Remote Distributed Control System

By using a hardware global reset circuit and hardware step-by-step power supply interlocking in the remote distributed control system, the problems of complex wiring and poor anti-interference ability in mine and tunnel emergency drill systems are solved, ensuring the safe reset of the system and the stability of disaster simulation when the PLC crashes or communication is interrupted.

CN123113574APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17COAL IND HANDAN DESIGN RES INST +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611448254.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-09-17
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing mine and tunnel emergency drill systems, centralized architectures have complex wiring, poor anti-interference capabilities, and weak safety reset mechanisms. Distributed solutions lack hardware-level power-on interlocking and rely on PLCs and communication for reset, resulting in unstable triggering relationships between disaster evolution steps and posing safety hazards.

Method used

A remote distributed control system is adopted. By setting up a hardware global reset circuit, hardware step-by-step power supply interlock, independent emergency stop signal bus and optocoupler isolation in the main control cabinet and field I/O substation integration box, the safe reset of the disaster simulation actuator and the hardware-level disaster timing interlock are ensured, which is independent of the PLC hardware safety reset circuit.

Benefits of technology

It enables hardware-forced reset in the event of PLC crash or communication interruption, eliminates disaster jump triggering, improves system safety and anti-interference capabilities, simplifies wiring and maintenance processes, and enhances the safety redundancy and realism of drills.

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Abstract

This invention provides a remote distributed control system, including a main control cabinet and at least one field I / O substation integration box. The main control cabinet integrates a programmable logic controller (PLC) host and an industrial Ethernet switch. Each substation integration box is equipped with a hardware interlocking circuit, where the downstream execution unit is connected in series with the upstream feedback contact to achieve step-by-step power supply interlocking, preventing fault-induced jump triggering. The main control cabinet has a hardware global reset circuit, and the emergency reset button is connected in series with the reset relays of each substation via an independent emergency stop bus, allowing for hard-wired forced reset in the event of communication interruption or PLC failure. The actuator power supply circuit is connected in series with multiple relay contacts to form a hardware and logic interlock; each substation is equipped with a dedicated interactive interlocking relay to lock fault escalation; control and power supply are physically separated, and reset only cuts off the power supply; it has a two-level reset mechanism of local reset and global emergency stop.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of emergency drills and disaster simulation technology in confined spaces such as mines and tunnels, and particularly to a remote distributed control system. Background Technology

[0002] In the field of emergency drills in mines and tunnels, in order to simulate the chain evolution process of complex disasters, the drill system needs to drive actuators such as smoke generators, electric heating devices, vibration motors, solenoid valves, strobe lights, and audible and visual alarms in multiple simulated areas, and collect multi-channel sensor signals such as temperature, gas concentration, smoke concentration, pressure, water level, and wind speed in real time.

[0003] The existing centralized architecture aggregates all sensors and actuators through long-distance cables to a single programmable logic controller (PLC) control cabinet. This results in a large amount of wiring work, long-distance analog signals are susceptible to electromagnetic interference, troubleshooting is difficult, and disassembly and redeployment are inconvenient. Global emergency stop and reset, as well as disaster evolution timing interlocks, all rely entirely on the PLC program. Once the PLC fails or communication is interrupted, the power supply to dangerous equipment cannot be cut off in time, and there is also a safety hazard that secondary disasters may be triggered prematurely or in a skipped manner.

[0004] With the development of remote data acquisition and transmission (I / O) technology, some training systems have adopted a distributed architecture to replace centralized cabling, distributing signal acquisition and drive functions to various simulation areas and exchanging data with the main control PLC via a communication bus, effectively solving the problems of long-distance cabling and signal interference. However, each distributed substation only undertakes signal pass-through and instruction execution functions, and does not have a hardware-level disaster timing interlock structure or a hardware safety reset circuit independent of the PLC. The triggering dependencies between disaster evolution steps are determined solely by software, which cannot prevent disaster jump triggering or reverse reset from the hardware root. In addition, the existing solution lacks hardware-level power supply interlock, independent hard-wired emergency stop bus, scenario-specific interactive interlock, and physical partitioning of control and power supply, resulting in insufficient safety redundancy and simulation realism. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide a remote distributed control system to solve the problems of complex wiring, poor anti-interference ability, weak safety reset mechanism in centralized architecture, as well as the lack of hardware step-by-step power supply interlocking, reset dependence on PLC and communication, lack of hardware interactive interlocking, disordered delay and step timing, and lack of isolation between control and power supply in conventional distributed solutions.

[0006] To address the above problems, the present invention provides a remote distributed control system, comprising:

[0007] The main control cabinet contains a programmable logic controller (PLC) host and an industrial Ethernet switch.

[0008] At least one field I / O substation integration box, the interior of which is physically divided into a signal access area, a logic processing area, a drive output area, and a power supply management area; the signal access area is equipped with analog input isolation barriers and digital input isolation barriers; the logic processing area is equipped with a remote I / O communication module; the drive output area is equipped with intermediate relay groups, solid-state relay groups, and hardware interlocking circuits; and the power supply management area is equipped with a DC regulated power supply.

[0009] The integrated box for field I / O substations is equipped with sensor signal input aviation plugs, actuator control output aviation plugs, industrial Ethernet communication aviation plugs, and power input aviation plugs on its cabinet wall panels.

[0010] The main control cabinet is also equipped with a hardware global reset circuit, including an emergency reset button installed on the cabinet door panel of the main control cabinet, and a reset relay installed in the drive output area of ​​each of the field I / O substation integration boxes.

[0011] Optionally, the normally closed contact of the emergency reset button is connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of each of the reset relays via an emergency stop signal bus independent of the industrial Ethernet; the emergency stop signal bus uses shielded twisted-pair cable with dual-channel redundant wiring, and the emergency stop signal bus is isolated from the control circuit in each of the field I / O substation integration boxes via an optocoupler; the normally open contact of the reset relay is connected in series in the power supply circuit of the disaster simulation actuator in the field I / O substation integration box, and the normally closed contact of the reset relay is connected in series in the power supply circuit of the safety reset mechanism. The safety reset mechanism includes a pressure relief solenoid valve, a drainage solenoid valve, and a ventilation reset contactor; the safety reset mechanism adopts an energized operation mode, and the normally closed contact of the reset relay is connected in series in the power supply circuit of each of the safety reset mechanisms.

