A platform door fault analysis method, device and storage medium

Abstract

The application discloses a platform door fault analysis method and device and a storage medium, and relates to the field of rail transit. The platform door control flow is divided into three independent control stages, i.e., train-ground command transmission, interlocking control and platform door control, according to time sequence, the complex linkage flow is disassembled into independent monitoring links, state parameters reflecting execution states are acquired in each control stage, and it is automatically judged whether the preset normal condition is met, subjective judgment and periodic inspection hysteresis depending on artificial experience are avoided, the specific stage of abnormal state parameters can be quickly locked when the platform door non-linkage fault occurs, the fault positioning time is significantly shortened, the operation stability and safety problems caused by low artificial inspection efficiency and untimely fault processing in the prior art are solved, and accurate positioning and efficient disposal of the fault source are realized.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of rail transit, in particular to a platform door fault analysis method, device and storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the acceleration of urbanization process, the challenges faced by urban rail transit system are increasingly severe, especially in the aspect of platform door control. In the platform door control of urban rail transit line, the control command is mainly initiated by the signal system, and the platform door system executes the command. The control involves two professions of signal and platform door. At present, the monitoring and maintenance of signal side platform door control mainly depends on the manual inspection and regular inspection of operation and maintenance personnel. This fault repair and planned maintenance mode depending on manual experience is easy to cause the fault handling not in time.

[0003] Specifically, in the face of complex signal equipment linkage, the platform door control command needs to be transmitted from the on-board ATC (Automatic Train Control) system to the ground interlocking system, and then to the combined interface cabinet and platform door side equipment. In this process, the fault positioning link is too long, and it is difficult to accurately locate the fault source in a short time. Therefore, when facing platform door emergencies and faults, operation and maintenance personnel are difficult to quickly investigate and effectively handle faults, resulting in low fault handling efficiency, and further affecting the stability and safety of metro operation. SUMMARY

[0004] The purpose of the present application is to provide a platform door fault analysis method, device and storage medium, which solves the operation stability and safety problems caused by low manual inspection efficiency and untimely fault handling in the prior art, and realizes accurate positioning and efficient disposal of the fault source.

[0005] In a first aspect, the present application provides a platform door fault analysis method, comprising: dividing a control process of a platform door into a plurality of control stages according to a time sequence of the control process of the platform door, the plurality of control stages comprising a train-ground command transmission stage, an interlocking control stage and a platform door control stage; the train-ground command transmission stage is a stage in which a control command of opening or closing a door is issued from a train-mounted system to a ground interlocking system, the interlocking control stage is a stage in which the ground interlocking system responds to the control command, and the platform door control stage is a stage in which a platform door system receives and responds to the control command; for each control stage, a state parameter reflecting the execution state of the control stage is obtained, whether the state parameter satisfies a preset normal condition is analyzed, and the control stage in which the state parameter does not satisfy the preset normal condition is determined as an abnormal stage, so as to realize fault positioning of platform door non-linkage.

[0006] In a second aspect, the present application provides an electronic device, comprising: a memory for storing a computer program; and a processor for implementing the steps of the platform door fault analysis method as described above when executing the computer program.

[0007] In a third aspect, the present application provides a computer readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, the computer program being executed by a processor to implement the steps of the platform door fault analysis method as described above.

[0008] The present application discloses a platform door fault analysis method, device and storage medium, and relates to the field of rail transit. The platform door control flow is divided into three independent control stages of train-ground command transmission, interlocking control and platform door control according to time sequence, the complex linkage flow is disassembled into independent monitoring links, the state parameters reflecting the execution state are acquired in each control stage, and it is automatically judged whether the preset normal condition is met, so that the subjective judgment depending on artificial experience and the hysteresis of regular inspection are avoided. When the platform door non-linkage fault occurs, the specific stage of abnormal state parameters can be quickly locked, the fault positioning time is significantly shortened, the operation stability and safety problems caused by low artificial inspection efficiency and untimely fault processing in the prior art are solved, and the accurate positioning and efficient disposal of the fault source are realized. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0009] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application, the drawings needed in the embodiments will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application, and other drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor.

[0010] Figure 1 A platform door control flowchart provided by the present application.

