TLS1.3 protocol security enhancement method and system based on homologous cryptographic algorithm

By introducing the SQISign signature algorithm and FleS public-key encryption algorithm into the TLS 1.3 protocol, the security deficiencies of TLS 1.3 in quantum computing environments are resolved, achieving post-quantum security protection and system compatibility, and ensuring communication security.

CN120834922APending Publication Date: 2025-10-24WUHAN UNIV

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202511110965.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-08-08
Publication Date
2025-10-24

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The TLS 1.3 protocol is not secure enough in a quantum computing environment. Existing solutions cannot be directly migrated to TLS 1.3 and do not provide a quantum-resistant signature mechanism in the identity authentication part, thus failing to achieve complete post-quantum security protection.

Method used

By introducing the post-quantum cryptography algorithm SQISign signature algorithm and FleS public key encryption algorithm, key exchange and identity authentication are achieved by embedding the key material of the post-quantum key encapsulation algorithm into the ClientHello and ServerHello messages of the TLS 1.3 protocol, combined with the HMAC key derivation function and signature verification algorithm.

Benefits of technology

Enhance the security of the TLS 1.3 protocol in a quantum computing environment to ensure secure and compatible communications, defend against quantum computing threats, and maintain a smooth transition for existing systems.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a TLS1.3 protocol security enhancement method and system based on a homologous cryptographic algorithm, and the method comprises the steps: 1), certificate generation: signing and issuing a certificate through an SQISign signature algorithm, and guaranteeing the verification and use of a post-quantum security signature algorithm through the certificate; and 2) protocol design: the client and the server complete identity verification through certificate verification based on an SQISign signature algorithm in a handshake stage of a TLS 1.3 protocol. And the server uses a FleS public key encryption algorithm to carry out key encapsulation and send the key encapsulation to the client, completes key exchange and establishes secure encryption connection with the client. The step 1) and the step 2) comprise compatibility design, and a homology-based post-quantum algorithm and a traditional cryptographic algorithm are allowed to coexist, so that the compatibility of an existing system is ensured. Through the method provided by the invention, the TLS 1.3 protocol can effectively resist security threats brought by quantum computing, the security of network communication in the quantum era is ensured, and meanwhile, the smooth transition of the existing system is ensured.
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Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of communication, more particularly, to a TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method and system based on homologous cryptographic algorithms. BACKGROUND

[0002] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is a core security protocol in modern network communication, widely used in web browsers, email, virtual private networks (VPN), and other Internet services. The main goal of the TLS protocol is to provide data encryption protection, identity authentication, and data integrity assurance for network communication, ensuring the security of network communication. With the release of TLS 1.3 version, the protocol has been optimized in multiple aspects, not only improving the handshake efficiency, but also removing support for known insecure algorithms, thereby improving the efficiency and security of the protocol. However, the TLS 1.3 protocol still relies on traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (ECDHE) algorithm. Under the challenge of quantum computing, these traditional cryptographic algorithms based on mathematical difficult problems are no longer secure. Quantum computers have the ability to efficiently break traditional cryptographic algorithms through quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm, thereby threatening the security protection provided by the TLS protocol.

[0003] The patent application with publication number CN114629646A proposes a secure transmission method and system based on hybrid post-quantum key encapsulation and negotiation, which is designed under the TLS 1.2 protocol framework. The hybrid key exchange algorithm ECDHE_KEM combines KEM algorithms with traditional ECDHE algorithms to generate a hybrid key, thereby improving the anti-quantum ability of the key exchange phase. However, this scheme is only applicable to the TLS 1.2 structure and cannot be directly migrated to TLS 1.3, and it does not provide an anti-quantum signature mechanism in the identity authentication part, so it cannot achieve complete post-quantum security protection. SUMMARY

[0004] To counter the threat of quantum computing, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged. The goal of post-quantum cryptography is to develop post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that remain secure even in a quantum computing environment. SQISign (Short Quaternion and Isogeny Signature) is a post-quantum digital signature algorithm based on isogeny and quaternion algebra, designed to provide quantum security for data signing. FleS is an efficient, flexible parameter, and secure post-quantum public key encryption scheme based on CSIDH. The security of both algorithms is based on the difficulty of finding isogeny problems between supersingular elliptic curves, which currently has no known efficient algorithm to crack in a quantum computing environment. Compared with other post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, the post-quantum algorithm based on isogeny has a smaller key and signature size, making it more efficient in environments with limited storage and bandwidth. In addition, the post-quantum algorithm based on isogeny can provide strong quantum resistance, ensuring identity verification, data integrity, and encryption functions in a quantum computing environment.