[0012] Optionally, the main control cabinet is also equipped with an actuator power supply control circuit, which includes an emergency equipment three-phase contactor. The coil of the emergency equipment three-phase contactor is connected to the corresponding channel of the digital output module of the programmable logic controller host. The main contacts of the emergency equipment three-phase contactor are connected in series in the AC power supply circuit of the emergency equipment directly driven by the main control cabinet. The emergency equipment includes a ventilation system fan, a global emergency broadcast and emergency lighting switching contactor. The power supply circuits of the global emergency broadcast and the emergency lighting switching contactor do not pass through the reset relay contacts.

[0013] Optionally, a signal surge protector is provided at the front end of the signal access area, and a power surge protector is provided in the power supply management area.

[0014] Optionally, the hardware interlocking circuit includes a first-level disaster execution unit and a second-level disaster execution unit, with the status feedback contact of the first-level disaster execution unit connected in series in the start-up circuit of the second-level disaster execution unit; the first-level disaster execution unit is a first-level disaster stepping relay, the second-level disaster execution unit is a second-level disaster stepping relay, and the status feedback contact is a normally open contact of the first-level disaster stepping relay; the hardware interlocking circuit also includes a third-level disaster stepping relay, with the normally open contact of the second-level disaster stepping relay connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the third-level disaster stepping relay; the number of levels of the first-level disaster stepping relay, the second-level disaster stepping relay, and the third-level disaster stepping relay is determined according to the disaster simulation task of the room.

[0015] Optionally, the interior of the field I / O substation integration box also includes a disaster simulation actuator. The power supply circuit of the disaster simulation actuator has a normally open contact of a reset relay that starts working when all contacts are closed, a normally open contact of a second-level disaster step relay, a normally open contact of a delay time relay, and a normally closed contact of an interactive interlocking relay, in order to form multiple hardware and logic controls.

[0016] Optionally, the power supply system of the remote distributed control system is divided into two parts: an uninterruptible power supply and a cut-off power supply. The uninterruptible power supply powers the programmable logic controller (PLC) host, the industrial Ethernet switch, the remote I / O communication module, the analog input isolation barrier, the digital input isolation barrier, and the 24V DC control circuit. The reset action does not affect the power supply. The cut-off power supply powers all disaster simulation actuators. It is cut off by the reset relay contacts during reset. The PLC host power supply circuit is independent of the AC power supply bus of the actuators in each field I / O substation integration box. The PLC host is powered directly from the external AC power supply by the explosion-proof regulated power supply module without being controlled by the reset relay contacts.

[0017] Optionally, the intermediate relay group in the drive output area is provided with a graded alarm relay group, which includes a warning relay, a critical relay, and a disaster relay. The normally open contact of the warning relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the yellow audible and visual alarm, the normally open contact of the critical relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the orange audible and visual alarm and the alarm horn, and the normally open contact of the disaster relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the red audible and visual alarm and the trigger circuit of the emergency broadcast system. Each graded alarm relay is provided with a set of self-holding normally open contacts.

[0018] Optionally, in the intermediate relay group of the drive output area, a corresponding interactive interlocking relay group is selected according to the disaster scenario carried by the room. The interactive interlocking relay groups of each field I / O substation integration box have scene mutual exclusion. Each field I / O substation integration box is equipped with only the interactive interlocking relays specific to the corresponding disaster scenario. The type and number of the interactive interlocking relay groups are determined according to the disaster simulation task of the room. The normally open contact of the early warning relay is uniformly connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the interactive interlocking relay.

[0019] Optionally, the drive output area is provided with a time delay relay. The coil of the time delay relay is connected in series with the normally open contact of the disaster relay and then connected to a DC regulated power supply. The coil of the time delay relay is energized and starts timing only when the disaster relay is energized and the second-level disaster step relay is energized. The time delay relay is an energized time delay relay.

[0020] The present invention provides a remote distributed control system comprising: a main control cabinet housing a programmable logic controller (PLC) host and an industrial Ethernet switch; at least one field I / O substation integration box, the interior of which is physically divided into a signal access area, a logic processing area, a drive output area, and a power supply management area; the signal access area is equipped with an analog input isolation barrier and a digital input isolation barrier; the logic processing area is equipped with a remote I / O communication module; the drive output area is equipped with an intermediate relay group, a solid-state relay group, and a hardware interlocking circuit; the power supply management area is equipped with a DC regulated power supply; the enclosure wall of the field I / O substation integration box is equipped with a sensor signal input aviation connector, an actuator control output aviation connector, an industrial Ethernet communication aviation connector, and a power input aviation connector; the main control cabinet is also equipped with a hardware global reset circuit, including an emergency reset button installed on the cabinet door panel of the main control cabinet, and reset relays installed in the drive output areas of each field I / O substation integration box. The remote distributed control system provided by this invention, through the setting of hardware-level power supply interlock, ensures that the power supply of the downstream disaster step relay coil is exclusively granted by the upstream hardware contacts. The programmable logic controller (PLC) only provides the drive signal path. Even if the PLC issues an incorrect command, as long as the upstream fails to engage, the downstream coil circuit is physically open, preventing disaster jumps or reverse triggering from the hardware source. By setting up a dual-channel redundant shielded twisted-pair emergency stop signal bus independent of the industrial Ethernet and using optocouplers for isolation, a forced reset can still be performed when the PLC crashes or communication is interrupted. Furthermore, the reset relay is installed inside each substation and has auxiliary contacts to feed back the status to the PLC, avoiding long-distance AC power supply wiring. Through the setting of a global reset circuit and the connection of a safety reset mechanism, a two-level reset mechanism is established, balancing maintenance convenience and emergency safety. This effectively solves the technical problems of existing centralized architectures, such as complex wiring, poor anti-interference ability, weak safety reset mechanism, and conventional distributed solutions lacking hardware-level power supply interlock, relying on the PLC for reset and communication, lacking hardware interactive interlock, disordered delay and step timing, and lack of isolation between control and power supply. Attached Figure Description

