, targeted protection measures are taken at the source where the flying object is generated, and therefore dependence on the follow-up protection stage is reduced; and secondly, through measurement and calculation of the first dissipation energy and supplementary protection operation, specific conditions of different nuclear power plants can be flexibly adapted, and high pertinence and effectiveness of design and implementation of a protection system are ensured. And finally, through the hierarchical protection design, the flying object protection capability of the nuclear power plant is improved, the distribution of protection resources is optimized, and the engineering cost and space occupation are reduced, so that a flexible and efficient protection solution is provided for the complex environment of the nuclear power plant.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of nuclear power plants, and in particular to a method for protecting a nuclear power plant from missiles, a device thereof, electronic equipment, and a medium. Background Art

[0002] Missile protection in nuclear power plants is a crucial component in ensuring their safe operation. Within a nuclear power plant, missiles can originate from high-energy fluid systems, rotating components, or internal explosions. Once they impact safety-related structures or equipment, they can cause common-mode failures, impacting the plant's safety functions.

[0003] Related technologies primarily rely on single protective measures, such as screening out low-probability events through probabilistic analysis, employing thick reinforced concrete barriers, or placing safety items away from the path of missiles. These methods can provide protection to a certain extent, but they also have significant limitations. These technologies lack flexibility in their protective measures and are difficult to adapt to the complex and changing environments and diverse design requirements of nuclear power plants. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The present application aims to solve at least one of the technical problems existing in the related art. To this end, the present application proposes a missile protection method and device, electronic equipment, and medium for a nuclear power plant, which lacks flexibility in protection means and can adapt to the complex and changing environment and different design requirements of a nuclear power plant.

[0005] A missile protection method for a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the first aspect of the present application includes:

[0006] Conducting missile source analysis on nuclear power plant items of the target nuclear power plant to obtain the missile generation probability corresponding to each nuclear power plant item;

[0007] When the missile generation probability satisfies a preset probability condition, source protection facilities are configured for the nuclear power plant item corresponding to the missile generation probability; wherein the nuclear power plant item configured with the source protection facilities is a source protection item;

[0008] Calculating the first dissipated energy of each source protection item to obtain the first dissipated energy of each source protection item;

[0009] performing a supplementary protection operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the first dissipated energy when the target nuclear power plant does not meet a preset protection condition;

[0010] When the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities.

[0011] According to some embodiments of the present application, when the target nuclear power plant does not meet a preset protection condition, performing a supplementary protection operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the first dissipated energy includes:

[0012] In a case where the first dissipated energy satisfies a first warning preset condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant does not satisfy the preset protection condition;

[0013] After determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition, predicting the missile escape path for the source protection items corresponding to the first escape energy to obtain the missile escape path corresponding to each source protection item in the target nuclear power plant;

[0014] Path protection facilities are configured for the missile escape path to reduce the energy generated by the missiles escaping from the source protection facilities.

[0015] According to some embodiments of the present application, configuring a path protection facility for the missile escape path includes:

[0016] The path protection facility is configured in the missile escape path according to at least one of a reinforced concrete barrier, a steel structure barrier, a composite energy absorbing structure and a flexible blocking structure.

[0017] According to some embodiments of the present application, configuring the path protection facility in the missile escape path based on at least one of a reinforced concrete barrier, a steel structure barrier, a composite energy absorbing structure, and a flexible blocking structure includes:

[0018] A reinforced concrete barrier is arranged in the missile dispersion path as the path protection facility, and a fiber reinforced composite material is sprayed on the side of the reinforced concrete barrier away from the source protection item, a steel lining is provided, or a steel plate is provided.

[0019] According to some embodiments of the present application, after configuring a path protection facility for the missile escape path, the method further includes:

[0020] Based on the first dissipated energy, calculating the second dissipated energy of each of the missile dissipation paths to obtain the second dissipated energy of each of the missile dissipation paths;

[0021] The step of performing a protection facility deployment operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facility when the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection condition includes:

[0022] When the first dissipated energy satisfies a first preset warning condition and the second dissipated energy does not satisfy a second preset warning condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant satisfies the preset protection condition;

[0023] After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities and the path protection facilities.

[0024] According to some embodiments of the present application, after calculating the second dissipation energy of each of the missile dissipation paths based on the first dissipation energy to obtain the second dissipation energy of each of the missile dissipation paths, the method further includes:

[0025] When the second dissipated energy satisfies the second warning preset condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition;

[0026] After determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition, in the target nuclear power plant, determining the missile escape path in which the second escape energy meets the second warning preset condition as a target escape path;

[0027] determining missile impact items based on the source protection items and the target escape path;

[0028] A missile protection facility is provided for the missile-affected items to prevent the missiles escaping from the source protection facility from causing damage to the missile-affected items.

[0029] According to some embodiments of the present application, configuring missile protection facilities for the missile impact items includes:

[0030] The missile impact protection facility is configured for the missile impact items based on at least one of protective armor and external energy absorbing structure.

[0031] According to some embodiments of the present application, configuring the missile impact protection facility for the missile impact items based on at least one of protective armor and external energy absorbing structure includes:

[0032] The external energy absorbing structure is configured to be formed according to at least one of foam aluminum, honeycomb structure and rubber;

[0033] The external energy-absorbing structure is determined as the missile-affected protection facility for the missile-affected items.

[0034] According to some embodiments of the present application, after configuring the missile impact protection facilities for the missile impact items, the method further includes:

[0035] Calculating the impact energy of the projectile and the affected items based on the first dissipated energy and the second dissipated energy to obtain the projectile impact energy;

[0036] The step of performing a protection facility deployment operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facility when the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection condition includes:

[0037] When the first dissipated energy satisfies the first preset warning condition, the second dissipated energy satisfies the second preset warning condition, and the projectile impact energy does not satisfy the third preset warning condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant satisfies the preset protection condition;

[0038] After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities, the path protection facilities, and the missile impact protection facilities.

[0039] According to some embodiments of the present application, after calculating the impact energy of the missile and the item affected by the missile based on the first dissipated energy and the second dissipated energy to obtain the impact energy of the missile, the method further includes:

[0040] When the impact energy of the projectile meets the third warning preset condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition;

[0041] After determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, reconfigure the source protection facilities for the source protection items, and return to performing the first dissipated energy measurement for each source protection item based on the source protection items with the reconfigured source protection facilities, until the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions;

[0042] After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities.

[0043] According to some embodiments of the present application, when the missile generation probability satisfies a preset probability condition, configuring source protection facilities for the nuclear power plant item corresponding to the missile generation probability includes:

[0044] When the probability of missile generation satisfies a preset probability condition, the source protection facility is configured for the nuclear power plant item corresponding to the probability of missile generation based on at least one of a source protection cover and a missile restraint component.

[0045] According to some embodiments of the present application, configuring the source protection facility for the nuclear power plant item corresponding to the missile generation probability based on at least one of a source protection cover and a missile restraint component includes:

[0046] The source protection cover is configured to be formed according to at least one of special alloy steel and composite ceramic material;

[0047] The source shield is defined as the missile protection facility for the missile affected items.

[0048] According to the missile protection device of a nuclear power plant according to the second aspect of the present application, the missile protection device is deployed by the protection facility deployment operation in the missile protection method described in any one of the embodiments of the first aspect of the present application.

[0049] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device comprising: a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant as described in any one of the embodiments of the first aspect of the present application.

[0050] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the storage medium stores a program, and the program is executed by a processor to implement the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant as described in any one of the embodiments of the first aspect of the present application.

[0051] The missile protection method, device, electronic equipment, and medium for a nuclear power plant according to the embodiments of the present application have at least the following beneficial effects:

[0052] The nuclear power plant missile protection method of the embodiment of the present application can effectively solve the problems existing in the prior art. First, through missile source analysis and the configuration of source protection facilities, targeted protection measures are taken at the source of missile generation, thereby reducing dependence on subsequent protection stages. Second, through the first escape energy measurement and supplementary protection operations, it can flexibly adapt to the specific conditions of different nuclear power plants, ensuring that the design and implementation of the protection system are highly targeted and effective. Finally, through the hierarchical protection design, not only the missile protection capability of the nuclear power plant is improved, but also the allocation of protection resources is optimized, and the engineering cost and space occupancy are reduced, thereby providing a flexible and efficient protection solution for the complex environment of the nuclear power plant.

