A method and system for trusted terminal connection for power grid data transmission

By generating a trust state digest and performing multi-level verification, a trusted connection is established, and an isolated re-proof channel is established when verification fails. This solves the problem of insufficient trustworthiness of power grid terminal equipment in subsequent data transmission, and realizes continuous trustworthiness and security of power grid data transmission.

CN123122878APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17GUANGZHOU POWER SUPPLY BUREAU GUANGDONG POWER GRID CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611180072.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-08-05
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, after grid terminal equipment is connected to the network, it relies solely on trusted authentication and key negotiation during the access phase, which makes it difficult to maintain the trustworthiness of the connection and the consistency of transmission constraints during subsequent data transmission, resulting in insufficient trustworthiness.

Method used

In response to the connection request from the terminal trusted proxy, the protocol profile rules corresponding to the target power grid business identifier are invoked to generate a trust state summary and perform multi-level verification to establish a trusted connection. If the verification fails during data transmission, an isolated re-proof channel is established and a differential proof block is generated for exception handling.

Benefits of technology

It achieves dynamic trust constraints during power grid data transmission, solves the problem of insufficient trustworthiness in subsequent transmission caused by authentication and key negotiation during the access phase in existing technologies, and ensures the continuous trustworthiness and security of power grid data transmission.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a terminal trusted connection method and system for power grid data transmission. In response to a connection request from a terminal trusted proxy, it invokes a protocol profiling rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier; the protocol profiling rule is sent to the terminal trusted proxy; a first verification is performed on the trust state digest returned by the terminal trusted proxy; if the first verification passes, a trusted connection is established; a second verification is performed on the power grid data packets encrypted and transmitted by the terminal trusted proxy; if the second verification fails, an isolated proof channel is established that only allows proof-of-proof data transmission, and a proof-of-proof template is sent; a differential proof block is received, and a third verification is performed on the differential proof block; if the third verification passes, a connection authentication credential update message is generated; otherwise, the trusted connection is terminated. Using this embodiment of the invention, the problem of insufficient trust in subsequent transmission caused by relying solely on one-time authentication and key negotiation during the access phase in existing technologies can be effectively solved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a terminal trusted connection method and system for power grid data transmission. Background Technology

[0002] With the increasing variety of power grid terminal equipment and access scenarios, after accessing the network, terminal equipment not only needs to complete identity authentication and secure connection establishment, but also needs to maintain connection trustworthiness and transmission constraint consistency during subsequent business data transmission.

[0003] In scenarios involving continuous transmission of power grid business messages, the terminal's operating status, communication configuration status, and the content of specific business messages may all change. Traditional methods that only complete one-time trusted authentication and key negotiation during the connection establishment phase are often insufficient to fully cover the continuous trusted transmission requirements after the connection is established. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention aims to provide a terminal trusted connection method and system for power grid data transmission. It can not only complete trusted authentication during the access establishment phase, but also maintain dynamic trusted constraints during the continuous transmission of power grid data packets. This effectively solves the problem of insufficient trust in subsequent transmission caused by relying solely on one-time authentication and key negotiation during the access phase in the prior art.

[0005] In a first aspect, embodiments of the present invention provide a terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission, comprising: In response to the connection request from the terminal's trusted proxy, the protocol profile rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier is invoked; The protocol profiling rules are sent to the terminal trusted agent so that the terminal trusted agent can generate a trust state digest; the trust state digest includes the current terminal's immutable proof component and variable proof component; A first verification is performed on the trust state digest. If the first verification passes, a trusted connection is established with the trusted proxy of the terminal. In response to the encrypted power grid data packet transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, the power grid data packet is subjected to a second verification. If the second verification passes, the power grid data packet is forwarded to the target terminal. If the second verification fails, an isolated reproof channel is established that only allows reproof data transmission, and a corresponding reproof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent according to the anomaly type, so that the terminal trusted agent can generate differential proof blocks according to the reproof template; The system receives the differential proof block uploaded by the trusted proxy of the terminal, performs a third verification on the differential proof block, and generates a connection authentication credential update message for the next transmission window if the third verification passes; otherwise, it terminates the trusted connection.

[0006] As an improvement to the above scheme, the step of responding to the connection request from the terminal trusted proxy and invoking the protocol profile rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier includes: In response to a connection request from a trusted terminal proxy, terminal identity information, terminal type information, and target power grid service identifier are obtained from the connection request. Based on the target power grid service identifier, select protocol profile rules that match the target power grid service identifier from the pre-built protocol profile library.

[0007] As an improvement to the above scheme, the terminal trusted agent responds to the protocol profiling rules issued by the terminal trusted agent, collects the invariant proof component and variable proof component of the current terminal, and generates a trust state summary. The trust state digest is signed and then sent to the secure access gateway; The immutable proof component includes at least hardware identity measurement information and secure boot measurement information; the variable proof component includes at least running process measurement information and communication configuration measurement information.

[0008] As an improvement to the above scheme, the invariant proof component includes the device hardware unique identifier metric, the bootloader metric, the firmware metric, and the root certificate metric. The variable proof components include the running process list metric, the key library file metric, the communication protocol stack configuration metric, the routing policy metric, and the cache protection configuration metric.

[0009] As an improvement to the above scheme, the first verification of the trust state digest, and the establishment of a trusted connection with the terminal trusted proxy if the first verification passes, includes: Perform a first verification on the trust state digest; If the verification passes, a connection authentication credential for the current transmission window is generated based on the trust state digest; the connection authentication credential includes a connection base key and a connection credential. The connection authentication credentials are sent to the trusted terminal agent, so that the trusted terminal agent establishes a trusted connection with the secure access gateway based on the connection authentication credentials.

[0010] As an improvement to the above scheme, the terminal trusted proxy responds to the initial power grid data message to be sent by parsing the initial power grid data message according to the protocol profiling rules and extracting the allowed semantic field content. The content of the allowed semantic fields is normalized and sequentially concatenated, and a business semantic summary is generated based on the processed field sequence. When the field normalization result or field order changes, a new business semantic digest is regenerated, and a new transmission subkey is re-derived. A transmission subkey is derived based on the connection authentication credential of the current transmission window, the business semantic digest, and the current transmission window number; A security encapsulation header is encapsulated in the initial power grid data message to obtain a power grid data message; The power grid data packets are encrypted and transmitted using the aforementioned transmission sub-key. A window commitment value is generated based on the message digest sequence within the current transmission window, and the window commitment value is sent to the secure access gateway at the end of the current transmission window.

[0011] As an improvement to the above scheme, the step of responding to the encrypted transmission of the power grid data packet by the trusted proxy of the terminal, performing a second verification on the power grid data packet, and forwarding the power grid data packet to the target terminal if the second verification passes, includes: In response to the encrypted power grid data packets transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, the following checks are performed on the power grid data packets: connection credential binding content verification, trust status signature verification, protocol profile version number verification, business semantic digest consistency verification, preceding message digest continuity verification, trust continuation index verification, and window commitment value verification. After all verifications pass, the power grid data message is forwarded to the target terminal.

[0012] As an improvement to the above scheme, if the second verification fails, an isolated re-proof channel is established that only allows re-proof data transmission, and a corresponding re-proof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent according to the anomaly type, so that the terminal trusted agent generates a differential proof block according to the re-proof template, including: If the second verification fails, an isolation channel key is derived based on the connection authentication credentials of the current transmission window, the exception type identifier, and the current transmission window number. An isolated proof channel is established using the isolated channel key; the isolated proof channel only allows the transmission of proof templates, differential proof blocks, and connection authentication credential update messages; Obtain the proof template corresponding to the exception type; The re-proof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent through the isolated re-proof channel, so that the terminal trusted agent generates a differential proof block according to the re-proof template.

[0013] As an improvement to the above scheme, when the exception type is a communication configuration exception, the corresponding re-proof template is to call the communication protocol stack configuration metric and the routing policy metric. When the exception type is process exception, the corresponding proof template is the metric value of the running process list and the metric value of the key library file; When the exception type is firmware exception, the corresponding verification template is the firmware metric and the bootloader metric.

[0014] Secondly, embodiments of the present invention also provide a terminal trusted connection system for power grid data transmission, comprising: The connection request response module 11 is used to respond to the connection request from the terminal trusted proxy and call the protocol profile rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier; Protocol profiling rule distribution module 12 is used to distribute the protocol profiling rules to the terminal trusted agent so that the terminal trusted agent generates a trust state digest; the trust state digest includes the current terminal's immutable proof component and variable proof component; Trusted connection establishment module 13 is used to perform a first verification on the trust state digest. If the first verification passes, a trusted connection is established with the terminal trusted agent. The power grid data packet forwarding module 14 is used to respond to the power grid data packet encrypted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, perform a second verification on the power grid data packet, and if the second verification is successful, forward the power grid data packet to the target terminal. The isolated re-proof channel establishment module 15 is used to establish an isolated re-proof channel that only allows re-proof data transmission if the second verification fails, and to send the corresponding re-proof template to the terminal trusted agent according to the exception type, so that the terminal trusted agent can generate differential proof blocks according to the re-proof template. The differential proof block verification module 16 is used to receive the differential proof block uploaded by the terminal trusted proxy, perform a third verification on the differential proof block, and generate a connection authentication credential update message for the next transmission window if the third verification passes; otherwise, terminate the trusted connection.

