Safety control method and device for distributed new energy equipment

Abstract

The invention discloses a safety control method and device for distributed new energy equipment, and the method comprises the steps: deploying a safety agent on a network-related terminal of the distributed new energy equipment, and enabling the safety agent to obtain a complete control right for a network interface of the network-related terminal; the security agent establishes an instruction filtering mechanism, configures an identification rule of a non-control type instruction and a control type instruction, and receives a service instruction from a third-party platform; for the identified non-control type instruction, the security agent releases and allows the non-control type instruction to communicate with the network-related terminal; aiming at the identified control type instruction, the security agent performs digital signature verification, and judges whether the control type instruction contains a preset effective digital signature generated by a power grid dispatching side authorization system or not; when the control type instruction contains an effective digital signature, the security agent allows the control type instruction to be issued to a function module of the network-related terminal equipment for execution; and when the control type instruction does not contain the effective digital signature, the security agent blocks and discards the control type instruction.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of network and information security technology, and in particular to a security control method and device for distributed new energy equipment. Background Technology

[0002] As the global energy structure shifts towards a low-carbon model, new energy power generation, represented by distributed photovoltaic (PV) power, is experiencing explosive growth. Unlike traditional centralized power plants, distributed new energy assets are characterized by their large number, small individual capacity, and geographically dispersed nature. To manage these massive, scattered assets economically and efficiently, a mainstream business model has emerged in the industry: third-party remote operation and maintenance monitoring cloud platforms (hereinafter referred to as "third-party platforms") connected to the internet. Equipment manufacturers or system integrators upload the operating data of core equipment such as inverters to the cloud platform through network-connected terminal equipment deployed on the user side, thereby enabling remote monitoring, fault diagnosis, firmware upgrades, and even key operations such as start-stop control and power regulation.

[0003] This model significantly reduces the operation and maintenance costs of distributed renewable energy, promoting its widespread application. However, it has a fundamental security vulnerability in its architecture: it establishes a control link independent of the power grid dispatch system, capable of directly controlling a massive number of grid-connected terminals in batches. This link effectively leads to the "loss of dispatching rights" of the power grid over grid-connected assets, posing a significant threat to the safe and stable operation of the power grid. In recent years, warnings such as those in the "Sunset Project" research report and real-world cyberattacks against the SolarView monitoring system have clearly confirmed the reality of this risk. Once attackers gain control by exploiting platform vulnerabilities or the inherent security weaknesses of terminal devices, they can use massive distributed power sources as weapons to launch coordinated attacks (such as synchronous start-up and shutdown or creating large power disturbances within a region), which could cause severe fluctuations in power grid frequency or voltage, or even lead to regional power grid collapse.

[0004] To address this challenge, existing technologies have primarily attempted solutions in the following two areas, but neither has fundamentally resolved the problem: First, strengthen security protection on the cloud platform side. This is currently the most common approach, which involves deploying traditional network security measures such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS / IPS), and web application firewalls (WAF) on the third-party platform. The drawback is: (1) Attackers can bypass the cloud platform and directly use the firmware vulnerabilities commonly found in terminal devices via the Internet to gain control over a large number of devices. Due to the huge number and variety of these terminals and their varying levels of security protection, they constitute a huge attack surface.

[0005] (2) It protects the platform itself from being compromised, but it cannot constrain the legitimate behavior of the platform operator. Even if the cloud platform itself is absolutely secure, the platform operator or its authorized users can still issue control commands that may endanger the safety of the power grid without the permission of the power grid dispatching agency. The control is still in the hands of a third party, and the power grid dispatching agency lacks effective technical intervention measures.

[0006] Second, establish a secure isolation channel between the terminal and the platform. Another approach is to use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) or an Access Private Network (APN) to encrypt the communication link. The drawback is: (1) For massive, low-cost scenarios such as low-voltage residential distributed photovoltaic, the cost of deploying and maintaining VPN / APN is too high and it is not economically feasible to promote it on a large scale.

[0007] (2) It only solves the problems of confidentiality and integrity of communication, but cannot solve the problems of compliance and authorization of the content of the instructions. Within the protected channel, legitimate third-party platforms can still freely issue control instructions that may endanger the power grid, and the power grid dispatching agency still cannot effectively intervene and block them.