[0011] Figure 2 A flowchart of a platform door fault analysis method provided by the present application.

[0012] Figure 3 A brief control block diagram of a platform door provided by the present application.

[0013] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of an electronic device provided by the present application.

[0014] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a computer readable storage medium provided by the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0015] The core of the present application is to provide a platform door fault analysis method, device and storage medium, which solves the problems of operation stability and safety caused by low efficiency of manual inspection and untimely fault handling in the prior art, and realizes accurate positioning and efficient disposal of the fault source.

[0016] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described below in connection with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative work fall within the protection scope of the present application.

[0017] Before describing the present application, it should be understood that: the platform door, also known as the shield door, is a device installed at the edge of the subway platform, which is used to isolate the track area and the platform area. Its core functions include improving passenger safety (preventing accidental falling onto the track), reducing the energy consumption of the station air conditioning and ventilation system, reducing the influence of train operation noise and piston wind on the station environment, and creating a safe and comfortable waiting environment for passengers; in the signal system, interlocking is a control system composed of a series of signal devices, and its core function is to grant the train a forward authorization only when the safety is confirmed by detecting the route setting, locking state and safety combination condition, so as to avoid train conflict and ensure the safe operation of rail transit; the on-board ATC is an automatic system integrated on the train, which mainly functions to automatically control the train running, ensure the safety of train operation and coordinate the train driving, and realize precise control of key operations such as train speed, stopping and command sending through real-time data interaction and logical operation.

[0018] Currently, the platform door control of urban rail transit lines is mainly initiated by the signal system (on-board ATC) of the on-board system, and the ground interlocking system of the platform door receives the open / close door command and executes the opening / closing action of the platform door. The platform door control process is as shown in Figure 1 , and the simple block diagram is as shown in Figure 2 . The on-board train automatic control system ATC initiates the open / close door command, and after the ground interlocking system receives the open / close door command, the open door relay KMJ / closing door relay GMJ is pulled up to turn on the platform door control circuit. After the platform door control circuit is turned on, the open / close door action is executed. When the door is opened, the door state feedback relay MGJ of the platform door system is pulled down to disconnect the interlocking side control circuit, and the ground interlocking system is informed that the platform door has been opened. When the door is closed, after the platform door is completely closed, the door state feedback relay MGJ of the platform door system is pulled up to turn on the interlocking side control circuit, and the ground interlocking system is informed that the platform door has been closed.

[0019] Because the platform screen door control process is lengthy, any problem in any step can lead to a platform screen door malfunction.

[0020] Therefore, as Figure 3 Firstly, this application provides a fault analysis method for platform screen doors, including: S11: Dividing the control process of the platform screen door into multiple control stages according to the time sequence of the control process, the multiple control stages include a vehicle-to-ground command transmission stage, an interlocking control stage, and a platform screen door control stage; the vehicle-to-ground command transmission stage is the stage in which the control command for opening or closing the door is sent from the vehicle system to the ground interlocking system, the interlocking control stage is the stage in which the ground interlocking system responds to the control command, and the platform screen door control stage is the stage in which the platform screen door system receives and responds to the control command.

[0021] Specifically, based on the natural temporal evolution of the urban rail transit platform screen door control process, the cross-disciplinary linkage process spanning the signaling system and the platform screen door system is deconstructed into three control stages with clear temporal boundaries and functional attributes. First, the vehicle-to-ground command transmission stage corresponds to the vertical transmission of control commands from the onboard system (such as the onboard ATC) to the ground interlocking system. This stage begins with the issuance of the command and ends with the ground interlocking system receiving and confirming the command's validity, focusing on the information interaction link between the systems. Second, the interlocking control stage is defined as the intermediate link where the ground interlocking system performs logical verification of the received open / close command and triggers the actuator. This is the process from the ground interlocking system responding to the command to the relays it controls (such as door opening relays and door closing relays) actuating and activating the platform screen door control circuit, emphasizing the internal logic processing and control output of the signaling system. Finally, the platform screen door control stage covers the entire execution process of the platform screen door system from receiving the control circuit activation signal to completing the opening and closing action and providing status feedback. It centers on the mechanical actions and status feedback at the physical layer, forming a complete temporal closed loop from command initiation to execution completion.