[0015] Compared with existing technologies, the present invention discloses a terminal trusted connection method and system for power grid data transmission. In response to a connection request from a terminal trusted proxy, the method invokes a protocol profiling rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier; the protocol profiling rule is then sent to the terminal trusted proxy to generate a trust state digest; the trust state digest includes the current terminal's immutable proof component and variable proof component; a first verification is performed on the trust state digest; if the first verification passes, a trusted connection with the terminal trusted proxy is established; in response to a power grid data packet encrypted and transmitted by the terminal trusted proxy, a second verification is performed on the power grid data packet; if the second verification passes, the power grid data packet is forwarded to the target terminal; if the second verification fails, an isolated proof channel is established that only allows proof data transmission, and a corresponding proof template is sent to the terminal trusted proxy according to the exception type, so that the terminal trusted proxy generates a differential proof block according to the proof template; the differential proof block uploaded by the terminal trusted proxy is received, and a third verification is performed on the differential proof block; if the third verification passes, a connection authentication credential update message for the next transmission window is generated; otherwise, the trusted connection is terminated. By employing the embodiments of the present invention, not only can trusted authentication be completed during the access establishment phase, but dynamic trusted constraints can also be maintained during the continuous transmission of subsequent power grid data packets. This effectively solves the problem of insufficient trustworthiness in subsequent transmission caused by relying solely on one-time authentication and key negotiation during the access phase in the prior art. Attached Figure Description

[0016] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a trusted terminal connection architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a terminal trusted connection system for power grid data transmission provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0017] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0018] In the description and claims, it should be understood that the terms "first," "second," etc., used in the description and claims are only for the purpose of distinguishing the description of the same technical features, and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated, nor necessarily the order of description or chronological order. The terms are interchangeable where appropriate. Therefore, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of that feature.

[0019] This invention provides a method for trusted terminal connection for power grid data transmission. Please refer to [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 1 In this embodiment, the terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission is applied to a secure access gateway, and is specifically executed through steps S1 to S6: S1. In response to the connection request from the terminal trusted proxy, invoke the protocol profile rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier; S2. The protocol profiling rules are sent to the terminal trusted agent so that the terminal trusted agent generates a trust state digest; the trust state digest includes the current terminal's immutable proof component and variable proof component; S3. Perform a first verification on the trust state digest. If the first verification passes, establish a trusted connection with the terminal trusted agent. S4. In response to the encrypted power grid data packet transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, perform a second verification on the power grid data packet. If the second verification passes, forward the power grid data packet to the target terminal. S5. If the second verification fails, an isolated re-proof channel is established that only allows the transmission of re-proof data, and the corresponding re-proof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent according to the anomaly type, so that the terminal trusted agent can generate differential proof blocks according to the re-proof template. S6. Receive the differential proof block uploaded by the trusted proxy of the terminal, perform a third verification on the differential proof block, and if the third verification passes, generate a connection authentication credential update message for the next transmission window; otherwise, terminate the trusted connection.

[0020] This invention can be deployed in power wireless access network environments, wired industrial control network environments, and hybrid access environments composed of edge nodes, station control layer devices, and backend security servers.

[0021] Preferably, the interactive objects in the terminal trusted connection architecture applicable to the embodiments of the present invention include a terminal trusted proxy, a secure access gateway, a trusted evaluation server, a key management server, and a protocol profile library.

[0022] The trusted proxy for the terminal is deployed on the side of the terminal device to be connected, and is used to perform functions such as collecting local authentication data of the terminal, generating trust state digests, generating business semantic digests, deriving transmission subkeys, and security encapsulation processing.

[0023] The secure access gateway is deployed at the business access boundary and is responsible for functions such as receiving connection requests, invoking protocol profile rules, verifying connection credential binding content, verifying the consistency of business semantic digests, verifying the continuity of preceding message digests, verifying the trust continuation index, verifying the window commitment value, and controlling the isolation verification channel.

[0024] The Trust Evaluation Server is used to perform functions such as trust state digest verification, trust state signature generation, differential proof block verification, and abnormal state re-judgment.

[0025] The key management server is responsible for functions such as generating connection base keys, generating connection credentials, generating update connection credential messages, generating update connection base key messages, and generating gateway migration credentials.

[0026] The protocol profile library is used to store protocol profile rules, protocol profile version numbers, and field extraction rules corresponding to different target power grid service identifiers.

[0027] In some more preferred embodiments, such as Figure 2 As shown, the trusted terminal connection architecture also includes an audit and evidence storage server, which stores records of the connection establishment process, connection credential update process, differential proof block verification process, and gateway migration process, forming an audit chain record.

[0028] To further illustrate the feasibility of this implementation, the terminal trusted proxy in this embodiment may, by way of example, also include a connection request submodule, a proof acquisition submodule, a digest generation submodule, a key derivation submodule, a message encapsulation submodule, a window processing submodule, and a migration processing submodule. The connection request submodule organizes terminal identity information, terminal type information, and the target power grid service identifier and initiates a connection request to the secure access gateway; the proof acquisition submodule collects immutable proof components and variable proof components; the digest generation submodule generates a trust state digest and a service semantic digest; the key derivation submodule derives a transmission subkey based on the connection base key, service semantic digest, data category identifier, transmission direction identifier, and current transmission window number; the message encapsulation submodule generates a secure encapsulation header and encrypts and encapsulates the power grid data message; the window processing submodule maintains the current transmission window number, generates a window commitment value, and outputs the window commitment reference value of the previous transmission window; the migration processing submodule completes the state migration before and after cross-gateway handover upon receiving the gateway migration credential.

[0029] The secure access gateway may further include a connection management submodule, a rule verification submodule, a continuity verification submodule, a verification control submodule, and a log upload submodule. The combination of the aforementioned submodules can be integrated or separated according to engineering deployment needs, but this will not affect the implementation of the technical solution described in this embodiment.

[0030] To establish a trusted connection, the terminal's trusted proxy must first initiate a connection request to the secure access gateway. In this embodiment of the invention, after receiving the connection request, the secure access gateway retrieves the corresponding protocol profile rules from the protocol profile database based on the target power grid service identifier and sends the protocol profile rules to the terminal's trusted proxy.

[0031] It should be noted that the protocol profiling rules are not merely used to describe the message format, but rather to define which fields the terminal trusted agent can extract from the power grid data message after establishing a trusted connection, in what order to process these fields, and how to form a verifiable business semantic summary of these fields.

[0032] Considering that complete protocol profile rules have redundant fields for generating trust state summaries, in some preferred embodiments, the secure access gateway sends the protocol profile version number and the set of allowed semantic fields to the terminal trusted agent.

[0033] Among them, the protocol profile version number is used to ensure that the terminal trusted agent and the secure access gateway use the same version of field extraction logic and semantic normalization logic, and allows the semantic field set to be used to limit the field boundaries participating in the generation of semantic summaries for subsequent business.

[0034] Preferably, the protocol profile library can pre-configure different protocol profile rules for different target power grid business identifiers, and each protocol profile rule can be composed of a protocol profile rule identifier, a protocol profile version number, field extraction rules, field normalization rules, field order rules, a set of allowed data categories, a set of allowed operations, a set of allowed object address ranges, and a set of allowed command types.

[0035] Protocol profiling rules in the protocol profiling library can be stored using pre-built configuration files, structured tables in a database, or a rule engine. For pre-built configuration files, corresponding rule files can be created based on the target power grid business identifier. For structured tables in a database, fields for target power grid business identifier, protocol profiling version number, field for extracting rules, and allowed operation set can be created. For the rule engine approach, the judgment conditions and processing actions corresponding to different target power grid business identifiers can be solidified into rule chains.

[0036] When a secure access gateway invokes protocol profiling rules, it can preferentially locate the rule set based on the target power grid business identifier, then select the corresponding version of the protocol profiling rule from the rule set based on the terminal type information and site deployment area information, and send the protocol profiling version number and the set of allowed semantic fields to the terminal trusted agent.

[0037] For example, when the target power grid service identifier corresponds to a remote control data service based on the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol, the protocol profiling rule includes a type identifier field, an information object address field, a control direction field or an uplink direction field, a quality description field, and a timestamp field; when the target power grid service identifier corresponds to a service based on the DL / T 634.5101 protocol, the protocol profiling rule includes an application service data unit type field, an object address field, a data category field, and a timestamp field; when the target power grid service identifier corresponds to a service based on the IEC 61850 protocol, the protocol profiling rule includes a point number field, which can be formed by combining a logical node identifier field and a data object identifier field, and further cooperates with a functional constraint field, a quality description field, and a timestamp field to participate in field extraction.

[0038] In one specific embodiment, when the logical node identifier field is “MMXU1” and the data object identifier field is “A.phsA.cVal.mag.f”, the point number field can be organized as “MMXU1 / A.phsA.cVal.mag.f”; when the logical node identifier field is “XCBR1” and the data object identifier field is “Pos.stVal”, the point number field can be organized as “XCBR1 / Pos.stVal”.

