Node security trust verification methods, systems, electronic devices, and storage media

By deploying a Merkle tree in the security management module to perform structured notarization of the public key and security capability parameters of the hardware trust root, the problems of vendor lock-in and high cost of HSM in distributed systems are solved, enabling cross-platform and cross-vendor security verification and improving the security and versatility of distributed scenarios.

CN123122935APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17SHANGHAI SPACECOM SATELLITE TECH LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611350367.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-09-01
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing distributed application systems, hardware cryptographic modules (HSMs) cannot meet the requirements of high elasticity and portability. They suffer from vendor lock-in, high deployment and maintenance costs, reduced security capabilities, and broken trust links, making them difficult to adapt to open and heterogeneous multi-cloud and distributed cluster environments.

Method used

By deploying a Merkle tree in the security management module, the public keys and security capability parameters of each hardware trust root are stored in a structured manner. This enables layer-by-layer hash comparison, synchronously verifying the legality of the public keys and the compliance of the security capability parameters, and building a cross-platform, cross-vendor secure linkage storage system. The Merkle verification path is used for double accurate verification.

Benefits of technology

It achieves dual and accurate verification during the distributed node trust access phase, intercepts abnormal heterogeneous nodes with substandard security levels and incompatible cryptographic capabilities, reduces deployment and maintenance costs, ensures the security of business data and keys across the entire domain, and adapts to the dynamic trust requirements of global distributed businesses.

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Abstract

This disclosure provides a node security trust verification method, system, electronic device, and storage medium. The method includes: locating the target leaf node corresponding to the trust root to be verified in a Merkle tree based on the identifier of the trust root to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and generating a Merkle verification path for the target leaf node; each leaf node in the Merkle tree corresponds to a valid trust root data block, and each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root; sending the Merkle verification path to a security authentication module, which performs layer-by-layer hash calculations based on the Merkle verification path and compares it with the baseline Merkle root, synchronously verifying the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf. This disclosure constructs a unified and standardized trust root data verification system, breaking down the vendor barriers and closed ecosystem of traditional hardware trust roots.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to the field of trusted computing technology, and in particular to a node security trust verification method, system, electronic device, and storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] Distributed application systems and cloud computing platforms have become the mainstream deployment architecture. For high-security business scenarios, the industry generally adopts a secure storage solution based on Hardware Cryptographic Modules (HSMs) to ensure key security. HSM products come in a variety of forms, including stand-alone hardware cryptographic machines, host PCI-E cryptographic cards, or hardware roots of trust (TPM, Chinese national cryptographic TCM chips, etc.) integrated on the motherboard.

[0003] However, the inherent design philosophy of HSM conflicts with the high elasticity and portability required by distributed and cloud platforms: the core principle of HSM is that the key cannot be exported, while distributed elastic scheduling scenarios require the key to support cross-node transfer; at the same time, traditional solutions use private transmission keys from cryptographic vendors to complete the interaction, which naturally has the defect of vendor lock-in and is difficult to adapt to open and heterogeneous multi-cloud and distributed cluster environments.

[0004] In globally distributed business scenarios such as satellite internet and global cloud services, there are stringent requirements for the trusted management and cross-node transfer capabilities of business data and keys. Existing mainstream protection solutions rely on hardware security module clusters and dedicated cryptographic resource pools to achieve key protection, which not only has high deployment and maintenance costs, but also is deeply tied to a single hardware vendor, lacking versatility and horizontal scalability. Traditional hardware trust root system architectures are closed, and the security capabilities and interaction protocols of devices from different vendors are incompatible, making it extremely easy for security capabilities to degrade and trust links to break when keys are transferred across nodes. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The technical problem to be solved by this disclosure is to overcome the above-mentioned defects in the prior art and provide a node security authorization verification method, system, electronic device, and storage medium.

[0006] This disclosure solves the above-mentioned technical problems through the following technical solution:

[0007] Firstly, a node security trust verification method is provided, applied to a security management module; the security management module deploys a Merkle tree, each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a legitimate trust root data block, and each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root; the node security trust verification method includes:

[0008] In response to the public key verification request sent by the security authentication module after the signature verification of the root of trust to be verified is completed, the target leaf node corresponding to the root of trust to be verified is located in the Merkle tree according to the identifier of the root of trust to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree is generated.

[0009] The Merkle verification path is sent to the security authentication module, which performs layer-by-layer hashing based on the Merkle verification path and compares it with the baseline Merkle root. Simultaneously, it verifies the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf. If both the public key and security capability parameters pass verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is deemed secure and compliant. If either the public key or the security capability parameter fails verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is deemed to have a security risk.

[0010] Optionally, it also includes:

[0011] The control policy constraints are sent to the security authentication module. The control policy constraints include verification rules and security level matching rules. The verification rules are used to trigger the security authentication module to parse the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node and verify their compliance. The security level matching rules are used to trigger the security authentication module to compare the security level of the root of trust to be verified with the trusted benchmark root of trust.

[0012] In response to the fact that the security level of the root of trust to be verified is lower than the security level of the trusted baseline root of trust, the business key and / or business encrypted data are re-encrypted to generate ciphertext that adapts to the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

[0013] Optionally, the Merkle tree includes a meta-Merkle tree and multiple trust subtrees; the trust subtrees are divided according to the deployment geographical location and / or business type of the global trust root, each trust subtree maintains an independent local baseline Merkle root, and the leaves of the meta-Merkle tree store the local baseline Merkle roots of each trust subtree;

[0014] Generate the Merkle check path from the target leaf node to the Merkle tree root node, including:

[0015] If node security trust verification occurs within the same trust subtree, only a Merkle verification path containing the local Merkle path of the corresponding trust subtree is generated;

[0016] If the node security trust verification is a cross-trust subtree authorization verification, then the Merkle verification path containing the local Merkle path and the meta-Merkle tree path is generated;

[0017] The local Merkle path is determined based on the trust subtree, and the meta-Merkle tree path is determined based on the meta-Merkle tree.