[0053] Additional aspects and advantages of the present application will be given in part in the description below, and in part will become obvious from the description below, or will be learned through practice of the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0054] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present application will become apparent and easily understood from the description of the embodiments in conjunction with the following drawings, in which:

[0055] Figure 1 A schematic flow chart of a missile protection method for a nuclear power plant proposed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0056] Figure 2 Another schematic flow chart of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant proposed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0057] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the function of the path protection facility proposed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0058] Figure 4 Another schematic flow chart of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant proposed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0059] Figure 5 Another schematic flow chart of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant proposed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0060] Figure 6 Another schematic flow chart of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant proposed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0061] Figure 7 Another schematic flow chart of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant proposed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0062] Figure 8 Another schematic flow chart of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant proposed in an embodiment of the present application;

[0063] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of the electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0064] The following describes in detail embodiments of the present application. Examples of the embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals throughout represent the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present application and are not to be construed as limiting the present application.

[0065] In the description of this application, "several" means one or more, "many" means more than two, "greater than," "less than," and "exceed" are understood to exclude the number itself, while "above," "below," and "within" are understood to include the number itself. The terms "first" and "second" are used solely to distinguish technical features and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance, or as implicitly specifying the number or order of the technical features indicated.

[0066] In the description of this application, it should be understood that descriptions involving orientations, such as up, down, left, right, front, and back, etc., indicating orientations or positional relationships, are based on the orientations or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings. They are only for the convenience of describing this application and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they cannot be understood as limitations on this application.

[0067] Throughout this specification, reference to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "illustrative embodiments," "examples," "specific examples," or "some examples" means that the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present application. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples.

[0068] In the description of this application, it should be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly defined, terms such as "set," "install," and "connect" should be understood in a broad sense, and those skilled in the art can reasonably determine the specific meanings of the above terms in this application based on the specific content of the technical solution. In addition, the identification of specific steps below does not represent a limitation on the order of steps and execution logic. The execution order and execution logic between each step should be understood and inferred with reference to the content described in the embodiments.

[0069] Missile protection in nuclear power plants is a crucial component in ensuring their safe operation. Within a nuclear power plant, missiles can originate from high-energy fluid systems, rotating components, or internal explosions. Once they impact safety-related structures or equipment, they can cause common-mode failures, impacting the plant's safety functions.

[0070] Specifically, common mode failure (CMF) refers to the simultaneous failure of multiple systems or components in a nuclear power plant or other complex system due to a common cause or factor. This failure mode differs from independent failure, which occurs when each system or component fails due to its own independent cause. Common mode failure can involve the interdependencies between multiple systems or components. When a common factor changes or fails, it can affect multiple parts of the entire system, resulting in the loss of overall system functionality.

[0071] Common-mode failures are a key safety consideration in nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plants consist of many complex systems and components that work together to ensure safe operation. If a common factor, such as a missile strike, causes multiple systems or components to fail simultaneously, the safety of the plant could be severely compromised.

[0072] Related technologies primarily rely on single protective measures, such as using probabilistic analysis to screen out low-probability events, using thick reinforced concrete barriers, or placing safety items away from the path of missiles. These methods can provide protection to a certain extent, but they also have significant limitations. While probabilistic analysis can screen out some low-probability events, its ability to handle high-risk events is limited. While thick reinforced concrete barriers offer strong protection, they increase project costs and floor space. Placing safety items away from the path of missiles can result in an overly large nuclear power plant layout, resulting in wasted space.

[0073] Related technologies are particularly inadequate when dealing with large, complex missiles. For example, single protective measures often fail to effectively address missiles generated by large equipment like steam turbines. These missiles possess high energy and are large in size, making a single barrier or layout adjustment insufficient to completely eliminate the threat.

[0074] Furthermore, the relevant technologies lack flexibility in their protective measures, making them difficult to adapt to the complex and changing environments and diverse design requirements of nuclear power plants. For some specialized locations, new protective materials or structures may need to be developed, further increasing R&D and production costs.

[0075] In general, the relevant technologies have problems in missile protection, such as single protection means, high cost, waste of space and limited protection effect against large and complex missiles. They are difficult to meet the dual requirements of safety and economy of modern nuclear power plants.

[0076] The present application aims to solve at least one of the technical problems existing in the related art. To this end, the present application proposes a missile protection method and device, electronic equipment, and medium for a nuclear power plant, which lacks flexibility in protection means and can adapt to the complex and changing environment and different design requirements of a nuclear power plant.

[0077] The technical solution of this application is further explained below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0078] Reference Figure 1 The missile protection method for a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present application may include:

[0079] Step S101: performing missile source analysis on nuclear power plant items of the target nuclear power plant to obtain the missile generation probability corresponding to each nuclear power plant item;

[0080] Step S102: If the missile generation probability satisfies a preset probability condition, source protection facilities are configured for the nuclear power plant items corresponding to the missile generation probability; wherein the nuclear power plant items configured with source protection facilities are source protection items;

[0081] Step S103: Calculate the first dissipated energy for each source protection item to obtain the first dissipated energy of each source protection item;

[0082] Step S104: if the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition, performing a supplementary protection operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the first dissipated energy;

[0083] Step S105 , when the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities.

[0084] The nuclear power plant missile protection method of the embodiment of the present application can effectively solve the problems existing in the prior art. First, through missile source analysis and the configuration of source protection facilities, targeted protection measures are taken at the source of missile generation, thereby reducing dependence on subsequent protection stages. Second, through the first escape energy measurement and supplementary protection operations, it can flexibly adapt to the specific conditions of different nuclear power plants, ensuring that the design and implementation of the protection system are highly targeted and effective. Finally, through the hierarchical protection design, not only the missile protection capability of the nuclear power plant is improved, but also the allocation of protection resources is optimized, and the engineering cost and space occupancy are reduced, thereby providing a flexible and efficient protection solution for the complex environment of the nuclear power plant.

[0085] In step S101 of some embodiments, missile source item analysis is performed on nuclear power plant items of a target nuclear power plant to obtain a missile generation probability corresponding to each nuclear power plant item;

[0086] It's important to note that conducting missile source analysis on nuclear power plant items at a target nuclear power plant is a fundamental and critical task. This step aims to identify and assess the probability that each item within the nuclear power plant could generate missiles, thereby providing a scientific basis and data support for subsequent protection design. This missile source analysis involves a comprehensive review of various equipment, systems, and operating procedures within the nuclear power plant to determine which items could potentially generate missiles during operation.

[0087] In some embodiments, missile source item analysis for nuclear power plant items of a target nuclear power plant may be performed as follows.

[0088] First, missile source analysis requires identifying critical items within a nuclear power plant. These critical items can include high-energy fluid systems (such as steam and coolant pipes), high-speed rotating mechanical components (such as turbines and pumps), and equipment potentially involved in internal explosions (such as certain types of valves or pressure vessels). These items require special attention because they can generate missiles during normal operation or under specific fault conditions.

[0089] Next, a detailed characterization analysis is conducted for each critical item. This includes evaluating parameters such as operating pressure, temperature, and speed, as well as material properties, geometry, and maintenance history. These factors can affect the probability and characteristics of missile generation. For example, a rupture in a high-pressure pipeline could generate a high-velocity missile, while a fracture in a rapidly rotating turbine blade could create a high-energy missile.

[0090] Next, a probability analysis method is used to estimate the probability of each critical item generating missiles. Probabilistic analysis can be based on historical data, equipment failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods. Through these analyses, it can be determined whether the probability of each item generating missiles exceeds a preset threshold, thereby determining whether it needs to be equipped with source protection facilities. The preset threshold can be determined based on the safety standards and design requirements of the nuclear power plant. For example, the probability threshold may be set at 10 -7 , that is, when the probability of missile incidents occurring each year is lower than this value, the risk can be considered acceptable.

[0091] During the analysis process, various possible accident scenarios and operating conditions can also be comprehensively considered. For example, under the influence of extreme weather conditions, earthquakes, or other external events, the probability of an item generating missiles may increase. Therefore, missile source analysis requires comprehensive consideration of both normal operating conditions and various potential abnormal operating conditions to ensure the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the analysis results.

[0092] In step S102 of some embodiments, if the missile generation probability satisfies a preset probability condition, source protection facilities are configured for nuclear power plant items corresponding to the missile generation probability; wherein the nuclear power plant items configured with source protection facilities are source protection items;

[0093] It's important to note that after the missile source analysis, the nuclear power plant enters the configuration phase of missile source protection facilities. This phase is a concrete response to the analysis results, aiming to implement effective protection measures for items with a high probability of generating missiles, thereby reducing missile risk. Specifically, when the missile generation probability of a nuclear power plant item equals or exceeds a preset probability threshold, appropriate source protection facilities are deployed for that item. These facilities can effectively reduce the likelihood of missile generation or reduce the initial energy of missiles, preventing them from posing a threat to the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0094] In practice, the configuration of source protection facilities can be customized based on the specific characteristics and potential risks of the item. For example, for high-energy fluid systems, such as steam or coolant pipes, pressure relief devices, reinforced pipe walls, or explosion-proof membranes may be installed. These measures can quickly release pressure or limit the spread of debris in the event of a pipe rupture or a sudden increase in pressure. For high-speed rotating mechanical components, such as turbines or centrifugal pumps, sturdy protective covers or shielding devices may need to be installed. These protective covers are made of high-strength materials and can capture fragments when the components break, preventing them from flying into the surrounding area.

