Safety verification method and system for radiation monitoring server platform of nuclear power plant

Abstract

The invention provides a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform safety verification method and system. And when an old server with redundant setting is replaced, obtaining configuration information, and carrying out configuration and offline simulation verification on a new server. After verification is passed, staged online verification is carried out: in the first stage, an old server is replaced by a first new server, and batch online verification is completed by carrying out communication data packet comparison with another old server which is still online; and in the second stage, another old server is replaced by a second new server, and the same batch comparison verification is carried out. And after all verification is passed, formally switching to two new servers. According to the method, through staged cooperation and batch verification, safe and undisturbed replacement and upgrading of the server platform are realized on the premise of ensuring continuous and safe operation of the nuclear power station.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of nuclear power safety technology, and more specifically, to a method and system for safety verification of a radiation monitoring server platform in a nuclear power plant. Background Technology

[0002] The nuclear power plant radiation monitoring system (KRT system) is a critical component in ensuring the safe operation of a nuclear power plant. It is responsible for real-time radiation monitoring of radioactive area boundaries and process flows. Its core functions are to prevent excessive personnel exposure, monitor reactor barrier integrity, and activate automatic safety measures when necessary. Currently, this system generally uses a server platform as the data processing and transmission hub. However, with the development of nuclear power technology, especially given the limitations of early imported servers due to foreign copyright restrictions hindering independent upgrades, and the current trend in new power plants towards domestically produced servers without a smooth transition method, the replacement or upgrading of radiation monitoring servers must ensure that it absolutely does not affect the safe operation of the power plant. Existing verification technologies have significant shortcomings: First, they lack a systematic and standardized verification process, relying on personnel experience, which has led to safety incidents of monitoring data interruption due to insufficient verification. Second, the verification process can easily interfere with the normal operation of power plants; approximately 40% of verifications have triggered false alarms, affecting operational judgment. Third, critical information (such as channel lockout status) often cannot be fully synchronized to the new system during replacement, potentially leaving monitoring blind spots and safety hazards. Finally, they fail to develop phased verification strategies based on different power plant operating modes (such as overhaul and normal operation); approximately 65% ​​of verification problems stem from testing at inappropriate times, increasing unnecessary safety risks. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The technical problem this invention aims to solve is that, in the existing technology, the lack of a systematic verification process for replacing or upgrading radiation monitoring servers in nuclear power plants, and the potential for the verification process to interfere with the normal operation of the power plant, lead to this invention providing a safety verification method for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform. When replacing or upgrading two redundant old radiation monitoring servers to two redundant new radiation monitoring servers, the following steps are performed: Obtain channel information for multiple radiation monitoring channels and a data point mapping table between the old radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and configure the new radiation monitoring server according to the channel information and the data point mapping table; The configured new radiation monitoring server is connected to the nuclear power plant control system and the selected radiation monitoring channel, and offline verification is performed in a simulation test environment; If the offline verification passes, in the first phase, a new radiation monitoring server replaces one of the old radiation monitoring servers and connects to the nuclear power plant control system and each radiation monitoring channel. Following a preset batch verification sequence, during different verification periods, the new radiation monitoring server is verified online based on the communication data packets exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels. In the second phase, a new radiation monitoring server replaces the other old radiation monitoring server and connects to the nuclear power plant control system and each radiation monitoring channel. Following a preset batch verification sequence, during different verification periods, the new radiation monitoring server is verified online based on the communication data packets exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the second new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels. If the second new radiation monitoring server passes online verification, then the two old radiation monitoring servers will be replaced with the two new radiation monitoring servers.

[0004] Furthermore, the step of connecting the configured new radiation monitoring server to the nuclear power plant control system and the selected radiation monitoring channel, and performing offline verification in a simulation test environment, includes: In the simulation test environment, test connections are established between the new radiation monitoring server and the simulation module of the nuclear power plant control system and multiple pre-selected radiation monitoring channels. Test data simulating various operating conditions were injected into the radiation monitoring channel in the test connection; Acquire and verify whether the communication data generated by the new radiation monitoring server in response to the test data and sent to the nuclear power plant control system simulation module meets the expected specifications; Specifically, when the communication data conforms to the expected specifications, the offline verification is deemed to have passed.