[0018] Optionally, the global trust anchor of the global trust root is stored based on the highest security level HSM. The update operations of the local baseline Merkle root of all trust subtrees and the global Merkle root of the meta-Merkle tree are all linked with the distributed threshold signature mechanism. The global root private key is split into multiple key fragments through Shamir secret sharing and stored in hardware trust roots of different vendors within the same trust domain. The legitimate update of the Merkle root can only be completed after threshold signature aggregation verification. The global trust anchor is determined based on the top-level hash value calculated by the meta-Merkle tree aggregation.

[0019] Secondly, a node security trust verification method is provided, applied to a security authentication module, wherein the node security trust verification method includes:

[0020] In response to an access request from a root of trust to be verified, the signature carried in the access request is verified.

[0021] Upon successful verification, a public key verification request is sent to the security management module. This triggers the security management module to locate the target leaf node corresponding to the trust root to be verified in the Merkle tree based on the identifier of the trust root to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and to generate a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree. The security management module deploys the Merkle tree, and each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a valid trust root data block. Each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root.

[0022] Based on the Merkle verification path, perform layer-by-layer hashing and compare with the baseline Merkle root to simultaneously verify the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf.

[0023] If both the public key and security capability parameters pass the dual verification, the node carrying the root of trust to be verified is determined to be secure and compliant.

[0024] If either the public key or the security capability parameter fails verification, the node carrying the root of trust to be verified is deemed to have a security risk.

[0025] Optionally, it also includes:

[0026] Obtain the control policy constraints sent by the security management module; the control policy constraints include verification rules and security level matching rules;

[0027] Parse the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node and verify their compliance;

[0028] Compare the security levels of the root of trust to be verified with those of the trusted benchmark root of trust;

[0029] In response to the fact that the security level of the root of trust to be verified is lower than the security level of the trusted baseline root of trust, the security management module is triggered to re-encrypt the ciphertext of the business key and / or the encrypted business data to generate ciphertext that is adapted to the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

[0030] Thirdly, a node security trust verification system is provided, including:

[0031] The security authentication module, in response to an access request from a trusted root to be verified, verifies the signature carried in the access request; in response to successful verification, it sends a public key verification request to the security management module.

[0032] The security management module locates the target leaf node corresponding to the trust root to be verified in the Merkle tree based on the identifier of the trust root to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and generates a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree; wherein, the security management module deploys a Merkle tree, and each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a valid trust root data block, and each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root;

[0033] The security authentication module performs layer-by-layer hashing operations based on the Merkle verification path and compares it with the baseline Merkle root, simultaneously verifying the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf. If both the public key and the security capability parameters pass the dual verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is determined to be secure and compliant; if either the public key or the security capability parameters fail the verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is determined to have a security risk.

[0034] Optionally, the security management module may also send control policy constraints to the security authentication module, wherein the control policy constraints include verification rules and security level matching rules;

[0035] The security authentication module parses the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node according to the verification rules and verifies their compliance, and compares the security levels of the root of trust to be verified with the trusted benchmark root of trust according to the security level matching rules.

[0036] In response to the fact that the security level of the root of trust to be verified is lower than the security level of the trusted baseline root of trust, the security authentication module triggers the security management module to perform re-encryption on the ciphertext of the business key and / or the business encrypted data, and generates ciphertext that is adapted to the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

[0037] Fourthly, an electronic device is provided, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and for running on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the node security authorization verification method as described in any one of the first or second aspects.

[0038] Fifthly, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the node security trust verification method as described in any one of the first or second aspects.

[0039] Based on common knowledge in the field, the above-mentioned preferred conditions can be combined arbitrarily to obtain various preferred embodiments of this disclosure.

[0040] The positive advancements of this disclosure are as follows: By deploying a Merkle tree in the security management module, this disclosure encapsulates the public keys and security capability parameters of each hardware trust root into structured leaf node data blocks for evidence storage. This overcomes the shortcomings of traditional device trust verification, which only verifies device signature identity and ignores security capability compliance. During the distributed node trust access phase, this solution relies on the Merkle verification path to complete layer-by-layer hash comparison, simultaneously achieving dual and accurate verification of the legality of the public key of the hardware trust root to be verified and the compliance of its security capability parameters. This effectively intercepts abnormal heterogeneous nodes with substandard security levels and incompatible cryptographic capabilities, completely avoiding the risks of security degradation, trust adaptation failure, and confidential data leakage during cross-vendor and cross-regional heterogeneous device networking collaboration. It ensures that the security protection level of all business data and keys remains constant throughout the entire process. Furthermore, this structured hash evidence storage and path verification method possesses the characteristics of being tamper-proof and traceable, significantly improving the credibility and security of device trust determination in distributed scenarios. Furthermore, this disclosure constructs a unified and standardized root of trust data verification system, breaking down the vendor barriers and closed ecosystem of traditional hardware roots of trust. It completely eliminates the strong dependence of traditional solutions on high-cost hardware security module clusters and dedicated cryptographic resource pools. While ensuring the accuracy of device security verification and the security of the entire network, it effectively reduces the cost of system construction, deployment and operation and maintenance. It takes into account the security, universality and efficiency of distributed heterogeneous device networking, and can perfectly adapt to the dynamic trust and control needs of global distributed services such as satellite Internet and global cloud services. Attached Figure Description

