Train control system vehicle-mounted electronic map encryption transmission method and device

Abstract

The invention provides a train control system vehicle-mounted electronic map encryption transmission method and device, and relates to the technical field of encryption transmission. The invention aims to determine an encryption algorithm according to the confidentiality of the vehicle-mounted electronic map, dynamically encrypt the vehicle-mounted electronic map, and ensure the safe transmission of the vehicle-mounted electronic map. The train control system vehicle-mounted electronic map encryption transmission method comprises the following steps: establishing data connection with train automatic protection equipment by utilizing a preset shared key; acquiring a to-be-transmitted vehicle-mounted electronic map; determining the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted according to a preset rule; selecting a corresponding encryption algorithm for encryption according to the importance level to obtain an encrypted electronic map; the encrypted electronic map is marked and sent to the automatic train protection equipment through the data connection, and the mark is used for the automatic train protection equipment to select a corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of encrypted transmission technology, and in particular to a method and apparatus for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system. Background Technology

[0002] In the train control system, the onboard electronic map contains precise locations of tracks, station layouts, signals, transponders, and other information, as well as temporary speed limit information. It provides the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) with fundamental geographical information about the track, signal equipment distribution, track parameters, and other crucial data, enabling the ATP to control the train based on the information provided by the onboard electronic map and real-time train location and speed data, ensuring safe train operation.

[0003] In existing technologies, in-vehicle electronic maps are transmitted from the Temporary Speed ​​Limit Server (TSRS) to the Train Protection Platform (ATP). The transmission method usually involves transmitting in plaintext over an open wireless network. However, plaintext transmission can easily lead to the leakage of confidential information such as sensitive line parameters and signal equipment locations contained in the transmitted content, posing a serious threat to train operation safety.

[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a new method for transmitting onboard electronic maps in train control systems to ensure the safe transmission of onboard electronic maps. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a method and apparatus for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system. The purpose is to select an encryption algorithm based on the importance level of the onboard electronic map, dynamically encrypt the onboard electronic map, and ensure the secure and reliable transmission of the onboard electronic map.

[0006] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application provides the following technical solutions:

[0007] In a first aspect, this application provides a method for encrypted transmission of an onboard electronic map in a train control system, the method being applied to a temporary speed limit server, comprising:

[0008] Establish a data connection with the train's automatic safety equipment using a preset shared key;

[0009] Obtain the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted;

[0010] The importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is determined according to preset rules;

[0011] Based on the importance level, the corresponding encryption algorithm is selected for encryption to obtain an encrypted electronic map;

[0012] The encrypted electronic map is annotated and sent to the train automatic protection equipment via the data connection. The annotation is used by the train automatic protection equipment to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map.

[0013] Secondly, this application provides an encrypted transmission device for an onboard electronic map in a train control system, wherein the method is applied to a temporary speed limit server, comprising:

[0014] The unit is used to establish a data connection with the train automatic protection equipment using a preset shared key;

[0015] The acquisition unit is used to acquire the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted;

[0016] A determining unit is used to determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted in the acquiring unit according to preset rules;

[0017] The unit is used to select the corresponding encryption algorithm based on the importance level in the determined unit to encrypt the encrypted electronic map.

[0018] The generating unit is used to annotate the encrypted electronic map in the obtaining unit and send it to the train automatic protection device through the data connection. The annotation is used by the train automatic protection device to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map.

[0019] Thirdly, this application provides an encrypted transmission system for an onboard electronic map of a train control system, the system including a temporary speed limit server and automatic train protection equipment;

[0020] The temporary speed limit server establishes a data connection with the train's automatic safety equipment using a preset shared key;

[0021] The temporary speed limit server determines the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted according to preset rules, and selects the corresponding encryption algorithm to encrypt it according to the importance level to obtain an encrypted electronic map.

[0022] The temporary speed limit server sends the annotated encrypted electronic map through the data connection. The annotation is used by the automatic train protection equipment to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map.

[0023] The automatic protection equipment for trains receives the encrypted electronic map, selects the decryption algorithm for the encrypted electronic map based on the annotations, and decrypts the encrypted electronic map to obtain the target vehicle-mounted electronic map.

[0024] Fourthly, this application provides a processor for running a program, wherein the program executes the above-described method for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system.

[0025] Fifthly, this application provides a storage medium for storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when running, controls the device where the storage medium is located to execute the above-described train control system on-board electronic map encryption transmission method.

[0026] Compared to existing technologies, this application provides a method and apparatus for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system. This method, with dynamic encryption at its core, enhances the security of onboard electronic map transmission. First, a secure channel is established using a preset shared key to ensure a reliable initial connection, laying the foundation for subsequent data transmission. After acquiring the onboard electronic map data to be transmitted, it is classified into importance levels according to preset rules, achieving differentiated protection for data with different levels of sensitivity. The encryption algorithm and encryption key are dynamically selected based on the importance level, ensuring that highly sensitive data (such as line parameters and temporary speed limits) receives high-strength encryption, while routine data uses moderate encryption, guaranteeing security while optimizing resource consumption. The encrypted data labeling mechanism allows the Train Control System (ATP) to quickly call the corresponding decryption algorithm based on the labeling information, achieving efficient and accurate decryption. This dynamic adjustment of encryption strategies breaks the limitations of traditional fixed encryption modes, significantly increasing the difficulty and cost for attackers to crack the encryption. By organically combining data classification, dynamic algorithm adaptation, and precise decryption matching, a complete end-to-end dynamic encryption system is constructed, effectively preventing the risk of leakage of classified information and providing reliable protection for train operation safety. Attached Figure Description

[0027] The above and other objects, features, and advantages of exemplary embodiments of this application will become readily understood by reading the following detailed description with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the drawings, several embodiments of this application are illustrated by way of example and not limitation, with the same or corresponding reference numerals denoteing the same or corresponding parts, wherein:

[0028] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating an encrypted transmission method for an onboard electronic map in a train control system, as proposed in an embodiment of this application, is shown schematically.

[0029] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating another method for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system, as proposed in an embodiment of this application, is shown schematically.

[0030] Figure 3 The diagram illustrates the process by which the temporary speed limit server and the automatic train protection device determine the session key in this application.