[0021] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware architecture topology of the remote distributed control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0022] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the internal structure and external interface of the field I / O substation integration box according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0023] The labels in the attached figures are explained as follows:

[0024] 1-Main control cabinet; 2-Field I / O substation integration box; 3-Analog area; 4-Sensors; 5-External actuators; 11-Programmable logic controller host; 111-Central processing unit module; 112-Digital input module; 113-Digital output module; 114-Analog input module; 115-Analog output module; 12-Industrial Ethernet switch; 13-Hardware global reset circuit; 131-Emergency reset button; 132-Reset relay; 14-Zone status indication circuit; 141-Status indicator matrix; 15-Actuator power supply control circuit; 151-Emergency equipment three-phase contactor; 16-Explosion-proof regulated power supply module; 21-Remote I / O communication module; 22-Analog input isolation barrier; 23-Digital input isolation barrier; 24-Intermediate relay group; 25-Solid-state relay group; 26- DC regulated power supply; 27-Sensor signal input aviation connector; 28-Actuator control output aviation connector; 29-Industrial Ethernet communication aviation connector; 20-Power input aviation connector; 2a-Signal access area; 2b-Logic processing area; 2c-Drive output area; 2d-Power supply management area; KA1-First-level disaster step relay; KA2-Second-level disaster step relay; KA3-Third-level disaster step relay; KB1-Early warning relay; KB2-Critical relay; KB3-Disaster relay; KC1-Fire extinguishing confirmation relay; KC2-Fire escalation relay; KX1-Airflow control confirmation relay; KX2-Drainage confirmation relay; KX3-Isolation door closing confirmation relay; KX4-Support confirmation relay; KT1-Delay time relay; SB1-Reset button; SA1-Multi-position selector switch. Detailed Implementation

[0025] The remote distributed control system provided by the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. It should be noted that the drawings are all in a very simplified form and use non-precise scales, used only to facilitate and clarify the illustration of the embodiments of the present invention. Furthermore, the structures shown in the drawings are often part of the actual structure. In particular, different figures may have different emphases and sometimes use different scales. It should be understood that relative terms such as "above," "below," "top," and "bottom" shown in the drawings can be used to describe the relationships between various elements. These relative terms are intended to cover different orientations of elements other than those depicted in the drawings. For example, if the device is inverted relative to the view in the drawings, an element described as "above" another element will now be below that element. It should also be understood that, unless specifically stated or indicated, the terms "first," "second," "third," etc., in the specification are only used to distinguish various components, elements, steps, etc., in the specification, and are not used to indicate logical or sequential relationships between various components, elements, steps, etc.

[0026] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware architecture topology of the remote distributed control system according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the internal structure and external interfaces of the field I / O substation integration box according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, the remote distributed control system provided in this embodiment includes:

[0027] Main control cabinet 1, wherein a programmable logic controller host 11 and an industrial Ethernet switch 12 are installed inside the main control cabinet 1;

[0028] At least one field I / O substation integration box 2, the interior of which is physically divided into a signal access area 2a, a logic processing area 2b, a drive output area 2c, a power supply management area 2d, and a disaster simulation actuator; the signal access area 2a is equipped with an analog input isolation barrier 22 and a digital input isolation barrier 23; the logic processing area 2b is equipped with a remote I / O communication module 21; the drive output area 2c is equipped with an intermediate relay group 24, a solid-state relay group 25, and a hardware interlocking circuit; the power supply management area 2d is equipped with a DC regulated power supply 26;

[0029] The field I / O substation integration box 2 is equipped with a sensor signal input aviation plug 27, an actuator control output aviation plug 28, an industrial Ethernet communication aviation plug 29, and a power input aviation plug 20 on the box wall panel.

[0030] The main control cabinet 1 is also provided with a hardware global reset circuit 13, including an emergency reset button 131 installed on the cabinet door panel of the main control cabinet 1, and a reset relay 132 installed in the drive output area 2c of each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2.

[0031] Please continue to refer to this. Figure 1 The remote distributed control system in this embodiment includes: a main control cabinet 1 and multiple field I / O substation integration boxes 2. One field I / O substation integration box 2 is deployed in each simulation area 3, and the main control cabinet 1 is deployed in the control room. The industrial Ethernet switch 12 in the main control cabinet 1 is connected to the remote I / O communication module 21 in each field I / O substation integration box 2 via industrial Ethernet. The physical transmission medium is shielded network cable or optical fiber, forming a star or linear topology distributed real-time control network. Sensor signals are acquired locally, and actuators are driven locally, eliminating the need to lay a large number of analog signal cables from each simulation area 3 to the control room.

[0032] Please continue to refer to this. Figure 2Each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2 has an Ingress Protection (IP) rating of not less than IP54. The interior of the field I / O substation integration box 2 is divided into the signal access area 2a, the logic processing area 2b, the drive output area 2c, and the power supply management area 2d according to physical space.

[0033] A surge protector is installed at the front end of the signal access area 2a. The surge protector contains the analog input isolation barrier 22 and the digital input isolation barrier 23. The input terminals of the analog input isolation barrier 22 and the digital input isolation barrier 23 are connected to the inner terminals of the sensor signal input aviation connector 27 via internal wiring. The output terminals of the analog input isolation barrier 22 and the digital input isolation barrier 23 are connected to the input channel of the remote I / O communication module 21. The external sensors 4 of the field I / O substation integration box 2 include a temperature sensor, a gas concentration sensor, a carbon monoxide sensor, a PM2.5 smoke concentration sensor, a water pressure sensor, a surrounding rock pressure sensor, a displacement sensor, a wind speed sensor, and an oxygen concentration sensor. Each sensor is connected to its corresponding sensor signal input aviation connector 27 via prefabricated cables. The collected field signals are transmitted to the remote I / O communication module 21 via the analog input isolation barrier 22 and the digital input isolation barrier 23, and then uploaded to the programmable logic controller host 11 in the main control cabinet 1 via the industrial Ethernet.