[0041] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the architecture of a distributed application system based on HSM in a cloud computing platform, providing a basis for existing technologies;

[0042] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the architecture of a distributed application system based on a host-level root of trust, provided for existing technologies;

[0043] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of an architecture for a distributed application system based on cloud deployment and host-level root of trust, provided for existing technologies;

[0044] Figure 4 A flowchart of a node security trust verification method provided as an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0045] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of an application scenario architecture for a node security trust verification method provided as an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0046] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of an application scenario architecture for another node security trust verification method provided as an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0047] Figure 7 A flowchart illustrating another node security trust verification method provided as an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0048] Figure 8 A flowchart illustrating another node security trust verification method provided as an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure;

[0049] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided as an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure. Detailed Implementation

[0050] The present disclosure is further illustrated below by way of embodiments, but the present disclosure is not limited to the scope of the embodiments described herein.

[0051] The prefixes such as "first" and "second" used in this disclosure are merely for distinguishing different descriptive objects and do not limit the position, order, priority, quantity, or content of the described objects. The use of ordinal numbers and other prefixes used to distinguish descriptive objects in this disclosure does not constitute a limitation on the described objects. The description of the described objects is given in the claims or the context of the embodiments, and should not be construed as an unnecessary limitation. Furthermore, in the description of this embodiment, unless otherwise stated, "multiple" means two or more.

[0052] In this embodiment of the disclosure, the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, and disclosure of user personal information comply with relevant laws and regulations and do not violate public order and good morals.

[0053] In distributed application systems, encryption of inter-system communication is a crucial means of ensuring secure communication networks, and the key is the foundation of encrypted communication; the security of the key is the decisive factor in evaluating the cryptographic application level. Based on security level requirements and application scenario requirements, key security protection levels, from low to high, can be achieved through: software encryption, Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), motherboard-level hardware root of trust combined with TEE, and Hardware Security Module (HSM).

[0054] In applications with high cryptographic security requirements, such as those requiring CC EAL5 or higher, FIPS 140-3 level 3 or higher, or Commercial Cryptography Assessment Level 3 or higher, HSM is often the only option. If the requirements are CC EAL4+, FIPS 140-3 level 2, or Commercial Cryptography Assessment Level 2, then motherboard-level hardware root of trust is an optional solution that balances security level, usage scenario, and cost.

[0055] The following description will take cloud computing platforms and their applications as an example.

[0056] Method 1: HSM-based solutions, such as Figure 1 As shown.

[0057] This solution is widely used. It manages the HSM cluster through a unified key management service (KMS), calls the HSM's cryptographic operation interface, and provides a unified service interface to various applications. Alternatively, the cloud platform itself can provide a KMS component for upper-layer applications to use. Applications that require cryptographic operation services (such as encrypting and storing confidential data) call the service interface provided by KMS. The main disadvantages of this solution are:

[0058] 1) High construction costs

[0059] HSM clusters, when used in conjunction with KMS management, are typically costly to build. Due to cryptographic security requirements, a hardware-based root of trust must be used to protect the master key. Confidential data from each application is encrypted using a data key generated within the HSM and stored in external storage. Furthermore, to prevent master key loss due to single points of failure, the HSM must be deployed in a high-availability mode or a multi-unit HSM cluster. In the context of global, multi-regional deployments (such as satellite internet ground station facilities), the complexity of regulatory compliance systems often necessitates localized deployment of HSM clusters (or secondary KMS + HSM) in certain countries or regions, further increasing construction costs.

[0060] 2) Difficulty in collaborating with vendors

[0061] In the key hierarchy of HSMs, the top-level root key is the vendor's master key. This master key is pre-installed by each HSM vendor within the HSM's protection area during production. Except in cases of breach, only the original HSM vendor knows this master key. Furthermore, the device-level protection key is derived from this vendor's master key and cannot be decrypted across vendors. Within the same HSM cluster, due to the closed nature of the protection key system, cross-vendor clustering is not possible at the hardware level. At the business level, centralized management via KMS can be used to encourage vendors to support standardized packaging and migration, achieving centralized HSM management. However, this involves considerable implementation work.

[0062] In situations requiring extremely high disaster recovery capabilities, using clusters from the same vendor at the hardware layer, combined with interfacing with heterogeneous cryptographic devices at the business layer, has become a common approach to ensure business continuity (i.e., managing HSM clusters or single machines from ≥2 vendors via KMS).

[0063] Method 2: Based on host-level root of trust, such as Figure 2 As shown.

[0064] The host-level root of trust refers to a type of HSM (such as a PCI-E cryptographic card) deployed on a host. Applications on each host that require cryptographic computation services call the interface provided by the host root of trust. This approach cannot independently build a complete cryptographic system and is typically only used to provide high-performance host-level cryptographic computation, but it cannot independently achieve a closed-loop key management system. This deployment is usually only for hosts hosting applications with high cryptographic computation requirements, and not all hosts will have it installed.

[0065] At the same time, this type of deployment scheme cannot provide a primary / backup or redundancy design at the hardware layer, and must rely on the primary / backup or redundancy deployment of the host (such as...). Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the application calls the interface services of two or more trust roots respectively.