[0039] In the IEC 61850 scenario, logical node identifier fields and data object identifier fields can be uniformly mapped to standardized fields that can participate in business semantic summary calculation.

[0040] After receiving the protocol profile version number and the set of allowed semantic fields, the terminal trusted agent begins to collect the current terminal's immutable proof components and variable proof components, and generates a trust state summary based on the collection results.

[0041] After receiving the trust state digest, the secure access gateway forwards it to the trusted assessment server. The trusted assessment server performs unpacking verification, version comparison, and trusted baseline matching on each piece of evidence corresponding to the trust state digest (i.e., the first verification) and generates a trust state signature.

[0042] In the first verification process, the trusted assessment server can first verify whether the device hardware unique identifier metric, bootloader metric, firmware metric, and root certificate metric are consistent with the registration baseline, and then verify whether the running process list metric, critical library file metric, communication protocol stack configuration metric, routing policy metric, and cache protection configuration metric are within the allowable range of change.

[0043] When the first verification passes, the Trust Assessment Server outputs a Trust State Signature and sends the Trust State Signature to the Key Management Server and the Secure Access Gateway. When the verification fails, the Trust Assessment Server can directly return an error reason identifier so that the subsequent isolation and verification process can begin.

[0044] After the trust assessment server generates a trust state signature, the key management server generates connection authentication credentials. The trusted proxy on the terminal and the secure access gateway must establish a trusted connection based on these connection authentication credentials before encrypted data transmission can occur between them.

[0045] During connection operation, if the secure access gateway detects a change in the version number of the variable proof component or a failure in any of the second verifications, it will not immediately adopt the method of full connection reconstruction. Instead, it will preferentially establish an isolated proof channel that only allows proof data transmission and issue the corresponding proof template to the terminal trusted agent according to the type of anomaly.

[0046] An isolated verification channel refers to a controlled security channel that is independent of the current power grid data message transmission channel. This channel is established using an isolated channel key that is independent of the current transmission subkey. The isolated channel key is preferably derived from the connection base key, the anomaly type identifier, and the current transmission window number.

[0047] It should be noted that the verification template can be pre-stored by the secure access gateway or by the trusted assessment server, and the two can share the mapping relationship between the exception type and the verification template.

[0048] After receiving the differential proof block, the trusted assessment server preferably finds the most recently verified base state based on the previous metric reference value, and then compares the current metric value with the trusted baseline and the most recently verified trusted state to determine whether the current change is an allowed change.

[0049] If the verification passes, the key management server generates an updated connection credential for the next transmission window number, and if necessary, generates an updated connection base key. The updated connection credential message and the updated connection base key message are then sent to the terminal trusted agent and the secure access gateway through the isolated verification channel. If the verification fails, the secure access gateway terminates the trusted connection.

[0050] In some preferred embodiments, the connection authentication credential update message includes a new connection credential sequence number, a new current transmission window number, a connection base key version number, a trust continuation index, an effective time, and a corresponding issuance signature.

[0051] The update connection base key message preferably includes at least the new connection base key version number, the corresponding connection credential serial number, the effective window number, key material protection information, and message integrity verification information.

[0052] After receiving the update connection credential message and the update connection base key message, the terminal trusted agent and secure access gateway can first verify the integrity of the message, then verify the size relationship between the connection base key version number and the locally stored version number, and then determine whether the effective window number matches the local current transmission window number.

[0053] Only when the above verification passes will the terminal trusted agent and secure access gateway switch to the new connection credential state and the new connection base key state.

[0054] To ensure consistency of the connection state before and after the differential proof block verification, the secure access gateway maintains a trust continuation index corresponding to the trusted proxy of the terminal. After the initial trusted connection is successfully established, the trusted proxy of the terminal writes the initial trust continuation index, and subsequently carries the current trust continuation index in the secure encapsulation header of each power grid data packet. When the differential proof block verification passes and the connection credential update is completed, the secure access gateway increments the trust continuation index, and the trusted proxy of the terminal writes the incremented trust continuation index into subsequent power grid data packets. The secure access gateway only receives power grid data packets with a trust continuation index value that matches the currently maintained value.

[0055] This allows for a one-to-one correspondence between the trusted continuity of the connection and the re-proofing action, preventing late messages, cached messages, or replay messages from the old window from being mistakenly received after the next round of connection credentials takes effect.

[0056] For example, the initial trust continuation index can be set to "0". Each time a differential proof block verification is completed and the update connection credential message is made effective, the trust continuation index is incremented by "1". If only the update connection base key message is received but the update connection credential message is not made effective, the current trust continuation index can be kept unchanged.

[0057] In some preferred embodiments, the terminal trusted agent maps control command data and state measurement data to a first logical channel and a second logical channel, respectively. The first and second logical channels correspond to independent transmission window numbers, independent transmission subkeys, independent preamble message digest chains, and independent connection credential subsequence numbers, respectively. This approach aims to separate high-risk control command data from high-frequency state measurement data. Control command data typically involves write operations and has higher requirements for timeliness, integrity, and authorization boundaries; state measurement data typically involves periodic uploads and has higher requirements for continuity and throughput. By employing a dual logical channel structure, different transmission window lengths and different connection credential rolling update cycles can be used for different data types. For example, the first logical channel can use a shorter transmission window and a faster connection credential rolling update cycle to increase the scrutiny of control command data; the second logical channel can use a longer transmission window and a lower update frequency to balance the transmission efficiency of state measurement data.

[0058] For example, the first logical channel can form a current transmission window every five frames of control command-type power grid data messages received or sent, and generate a window commitment value at the end of each current transmission window; the second logical channel can form a current transmission window every twenty frames of status measurement-type power grid data messages received or sent, and generate a window commitment value at the end of that current transmission window. In this way, control command-type data can undergo more frequent integrity aggregation verification, while status measurement-type data achieves higher transmission efficiency. In another implementation, the terminal trusted proxy can further map alarm linkage-type data to a third logical channel to form a multi-logical channel structure.

[0059] In gateway switching scenarios, such as when a trusted terminal proxy switches from a first secure access gateway to a second secure access gateway, the key management server can generate a gateway migration certificate. The gateway migration certificate is preferably bound to the identifiers of the first and second secure access gateways, the remaining validity period, the current transmission window number, and the current window commitment value. When the trusted terminal proxy completes the connection migration using the gateway migration certificate, it only resubmits the variable proof component, not the invariant proof component.

[0060] Firstly, it can reduce the overhead of full proof during the migration process. Secondly, it can also use the current window commitment value to connect the window state before migration with the connection state after migration, thereby maintaining business continuity.

[0061] Upon receiving the gateway migration credential, the second secure access gateway verifies its consistency with the locally received migration request and decides whether to accept the migration based on the remaining validity period. If accepted, the second secure access gateway submits the variable proof component verification result to the trusted assessment server, which then issues a new connection credential or updates the connection base key, completing the migration process. Further, in a preferred embodiment, after the gateway migration, the original connection credential sequence number chain can be continued, or the second secure access gateway can allocate a new connection credential sub-sequence number while maintaining the original connection base key version number association.

[0062] To enhance system traceability, the audit evidence server generates an audit chain record for each trusted connection establishment, connection credential update, differential proof block verification, and gateway migration process. The audit chain record can include at least the current connection credential sequence number, the previous connection credential sequence number, the current window commitment value, the differential proof block digest value, the trust continuation index, and the current secure access gateway identifier. The audit evidence server can store these records using a sequential storage structure or a linked storage structure, and can perform index queries based on timestamps, terminal identity information, target power grid service identifiers, or connection credential sequence numbers. Compared to simply recording ordinary logs, the audit chain record in this embodiment simultaneously records the connection credential evolution relationship, the window commitment relationship, and the differential proof block verification result, thus facilitating the reconstruction of the entire process "before the anomaly—during the anomaly—after the anomaly." In another embodiment, the audit chain record can further include the protocol profile version number, the connection base key version number, the anomaly type identifier, and the current transmission window number to form a more complete traceability evidence chain.

[0063] Furthermore, when the secure access gateway detects that the protocol profile version number stored locally by the terminal trusted agent is inconsistent with the protocol profile version number in the protocol profile library, the secure access gateway issues a protocol profile refresh command to the terminal trusted agent. After executing the protocol profile refresh command, the terminal trusted agent recalculates the communication protocol stack configuration metric in the variable proof component and regenerates the trust state digest. The key management server only issues a new connection credential after the regenerated trust state digest passes verification. The significance of this process is that once the protocol profile rules change, the business semantic digest generation logic and the business semantic digest consistency verification logic will also change. Therefore, the protocol profile refresh action should be included in the change event of the variable proof component to ensure that the trusted connection state remains consistent before and after the protocol profile version switch. In one example, if the protocol profile version number is upgraded from "V1.0.3" to "V1.0.4", and the new version adds a normalization requirement for the timestamp field precision, then after the terminal trusted agent executes the protocol profile refresh command, it is preferable to reread the communication protocol stack configuration metric and related parsing module configuration, and then regenerate the trust state digest to prevent inconsistencies in the parsing logic under the old and new protocol profile versions.