[0005] Furthermore, the injection of test data simulating various operating conditions into the radiation monitoring channel in the test connection includes: By using a pre-set test procedure, and in accordance with the communication protocol standard followed between the nuclear power plant control system and the old radiation monitoring server, an encoded test data sequence is generated and injected. The test data sequence is configured to simulate the output of the radiation monitoring channel, the output including at least one of the following: measured values, device status signals, alarm signals, and dynamic watchdog clock signals.

[0006] Furthermore, the preset batch verification sequence includes: The verification sequence of multiple batches transitioning from the complete unloading mode to the overhaul mode.

[0007] Furthermore, the online verification of the first new radiation monitoring server based on the communication data packets exchanged between another old radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels includes: The first communication data packet exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the second communication data packet exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are respectively acquired. The third communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the fourth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are respectively acquired. The first communication data packet is compared with the third communication data packet, and the second communication data packet is compared with the fourth communication data packet, respectively, to verify whether the interactive data content between the first new radiation monitoring server and the other old radiation monitoring server is consistent; If the comparison finds that the deviation of any corresponding data packet exceeds the preset threshold, an alarm will be triggered; If the deviation of all corresponding data packets does not exceed the preset threshold, the first new radiation monitoring server is deemed to have passed the online verification for this batch.

[0008] Furthermore, the radiation monitoring channel includes a switch quantity monitoring channel and an analog quantity testing channel, and the comparison includes: Compare whether the switch status signals in the second communication data packet and the fourth communication data packet are consistent; And / or, calculate the relative deviation between the measured values ​​in the second communication data packet and the fourth communication data packet, and determine whether the relative deviation exceeds the preset threshold.

[0009] Furthermore, when performing the online verification on the analog quantity monitoring channel, the analog input value used for the test does not exceed the preset proportion of the preset first-level alarm threshold of the corresponding channel.

[0010] Furthermore, before performing the online verification on the switch quantity monitoring channel, the interlocking action of the downstream equipment triggered by the alarm signal of the switch quantity monitoring channel is blocked.

[0011] Further, the online verification of the second new radiation monitoring server based on the communication data packets exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the second new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels includes: The fifth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the sixth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are respectively acquired. The seventh communication data packet exchanged between the second new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the eighth communication data packet exchanged between the second new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are respectively acquired. The fifth communication data packet is compared with the seventh communication data packet, and the sixth communication data packet is compared with the eighth communication data packet, respectively, to verify whether the interactive data content between the second new radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server is consistent; If the comparison finds that the deviation of any corresponding data packet exceeds the preset threshold, an alarm will be triggered; If the deviation of all corresponding data packets does not exceed the preset threshold, the second new radiation monitoring server is deemed to have passed the online verification for this batch.

[0012] The present invention also provides a safety verification system for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform, including a processor and a memory storing a computer program, wherein the processor implements the steps of any of the above-described methods when executing the computer program.

[0013] The beneficial effects of this invention are that it provides a safety verification method for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform. When replacing or upgrading two redundant old radiation monitoring servers to two redundant new radiation monitoring servers, the following steps are performed: obtaining channel information for multiple radiation monitoring channels and a data point mapping table between the old radiation monitoring servers and the nuclear power plant control system; configuring the new radiation monitoring server according to the channel information and the data point mapping table; connecting the configured new radiation monitoring server to the nuclear power plant control system and the selected radiation monitoring channels, and performing offline verification in a simulation test environment; if the offline verification passes, in the first stage, replacing one of the old radiation monitoring servers with a first new radiation monitoring server and connecting it to the nuclear power plant control system and each radiation monitoring channel, according to a preset batch verification order. During different verification periods, the first new radiation monitoring server is verified online based on communication data packets exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels, respectively. In the second stage, the second new radiation monitoring server replaces the other old radiation monitoring server and connects to the nuclear power plant control system and each radiation monitoring channel. Following a preset batch verification sequence, the second new radiation monitoring server is verified online during different verification periods based on communication data packets exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the second new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels, respectively. If the second new radiation monitoring server passes the online verification, the two old radiation monitoring servers are replaced by the two new radiation monitoring servers. This invention, through phased collaborative verification, a progressive verification combining offline and online methods, and an intelligent batch verification mechanism based on the nuclear power plant's operating mode, achieves safe, efficient, and uninterrupted replacement or upgrade of the radiation monitoring server platform while ensuring the continuous and safe operation of the nuclear power plant. Attached Figure Description