[0066] Furthermore, this type of deployment scheme is only suitable for small-scale, special application password hardening and is not suitable for large-scale distributed deployments or cloud computing deployments, as follows: Figure 3 As shown:

[0067] This solution is not suitable, therefore the cloud platform is marked with a dashed line in the diagram. This solution cannot be adapted for large-scale deployment, mainly for the following reasons:

[0068] 1) Host-level root of trust cannot be directly managed by KMS.

[0069] Host-level root of trust communicates only with processes within the host (e.g., via the PCI-E bus). If managed by KMS, each host application needs a unified interface to interface with KMS, or a unified plugin needs to be deployed on each host.

[0070] 2) Keys are difficult to share between trust roots.

[0071] The design principle of hardware security modules is to ensure that keys are never leaked. However, cross-device migration inevitably involves key movement. In this cloud platform architecture based on host-level roots of trust, the migration of confidential data caused by upper-layer application migration requires multiple encryption and decryption operations between roots of trust, which can have catastrophic consequences in the event of host failure. Therefore, in this architecture, host-level roots of trust still need to maintain a hardware-level primary / backup relationship, or set a threshold using the Shamir secret sharing algorithm (within the threshold value, keys can be recovered from key fragments) to address fault migration and resistance to single points of failure.

[0072] In conclusion, HSM clusters remain the cornerstone of cryptographic services, especially irreplaceable in highly compliant scenarios, but this comes with high hardware investment, high operational costs, and vendor lock-in. Cloud-native cryptographic services (such as modular cryptographic resource pools and elastic HSM subscriptions) can reduce the proportion of investment in cryptographic security, but this is not suitable for privately deployed business scenarios.

[0073] Based on at least one of the above problems, this disclosure provides a node security trust verification method. This method breaks through the closed nature of traditional hardware trust roots and forms a secure linkage storage system that can be cross-platform, cross-vendor, and compatible with multiple forms of trust roots. It breaks vendor lock-in, reduces redundant deployment, and reduces overall construction costs without reducing security levels.

[0074] Before introducing the node security trust verification method of this embodiment, let's first introduce the technical terms involved in this embodiment.

[0075] A root of trust is the smallest trusted base that provides cryptographically verifiable and trusted services within a specific security boundary, based on hardware or hardware security extensions and grounded in physical non-cloning (PUF) and tamper-proof mechanisms. Each root of trust has a unique vendor root key, device encryption key, and public-private key pair generated by the root of trust itself.

[0076] A secure storage environment is a secure environment supported by relevant roots of trust, used to encrypt and store confidential data from applications and ensure its availability. The secure storage environment authenticates applications that access it; only applications with valid authentication parameters (App credentials) can access and use it.

[0077] The security management module manages the roots of trust and applications. The security management module itself should also be equipped with a root of trust (to ensure reliability, the security management module and its root of trust should be deployed with high availability in practice). The security management module generates encryption keys (Encryption_K) and authentication parameters (Credentials) for other roots of trust through its own root of trust, and distributes these parameters to each root of trust. (From an implementation perspective, this can be achieved through encrypted distribution using public keys generated internally by each root of trust, or by the security management module having a built-in private CA that distributes these parameters by establishing internal TLS channels with each root of trust.)

[0078] The security authentication module is used to authenticate whether the root of trust is legitimate and whether each application can access the secure storage environment.

[0079] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating a node security trust verification method provided as an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure. The method is applied to a security management module. The security management module is applied to a node security trust verification system. See [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 5 and Figure 6 In addition to the security management module, the system also includes a security authentication module. The security management module is deployed with a Merkle tree. Each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a legitimate trust root data block, and each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root.

[0080] Traditional Merkle leaf nodes typically only store public key hashes (Hash(PK)). However, in cross-vendor scenarios, such as when a key generated by Vendor A's HSM (high security level) is migrated to Vendor B's TPM (low security level), direct trust will lead to a security degradation; conversely, it will be impossible to decrypt.

[0081] To address the aforementioned issues with heterogeneous mutual trust, this embodiment constructs a "capability fingerprint embedded" Merkle leaf node structure. Security capability parameters characterize the capability fingerprint of the trust root, and may include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following parameters: security level, algorithm suite, vendor identifier, PUF signature, etc. When constructing Merkle leaf data, instead of simply hashing the public key, the security capability parameters of the trust root are bound to the public key to generate leaf nodes. Taking security capability parameters including security level, algorithm suite, vendor identifier, and PUF signature as an example, the leaf node of the i-th trust root... satisfy:

[0082] ;

[0083] in, : The public key corresponding to the i-th trust root;

[0084] : The vendor identifier corresponding to the i-th trust root;

[0085] Quantification of security levels (such as national cryptographic level 2 and 3, FIPS 140-3 Level 2 / 3, etc.);

[0086] Supported algorithm suite identifiers (such as SM2 / SM3 / SM4, ECC / SHA / AES, etc.);

[0087] A device-unique signature generated based on a physically unclonable function, preventing the public key from being copied into a software emulator.

[0088] The following is combined with Figure 4-6 Further explanation is provided regarding the node security trust verification process.

[0089] See Figure 4 The security trust verification method for this node includes the following steps:

[0090] Step 401: In response to the public key verification request sent by the security authentication module after the signature verification of the root of trust to be verified is completed, locate the target leaf node corresponding to the root of trust to be verified in the Merkle tree according to the identifier of the root of trust to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and generate the Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree.

[0091] The target leaf node converges from the bottom layer to the top Merkle root along with all its sibling hash values, and is then concatenated to form a standard Merkle check path.