[0008] In summary, existing technologies, whether focusing on cloud platform protection or channel encryption, have failed to address the risks of "dispatch control being lost" and "off-the-ground control" posed by third-party platforms. The fundamental reason lies in the lack of a technical means to effectively and forcefully transmit and solidify the authorization intent of the power grid dispatching agency at the final point of control command—namely, the massive and dispersed network-connected terminal devices themselves. Therefore, there is an urgent need in this field for a new technical solution that, without altering the existing third-party operation and maintenance business model, can technically establish a final line of defense for the power grid dispatching agency, ensuring that all control commands affecting power grid security must be authorized by the power grid dispatching side, thereby firmly maintaining ultimate control in the hands of the power grid. Summary of the Invention

[0009] The purpose of this invention is to design a safety control method and device for distributed new energy equipment, which solves the technical defects of "loss of scheduling rights" and "in-the-wild control" risks brought to distributed new energy equipment by third-party platforms.

[0010] This invention provides a safety control method for distributed new energy equipment, comprising: S1: Deploy a security agent on the network-connected terminal of the distributed new energy equipment, so that the security agent can obtain complete control over the network interface of the network-connected terminal; S2: The security agent establishes an instruction filtering mechanism, configures the identification rules for non-control instructions and the identification rules for control instructions, and then receives business instructions from third-party platforms; S3: For non-control commands identified, the security agent directly allows them to communicate with the functional modules on the network terminal; for control commands identified, the security agent performs digital signature verification to determine whether the control commands contain a valid digital signature generated by a preset power grid dispatching side authorization system. S4: When the control instruction contains a valid digital signature, the security agent allows the control instruction to be sent to the functional module of the network terminal device for execution; when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent blocks and discards the control instruction.

[0011] The above solution, without changing the existing third-party operation and maintenance business model or affecting its normal monitoring functions, establishes an unavoidable technical defense line on the network terminal side, with the final authorization held by the power grid dispatching agency. This technical means firmly transfers the final control of distributed new energy equipment to the power grid dispatching agency, ensuring that any control commands that may affect power grid security must be reviewed and authorized by the power grid dispatching agency. This effectively resists external network attacks and internal violations, ensuring the safe and stable operation of the power grid in large-scale distributed new energy access scenarios.

[0012] Preferably, before the security agent receives business instructions from the third-party platform, it further includes: The third-party platform sends the request to issue the control commands to the power grid dispatching authorization system; The power grid dispatching authorization system performs a security check on the issued request, and after the check is passed, it generates the valid digital signature using a preset private key and returns the control command carrying the valid digital signature to the third-party platform.

[0013] Preferably, the power grid dispatching authorization system performs a security check on the issued request according to preset risk control rules; specifically: For low-risk control commands with a control scale less than a preset threshold, the power grid dispatching authorization system automatically performs security checks and generates digital signatures. For high-risk control commands that exceed a preset threshold or involve frequent switching, the power grid dispatching authorization system triggers a manual review process or generates a digital signature after power grid simulation analysis.

[0014] Preferably, in step S1, the security agent includes: It resides in the operating system of the network-connected terminal in the form of software, and takes over all network communications of the network-connected terminal at the system level; The security agent is packaged based on the security agent development kit SDK provided by the manufacturer, and the equipment manufacturer integrates the packaged security agent into the firmware of the network terminal. It is deployed in conjunction with the security chip built into the network terminal, and the security chip is used to store key information and perform signature verification operations.

[0015] Preferably, in step S2, the non-control commands include command identification that does not involve changes in the terminal's operating status; the control commands include commands that directly affect grid security, such as power regulation, start-stop control, grid connection / off-grid switching, and operating parameter adjustment.

[0016] Preferably, in step S3, the digital signature verification includes: The security agent extracts the digital signature field from the control instructions; The digital signature is decrypted and verified using the public key of the pre-stored power grid dispatching side authorization system; Verify the integrity of the control instructions and the legitimacy of the signature source.

[0017] Preferably, in step S4, when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent generates an alarm message and reports it to the security monitoring system on the power grid dispatch side. The alarm information includes the source address of the unauthorized command, the command type, the command content summary, and the timestamp.