[0064] In the above scheme, the trusted connection of the terminal can not only complete trusted authentication during the access establishment phase, but also maintain dynamic trusted constraints during the continuous transmission of power grid data packets. This effectively solves the problem of insufficient trustworthiness in subsequent transmission caused by relying only on one-time authentication and key negotiation during the access phase in the existing technology.

[0065] As a preferred implementation, step S1, in response to the connection request from the terminal trusted proxy, invokes the protocol profile rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier, including: In response to a connection request from a trusted terminal proxy, terminal identity information, terminal type information, and target power grid service identifier are obtained from the connection request. Based on the target power grid service identifier, select protocol profile rules that match the target power grid service identifier from the pre-built protocol profile library.

[0066] The trusted terminal agent first initiates a connection request to the secure access gateway, and carries the terminal identity information, terminal type information and target power grid service identifier in the connection request.

[0067] Among them, the terminal identity information can be a combination of terminal serial number, device certificate identifier, station number and device logical number; the terminal type information can be a type identifier such as protection terminal, measurement and control terminal, fault recording terminal, feeder automation terminal or remote communication terminal; and the target power grid service identifier can correspond to telemetry transmission service, remote signaling transmission service, remote control transmission service, setting value verification service, alarm linkage service or station control communication service.

[0068] The protocol profiling library can pre-configure different protocol profiling rules for different target power grid business identifiers. Each protocol profiling rule can be composed of a protocol profiling rule identifier, a protocol profiling version number, field extraction rules, field normalization rules, field order rules, a set of allowed data categories, a set of allowed operations, a set of allowed object address ranges, and a set of allowed command types.

[0069] In the above scheme, based on the target power grid service identifier in the connection request, protocol profile rules with pre-existing binding mapping relationships can be filtered from the protocol profile library for subsequent execution verification and data transmission.

[0070] In a preferred implementation, the terminal trusted agent responds to the protocol profiling rules issued by the terminal trusted agent, collects the invariant proof component and variable proof component of the current terminal, and generates a trust state summary. The trust state digest is signed and then sent to the secure access gateway; The immutable proof component includes at least hardware identity measurement information and secure boot measurement information; the variable proof component includes at least running process measurement information and communication configuration measurement information.

[0071] Preferably, the invariant proof component includes a device hardware unique identifier metric, a bootloader metric, a firmware metric, and a root certificate metric. The variable proof components include the running process list metric, the key library file metric, the communication protocol stack configuration metric, the routing policy metric, and the cache protection configuration metric.

[0072] In some preferred embodiments, the terminal trusted agent first forms the original proof data according to a fixed proof data organization order. Specifically, it can be concatenated in the order of "device hardware unique identifier metric value - bootloader metric value - firmware metric value - root certificate metric value - running process list metric value - key library file metric value - communication protocol stack configuration metric value - routing policy metric value - cache protection configuration metric value". Then, a trust state digest is obtained through cryptographic hash operation. Finally, the trust state digest is signed using a signature key pre-set on the terminal side and sent to the secure access gateway.

[0073] Incorporating both the invariant proof component and the variable proof component into the trust state digest ensures that the trust state assessment during connection establishment covers both the basic trust attributes of the terminal hardware and the dynamic trust attributes during communication operation.

[0074] To make the generation path of the trust state digest clearer, the preferred method in this embodiment of the invention is as follows: First, read the device hardware unique identifier metric, bootloader metric, firmware metric, root certificate metric, running process list metric, critical library file metric, communication protocol stack configuration metric, routing policy metric, and cache protection configuration metric; then, add field name identifiers and field length identifiers to each piece of proof data to form tagged proof data fragments; then, concatenate the tagged proof data fragments in a preset order to form the original proof data text; subsequently, perform a cryptographic hash operation on the original proof data text to form a trust state digest; finally, sign the trust state digest using the terminal-side signing key to form the proof message body to be sent.

[0075] The advantage of using field name identifiers and field length identifiers is that they can prevent boundary ambiguities when splicing different proof data fragments. If a certain variable proof component does not exist in the current terminal, for example, if a certain type of terminal does not have a cache protection configuration module, the corresponding field can be written with a null value identifier to maintain the overall structural consistency of the original proof data.

[0076] As a preferred implementation, step S3, performing a first verification on the trust state digest, and if the first verification passes, establishing a trusted connection with the terminal trusted proxy, includes: Perform a first verification on the trust state digest; If the verification passes, a connection authentication credential for the current transmission window is generated based on the trust state digest; the connection authentication credential includes a connection base key and a connection credential. The connection authentication credentials are sent to the trusted terminal agent, so that the trusted terminal agent establishes a trusted connection with the secure access gateway based on the connection authentication credentials.

[0077] It should be noted that the connection authentication credential is not just a static access permission mark, but a protected data object that is bound to terminal identity information, secure access gateway identifier, target power grid service identifier, protocol profile version number, allowed data category set, allowed operation set, current transmission window number, and trust state summary.

[0078] Furthermore, the connection authentication credential can also include a trust state signature generated by the trusted assessment server and an issuance signature generated by the key management server, thus forming a dual-signature structure. The issuance signature is preferably generated for the connection base key version number and the current transmission window number to characterize the issuance status of the current connection base key and its corresponding window.

[0079] The dual-signature structure separates the verification of "whether the trusted state passes verification" and "whether the connection base key and connection credentials are allowed in this state" into two distinct verifiable actions, avoiding the use of a single signature object to carry all security semantics. The terminal trusted agent and secure access gateway only accept the connection credentials when both the trusted state signature and the issuance signature pass verification, and establish a trusted connection based on the connection base key and connection credentials.

[0080] The key management server assigns an incrementing connection base key version number to each newly issued connection base key and writes this version number into the corresponding connection credential. When processing update connection credential messages and update connection base key messages, the terminal trusted agent and secure access gateway preferentially accept only update results with a connection base key version number greater than the locally stored version number. This prevents older update connection base key messages from being replayed and overwriting the current valid key state.

[0081] In a preferred embodiment, the terminal trusted proxy responds to the initial power grid data packet to be sent by parsing the initial power grid data packet according to the protocol profiling rules and extracting the allowed semantic field content. The content of the allowed semantic fields is normalized and sequentially concatenated, and a business semantic summary is generated based on the processed field sequence. When the field normalization result or field order changes, a new business semantic digest is regenerated, and a new transmission subkey is re-derived. A transmission subkey is derived based on the connection authentication credential of the current transmission window, the business semantic digest, and the current transmission window number; A security encapsulation header is encapsulated in the initial power grid data message to obtain a power grid data message; The power grid data packets are encrypted and transmitted using the aforementioned transmission sub-key. A window commitment value is generated based on the message digest sequence within the current transmission window, and the window commitment value is sent to the secure access gateway at the end of the current transmission window.

[0082] The predefined set of allowed semantic fields defines the boundaries of fields that participate in the generation of subsequent business semantic summaries. When extracting the content of allowed semantic fields, the field content is extracted based on the set of allowed semantic fields.

[0083] It is important to note that the generation of business semantic digests does not involve directly hashing the original data message of the entire power grid. Instead, it prioritizes field normalization and sequential concatenation.

[0084] The field normalization processing described in this embodiment of the invention refers to the unified processing of the format differences that may occur in different message encoding methods for the same semantic field. For example, the information object address field is uniformly converted into a fixed-length string expression, the control direction field or the uplink direction field is uniformly converted into a predefined enumeration value, and the timestamp field is uniformly formatted with the same precision and the same time zone.

[0085] Sequential splicing refers to connecting the normalized field contents in a fixed order to form a field sequence according to the pre-defined field order of the protocol profiling rules, and then generating a business semantic summary based on this field sequence.

[0086] In another approach, field concatenation can be performed according to field number order, rather than simply the order in which fields appear. For example, a protocol profiling rule can assign field number "01" to the type identifier field, field number "02" to the information object address field, field number "03" to the control direction field, and field number "04" to the timestamp field. When the trusted terminal agent generates the business semantic digest, it can first retrieve the values ​​in the order of field numbers and then concatenate the results. The above substitution process does not affect the core concept of this implementation method.

[0087] The advantage of field normalization and sequential concatenation is that trusted terminal proxies and secure access gateways can maintain a consistent understanding of the key semantics of power grid data packets without disclosing the complete payload content of the power grid data packets.

[0088] When the field normalization result or field order changes, the terminal trusted agent regenerates a new business semantic digest and re-derives a new transport subkey, thereby enabling changes in business semantics to be directly transmitted to changes in the transport subkey of the encryption layer.

[0089] For example, in a remotely controlled power grid data message, the original value of the type identifier field is "45", the original value of the information object address field is "18", the original value of the control direction field is "DOWN", and the original value of the timestamp field is "2026-04-22 13:05:09.125". The terminal trusted agent can normalize the type identifier field to a three-digit string "045", the information object address field to a six-digit string "000018", the control direction field to an enumerated value "01", and the timestamp field to "20260422130509125" according to the protocol profiling rules. If the default field order in the protocol profiling rules is "type identifier field—information object address field—control direction field—timestamp field", then the trusted terminal agent can concatenate the normalized fields sequentially to form the field sequence "0450000180120260422130509125", and then perform a cryptographic hash operation on this field sequence to obtain the business semantic digest. If the information object address field changes to "19" in a subsequent similar power grid data message received by the trusted terminal agent, the normalized field sequence will become "0450000190120260422130509125", thereby generating a new business semantic digest, and the transmission subkey will also be updated accordingly.