[0095] When configuring source protection facilities, their reliability and maintainability must also be considered. Source protection facilities must be able to operate stably throughout the lifecycle of the nuclear power plant and facilitate regular inspection and maintenance. Furthermore, these facilities should be designed to minimize interference with the normal operation of the nuclear power plant, ensuring that they can provide their protective effects without compromising equipment performance.

[0096] After the configuration of source protection facilities is complete, the nuclear power plant items equipped with these facilities are called source protection items. These source protection items will receive additional attention and management to ensure that their protection facilities are always in good working condition. At the same time, relevant data and information on source protection items, such as the design parameters, maintenance records, and performance evaluations of the protection facilities, must be carefully recorded and archived. These records will provide an important basis for subsequent evaluation and improvement of the protection facilities.

[0097] It should be understood that the configuration of source protection facilities is not only the first line of defense in the missile protection system but also provides the foundation for subsequent protection designs. By effectively reducing the probability of missile generation and initial energy, source protection facilities alleviate the pressure on subsequent flight path protection and safety item protection stages. This layered protection design can improve the overall safety performance of nuclear power plants and ensure that the nuclear power plant can maintain the normal operation of its safety functions in the face of missile threats.

[0098] In step S103 of some embodiments, a first dissipated energy is calculated for each source protection item to obtain the first dissipated energy of each source protection item;

[0099] It should be noted that calculating the first dissipated energy for each source protection item is a key step in the missile protection system. This step aims to assess the energy level that may remain in the missile after the source protection facilities are activated, thereby providing an important basis for subsequent protection design. The calculation of the first dissipated energy involves multiple factors, including the physical properties of the missile (such as mass, velocity, and shape), the performance of the source protection facilities (such as material strength and structural design), and the interaction between the missile and the protection facilities.

[0100] In some embodiments, the first dissipated energy calculation for each source protection item can be completed through the following embodiments.

[0101] First, accurate first-pass energy estimation requires an in-depth analysis of the missile's generation mechanism and motion characteristics. This includes understanding parameters such as the missile's initial velocity, direction, mass, and shape. For example, in a high-energy fluid system, a pipe rupture can produce high-speed fragments, whose motion characteristics depend on the pressure at the time of rupture, the properties of the fluid, and the geometry of the pipe. For projectiles generated by rotating mechanical components, such as turbine blade fractures, their motion characteristics are closely related to the component's rotational speed, material properties, and fracture mode.

[0102] Secondly, the measurement process needs to consider the absorption and reduction effect of the source protection facilities on the energy of the missiles. Different protection facilities (such as protective covers, restraints, and energy-absorbing materials) have different design focuses, and their reduction mechanisms for the energy of the missiles are also different. For example, a well-designed protective cover can significantly reduce the kinetic energy of the missile by capturing and restricting its movement; while energy-absorbing materials absorb the energy of the missile by deformation or rupture. Therefore, when measuring the first dissipated energy, it is necessary to evaluate in detail the material properties, structural strength, and geometric design of the protection facilities to reduce the energy of the missile.

[0103] In addition, the calculation of the first dissipated energy also requires the use of appropriate calculation methods and tools. In actual operation, a variety of methods such as probability analysis, numerical simulation and experimental testing can be combined to improve the accuracy of the measurement. Probabilistic analysis can evaluate the uncertainty of the generation and movement of missiles based on historical data and statistical models. Numerical simulation uses tools such as computational fluid dynamics (CFD) or finite element analysis (FEA) to simulate the interaction process between missiles and protective facilities, thereby predicting the dissipated energy of missiles. Experimental testing verifies and calibrates the calculation model through actual impact tests or missile simulation experiments to ensure the reliability of the measurement results.

[0104] This process also allows for comprehensive consideration of various possible operating conditions and boundary conditions. For example, factors such as extreme weather conditions, aging equipment, or improper maintenance can affect the generation and motion characteristics of projectiles. Therefore, performing sensitivity analysis on these potential variables during the first-stage dissipated energy calculation ensures that the results cover all possible scenarios.

[0105] It should be understood that the results of the initial dissipated energy calculation will directly influence the design of subsequent protective measures. If the calculation results indicate that the dissipated energy of the missile still exceeds an acceptable level, additional protective measures will need to be implemented along the flight path, such as adding protective barriers or energy-absorbing structures. Conversely, if the calculation results show that the dissipated energy of the missile has dropped to an acceptable level, the protective facility deployment phase can begin. Therefore, this step not only verifies the effectiveness of the source protection facilities but also constitutes a key component of the overall missile protection system design.

[0106] In step S104 of some embodiments, if the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition, performing a supplementary protection operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the first dissipated energy;

[0107] It should be noted that if a target nuclear power plant still fails to meet the pre-set protection conditions after deploying source protection measures, supplementary protection operations based on the first escape energy are necessary. This means that even though source protection measures have been deployed, the residual energy of the missile may still pose a threat to the safety items of the nuclear power plant. Therefore, additional protection measures must be implemented to further reduce the energy of the missile and ensure that it does not affect the safety functions of the nuclear power plant.

[0108] In some embodiments, when the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, supplementary protection operations are performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the first dissipated energy, which can be achieved through the following embodiments.

[0109] The first step in supplemental protection operations is a detailed analysis of the missile's trajectory. This includes determining the trajectory, velocity, and energy distribution of the missile after it has been impacted by the source protection. This analysis identifies critical areas where the missile may have passed and potential impact points. These areas may include safety-related equipment, control systems, and personnel routes.

[0110] Next, based on the characteristics of the missile and the results of the path analysis, appropriate supplemental protective measures are designed and implemented. These measures may include adding protective barriers, energy-absorbing structures, or flexible interception nets along the missile's path. Protective barriers can be made of reinforced concrete, steel, or other high-strength materials, designed to absorb and disperse the kinetic energy of the missile through physical obstruction. Energy-absorbing structures absorb energy through material deformation or destruction, such as aluminum foam, honeycomb structures, or rubber. Flexible interception nets use their toughness to capture missiles, dissipating their kinetic energy through deformation of the net cables.

[0111] When designing supplementary protective measures, the spatial layout and existing structures of the nuclear power plant can also be considered. For example, walls, floors, or other structures within the nuclear power plant can be reinforced or modified to enhance their ability to withstand missiles. Furthermore, specialized energy-absorbing modules or interception devices can be placed in the missile path. These devices can be fixed or movable, allowing for adjustment as needed.

[0112] It's important to note that supplementary protection measures should also consider both cost-effectiveness and implementation difficulty. While the goal is to minimize the threat of missiles, in practice, a balance must be struck between effectiveness and affordability. Therefore, when designing supplementary protection measures, a detailed cost analysis and effectiveness evaluation is necessary to ensure that the resources invested deliver the greatest possible protection benefits.

[0113] Furthermore, the implementation of supplementary safeguards can be integrated with the overall safety strategy of a nuclear power plant. For example, redundant design can be implemented to ensure that even if some safeguards fail, other systems can still maintain the plant's safety functions. Furthermore, appropriate maintenance and inspection plans should be developed to regularly assess the effectiveness of supplementary safeguards and ensure they are functioning properly when needed.

[0114] It should be understood that the supplementary protection operation in step S104 is a key measure when source protection facilities cannot completely eliminate the missile threat. Through detailed path analysis, reasonable protection design, economic assessment, and continuous maintenance and management, supplementary protection operations can effectively reduce the residual energy of missiles and ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. This step, together with source protection facilities, constitutes a multi-layered protection system, providing comprehensive missile protection for nuclear power plants.

[0115] Reference Figure 2 According to some embodiments of the present application, step S104, when the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, performing a supplementary protection operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the first dissipated energy, may include:

[0116] Step S201: When the first dissipated energy meets the first warning preset condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition;

[0117] Step S202: After determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, predicting the missile escape path for the source protection items corresponding to the first escape energy, and obtaining the missile escape path corresponding to each source protection item in the target nuclear power plant;

[0118] Step S203: configuring path protection facilities for the missile escape path to reduce the energy generated by missiles escaped from the source protection facilities.