[0034] The logic processing area 2b is equipped with the remote I / O communication module 21 and its supporting analog input module 114, analog output module 115, central processing unit (CPU) module 111, digital input module 112, and digital output module 113. It communicates with the main control cabinet 1 via the industrial Ethernet communication aviation connector 29. The remote I / O communication module 21 is equipped with an Ethernet interface and connects to the industrial Ethernet switch 12 inside the main control cabinet 1 via a shielded network cable or optical fiber through the industrial Ethernet communication aviation connector 29, enabling data exchange between the field I / O substation integration box 2 and the main control cabinet 1.

[0035] The drive output area 2c is provided with the intermediate relay group 24 and the solid-state relay group 25, as well as the reset relay 132 installed in the drive output area 2c. The coil rated voltage of the intermediate relay in the intermediate relay group 24 is DC 24V, and the rated load of the contacts is selected according to the load type: for high-power low-frequency switching actuators, intermediate relays with AC 220V and 10A specifications are selected; for low-power high-frequency switching actuators, solid-state relays in the solid-state relay group 25 with DC 3V to 32V input and AC 220V and 5A output are selected. The input terminals of the intermediate relay group 24, the solid-state relay group 25, and the reset relay 132 are connected to the output channel of the digital output module 113, and the output contacts of the intermediate relay group 24, the solid-state relay group 25, and the reset relay 132 are connected to the inner terminal of the actuator control output aviation plug 28. The external actuators 5 of the field I / O substation integration box 2 include a smoke generator, an electric heating device, a vibration motor, a solenoid valve, a strobe light, and an audible and visual alarm. All are connected to the corresponding actuator control output aviation plugs 28 via pre-fabricated cables, and the operation of the external actuators 5 is controlled by the relay group in the drive output area 2c. The power supply circuits for the emergency lighting switching contactor and the emergency broadcast do not pass through the contacts of the reset relay 132, ensuring that the emergency equipment can still operate normally in the reset state. Each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2 has a set of auxiliary normally open contacts, whose status signals are fed back to the programmable logic controller host 11 via the remote I / O communication module 21 for real-time monitoring of the working status of the reset relay 132.

[0036] The power supply management area 2d is equipped with a surge protector, which includes the DC regulated power supply 26 and overvoltage protection circuits, overcurrent protection circuits, short-circuit protection circuits, and leakage protection circuits. A metal isolation plate is installed between the drive output area 2c and the signal access area 2a and the logic processing area 2b to physically separate high-voltage and low-voltage circuits. The DC regulated power supply 26 in the power supply management area 2d provides 24V DC control power to the isolation barrier of the signal access area 2a, the remote I / O communication module 21 of the logic processing area 2b, and the intermediate relay group 24 of the drive output area 2c.

[0037] Please continue to refer to this. Figure 1The main control cabinet 1 is also equipped with an actuator power supply control circuit 15, which includes an emergency equipment three-phase contactor 151. The coil of the emergency equipment three-phase contactor 151 is connected to the corresponding channel of the digital output module 113 of the programmable logic controller host 11, and its main contacts are connected in series in the AC power supply circuit of the emergency equipment directly driven by the main control cabinet 1. The emergency equipment includes a ventilation system fan, a global emergency broadcast and emergency lighting switching contactor. The power supply circuits of the emergency lighting switching contactor and the emergency broadcast do not pass through the reset relay contacts.

[0038] Please continue to refer to this. Figure 1 and Figure 2 The remote distributed control system also includes an explosion-proof voltage regulator module 16, which is built into the main control cabinet 1 and each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2. The input port of the explosion-proof voltage regulator module 16 is connected to an external AC power supply, and the output port is connected to the DC power supply terminal of each module. The main control cabinet 1 adopts a layered layout, with the upper part being the DC control area and the lower part being the AC execution area, separated by a metal partition. The power supply system of the remote distributed control system is divided into two parts: an uninterruptible power supply and a cut-off power supply. The uninterruptible power supply powers the programmable logic controller host 11, the industrial Ethernet switch 12, the remote I / O communication module 21, the signal isolation barrier, and the DC 24V control circuit. The reset action does not affect the power supply of this part. The cut-off power supply powers all the disaster simulation actuators. During reset, it is cut off by the contacts of the reset relay 132. The power supply circuit of the programmable logic controller host 11 is independent of the AC power supply bus of the actuator of each field I / O substation integration box 2. The programmable logic controller host 11 is directly powered by the explosion-proof voltage regulator module 16 from the external AC power supply without being controlled by the contacts of the reset relay 132.

[0039] The hardware global reset circuit 13 includes an emergency reset button 131 installed on the cabinet door panel of the main control cabinet 1, and a reset relay 132 installed in the drive output area 2c of each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2. The normally closed contact of the emergency reset button 131 is connected in series to the coil power supply circuit of the reset relay 132 in each field I / O substation integration box via an emergency stop signal bus independent of the industrial Ethernet. The emergency stop signal bus uses shielded twisted-pair cable with dual-channel redundant wiring to transmit a 24V low-voltage DC signal. The emergency stop signal bus is isolated from the control circuit in each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2 by an optocoupler to avoid ground potential difference interference and surge intrusion from long-distance wiring.

[0040] Under normal conditions, when the emergency reset button 131 is not pressed, its normally closed contact remains closed, and the coils of the reset relays 132 in each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2 are energized and engaged. The normally open contact of the reset relay 132 closes, supplying power to the disaster simulation actuators in each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2; the normally closed contact of the reset relay 132 opens, and the safety reset mechanism does not operate. When the emergency reset button 131 is pressed, the coils of the reset relays 132 in each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2 simultaneously de-energize and release, their normally open contacts open, cutting off the power supply to all the disaster simulation actuators; their normally closed contacts close, connecting the power supply circuits of each of the safety reset mechanisms, and the system is forcibly restored to a safe initial state. The emergency lighting switching contactor and emergency broadcast maintain normal power supply during the reset process. The entire reset process is completed by an independent hard-wired circuit, and it remains effective even if the programmable logic controller host 11 crashes or the communication bus is interrupted.