[0031] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of an onboard electronic map encryption transmission system for a train control system according to an embodiment of this application is shown.

[0032] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of an encrypted transmission device for an onboard electronic map in a train control system, as proposed in an embodiment of this application, is shown.

[0033] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of another train control system on-board electronic map encryption transmission device proposed in an embodiment of this application is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0034] Exemplary embodiments of this application will now be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. While exemplary embodiments of this application are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that this application may be implemented in various forms and should not be limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided to enable a more thorough understanding of this application and to fully convey the scope of this application to those skilled in the art.

[0035] It should be noted that, unless otherwise stated, the technical or scientific terms used in this application shall have the ordinary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application pertains.

[0036] In the train control system, the onboard electronic map contains precise locations of tracks, station layouts, signals, transponders, and other information, as well as temporary speed limit information. It provides the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) with fundamental geographical information about the track, signal equipment distribution, track parameters, and other crucial data, enabling the ATP to control the train based on the information provided by the onboard electronic map and real-time train location and speed data, ensuring safe train operation.

[0037] In existing technologies, onboard electronic maps are transmitted from the Temporary Speed ​​Limit Server (TSRS) to the Train Protection Authority (ATP). The transmission method usually employs plaintext encryption, which leads to the leakage of confidential information such as sensitive line parameters and signal equipment locations, posing a serious threat to train operation safety.

[0038] Based on this, to overcome the aforementioned limitations, the inventors conceived of a method for dynamically encrypting onboard electronic maps, namely, an encrypted transmission method for onboard electronic maps in a train control system. This method is applied to a temporary speed limit server and includes: establishing a data connection with the train's automatic safety protection equipment using a preset shared key; acquiring the onboard electronic map to be transmitted; determining the importance level of the onboard electronic map according to preset rules; selecting a corresponding encryption algorithm based on the importance level to encrypt the map, resulting in an encrypted electronic map; marking the encrypted electronic map; and sending it to the train's automatic safety protection equipment through the data connection. The markings are used by the train's automatic safety protection equipment to select a corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map. Compared to existing encryption methods, this dynamically adjusted encryption strategy breaks the limitations of plaintext encrypted transmission. By organically combining data hierarchical classification, dynamic algorithm adaptation, and precise decryption matching, a complete end-to-end dynamic encryption system is constructed, effectively preventing the risk of leakage of confidential information and providing reliable protection for train operation safety.

[0039] The specific steps of this application are as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the method is applied to a temporary rate-limiting server and includes:

[0040] Step 101: Establish a data connection with the train automatic protection equipment using the preset shared key.

[0041] In this step, to ensure the transmission of the onboard electronic map, a data connection needs to be established between the temporary speed limit server and the automatic train protection system (ATS). The temporary speed limit server and ATS share a preset key. The specific data establishment process includes: Key Negotiation Phase: The ATP sends a connection request to the TSRS, containing an authentication code, a desired cryptographic algorithm message, and a random number. The authentication code contains a preset encryption algorithm table, where the encryption algorithms correspond to the encrypted electronic map annotations. The ATP uses the preset key to encrypt this information in response. Authentication: The TSRS decrypts the response information and verifies the validity of the desired cryptographic algorithm message and the random number, ensuring the legitimate identities of both communicating parties. Session Key Generation: A temporary session key is generated based on the preset key and the random number, used for message verification to ensure the legitimacy of the identities.

[0042] It is worth noting that the temporary rate-limiting server establishes a data connection based on a preset shared key primarily to verify the legitimacy of the identities of both parties, ensuring that the data to be transmitted can be transmitted and that the message transmission is complete.

[0043] Step 102: Obtain the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted.

[0044] After establishing a data connection between the temporary speed limit server and the automatic train protection equipment in step 101, the temporary speed limit server obtains the onboard electronic map to be transmitted. This map is in file form and is a digital representation of the train operation scenario, containing static basic information such as track, switches, and signals, as well as parameters such as gradient and curve radius of the corresponding section. These map files are packaged in a standardized format, covering vector graphic data, coordinate system, and attribute annotations. Subsequently, based on the established data connection, they will be transmitted to the automatic train protection equipment to provide underlying geographic information support for its accurate execution of speed limit strategies and to ensure driving safety. This serves as the basic data source for vehicle-ground collaboration to achieve safe train control.

[0045] Step 103: Determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted according to preset rules;

[0046] After obtaining the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted in step 102, the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is determined according to preset rules. The determination of the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is divided into two types:

[0047] A method for determining the importance level of a station based on the onboard electronic map to be transmitted, and determining the importance level corresponding to the station map file based on a preset information level table.

[0048] Another method involves acquiring route information data from the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted and determining the importance level of the map. This includes: determining the number of routes in the map with a design speed exceeding a first preset design speed, the actual usage frequency of these routes, and also the number of devices such as traffic lights and transponders in the map. If the number of devices falls within different preset ranges (first range: Level 1 confidentiality; second range: Level 2 confidentiality; third range: Level 3 confidentiality), then the importance level of the map is determined. Of course, the devices must be at least one type. Alternatively, the importance level can be determined based on the number of routes, using the same method as determining the importance level based on the number of devices, which will not be elaborated here. The importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted can also be determined based on temporary speed limit information. For example, if the number of temporary speed limit entries in the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted falls within the first speed limit range, the confidentiality level is Level 1; if it falls within the second speed limit range, the confidentiality level is Level 2; and if it falls within the third speed limit range, the confidentiality level is Level 3. It is worth noting that the confidentiality level of the electronic map to be transmitted follows this order: Level 1 > Level 2 > Level 3 > ... > (n-1) > Level n.

[0049] Step 104: Select the corresponding encryption algorithm according to the importance level to encrypt the electronic map.