[0119] In some embodiments, step S201 is to determine that the target nuclear power plant does not meet a preset protection condition when the first dissipated energy meets a first preset warning condition;

[0120] It should be noted that when the first escaped energy meets the first alert pre-condition, this indicates that despite the implementation of source protection measures, the residual energy of the missile may still pose a threat to the nuclear power plant's critical items. In this case, the nuclear power plant must be determined to have failed to meet the pre-condition, triggering the supplementary protection mechanism. This determination is based on a precise assessment of the first escaped energy, typically involving detailed calculations of factors such as the missile's velocity, mass, and shape. The setting of the first alert pre-condition requires comprehensive consideration of the nuclear power plant's safety standards, equipment tolerances, and historical data to ensure the integrity of critical items is protected to the greatest extent possible in a missile event.

[0121] In some embodiments, step S202, after determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, predicting the missile escape path for the source protection items corresponding to the first fugitive energy, and obtaining the missile escape path corresponding to each source protection item in the target nuclear power plant;

[0122] It should be noted that after confirming that the nuclear power plant does not meet the protection conditions, the next step is to predict the missile escape path of the source protection items. This step requires an in-depth analysis of the trajectory of the missile after the source protection facilities act. Predicting the escape path requires considering many factors, including the speed, direction, mass of the missile and its interaction with the surrounding environment. Using advanced computing tools such as computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation and finite element analysis (FEA), combined with the specific layout and equipment location of the nuclear power plant, it is possible to accurately depict the path that the missile may take. These path analyses are crucial for the subsequent deployment of protection facilities because they point out the key areas and equipment that the missile may hit.

[0123] In step S203 of some embodiments, path protection facilities are configured for the missile escape path to reduce the energy generated by missiles escaping from the source protection facilities.

[0124] It should be noted that deploying path protection facilities along missile escape paths is a key measure for reducing missile energy. The design of path protection facilities is customized based on the characteristics of the missile and the predicted escape path, aiming to further absorb and disperse the missile's kinetic energy. These facilities may include reinforced concrete barriers, steel guardrails, energy-absorbing material modules, or flexible interception nets. Reinforced concrete barriers, with their high strength and impact resistance, are suitable for blocking high-speed missiles; steel guardrails, with their excellent toughness and plasticity, can effectively absorb the kinetic energy of missiles. Energy-absorbing material modules dissipate energy through material deformation or failure, while flexible interception nets use their toughness to capture missiles and absorb kinetic energy through deformation of the net cables. The installation location and design parameters of these facilities must precisely match the predicted escape path to ensure they effectively reduce the energy of missiles as they pass, thereby protecting critical nuclear power plant items from damage.

[0125] It should be understood that each step, from assessing the primary escape energy to predicting the escape path and then deploying path protection facilities, is closely linked, collectively forming a second line of defense for nuclear power plants against missile threats. Through this process, nuclear power plants can effectively address missile threats that cannot be fully eliminated by source protection facilities, significantly improving their overall protection capabilities and ensuring the safe and stable operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0126] In a nuclear power plant's missile protection system, deploying path protection facilities along the missile escape path is a crucial component in ensuring the plant's safe operation. The design and selection of these path protection facilities are directly related to the ability to effectively reduce the energy of missiles and prevent them from damaging critical equipment and safety items.

[0127] According to some embodiments of the present application, path protection facilities configured for missile escape paths can be based on a variety of structural forms, including reinforced concrete barriers, steel structure barriers, composite energy-absorbing structures, and flexible blocking structures. Each of these protection facilities has unique characteristics and applicable scenarios, and can provide effective protection for different missile characteristics and escape paths.

[0128] Reinforced concrete barriers are a type of protective structure widely used in nuclear power plant protection designs due to their high strength and excellent impact resistance. Typically composed of multiple layers of steel and concrete, these barriers effectively absorb and disperse the kinetic energy of projectiles. When deploying a reinforced concrete barrier within a projectile escape path, the thickness and structure of the barrier must be designed based on the characteristics of the projectile and the predicted impact energy. While reinforced concrete barriers offer advantages in durability and reliability, their disadvantages include a long construction period and the large space they require. Therefore, the design must comprehensively consider the spatial layout and construction conditions of the nuclear power plant.

[0129] Steel structure barriers are another type of path protection facility, which are characterized by high strength and good toughness, and can effectively absorb the kinetic energy of missiles. Steel structure barriers are usually made of high-strength steel and can be designed in various forms, such as steel plates, steel beams or steel mesh. These structures can disperse the impact force of missiles through the interaction between layers, thereby reducing their energy. The advantage of steel structure barriers lies in their flexibility in design and installation, which can be customized according to the escape path and energy of the missile. In addition, the construction period of steel structure barriers is relatively short, making them suitable for use in areas with limited space. However, the cost of steel structure barriers is relatively high, and more complex structural designs may be required when facing extremely high-energy missiles.

[0130] Composite energy-absorbing structures are another form of protection. Their core goal is to gradually absorb the energy of projectiles through a multi-layer composite design. This composite energy-absorbing structure can be composed of layers of materials with varying properties, such as high-strength steel, aluminum foam, or composite fiber. Each layer of material deforms or breaks upon impact, dissipating the projectile's kinetic energy. The design of a composite energy-absorbing structure requires precise calculation of the energy absorption capacity and deformation characteristics of each layer to ensure that the overall structure can effectively withstand impacts from projectiles. This structure is particularly suitable for protection against high-energy projectiles, but its design and manufacturing costs are relatively high, necessitating a balance between protective effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in practical applications.

[0131] Flexible barrier structures are another option among path protection facilities, and their characteristic is that they intercept and weaken the energy of missiles through the toughness of flexible materials. Flexible barrier structures are usually composed of high-strength steel cables, composite fiber ropes or flexible fabrics, which can effectively intercept small and medium-sized missiles and absorb their kinetic energy through the deformation of the material. The advantages of flexible barrier structures are that they are low in cost, easy to install, and occupy less space inside the nuclear power plant. However, the protective capability of flexible barrier structures is limited, and they are mainly suitable for the protection of low-energy or small and medium-sized missiles. When facing high-energy or large missiles, flexible barrier structures may not be able to completely eliminate the threat, so they usually need to be used in combination with other protective measures.

[0132] According to some embodiments of the present application, configuring a path protection facility in a missile escape path based on at least one of a reinforced concrete barrier, a steel structure barrier, a composite energy absorbing structure, and a flexible blocking structure may include:

[0133] A reinforced concrete barrier is arranged as a path protection facility in the missile dispersion path, and fiber-reinforced composite materials are sprayed on the side of the reinforced concrete barrier away from the source protection items, a steel lining is installed, or a steel plate is installed.

[0134] In practical applications, the selection and design of path protection facilities can comprehensively consider the characteristics of the missiles, the escape path, the spatial layout of the nuclear power plant, and the specific requirements of the protection target. For example, in critical areas of the missile escape path, reinforced concrete barriers and steel structure barriers can be combined to provide multi-layered protection. At the same time, flexible blocking structures can be installed in the early stages of the path to intercept and weaken low-energy missiles, thereby reducing the burden on subsequent protection stages. Furthermore, composite energy-absorbing structures can be used to protect critical equipment and safety items, ensuring that even if missiles penetrate the initial layers of protection, they will not cause fatal damage.

[0135] Reference Figure 3 The embodiment of the present application shown, Figure 3 The figure shows a schematic diagram of missile source items, path protection facilities and protected items. Path protection facilities include barriers and nets, which are key components for reducing missile energy. Barriers and nets provide physical barriers along the escape path of missiles to reduce the potential threat of missiles to protected items. Barriers can be made of materials such as reinforced concrete or steel structures, and are designed to absorb and disperse the kinetic energy of missiles through their strength and toughness. Nets are flexible structures, usually made of high-strength steel cables or fibers, that intercept and weaken the energy of missiles through their toughness. The layout and design of these facilities need to be customized according to the characteristics of the missiles and the predicted escape path to ensure effective protection.

[0136] In short, the configuration of path protection facilities is a critical component of a nuclear power plant's missile protection system. By rationally selecting and combining various protective measures, such as reinforced concrete barriers, steel structure barriers, composite energy-absorbing structures, and flexible barrier structures, the dissipated energy of missiles can be effectively reduced, protecting critical equipment and safety items in the nuclear power plant. This layered, multi-faceted protection design not only improves nuclear power plant safety but also provides a flexible solution for complex environments. In practical applications, an optimized protection plan must be developed based on the characteristics of the missiles, their dissipation paths, and the specific circumstances of the nuclear power plant to ensure the plant's safety functions remain operational when faced with missile threats.