[0014] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. In the accompanying drawings: Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the safety verification method for the nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform of the present invention. Figure 2 This is a network topology diagram of redundant deployment of radiation monitoring servers and data acquisition in a power plant. Detailed Implementation

[0015] To provide a clearer understanding of the technical features, objectives, and effects of the present invention, specific embodiments of the invention are now described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the following description, specific details such as particular structures and techniques are set forth for illustrative purposes and not for limitation, in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the invention. However, those skilled in the art will understand that the invention can also be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known devices, circuits, and methods are omitted so as not to obscure the description of the invention with unnecessary detail.

[0016] like Figure 1 As shown, Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the safety verification method for the nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform of the present invention.

[0017] This invention provides a safety verification method for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform. When replacing or upgrading two redundant old radiation monitoring servers to two redundant new radiation monitoring servers, the following steps are performed: Obtain channel information for multiple radiation monitoring channels and a data point mapping table between the old radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and configure the new radiation monitoring server based on the channel information and the data point mapping table; The newly configured radiation monitoring server was connected to the nuclear power plant control system and the selected radiation monitoring channel, and offline verification was carried out in a simulation test environment. If the offline verification passes, in the first phase, the first new radiation monitoring server will replace one of the old radiation monitoring servers and connect to the nuclear power plant control system and various radiation monitoring channels. According to the preset batch verification sequence, in different verification periods, the first new radiation monitoring server will be verified online based on the communication data packets exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels. In the second phase, the second new radiation monitoring server will replace the other old radiation monitoring server and connect to the nuclear power plant control system and various radiation monitoring channels. According to the preset batch verification sequence, in different verification periods, the second new radiation monitoring server will be verified online based on the communication data packets exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the second new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels. If the online verification of the second new radiation monitoring server passes, the two old radiation monitoring servers will be replaced with the two new radiation monitoring servers.

[0018] It should be noted that offline verification is a functional verification of the newly configured radiation monitoring server in a simulation test environment. By simulating test data under various operating conditions, the correctness and compliance of the server's data acquisition, parsing, and transmission functions are verified. Online verification, on the other hand, is conducted in an actual nuclear power plant environment. Through a phased replacement and parallel operation of the old and new servers, within a controlled safety boundary, the data consistency, interface reliability, and system stability of the radiation monitoring server under actual operating conditions are verified. The data point mapping table is a predefined structured table used to clarify the correspondence between all data exchange points between the old radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system. The data point mapping table contains the identifier, name, data type, communication address, transmission protocol, and mapping relationship between the old and new systems for each data point. It is the core configuration basis to ensure interface compatibility and seamless data connection between the old and new servers and the control system.

[0019] Furthermore, the configured new radiation monitoring server is connected to the nuclear power plant control system and the selected radiation monitoring channels. Offline verification is performed in a simulation test environment, including: establishing test connections between the new radiation monitoring server and the simulation module of the nuclear power plant control system and multiple pre-selected radiation monitoring channels in the simulation test environment; injecting test data simulating various operating conditions into the radiation monitoring channels in the test connections; acquiring and verifying whether the communication data generated by the new radiation monitoring server in response to the test data and sent to the simulation module of the nuclear power plant control system meets the expected specifications; wherein, when the communication data meets the expected specifications, the offline verification is deemed to have passed.

[0020] Specifically, the verification process is executed automatically by a dedicated testing program. Based on a preset data point mapping table and communication protocol standards, the program parses and compares the data received by the new server, monitors the accuracy and consistency of data collection in real time, and automatically generates an offline verification report that includes data consistency, response time, and anomaly records.

[0021] Furthermore, injecting test data simulating various operating conditions into the radiation monitoring channel in the test connection includes: generating and injecting an encoded test data sequence through a preset test program, based on the communication protocol standard followed between the nuclear power plant control system and the old radiation monitoring server; the test data sequence is configured to simulate the output of the radiation monitoring channel, and the output includes at least one of the following: measured values, equipment status signals, alarm signals, and dynamic watchdog clock signals.