[0005] The existing scheme is only applicable to the TLS 1.2 structure and cannot be directly migrated to TLS 1.3, and does not provide a quantum-resistant signature mechanism in the identity authentication part, so it cannot achieve complete post-quantum security protection.

[0006] Based on this, the present application provides a TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method based on the SQISign post-quantum signature algorithm and the FleS post-quantum public key encryption algorithm. This method aims to improve the security of the TLS 1.3 protocol under the threat of quantum computing, specifically by introducing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms into the key exchange and identity authentication mechanisms of TLS 1.3. The key goal of the invention is to ensure the security of the TLS 1.3 protocol in a quantum computing environment, while not imposing a significant burden on compatibility and performance.

[0007] To achieve the above purpose, the first aspect of the present application provides a TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method based on an isogeny cryptographic algorithm, comprising: issuing a certificate through the SQISign signature algorithm; Introducing a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm in the TLS 1.3 protocol to obtain a security-enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, specifically: embedding a post-quantum key encapsulation algorithm FleS key material in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages, the key material including a temporary public key and ciphertext information, wherein the ClientHello message is a client hello message, and the ServerHello message is a server hello message.

[0008] In an embodiment, the certificate is issued by the SQISign signature algorithm, including: The supported SQISign signature algorithm is declared through the SignatureAlgorithms extension field, and the SQISign signature certificate and signature value are constructed, and the SignatureAlgorithms is a signature algorithm class.

[0009] In an embodiment, the method further includes: the client and the server communicate based on the security-enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol.

[0010] In an embodiment, the client and the server communicate based on the security-enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, including: The certificate authority issues a certificate for the server; The client and the server complete key exchange to obtain a random number, and generate a master key through a key derivation function based on HMAC, and further derive a session key for encryption, wherein HMAC is a message authentication code algorithm based on a hash function and a key; The client and the server use a signature verification algorithm to verify the validity of the other party's certificate, and complete mutual authentication.

[0011] In an embodiment, the certificate authority issues a certificate for the server, including: Receiving a certificate signing request sent by the server, wherein the certificate signing request is generated by the server using a server public key, and the certificate signing request includes the server's public key, server identity information, and a digital signature of the information, and the server public key is generated by the server through a key generation function; Verifying the server's identity information and the digital signature, and if the verification is passed, issuing a server signature certificate to the server and generating a digital signature for the server signature certificate using its own private key.

[0012] In an embodiment, when mutual authentication is adopted, the method further includes: the certificate authority issues a certificate for the client.

[0013] In an implementation, the client and the server complete a key exchange to obtain a random number, and generate a master key through an HMAC-based key derivation function, including: The client sends a client hello message to the server, specifically including: based on a client local configuration, generating a temporary encryption public-private key pair through a key generation algorithm, and writing the temporary encryption public key into a key share extension, wherein the client local configuration includes a supported cipher suite, a key share extension, a key exchange mode extension, and a supported group extension; The server sends a server hello message to the client, specifically including: the server obtains the client temporary encryption public key by parsing the client hello message, the server locally generates a random number, calculates a ciphertext through a public key encryption algorithm and the random number, and writes the ciphertext into the key share extension.

[0014] In an implementation, the client and the server use a signature verification algorithm to verify the validity of the certificate of the other party, complete mutual authentication, including: The server sends a server certificate message to the client, wherein the server certificate message includes a server signed certificate; The server sends a server certificate verification message to the client, wherein the server certificate verification message includes information signed by the server based on the server signed private key through the SQISign signature algorithm on the hash of all messages since the server handshake; The server sends a server handshake completion message to the client to enable the client to perform integrity verification, and the server handshake completion message includes handshake integrity check information generated by the server based on the hash value of all handshake messages; The client sends a client handshake completion message to the server to enable the server to perform integrity verification, and the client handshake completion message includes handshake integrity check information generated by the client based on the hash value of all handshake messages.