[0090] It should be noted that, in order to ensure that the consistency verification of business semantic digest has a clear implementation path, after receiving the power grid data packet, the secure access gateway preferably extracts the field content corresponding to the allowed semantic field set of the received power grid data packet according to the same protocol profiling rules, field normalization rules and field order rules as the terminal trusted agent, and independently generates the gateway-side business semantic digest on the gateway side.

[0091] Subsequently, the secure access gateway compares the gateway-side service semantic digest with the corresponding service semantic digest on the terminal's trusted proxy side. The service semantic digest on the terminal's trusted proxy side can be preserved through the secure connection state context or mapped to the local connection state table through the association index in the secure encapsulation header. If they match, the service semantic digest consistency check is deemed successful; if they do not match, it is determined that there is a discrepancy between the terminal side and the gateway side's understanding of the key semantics of the power grid data packet, or that the power grid data packet has been tampered with during transmission related to the set of allowed semantic fields, thereby triggering the exception handling process.

[0092] The derivation process of the transmission subkey is preferably completed based on the connection base key, the service semantic digest, the data category identifier, the transmission direction identifier, and the current transmission window number.

[0093] Among them, the data category identifier can be used to distinguish control command data, status measurement data, remote signaling event data, log upload data, or configuration and maintenance data; the transmission direction identifier is used to distinguish the sending direction of the terminal trusted agent and the sending direction of the secure access gateway; the current transmission window number is used to distinguish the transmission context under different time windows or different message batches.

[0094] By incorporating the business semantic digest, data category identifier, transmission direction identifier, and current transmission window number into the derived input of the transmission subkey, the same connection base key can correspond to different transmission subkeys under different business categories, different transmission directions, and different transmission windows, thereby reducing the risk of a single transmission subkey being reused for a long time.

[0095] After adding a secure encapsulation header to the power grid data message to be sent, the terminal trusted agent uses the transmission subkey to encrypt and transmit the power grid data message.

[0096] In some preferred embodiments, the secure encapsulation header includes at least the connection credential sequence number, the current transmission window number, the variable proof component version number, the preceding message digest value, and the trust continuation index.

[0097] The connection credential sequence number is used to identify the connection credential version to which the current power grid data message belongs; the current transmission window number is used to indicate which window period the current power grid data message belongs to; the variable proof component version number is used to characterize whether the terminal runtime configuration and process status have changed; the preceding message digest value is used to form a message continuity verification chain; and the trust continuation index is used to characterize whether the current power grid data message is still in a trusted continuity state after the most recent successful verification.

[0098] Preferably, the terminal trusted agent also generates a window commitment value for the message digest sequence within the current transmission window, and sends the window commitment value to the secure access gateway at the end of the current transmission window.

[0099] In a preferred embodiment, the window commitment value is generated by first connecting the message digest values ​​according to the sending or receiving order of the power grid data messages to form a window digest sequence, then performing segmented digest processing on the window digest sequence to obtain a segmented digest sequence, and finally connecting the segmented digest sequences and performing overall digest processing according to the segmented order to obtain the window commitment value.

[0100] When the trusted proxy of the terminal sends the window commitment value of the current transmission window, it can also simultaneously send the window commitment reference value of the previous transmission window, so that the secure access gateway can establish a cross-window continuity verification relationship.

[0101] For example, a current transmission window contains ten power grid data packets. The terminal trusted agent first calculates the message digest value of each of the ten power grid data packets, and then concatenates the ten message digest values ​​in the order of transmission to form a window digest sequence. If the ten message digest values ​​are divided into two segments of five, the first five message digest values ​​and the last five message digest values ​​can be processed separately to obtain the first segment digest value and the second segment digest value. Then, the first segment digest value and the second segment digest value are concatenated and processed as a whole to obtain the window commitment value. If the next current transmission window continues to send power grid data packets, the terminal trusted agent can attach the window commitment value of the previous current transmission window as a window commitment reference value when sending the window commitment value of the next current transmission window, thus forming a chain association between the two current transmission windows. If a packet is lost within a current transmission window, the corresponding window digest sequence will be inconsistent with the window digest sequence formed by the secure access gateway based on the received results, thereby detecting the anomaly during the window commitment value verification stage. If a late or duplicate message occurs within a current transmission window, the construction of the message sequence by the terminal trusted agent and the secure access gateway will differ, and the window commitment value verification will also fail.

[0102] In the above scheme, by participating the service semantic digest in the derivation of the transmission subkey, the transmission subkey is simultaneously constrained by the connection base key, the service semantic digest, the data category identifier, the transmission direction identifier, and the current transmission window number. This enables fine-grained key isolation under different service categories, different transmission directions, and different transmission windows, which is beneficial to improving the security protection capability of power grid data message transmission.

[0103] In a preferred implementation, step S4, in response to the encrypted power grid data packet transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, performs a second verification on the power grid data packet. If the second verification passes, the power grid data packet is forwarded to the target terminal, including: In response to the encrypted power grid data packets transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, the following checks are performed on the power grid data packets: connection credential binding content verification, trust status signature verification, protocol profile version number verification, business semantic digest consistency verification, preceding message digest continuity verification, trust continuation index verification, and window commitment value verification. After all verifications pass, the power grid data message is forwarded to the target terminal.

[0104] The connection credential binding content verification is used to determine whether the terminal identity information, secure access gateway identifier, target power grid service identifier, protocol profile version number, allowed data category set, allowed operation set, current transmission window number, and trust status summary corresponding to the current power grid data packet all fall within the allowed range of the current connection credential.

[0105] In some preferred embodiments, the connection credential can also be bound to a range of allowed object addresses and a set of allowed command types.

[0106] Allowed object address ranges can be used to restrict a trusted agent of a terminal to access only telemetry points, tele-signaling points, or control points within a specific object address range. Allowed command type sets can be used to restrict a trusted agent of a terminal to sending only certain types of control operations or status transmission operations. Allowed data category sets can be stored using enumerated value lists, bitmap identifiers, or classification label sets. Allowed operation sets can be represented using predefined operation code sets, such as upload, download, confirmation, receipt, query, and maintenance operation types. When performing connection credential binding content verification, the secure access gateway can first determine whether the data category identifier falls within the allowed data category set, then determine whether the operation code falls within the allowed operation set, and further determine whether the object address in the power grid data message is within the allowed object address range, and whether the command type is within the allowed command type set.

[0107] In this way, even if an attacker attempts to send an object address access request or control command beyond the authorized scope using an existing session after a trusted connection has been established, the request will be blocked because it does not meet the verification requirements of the connection credential binding content. This embodiment of the invention further moves the object address and command constraints forward to the connection credential binding content and links them with the business semantic digest and the transmission subkey derivation process.

[0108] Trust state signature verification is used to determine whether the current trust state digest still corresponds to the most recent trust assessment result.

[0109] The protocol profile version number verification is used to determine whether the field extraction logic used by the terminal trusted proxy and the secure access gateway is consistent.

[0110] The business semantic digest consistency check is used to determine whether the business semantic digest calculated by the terminal trusted agent is consistent with the gateway-side business semantic digest obtained by the security access gateway after parsing the power grid data packet according to the same protocol profiling rules.

[0111] Prequel message digest continuity check is used to determine whether there are packet insertions, out-of-order delivery, packet deletions, or replays in the message link.

[0112] Trust continuation index verification is used to determine whether the current power grid data packet still belongs to the trusted continuous interval after the most recent successful re-proof; window commitment value verification is used to determine whether the digest sequence within the entire transmission window has been completely tampered with. When all the above verifications pass, the secure access gateway forwards the power grid data packet to the target service side.

[0113] In the above scheme, by setting the window commitment value, the preceding message digest value, and the trust continuation index, the secure access gateway can jointly verify the continuity, consistency, and integrity of power grid data packets. This makes it easier to detect anomalies such as message replay, message insertion, message out-of-order delivery, and message deletion, thereby improving the security and verifiability of packets during continuous transmission.

[0114] As a preferred implementation, step S5, if the second verification fails, establishes an isolated re-proof channel that only allows re-proof data transmission, and issues a corresponding re-proof template to the terminal trusted agent according to the anomaly type, so that the terminal trusted agent generates a differential proof block according to the re-proof template, including: If the second verification fails, an isolation channel key is derived based on the connection authentication credentials of the current transmission window, the exception type identifier, and the current transmission window number. An isolated proof channel is established using the isolated channel key; the isolated proof channel only allows the transmission of proof templates, differential proof blocks, and connection authentication credential update messages; Obtain the proof template corresponding to the exception type; The re-proof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent through the isolated re-proof channel, so that the terminal trusted agent generates a differential proof block according to the re-proof template.