[0022] This time-series-based stage division transforms complex control processes with long chains and multiple links into independent functional units with clear input-output relationships, laying a structured foundation for subsequent staged fault analysis.

[0023] S12: For each control stage, acquire the status parameters that reflect the execution status of the control stage, analyze whether the status parameters meet the preset normal conditions, and determine the control stage whose status parameters do not meet the preset normal conditions as an abnormal stage, so as to realize the fault location of the platform door not being linked.

[0024] Specifically, for the independently controlled stages such as vehicle-to-ground command transmission, interlocking control, and platform screen door control, a state parameter acquisition mechanism matching the functional characteristics of each stage is established to acquire key data that can characterize the execution status of each stage in real time (such as the timing of command transmission, the logical correctness of control signals, and the completion of physical actions). Based on the design specifications and safety logic of the urban rail transit platform screen door control system, condition thresholds or logical rules reflecting the normal operating status of each stage are preset (such as the upper limit of signal transmission delay, the range of control signal levels, and the action response time window).

[0025] By dynamically comparing the actual state parameters collected at each stage with preset normal conditions, the abnormal execution state can be identified by using parameter deviations or logical contradictions. This allows the platform door non-linkage fault to be located at a specific control stage, realizing a technological shift from "full-link manual investigation" to "stage-by-stage parameterized diagnosis". By using data-driven accurate judgment to replace the traditional fuzzy inference that relies on human experience, the efficiency and reliability of fault location are significantly improved.

[0026] In an exemplary embodiment, for each control stage, state parameters reflecting the execution state of the control stage are acquired, and it is analyzed whether the state parameters meet preset normal conditions. Control stages whose state parameters do not meet the preset normal conditions are determined to be abnormal stages. This includes: in the vehicle-to-ground command transmission stage, acquiring a control command issued by the vehicle system, where the control command is an open door command or a close door command; acquiring the initial state and interface voltage of the door status feedback relay MGJ, where the door status feedback relay is a device that provides feedback on the actual open and closed state of the platform door; determining whether the initial state is a first preset state corresponding to the control command, and whether the interface voltage of the door status feedback relay is a first preset voltage corresponding to the control command; if the initial state is not the first preset state or the interface voltage of the door status feedback relay is not the first preset voltage, the vehicle-to-ground command transmission stage is determined to be an abnormal stage, and it is determined that the control command does not correspond to the initial state of the platform door.

[0027] Specifically, in the implementation of the vehicle-to-ground command transmission phase, a dual parameter verification mechanism is used to accurately determine the validity of the command transmission.

[0028] First, the system receives the door opening / closing control command from the vehicle system (clearly indicating whether the current operation is to open or close the door). Simultaneously, it collects the initial state (engaged / disengaged) of the door status feedback relay MGJ and its interface voltage value. The MGJ's state directly reflects the actual opening / closing / locking state of the platform door (engaged indicates the door is closed and locked, corresponding to a conductive circuit; disengaged indicates the door is not locked or is in an open state, corresponding to a disconnected circuit). The interface voltage is a quantitative parameter characterizing the relay coil's energization state (engaged corresponds to a standard operating voltage, such as 24V or 12V; disengaged voltage is 0V).

[0029] According to the preset control logic rules, when the on-board system sends an open command, the prerequisite should be that the platform door is in a closed and locked state (i.e., the MGJ is initially in the raised state and the interface voltage is at the standard value), so that the ground interlocking system can drive the open relay to act after responding to the command. When a close command is sent, the prerequisite should be that the platform door is in an unlocked or open state (i.e., the MGJ is initially in the lowered state and the interface voltage is 0V), so that the close action can be performed and the locking can be restored. By comparing the real-time collected initial state of the MGJ and the interface voltage with the expected conditions of the control command, if there is a state contradiction (such as the MGJ being in the lowered state when the open command is sent) or voltage abnormality (such as the interface voltage not being 0V under the close command), it indicates that there is a logical conflict or signal abnormality in the command transmission between the vehicle and the ground. This may be caused by mistransmission of commands, link failure, or distortion of state feedback, resulting in a mismatch between the control command and the actual initial state of the platform door, thus determining this stage as an abnormal stage.