[0015] Based on the same inventive concept, the second aspect of the present application provides a TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement system based on a homologous cryptographic algorithm, including: A certificate generation module for issuing a certificate through an SQISign signature algorithm; A protocol enhancement module for introducing a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm in the TLS 1.3 protocol to obtain a security-enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, specifically: embedding key material of a post-quantum key encapsulation algorithm FleS in a ClientHello and a ServerHello message, the key material including a temporary public key and ciphertext information, wherein the ClientHello message is a client hello message, and the ServerHello message is a server hello message Based on the same inventive concept, the third aspect of the present application provides a computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, and the program is executed by a processor to implement the method for enhancing security of TLS 1.3 protocol based on homomorphic cryptography algorithm according to the first aspect.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following advantages and beneficial technical effects: The present application provides a method for enhancing security of TLS 1.3 protocol based on homomorphic cryptography algorithm, which can migrate the homomorphic cryptography algorithm to the TLS 1.3 protocol. The method includes the following steps: certificate generation, issuing a certificate through the SQISign signature algorithm to ensure that the signature algorithm can be verified and used through the certificate for post-quantum security; protocol design, identity verification is completed through certificate verification based on the SQISign signature algorithm in the handshake phase of the TLS 1.3 protocol between the client and the server. The server uses the FleS public key encryption algorithm to perform key encapsulation and send to the client, completes key exchange and establishes a secure encrypted connection with the client. In addition, compatibility design is performed during certificate generation and protocol design, allowing the post-quantum algorithm based on homomorphism to coexist with the traditional cryptography algorithm to ensure the compatibility of the existing system. Through the method of the present application, the enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol can effectively resist the security threat brought by quantum computing, ensure the security of network communication in the quantum era, and ensure the smooth transition of the existing system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0017] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiment or prior art description. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present application, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can also be obtained without creative labor.

[0018] Figure 1 The flowchart of the method for enhancing security of TLS 1.3 protocol based on homomorphic cryptography algorithm in the embodiment of the present application is shown in Figure 2 The schematic diagram of the enhanced TLS 1.3 handshake protocol in the embodiment of the present application is shown in DETAILED DESCRIPTION Embodiment one The present embodiment provides a method for enhancing security of TLS 1.3 protocol based on homomorphic cryptography algorithm, please refer to Figure 1 , which includes: S1: issuing a certificate through the SQISign signature algorithm.

[0019] S2: introducing a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm in the TLS 1.3 protocol to obtain a security-enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, specifically: embedding a post-quantum key encapsulation algorithm FleS in the key material in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages, the key material including a temporary public key and ciphertext information, wherein the ClientHello message is a client hello message, and the ServerHello message is a server hello message.

[0020] Specifically, the SQISign signature algorithm is a post-quantum signature algorithm. The entities of the scheme include a server (Server), a client (Client), and a certificate authority (Certificate Authority, CA). The certificate authority CA generates valid certificates for the server and the client. The client and the server establish a reliable communication connection through the TLS 1.3 protocol and complete the identity authentication of the server and the reliable key exchange. In this process, we introduce a homology-based post-quantum cryptographic algorithm to complete the key exchange and identity authentication. The client and the server complete the key exchange securely through the post-quantum public key encryption algorithm FleS and complete the identity verification of both parties using the SQISign signature certificate. In the entire process, the introduction of the post-quantum algorithm ensures that the security of the TLS 1.3 protocol is still guaranteed even in a quantum computing environment, preventing traditional encryption algorithms from being cracked under quantum computing attacks. Embedding the homology-based post-quantum cryptographic algorithm in the TLS 1.3 protocol includes two steps: certificate generation and verification and protocol design, both of which include compatibility design.

[0021] S1 can be implemented in the following way: The supported SQISign signature algorithm is declared through the SignatureAlgorithms extension field, and the SQISign signature certificate and signature value are constructed, and SignatureAlgorithms is a signature algorithm class.