[0018] Preferably, a safety control device for distributed new energy equipment includes: The security agent deployment module is used to deploy a security agent on the network-connected terminal of the distributed new energy equipment, so that the security agent can obtain complete control over the network interface of the network-connected terminal. The identification rule setting module is used to establish an instruction filtering mechanism in the security agent, configure the identification rules for non-control instructions and the identification rules for control instructions, and then receive business instructions from third-party platforms. The instruction recognition module is used to allow non-control instructions to be directly passed by the security agent, allowing them to communicate with the functional modules on the network terminal; for control instructions, the security agent performs digital signature verification to determine whether the control instructions contain a valid digital signature generated by a preset power grid dispatching side authorization system. The digital signature verification module is used so that when the control instruction contains a valid digital signature, the security agent allows the control instruction to be sent to the functional module of the network terminal device for execution; when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent blocks and discards the control instruction.

[0019] A terminal device includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the aforementioned security control method for distributed new energy devices.

[0020] A computer-readable storage medium includes a stored computer program, wherein, when the computer program is executed, it controls the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located to perform a security control method for distributed new energy devices as described above.

[0021] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: This invention discloses a security control method and apparatus for distributed renewable energy equipment. By deploying a security agent on the grid-connected terminal and locking the final execution permission of control commands to the grid dispatching side, it effectively solves the problem of "dispatching rights being lost" caused by third-party platforms. Through digital signature verification, it ensures that only control commands authorized by the grid dispatching side can be executed, thereby preventing unauthorized control behaviors from impacting the grid. Through strict management of control commands, it reduces the potential threat of distributed renewable energy equipment to the safe and stable operation of the grid and improves the overall security of the grid. Through a command filtering mechanism, it distinguishes between commands that require strict control and commands that can be allowed, avoiding complex signature verification operations for all commands, reducing system overhead, and ensuring the real-time nature of services. Attached Figure Description

[0022] Figure 1 This is a schematic flowchart of a safety control method for distributed new energy equipment provided by an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a power grid dispatch scenario diagram of a distributed photovoltaic power station provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a diagram of a unified power grid dispatching scenario provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a system module diagram of a safety control device for distributed new energy equipment provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0023] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0024] like Figure 1As shown, this application provides a safety control method for distributed new energy equipment, including: S1: Deploy a security agent on the network-connected terminal of the distributed new energy equipment, so that the security agent can obtain complete control over the network interface of the network-connected terminal; S2: The security agent establishes an instruction filtering mechanism, configures the identification rules for non-control instructions and the identification rules for control instructions, and then receives business instructions from third-party platforms; S3: For non-control commands identified, the security agent directly allows them to communicate with the functional modules on the network terminal; for control commands identified, the security agent performs digital signature verification to determine whether the control commands contain a valid digital signature generated by a preset power grid dispatching side authorization system. S4: When the control instruction contains a valid digital signature, the security agent allows the control instruction to be sent to the functional module of the network terminal device for execution; when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent blocks and discards the control instruction.

[0025] In one embodiment provided in this application, such as Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment is applied to a grid dispatching scenario containing distributed photovoltaic power stations. It achieves secure access and remote control of photovoltaic equipment through multi-level proxy and encrypted authentication. The specific process is as follows: During the access pre-authorization phase, the secure access zone of the power grid control center sends a pre-authorization instruction to the field control center. This instruction carries the access permission threshold and encryption public key from the power grid side.

[0026] Control commands are encrypted and issued by the field control center. Based on the pre-authorization result, the control center generates control commands and signs the command content using a secure hash algorithm before sending them to the security agent of the distributed photovoltaic power station. The security agent verifies the signature's legitimacy using a built-in certificate.

[0027] After receiving the control command, the security agent simultaneously forwards a copy of the command to the fake control center. It then detects the illegal access identifier of the fake control center through local whitelist verification and triggers the unauthorized command interception mechanism to terminate the execution of the copy.

[0028] The photovoltaic equipment command response security agent sends a non-rejection command to the photovoltaic inverter of the distributed photovoltaic power station. After verifying the command signature, the inverter performs power regulation. At the same time, the security agent reports the execution status of the regulation command to the field control center, completing the closed-loop control.