[0030] This dual verification mechanism based on relay status and voltage parameters constructs a pre-judgment condition for the legality of commands through the linkage analysis of electrical signals and physical locking status. It can effectively identify potential faults caused by inconsistent states in the vehicle-to-ground interaction process, and provide a precise stage division basis for subsequent fault location.

[0031] In one exemplary embodiment, after determining that the initial state is the first preset state and the interface voltage of the door state feedback relay is the first preset voltage, the method further includes: determining whether the data packet corresponding to the control command issued by the vehicle system can be obtained through the mirror port; if not, determining that the vehicle-to-ground command transmission stage is an abnormal stage, and determining that the communication link between the vehicle system and the ground interlocking system is abnormal.

[0032] Specifically, in the fault diagnosis during the vehicle-to-ground command transmission phase, a data packet-level communication link verification mechanism is established to achieve integrity detection of the physical channel for command transmission. After confirming that the initial state and interface voltage of the door status feedback relay MGJ meet the preset conditions of the control command (i.e., completing the logical-level state verification), the control commands issued by the vehicle system are further monitored at the data link layer using mirror port technology. Mirror port technology is a network traffic replication technique that can completely copy the communication data packets between the vehicle system and the ground interlocking system to the monitoring equipment without affecting the original communication. If a valid data packet corresponding to the control command cannot be obtained during this process, it indicates a physical layer fault (such as fiber optic cable breakage or switch port failure) or a protocol layer anomaly (such as data frame loss or checksum error) in the communication link, causing the command to meet the preset state conditions at the logical level but not actually be successfully transmitted to the ground interlocking system.

[0033] This verification mechanism based on data packet capture combines logical state verification with physical link monitoring to achieve dual protection for the vehicle-to-ground command transmission process. It can accurately identify implicit transmission interruptions caused by communication medium failures or network equipment anomalies, providing direct evidence at the data link layer for cross-system fault location and significantly improving the accuracy and efficiency of fault diagnosis.

[0034] In one exemplary embodiment, for each control stage, a status parameter reflecting the execution state of the control stage is acquired, and it is analyzed whether the status parameter meets a preset normal condition. The control stage whose status parameter does not meet the preset normal condition is determined to be an abnormal stage. This includes: in the interlocking control stage, acquiring the first power supply voltage of the action relay corresponding to the control command; the action relay is a device that conducts the door opening control circuit or door closing control circuit of the corresponding platform door according to the control command; determining whether the first power supply voltage is the first target voltage; if not, the interlocking control stage is determined to be abnormal, and the power supply of the platform door side circuit used to execute the control command is determined to be abnormal.

[0035] Specifically, during the interlocking control phase, real-time monitoring of the power supply voltage to the actuating relays establishes a direct criterion for determining the effectiveness of the signal system's control output. The actuating relays (i.e., door opening relays KMJ or door closing relays GMJ) are the core actuators connecting the ground interlocking system and the platform door control circuit. Their function is to receive an interlocking system command, energize their coils, and activate the corresponding door opening or closing control circuit (such as a 24V DC circuit), thereby driving the platform door actuator to move.

[0036] During this stage, the first supply voltage of the action relay corresponding to the control command (i.e., the real-time voltage across the relay coil) is acquired and compared with the preset first target voltage. If the supply voltage does not reach the target value (e.g., the voltage is too low, fluctuates, or is zero), it indicates that the relay coil cannot be properly energized and engaged, causing the platform door control circuit to fail to conduct. Even if the train-to-ground command transmission stage is normal, subsequent platform door actions will stall due to the lack of a drive signal. This anomaly may originate from a fault in the power module inside the interlocking system, poor contact in the relay interface circuit, voltage attenuation or short circuit caused by cable insulation damage, or hardware failure of the control logic output unit.

[0037] By using the power supply voltage of the action relay as a key state parameter and directly linking it to the mechanical action prerequisite of the relay, it is possible to quickly locate electrical interface faults between the interlocking system and the platform screen door, realize the effective diagnosis of the core control link of "signal system control output - relay execution - circuit conduction", avoid blind spots in cross-disciplinary troubleshooting, and provide a clear basis for efficiently repairing linkage faults between the signal system and the platform screen door system.