[0041] The safety reset mechanism is the external actuator 5 used to restore the remote distributed control system to its initial state. It includes a pressure relief solenoid valve, a drainage solenoid valve, and a ventilation reset contactor. All safety reset mechanisms operate under an energized actuation mode. Depending on the disaster scenario simulated in each of the simulated areas 3, a toxic gas simulation release unit shut-off solenoid valve, a vibration motor stop contactor, and a smoke generator stop contactor may also be configured. The normally closed contact of the reset relay 132 is connected in series in the power supply circuit of each safety reset mechanism, and the contact closes during the reset operation.

[0042] The main control cabinet 1 is also equipped with a status indicator matrix 141 on its cabinet door panel. The rows of the status indicator matrix 141 correspond to each of the analog areas 3, and the columns of the status indicator matrix 141 correspond to the online status, alarm status, fault status, and actuator operating status. The positive terminal of each indicator is connected to a 24-volt DC power supply via a current-limiting resistor, and the negative terminal is connected to the corresponding channel of the digital output module 113 of the programmable logic controller host 11. The programmable logic controller host 11 drives the indicator to light up according to the real-time status of each field I / O substation integration box 2.

[0043] Please continue to refer to this. Figure 2The drive output area 2c is equipped with a first-level disaster stepping relay KA1, a second-level disaster stepping relay KA2, and a third-level disaster stepping relay KA3, which can be configured according to scenario requirements. The normally open contact of the first-level disaster stepping relay KA1 is connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2. The drive signal of the programmable logic controller (PLC) host 11 serves as the start command, and the normally open contact of the first-level disaster stepping relay KA1 serves as the hardware interlocking condition; the two constitute a series AND logic. Even if the PLC host 11 mistakenly sends the drive signal for the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2 due to program crashes or electromagnetic interference, as long as the first-level disaster stepping relay KA1 has not yet engaged, the coil circuit of the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2 is physically open and cannot be energized. Similarly, the normally open contact of the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2 is connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the third-level disaster stepping relay KA3, thus forming a step interlock. The power supply authority for the coil of the subsequent disaster stepping relay is exclusively granted by the preceding hardware contacts. The programmable logic controller host 11 only provides the negative path for the drive signal and cannot directly drive the subsequent stage by bypassing the preceding contacts. The number of stages of the first-stage disaster stepping relay KA1, the second-stage disaster stepping relay KA2, and the third-stage disaster stepping relay KA3 is determined according to the disaster simulation task of the simulation area 3 in which they are located.

[0044] Each of the first-level disaster stepping relay KA1, the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2, and the third-level disaster stepping relay KA3 is equipped with a set of self-holding normally open contacts. One end of each self-holding normally open contact is connected to the positive output terminal of the DC regulated power supply 26, and the other end is connected to the positive terminal of the corresponding relay coil. A reset button SB1 is connected in series in each holding circuit and is installed on the panel of each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2. When a reset is required after the exercise, pressing the reset button SB1 will open its normally closed contact, cutting off the power supply to the self-holding circuit. The self-holding state of the first-level disaster stepping relay KA1, the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2, the third-level disaster stepping relay KA3, the graded alarm relays, and the interactive interlocking relays will be cleared, and the system will return to standby mode. This reset method does not cut off the main power supply of the field I / O substation integration box 2. In emergency situations, the power supply can be cut off through the hardware global reset circuit 13 to force a reset.

[0045] The drive output area 2c is also equipped with a time delay relay KT1, which is an energized time delay relay. The coil of the time delay relay KT1 is connected in series with the normally open contact of the disaster relay KB3 and then connected to the DC regulated power supply 26. The coil of the time delay relay KT1 is only energized and starts timing when the disaster relay KB3 is energized and the second-level disaster step relay KA2 is energized. The normally open contact of the time delay relay KT1 is connected in series in the AC power supply circuit of the disaster simulation actuator, rather than in series in the coil circuit of the second-level disaster step relay KA2. The time delay relay KT1 is equipped with a multi-position selector switch SA1, which allows for flexible switching of the delay time for multiple scenarios by switching the timing resistor with different resistance values. When a reset occurs, the hardware global reset circuit 13 cuts off the AC input terminal of the DC regulated power supply 26 of the field I / O substation integration box 2, the coil of the time delay relay KT1 is de-energized, and its contacts immediately return to the open state; when the local reset button SB1 is reset, the programmable logic controller host 11 synchronously cancels the drive signal of the disaster relay KB3, the coil of the time delay relay KT1 is de-energized, and its contacts return to the open state.

[0046] The disaster step-locking link and the time-delay triggering link operate decoupled: the coil of the second-stage disaster step relay KA2 is only locked by the first-stage disaster step relay KA1 and driven by the programmable logic controller host 11. After being energized, its normally open contact closes, providing a path for the actuator power supply circuit; after the time delay relay KT1 reaches its delay, its contact closes, and the actuator power supply circuit is fully connected. The two links operate independently, only intersecting in the actuator power supply circuit.

[0047] The power supply circuit of the disaster simulation actuator is connected in series with the normally open contact of the reset relay 132, the normally open contact of the second-stage disaster step relay KA2, the normally open contact of the delay time relay KT1, and the normally closed contact of the interactive lockout relay. The above contacts are connected in series, and the disaster simulation actuator can only be powered on and work when all of them are closed, thus forming multiple hardware and logic controls.

[0048] The intermediate relay group 24 in the drive output area 2c is equipped with a hierarchical alarm relay group, including a warning relay KB1, a critical relay KB2, and a disaster relay KB3. The normally open contact of the warning relay KB1 is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the yellow audible and visual alarm for warning level indication; the normally open contact of the critical relay KB2 is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the orange audible and visual alarm and the alarm horn for critical level indication; the normally open contact of the disaster relay KB3 is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the red audible and visual alarm and the trigger circuit of the emergency broadcast system for disaster level indication and emergency broadcast triggering. These three relays form a tiered hardware drive chain, responsible only for alarm display and audible and visual warning, and do not participate in disaster step-by-step control interlocking. Each hierarchical alarm relay is equipped with a set of self-holding normally open contacts, which remain in the holding state once activated. After the warning relay KB1 self-holds, its normally open contact remains closed throughout the disaster, ensuring the continued validity of the operating authority of the interactive interlocking relay. All self-holding states can be cleared by the reset button SB1 or the global emergency stop reset on the substation panel.