[0137] In step S105 of some embodiments, when the target nuclear power plant meets preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities.

[0138] It should be noted that once the target nuclear power plant meets the pre-set protection conditions after the deployment of source protection facilities, that is, the escape energy of missiles has been reduced to an acceptable level, the protection facilities will enter the deployment phase. This step marks the final implementation of the nuclear power plant's missile protection system and ensures that the protection facilities can effectively protect the nuclear power plant's key items and safety functions.

[0139] It should be understood that the deployment of protective facilities in step S105 is a critical step, performed only after the nuclear power plant meets the pre-set protection conditions. By ensuring the correct installation, integration, and operation of source protection facilities, the nuclear power plant can effectively defend against the threat of missiles and ensure the proper performance of its safety functions. This step not only marks the completion of the missile protection system but also provides a solid guarantee for the long-term safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0140] Reference Figure 4 According to some embodiments of the present application, after configuring a path protection facility for the missile escape path in step S203, the following steps may also be included:

[0141] Step S401: Calculate the second dissipation energy of each missile dissipation path based on the first dissipation energy to obtain the second dissipation energy of each missile dissipation path;

[0142] In step S105, when the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, based on the source protection facilities, the protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant, which may include:

[0143] Step S402: determining that the target nuclear power plant meets a preset protection condition when the first dissipated energy meets a first preset warning condition and the second dissipated energy does not meet a second preset warning condition;

[0144] Step S403: After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities and the path protection facilities.

[0145] In step S401 of some embodiments, based on the first dissipated energy, a second dissipated energy is calculated for each missile dissipation path to obtain the second dissipated energy for each missile dissipation path;

[0146] It should be noted that based on the first dissipated energy, the second dissipated energy is calculated for each missile dissipation path. The first dissipated energy refers to the energy dissipated by the missile after the source protection facilities act on it, while the second dissipated energy is the remaining energy after the path protection facilities further reduce the missile energy on this basis. This calculation step needs to comprehensively consider the type and layout of the path protection facilities and the characteristics of the missiles. For example, if the path protection facility is a reinforced concrete barrier, it is necessary to calculate the remaining energy after the missile penetrates the barrier based on its thickness, material strength, and the impact angle and speed of the missile; if it is a flexible blocking structure, it is necessary to consider the effect of its toughness, weaving density and other factors on the absorption of the missile's kinetic energy. Through precise numerical simulation and engineering calculations, the second dissipated energy of each missile dissipation path is obtained, thereby providing data support for the subsequent judgment of whether the protection conditions are met.

[0147] In step S402 of some embodiments, when the first dissipated energy satisfies a first preset warning condition and the second dissipated energy does not satisfy a second preset warning condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant satisfies a preset protection condition;

[0148] It should be noted that if the first fugitive energy meets the first warning preset condition, but the second fugitive energy does not meet the second warning preset condition, the target nuclear power plant is determined to meet the preset protection condition. The first warning preset condition can be set based on nuclear power plant safety standards and is used to determine whether the energy of the missile remains at a high risk level after source protection. When the first fugitive energy reaches or exceeds this condition, it means that although the source protection facilities have been effective, the residual energy of the missile is still high, posing a potential risk. The second warning preset condition is a more stringent energy threshold used to assess whether the missile energy has been reduced to a safe level after being reduced by the path protection facilities. If the second fugitive energy does not meet the second warning preset condition, it indicates that the path protection facilities have effectively reduced the missile energy to an acceptable range. At this point, it can be determined that the nuclear power plant as a whole meets the preset protection conditions, that is, it has met the requirements for safe operation in terms of missile protection.

[0149] In step S403 of some embodiments, after determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities and the path protection facilities.

[0150] It should be noted that after confirming that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, the deployment of protective facilities is carried out based on the source protection facilities and path protection facilities. This step is a critical step in officially installing and commissioning the proven and effective protective facilities. During the deployment process, the stability and reliability of the source protection facilities and path protection facilities must be ensured. For source protection facilities, their compatibility with the relevant equipment must be checked to ensure that they will not fail due to factors such as vibration and temperature fluctuations during equipment operation. Path protection facilities must be precisely installed in key locations based on the predicted missile escape path to ensure that they can accurately function when missiles pass through. At the same time, a comprehensive monitoring and maintenance mechanism must be established to regularly inspect, test, and maintain the protective facilities, promptly identify and address potential problems, and ensure the continued effective operation of the protective facilities throughout the nuclear power plant's lifecycle.

[0151] It should be understood that through this series of rigorous deployment and management measures, a reliable nuclear power plant missile protection system will eventually be established, providing solid guarantees for the safe and stable operation of nuclear power plants.

[0152] Reference Figure 5According to some embodiments of the present application, after calculating the second dissipation energy of each missile dissipation path based on the first dissipation energy in step S401 to obtain the second dissipation energy of each missile dissipation path, the method further includes:

[0153] Step S501: determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet a preset protection condition when the second dissipated energy meets a second warning preset condition;

[0154] Step S502: after determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition, in the target nuclear power plant, determining the missile escape path whose second escape energy meets the second warning preset condition as the target escape path;

[0155] Step S503, determining the items affected by the missile based on the source protection items and the target escape path;

[0156] Step S504: configuring missile protection facilities for the missile-affected items to prevent missiles emitted from the source protection facilities from causing damage to the missile-affected items.

[0157] In some embodiments, step S501 is to determine that the target nuclear power plant does not meet a preset protection condition when the second dissipated energy meets a second warning preset condition;

[0158] It should be noted that after calculating the second escape energy for each missile escape path, the next step is to determine whether the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions. Specifically, if the second escape energy meets the second warning preset condition, the target nuclear power plant is determined to not meet the preset protection conditions. The second warning preset condition is a more stringent energy threshold used to determine whether the missile energy, after being reduced by the path protection facilities, is still too high, posing a potential safety risk. If the second escape energy reaches or exceeds this condition, it indicates that the current protection measures are insufficient to reduce the missile energy to a safe level, and the nuclear power plant still faces a high risk.

[0159] In step S502 of some embodiments, after determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition, in the target nuclear power plant, a missile escape path whose second escape energy meets the second warning preset condition is determined as a target escape path;

[0160] It's important to note that after determining that a target nuclear power plant fails to meet the pre-set protection conditions, further investigation is needed to determine which missile escape paths are the key factors contributing to this failure. Specifically, within the target nuclear power plant, missile escape paths whose second escape energy meets the pre-set second alert conditions are designated as target escape paths. This step aims to identify specific paths where missile energy remains excessively high even after path protection measures have been applied, allowing for more in-depth analysis and resolution of these paths. This approach allows for precise identification of the problem, providing a basis for optimizing subsequent protection measures.

[0161] In step S503 of some embodiments, based on the source shielding items and the target escape path, determining the items affected by the missile;

[0162] It should be noted that based on the source protection items and the target escape path, the next step is to determine the items affected by the missiles. This step requires analyzing the trajectory of the missiles on the escape path, as well as the range and items they may affect. By simulating the movement path and energy distribution of the missiles, combined with the layout of the nuclear power plant and the location of the equipment, it is possible to identify the equipment and systems that may be affected by the missiles. These items are called missile-affected items, and they may include key safety equipment, control systems or other important facilities. Identifying the items affected by the missiles is a key step in ensuring the pertinence and effectiveness of protective measures, as it directly points out the specific targets that need further protection.

[0163] In step S504 of some embodiments, missile protection facilities are configured for the missile-affected items to prevent missiles emitted from the source protection facilities from causing damage to the missile-affected items.

[0164] It should be noted that missile protection facilities are installed for items affected by missiles to prevent them from being damaged by missiles escaping from the source protection facilities. This step aims to further reduce the risk of damage from missiles by providing additional protective measures for affected items. The design of missile protection facilities must be customized based on the characteristics of the specific items and the missiles. For example, critical safety equipment may require protective covers or barriers to absorb and disperse the kinetic energy of missiles. For instruments and equipment requiring high precision, flexible blocking structures or other sophisticated protective measures may be required. The installation of these protective facilities must ensure compatibility with existing equipment and minimize interference with the normal operation of the nuclear power plant. Furthermore, appropriate maintenance and inspection plans must be developed to ensure the long-term and stable functioning of these protective facilities and safeguard the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0165] It should be understood that through the above steps, nuclear power plants can effectively identify and address weak links in the missile protection system, continuously improve protection measures, ensure that when facing the threat of missiles, they can minimize risks and ensure the safe and stable operation of nuclear power plants.