[0029] The abnormal command tracing system detects that the pseudo control center attempts to send pseudo commands to the security agent. The security agent identifies the anomaly by double-checking the command source address and signature, and sends the pseudo command information back to the business risk model of the power grid control center to update the risk database and strengthen subsequent access audits.

[0030] This embodiment achieves secure access and controllable scheduling of distributed photovoltaic devices through a multi-level collaborative mechanism of "pre-authorization-encryption issuance-tiered interception-status feedback," while effectively identifying and intercepting illegal commands from fake control centers.

[0031] Preferably, before the security agent receives business instructions from the third-party platform, it further includes: The third-party platform sends the request to issue the control commands to the power grid dispatching authorization system; The power grid dispatching authorization system performs a security check on the issued request, and after the check is passed, it generates the valid digital signature using a preset private key and returns the control command carrying the valid digital signature to the third-party platform.

[0032] Preferably, the power grid dispatching authorization system performs a security check on the issued request according to preset risk control rules; specifically: For low-risk control commands with a control scale less than a preset threshold, the power grid dispatching authorization system automatically performs security checks and generates digital signatures. For high-risk control commands that exceed a preset threshold or involve frequent switching, the power grid dispatching authorization system triggers a manual review process or generates a digital signature after power grid simulation analysis.

[0033] Preferably, in step S1, the security agent includes: It resides in the operating system of the network-connected terminal in the form of software, and takes over all network communications of the network-connected terminal at the system level; The security agent is packaged based on the security agent development kit SDK provided by the manufacturer, and the equipment manufacturer integrates the packaged security agent into the firmware of the network terminal. It is deployed in conjunction with the security chip built into the network terminal, and the security chip is used to store key information and perform signature verification operations.

[0034] In one embodiment provided in this application, for newly added photovoltaic terminal equipment, a security agent program and basic configuration, including the equipment's unique identifier and root certificate information related to the grid master station, are pre-installed in the terminal control system or communication module during the equipment manufacturing stage or before delivery. After the terminal is installed on-site and wiring is completed, during the grid connection acceptance or commissioning phase of the substation, the security agent is activated and registered through interaction with the grid master station or a registered third-party platform to obtain an operating certificate and initial security policy. After activation, the terminal's external business communication is switched to be uniformly forwarded by the security agent.

[0035] For existing photovoltaic terminal equipment, a registered and certified third-party platform will organize remote upgrades, loading the security agent into the terminal control system or communication module via software upgrade. After the upgrade, the terminal will restart the relevant modules and enable the security agent within the appropriate operating window, initiate registration and certificate application to the superior system according to the new terminal process, obtain the operating certificate and policy, and close or restrict the use of the original direct connection to the external system, thus achieving consistent management of existing and new terminals.

[0036] Preferably, in step S2, the non-control commands include command identification that does not involve changes in the terminal's operating status; the control commands include commands that directly affect grid security, such as power regulation, start-stop control, grid connection / off-grid switching, and operating parameter adjustment.

[0037] In one embodiment provided in this application, such as Figure 3 As shown, the risk control system is planned to be deployed and uniformly dispatched at the provincial and grid levels. The provincial, grid, and local dispatch departments will combine the impact of relevant control instructions on the local power grid operation, design risk control rules, and simulate them through safety verification to automatically make risk control decisions.

[0038] The "business risk control rules" of the grid-level master station are synchronized down to the provincial master station, and the rules of the provincial master station are then synchronized to the prefecture-level master station, achieving unified risk control rules and data across multiple master stations. Each level of master station performs a "security check" during the process to ensure the security of dispatch instructions or data interactions (such as grid operation safety and data compliance). The provincial master station initiates an "instruction request" to a third-party platform. After "instruction authorization," the third-party platform can participate in the dispatch of distributed photovoltaic (PV) power plants. Simultaneously, the prefecture-level master station also directly performs dispatch-related operations on distributed PV power plants. Ultimately, the unified dispatch of "distributed PV power plants" is completed collaboratively by multiple level master stations and third-party platforms, achieving collaborative management and control of PV resources. The core of this embodiment is to construct a collaborative dispatch system for distributed PV power plants through rule synchronization and security checks at multiple level master stations, combined with the authorized participation of third-party platforms. This system ensures both grid-side safety and compliance while introducing third-party resources to participate in PV dispatch.