[0022] Specifically, the test data sequence is encoded according to the Modbus communication protocol standard and the data storage address bits, dynamically simulating the complete output including channel measurement values, equipment status, alarm triggers and watchdog signals; the test program supports manually setting specific values ​​to simulate tripping, alarm and other working conditions, and can freely combine different signal types to fully verify the data processing and response capabilities of the new server under various preset and boundary conditions.

[0023] Offline testing involves setting up a test platform in a laboratory environment, establishing test connections between the new radiation monitoring server and the simulation module of the nuclear power plant control system, as well as multiple pre-selected radiation monitoring channels (10 representative channels were connected in the actual embodiment). A dedicated test program was designed to generate a test data sequence containing measured values, equipment status, historical data, and a dynamic watchdog clock signal, encoded according to the MODBUS protocol standard of the radiation monitoring server software and the data storage address bits. Test data simulating various radiation levels and operating conditions was injected into the radiation monitoring channels in the test connections, and trip simulation values ​​or alarm states could be freely set or manually configured. The connection between the new server and the KRT channels was verified through this program. The process involves verifying the normality of data parsing and comparing data from the old and new servers in real time to ensure accurate and consistent data acquisition. Simultaneously, the data transmission interface between the new server and the nuclear power plant control system (DCS) is verified in a simulated environment, simulating various operating conditions to test the stability, integrity, and real-time performance of data transmission. Particular attention is paid to the reliability of alarm signal transmission, and transmission delay monitoring is implemented. Finally, the communication data generated and sent to the DCS simulation module by the new server in response to test data is acquired and verified to meet expected specifications. Verification results are automatically recorded and a visual report is generated. During this offline verification process, three data format mismatch issues were successfully identified and resolved. When all communication data meets expected specifications, the offline verification is considered successful.

[0024] Furthermore, the preset batch verification sequence includes multiple batch verification sequences that transition sequentially from the complete unloading mode to the overhaul mode.

[0025] Specifically, the pre-set batch verification sequence includes multiple batches transitioning sequentially from the full refueling mode to the overhaul mode. The innovative batch verification based on operating modes divides the verification work into seven batches to match the overhaul process of the nuclear power plant: each batch corresponds to a specific operating state of the nuclear power plant, ensuring verification is conducted within the safety window; verification is prioritized according to the importance of the channel and its availability requirements under different operating modes, with the most important channels and those with the strictest availability requirements included in the first batch for priority verification. The first batch targets channels that must be available under the full refueling mode (such as spent fuel pool monitoring), and the verification content includes issuing alarms through the on-site KRT channel, simulating measurement value output, and confirming the normal operation of the new server's measurement value display, DCS-KRT network communication, and DCS interface information using a full-channel verification method; the second batch targets channels that must be available under overhaul mode 6 (such as reactor building monitoring); the third to seventh batches sequentially target channels that need verification under different overhaul modes, with the last batch verifying channels without safety requirements. Nuclear power plant unit operation status is divided into Mode 1 (normal operation and power generation) to Mode 6 (shutdown and unsealed fuel). Each intermediate state corresponds to different equipment requirements. In this plan, different unit modes correspond to different test batches. All KRT channels in each batch adopt the same verification method to ensure that the verification process is systematic, safe and closely coordinated with the power plant operation status.

[0026] In one embodiment, during the information sorting phase, the radiation monitoring channel information of the entire plant is organized and divided into red, yellow, and green channels according to safety level. Among them, the red channel is the most important and must be verified in a specific operating mode, the yellow channel is of medium importance and can be verified in multiple modes, and the green channel is of low importance and can be verified in any mode. At the same time, a data point mapping table is established to clarify the correspondence with 208 data points in the DCS system, thereby laying the foundation for subsequent offline and online phased verification, ensuring that the verification process is safe, complete, and does not affect the normal operation of the power plant.

[0027] The key radiation monitoring channels that need to be prioritized for testing under different nuclear power unit operating modes are divided as shown in Table 1. Among them, the channel corresponding to mode 7 (complete unloading mode) is the red channel, the channels corresponding to modes 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2 are the yellow channels, and the channel corresponding to mode 1 (normal operation mode) is the green channel.