[0092] Step 402: Send the Merkle verification path to the security authentication module, so that the security authentication module can perform layer-by-layer hashing based on the Merkle verification path and compare it with the baseline Merkle root, and synchronously verify the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf.

[0093] If both the public key and security capability parameters pass the dual verification, the node carrying the root of trust to be verified is deemed to be secure and compliant; if either the public key or the security capability parameters fail the verification, the node carrying the root of trust to be verified is deemed to have a security risk.

[0094] In this embodiment, by collaborating with the security authentication module and using the Merkle tree to structurally store the hardware trust root public key and security capability parameters, the trust access phase achieves dual verification of the public key and security capability parameters, intercepts abnormal heterogeneous nodes, breaks down trust root vendor barriers, eliminates dependence on expensive hardware cryptographic clusters, reduces deployment and maintenance costs, and adapts to distributed business dynamic trust scenarios such as satellite internet and global cloud services.

[0095] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0096] The control policy constraints are sent to the security authentication module. The control policy constraints include verification rules and security level matching rules. The verification rules are used to trigger the security authentication module to parse the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node and verify their compliance. The security level matching rules are used to trigger the security authentication module to compare the security level of the root of trust to be verified with the trusted benchmark root of trust.

[0097] In response to a security level of the root of trust to be verified being lower than that of the trusted baseline root of trust, the business key and / or business encrypted data are re-encrypted to generate ciphertext that matches the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

[0098] In this embodiment, the business key includes upper-layer business-used keys such as business session keys, data encryption keys, key encryption keys, virtual machine instance keys, and business signature keys, which are different from the hardware root key embedded within the trust root hardware. Business encrypted data is ciphertext obtained by encrypting with the business key, such as business ciphertext data, virtual machine image ciphertext, application runtime context ciphertext, and business credential ciphertext. When the security level of the trust root to be verified is insufficient, the business key and / or business encrypted data are re-encrypted to ensure that the cryptographic algorithm and key strength of the ciphertext match the security capability parameters supported by the trust root to be verified, thus preventing high-security-strength ciphertext from being unable to be decrypted or from posing a risk of leakage in a low-security-level trust root environment.

[0099] In this embodiment, when the security management module issues the Merkle verification path, it carries the control policy constraints so that the security authentication module can complete the security verification based on the verification rules and security level matching rules contained in the control policy constraints, and adaptively complete the ciphertext adaptation optimization according to the root of trust security level.

[0100] The following example demonstrates the process of performing security trust verification on nodes by applying the node security trust verification method of this embodiment to a virtual machine migration scenario.

[0101] When migrating virtual machines, the target root of trust not only verifies the hash match of the Merkle check path (proving the public key is valid), but also needs to parse the leaf nodes. and If the security level of the root of trust (root of trust to be verified) of the virtual machine to be migrated is less than the security level of the root of trust (trusted baseline root of trust) of the source virtual machine, the "key re-encryption" process is automatically triggered. The security management module schedules the middleware to perform the conversion, rather than directly rejecting or blindly trusting the device. This embodiment breaks the lock of vendor proprietary protocols at the logical layer, realizes a mutual trust model based on "security capabilities" rather than "vendor brand", and realizes a dynamic trust mechanism based on the actual security capabilities of the device.

[0102] In one embodiment, the Merkle tree includes a meta-Merkle tree and multiple trust subtrees. The trust subtrees are divided according to the deployment geographic location and / or business type of the global trust root. Each trust subtree maintains an independent local baseline Merkle root, and the leaves of the meta-Merkle tree store the local baseline Merkle roots of each trust subtree. Generating a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the Merkle tree root node includes:

[0103] If node security trust verification occurs within the same trust subtree, only a Merkle verification path containing the local Merkle path of the corresponding trust subtree is generated;

[0104] If the node security trust verification is a cross-trust subtree authorization verification, then a Merkle verification path containing the local Merkle path and the meta-Merkle tree path is generated.

[0105] The local Merkle path is determined based on the trust subtree, and the meta-Merkle tree path is determined based on the meta-Merkle tree.

[0106] In this embodiment, by constructing the global trust root in layers and domains, the operational efficiency and disaster recovery capability of the global trust root can be effectively improved, and the problems of low verification efficiency and single point of failure in scenarios such as large-scale cross-domain node credit granting and business migration can be solved.

[0107] For satellite internet and integrated space-ground network scenarios, characterized by globally distributed ground station deployments and dynamic online / offline status of satellite nodes, a traditional single global Merkle tree architecture would trigger a global Merkle root update for any ground station maintenance, satellite node backup, or node access / exit status change. This necessitates network-wide synchronization of verification information, resulting in high verification overhead and low network-wide synchronization efficiency. To address this, this embodiment constructs a dynamic Merkle forest architecture based on trust domain sharding. The global trust domain is divided into multiple independent trust subtrees according to geographical location and service type. Each subtree maintains its own local Merkle root. Simultaneously, a meta-Merkle tree is constructed by the security management module, using the local Merkle roots of each trust subtree as leaf nodes of the meta-Merkle tree. The global trust anchor is stored in the highest-security hardware security module (HSM).

[0108] Based on this architecture, in node migration and trust verification scenarios within the same trust subtree, only the local Merkle path within the subtree needs to be verified, without needing to be aware of changes in the global Merkle tree state; in cross-domain trust and migration scenarios across trust subtrees, only the local Merkle path and the meta Merkle tree path need to be synchronized, which greatly reduces the amount of verification data and reduces the synchronization overhead across the entire network.