[0050] After determining the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted in step 103, a corresponding encryption algorithm is selected according to the preset encryption algorithm table, and an encryption key is generated. The encryption key is generated based on the encryption algorithm key length and the session key, and the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is encrypted using the encryption algorithm to obtain an encrypted electronic map. The importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted in the preset encryption algorithm table is positively correlated with the encryption strength of the encryption algorithm. Multiple encryption algorithms can be used for the same importance level, or only one encryption algorithm can be used; this is not limited. When multiple encryption algorithms correspond to the same importance level, an encryption algorithm can be randomly selected, or the encryption algorithm with the most key bits among the confidential algorithms can be selected. When encryption algorithms have the same number of bits, the algorithm's computational efficiency can be adapted to the performance of the vehicle-mounted equipment. For example, by comparing the actual encryption and decryption time of the algorithms in the vehicle hardware environment, the algorithm with shorter processing time is prioritized to ensure smooth transmission. Alternatively, the algorithm's anti-attack characteristics can be considered, such as its defense capabilities against differential analysis and linear analysis, to select an algorithm that is more difficult to crack, ensuring reliable encryption without affecting the real-time performance of the train control system. Of course, decisions can also be made from multiple dimensions. For example, regarding algorithm compatibility, algorithms that are compatible with the cryptographic modules already deployed on both vehicle and ground devices should be prioritized. For instance, if the vehicle-mounted ATP device integrates a national cryptographic algorithm acceleration chip, SM4 should be preferred over AES for the same key length to reduce hardware compatibility overhead. From the perspective of quantum attack resistance potential, algorithms with strong resistance to quantum computing threats (such as some prototypes of post-quantum cryptography algorithms) should be prioritized even if the current key length is the same, to adapt to future security needs in advance. From the perspective of operation and maintenance costs, if an algorithm has accumulated mature key management and troubleshooting solutions in the existing vehicle-ground security system, it can also be prioritized to reduce the maintenance complexity of the encryption process, ensuring that encryption not only meets current security standards but also leaves sufficient room for optimization in long-term applications. The specific choice can be determined according to the actual situation. The preset encryption algorithm table can have multiple importance levels; this embodiment only describes the first, second, and third importance levels.

[0051] Furthermore, after determining the encryption algorithm and generating the encryption key, where the encryption key is determined based on the key length of the selected encryption algorithm, the onboard electronic map to be transmitted is encrypted according to the corresponding encryption algorithm. When the encryption algorithm is selected based on the importance level of the obtained station map file, the corresponding station map file is encrypted. When the encryption algorithm is determined based on the importance level of the route information in the onboard electronic map to be transmitted, the map to be transmitted is encrypted.

[0052] Step 105: Mark the encrypted electronic map and send it to the train automatic protection equipment through the data connection.

[0053] In this step, after determining the encrypted electronic map in step 104, it is marked based on the importance level information of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted. The mark is a unique identifier, used by the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map. This allows the ATP system to quickly locate the decryption algorithm using a preset encryption algorithm table.

[0054] In this step, the transmission speed of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is calculated as follows: obtain the signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio, and network access status information of the two radios of the vehicle-mounted device; based on the number of radios connected to the network, the signal strength, and the signal-to-noise ratio information, obtain the electronic map packet transmission frequency and the number of packets, and determine the transmission speed of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted.

[0055] In summary, this application provides a method for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system. This method, with dynamic encryption at its core, enhances the security of onboard electronic map transmission. First, a secure channel is established using a preset shared key to ensure a reliable initial connection, laying the foundation for subsequent data transmission. After acquiring the onboard electronic map data to be transmitted, it is classified into importance levels according to preset rules, achieving differentiated protection for data with different levels of sensitivity. Encryption algorithms are dynamically selected based on the importance level, ensuring high-sensitivity data (such as line parameters and temporary speed limits) receives high-strength encryption, while routine data uses moderate encryption, ensuring both security and optimized resource consumption. The encrypted data annotation mechanism allows the Train Control System (ATP) to quickly call the corresponding decryption algorithm based on the annotation information, achieving efficient and accurate decryption. This dynamic adjustment of encryption strategies breaks the limitations of traditional fixed encryption modes, significantly increasing the difficulty and cost for attackers to crack the encryption. By organically combining data classification, dynamic algorithm adaptation, and precise decryption matching, a complete end-to-end dynamic encryption system is constructed, effectively preventing the risk of leakage of classified information and providing reliable protection for train operation safety.

[0056] Furthermore, based on the above Figure 1 The embodiments of the present invention shown herein provide a more detailed explanation of how to encrypt transmission, as detailed below. Figure 2 As shown:

[0057] Step 201: Establish a data connection with the train automatic protection equipment using a preset shared key.

[0058] In this step, the temporary speed limit server and the automatic train protection equipment have a preset shared key. Establishing a data connection involves either the automatic train protection equipment or the temporary speed limit server generating a connection request based on this shared key. Upon receiving the connection request, the temporary speed limit server or the automatic train protection equipment verifies its validity. Once the requesting end receives the request, verifies its validity, and generates a session key, a data connection is established between the temporary speed limit server and the automatic train protection equipment. After the data connection is established, all data to be transmitted over this data connection channel is authenticated using the session key to ensure the integrity and security of the transmitted data.

[0059] In this embodiment, specific steps are also given for the above-mentioned data connection establishment process, such as... Figure 3 As shown:

[0060] First, the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) device sends an identification code and a desired cryptographic algorithm message m1, along with a random number RA, to the Temporary Speed ​​Limiting Server (TSRS). The desired cryptographic algorithm message m1 contains an encryption algorithm table. Second, the TSRS device receives the m1 message and RA, and generates a random number RB. The TSRS uses the random number RA, RB, and a preset shared key KMAC to calculate the session key Ks using a shared key generation algorithm. The TSRS then sends an identification code and cryptographic algorithm message m2, the random number RB, and a verification code MAC1(m2|RB,Ks) calculated using the session key Ks to the ATP device. Finally, the ATP device receives the m2 message and RB. The ATP device uses the random number RA, RB, and the preset shared key KMAC to calculate the session key Ks using a shared key generation algorithm. Use Ks to calculate the message verification code MAC2(m2|RB,Ks). If MAC2(m2|RB,Ks) matches MAC1(m2|RB,Ks), TSRS and ATP complete identity authentication and share the session key Ks and the preset encryption algorithm table.

[0061] Step 202: Determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted according to preset rules, and select the corresponding encryption algorithm to encrypt it according to the importance level to obtain the encrypted electronic map.