[0166] According to some embodiments of the present application, step S504 of configuring missile protection facilities for missile impact items may include:

[0167] Based on at least one of protective armor and external energy absorbing structure, missile protection facilities are configured for missile impact items.

[0168] In the design of missile protection for nuclear power plants, configuring protective facilities for items affected by missiles is a key step in ensuring safety. According to some embodiments of the present application, this can be achieved through the use of technical means such as protective armor and external energy-absorbing structures.

[0169] Protective armor is a form of defense that utilizes high-strength, high-toughness materials to form a solid barrier against the impact of projectiles. Special alloy steels and composite ceramics are widely used in protective armor due to their superior impact resistance. These materials effectively absorb and disperse the kinetic energy of projectiles, reducing their destructive power on the objects being protected. For example, installing multiple layers of high-strength steel armor around critical equipment can effectively resist direct impact from projectiles and protect the core components within. The design of protective armor must take into account the characteristics of projectiles and the possible angles of impact to ensure its effectiveness. Its modular design facilitates installation and maintenance and can be flexibly adjusted to meet specific needs.

[0170] External energy-absorbing structures absorb the kinetic energy of projectiles by deforming or breaking the material, reducing their impact. These structures typically consist of multiple layers of materials with varying properties, such as aluminum foam, honeycomb structures, or rubber. Upon impact, these materials plastically deform or fracture, gradually dissipating the projectile's energy. For example, external energy-absorbing modules placed around critical items can effectively mitigate impact forces and protect them from damage. While external energy-absorbing structures are suitable for protecting against high-energy projectiles, they are relatively costly, requiring a balanced consideration of both effectiveness and affordability.

[0171] In summary, by equipping missile-affected items with protective armor and external energy-absorbing structures, the risk of damage from missiles can be effectively reduced, improving the safety of nuclear power plants. These measures are an important component of a nuclear power plant's missile protection system, helping to ensure the plant's safe and stable operation in the face of missile threats.

[0172] Reference Figure 6 According to some embodiments of the present application, configuring missile protection facilities for projectiles and items based on at least one of protective armor and external energy-absorbing structures may include:

[0173] Step S601, configuring an external energy-absorbing structure using at least one of foamed aluminum, a honeycomb structure, and rubber;

[0174] Step S602: Determine the external energy absorbing structure as a missile protection facility for missile impact items.

[0175] In step S601 of some embodiments, an external energy absorbing structure is configured based on at least one of foamed aluminum, a honeycomb structure, and rubber;

[0176] It should be noted that when configuring missile protection facilities for items impacted by missiles, an external energy-absorbing structure can be configured using at least one of aluminum foam, a honeycomb structure, and rubber. Aluminum foam is a porous material whose internal bubbles rapidly deform and absorb significant amounts of energy upon impact. This material not only possesses excellent energy-absorbing properties but also possesses high strength and low density. Therefore, it can effectively enhance the impact resistance of protective facilities without significantly increasing the weight of the structure. Aluminum foam can be processed into various shapes and sizes to suit the protection requirements of different items.

[0177] Honeycomb structures, with their unique geometry, offer exceptional energy absorption. Materials composed of honeycomb cells absorb and disperse energy through deformation and collapse upon impact. This structure reduces weight while providing high strength and stiffness, leading to its widespread use in aerospace and defense. In nuclear power plant missile defense, honeycomb structures can be used as external energy-absorbing structures, installed on the exterior of critical equipment to protect it from direct impact with missiles.

[0178] As a highly elastic material, rubber is used in energy-absorbing structures for its excellent energy absorption capacity and toughness. Rubber elastically deforms when subjected to impact, absorbing and dissipating significant amounts of impact energy. Furthermore, rubber exhibits excellent environmental stability and durability, maintaining its performance over time in the complex environment of nuclear power plants. Rubber can be fashioned into energy-absorbing components of various shapes and sizes, such as rubber pads and blocks, to meet diverse protection requirements.

[0179] In step S602 of some embodiments, the external energy absorbing structure is determined as a missile impact protection facility for the missile impact item.

[0180] It should be noted that when configuring external energy-absorbing structures, appropriate materials and structural forms can be selected based on the characteristics of the projectiles and the specific requirements of the protection target. For example, for high-speed, high-energy projectiles, a multi-layer composite structure can be used, combining the advantages of foamed aluminum and honeycomb structures to achieve better energy absorption. For low-speed, low-energy projectiles, rubber materials may be sufficient to provide adequate protection. Furthermore, the design of the external energy-absorbing structure must also consider its ease of installation and maintainability to ensure easy inspection and maintenance during routine operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0181] Once an external energy-absorbing structure is designated as a missile protection device for an item, it must be tightly integrated with the item to maximize its effectiveness. During installation, the shape, size, and location of the item, as well as the possible angle and direction of impact from missiles, must be considered. The external energy-absorbing structure must be securely fastened to the surface of the item to prevent displacement or dislodging upon impact. Performance testing of the installed energy-absorbing structure is also required to verify its ability to meet the required energy absorption capacity and protection.

[0182] Throughout the lifecycle of a nuclear power plant, external energy absorption structures require regular inspection and maintenance. Inspections should include structural integrity, material degradation, and connection conditions. Any damage or signs of degradation detected should be promptly repaired or replaced to ensure the energy absorption structure's protective performance is not compromised. Furthermore, as nuclear power plant operating experience accumulates and technology advances, energy absorption structures may need to be optimized and upgraded to meet new protection requirements and enhance their effectiveness.

[0183] It should be understood that by configuring an external energy-absorbing structure using at least one of foamed aluminum, honeycomb, and rubber as a missile protection device, the risk of damage to items caused by missiles can be effectively reduced. This step is a crucial component of a nuclear power plant's missile protection system, helping to ensure the plant's safe and stable operation in the face of missile threats.

[0184] Reference Figure 7 According to some embodiments of the present application, after configuring missile protection facilities for missile impact items in step S504, the following steps may also be included:

[0185] Step S701, calculating the impact energy of the projectile and the item affected by the projectile based on the first dissipated energy and the second dissipated energy to obtain the impact energy of the projectile;

[0186] In step S105, when the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, based on the source protection facilities, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant, which may include:

[0187] Step S702: determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection condition when the first dissipated energy meets the first preset warning condition, the second dissipated energy meets the second preset warning condition, and the projectile impact energy does not meet the third preset warning condition;

[0188] Step S703: After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities, the path protection facilities and the missile impact protection facilities.

[0189] In some embodiments, step S701 measures the impact energy of the projectile and the item affected by the projectile based on the first dissipated energy and the second dissipated energy to obtain the impact energy of the projectile;

[0190] It should be noted that after configuring protective measures for missile impact items, the impact energy of the missile impact items can be calculated based on the first and second dissipated energies to obtain the missile impact energy. This step aims to comprehensively consider the residual energy of the missile after it has been impacted by both source and path protection facilities, as well as the potential impact of this energy on the items. The first dissipated energy reflects the energy level of the missile after source protection, while the second dissipated energy further accounts for the energy reduction effect of path protection facilities. By combining these two energy parameters, the impact energy of the missile when it ultimately impacts the affected items can be more accurately calculated. This calculation process requires consideration of multiple factors, including the mass, velocity, shape, and material properties of the missile, as well as the energy absorption capacity of the protective measures and the impact resistance of the items. Determining the missile impact energy through precise numerical simulation and engineering calculations provides critical data support for subsequent determination of whether the nuclear power plant meets the protection requirements.

[0191] In some embodiments, in step S702, when the first dissipated energy satisfies a first preset warning condition, the second dissipated energy satisfies a second preset warning condition, and the projectile impact energy does not satisfy a third preset warning condition, it is determined that the target nuclear power plant satisfies a preset protection condition;

[0192] It should be noted that the first alert preset condition is used to determine whether the energy of a missile after source protection is at a high-risk level; the second alert preset condition is used to assess the energy reduction effectiveness of path protection facilities; and the third alert preset condition is the energy threshold for missile impacts. If the missile impact energy does not reach the third alert preset condition, it means that the coordinated action of multiple layers of protection facilities has reduced the missile impact energy to a safe level that the items can withstand. At this point, it can be determined that the nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, that is, it has sufficient protection capabilities to withstand missile impacts.

[0193] In some embodiments, in step S703, after determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities, the path protection facilities, and the missile impact protection facilities.