[0038] In one exemplary embodiment, after determining that the first power supply voltage of the action relay is the first target voltage, the method further includes: determining whether the action relay performs a preset action according to the control command; if not, determining that the interlocking control stage is an abnormal stage.

[0039] Specifically, in the fault diagnosis of the interlocking control phase, a precise verification mechanism of "electrical signal input - relay state switching" is constructed to achieve in-depth verification of the integrity of control command execution. After confirming that the first supply voltage of the operating relay (KMJ / GMJ) reaches the first target voltage (i.e., it has the electrical conditions for normal excitation), it is further monitored whether the relay executes the preset state switching action according to the control command.

[0040] Specifically, when a door opening command is received, the state of the door opening relay KMJ should change from "dropped" (coil de-energized, contacts open) to "engaged" (coil energized, contacts closed) to activate the door opening control circuit; when a door closing command is received, the state of the door closing relay GMJ should change from "dropped" to "engaged" to activate the door closing control circuit. This state switching is the core indicator of the relay converting electrical signals into mechanical actions, directly determining whether the platform door control circuit can be activated.

[0041] If the power supply voltage is normal but the relay status does not switch as instructed (e.g., KMJ / GMJ remains in the "fallen" state), it indicates that the relay has a mechanical jam, contact oxidation, abnormal coil winding, or other physical faults, or that the control wiring between the interlocking system and the relay is loose or the terminals are not in good contact, resulting in a hidden fault of "there is an electrical signal input but no mechanical action output".

[0042] It is evident that by using relay state switching as a key judgment parameter and forming an "electrical-mechanical" dual-layer verification with power supply voltage detection, relay execution failures that cannot be detected by voltage monitoring alone can be accurately identified. This effectively solves the problem of mechanical contact faults or state feedback lag that are difficult to detect in traditional manual inspections. It provides direct evidence for quickly locating interface anomalies between the signal system and the platform door control circuit, and improves the accuracy and comprehensiveness of fault diagnosis in complex linkage scenarios.

[0043] In one exemplary embodiment, after determining that the action relay has not performed a preset action according to the control command, the method further includes: obtaining the interface voltage of the action relay and determining whether the interface voltage of the action relay is normal; if normal, determining that there is a cable fault or control fault on the platform door side; if abnormal, determining that there is a cable fault or power supply fault in the signal side circuit used to transmit control commands.

[0044] Specifically, in the fault diagnosis of the interlocking control phase, a precise fault location mechanism is constructed by layering the detection of the relay interface voltage to the platform door side. When it is determined that the relay (KMJ / GMJ) has not performed the state switching according to the control command (e.g., KMJ does not change from falling to energizing when the door opening command is received), the relay interface voltage (i.e., the real-time voltage output from the signal system to the relay coil) is further obtained and its normality is determined (e.g., whether it has reached the rated operating voltage). Essentially, this is a fault boundary diagnosis between the "control signal transmission link" and the "actuator drive circuit".

[0045] If the interface voltage is normal (meets the preset standard value), it indicates that the signal system has output the correct control voltage, but the relay has failed to operate due to a cable fault on the platform door side (such as loose terminals, short circuit caused by cable insulation damage) or a control circuit fault (such as mechanical jamming of the relay, oxidation of contacts). The fault is located in the execution link on the platform door side. If the interface voltage is abnormal (below the rated value or zero), it indicates that there is a cable fault (such as open circuit of signal transmission line, grounding fault) or power supply fault (such as failure of interlocking system power module, blown fuse of power supply circuit), which causes the control signal to fail to be effectively transmitted to the relay coil.

[0046] It is important to understand that "platform door side" refers to the connection from the lightning protection distribution cabinet terminals in the signal equipment room to the platform door equipment room terminals and the platform door equipment itself. "Signal side" refers to the connection from the lightning protection distribution cabinet terminals in the signal equipment room to the interlocking equipment (including relays).