[0062] In this step, the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is positively correlated with the encryption security level of the encryption algorithm corresponding to that importance level. This embodiment determines the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted according to preset rules as follows:

[0063] The system obtains the classification level of each station within the coverage area of ​​the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; based on the classification level, it determines whether a station is a special classified station; if so, it determines the importance level of the classified information according to the classification level of each station; if not, it determines the importance level according to the route information in the electronic map to be transmitted. Specifically, if the classification level is greater than a preset classification level, the station is determined to be a special classified station; if the classification level is less than or equal to the preset classification level, the station is determined to be a non-special classified station.

[0064] For non-special classified stations, the following two encryption methods are available:

[0065] Method 1: Directly determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted based on the information within the vehicle-mounted electronic map.

[0066] The specific steps are as follows: extract route information from the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; obtain the design speed of the routes in the route information and determine the number of routes whose design speed exceeds a first preset design speed; obtain the actual usage frequency of the route information, where the actual usage frequency can be the usage frequency within a preset time period, which can be obtained through operation logs; determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted based on the number of routes and the actual usage frequency of the route information. It is worth noting that the route information includes route numbers and design speeds of different numbered routes. The first preset design speed is set according to actual conditions. The above technical solution determines the importance level by extracting the design speed and actual usage frequency from the route information, thus realizing the quantitative classification of vehicle-mounted electronic maps. Its technical feature lies in using "the number of routes exceeding the preset speed" and "actual usage frequency" as core indicators. The former reflects the physical sensitivity of the route (e.g., high-speed routes have higher confidentiality), while the latter reflects the data importance in operation (e.g., leakage of high-frequency routes has a greater impact). This dual-dimensional assessment breaks through the limitations of a single standard, making the classification of importance levels more in line with the actual security needs of the train control system, providing a precise grading basis for subsequent dynamic encryption, and avoiding the problems of over-encryption or under-encryption.

[0067] Regarding the step of "determining the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted based on the number of lines and the actual usage frequency of the line information," this embodiment provides the following specific steps:

[0068] The number of lines and the actual usage frequency of the line information are multiplied by a first weighted value and a second weighted value, respectively. The sum of the two products is used to obtain a comprehensive score, where the sum of the first weighted value and the second weighted value is 1. When the comprehensive score is greater than the first score, the vehicle electronic map to be transmitted is determined to be classified as Level 1 confidential. When the comprehensive score is less than the first score but greater than the second score, the vehicle electronic map to be transmitted is determined to be classified as Level 2 confidential. When the comprehensive score is less than the second score, the vehicle electronic map to be transmitted is determined to be classified as Level 3 confidential. The importance level is as follows: Level 1 confidentiality is greater than Level 2 confidentiality, and Level 2 confidentiality is greater than Level 3 confidentiality.

[0069] In the practical application scenario of safe transmission of onboard electronic maps in train control systems, the electronic map of a railway line containing 10 stations needs to be described, and the importance level of each station's electronic map file needs to be assessed. First, the line information is extracted, which includes the unique number of each station's jurisdiction section and parameters such as the maximum design speed. The jurisdiction section numbers are from L001 to L010, with design speeds of 350 km / h (L001-L003), 250 km / h (L004-L006), 160 km / h (L007-L008), and 120 km / h (L009-L010), respectively. A preset speed of 200 km / h is set, and it is found that there are 6 jurisdiction sections (L001-L006) with design speeds exceeding this preset value.

[0070] Next, the actual usage frequency within the jurisdiction is obtained. By analyzing the operational data for a certain day, the average daily number of arriving, departing, and passing trains in each jurisdiction is as follows: L001-L003 (3 trains / day each), L004-L006 (1 train / day), L007-L008 (2 trains / day), and L009-L010 (1 train / day). At this time, the actual usage frequency of the onboard electronic map is 3+3+3+1+1+1+2+2+1+1=18 times.

[0071] Then, a comprehensive score is calculated according to the rules, with the first weighting value set at 0.6 (corresponding to the number of lines with design speeds exceeding the preset value) and the second weighting value at 0.4 (corresponding to actual usage frequency). The comprehensive score is 0.6 × 6 + 0.4 × 0.4 = 0.52 points. The first score is set at 0.7 points and the second score at 0.4 points. Since 0.4 < 0.52 < 0.7, the in-vehicle electronic map is classified as Level 2 Confidential.

[0072] In practical applications, this dynamic evaluation method employs medium-strength encryption (such as the SM4 algorithm) for maps classified as Level 2 confidential, ensuring both security and resource optimization. The dynamic nature of this method is reflected in the following: if the L007-L010 jurisdiction area undergoes speed upgrades, increasing the design speed to over 200 km / h, the number of jurisdiction areas exceeding the preset speed becomes 8. The comprehensive score is then recalculated as (8 ÷ 10 × 100 × 0.6) + (0.55 × 100 × 0.4) = 48 + 22 = 70 points. In this case, the map will be classified as Level 1 confidential, and a higher-level encryption algorithm (such as AES-256) will be used accordingly, allowing the encryption strategy to be dynamically adjusted based on the actual conditions of the lines. The weighted comprehensive score is used to classify the levels, with the technical feature being the introduction of first and second weighted values ​​(summing up to 1) and a scoring threshold. This quantitative model transforms the "number of lines exceeding the preset speed" and "actual usage frequency" into a comparable comprehensive score, shifting the level determination from qualitative to quantitative and reducing subjective bias. For example, the importance of high-speed or high-frequency lines can be highlighted by adjusting weights, flexibly adapting to different operational scenarios. Meanwhile, the clear division of the three-level scoring range ensures consistency and operability in the rating determination, laying a standardized foundation for accurate matching of encryption algorithms.

[0073] Method 2: Divide the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted into multiple importance levels. Based on the preset information level table, determine the importance level of the station map file, that is, determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted.

[0074] Specific steps: Obtain feature parameter information of the route information in the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; determine the station map file based on the feature parameter information; determine the importance level of the station map file based on a preset information level table, which contains rules for determining the information importance level of the station map file. Through the preset information level table, targeted rules can be formulated according to different feature parameters (such as geographical environment and traffic flow), making the importance level highly correlated with the actual sensitivity of the data. This block processing mode can both strengthen the encryption of highly sensitive data and reduce the encryption cost of low-sensitivity data, improving the balance between transmission efficiency and security.