[0194] It should be noted that after confirming that the nuclear power plant meets the pre-set protection conditions, the next step is to deploy the protection facilities based on the source protection, path protection, and missile impact protection. This step marks the final implementation phase of the protection system, which involves the formal installation of all designed protection facilities within the nuclear power plant and ensuring their seamless integration with existing systems. During the deployment process, the stability and reliability of each protection facility must be ensured. Source protection facilities must work closely with related equipment. Path protection facilities should be installed in key locations to effectively reduce the energy of missiles. Missile impact protection facilities must be securely installed around impacted items to ensure they can provide the intended protective effect in the event of a missile impact. Furthermore, a comprehensive monitoring and maintenance mechanism must be established to regularly inspect, test, and maintain the protection facilities, promptly identify and address potential problems, and ensure the continued effective operation of the protection facilities throughout the nuclear power plant's lifecycle. Through this series of rigorous deployment and management measures, a reliable nuclear power plant missile protection system will be established, providing a solid foundation for the safe and stable operation of the plant.

[0195] Reference Figure 8 According to some embodiments of the present application, after calculating the impact energy of the missile and the item based on the first dissipated energy and the second dissipated energy in step S701 to obtain the impact energy of the missile, the method further includes:

[0196] Step S801: When the impact energy of the projectile meets the third warning preset condition, it is determined that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition;

[0197] Step S802: After determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, reconfigure the source protection facilities for the source protection items, and return to executing the first dissipated energy measurement for each source protection item based on the source protection items with the reconfigured source protection facilities, until the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions;

[0198] Step S803: After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities.

[0199] In some embodiments, step S801 is to determine that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition when the impact energy of the projectile meets the third warning preset condition;

[0200] It should be noted that if the impact energy of a missile meets the third alert pre-condition, the target nuclear power plant is determined to not meet the pre-condition protection requirements. The third alert pre-condition is a strict energy threshold used to assess whether the impact energy of a missile exceeds the safety range that the item can withstand. When the impact energy reaches or exceeds this condition, it indicates that the current protective measures are insufficient to withstand the impact of the missile, and the nuclear power plant faces a high safety risk.

[0201] In step S802 of some embodiments, after determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, source protection facilities are reconfigured for the source protection items, and based on the source protection items with the reconfigured source protection facilities, the first dissipated energy measurement is performed for each source protection item until the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions.

[0202] It should be noted that after determining that a nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, measures need to be taken to reconfigure the source protection facilities to enhance the protection effect. The specific operation may be to reconfigure the source protection facilities for the source protection items. This may include upgrading the material of the protective cover, increasing the strength of the restraints, or improving the design of the equipment to more effectively reduce the probability of missile generation or weaken its initial energy. After reconfiguring the source protection facilities, it is necessary to return to perform the first dissipated energy measurement for each source protection item to verify whether the new protection measures are effective. This process may require multiple iterations until the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, that is, the impact energy of the missile is reduced to below the third alert preset conditions.

[0203] In step S803 of some embodiments, after determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities.

[0204] It should be noted that after confirming that the target nuclear power plant meets the pre-set protection conditions, the deployment of protective facilities is carried out based on the source protection facilities, path protection facilities, and missile impact protection facilities. This step is the final stage of the protection system implementation and ensures that all designed protective facilities are properly installed and put into use. During the deployment process, it is necessary to ensure that the source protection facilities are closely coordinated with the relevant equipment, that the path protection facilities are installed in key locations to effectively reduce the energy of the missiles, and that the missile impact protection facilities are securely installed around the impacted items to resist the impact of the missiles.

[0205] According to some embodiments of the present application, when the missile generation probability satisfies a predetermined probability condition, configuring source protection facilities for nuclear power plant items corresponding to the missile generation probability may include:

[0206] When the probability of missile generation meets the preset probability conditions, source protection facilities are configured for nuclear power plant items corresponding to the probability of missile generation based on at least one of the source protection cover and the missile restraint component.

[0207] Source protection is a critical first step in a nuclear power plant's missile protection system. When the probability of missile generation meets pre-defined probabilistic conditions—that is, when a probabilistic analysis indicates that the risk of missile generation from certain nuclear power plant items exceeds an acceptable threshold—effective source protection facilities must be deployed for these items. According to some embodiments of the present application, this can be achieved through the use of source protection covers and missile containment devices.

[0208] Specifically, a source shield is a physical barrier designed to directly prevent the formation of missiles or reduce their initial energy. These shields are usually made of high-strength, impact-resistant materials, such as special alloy steels or composite ceramic materials, and can withstand impact forces under extreme conditions. For example, in high-energy fluid systems, such as steam pipes or coolant pipes, installing shields can effectively capture and confine fragments generated when the pipes rupture, preventing them from flying into the surrounding area. The design of the shield needs to consider many factors, including the possible speed, direction and mass of the missiles, as well as the operating environment and maintenance requirements of the equipment. Reasonable shield design can not only effectively reduce the risk of missiles, but also minimize interference with the normal operation of the equipment.

[0209] Missile restraints are another important source protection measure that prevents the formation of potential missiles by limiting their movement. Restraints can be sturdy metal frames, high-strength straps, or other forms of fixing devices used to limit the displacement of equipment components in the event of a fault. For example, in high-speed rotating mechanical components such as turbines or centrifugal pumps, installing restraints can prevent fragments from flying when blades break, thereby protecting the safety of surrounding equipment and personnel. The design of restraints needs to be customized according to the specific equipment characteristics and potential failure modes to ensure that the movement of components can be effectively restricted under various operating conditions.

[0210] When configuring source protection facilities, multiple factors must be considered, including the characteristics of the projectiles, the equipment's operating environment, and the reliability and maintainability of the protection facilities. For example, for piping in high-energy fluid systems, in addition to protective covers, restraints may be required to provide more comprehensive protection. Furthermore, the design of the protection facilities should also consider their impact on equipment heat dissipation and maintenance operations, ensuring that while providing effective protection, they do not unnecessarily hinder the normal operation and routine maintenance of the equipment.

[0211] After the source protection facilities are deployed, they must undergo regular inspection and maintenance to ensure they remain in good working order. This includes checking the integrity and tightness of the shields and restraints, as well as their fit with the equipment, to promptly identify and correct any potential problems. These measures ensure that the source protection facilities continue to function effectively throughout the lifecycle of the nuclear power plant, reducing the probability of missile generation and providing a solid foundation for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0212] According to some embodiments of the present application, configuring source protection facilities for nuclear power plant items corresponding to missile generation probabilities based on at least one of source protection covers and missile containment components may include:

[0213] A source protection cover is formed by configuring at least one of special alloy steel and composite ceramic material;

[0214] The source shield is defined as the missile protection facility for missile-affected items.

[0215] It should be noted that in the missile protection system of a nuclear power plant, the source shield is one of the key protection components. According to some embodiments of the present application, the configuration of the source shield involves the selection of high-performance materials such as special alloy steels and composite ceramic materials to ensure that the shield can effectively resist the impact of missiles under extreme conditions. These materials not only have high strength and high toughness, but can also withstand special environmental factors such as high temperature and high pressure in nuclear power plants. Special alloy steel is widely used in the manufacture of shields due to its excellent mechanical properties and environmental stability. Through special heat treatment processes and alloy composition design, special alloy steel can maintain high strength while having good toughness and impact resistance. Composite ceramic materials, with their high hardness and low density, provide excellent impact protection while reducing the weight of the shield. The rational selection and application of these materials ensure the reliability of the source shield in various potential missile events.

[0216] When configuring source shields, customized design and manufacturing are required based on the specific characteristics of nuclear power plant items and the probability of missile generation. For example, for pipes and valves in high-energy fluid systems, the design of the shields must consider their shape, size, and mounting interface with the equipment to ensure they fit snugly against the equipment surface and form an effective protective barrier. Furthermore, the structural design of the shields must take into account the equipment's heat dissipation requirements and the feasibility of routine maintenance, to ensure that the shield's installation does not affect the normal operation and maintenance of the equipment.

[0217] After the configuration of the source shield is completed, it is identified as a missile protection facility for missile-affected items. This means that the shield must not only protect the nuclear power plant items it directly covers, but also provide protection for other related items that may be affected by missiles. For example, when the shield of a certain equipment successfully blocks the escape of missiles, it also indirectly protects surrounding equipment from direct impact by missiles. Therefore, the source shield plays a dual role in the nuclear power plant's missile protection system. It is both the first line of defense for source protection and an important node in the overall protection network. Through reasonable design, material selection, and installation, the source shield can effectively reduce the probability of missile generation and mitigate its potential threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant, providing important guarantees for the safe and stable operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0218] According to the missile protection device of a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present application, the missile protection device is deployed by the protection facility deployment operation in any missile protection method of the embodiment of the first aspect of the present application.