[0115] It should be noted that the isolated proof channel only allows the transmission of proof templates, differential proof blocks, update connection credential messages, and update connection base key messages, and does not allow the continued transmission of ordinary power grid data packets. This channel isolation design helps to physically or logically separate the proof data stream from the power grid data packet stream in the event of anomalies, reducing the risks associated with continuing to transmit ordinary power grid data packets under abnormal conditions.

[0116] Preferably, the isolated verification channel can be established using either logical isolation or physical isolation. When using logical isolation, the secure access gateway can allocate independent message type identifiers, independent message queues, and independent isolation channel keys to the isolated verification channel on the existing communication link. When using physical isolation, the secure access gateway can switch the verification traffic to an independent control link or an independent management port.

[0117] Regardless of the method used, isolated proof channels are only allowed to transmit proof templates, differential proof blocks, update connection credential messages, and update connection base key messages to maintain the channel's single purpose.

[0118] Furthermore, preferably, when the exception type is a communication configuration exception, the corresponding re-proof template is the call to the communication protocol stack configuration metric and the routing policy metric. When the exception type is process exception, the corresponding proof template is the metric value of the running process list and the metric value of the key library file; When the exception type is firmware exception, the corresponding verification template is the firmware metric and the bootloader metric.

[0119] After receiving the re-proof template, the terminal trusted agent does not resubmit all proof data, but instead generates only the differential proof block related to the current anomaly type according to the re-proof template.

[0120] Preferably, the differential proof block includes at least the changed component set identifier, the previous metric reference value, the current metric value, and the component set version number.

[0121] For example, the device hardware unique identifier metric corresponds to component code "01", the bootloader metric corresponds to component code "02", the firmware metric corresponds to component code "03", the running process list metric corresponds to component code "04", the critical library file metric corresponds to component code "05", the communication protocol stack configuration metric corresponds to component code "06", the routing policy metric corresponds to component code "07", and the cache protection configuration metric corresponds to component code "08". When a communication configuration anomaly occurs, the terminal trusted agent can write "06, 07" into the change component set identifier; when a process anomaly occurs, the terminal trusted agent can write "04, 05" into the change component set identifier; when both a communication configuration anomaly and a process anomaly occur simultaneously, the terminal trusted agent can write "04, 05, 06, 07" into the change component set identifier simultaneously.

[0122] The previous metric reference value can be used to locate the state of the corresponding component that most recently passed the trust evaluation. The current metric value is used to record the actual value collected this time. The component set version number is used to identify the version of the variable proof component to which the current differential proof block belongs. When a variable proof component changes again, the component set version number can be incremented so that the trust evaluation server can distinguish the differential proof results of different rounds.

[0123] In the above scheme, by setting up an isolated reproof channel and a differential proof block, when the terminal encounters communication configuration abnormalities, process abnormalities, or firmware abnormalities, it is not necessary to re-execute the full proof and complete connection reconstruction. Instead, it only needs to perform local reproof around the changed variable proof components. This helps to shorten the anomaly recovery time, reduce the amount of reproof data in the anomaly handling process, and improve the system's continuous operation capability in abnormal scenarios.

[0124] To make the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the following Example 1 is described using a complete single-run example.

[0125] Suppose a substation control terminal with a trusted proxy needs to upload telemetry data to the dispatching side and receive specific remote control commands. When accessing the network, this terminal submits its identity information, terminal type information, and target power grid service identifier to the secure access gateway. The target power grid service identifier corresponds to a "composite service of telemetry upload and remote control reception." The secure access gateway retrieves the corresponding protocol profile rules from the protocol profile library and issues the protocol profile version number and the set of allowed semantic fields. The trusted proxy collects the device's unique hardware identifier metric, bootloader metric, firmware metric, root certificate metric, running process list metric, key library file metric, communication protocol stack configuration metric, routing policy metric, and cache protection configuration metric, generates a trust state digest, and sends it. After successful verification by the trust assessment server, a trust state signature is output, and the key management server generates a connection base key, a connection base key version number, and a connection credential. The terminal trusted agent then establishes a trusted connection based on the connection base key and connection credentials, and begins to extract the information object address field, control direction field, quality description field and timestamp field according to the protocol profiling rules to generate a business semantic digest. Then, it derives the transmission subkey by combining the data category identifier, transmission direction identifier and the current transmission window number.

[0126] In this single-run instance, the terminal trusted agent first maps telemetry upload-type power grid data packets to the second logical channel and remote control command-type power grid data packets to the first logical channel. Assuming the current transmission window number of the second logical channel is "0001," and twenty frames of telemetry upload-type power grid data packets are sent within a single transmission window, the terminal trusted agent, before sending the first frame of telemetry upload-type power grid data packets, derives a first transmission subkey based on the connection base key, the service semantic digest corresponding to the frame, the data category identifier, the transmission direction identifier, and the current transmission window number "0001." This first transmission subkey is then used to encrypt and encapsulate the first frame of telemetry upload-type power grid data packets. Subsequently, the terminal trusted agent continues to send the next nineteen frames of telemetry upload-type power grid data packets, writing the connection credential sequence number, the current transmission window number "0001," the variable proof component version number, the preceding message digest value, and the trust continuation index into the secure encapsulation header of each frame of power grid data packets. After the twentieth frame of telemetry-transmitted power grid data packets in the second logical channel is transmitted, the terminal trusted agent generates a window commitment value based on the twenty message digest values ​​within the current transmission window and sends this window commitment value to the secure access gateway. The secure access gateway reconstructs the window digest sequence based on the twenty frames of telemetry-transmitted power grid data packets received locally and verifies the window commitment value. If the window commitment value verification passes, the transmission process for the current transmission window ends.

[0127] During the continued operation of the aforementioned single-run instance, assuming that before a remote control command-type power grid data packet is sent within the first logical channel, the terminal trusted agent detects a change in the communication protocol stack configuration metric, causing the variable proof component version number to increment, the terminal trusted agent will carry the new variable proof component version number in the secure encapsulation header when subsequently sending power grid data packets. Upon receiving this power grid data packet, the secure access gateway detects the change in the variable proof component version number and immediately stops forwarding ordinary power grid data packets on the first logical channel, establishing an isolated reproof channel that only allows reproof data transmission. Subsequently, the secure access gateway, classifying the exception as a communication configuration exception, retrieves the corresponding reproof template from its local machine or the trusted assessment server and sends this template to the terminal trusted agent. Based on the received reproof template, the terminal trusted agent extracts the communication protocol stack configuration metric and routing policy metric, forming a differential proof block containing only the changed component set identifier, the previous metric reference value, the current metric value, and the component set version number, and then sends it to the trusted assessment server through the isolated reproof channel. After verifying the differential proof block, if the trusted assessment server determines that the communication configuration change is a permissible change, it returns a pass result to the key management server. The key management server then generates an updated connection credential for the next transmission window number, and, if necessary, an updated connection base key, and sends the updated connection credential message and updated connection base key message through the isolated proof channel. Upon receiving the updated connection credential message and updated connection base key message, the secure access gateway increments the trust continuation index and allows the terminal trusted agent to resume normal power grid data packet transmission under the new current transmission window number. If the trusted assessment server determines that the communication configuration change is not a permissible change, the secure access gateway directly terminates the trusted connection.

[0128] In this single-run instance, if the trusted terminal agent switches from the first secure access gateway to the second secure access gateway during telemetry transmission, the key management server can generate a gateway migration certificate. The trusted terminal agent sends this gateway migration certificate to the second secure access gateway, while only resubmitting the variable proof component. After verifying the gateway migration certificate, the second secure access gateway sends the variable proof component to the trusted evaluation server for review. If the trusted evaluation server verifies the certificate, the key management server issues a new connection certificate matching the current window state, and the trusted terminal agent continues to send subsequent power grid data packets under the new secure access gateway. In this way, the current window commitment value before the gateway migration and the connection state after the gateway migration can be seamlessly connected.

[0129] Example 2 illustrates the terminal trusted connection process specifically for telemetry uploading service scenarios. In this example, the target power grid service identifier is set to "telemetry uploading service," and the terminal trusted agent only enables the second logical channel, while the first logical channel remains inactive. The secure access gateway retrieves the protocol profile rules corresponding to the telemetry uploading service from the protocol profile library and issues the protocol profile version number and the set of allowed semantic fields. After completing the generation of trust state digest, verification of trust state signature, and establishment of connection credentials, the terminal trusted agent only processes state measurement data. Since there are no remote-controlled power grid data packets in this scenario, the set of allowed operations can only include "uploading." During the continuous transmission phase, the terminal trusted agent preferably forms a current transmission window every twenty frames of telemetry uploading power grid data packets received or sent, and generates a window commitment value at the end of each current transmission window. The secure access gateway focuses on performing service semantic digest consistency verification, preceding message digest continuity verification, and window commitment value verification to ensure that telemetry uploading power grid data packets remain continuous and trusted under long window conditions. If a change occurs in the cache protection configuration metric in this scenario, the secure access gateway can establish an isolated proof channel and form a differential proof block only around the cache protection configuration metric, the communication protocol stack configuration metric, and the routing policy metric. Since this embodiment only involves telemetry transmission services, it better highlights the continuous and reliable transmission characteristics of the second logical channel, long window processing, and periodically transmitted power grid data messages.