[0075] In this embodiment, the characteristic parameters of the basic route information of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted are used to determine the station map file. A preset information level is then used to determine the importance level of different map data blocks. The preset information level table can represent the complexity of the geographical environment characteristic parameters, which can be divided into multiple intervals. Complexity interval one [n, nm] corresponds to Level 1 confidentiality, complexity interval two [nm, t] corresponds to Level 2 confidentiality, complexity interval three [t, 0] corresponds to Level 3 confidentiality, and so on, where n is greater than m and t is greater than 0. The correlation between the complexity interval and the confidentiality level is positive; that is, the higher the complexity, the higher the confidentiality level of the station map file. The preset information level table can also be a rule for classifying the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted based on the route's traffic capacity and actual traffic flow. It can also be a rule for classifying the vehicle-mounted electronic map based on other characteristic parameters, which is not limited here.

[0076] For special classified stations, the corresponding onboard electronic maps are directly classified as Level 1 confidential, and matched with a Level 1 security encryption algorithm.

[0077] Furthermore, when the characteristic parameter information is the traffic carrying capacity and actual traffic flow of the station line, the method includes:

[0078] The system determines whether the traffic capacity of the station line is greater than a preset traffic capacity and whether the actual traffic flow is greater than a preset traffic flow. If both the traffic capacity and actual traffic flow of the station line are greater than the preset traffic capacity, the station is designated as a Level 1 confidential station and marked as Level 1 confidential, and an encryption algorithm with Level 1 security is applied to the Level 1 confidential station. If the traffic capacity and actual traffic flow of the station line are less than the preset traffic flow, or if the traffic capacity and actual traffic flow of the station line are less than the preset traffic capacity, the station is designated as a Level 2 confidential station and marked as Level 2 confidential, and an encryption algorithm with Level 2 security is applied to the Level 2 confidential station. If both the traffic capacity and actual traffic flow of the station line are less than the preset traffic capacity, the station is designated as a Level 3 confidential station and marked as Level 3 information confidential, and an encryption algorithm with Level 3 security is applied to the Level 3 confidential station.

[0079] As can be seen, data blocks are divided based on traffic capacity and actual traffic flow, and a three-level classification is achieved through a combination of two parameters (both exceeding preset limits / one exceeding and one falling short / both falling short). Traffic capacity reflects the theoretical importance of the route, while actual traffic flow reflects real-time operational risks. Combining the two can identify core road sections with "high capacity and high flow" (such as hub trunk lines) and match them with high-intensity encryption; moderate encryption is applied to secondary road sections with "one exceeding and one falling short," and simplified encryption is applied to secondary road sections with "both falling short." This classification method directly links the encryption strategy to the operational pressure and risks of the route, optimizing overall transmission efficiency while ensuring the safety of core routes.

[0080] For example, the onboard electronic map to be transmitted includes stations A, B, and C. The preset traffic capacity is 100 trains / day, and the preset traffic flow is 80 trains / day. Station A has a traffic capacity of 120 trains / day and an actual traffic flow of 90 trains / day, both exceeding the preset values, and is therefore classified as a Level 1 confidential station. Station B has a traffic capacity of 110 trains / day (exceeding 100 trains / day) and an actual traffic flow of 70 trains / day (below 80 trains / day), and is therefore classified as a Level 2 confidential station. Station C has a traffic capacity of 80 trains / day and an actual traffic flow of 60 trains / day, both below the corresponding preset values, and is therefore classified as a Level 3 confidential station, and is assigned a corresponding encryption algorithm.

[0081] Step 203: Mark the encrypted electronic map and send it to the train automatic protection equipment via data connection.

[0082] After obtaining the encrypted electronic map in step 202, the temporary speed limit server also annotates the encrypted electronic map and sends the annotated encrypted electronic map to the train automatic protection equipment via a data connection. The annotation is used by the train automatic protection equipment to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map. The annotation can be determined based on the importance level of the onboard electronic map to be transmitted.

[0083] In addition, when sending the annotated encrypted electronic map, it can be sent in packets. The packet sending principle can be determined based on the current network transmission status. If the packet sending is done in packets, each packet contains the total number of encrypted electronic map packets and the sequence number of the current packet, so as to ensure that the train automatic protection equipment can completely assemble the packets and obtain the complete encrypted electronic map.

[0084] Further, the embodiment of the present application also controls the transmission speed of the in-vehicle electronic map to be transmitted, and the control method of this transmission speed is calculated based on the data of two radio stations of the vehicle-mounted device, specifically as follows: Obtain the wireless network signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio, radio station network access status, and cell number at the current position of the radio station. The cell number is used to represent the position of the radio station, that is, which base station the radio station is connected to; Based on the wireless network signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio, the number of networked radio stations of the vehicle-mounted device, and the radio station network access status, select the first radio station, and the first radio station is the radio station with the best communication state; Obtain the number of packets per transmission cycle, transmission frequency, and number of bytes per packet of the first radio station; Based on the number of packets per transmission cycle, transmission frequency, and number of bytes per packet of the first radio station, determine the transmission speed of the in-vehicle electronic map to be transmitted. Among them, the vehicle-mounted device reports the data of the radio station of the vehicle-mounted device to the temporary speed limit server with the periodic (2s) position report. This data can be quadruple data, and the quadruple data is (RSRP, PCI, SINR, State), where RSRP identifies the wireless network signal strength at the current position, PCI identifies the current network cell number, SINR identifies the signal-to-noise ratio at the current position, and State identifies the current radio station network access status (not networked, networked). It should be noted that after selecting the first radio station, calculate the transmission speed of the in-vehicle electronic map to be transmitted based on the data of the first radio station. After calculating the transmission speed of the in-vehicle electronic map, no matter which radio station transmits the in-vehicle electronic map, its transmission speed is the transmission speed calculated above.