[0109] In one embodiment, the global trust anchor of the global trust root is stored using the highest security level HSM. Update operations of the local baseline Merkle root of all trust subtrees and the global Merkle root of the meta-Merkle tree are all linked to the distributed threshold signature mechanism. The global root private key is split into multiple key fragments through Shamir secret sharing and stored in hardware trust roots of different vendors within the same trust domain. The legitimate update of the Merkle root can only be completed after threshold signature aggregation verification. The global trust anchor is determined based on the top-level hash value calculated by the meta-Merkle tree aggregation.

[0110] This embodiment combines the Merkle root update mechanism with distributed threshold signature technology to achieve decentralized global trust root management. Specifically, it can shard the private key based on the Shamir secret sharding scheme and distribute the sharded private key across trust roots from different vendors and nodes within the same trust domain, thus mitigating the risk of single points of failure.

[0111] In this embodiment, based on the aforementioned layered and domain-based Merkle forest architecture and decentralized trust management mechanism, a unified secure storage environment that is cross-domain, cross-vendor, and has no security level loss can be constructed. This environment can provide highly flexible, highly reliable, and dynamically adaptive cryptographic application infrastructure support for operational systems deployed across all domains, such as integrated space-ground networks and global cloud service platforms.

[0112] This disclosure also provides a node security trust verification method, applied to a security authentication module, see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 7 The security trust verification method for this node includes:

[0113] Step 701: In response to the access request of the root of trust to be verified, verify the signature carried in the access request.

[0114] Step 702: In response to successful verification, a public key verification request is sent to the security management module to trigger the security management module to locate the target leaf node corresponding to the trust root to be verified in the Merkle tree based on the identifier of the trust root to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and generate a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree.

[0115] The identified leaves converge from the bottom layer upwards to the top Merkle root, along with all the sibling hash values, forming a standard Merkle check path.

[0116] The security management module deploys a Merkle tree. Each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a legitimate trust root data block, and each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root.

[0117] Step 703: Perform layer-by-layer hashing based on the Merkle verification path and compare it with the baseline Merkle root to synchronously verify the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf.

[0118] Step 704: If both the public key and security capability parameters pass the dual verification, the node carrying the root of trust to be verified is determined to be secure and compliant; if either the public key or the security capability parameter fails the verification, the node carrying the root of trust to be verified is determined to have a security risk.

[0119] In this embodiment, by collaborating with the security management module and using Merkle trees to structurally store the hardware trust root public key and security capability parameters, the trust access phase achieves dual verification of the public key and security capability parameters, intercepts abnormal heterogeneous nodes, breaks down trust root vendor barriers, eliminates dependence on expensive hardware cryptographic clusters, reduces deployment and maintenance costs, and adapts to distributed business dynamic trust scenarios such as satellite internet and global cloud services.

[0120] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0121] Obtain the control policy constraints sent by the security management module; the control policy constraints include verification rules and security level matching rules;

[0122] Parse the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node and verify their compliance;

[0123] Compare the security levels of the root of trust to be verified with those of the trusted baseline root of trust.

[0124] In response to the fact that the security level of the root of trust to be verified is lower than that of the trusted baseline root of trust, the security management module is triggered to re-encrypt the ciphertext of the business key and / or the encrypted business data to generate ciphertext that is adapted to the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

[0125] This embodiment of node security trust verification enables cross-platform secure storage based on hardware trust roots. It improves upon the closed nature and vendor lock-in issues of hardware trust roots by linking and managing trust roots in the same trust domain. It establishes a trust chain (such as through private PKI, public key Merkle tree, dynamic credentials, blockchain, etc.) while maintaining the independence of encryption keys and encryption mechanisms within each trust root. It adapts to various trust roots in a universal way, including but not limited to system-level trust roots (HSM, such as cryptographic machines), host-level trust roots (such as PCI-E cryptographic cards), motherboard-level trust roots (such as TPM, TCM), and CPU instruction-level trust roots (TEE, such as Intel SGX).

[0126] See Figure 5 By linking trust roots within the same trust domain, a "secure enclave" is constructed, i.e., a secure storage environment as shown in the diagram. Confidential data in this environment can only be accessed by the applications that generated it, and can only be encrypted / decrypted by designated trust roots. When application migration occurs across nodes and trust roots, the node security authorization verification method provided in this embodiment can complete the trusted endorsement of cross-device trust relationships. It supports new trust roots in initiating compliant decryption requests to the original trust roots based on verified legitimate trust relationships, and re-adapts and encrypts the migrated confidential data, completing the secure data migration and adaptation across trust roots.

[0127] The trusted relationship across the entire domain is established based on the node security trust verification mechanism. The secure storage environment can be implemented through cloud platform storage resources or run on a physical system. When an application migrates, the security management module can schedule the original trust root to decrypt confidential data (using Encryption_K), and the takeover trust root will then encrypt the confidential data. When a trust root fails or triggers a physical circuit breaker mechanism, the security management module schedules its own mapped trust root, uses the original trust root's decryption key (Encryption_K) to decrypt the confidential data, and then the takeover trust root encrypts the confidential data. During this migration or recovery process, the access control mechanism of the secure storage environment is protected by the security authentication module, allowing only the application to which the confidential data belongs and the trust root mapped to that application to access the data.

[0128] In the above mechanisms, establishing a trust relationship is the most crucial element; see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 8 The node security trust verification method in this embodiment further explains the trust relationship establishment process of each trust root.