[0219] It can be seen that the contents of the above-mentioned embodiments of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant are applicable to the embodiments of the missile protection device for this nuclear power plant. The functions specifically implemented by the embodiments of the missile protection device for this nuclear power plant are the same as those in the above-mentioned embodiments of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved by the above-mentioned embodiments of the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant.

[0220] Reference Figure 9 , Figure 9 The hardware structure of an electronic device according to another embodiment is shown. The electronic device may include:

[0221] The processor 901 can be implemented as a general-purpose CPU (Central Processing Unit), a microprocessor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits, and is used to execute relevant programs to implement the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application;

[0222] The memory 902 can be implemented in the form of a read-only memory (ROM), a static storage device, a dynamic storage device, or a random access memory (RAM). The memory 902 can store an operating system and other application programs. When the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this specification are implemented through software or firmware, the relevant program code is stored in the memory 902 and is called by the processor 901 to execute the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant in the embodiments of this application.

[0223] Input / output interface 903, used to implement information input and output;

[0224] Communication interface 904, used to implement communication interaction between this device and other devices, which can be achieved through wired means (such as USB, network cable, etc.) or wireless means (such as mobile network, WiFi, Bluetooth, etc.);

[0225] Bus 905 , which transmits information between various components of the device (e.g., processor 901 , memory 902 , input / output interface 903 , and communication interface 904 );

[0226] The processor 901 , the memory 902 , the input / output interface 903 and the communication interface 904 are connected to each other in communication within the device via a bus 905 .

[0227] The present application also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program. A processor of a computer device reads and executes the computer program, so that the computer device implements the above-mentioned missile protection method for a nuclear power plant.

[0228] The terms "first," "second," "third," "fourth," and the like (if any) in the specification of the present disclosure and the accompanying drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a particular order or precedence. It should be understood that the terms used in this manner are interchangeable where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present disclosure described herein, for example, can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "comprises" and "comprising," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, e.g., a process, method, system, product, or apparatus comprising a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such process, method, product, or apparatus.

[0229] It should be understood that in the present disclosure, "at least one (item)" refers to one or more, and "plurality" refers to two or more. "And / or" is used to describe the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that three relationships may exist. For example, "A and / or B" can mean: only A exists, only B exists, and A and B exist at the same time, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the previous and next associated objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one of the following items" or similar expressions refers to any combination of these items, including any combination of single items or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b or c can mean: a, b, c, "a and b", "a and c", "b and c", or "a and b and c", where a, b, c can be single or multiple.

[0230] It should be understood that in the description of the embodiments of the present application, multiple (or multiple items) means more than two, greater than, less than, exceed, etc. are understood to exclude the number itself, and above, below, within, etc. are understood to include the number itself.

[0231] In the several embodiments provided in the present disclosure, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely schematic. For example, the division of units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0232] Units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of these units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0233] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present disclosure may be integrated into a single processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into a single unit. The aforementioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional units.

[0234] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present disclosure, or the part that contributes to the relevant technology, or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the various embodiments of the present disclosure. The aforementioned storage medium may include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk or optical disk, etc., various media that can store program codes.

[0235] It should also be understood that the various implementation methods provided in the embodiments of the present application can be combined arbitrarily to achieve different technical effects.

[0236] The above is a specific description of the implementation methods of the present disclosure, but the present disclosure is not limited to the above implementation methods. Those skilled in the art can make various equivalent modifications or substitutions without violating the spirit of the present disclosure. These equivalent modifications or substitutions are all included in the scope defined by the claims of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A method for protecting a nuclear power plant from missiles, characterized in that: include: Conducting missile source analysis on nuclear power plant items of the target nuclear power plant to obtain the missile generation probability corresponding to each nuclear power plant item; When the missile generation probability satisfies a preset probability condition, source protection facilities are configured for the nuclear power plant item corresponding to the missile generation probability; wherein the nuclear power plant item configured with the source protection facilities is a source protection item; Calculating the first dissipated energy of each source protection item to obtain the first dissipated energy of each source protection item; performing a supplementary protection operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the first dissipated energy when the target nuclear power plant does not meet a preset protection condition; When the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The step of performing a supplementary protection operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the first dissipated energy when the target nuclear power plant does not meet a preset protection condition includes: In a case where the first dissipated energy satisfies a first warning preset condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant does not satisfy the preset protection condition; After determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition, predicting the missile escape path for the source protection items corresponding to the first escape energy to obtain the missile escape path corresponding to each source protection item in the target nuclear power plant; Path protection facilities are configured for the missile escape path to reduce the energy generated by the missiles escaping from the source protection facilities.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The configuring of path protection facilities for the missile escape path includes: The path protection facility is configured in the missile escape path according to at least one of a reinforced concrete barrier, a steel structure barrier, a composite energy absorbing structure and a flexible blocking structure.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The path protection facility is configured in the projectile escape path based on at least one of a reinforced concrete barrier, a steel structure barrier, a composite energy absorbing structure, and a flexible blocking structure, including: A reinforced concrete barrier is arranged in the missile dispersion path as the path protection facility, and a fiber reinforced composite material is sprayed on the side of the reinforced concrete barrier away from the source protection item, a steel lining is provided, or a steel plate is provided.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that After configuring a path protection facility for the missile escape path, the method further includes: Based on the first dissipated energy, calculating the second dissipated energy of each of the missile dissipation paths to obtain the second dissipated energy of each of the missile dissipation paths; The step of performing a protection facility deployment operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facility when the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection condition includes: When the first dissipated energy satisfies a first preset warning condition and the second dissipated energy does not satisfy a second preset warning condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant satisfies the preset protection condition; After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities and the path protection facilities.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that After calculating the second dissipated energy of each of the missile dissipation paths based on the first dissipated energy to obtain the second dissipated energy of each of the missile dissipation paths, the method further includes: When the second dissipated energy satisfies the second warning preset condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition; After determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition, in the target nuclear power plant, determining the missile escape path in which the second escape energy meets the second warning preset condition as a target escape path; determining missile impact items based on the source protection items and the target escape path; A missile protection facility is provided for the missile-affected items to prevent the missiles escaping from the source protection facility from causing damage to the missile-affected items.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The provision of missile protection facilities for the missile-affected items includes: The missile impact protection facility is configured for the missile impact items based on at least one of protective armor and external energy absorbing structure.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The provision of the missile protection facility for the missile-affected items based on at least one of protective armor and external energy-absorbing structure includes: The external energy absorbing structure is configured to be formed according to at least one of foam aluminum, honeycomb structure and rubber; The external energy-absorbing structure is determined as the missile-affected protection facility for the missile-affected items.

9. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that After configuring the missile impact protection facilities for the missile impact items, the method further includes: Calculating the impact energy of the projectile and the affected items based on the first dissipated energy and the second dissipated energy to obtain the projectile impact energy; The step of performing a protection facility deployment operation in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facility when the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection condition includes: When the first dissipated energy satisfies the first preset warning condition, the second dissipated energy satisfies the second preset warning condition, and the projectile impact energy does not satisfy the third preset warning condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant satisfies the preset protection condition; After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities, the path protection facilities, and the missile impact protection facilities.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that After calculating the impact energy of the missile and the affected items based on the first and second stray energies to obtain the impact energy of the missile, the method further includes: When the impact energy of the projectile meets the third warning preset condition, determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection condition; After determining that the target nuclear power plant does not meet the preset protection conditions, reconfigure the source protection facilities for the source protection items, and return to performing the first dissipated energy measurement for each source protection item based on the source protection items with the reconfigured source protection facilities, until the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions; After determining that the target nuclear power plant meets the preset protection conditions, a protection facility deployment operation is performed in the target nuclear power plant based on the source protection facilities.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, characterized in that When the probability of missile generation satisfies a preset probability condition, configuring source protection facilities for the nuclear power plant items corresponding to the probability of missile generation includes: When the probability of missile generation satisfies a preset probability condition, the source protection facility is configured for the nuclear power plant item corresponding to the probability of missile generation based on at least one of a source protection cover and a missile restraint component.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The configuring the source protection facility for the nuclear power plant item corresponding to the missile generation probability based on at least one of a source protection cover and a missile restraint component includes: The source protection cover is configured to be formed according to at least one of special alloy steel and composite ceramic material; The source shield is defined as the missile protection facility for the missile affected items.

13. A missile protection device for a nuclear power plant, characterized in that: The missile protection device is deployed by the protection facility deployment operation in the missile protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 12.

14. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant according to any one of claims 1 to 12 is implemented.

15. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The storage medium stores a program, and the program is executed by a processor to implement the missile protection method for a nuclear power plant according to any one of claims 1 to 12.

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