[0085] Specifically, in this step, if the number of networked radio stations is 0, the transmission speed of the in-vehicle electronic map to be transmitted by the temporary speed limit server is 0. When there is 1 networked radio station, this networked radio station is the first radio station. Based on different ranges of wireless network signal strength and signal-to-noise ratio, determine the transmission speed of the in-vehicle electronic map to be transmitted. The transmission speed formula is: number of bytes per packet * number of packets per transmission cycle * (1 / transmission cycle). The unit of 1 is second. Specifically as follows: If -115db < RSRP < -105db of the first radio station and SINR > 10, when the TSRS transmission cycle is 500ms, the expected transmission frequency is 1 packet per cycle, and the speed is 400Byte * 1 packet * (1s / 500ms) = 800Byte / s. If RSRP < -115db of the first radio station and 10 > SINR > 3, when the TSRS transmission cycle is 500ms, the expected transmission frequency is 1 packet per 2 cycles, that is, (1 / 2) packet, and the speed is 400Byte * (1 / 2) packet * (1s / 500ms) = 400Byte / s.

[0086] When the number of networked radio stations is 2, it is determined whether there is any radio station among the networked radio stations whose network signal strength and signal-to-noise ratio are within the first preset range. The first preset range is -95 dB < RSRP < -85 dB and SINR > 25. If there are two radio stations, one is selected. If only one radio station meets the conditions, select that radio station (this radio station is the radio station with good communication status). Obtain the number of transmission cycle packets, transmission frequency, and bytes per packet of this radio station; based on the number of transmission cycle packets, transmission frequency, and bytes per packet of the first radio station, determine the transmission speed of the to-be-transmitted vehicle-mounted electronic map. For example: when the TSRS transmission cycle is 500 ms, the bytes per packet is 400 Byte, and the expected transmission frequency is 3 packets per cycle, the speed is 400 Byte * 3 packets * (1 s / 500 ms) = 2400 Byte / s.

[0087] When the number of networked radio stations is 2, it is determined whether there is any radio station among the networked radio stations whose network signal strength and signal-to-noise ratio are within the second preset range. The first preset range is RSRP < -95 dB and SINR > 16. If there are two radio stations, perform an alternative selection of the radio stations. If only one radio station meets the conditions, select that radio station. Obtain the number of transmission cycle packets, transmission frequency, and bytes per packet of the radio station; based on the number of transmission cycle packets, transmission frequency, and bytes per packet of the radio station, determine the transmission speed of the to-be-transmitted vehicle-mounted electronic map. For example: when the TSRS transmission cycle is 500 ms, the bytes per packet is 400 Byte, and the expected transmission frequency is 2 packets per cycle, the speed is 400 Byte * 2 packets * (1 s / 500 ms) = 1600 Byte / s. By calculating the transmission speed of the to-be-transmitted vehicle-mounted electronic map as above, the transmission stability of the to-be-transmitted vehicle-mounted electronic map is improved. Further, the present application also proposes a vehicle-mounted electronic map encrypted transmission system for a train control system. The system includes a temporary speed limit server and a train automatic protection device, specifically as Figure 4 shown:

[0088] Step 401, the temporary speed limit server establishes a data connection with the train automatic protection device using a preset shared key.

[0089] Step 402, the temporary speed limit server determines the importance level of the to-be-transmitted vehicle-mounted electronic map according to a preset rule, and selects a corresponding encryption algorithm for encryption according to the importance level to obtain an encrypted electronic map.

[0090] Step 403, the temporary speed limit server sends the marked encrypted electronic map through the data connection. The marking is used for the train automatic protection device to select a corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map.

[0091] Step 404: The automatic protection device of the train receives the encrypted electronic map, selects the decryption algorithm of the encrypted electronic map according to the annotation, and decrypts the encrypted electronic map to obtain the target vehicle-mounted electronic map.

[0092] The following example illustrates the system described above:

[0093] The process by which the temporary speed limit server establishes a data connection with the train automatic protection equipment using a preset shared key is as described in step 101 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0094] When the onboard electronic map to be transmitted does not determine the station map file, the temporary speed limit server is mainly used for:

[0095] Based on the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted, the cryptographic algorithm for the map to be transmitted is determined to be En() and the current map encryption key is Ks. At this time, the temporary speed limit server uses CBC (Block Cipher Linked Mode) to encrypt the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted, and performs block P operations on the map to be transmitted. i The corresponding ciphertext block C i =En(C i-1 ^P i ,K s In this context, En() represents the encryption algorithm for the onboard electronic map to be transmitted, and ^ represents a bitwise XOR operation. The TSRS device and the ATP device share an initial ciphertext block of all zeros, C0. The specific encryption algorithm can be TDES and / or SM4, or other high-strength encryption algorithms, which are not limited here. The Temporary Speed ​​Limiting Server (TSRS) device selects the packet data to be sent for the current message according to the pre-configured number of bits in the ciphertext of the electronic map per packet message or in combination with the current network latency status through the map packetization module. The TSRS device sends the encrypted electronic map packet message to the Train Automatic Protection (ATP) device, which includes the file ID, total number of sub-packets, current sub-packet sequence number, and current sub-packet data bit length, referring to the data length and encrypted electronic map sub-packet data bit information of the currently being sent sub-packet.

[0096] The Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system is primarily used to: receive encrypted electronic map packets sequentially through a data channel established via a data connection. Once the ATP determines that all packets of the currently transmitted onboard electronic map have been successfully received, it sequentially assembles the encrypted text of each packet into a complete encrypted electronic map. The ATP then decrypts the encrypted electronic map using the decryption algorithm De() of the encryption algorithm En() from a preset encryption algorithm table, along with the communication key Ks, based on the markings on the encrypted electronic map, obtaining the plaintext data of the onboard electronic map. The ATP uses CBC mode to decrypt the encrypted data of the onboard electronic map, sharing an initial ciphertext block of all zeros (C0). For each encrypted electronic map data block P... i The corresponding plaintext block P i =De(C i ATP calculates the CRC of the plaintext data of the vehicle-mounted electronic map. If the calculated result matches the CRC value in the electronic map index file, ATP determines that the electronic map version is correct and writes it to the storage device. If the calculated CRC result does not match, ATP determines that the electronic map data is incorrect, deletes the map file information, and reports to TSRS that the map file's CRC is empty. When the TSRS device receives the map file CRC sent by ATP and it matches the locally stored map file, TSRS determines that the electronic map file has been successfully downloaded.