[0129] The security management module internally maintains trust root information for all access trust domains and constructs a Merkle tree. Each leaf node of this Merkle tree corresponds to a data block of a legitimate trust root, and the data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the trust root. The security management module uses the signature mechanism of the trust root authentication parameter Credential to complete the legitimacy verification, and uses the trust root private key to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the authentication parameters. Simultaneously, it relies on the Merkle tree architecture to achieve integrity protection and trusted verification of the public key and security capability parameters of the entire domain trust root. This embodiment uses a structured Merkle tree as the core trust benchmark for the trust root public key and security capabilities, combined with the confidentiality protection capability of the authentication parameters, to form a complete node security authorization and verification security barrier. The security management module can store verified and trusted Merkle roots in compliant trust roots as global trust anchors, effectively preventing the benchmark trust data from being tampered with.

[0130] Meanwhile, in the process of responding to the public key verification request of the security authentication module and generating and distributing the Merkle verification path, only the local path information required for verification is pushed, without exposing the complete Merkle tree structure. Under the premise of ensuring the accuracy of dual verification of the legality of the node's public key and the compliance of security capability parameters, the security and confidentiality of the whole domain trust system are further improved.

[0131] The security management module maintains the public keys of all trust roots joined to the trust domain, constructs a Merkle tree, and verifies the legitimacy of the trust roots by combining the signatures of the authentication parameters (Credentials). This mechanism protects the confidentiality and integrity of the authentication parameters through private keys and protects and verifies the integrity of the public keys through the Merkle tree.

[0132] By using the Merkle tree as the public key trust base, and in conjunction with the confidentiality protection of authentication parameters, security capabilities can be fully guaranteed. The security management module can store the Merkle root in the corresponding trust root as a global trust anchor to protect it from being tampered with, and there is no need to expose the complete tree when returning the Merkle path.

[0133] Corresponding to the aforementioned embodiments of the node security authorization verification method, this disclosure also provides embodiments of the node security authorization verification system.

[0134] This disclosure provides a node security trust verification system, comprising:

[0135] The security authentication module, in response to an access request from a trusted root to be verified, verifies the signature carried in the access request; in response to successful verification, it sends a public key verification request to the security management module.

[0136] The security management module locates the target leaf node corresponding to the trust root to be verified in the Merkle tree based on the identifier of the trust root to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and generates a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree; wherein, the security management module deploys a Merkle tree, and each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a valid trust root data block, and each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root;

[0137] The security authentication module performs layer-by-layer hashing operations based on the Merkle verification path and compares it with the baseline Merkle root, simultaneously verifying the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf. If both the public key and the security capability parameters pass the dual verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is determined to be secure and compliant; if either the public key or the security capability parameters fail the verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is determined to have a security risk.

[0138] In one embodiment, the security management module also sends control policy constraints to the security authentication module, the control policy constraints including verification rules and security level matching rules;

[0139] The security authentication module parses the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node according to the verification rules and verifies their compliance, and compares the security levels of the root of trust to be verified with the trusted benchmark root of trust according to the security level matching rules.

[0140] In response to the fact that the security level of the root of trust to be verified is lower than the security level of the trusted baseline root of trust, the security authentication module triggers the security management module to perform re-encryption on the ciphertext of the business key and / or the business encrypted data, and generates ciphertext that is adapted to the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

[0141] The specific working mechanisms of the security management module and the security authentication module can be found in the above method implementation examples, and will not be repeated here.

[0142] For the system embodiments, since they basically correspond to the method embodiments, the relevant parts can be referred to in the description of the method embodiments. The system embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this disclosure according to actual needs.

[0143] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an example embodiment of the present disclosure. The electronic device includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and used to run on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the node security authorization verification method described in any of the above embodiments. Figure 9 The electronic device 90 shown is merely an example and should not impose any limitation on the functionality and scope of use of the embodiments disclosed herein.

[0144] like Figure 9 As shown, the electronic device 90 can be manifested as a general-purpose computing device, such as a server device. The components of the electronic device 90 may include, but are not limited to: at least one processor 91, at least one memory 92, and a bus 93 connecting different system components (including memory 92 and processor 91).

[0145] Bus 93 includes a data bus, an address bus, and a control bus.

[0146] The memory 92 may include volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM) 921 and / or cache memory 922, and may further include read-only memory (ROM) 923.

[0147] The memory 92 may also include a program tool 925 (or utility) having a set (at least one) program module 924, such program module 924 including but not limited to: an operating system, one or more application programs, other program modules, and program data, each or some combination of these examples may include an implementation of a network environment.

[0148] The processor 91 executes various functional applications and data processing by running computer programs stored in the memory 92, such as the node security trust verification method provided in any of the above embodiments.

[0149] Electronic device 90 can also communicate with one or more external devices 94 (e.g., keyboard, pointing device, etc.). This communication can be performed through input / output (I / O) interface 95. Furthermore, electronic device 90 can also communicate with one or more networks (e.g., local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), and / or public network, such as the Internet) via network adapter 96. As shown, network adapter 96 communicates with other modules of electronic device 90 via bus 93. It should be understood that, although not shown in the figure, other hardware and / or software modules can be used in conjunction with electronic device 90, including but not limited to: microcode, device drivers, redundant processors, external disk drive arrays, RAID (disk array) systems, tape drives, and data backup storage systems.

[0150] It should be noted that although several units / modules or sub-units / modules of the electronic device have been mentioned in the detailed description above, this division is merely exemplary and not mandatory. In fact, according to embodiments of this disclosure, the features and functions of two or more units / modules described above can be embodied in one unit / module. Conversely, the features and functions of one unit / module described above can be further divided and embodied by multiple units / modules.