[0028] Table 1 shows the batch verification sequence for nuclear power unit operating modes and channel safety levels. The list of radiation monitoring channels is shown in Table 2. Channel numbers starting with "1KRT" or "2KRT" indicate that the channel belongs exclusively to Unit 1 or Unit 2, respectively; channels starting with "9KRT" indicate that the channel is shared by both units.

[0029] Table 2. Examples of detailed information about radiation monitoring channels Furthermore, based on the communication data packets exchanged between another old radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels, the online verification of the first new radiation monitoring server includes: acquiring the first communication data packet exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the second communication data packet exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels; acquiring the third communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the fourth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels. The first communication data packet is compared with the third communication data packet, and the second communication data packet is compared with the fourth communication data packet to verify whether the interactive data content between the first new radiation monitoring server and another old radiation monitoring server is consistent. If the comparison finds that the deviation of any corresponding data packet exceeds the preset threshold, an alarm is triggered. If the deviation of all corresponding data packets does not exceed the preset threshold, it is determined that the first new radiation monitoring server has passed the online verification of this batch.

[0030] like Figure 2 As shown, the KRT002AR server rack is deployed with two redundant units, responsible for collecting measurement data and alarm information from the 1, 2, and 9 KRT series on-site radiation monitoring channels. The signals are connected to the multi-channel RS485 communication cards in 1KRT002AR and 2KRT002AR via two RS485 buses composed of KRT devices connected in series with twisted-pair cables. After data collection, the data is summarized, recorded, and stored in the KRT server, and then uploaded to station 68 of the NC-DCS system and the radiation protection duty room workstation via the KCP gateway. This enables the main control operator and radiation protection personnel to monitor and respond to alarms in real time for the radiation levels of key areas of the unit, process flow, and effluents. The DCS system uses the KRT002AR of the same unit as the main communication link, with the adjacent side as the backup link, supporting automatic switching between main and backup.

[0031] Based on this architecture, when a nuclear power plant enters overhaul mode and initiates the first batch of verifications, five key channels that must be available under the complete unloading mode are selected for verification: First, the first communication data packet between the still-operating old radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the second communication data packet between the old server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are acquired; simultaneously, the third communication data packet between the newly connected first new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the fourth communication data packet between the new server and the same batch of radiation monitoring channels are acquired; then, the first and third communication data packets, and the second and fourth communication data packets are compared one by one to verify whether the data content exchanged between the old and new servers is consistent; if the deviation of any compared data packet exceeds a preset threshold, an alarm is triggered; if the deviation of all data packets does not exceed the threshold, the online verification of the first new radiation monitoring server in this batch is deemed to have passed.

[0032] Furthermore, the radiation monitoring channel includes a switch quantity monitoring channel and an analog quantity testing channel. The comparison includes: comparing whether the switch quantity status signals in the second communication data packet and the fourth communication data packet are consistent; and / or, calculating the relative deviation between the measured values ​​in the second communication data packet and the fourth communication data packet, and determining whether the relative deviation exceeds a preset threshold.

[0033] In one embodiment, the comparison process first parses the data structure of the second and fourth communication data packets, extracts the bit status information of the switch quantity and compares them bit by bit to ensure that they are completely consistent; for analog quantities, the floating-point format measurement value is read from the data packet, the relative deviation percentage between the corresponding measurement values ​​of the new and old servers is calculated, and compared with a preset deviation threshold (e.g., 5%). If the threshold is exceeded, an alarm is automatically triggered and abnormal data points are marked.

[0034] Furthermore, when performing online verification of the analog quantity monitoring channel, the analog input value used for the test shall not exceed the preset proportion of the preset first-level alarm threshold of the corresponding channel.

[0035] Specifically, when performing online verification of analog quantity monitoring channels, the analog input values ​​used for testing are strictly limited to a safe percentage (e.g., 80%) not exceeding the preset first-level alarm threshold of the channel. This ensures that the testing activities remain within safe boundaries and avoids triggering unplanned alarms. Before performing online verification of digital quantity monitoring channels, the interlocking actions of downstream equipment triggered by the alarm signal of the channel are pre-blocked through software configuration. This achieves safe "soft testing," which verifies the normal functioning of the digital quantity signals while isolating them from interfering with the actual process flow.