[0039] The identification rules for non-control commands and the identification rules for control commands include: Non-control-related instructions were directly filtered and released; For a small number of site deployment / deployment control commands, the system automatically determines and authorizes execution, ensuring a seamless process. For large-scale, frequent commissioning and decommissioning control commands, risk control verification needs to be carried out by the system or manually to confirm that there is no risk to the operation of the power grid before granting dispatch authorization signature, which is then verified and executed by the safety agent.

[0040] Preferably, in step S3, the digital signature verification includes: The security agent extracts the digital signature field from the control instructions; The digital signature is decrypted and verified using the public key of the pre-stored power grid dispatching side authorization system; Verify the integrity of the control instructions and the legitimacy of the signature source.

[0041] Preferably, in step S4, when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent generates an alarm message and reports it to the security monitoring system on the power grid dispatch side. The alarm information includes the source address of the unauthorized command, the command type, the command content summary, and the timestamp.

[0042] In one embodiment provided in this application, a control instruction processing flow is provided; Registered and authorized third-party platforms generate control instructions for one or more photovoltaic terminal devices based on the needs of owners or operation and maintenance, such as power adjustment and inverter start-up and shutdown. After completing basic logic verification locally, the control instructions are encapsulated into standard messages and sent to the grid master station's risk control system through the communication channel between the platform and the grid master station.

[0043] After receiving control-related instructions, the power grid master station risk control system performs permission verification, security assessment, and group control risk analysis on the instructions based on the third-party platform's filing information, authorization scope, power grid operation status, and preset risk control strategies. For control-related instructions with acceptable risk and in compliance with the strategies, a "pass" result is generated, and the control-related instructions are digitally signed using the power grid master station's signature key to form a signed control-related instruction message that is returned to the third-party platform. For control-related instructions that do not comply with the strategies, a "fail" result is generated, and the risk control event is recorded.

[0044] After receiving the signed control instruction message, the third-party platform forwards the message to the target photovoltaic terminal device through the existing control channel. Since the terminal's external communication entry is uniformly handled by the security agent, the signed control instruction is received by the terminal security agent.

[0045] The terminal security agent classifies and identifies the received business instructions. Instructions that are not subject to control are allowed to pass after completing basic legality checks. For messages identified as subject to control, the agent extracts signature information and related metadata, calls the locally stored power grid master station public key or certificate for signature verification, and checks constraints such as the effective time window.

[0046] When the signature verification is successful and the control instruction is within the valid time window, the security agent reconfirms the rationality of the target terminal and the range of control parameters according to the local policy. After confirmation, the control instruction is sent to the terminal control module for execution, and the execution time, execution result and other information are recorded. When the signature verification fails, the signature certificate is invalid, or the control instruction has exceeded the valid time window, the security agent determines the instruction as an illegal or suspicious instruction, does not execute it, generates a detailed log on the terminal, and sends a security alarm message to the power grid master station or monitoring system through the existing reporting channel.

[0047] Preferred, such as Figure 4 As shown, a safety control device for distributed new energy equipment includes: The security agent deployment module is used to deploy a security agent on the network-connected terminal of the distributed new energy equipment, so that the security agent can obtain complete control over the network interface of the network-connected terminal. The identification rule setting module is used to establish an instruction filtering mechanism in the security agent, configure the identification rules for non-control instructions and the identification rules for control instructions, and then receive business instructions from third-party platforms. The instruction recognition module is used to allow non-control instructions to be directly passed by the security agent, allowing them to communicate with the functional modules on the network terminal; for control instructions, the security agent performs digital signature verification to determine whether the control instructions contain a valid digital signature generated by a preset power grid dispatching side authorization system. The digital signature verification module is used so that when the control instruction contains a valid digital signature, the security agent allows the control instruction to be sent to the functional module of the network terminal device for execution; when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent blocks and discards the control instruction.

[0048] A terminal device includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the aforementioned security control method for distributed new energy devices.

[0049] A computer-readable storage medium includes a stored computer program, wherein, when the computer program is executed, it controls the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located to perform a security control method for distributed new energy devices as described above.