[0047] It is evident that this secondary discrimination mechanism based on interface voltage, by precisely dividing the fault range into the signal side (control source) and the platform door side (execution end), avoids the blind spots in traditional cross-disciplinary troubleshooting caused by the lengthy links. It enables rapid attribution of anomalies such as "electrical signal input but no mechanical action". Normal voltage points to physical faults at the execution end, while abnormal voltage points to electrical faults at the control end. This provides maintenance personnel with a clear guide to "maintain by module according to voltage status", improving the diagnostic efficiency and accuracy of interface faults in complex linkage systems.

[0048] In an exemplary embodiment, for each control stage, a status parameter reflecting the execution state of the control stage is acquired, and it is analyzed whether the status parameter meets a preset normal condition. The control stage whose status parameter does not meet the preset normal condition is determined to be an abnormal stage. This includes: in the platform door control stage, acquiring the second power supply voltage of the door status feedback relay; determining whether the second power supply voltage is the second target voltage; if not, determining that the platform door control stage is abnormal, and determining that the power supply of the signal side circuit used to transmit control commands is abnormal.

[0049] Specifically, in the fault diagnosis of the platform screen door control phase, the integrity of the power supply to the platform screen door control system is directly verified by continuously monitoring the power supply voltage of the door status feedback relay MGJ. As the core electrical feedback component for the actual opening and closing state of the platform screen door, the MGJ's power supply voltage (i.e., the second power supply voltage) must remain at the normal power supply voltage value (i.e., the second target voltage, such as DC24V or 12V) regardless of the platform screen door's state (whether closed / locked or open / unlocked). This is because the MGJ's status feedback logic is based on the on / off state of the relay contacts (clicking / closing) rather than the presence or absence of power supply voltage; its power supply circuit must always remain normally energized to ensure the real-time nature of the status feedback.

[0050] At this stage, if the second supply voltage deviates from the second target voltage (e.g., voltage fluctuations, drops, or loss of voltage), it directly indicates an abnormality in the power supply link of the platform screen door control circuit. This may stem from a power module failure in the signal side circuit (e.g., unstable voltage output, blown fuse), poor contact or grounding short circuit due to cable damage, or problems such as loose power supply terminals or abnormal coil resistance of the MGJ relay body. Such power supply abnormalities will cause the MGJ to malfunction, making it impossible to accurately reflect the actual status of the platform screen door to the interlocking system, thereby triggering a failure in the linkage between the door control system and the signal system.

[0051] By using the MGJ's power supply voltage as an independent monitoring parameter and setting a constant target threshold, this embodiment achieves indiscriminate detection of the power supply stability of the platform screen door control circuit. It can quickly locate hidden faults in the power supply link on the signal side, avoid state feedback distortion or system misjudgment caused by power supply abnormalities, and provide a basic electrical guarantee for the reliable operation of the platform screen door system.

[0052] In one exemplary embodiment, after determining that the second power supply voltage is the second target voltage, the method further includes: determining whether the door status feedback relay performs an action according to the control command; if not, obtaining the interface voltage of the door status feedback relay; if the interface voltage of the door status feedback relay is abnormal, determining that there is a cable fault or a platform door control fault in the platform door side circuit used to execute the control command; if the interface voltage of the door status feedback relay is normal, determining that there is a cable fault or an interlocking fault in the signal side circuit.

[0053] Specifically, in the fault diagnosis of the platform screen door control phase, a three-level verification mechanism of "power supply integrity - action validity - interface signal" is constructed to achieve precise hierarchical location of complex linkage faults. After confirming that the second power supply voltage of the door status feedback relay MGJ is the second target voltage (i.e., the power supply circuit is normal and has the electrical prerequisite for relay action), it is further determined whether MGJ executes the preset action according to the control command (e.g., when receiving the door open command, it should change from energized to energized, and when receiving the door close command, it should change from energized to energized). This action is a direct electrical mapping of the physical state change (opening / closing) of the platform screen door. If MGJ does not act according to the command, it indicates that the control command has not been effectively converted into the mechanical action or status feedback of the door. At this time, the fault is delineated by detecting the interface voltage of MGJ (i.e., the status signal voltage output by the relay contact to the interlocking system, reflecting the actual position and locking status of the door).