[0036] Furthermore, before conducting online verification of the switch quantity monitoring channel, the interlocking action of downstream equipment triggered by the alarm signal of the switch quantity monitoring channel is blocked.

[0037] In one embodiment, when the nuclear power plant enters overhaul mode and initiates the first batch of verifications, five critical channels that must be available under full refueling mode are selected for the aforementioned verification. Analog test values ​​are controlled at 70% of the first-level alarm threshold, and "soft testing" is used to verify the switch signals. During verification, a lockout information synchronization mechanism automatically checks and synchronizes lockout information after each day's verification. A dedicated comparison tool ensures complete consistency between the lockout states of the old and new systems, generating a double-confirmed report and setting up anomaly warnings to prevent long-term lockouts from going undetected. All seven batches of verifications were completed sequentially over a total of 14 days.

[0038] Furthermore, based on the communication data packets exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the second new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels, the online verification of the second new radiation monitoring server includes: acquiring the fifth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the sixth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels. The seventh communication data packet exchanged between the second new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the eighth communication data packet exchanged between the second new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels were obtained respectively. The fifth communication data packet is compared with the seventh communication data packet, and the sixth communication data packet is compared with the eighth communication data packet to verify whether the interactive data content between the second new radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server is consistent. If the comparison finds that the deviation of any corresponding data packet exceeds the preset threshold, an alarm is triggered. If the deviation of all corresponding data packets does not exceed the preset threshold, it is determined that the online verification of the second new radiation monitoring server in this batch has passed.

[0039] In one embodiment, after the first new radiation monitoring server completes all batch verifications and operates stably, online verification of the second new server is initiated in the second phase. During this process, using the verified first new server as a benchmark, the same batch strategy and data packet comparison method as described above are employed to sequentially verify the consistency of the second new server with the first new server in data acquisition, processing, and transmission. This ensures that the two new servers are completely equivalent in function and performance, jointly forming reliable redundancy. In this embodiment, the replacement and verification of the second server were successfully completed using this method. During this process, all data comparison deviations were less than the preset 2%, the system switchover was smooth, and no abnormal alarms were generated.

[0040] Following this, a smooth transition verification phase begins, during which the old and new workstations can run in parallel for at least 7 days (10 days in this example). Operators can freely switch between the two systems to familiarize themselves with the new system. During this period, a problem feedback mechanism is established to address issues promptly (e.g., fixing two interface display problems). Once the preset conditions for ending parallel operation are met, the old workstation is decommissioned, and the system switchover is complete. After the switchover, a 72-hour enhanced monitoring period is initiated, generating daily system operation reports to assess stability and setting key indicator thresholds. If these thresholds are exceeded, a rollback procedure is automatically initiated. Simultaneously, a rapid response mechanism is established to ensure timely resolution of issues, ultimately achieving a safe and smooth transition between the old and new radiation monitoring server platforms.

[0041] The present invention also provides a safety verification system for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform, including a processor and a memory storing a computer program, wherein the processor implements the steps of any of the above methods when executing the computer program.

[0042] It is understood that the above embodiments only illustrate preferred embodiments of the present invention, and their descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, but they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can freely combine the above technical features without departing from the concept of the present invention, and can also make several modifications and improvements, all of which fall within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, all equivalent transformations and modifications made with respect to the scope of the claims of the present invention should fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for security verification of a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform, characterized in that, When replacing or upgrading two redundant old radiation monitoring servers to two redundant new radiation monitoring servers, the following steps should be performed: Obtain channel information for multiple radiation monitoring channels and a data point mapping table between the old radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and configure the new radiation monitoring server according to the channel information and the data point mapping table; The configured new radiation monitoring server is connected to the nuclear power plant control system and the selected radiation monitoring channel, and offline verification is performed in a simulation test environment; If the offline verification is successful, in the first phase, the first new radiation monitoring server will replace one of the old radiation monitoring servers and connect to the nuclear power plant control system and each radiation monitoring channel. According to the preset batch verification sequence, in different verification periods, the first new radiation monitoring server will be verified online based on the communication data packets exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels. In the second phase, a second new radiation monitoring server replaces another old radiation monitoring server and connects to the nuclear power plant control system and each radiation monitoring channel. According to the preset batch verification sequence, in different verification periods, the second new radiation monitoring server is verified online based on the communication data packets exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the second new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels, respectively. If the second new radiation monitoring server passes online verification, then the two old radiation monitoring servers will be replaced with the two new radiation monitoring servers.