[0050] The above description represents the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various improvements and modifications without departing from the principles of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications are also considered to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A safety control method for distributed new energy equipment, characterized in that, include: S1: Deploy a security agent on the network-connected terminal of the distributed new energy equipment, so that the security agent can obtain complete control over the network interface of the network-connected terminal; S2: The security agent establishes an instruction filtering mechanism, configures the identification rules for non-control instructions and the identification rules for control instructions, and then receives business instructions from third-party platforms; S3: For non-control commands identified, the security agent directly allows them to communicate with the functional modules on the network terminal; for control commands identified, the security agent performs digital signature verification to determine whether the control commands contain a valid digital signature generated by a preset power grid dispatching side authorization system. S4: When the control instruction contains a valid digital signature, the security agent allows the control instruction to be sent to the functional module of the network terminal device for execution; when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent blocks and discards the control instruction.

2. The safety control method for distributed new energy equipment according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the security agent receives business instructions from the third-party platform, the following is also included: The third-party platform sends the request to issue the control commands to the power grid dispatching authorization system; The power grid dispatching authorization system performs a security check on the issued request, and after the check is passed, it generates the valid digital signature using a preset private key and returns the control command carrying the valid digital signature to the third-party platform.

3. The safety control method for distributed new energy equipment according to claim 2, characterized in that, The power grid dispatching authorization system performs a security check on the issued request according to preset risk control rules; specifically: For low-risk control commands with a control scale less than a preset threshold, the power grid dispatching side authorization system automatically performs security checks and generates digital signatures. For high-risk control commands that exceed a preset threshold or involve frequent switching, the power grid dispatching authorization system triggers a manual review process or generates a digital signature after power grid simulation analysis.

4. A safety control method for distributed new energy equipment according to claim 3, characterized in that, In step S1, the security agent includes: It resides in the operating system of the network-connected terminal in the form of software, and takes over all network communications of the network-connected terminal at the system level; The security agent is packaged based on the security agent development kit SDK provided by the manufacturer, and the equipment manufacturer integrates the packaged security agent into the firmware of the network terminal. It is deployed in conjunction with the security chip built into the network terminal, and the security chip is used to store key information and perform signature verification operations.

5. A safety control method for distributed new energy equipment according to claim 4, characterized in that, In step S2, the non-control commands include commands that do not involve changes in the terminal's operating status; the control commands include commands that directly affect grid security, such as power regulation, start-stop control, grid connection / off-grid switching, and operating parameter adjustment.

6. A safety control method for distributed new energy equipment according to claim 5, characterized in that, In step S3, the digital signature verification includes: The security agent extracts the digital signature field from the control instructions; The digital signature is decrypted and verified using the public key of the pre-stored power grid dispatching side authorization system; Verify the integrity of the control instructions and the legitimacy of the signature source.

7. A safety control method for distributed new energy equipment according to claim 6, characterized in that, In step S4, when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent generates an alarm message and reports it to the security monitoring system on the power grid dispatch side. The alarm information includes the source address of the unauthorized command, the command type, the command content summary, and the timestamp.

8. A safety control device for distributed new energy equipment, characterized in that, include: The security agent deployment module is used to deploy a security agent on the network-connected terminal of the distributed new energy equipment, so that the security agent can obtain complete control over the network interface of the network-connected terminal. The identification rule setting module is used to establish an instruction filtering mechanism in the security agent, configure the identification rules for non-control instructions and the identification rules for control instructions, and then receive business instructions from third-party platforms. The instruction recognition module is used to allow non-control instructions to be directly passed by the security agent, allowing them to communicate with the functional modules on the network terminal; for control instructions, the security agent performs digital signature verification to determine whether the control instructions contain a valid digital signature generated by a preset power grid dispatching side authorization system. The digital signature verification module is used so that when the control instruction contains a valid digital signature, the security agent allows the control instruction to be sent to the functional module of the network terminal device for execution; when the control instruction does not contain a valid digital signature, the security agent blocks and discards the control instruction.

9. A terminal device, characterized in that, The device includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, wherein the processor, when executing the computer program, implements a safety control method for distributed new energy devices as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium includes a stored computer program, wherein, when the computer program is executed, it controls the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located to perform a security control method for distributed new energy devices as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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