[0054] If the interface voltage is abnormal (such as the voltage value not matching the preset state, no low level output when opening the door, and no high level output when closing the door), it indicates that the fault originates from the platform door side circuit (such as a faulty door machine controller, a jammed transmission mechanism causing the door to not actually move, or oxidation of MGJ contacts and loose wiring causing signal feedback failure), that is, there is an abnormality in the mechanical control or status acquisition link of the execution end.

[0055] If the interface voltage is normal (meets the preset voltage value), it indicates a fault on the signal side (such as an interlocking system logic error that fails to trigger the action command correctly, damaged insulation of the signal transmission cable causing command loss, or a loose connection or short circuit in the control wiring between the ground interlocking and MGJ), meaning there is a problem with the command generation or signal transmission link at the control end.

[0056] It is evident that this hierarchical diagnostic logic, by breaking down the complex scenario of "normal power supply but abnormal operation" into two major categories, "execution-side fault" and "control-side fault," and using the interface voltage as a key parameter as the fault demarcation point, avoids the ambiguity in localization caused by the lengthy links in traditional cross-disciplinary troubleshooting. It provides maintenance personnel with a clear troubleshooting path of "checking the execution status first, then distinguishing between signal / door sides," significantly improving the diagnostic efficiency and accuracy of hidden faults in the platform door control stage.

[0057] Furthermore, in another exemplary embodiment, this application also sets an analysis time window for the complete process according to the platform door opening control flow, and performs non-linkage analysis in three stages. The analysis time window is set to not exceed a preset time, and an automatic alarm for platform door linkage timeout fault is triggered after the preset time is exceeded. Specifically, in the fault diagnosis system of the platform door control flow, independent and strict execution time limits can be set for each control stage (vehicle-to-ground command transmission, interlocking control, platform door control), or a total execution time limit can be set for all control stages, thus constructing a fault early warning system based on timing logic.

[0058] Because platform screen door linkage involves the coordination of multiple systems, any delay or blockage in any link may lead to safety risks. Therefore, it is essential to preset reasonable time thresholds for each stage, or to set an overall time threshold (e.g., 10 seconds) for all stages. Essentially, this transforms the theoretical response time of the system design into a quantifiable monitoring indicator. When the actual execution time exceeds the preset window, an overtime alarm is automatically triggered. For example, if the platform screen door fails to complete its action within the specified time, an emergency brake or audible and visual alarm is triggered in a timely manner to prevent trains from departing prematurely or passengers from accidentally entering dangerous areas.

[0059] This time-window-based fault warning mechanism transforms the traditional "post-incident investigation" into "real-time monitoring + threshold warning." By quantifying time-series indicators, it achieves dynamic health assessment of the platform door linkage system, providing preventative protection for the safe operation of urban rail transit.

[0060] Secondly, such as Figure 4 This application provides an electronic device, including: a memory 31 for storing a computer program; and a processor 32 for implementing the steps of the platform door fault analysis method described above when executing the computer program.

[0061] For a description of the electronic device, please refer to the above embodiments; this application will not repeat the details here.

[0062] Thirdly, such as Figure 5 This application provides a computer-readable storage medium 41, on which a computer program 42 is stored. When the computer program 42 is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the platform door fault analysis method described above.

[0063] For a description of the computer-readable storage medium 41, please refer to the above embodiments; this application will not repeat it here.