[0049] Each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2 in each of the simulation areas 3 is equipped with a corresponding interactive interlocking relay group according to the disaster scenario it undertakes. The interactive interlocking relay groups of each of the field I / O substation integration boxes 2 are mutually exclusive, and each field I / O substation integration box 2 is equipped with only the interactive interlocking relay specific to its corresponding disaster scenario. The type and number of the interactive interlocking relay groups are determined according to the disaster simulation task of the simulation area 3. The normally open contact of the warning relay KB1 is uniformly connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of all the interactive interlocking relays. The closed state of the warning relay KB1 is used as the hardware unlocking condition for interactive operation. That is, before the disaster reaches the warning level, all personnel handling interactive operations are locked at the hardware level and cannot be executed.

[0050] In the simulated area 3, which carries out a conveyor belt fire disaster scenario, the on-site I / O substation integration box 2 is equipped with a fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1, a fire escalation relay KC2, and a ventilation scheduling confirmation relay KX1. The normally open contact of the warning relay KB1 is connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1. When the warning relay KB1 is engaged and a participant operates a fire extinguisher to trigger the magnetic reed switch sensor, the programmable logic controller host 11 drives the fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1 to engage. After the fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1 engages, one set of its normally closed contacts opens, cutting off the coil power supply circuit of the fire escalation relay KC2 and locking the fire escalation path; one set of its normally open contacts closes, connecting the smoke exhaust fan contactor coil power supply circuit and starting the smoke exhaust fan; the other set of its normally closed contacts opens, cutting off the electric heating device contactor coil power supply circuit and stopping the electric heating device. The coil power supply circuit of the airflow scheduling confirmation relay KX1 is also connected in series with the normally open contact of the warning relay KB1. When the participants manually operate the damper handwheel to trigger the proximity switch, the programmable logic controller host 11 drives the airflow scheduling confirmation relay KX1 to engage. Its normally open contact connects the power supply circuit of the smoke exhaust fan contactor coil, and its normally closed contact disconnects the power supply circuit of the solenoid valve of the toxic gas simulation release unit, preventing the release of toxic gas. In this scenario, the field I / O substation integration box 2 is not equipped with a drainage confirmation relay KX2, an isolation door closure confirmation relay KX3, or a support confirmation relay KX4.

[0051] A drainage confirmation relay KX2 is installed in the field I / O substation integration box 2 of the simulated area 3, which carries out the scenario of sudden flooding of alleyways. The normally open contact of the warning relay KB1 is connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the drainage confirmation relay KX2. When the warning relay KB1 is energized and the participant presses the drainage start button, the programmable logic controller host 11 drives the drainage confirmation relay KX2 to energize, its normally open contact closes to connect the power supply circuit of the drainage pump contactor coil, and starts the drainage pump; its normally closed contact opens to cut off the power supply circuit of the water inlet solenoid valve, and stops the water inlet simulation. The field I / O substation integration box 2 in this scenario does not have the fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1, the fire escalation relay KC2, the airflow scheduling confirmation relay KX1, the isolation door closing confirmation relay KX3, and the support confirmation relay KX4.

[0052] In the simulated area 3, which simulates a gas explosion disaster, the field I / O substation integration box 2 is equipped with an isolation door closing confirmation relay KX3. The normally open contact of the warning relay KB1 is connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the isolation door closing confirmation relay KX3. When the warning relay KB1 is engaged and the participant manually rotates the isolation door handwheel to trigger the proximity switch, the programmable logic controller host 11 drives the isolation door closing confirmation relay KX3 to engage. Its normally open contact connects the power supply circuit of the isolation door closing indicator light, indicating that the isolation door is closed; its normally closed contact disconnects the power supply circuit of the solenoid valve of the toxic gas simulation release unit, preventing the spread of toxic gas. In this scenario, the field I / O substation integration box 2 does not include the fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1, the fire escalation relay KC2, the airflow scheduling confirmation relay KX1, the drainage confirmation relay KX2, or the support confirmation relay KX4.

[0053] The support confirmation relay KX4 is installed in the field I / O substation integration box 2 of the simulated area 3, which bears the roof collapse disaster scenario. The normally open contact of the warning relay KB1 is connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the support confirmation relay KX4. When the warning relay KB1 is energized and the participants operate the hydraulic valve handle to trigger the limit switch, the programmable logic controller host 11 drives the support confirmation relay KX4 to energize. Its normally open contact connects the power supply circuit of the support completion indicator light, indicating that the support has been completed; its normally closed contact disconnects the power supply circuit of the secondary collapse simulation actuator, locking the secondary collapse disaster. The field I / O substation integration box 2 in this scenario does not have the fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1, the fire escalation relay KC2, the airflow scheduling confirmation relay KX1, the drainage confirmation relay KX2, or the isolation door closing confirmation relay KX3.

[0054] The on-site I / O substation integration box 2 in the simulated area 3, which carries the gas explosion disaster scenario, is equipped with a first-level disaster step relay KA1, a second-level disaster step relay KA2, a third-level disaster step relay KA3, a warning relay KB1, a critical relay KB2, a disaster relay KB3, an isolation door closing confirmation relay KX3, and a delay time relay KT1. The external actuator 5 includes a strobe light, a high-pressure gas piston, a smoke generator, a vibration motor, and a top plate hydraulic mechanism.

[0055] The on-site I / O substation integration box 2 in the simulated area 3 carrying the belt fire disaster scenario is equipped with a first-level disaster step relay KA1, a second-level disaster step relay KA2, a warning relay KB1, a critical relay KB2, a disaster relay KB3, a fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1, a fire escalation relay KC2, an airflow scheduling confirmation relay KX1, and a delay time relay KT1. The external actuator 5 includes a smoke generator, an electric heating device, and an infrared flame simulator.

[0056] The on-site I / O substation integration box 2 in the simulated area 3, which bears the roof collapse disaster scenario, is equipped with a first-level disaster step relay KA1, a second-level disaster step relay KA2, an early warning relay KB1, a critical relay KB2, a disaster relay KB3, a support confirmation relay KX4, and a delay time relay KT1. The external actuator 5 includes a hydraulic loading mechanism, a simulated airbag, and a vibration motor.