[0022] In an embodiment, the method further includes S3: the client and the server communicate based on the security-enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol.

[0023] The client and the server communicate based on the security-enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, including: S3.1: the certificate authority issues a certificate for the server; S3.2: the client and the server complete the key exchange to obtain a random number, and generate a master key through a key derivation function based on HMAC, and further derive a session key for encryption, wherein HMAC is a hash function and key-based message authentication code algorithm; S3.3: The client and the server verify the validity of each other's certificate using a signature verification algorithm, and complete mutual authentication.

[0024] Specifically, S3.1 can be implemented in the following manner: receiving a certificate signing request sent by the server, wherein the certificate signing request is generated by the server using a server public key, and the certificate signing request includes the server's public key, server identity information, and a digital signature of the information, the server public key being generated by the server through a key generation function; verifying the server's identity information and the digital signature, and if the verification is passed, issuing a server signature certificate to the server and generating a digital signature for the server signature certificate using a private key of the client.

[0025] In a specific implementation process, a certificate authority CA acts as a trusted authority and issues a certificate for the server. The key generation function is SQISignKeygen(), and the generated SQISign key pair is ( ), is the server public key, is the server private key. The server uses to generate a certificate signing request CSR, and the CSR contains the server's public key , server identity information, and a signature of the information, and then submits CSR1 to the CA.

[0026] After the CA verifies that the server identity information in CSR1 is correct and the digital signature is valid, the CA issues a server signature certificate ServerSignCert to the server and generates a digital signature for ServerSignCert using a private key of the CA.

[0027] When mutual authentication is adopted, the method further includes: the certificate authority issuing a certificate for the client.

[0028] Specifically, the process of generating a certificate for the client is as follows: The client generates an SQISign key pair ( ) through a key generation function SQISignKeygen(), and then uses to generate a certificate signing request CSR2, and the CSR2 contains the client's public key , client identity information, and a signature of the information, and the client submits CSR2 to the CA.

[0029] After the CA verifies that the client identity information in CSR2 is correct and the digital signature is valid, the CA issues a client signature certificate ClientSignCert to the client and generates a digital signature for ClientSignCert using a private key of the CA.

[0030] This paper builds on the existing TLS 1.3 protocol by using SQISign signature certificates for identity authentication and using the FleS public key encryption algorithm for key exchange, ensuring communication security in the face of quantum computing threats. The specific protocol flow (one-way authentication) for communication between the client and server using the enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol is as follows: 1) The client sends a ClientHello message to the server.

[0031] Input: Client local configuration, including supported cipher suites CipherSuites, key sharing extension KeyShareExt, key exchange mode extension KeyExchangemodesExt, and supported group extension SupportedGroupsExt.

[0032] Operation: The client generates a temporary encryption public and private key pair through the key generation algorithm FleSKeygen() ( ), and the temporary encryption public key Write the key sharing extension.

[0033] Purpose and results: Declare capabilities to the server and send the public key to prepare for subsequent key exchange.

[0034] Home: Key exchange step.

[0035] 2) The server sends a ServerHello message to the client.

[0036] Input: ClientHello message from the client, local configuration of the server.

[0037] Operation: The server obtains the client's temporary encryption public key by parsing the ClientHello message The server generates a random number Rnd locally and encrypts it using the public key encryption algorithm FleSEnc( ,Rnd) calculates the ciphertext , and the ciphertext Write the key sharing extension.

[0038] Purpose and Results: Negotiate encryption parameters with the client and complete key exchange material preparation.

[0039] Home: Key exchange step.

[0040] 3) The server sends ServerCertificate (server certificate message) to the client.

[0041] Input: Server Sign Certificate (ServerSignCert, signed by CA).

[0042] Operation: Write ServerSignCert in the message.

[0043] Purpose and result: Let the client verify the server identity and get the signing public key.

[0044] Belongs to: Identity authentication step.

[0045] 4) Server sends ServerCertificateVerify (Server Certificate Verify message) to the client.

[0046] Input: Server signing private key and hash of all messages so far, ServerHash.