[0064] It should also be noted that, in this specification, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0065] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to make or use the invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Therefore, the invention is not to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A method of failure analysis of a platform door, characterized in that The method comprises the following steps: According to the time sequence of the control process of the platform door, the control process of the platform door is divided into multiple control stages, including a vehicle-ground command transmission stage, an interlocking control stage and a platform door control stage; the vehicle-ground command transmission stage is the stage of issuing a control command of opening or closing the door from the vehicle-mounted system to the ground interlocking system, the interlocking control stage is the stage of the ground interlocking system responding to the control command, and the platform door control stage is the stage of the platform door system receiving and responding to the control command; For each control stage, a state parameter reflecting the execution state of the control stage is obtained, and it is analyzed whether the state parameter meets a preset normal condition, and the control stage in which the state parameter does not meet the preset normal condition is determined as an abnormal stage, so as to realize fault positioning of the non-linkage of the platform door; For each control stage, a state parameter reflecting the execution state of the control stage is obtained, and it is analyzed whether the state parameter meets a preset normal condition, and the control stage in which the state parameter does not meet the preset normal condition is determined as an abnormal stage, comprising: In the vehicle-ground command transmission stage, the control command issued by the vehicle-mounted system is obtained, and the control command is an opening command or a closing command; The initial state and the interface voltage of the door state feedback relay are obtained, and the door state feedback relay is a device for feeding back the actual opening and closing state of the platform door; It is judged whether the initial state is a first preset state corresponding to the control command, and whether the interface voltage of the door state feedback relay is a first preset voltage corresponding to the control command; If the initial state is not the first preset state or the interface voltage of the door state feedback relay is not the first preset voltage, it is determined that the vehicle-ground command transmission stage is an abnormal stage, and it is determined that the control command does not correspond to the initial state of the platform door; After it is determined that the initial state is the first preset state and the interface voltage of the door state feedback relay is the first preset voltage, the method further comprises the following steps: It is judged whether the data packet corresponding to the control command issued by the vehicle-mounted system can be obtained through the mirror port; If not, it is determined that the vehicle-ground command transmission stage is an abnormal stage, and it is determined that the communication link between the vehicle-mounted system and the ground interlocking system is abnormal.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: For each control stage, a state parameter reflecting the execution state of the control stage is obtained, and it is analyzed whether the state parameter meets a preset normal condition, and the control stage in which the state parameter does not meet the preset normal condition is determined as an abnormal stage, comprising: In the interlocking control stage, a first power supply voltage of an action relay corresponding to the control command is obtained; the action relay is an opening relay for controlling the opening of the platform door or a closing relay for controlling the closing of the platform door; It is judged whether the first power supply voltage is a first target voltage; If not, it is determined that the interlocking control stage is abnormal, and it is determined that the power supply of the platform door side circuit for executing the control command is abnormal.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the step of determining the cause of the malfunction of the platform door comprises the steps of: determining whether the platform door is in a closed state; and determining whether the platform door is in an open state. After it is determined that the first power supply voltage of the action relay is the first target voltage, the method further comprises the following steps: determining whether the action relay performs a preset action according to the control command; if not, determining that the interlocking control stage is an abnormal stage.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the step of determining the cause of the malfunction of the platform door comprises the steps of: determining whether the platform door is in a closed state; and determining whether the platform door is in an open state. After determining that the action relay does not perform a preset action according to the control command, the method further comprises: acquiring an interface voltage of the action relay, and determining whether the interface voltage of the action relay is normal; if normal, determining that the cable of the signal side circuit for transmitting the control command is faulty or the power supply is faulty. For each control stage, a state parameter reflecting an execution state of the control stage is acquired, and it is determined whether the state parameter satisfies a preset normal condition, and the control stage in which the state parameter does not satisfy the preset normal condition is determined as an abnormal stage, comprising:

5. The platform door fault analysis method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that, in the platform door control stage, acquiring a second supply voltage of the door state feedback relay; determining whether the second supply voltage is a second target voltage; if not, determining that the platform door control stage is abnormal, and determining that the power supply of the signal side circuit for transmitting the control command is abnormal. After determining that the second supply voltage is the second target voltage, the method further comprises:

6. The method of claim 5, wherein the step of analyzing the malfunction of the platform door comprises the steps of: determining whether the platform door is in a closed state; and determining whether the platform door is in an open state. determining whether the door state feedback relay performs an action according to the control command; if not, acquiring an interface voltage of the door state feedback relay; if the interface voltage of the door state feedback relay is abnormal, determining that the cable of the platform door side circuit for executing the control command is faulty or the platform door control is faulty; if the interface voltage of the door state feedback relay is normal, determining that the cable of the signal side circuit is faulty or the interlocking is faulty. comprising:

7. An electronic device, comprising: a memory for storing a computer program; a processor for implementing the steps of the fault analysis method of the platform door according to any one of claims 1-6 when executing the computer program. The computer program is stored on the computer readable storage medium, and the computer program is executed by the processor to implement the steps of the fault analysis method of the platform door according to any one of claims 1-6.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, ​

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