[0097] Furthermore, as a response to the above Figure 1-2 The implementation of the method embodiment shown in this invention provides a vehicle-mounted electronic map encryption transmission device for a train control system. This device is used to dynamically determine the encryption algorithm of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted. The embodiment of this device corresponds to the aforementioned method embodiment. For ease of reading, this embodiment will not repeat the details of the aforementioned method embodiment, but it should be clear that the device in this embodiment can implement all the contents of the aforementioned method embodiment. Specifically, as shown... Figure 5 As shown, the device is applied to a temporary rate-limiting server and includes:

[0098] Unit 51 is used to establish a data connection with the train automatic protection device using a preset shared key;

[0099] Acquisition unit 52 is used to acquire the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted;

[0100] Determining unit 53 is used to determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted in the acquisition unit 52 according to preset rules;

[0101] Unit 54 is used to select the corresponding encryption algorithm for encryption based on the importance level in the determining unit 53, thereby obtaining an encrypted electronic map.

[0102] The generating unit 55 is used to annotate the encrypted electronic map in the obtaining unit 54 and send it to the train automatic protection device through the data connection in the utilization unit 51. The annotation is used by the train automatic protection device to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map.

[0103] Furthermore, such as Figure 6 As shown, the determining unit 53 includes:

[0104] The determining unit 53 is used to obtain the classification level of each station within the coverage area of ​​the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; based on the classification level, determine whether the station is a special classified station; if so, determine the importance level of the classified information according to the classification level of each station; if not, determine the importance level according to the route information in the electronic map to be transmitted. Determining the importance level according to the route information in the electronic map to be transmitted includes:

[0105] Extraction module 531 is used to extract route information from the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted;

[0106] The acquisition module 532 is used by the extraction module 531 to acquire the line design speed in the line information and determine the number of lines in the line information whose design speed exceeds the first preset design speed.

[0107] The acquisition module 532 is used to acquire the actual usage frequency of the line information;

[0108] The determination module 533 is used to determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted based on the number of lines in the acquisition module 532 and the actual usage frequency of the line information.

[0109] Furthermore, such as Figure 6 As shown, the determining module 533 includes:

[0110] Using submodule 5331, if the station is a special classified station, the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is determined to be classified as Level 1 confidential.

[0111] The submodule 5331, when the station is not a special classified station, is used to obtain a comprehensive score by multiplying the number of lines by the first weighted value and the actual usage frequency of the line information by the second weighted value, and the sum of the products. The sum of the first weighted value and the second weighted value is 1.

[0112] When the overall score is greater than the first score, the vehicle electronic map to be transmitted is determined to be classified as Level 1 confidential.

[0113] When the overall score is less than the first score but greater than the second score, the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is determined to be classified as Level 2 confidential.

[0114] When the overall score is less than the second score, the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is classified as Level 3 confidential.

[0115] Furthermore, such as Figure 6 As shown, the determining unit 53 includes:

[0116] The parameter acquisition module 534 is used to acquire the feature parameter information of the route information in the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted.

[0117] The segmentation module 535 is used to segment the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted based on the feature parameter information in the acquisition parameter module 534, so as to determine the importance level of the station;

[0118] The grade determination module 536 is used to determine the importance level of the station map file in the division module 535 based on a preset information grade table. The preset information grade table contains rules for determining the information importance level of the station map file.

[0119] Furthermore, the characteristic parameter information includes the traffic capacity and actual traffic flow of the line, and the device also includes:

[0120] Determine whether the traffic carrying capacity of the station line is greater than the preset traffic carrying capacity, and whether the actual traffic flow is greater than the preset traffic flow;

[0121] If the traffic capacity of the station line is greater than the preset traffic capacity and the actual traffic flow is greater than the preset traffic flow, then the station where the line is located is identified as a Level 1 confidential station, marked as Level 1 confidential, and an encryption algorithm with Level 1 security level is matched for the Level 1 confidential station.

[0122] If the traffic capacity of the station is greater than the preset traffic capacity and the actual traffic flow is less than the preset traffic flow, or if the traffic capacity of the station line is less than the preset traffic capacity and the actual traffic flow is greater than the preset traffic flow, then the station where the station line is located is identified as a Level 2 confidential station and marked as Level 2 confidential, and a Level 2 security level encryption algorithm is matched for the Level 2 confidential station.

[0123] If the traffic capacity of the station is less than the preset traffic capacity and the actual traffic flow is less than the preset traffic flow, then the station where the line is located is determined to be a Level 3 confidential station and marked as Level 3 information confidentiality. A Level 3 security level encryption algorithm is then matched for the Level 3 confidential station.

[0124] Furthermore, such as Figure 6 As shown, the partitioning module 535 includes:

[0125] Submodule 5351 is used to obtain the signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio, and network access status information of the two radios of the vehicle-mounted equipment.

[0126] Based on the number of networked radio stations, signal strength, and signal-to-noise ratio information, the electronic map packet transmission frequency and packet byte count are obtained to determine the transmission speed of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted.

[0127] Furthermore, such as Figure 6 As shown, the determining unit 53 includes:

[0128] After determining the encryption algorithm, obtain the encryption length of the encryption algorithm;

[0129] The encryption algorithm at the first level of security uses a key length that is a preset first length, which is less than the encryption length.

[0130] The encryption algorithm for the second level of security uses a preset second length, which is less than a preset first length.

[0131] The encryption algorithm for the three-level security level uses a preset third length, which is less than a preset second length.

[0132] Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention also provide an encrypted transmission system for an onboard electronic map in a train control system, wherein the temporary speed limit server in the system can apply the above-described... Figure 1-2 The method for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system as described in any one of the following.

[0133] Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention also provide a computing device, the computing device comprising: at least one processor, and a memory, wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the processor, the instructions being executed by the processor, thereby enabling the processor to perform the above-described operations. Figure 1-2 The method for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system as described in any one of the following.

[0134] Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention also provide a readable storage medium for storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when running, controls the device where the storage medium is located to perform the above-described actions. Figure 1-2 The method for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system as described in any one of the following.

[0135] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions in other embodiments.

[0136] It is understood that the relevant features in the above methods and apparatus can be referenced interchangeably. Furthermore, the terms "first," "second," etc., in the above embodiments are used to distinguish between embodiments and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of any particular embodiment.