[0047] Operation: Server signs the hash of all messages since the beginning of the handshake, ServerHash, using the server signing private key by signing algorithm SQISignsign(), and writes it in the ServerCertificateVerify message.

[0048] Purpose and result: Prove the server identity and message integrity, for the client to verify later.

[0049] Belongs to: Identity authentication step.

[0050] 5) Server sends ServerFinished (Server Handshake Complete message) to the client.

[0051] Input: hash of all handshake messages.

[0052] Operation: Generate handshake integrity check code and write it in the message.

[0053] Purpose and result: End signal of the server handshake process, the client can verify the integrity.

[0054] Belongs to: Identity authentication step.

[0055] 6) Client sends ClientFinished (Client Handshake Complete message) to the server.

[0056] Input: hash of all client handshake messages.

[0057] Operation: Generate handshake integrity check code and write it in the message.

[0058] Purpose and result: client handshake process end signal, server can verify integrity, complete the last confirmation before secure communication.

[0059] Belong: identity authentication step.

[0060] See Figure 2 , for the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol after security enhancement in the embodiment of the application.

[0061] If bidirectional authentication is adopted, the specific process is as follows: 1) The client sends a ClientHello (client hello message) to the server.

[0062] Input: client local configuration, including supported cipher suites CipherSuites, key sharing extension KeyShareExt, key exchange mode extension KeyExchangemodesExt and supported group extension SupportedGroupsExt.

[0063] Operation: the client generates a temporary encryption public-private key pair (FleSKeygen(), and writes the temporary encryption public key ) into the key sharing extension.

[0064] Purpose and result: declare the ability to the server, send the public key, and prepare for subsequent key exchange.

[0065] Belong: key exchange step.

[0066] 2) The server sends a ServerHello (server hello message) to the client.

[0067] Input: client ClientHello message, server local configuration.

[0068] Operation: the server obtains the client temporary encryption public key by analyzing the ClientHello message. The server generates a random number Rnd locally, calculates the ciphertext by a public key encryption algorithm FleSEnc( ,Rnd), and writes the ciphertext into the key sharing extension.

[0069] Purpose and result: negotiate encryption parameters with the client and complete key exchange material preparation.

[0070] Belong: key exchange step.

[0071] ​3) Server sends ClientCertificateRequest to Client.

[0072] Input: Server security policy.

[0073] Action: Write Server supported signature algorithm extension SigAlgExt in the message.

[0074] Purpose and result: Inform the client that a certificate is required and complete the pre-step of two-way authentication.

[0075] Belongs to: Identity authentication step.

[0076] 4) Server sends ServerCertificate to Client.

[0077] Input: Server signature certificate (ServerSignCert, signed by CA).

[0078] Action: Write ServerSignCert in the message.

[0079] Purpose and result: Let the client verify the server's identity and obtain the signature public key.

[0080] Belongs to: Identity authentication step.

[0081] 5) Server sends ServerCertificateVerify to Client.

[0082] Input: Server signature private key and the hash of all messages so far ServerHash.

[0083] Action: The server uses the server signature private key signs the hash of all messages since the start of the server handshake ServerHash using the signature algorithm SQISignsign(), and writes it into the ServerCertificateVerify message.

[0084] Purpose and result: Prove the server's identity and message integrity, and facilitate subsequent verification by the client.

[0085] Belongs to: Identity authentication step.

[0086] 6) Server sends ServerFinished to Client.

[0087] Input: hash of all handshake messages.

[0088] Operation: Generate handshake integrity check code and write into message.

[0089] Purpose and result: Server handshake procedure end signal, client can verify integrity.

[0090] Belongs: Identity authentication step.

[0091] 7) Client sends ClientCertificate message to server.

[0092] Input: Client sign certificate (ClientSignCert, issued by CA).

[0093] Operation: Write ClientSignCert into message.

[0094] Purpose and result: Provide client identity credentials to server, prepare for subsequent authentication.

[0095] Belongs: Identity authentication step.

[0096] 8) Client sends ClientCertificateVerify message to server.

[0097] Input: Client sign private key and hash of all messages so far, ClientHash.

[0098] Operation: Client uses client sign private key to sign hash of all messages since handshake start, ClientHash, by signing algorithm SQISignsign(), and write it into ClientCertificateVerify message.