[0057] The field I / O substation integration box 2 in the simulated area 3, which carries the scenario of sudden water flooding, is equipped with a first-level disaster step relay KA1, a second-level disaster step relay KA2, a warning relay KB1, a critical relay KB2, a disaster relay KB3, a drainage confirmation relay KX2, and a delay time relay KT1. The external actuator 5 includes a solenoid valve, a water pump, a sludge simulation release device, and a short-circuit spark simulation device.

[0058] Each of the simulation zones 3 has a field I / O substation integration box 2 configured only with relays and external actuators 5 related to the disaster simulation task of that zone. Switching between different disaster scenarios only requires changing the control program of the programmable logic controller host 11 through the host computer software, without changing the hardware configuration.

[0059] Each of the aforementioned field I / O substation integration boxes 2 may be equipped with a local emergency stop button. Its normally closed contact is connected in series with the coil power supply circuit of the reset relay 132 of the aforementioned field I / O substation integration box 2. When pressed, the power supply to the disaster simulation actuator in this area is cut off only. When global linkage is required, the auxiliary contacts of each local emergency stop button are connected in parallel and then connected to the emergency stop signal bus.

[0060] After the remote distributed control system passes its power-on self-test, the online status indicator light illuminates, and the remote distributed control system enters standby mode. Upon startup of the exercise, the programmable logic controller (PLC) host 11 loads the disaster model, reads real-time monitoring data from sensors in each of the simulated areas 3, and sequentially drives the early warning relay KB1, the critical relay KB2, or the disaster relay KB3 to activate and maintain their positions according to preset thresholds, triggering corresponding levels of audible and visual alarms.

[0061] When the disaster reaches the warning threshold, the warning relay KB1 is activated and self-holding, and its normally open contact closes, unlocking all interactive operation permissions within the simulated area 3. When the disaster reaches the catastrophic threshold, the catastrophic relay KB3 is activated, and the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2 is already activated. The delay time relay KT1 is then energized and begins timing. The programmable logic controller host 11 drives the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2 to activate, and the second-level disaster stepping relay KA2 self-holds, its normally open contact closing to provide a path for the actuator power supply circuit. After the delay time relay KT1 reaches its set time, its contacts close, the actuator power supply circuit is fully connected, and the actuator operates.

[0062] Participants can perform corresponding response operations at any stage of the disaster. In a conveyor belt fire scenario, operating a fire extinguisher triggers the fire extinguishing confirmation relay KC1, or operating a control damper triggers the airflow control confirmation relay KX1. In a flooded alleyway scenario, starting a drainage pump triggers the drainage confirmation relay KX2. In a gas explosion scenario, closing an isolation door triggers the isolation door closing confirmation relay KX3. In a roof collapse scenario, operating hydraulic support triggers the support confirmation relay KX4. This triggers the corresponding interactive interlocking relay in the field I / O substation integration box 2 of the simulated area 3, whose normally closed contact disconnects the power supply circuit of the corresponding disaster escalation execution mechanism, locking the disaster escalation path, while its normally open contact connects the power supply circuit of the disaster relief equipment.

[0063] After the drill is completed normally, press the reset button SB1 on the panel of the field I / O substation integration box 2. Its normally closed contact will open, cutting off the power supply to the self-holding circuits of all first-level disaster stepping relays KA1, second-level disaster stepping relays KA2, third-level disaster stepping relays KA3, graded alarm relays, and interactive interlocking relays. All self-holding states will be cleared, and the system will return to standby mode. The substation power supply will not be cut off during this process. In an emergency, press the emergency reset button 131 on the cabinet door panel of the main control cabinet 1. Its normally closed contact will open, and the coils of the reset relays 132 in each field I / O substation integration box 2 will be de-energized simultaneously. Their normally open contacts will open, cutting off the power supply to all disaster simulation actuators. Their normally closed contacts will close, connecting the safety reset mechanism, forcing the system to return to the initial safe state. The emergency lighting switching contactor and emergency broadcast will maintain normal power supply during this process.

[0064] In summary, this embodiment provides a remote distributed control system, including: a main control cabinet housing a programmable logic controller (PLC) host and an industrial Ethernet switch; at least one field I / O substation integration box, the interior of which is physically divided into a signal access area, a logic processing area, a drive output area, and a power management area; the signal access area is equipped with analog input isolation barriers and digital input isolation barriers; the logic processing area is equipped with a remote I / O communication module; the drive output area is equipped with an intermediate relay group, a solid-state relay group, and a hardware interlocking circuit; the power management area is equipped with a DC regulated power supply; the enclosure wall of the field I / O substation integration box is equipped with a sensor signal input aviation connector, an actuator control output aviation connector, an industrial Ethernet communication aviation connector, and a power input aviation connector; the main control cabinet also has a hardware global reset circuit, including an emergency reset button installed on the cabinet door panel of the main control cabinet, and reset relays installed in the drive output areas of each field I / O substation integration box. The remote distributed control system provided by this invention, through the setting of hardware-level power supply interlock, ensures that the power supply of the downstream disaster step relay coil is exclusively granted by the upstream hardware contacts. The programmable logic controller (PLC) only provides the drive signal path. Even if the PLC issues an incorrect command, as long as the upstream fails to engage, the downstream coil circuit is physically open, preventing disaster jumps or reverse triggering from the hardware source. By setting up a dual-channel redundant shielded twisted-pair emergency stop signal bus independent of the industrial Ethernet and using optocouplers for isolation, a forced reset can still be performed when the PLC crashes or communication is interrupted. Furthermore, the reset relay is installed inside each substation and has auxiliary contacts to feed back the status to the PLC, avoiding long-distance AC power supply wiring. Through the setting of a global reset circuit and the connection of a safety reset mechanism, a two-level reset mechanism is established, balancing maintenance convenience and emergency safety. This effectively solves the technical problems of existing centralized architectures, such as complex wiring, poor anti-interference ability, weak safety reset mechanism, and conventional distributed solutions lacking hardware-level power supply interlock, relying on the PLC for reset and communication, lacking hardware interactive interlock, disordered delay and step timing, and lack of isolation between control and power supply.