[0130] Example 3 illustrates the terminal trusted connection process specifically for remote control delivery service scenarios. In this example, the target power grid service identifier is set to "remote control delivery service," and the terminal trusted agent only activates the first logical channel, while the second logical channel remains inactive. The secure access gateway retrieves the protocol profile rules corresponding to the remote control delivery service from the protocol profile library and prioritizes the delivery of a set of allowed semantic fields, including type identifier, information object address, control direction, and timestamp fields. After establishing the connection, the terminal trusted agent processes only power grid data packets of control command type, preferably using a shorter current transmission window, for example, forming a current transmission window for every five frames of remote control delivery power grid data packets received or sent. In this scenario, the connection credentials preferably bind a narrower range of allowed object addresses and a smaller set of allowed command types simultaneously to enhance the constraint on control boundaries. After receiving a remote control delivery power grid data packet, the secure access gateway, in addition to performing a service semantic digest consistency check, preferably prioritizes performing allowed object address range checks and allowed command type set checks. If an illegal object address access or an illegal command type request occurs, the connection credential binding content verification can be directly determined to have failed, and the isolated verification channel will be triggered immediately. Since remote control delivery services have high requirements for timeliness and authorization accuracy, this embodiment better highlights the features of the first logical channel, short window processing, object address and command constraints, and rapid intervention of isolated verification.

[0131] To verify the improvement effect of this embodiment compared to the closest prior art, a set of exemplary comparative experiments were set up. The comparative scheme adopted the access method disclosed in the closest prior art, which "pre-installs a trusted platform control module in the power wireless terminal, power wireless access point and power authentication server to perform certificate distribution, two-way identity authentication, platform identity and integrity assessment and key negotiation", and maintained consistency in the number of terminals, message sending frequency, network bandwidth, service type and attack injection method. The focus of the disclosed comparative scheme is on trusted authentication, integrity assessment and key negotiation in the access phase. This embodiment further introduces the service semantic digest to participate in the transmission subkey derivation, window commitment value, isolated proof channel and differential proof block update mechanism.

[0132] To ensure greater clarity in the statistical scope of the comparative test data, all experiments in this embodiment are preferably conducted under the same hardware environment, network topology, packet load conditions, and anomaly injection strategy. Each experiment is preferably repeated ten times, and the arithmetic mean of the ten results is taken as the statistical result in Table 4. Among them, "Communication Configuration Anomaly Recovery Time" refers to the time from when the secure access gateway first detects a change in the version number of the variable proof component to when normal power grid data packet forwarding is restored; "Process Anomaly Recovery Time" refers to the time from when an anomaly is detected in the running process list metric to when normal power grid data packet forwarding is restored; "Gateway Migration Recovery Time" refers to the time from when the terminal trusted agent initiates a gateway migration request to when the second secure access gateway allows the restoration of normal power grid data packet forwarding; "Illegal Object Address Access Interception Rate" refers to the proportion of the total number of preset illegal object address access requests that are successfully identified and intercepted by the secure access gateway; "Illegal Command Type Interception Rate" refers to the proportion of the total number of preset illegal command type requests that are successfully identified and intercepted by the secure access gateway; "Message Replay Recognition Rate" refers to the proportion of the total number of preset message replay attack samples that are jointly identified by the preceding message digest continuity check and the window commitment value check; and "Average Re-proof Data Volume" refers to the average proportion of the number of proof data bytes resubmitted after the anomaly occurs to the total number of proof data bytes.

[0133] Table 1 Protocol Profile Rules Table 2 Mapping Table of Anomaly Types and Re-proof Templates Table 3. Exemplary Test Environments Table 4 Comparative test results It should be noted that the data in Table 4 is used to illustrate the verification effect of this embodiment in the above-mentioned test environment. It is exemplary test data in the specification and is used to intuitively demonstrate the improvement effect of this embodiment compared with the closest prior art solution. It does not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection.

[0134] As can be clearly seen from Table 4, this implementation method achieves at least the following beneficial effects. First, this implementation method does not rely on re-executing full proof and complete connection reconstruction after an anomaly occurs. Instead, it utilizes isolated re-proof channels and differential proof blocks to perform partial re-proof only on the variable proof components that have changed. Therefore, under the exemplary experimental conditions, it exhibits a shorter recovery time for normal transmission in scenarios such as communication configuration anomalies, process anomalies, and gateway migration. Second, this implementation method collaboratively introduces allowed object address ranges, allowed command type sets, business semantic digest consistency verification, and window commitment value verification into the continuous transmission process. Therefore, under the exemplary experimental conditions, it exhibits higher capabilities in identifying and intercepting illegal object address access, illegal command types, and message replay. Third, this implementation method incorporates business semantic digests, data category identifiers, transmission direction identifiers, and the current transmission window number into the transmission subkey derivation process, naturally separating transmission subkeys under different business categories, directions, and windows, thereby improving the granularity of data protection in the continuous connection state. Finally, this implementation method integrates connection credential updates, differential proof block verification, window commitment value evolution, and gateway migration processes into the evidence storage link through audit chain records, thus facilitating subsequent event tracing and responsibility location.

[0135] Furthermore, the technical feature of business semantic digests participating in the derivation of transmission subkeys directly binds the key semantics of power grid data packets to the encryption protection context, thereby producing a fine-grained key isolation effect; the technical features of window commitment value and preceding message digest continuity verification make it easier to identify message insertion, message out-of-order, message deletion, and message replay during continuous transmission, thereby producing anti-replay and anti-tampering effects; the technical features of isolated proof channels and differential proof blocks make anomaly handling no longer dependent on full proof, thereby shortening anomaly recovery time and reducing the amount of re-proof data; the technical feature of gateway migration credentials eliminates the need to resubmit all invariant proof components during connection migration, thereby reducing migration overhead and maintaining transmission continuity; the technical feature of audit chain records enables unified traceability of connection credential updates, window commitment value evolution, and differential proof block verification processes, thereby enhancing audit traceability.

[0136] The terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission provided by the embodiments of the present invention can not only complete trusted authentication during the access establishment phase, but also maintain dynamic trusted constraints during the continuous transmission of power grid data packets. This effectively solves the problem of insufficient trust in subsequent transmission caused by relying only on one-time authentication and key negotiation during the access phase in the prior art.

[0137] This invention provides a trusted terminal connection system for power grid data transmission applied to a secure access gateway. Please refer to... Figure 3The terminal trusted connection system for power grid data transmission includes a connection request response module 11, a protocol profiling rule distribution module 12, a trusted connection establishment module 13, a power grid data packet forwarding module 14, an isolated proof channel establishment module 15, and a differential proof block verification module 16, wherein: The connection request response module 11 is used to respond to the connection request from the terminal trusted proxy and call the protocol profile rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier; Protocol profiling rule distribution module 12 is used to distribute the protocol profiling rules to the terminal trusted agent so that the terminal trusted agent generates a trust state digest; the trust state digest includes the current terminal's immutable proof component and variable proof component; Trusted connection establishment module 13 is used to perform a first verification on the trust state digest. If the first verification passes, a trusted connection is established with the terminal trusted agent. The power grid data packet forwarding module 14 is used to respond to the power grid data packet encrypted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, perform a second verification on the power grid data packet, and if the second verification is successful, forward the power grid data packet to the target terminal. The isolated re-proof channel establishment module 15 is used to establish an isolated re-proof channel that only allows re-proof data transmission if the second verification fails, and to send the corresponding re-proof template to the terminal trusted agent according to the exception type, so that the terminal trusted agent can generate differential proof blocks according to the re-proof template. The differential proof block verification module 16 is used to receive the differential proof block uploaded by the terminal trusted proxy, perform a third verification on the differential proof block, and generate a connection authentication credential update message for the next transmission window if the third verification passes; otherwise, terminate the trusted connection.

[0138] In a preferred embodiment, the connection request response module 11 is specifically used for: In response to a connection request from a trusted terminal proxy, terminal identity information, terminal type information, and target power grid service identifier are obtained from the connection request. Based on the target power grid service identifier, select protocol profile rules that match the target power grid service identifier from the pre-built protocol profile library.

[0139] In a preferred implementation, the terminal trusted agent responds to the protocol profiling rules issued by the terminal trusted agent, collects the invariant proof component and variable proof component of the current terminal, and generates a trust state summary. The trust state digest is signed and then sent to the secure access gateway; The immutable proof component includes at least hardware identity measurement information and secure boot measurement information; the variable proof component includes at least running process measurement information and communication configuration measurement information.

[0140] In a preferred embodiment, the invariant proof component includes a device hardware unique identifier metric, a bootloader metric, a firmware metric, and a root certificate metric. The variable proof components include the running process list metric, the key library file metric, the communication protocol stack configuration metric, the routing policy metric, and the cache protection configuration metric.

[0141] In a preferred embodiment, the trusted connection establishment module 13 is specifically used for: Perform a first verification on the trust state digest; If the verification passes, a connection authentication credential for the current transmission window is generated based on the trust state digest; the connection authentication credential includes a connection base key and a connection credential. The connection authentication credentials are sent to the trusted terminal agent, so that the trusted terminal agent establishes a trusted connection with the secure access gateway based on the connection authentication credentials.