[0099] Purpose and result: Prove client identity and message integrity, facilitate server verification.

[0100] Belongs: Identity authentication step.

[0101] 9) Client sends ClientFinished message to server.

[0102] Input: Hash of all client handshake messages.

[0103] Operation: Generate handshake integrity check code and write into message.

[0104] Purpose and result: Client handshake procedure end signal, server can verify integrity, final confirmation before completing secure communication.

[0105] Belonging: identity authentication step.

[0106] Through steps 1), 2), the client and the server complete the key exchange to obtain the random number Random, and generate the master key MasterKey through the HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF, HMAC based Key Derivation Function), and further derive the session key used for encryption. Through steps 3)-9), the client and the server verify the validity of the certificate of the other party by using the signature verification algorithm SQISignVerify(), and complete the mutual identity authentication.

[0107] The existing TLS 1.3 protocol does not support post-quantum cryptographic algorithms natively, and its standard key exchange mode and certificate verification method are still based on the traditional elliptic curve cryptography system (such as ECDHE, ECDSA, etc.). In order to realize smooth protocol evolution and wide compatibility in actual deployment, the application provides a reservation strategy for the extension field and content format definition, which ensures that the existing intermediate equipment can correctly identify the new field without affecting the operation of the original system. This "backward compatible" design concept provides a practical basis for large-scale deployment.

[0108] In terms of key exchange, the present scheme introduces a double-path key negotiation mechanism, that is, it supports traditional and post-quantum key exchange processes at the same time. Specifically: both parties can complete ECDHE and FleS encapsulated key exchange in the handshake process, and generate the master key by combining in the final stage and further derive the session key; such "mixed key exchange" method preserves the traditional security while providing quantum resistance, providing technical support for protocol evolution.

[0109] The following details the differences between the present scheme and the improved scheme for the TLS 1.2 protocol in the existing scheme: (I) A large amount of negotiation information in TLS 1.2 is achieved by embedding in fixed fields, which lacks a unified extension channel, and is not conducive to the subsequent upgrade of the protocol and the introduction of new algorithms. TLS 1.3 has optimized the protocol structure compared to TLS 1.2, and TLS 1.3 introduces a flexible extension mechanism, so that the handshake phase can carry more negotiation information through the extension fields in ClientHello and ServerHello, thereby completing key exchange and identity authentication in one round of interaction. The present application makes the following improvements to this unique extension structure: 1. A post-quantum key encapsulation field embedding mechanism is designed, which embeds the temporary public key, ciphertext and other information required by the FleS key encapsulation algorithm into the KeyShare extension field.

[0110] 2. Add new post-quantum signature algorithm negotiation and certificate structure: The application declares the supported SQISign signature algorithm through the SignatureAlgorithms extension field, constructs a compatible SQISign signature certificate and signature value, and realizes a complete post-quantum identity authentication link.

[0111] The existing scheme still uses traditional ECC signature, while the post-quantum signature algorithm used by the application mainly differs from the traditional signature algorithm and the technical difficulties to be overcome include: The post-quantum signature algorithm usually has different data structures and larger public key and signature size, which needs to be specially packaged in the certificate and explicitly declared in the related field in the TLS handshake. The existing scheme mentions using the server public key to verify the certificate signature value, and does not involve any certificate extension structure related to the post-quantum algorithm. The certificate description completely conforms to the traditional X.509 structure, so the identity authentication system of the existing scheme is still based on traditional cryptographic algorithms (such as ECC, RSA, etc.). In terms of implementation method, the traditional signature algorithm is based on integer factorization or elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, and the engineering implementation is mature; SQISign belongs to a post-quantum signature scheme based on homomorphic mapping, and its security depends on the difficulty of constructing homomorphic paths between super-singular elliptic curves, involving complex algebraic geometry and graph computation.

[0112] (2) In the process of integrating SQISign into the TLS 1.3 protocol, the following technical difficulties need to be overcome: First, design an adaptive message structure to reasonably embed the large size SQISign signature value in the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages of TLS 1.3; second, extend the signature_algorithms protocol field to support SQISign algorithm negotiation, ensuring that the new field does not affect protocol forwarding and compatibility; third, build a compatible X.509 certificate format to ensure that the certificate chain verification logic is not broken.