2. The method for security verification of a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of connecting the configured new radiation monitoring server to the nuclear power plant control system and the selected radiation monitoring channel, and performing offline verification in a simulation test environment includes: In the simulation test environment, test connections are established between the new radiation monitoring server and the simulation module of the nuclear power plant control system and multiple pre-selected radiation monitoring channels. Test data simulating various operating conditions were injected into the radiation monitoring channel in the test connection; Acquire and verify whether the communication data generated by the new radiation monitoring server in response to the test data and sent to the nuclear power plant control system simulation module meets the expected specifications; Specifically, when the communication data conforms to the expected specifications, the offline verification is deemed to have passed.

3. The nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform security verification method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The injection of test data simulating various operating conditions into the radiation monitoring channel in the test connection includes: By using a pre-set test procedure, and in accordance with the communication protocol standard followed between the nuclear power plant control system and the old radiation monitoring server, an encoded test data sequence is generated and injected. The test data sequence is configured to simulate the output of the radiation monitoring channel, the output including at least one of the following: measured values, device status signals, alarm signals, and dynamic watchdog clock signals.

4. The security verification method for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform according to claim 1, characterized in that... The preset batch verification sequence includes: The verification sequence of multiple batches transitioning from the complete unloading mode to the overhaul mode.

5. The security verification method for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform according to claim 4, characterized in that... The online verification of the first new radiation monitoring server based on the communication data packets exchanged between another old radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server with the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels includes: The first communication data packet exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the second communication data packet exchanged between the other old radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are respectively acquired. The third communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the fourth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are respectively acquired. The first communication data packet is compared with the third communication data packet, and the second communication data packet is compared with the fourth communication data packet, respectively, to verify whether the interactive data content between the first new radiation monitoring server and the other old radiation monitoring server is consistent; If the comparison finds that the deviation of any corresponding data packet exceeds the preset threshold, an alarm will be triggered; If the deviation of all corresponding data packets does not exceed the preset threshold, the first new radiation monitoring server is deemed to have passed the online verification for this batch.

6. The nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform security verification method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The radiation monitoring channel includes a switch quantity monitoring channel and an analog quantity testing channel, and the comparison includes: Compare whether the switch status signals in the second communication data packet and the fourth communication data packet are consistent; And / or, calculate the relative deviation between the measured values ​​in the second communication data packet and the fourth communication data packet, and determine whether the relative deviation exceeds the preset threshold.

7. The nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform security verification method according to claim 6, characterized in that, When performing the online verification on the analog quantity monitoring channel, the analog input value used for the test shall not exceed the preset proportion of the preset first-level alarm threshold of the corresponding channel.

8. The nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform security verification method according to claim 6 or 7, characterized in that, Before performing the online verification on the switch quantity monitoring channel, the interlocking action of the downstream equipment triggered by the alarm signal of the switch quantity monitoring channel is blocked.

9. The security verification method for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform according to claim 1, characterized in that... The online verification of the second new radiation monitoring server based on the communication data packets exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the second new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels includes: The fifth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the sixth communication data packet exchanged between the first new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are respectively acquired. The seventh communication data packet exchanged between the second new radiation monitoring server and the nuclear power plant control system, and the eighth communication data packet exchanged between the second new radiation monitoring server and the corresponding batch of radiation monitoring channels are respectively acquired. The fifth communication data packet is compared with the seventh communication data packet, and the sixth communication data packet is compared with the eighth communication data packet, respectively, to verify whether the interactive data content between the second new radiation monitoring server and the first new radiation monitoring server is consistent; If the comparison finds that the deviation of any corresponding data packet exceeds the preset threshold, an alarm will be triggered; If the deviation of all corresponding data packets does not exceed the preset threshold, the second new radiation monitoring server is deemed to have passed the online verification for this batch.

10. A safety verification system for a nuclear power plant radiation monitoring server platform, comprising a processor and a memory storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9.

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