[0137] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0138] The algorithms and displays provided herein are not inherently related to any particular computer, virtual system, or other device. Various general-purpose systems can also be used in conjunction with the teachings herein. The required structure for constructing such systems is apparent from the above description. Furthermore, this invention is not directed to any particular programming language. It should be understood that the contents of the invention described herein can be implemented using various programming languages, and the above description of specific languages ​​is for the purpose of disclosing the best mode of implementation of the invention.

[0139] In addition, the memory may include non-permanent memory in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM, and the memory includes at least one memory chip.

[0140] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0141] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0142] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0143] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0144] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPU), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0145] Memory may include non-persistent memory in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of computer-readable media.

[0146] Computer-readable media includes both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can store information using any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile optical disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape, magnetic magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transferable medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transient computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0147] It should also be noted that the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Unless otherwise specified, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes that element.

[0148] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0149] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps in a train control system, characterized in that, The method is applied to temporary rate-limiting servers and includes: Establish a data connection with the train's automatic safety equipment using a preset shared key; Obtain the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; The importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is determined according to preset rules; Based on the importance level, the corresponding encryption algorithm is selected for encryption to obtain an encrypted electronic map; The encrypted electronic map is annotated and sent to the train automatic protection equipment via the data connection. The annotation is used by the train automatic protection equipment to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted according to preset rules includes: Obtain the classification level of each station within the coverage area of ​​the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; Based on the aforementioned classification level, determine whether the station is a special classified station; If so, the importance level of classified information shall be determined according to the confidentiality level of each station; If not, the importance level is determined based on the line information in the electronic map to be transmitted; The determination of importance level based on the line information in the electronic map to be transmitted includes: Extract route information from the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; Obtain the design speed of the line from the line information, and determine the number of lines whose design speed exceeds the first preset design speed. The actual frequency of use for obtaining line information; The importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is determined based on the number of lines and the actual frequency of use of the line information.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The determination of the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted includes: If the station is a special classified station, the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is classified as Level 1 confidential. If the station is not a special classified station, the comprehensive score is obtained by multiplying the number of lines by the first weighting value and the actual usage frequency of the line information by the second weighting value, and the sum of the products of the two. The sum of the first weighting value and the second weighting value is 1. When the overall score is greater than the first score, the vehicle electronic map to be transmitted is determined to be classified as Level 1 confidential. When the overall score is less than the first score but greater than the second score, the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is determined to be classified as Level 2 confidential. When the overall score is less than the second score, the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is classified as Level 3 confidential.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted according to preset rules includes: Obtain feature parameter information of the route information in the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; Based on the aforementioned feature parameter information, the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted is divided to determine the importance level of each station. Based on a preset information level table, the importance level of the station map file is determined. The preset information level table contains rules for determining the importance level of information in the station map file.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The characteristic parameter information includes the traffic carrying capacity and actual traffic flow of the station line, and the method includes: Determine whether the traffic carrying capacity of the station line is greater than the preset traffic carrying capacity, and whether the actual traffic flow is greater than the preset traffic flow; If the traffic capacity of the station line is greater than the preset traffic capacity and the actual traffic flow is greater than the preset traffic flow, then the station where the station line is located is identified as a Level 1 confidential station and marked as Level 1 confidential, and a Level 1 security level encryption algorithm is matched for the Level 1 confidential station. If the traffic carrying capacity of the station line is greater than the preset traffic carrying capacity and the actual traffic flow is less than the preset traffic flow, or if the traffic carrying capacity of the line is less than the preset traffic carrying capacity and the actual traffic flow is greater than the preset traffic flow, then the station where the station line is located is determined as a Level 2 confidential station and marked as Level 2 confidential, and a Level 2 security level encryption algorithm is matched for the Level 2 confidential station. If the traffic capacity of the station line is less than the preset traffic capacity and the actual traffic flow is less than the preset traffic flow, then the station where the station line is located is determined as a third-level confidential station and marked as a level 3 confidentiality station, and a level 3 security level encryption algorithm is assigned to the level 3 confidential station.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: Acquire the signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio, and network access status information of the two radios on the vehicle-mounted equipment; Based on the number of networked radio stations, signal strength, and signal-to-noise ratio information, the electronic map packet transmission frequency and packet byte count are obtained to determine the transmission speed of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted.

7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The method further includes: after determining the encryption algorithm, obtaining the encryption length of the encryption algorithm; The encryption algorithm at the first level of security uses a key length that is a preset first length, which is less than the encryption length. The encryption algorithm for the second level of security uses a preset second length, which is less than a preset first length. The encryption algorithm for the three-level security level uses a preset third length, which is less than a preset second length.

8. A train control system onboard electronic map encryption transmission device, characterized in that, The device is used in a temporary rate-limiting server and includes: The unit is used to establish a data connection with the train automatic protection equipment using a preset shared key; The acquisition unit is used to acquire the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted; A determining unit is used to determine the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted in the acquiring unit according to preset rules; The unit is used to select the corresponding encryption algorithm based on the importance level in the determined unit to encrypt the encrypted electronic map. The generating unit is used to annotate the encrypted electronic map in the obtaining unit and send it to the train automatic protection device through the data connection. The annotation is used by the train automatic protection device to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map.

9. A train control system for encrypted transmission of onboard electronic maps, characterized in that, The system includes a temporary speed limit server and automatic train protection equipment; The temporary speed limit server establishes a data connection with the train's automatic safety equipment using a preset shared key; The temporary speed limit server determines the importance level of the vehicle-mounted electronic map to be transmitted according to preset rules, and selects the corresponding encryption algorithm to encrypt it according to the importance level to obtain an encrypted electronic map. The temporary speed limit server sends the annotated encrypted electronic map through the data connection. The annotation is used by the automatic train protection equipment to select the corresponding encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted electronic map. The automatic protection equipment for trains receives the encrypted electronic map, selects the decryption algorithm for the encrypted electronic map based on the annotations, and decrypts the encrypted electronic map to obtain the target vehicle-mounted electronic map.

10. A storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium is used to store a computer program, wherein when the computer program is executed, it controls the device where the storage medium is located to execute the encrypted transmission method of the train control system on-board electronic map as described in any one of claims 1-7.

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