[0113] The hybrid key exchange algorithm ECDHE_KEM proposed in the patent application with publication number CN114629646A is designed under the TLS 1.2 protocol framework, which combines KEM algorithm with traditional ECDHE algorithm to generate hybrid key, thereby improving the anti-quantum ability of the key exchange stage. However, this scheme is only applicable to TLS 1.2 structure and cannot be directly migrated to TLS 1.3, and it does not provide an anti-quantum signature mechanism in the identity authentication part, so it cannot realize complete post-quantum security protection.

[0114] Different from the prior art, the application is designed for the latest TLS 1.3 protocol architecture, utilizes the single round handshake and flexible expansion mechanism, embeds the key material of the post-quantum key encapsulation algorithm FleS in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages, and realizes the native support of the post-quantum key agreement. Meanwhile, the application adopts the SQISign post-quantum signature algorithm to generate the digital certificates of the client and the server, constructs the bidirectional authentication mechanism, and comprehensively resists the quantum computing threat. In addition, the application has good backward compatibility, is suitable for not only the TLS 1.3 but also the collaborative deployment with the TLS 1.2 protocol, can be widely applied to the security upgrade in the transition stage of new and old systems, and has higher practicability and engineering feasibility.

[0115] Embodiment two Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment provides a TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement system based on a homogenous cryptographic algorithm, which comprises: a certificate generation module configured to issue a certificate through an SQISign signature algorithm; a protocol enhancement module configured to introduce a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm in the TLS 1.3 protocol to obtain a security-enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, and specifically configured to embed the key material of the post-quantum key encapsulation algorithm FleS in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages, wherein the key material comprises a temporary public key and ciphertext information, the ClientHello message is a client hello message, and the ServerHello message is a server hello message.

[0116] Since the system introduced in the embodiment two is the system used for implementing the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method based on a homogenous cryptographic algorithm in the embodiment one, the specific structure and deformation of the system can be understood by those skilled in the art based on the method introduced in the embodiment one, and thus will not be described here again. The system used for the method in the embodiment one belongs to the range that the application desires to protect.

[0117] Embodiment three Based on the same inventive concept, the application further provides a computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, and the program is executed by a processor to realize the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method based on a homogenous cryptographic algorithm in the embodiment one.

[0118] Since the computer readable storage medium introduced in the third embodiment of the present application is the computer readable storage medium used in the implementation of the method for enhancing the security of the TLS 1.3 protocol based on the homomorphic cipher algorithm in the first embodiment of the present application, the specific structure and variations of the computer readable storage medium can be understood by those skilled in the art based on the method introduced in the first embodiment of the present application, and thus will not be described here again. The computer readable storage medium used in the method of the first embodiment of the present application belongs to the scope of the present application.

[0119] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present application can be a method, a system, or a computer program product. Accordingly, the present application can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application can take the form of a computer program product on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROMs, optical storage media, etc.) embodying computer readable program code.

[0120] The present application is described in reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each flow and / or block in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, as well as the combination of the flows and / or blocks in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing devices to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing devices generate a means for implementing the functions specified in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 The functions specified in one or more flows and / or blocks Figure 1 The means for implementing the functions specified in one or more flows and / or blocks.