[0142] In a preferred embodiment, the terminal trusted proxy responds to the initial power grid data packet to be sent by parsing the initial power grid data packet according to the protocol profiling rules and extracting the allowed semantic field content. The content of the allowed semantic fields is normalized and sequentially concatenated, and a business semantic summary is generated based on the processed field sequence. When the field normalization result or field order changes, a new business semantic digest is regenerated, and a new transmission subkey is re-derived. A transmission subkey is derived based on the connection authentication credential of the current transmission window, the business semantic digest, and the current transmission window number; A security encapsulation header is encapsulated in the initial power grid data message to obtain a power grid data message; The power grid data packets are encrypted and transmitted using the aforementioned transmission sub-key. A window commitment value is generated based on the message digest sequence within the current transmission window, and the window commitment value is sent to the secure access gateway at the end of the current transmission window.

[0143] In a preferred embodiment, the power grid data packet forwarding module 14 is specifically used for: In response to the encrypted power grid data packets transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, the following checks are performed on the power grid data packets: connection credential binding content verification, trust status signature verification, protocol profile version number verification, business semantic digest consistency verification, preceding message digest continuity verification, trust continuation index verification, and window commitment value verification. After all verifications pass, the power grid data message is forwarded to the target terminal.

[0144] In a preferred embodiment, the isolation verification channel establishment module 15 is specifically used for: If the second verification fails, an isolation channel key is derived based on the connection authentication credentials of the current transmission window, the exception type identifier, and the current transmission window number. An isolated proof channel is established using the isolated channel key; the isolated proof channel only allows the transmission of proof templates, differential proof blocks, and connection authentication credential update messages; Obtain the proof template corresponding to the exception type; The re-proof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent through the isolated re-proof channel, so that the terminal trusted agent generates a differential proof block according to the re-proof template.

[0145] As a preferred implementation, when the exception type is a communication configuration exception, the corresponding re-proof template is the call to the communication protocol stack configuration metric and the routing policy metric. When the exception type is process exception, the corresponding proof template is the metric value of the running process list and the metric value of the key library file; When the exception type is firmware exception, the corresponding verification template is the firmware metric and the bootloader metric.

[0146] The terminal trusted connection system for power grid data transmission provided by the embodiments of the present invention can not only complete trusted authentication during the access establishment phase, but also maintain dynamic trusted constraints during the continuous transmission of power grid data packets. This effectively solves the problem of insufficient trust in subsequent transmission caused by relying only on one-time authentication and key negotiation during the access phase in the prior art.

[0147] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods. The storage medium can be a magnetic disk, optical disk, read-only memory (ROM), or random access memory (RAM), etc.

[0148] The above description represents the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various improvements and modifications without departing from the principles of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications are also considered to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission, characterized in that, The terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission, applied to a secure access gateway, includes: In response to the connection request from the terminal's trusted proxy, the protocol profile rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier is invoked; The protocol profiling rules are sent to the terminal trusted agent so that the terminal trusted agent can generate a trust state digest; the trust state digest includes the current terminal's immutable proof component and variable proof component; A first verification is performed on the trust state digest. If the first verification passes, a trusted connection is established with the trusted proxy of the terminal. In response to the encrypted power grid data packet transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, the power grid data packet is subjected to a second verification. If the second verification passes, the power grid data packet is forwarded to the target terminal. If the second verification fails, an isolated reproof channel is established that only allows reproof data transmission, and a corresponding reproof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent according to the anomaly type, so that the terminal trusted agent can generate differential proof blocks according to the reproof template; The system receives the differential proof block uploaded by the trusted proxy of the terminal, performs a third verification on the differential proof block, and generates a connection authentication credential update message for the next transmission window if the third verification passes; otherwise, it terminates the trusted connection.

2. The terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step of responding to a connection request from a trusted terminal proxy by invoking the protocol profile rule corresponding to the target power grid service identifier includes: In response to a connection request from a trusted terminal proxy, terminal identity information, terminal type information, and target power grid service identifier are obtained from the connection request. Based on the target power grid service identifier, select protocol profile rules that match the target power grid service identifier from the pre-built protocol profile library.

3. The terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The terminal trusted agent responds to the protocol profiling rules issued by the terminal trusted agent, collects the invariant proof component and variable proof component of the current terminal, and generates a trust state summary. The trust state digest is signed and then sent to the secure access gateway; The invariant proof component includes at least hardware identity measurement information and secure boot measurement information; The variable proof component includes at least runtime metric information and communication configuration metric information.

4. A terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission as described in claim 1 or 3, characterized in that, The invariant proof components include the device hardware unique identifier metric, the bootloader metric, the firmware metric, and the root certificate metric. The variable proof components include the running process list metric, the key library file metric, the communication protocol stack configuration metric, the routing policy metric, and the cache protection configuration metric.

5. The terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The first verification of the trust state digest, and the establishment of a trusted connection with the terminal trusted proxy if the first verification passes, includes: Perform a first verification on the trust state digest; If the verification passes, a connection authentication credential for the current transmission window is generated based on the trust state digest; the connection authentication credential includes a connection base key and a connection credential. The connection authentication credentials are sent to the trusted terminal agent, so that the trusted terminal agent establishes a trusted connection with the secure access gateway based on the connection authentication credentials.

6. The terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The terminal trusted proxy responds to the initial power grid data message to be sent by parsing the initial power grid data message according to the protocol profiling rules and extracting the allowed semantic field content. The content of the allowed semantic fields is normalized and sequentially concatenated, and a business semantic summary is generated based on the processed field sequence. When the field normalization result or field order changes, a new business semantic digest is regenerated, and a new transmission subkey is re-derived. A transmission subkey is derived based on the connection authentication credential of the current transmission window, the business semantic digest, and the current transmission window number; A security encapsulation header is encapsulated in the initial power grid data message to obtain a power grid data message; The power grid data packets are encrypted and transmitted using the aforementioned transmission sub-key. A window commitment value is generated based on the message digest sequence within the current transmission window, and the window commitment value is sent to the secure access gateway at the end of the current transmission window.

7. The terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The method of responding to the encrypted power grid data packet transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, performing a second verification on the power grid data packet, and forwarding the power grid data packet to the target terminal if the second verification passes, includes: In response to the encrypted power grid data packets transmitted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, the following checks are performed on the power grid data packets: connection credential binding content verification, trust status signature verification, protocol profile version number verification, business semantic digest consistency verification, preceding message digest continuity verification, trust continuation index verification, and window commitment value verification. After all verifications pass, the power grid data message is forwarded to the target terminal.

8. The terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission as described in claim 1, characterized in that, If the second verification fails, an isolated re-proof channel is established that only allows re-proof data transmission, and a corresponding re-proof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent according to the anomaly type, so that the terminal trusted agent generates a differential proof block according to the re-proof template, including: If the second verification fails, an isolation channel key is derived based on the connection authentication credentials of the current transmission window, the exception type identifier, and the current transmission window number. An isolated proof channel is established using the isolated channel key; the isolated proof channel only allows the transmission of proof templates, differential proof blocks, and connection authentication credential update messages; Obtain the proof template corresponding to the exception type; The re-proof template is sent to the terminal trusted agent through the isolated re-proof channel, so that the terminal trusted agent generates a differential proof block according to the re-proof template.

9. A terminal trusted connection method for power grid data transmission as described in claim 1 or 8, characterized in that, When the exception type is communication configuration exception, the corresponding proof template is to call the communication protocol stack configuration metric and the routing policy metric. When the exception type is process exception, the corresponding proof template is the metric value of the running process list and the metric value of the key library file; When the exception type is firmware exception, the corresponding verification template is the firmware metric and the bootloader metric.

10. A terminal trusted connection system for power grid data transmission, characterized in that, The trusted terminal connection system for power grid data transmission, applied to a secure access gateway, includes: The connection request and response module is used to respond to connection requests from the terminal's trusted proxy and invoke the protocol profile rules corresponding to the target power grid service identifier. The protocol profiling rule distribution module is used to distribute the protocol profiling rules to the terminal trusted agent, so that the terminal trusted agent can generate a trust state digest; the trust state digest includes the current terminal's immutable proof component and variable proof component; A trusted connection establishment module is used to perform a first verification on the trust state digest. If the first verification passes, a trusted connection is established with the terminal trusted proxy. The power grid data packet forwarding module is used to respond to the power grid data packet encrypted by the trusted proxy of the terminal, perform a second verification on the power grid data packet, and if the second verification is successful, forward the power grid data packet to the target terminal. The isolated re-proof channel establishment module is used to establish an isolated re-proof channel that only allows re-proof data transmission if the second verification fails, and to send the corresponding re-proof template to the terminal trusted agent according to the exception type, so that the terminal trusted agent can generate differential proof blocks according to the re-proof template; The differential proof block verification module is used to receive the differential proof block uploaded by the terminal's trusted proxy, perform a third verification on the differential proof block, and generate a connection authentication credential update message for the next transmission window if the third verification passes; otherwise, the trusted connection is terminated.