[0065] Furthermore, it should be understood that although the present invention has been disclosed above with reference to preferred embodiments, these embodiments are not intended to limit the present invention. For any person skilled in the art, many possible variations and modifications can be made to the technical solutions of the present invention based on the disclosed technical content, or equivalent embodiments can be modified accordingly, without departing from the scope of the present invention. Therefore, any simple modifications, equivalent changes, and modifications made to the above embodiments based on the technical essence of the present invention, without departing from the content of the present invention, shall still fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A remote distributed control system, characterized in that, include: The main control cabinet contains a programmable logic controller (PLC) host and an industrial Ethernet switch. At least one field I / O substation integration box, the interior of which is physically divided into a signal access area, a logic processing area, a drive output area, and a power supply management area; the signal access area is equipped with analog input isolation barriers and digital input isolation barriers; the logic processing area is equipped with a remote I / O communication module; the drive output area is equipped with intermediate relay groups, solid-state relay groups, and hardware interlocking circuits; and the power supply management area is equipped with a DC regulated power supply. The integrated box for field I / O substations is equipped with sensor signal input aviation plugs, actuator control output aviation plugs, industrial Ethernet communication aviation plugs, and power input aviation plugs on its cabinet wall panels. The main control cabinet is also equipped with a hardware global reset circuit, including an emergency reset button installed on the cabinet door panel of the main control cabinet, and a reset relay installed in the drive output area of ​​each of the field I / O substation integration boxes.

2. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The normally closed contact of the emergency reset button is connected in series with the coil power supply circuit of each reset relay via an emergency stop signal bus independent of the industrial Ethernet. The emergency stop signal bus uses shielded twisted-pair cable with dual-channel redundant wiring, and is isolated from the control circuits within each field I / O substation integration box via optocouplers. The normally open contact of the reset relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the disaster simulation actuator within the field I / O substation integration box, and the normally closed contact of the reset relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the safety reset mechanism. The safety reset mechanism includes a pressure relief solenoid valve, a drainage solenoid valve, and a ventilation reset contactor. The safety reset mechanism operates under energized conditions, and the normally closed contact of the reset relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of each safety reset mechanism.

3. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The main control cabinet is also equipped with an actuator power supply control circuit, which includes an emergency equipment three-phase contactor. The coil of the emergency equipment three-phase contactor is connected to the corresponding channel of the digital output module of the programmable logic controller host. The main contacts of the emergency equipment three-phase contactor are connected in series in the AC power supply circuit of the emergency equipment directly driven by the main control cabinet. The emergency equipment includes a ventilation system fan, a global emergency broadcast and emergency lighting switching contactor. The power supply circuits of the global emergency broadcast and the emergency lighting switching contactor do not pass through the reset relay contacts.

4. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, A signal surge protector is installed at the front end of the signal access area, and a power surge protector is installed in the power supply management area.

5. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The hardware interlocking circuit includes a first-level disaster execution unit and a second-level disaster execution unit. The starting circuit of the second-level disaster execution unit is connected in series with the status feedback contact of the first-level disaster execution unit. The first-level disaster execution unit is a first-level disaster stepping relay, and the second-level disaster execution unit is a second-level disaster stepping relay. The status feedback contact is a normally open contact of the first-level disaster stepping relay. The hardware interlocking circuit also includes a third-level disaster stepping relay. The coil power supply circuit of the third-level disaster stepping relay is connected in series with the normally open contact of the second-level disaster stepping relay. The number of levels of the first-level disaster stepping relay, the second-level disaster stepping relay, and the third-level disaster stepping relay is determined according to the disaster simulation task of the room.

6. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The integrated box of the field I / O substation also includes a disaster simulation actuator inside. The power supply circuit of the disaster simulation actuator has a normally open contact of a reset relay that starts working when all contacts are closed, a normally open contact of a second-level disaster step relay, a normally open contact of a delay time relay, and a normally closed contact of an interactive interlocking relay, so as to form multiple hardware and logic controls.

7. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The power supply system of the remote distributed control system is divided into two parts: an uninterruptible power supply and a cut-off power supply. The uninterruptible power supply powers the programmable logic controller (PLC) host, the industrial Ethernet switch, the remote I / O communication module, the analog input isolation barrier, the digital input isolation barrier, and the 24V DC control circuit. The reset action does not affect the power supply. The cut-off power supply powers all disaster simulation actuators. It is cut off by the reset relay contacts during reset. The PLC host power supply circuit is independent of the AC power supply bus of the actuators in each field I / O substation integration box. The PLC host is powered directly from the external AC power supply by the explosion-proof regulated power supply module without being controlled by the reset relay contacts.

8. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The intermediate relay group in the drive output area is equipped with a graded alarm relay group, which includes a warning relay, a critical relay, and a disaster relay. The normally open contact of the warning relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the yellow audible and visual alarm. The normally open contact of the critical relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the orange audible and visual alarm and the alarm horn. The normally open contact of the disaster relay is connected in series with the power supply circuit of the red audible and visual alarm and the trigger circuit of the emergency broadcast system. Each graded alarm relay is equipped with a set of self-holding normally open contacts.

9. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 8, characterized in that, In the intermediate relay group of the drive output area, the corresponding interactive interlocking relay group is selected according to the disaster scenario carried by the room. The interactive interlocking relay group of each field I / O substation integration box has scene mutual exclusion. Each field I / O substation integration box is equipped with only the interactive interlocking relay dedicated to the corresponding disaster scenario. The type and number of the interactive interlocking relay group are determined according to the disaster simulation task of the room. The normally open contact of the warning relay is uniformly connected in series in the coil power supply circuit of the interactive interlocking relay.

10. The remote distributed control system as described in claim 8, characterized in that, The drive output area is equipped with a time delay relay. The coil of the time delay relay is connected in series with the normally open contact of the disaster relay and then connected to a DC regulated power supply. The coil of the time delay relay is energized and starts timing only when the disaster relay is energized and the second-level disaster step relay is energized. The time delay relay is an energized time delay relay.