[0121] Although the preferred embodiments of the present application have been described, those skilled in the art can make additional changes and modifications to the embodiments once they know the basic inventive concept. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including all the preferred embodiments and all the changes and modifications falling within the scope of the present application. Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to the embodiments of the present application without departing from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the present application. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the embodiments of the present application fall within the scope of the claims of the present application and their equivalents, the present application is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A method for security enhancement of TLS 1.3 protocol based on homomorphic cryptography algorithm, characterized in that, The method comprises the following steps: Issuing a certificate through an SQISign signature algorithm; Introducing a post-quantum cryptography algorithm in a TLS 1.3 protocol to obtain a secure enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, specifically, embedding a FleS key material of a post-quantum key encapsulation algorithm in a ClientHello and a ServerHello message, the key material comprising a temporary public key and ciphertext information, wherein the ClientHello message is a client hello message, and the ServerHello message is a server hello message.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement based on the homomorphic cipher algorithm is characterized by, Issuing a certificate through an SQISign signature algorithm, comprising: Declaring support for an SQISign signature algorithm through a SignatureAlgorithms extension field, and constructing a certificate compatible with the SQISign signature algorithm and a signature value, the SignatureAlgorithms being a signature algorithm class.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement based on the homomorphic cipher algorithm is characterized by, The method further comprises that the client and the server communicate based on the secure enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method based on the homologous password algorithm is characterized by, The client and the server communicate based on the secure enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, comprising: The certificate authority issues a certificate for the server; The client and the server complete key exchange to obtain a random number, and generate a master key through a key derivation function based on HMAC, and further derive a session key for encryption, wherein HMAC is a hash function and key-based message authentication code algorithm; The client and the server verify the validity of the certificate of the other party using a signature verification algorithm, and complete mutual authentication.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method based on the homomorphic cipher algorithm is characterized by, The certificate authority issues a certificate for the server, comprising: Receiving a certificate signing request sent by the server, wherein the certificate signing request is generated by the server using a server public key, and the certificate signing request comprises a public key of the server, server identity information, and a digital signature of the information, and the server public key is generated by the server through a key generation function; Verifying the identity information and the digital signature of the server, and if the verification is passed, issuing a server signature certificate to the server and generating a digital signature for the server signature certificate using a private key of the certificate authority.

6. The method of claim 4, wherein the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method based on the homologous password algorithm is characterized by, When mutual authentication is adopted, the method further comprises that the certificate authority issues a certificate for the client.

7. The method of claim 4, wherein the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement method based on the homologous password algorithm is characterized by, The client and the server complete key exchange to obtain a random number, and generate a master key through a key derivation function based on HMAC, comprising: The client sends a client hello message to the server, specifically comprising: generating a temporary encryption public-private key pair through a key generation algorithm based on a client local configuration, and writing the temporary encryption public key into a key sharing extension, wherein the client local configuration comprises a supported cipher suite, a key sharing extension, a key exchange mode extension, and a supported group extension; The server sends a server hello message to the client, specifically comprising: the server obtains the client temporary encryption public key by analyzing the client hello message, generates a random number locally, calculates ciphertext through a public key encryption algorithm and the random number, and writes the ciphertext into the key sharing extension.

8. The method of claim 4, wherein the TLS 1.3 protocol security enhancement based on the homomorphic cipher algorithm is characterized by, The client and the server verify the validity of the certificate of the other party using a signature verification algorithm, and complete mutual authentication, comprising: The server sends a server certificate message to the client, wherein the server certificate message includes a server signature certificate; The server sends a server certificate verification message to the client, wherein the server certificate verification message includes information signed by the server based on the server signature private key by the SQISign signature algorithm on the hash of all messages since the server handshake; The server sends a server handshake completion message to the client to enable the client to perform integrity verification, and the server handshake completion message includes handshake integrity verification information generated by the server based on the hash value of all handshake messages; The client sends a client handshake completion message to the server to enable the server to perform integrity verification, and the client handshake completion message includes handshake integrity verification information generated by the client based on the hash value of all handshake messages. 9.A system for security enhancement of TLS 1.3 protocol based on homomorphic cryptography algorithm, characterized in that, Comprise: Certificate generation module, for issuing certificate by SQISign signature algorithm; Protocol enhancement module, for introducing post-quantum cryptographic algorithm in TLS 1.3 protocol, obtaining security enhanced TLS 1.3 protocol, specifically: embedding the key material of post-quantum key encapsulation algorithm FleS in ClientHello and ServerHello messages, the key material includes temporary public key and ciphertext information, wherein, ClientHello message is client hello message, ServerHello message is server hello message.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, A computer program is stored thereon, which is executed by a processor to implement the method for security enhancement of TLS 1.3 protocol based on homomorphic cryptographic algorithm according to any one of claims 1 to 2.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Secure transmission method and system based on quantum key encapsulation and negotiation after mixing

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Cited By

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