[0151] This disclosure also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the node security trust verification method provided in any of the above embodiments.

[0152] The readable storage medium may be more specifically adopted, including but not limited to: portable disk, hard disk, random access memory, read-only memory, erasable programmable read-only memory, optical storage device, magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof.

[0153] This disclosure also provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the node security trust verification method described in any of the above embodiments.

[0154] The program code for executing the computer program product of this disclosure can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, and the program code can be executed entirely on a user device, partially on a user device, as a stand-alone software package, partially on a user device and partially on a remote device, or entirely on a remote device.

[0155] While specific embodiments of this disclosure have been described above, those skilled in the art should understand that these are merely illustrative examples, and the scope of protection of this disclosure is defined by the appended claims. Those skilled in the art can make various changes or modifications to these embodiments without departing from the principles and essence of this disclosure, but all such changes and modifications fall within the scope of protection of this disclosure.

Claims

1. A method for node security attestation, the method comprising: It is applied to the security management module; the security management module is deployed with a Merkle tree, each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a legitimate trust root data block, and each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root; The node security trust verification method includes: In response to the public key verification request sent by the security authentication module after the signature verification of the root of trust to be verified is completed, the target leaf node corresponding to the root of trust to be verified is located in the Merkle tree according to the identifier of the root of trust to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree is generated. The Merkle verification path is sent to the security authentication module, which performs layer-by-layer hashing based on the Merkle verification path and compares it with the baseline Merkle root. Simultaneously, it verifies the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf. If both the public key and security capability parameters pass verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is deemed secure and compliant. If either the public key or the security capability parameter fails verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is deemed to have a security risk.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, Also includes: The control policy constraints are sent to the security authentication module. The control policy constraints include verification rules and security level matching rules. The verification rules are used to trigger the security authentication module to parse the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node and verify their compliance. The security level matching rule is used to trigger the security authentication module to compare the security level of the root of trust to be verified with the trusted benchmark root of trust. In response to the fact that the security level of the root of trust to be verified is lower than the security level of the trusted baseline root of trust, the business key and / or business encrypted data are re-encrypted to generate ciphertext that adapts to the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The Merkle tree includes a meta-Merkle tree and multiple trust subtrees; the trust subtrees are divided according to the deployment geographical location and / or business type of the global trust root, and each trust subtree maintains an independent local baseline Merkle root. The leaves of the meta-Merkle tree store the local baseline Merkle roots of each trust subtree. Generate the Merkle check path from the target leaf node to the Merkle tree root node, including: If node security trust verification occurs within the same trust subtree, only a Merkle verification path containing the local Merkle path of the corresponding trust subtree is generated; If the node security trust verification is a cross-trust subtree authorization verification, then the Merkle verification path containing the local Merkle path and the meta-Merkle tree path is generated; The local Merkle path is determined based on the trust subtree, and the meta-Merkle tree path is determined based on the meta-Merkle tree.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The global trust anchor of the global trust root is stored using the highest security level HSM. Update operations of the local baseline Merkle root of all trust subtrees and the global Merkle root of the meta-Merkle tree are all linked to the distributed threshold signature mechanism. The global root private key is split into multiple key fragments through Shamir secret sharing and stored in hardware trust roots of different vendors within the same trust domain. The Merkle root can only be legally updated after threshold signature aggregation verification. The global trust anchor is determined based on the top-level hash value calculated by the meta-Merkle tree aggregation.

5. A method for node security attestation, the method comprising: The node security trust verification method, applied to the security authentication module, includes: In response to an access request from a root of trust to be verified, the signature carried in the access request is verified. Upon successful verification, a public key verification request is sent to the security management module. This triggers the security management module to locate the target leaf node corresponding to the trust root to be verified in the Merkle tree based on the identifier of the trust root to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and to generate a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree. The security management module deploys the Merkle tree, and each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a valid trust root data block. Each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding trust root. Based on the Merkle verification path, perform layer-by-layer hashing and compare with the baseline Merkle root to simultaneously verify the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf. If both the public key and security capability parameters pass the dual verification, the node carrying the root of trust to be verified is determined to be secure and compliant. If either the public key or the security capability parameter fails verification, the node carrying the root of trust to be verified is deemed to have a security risk.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein, Also includes: Obtain the control policy constraints sent by the security management module; the control policy constraints include verification rules and security level matching rules; Parse the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node and verify their compliance; Compare the security levels of the root of trust to be verified with those of the trusted benchmark root of trust; In response to the fact that the security level of the root of trust to be verified is lower than the security level of the trusted baseline root of trust, the security management module is triggered to re-encrypt the ciphertext of the business key and / or the encrypted business data to generate ciphertext that is adapted to the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

7. A node security attestation system, comprising: include: The security authentication module, in response to an access request from a root of trust to be verified, verifies the signature carried in the access request. Upon successful verification, a public key verification request is sent to the security management module. The security management module locates the target leaf node corresponding to the root of trust to be verified in the Merkle tree based on the identifier of the root of trust to be verified carried in the public key verification request, and generates a Merkle verification path from the target leaf node to the root node of the Merkle tree; wherein, the security management module deploys a Merkle tree, and each leaf node of the Merkle tree corresponds to a valid root of trust data block, and each data block contains the public key and security capability parameters of the corresponding root of trust; The security authentication module performs layer-by-layer hashing operations based on the Merkle verification path and compares it with the baseline Merkle root, simultaneously verifying the legality of the public key and the compliance of the security capability parameters of the trust root to be verified stored in the target leaf. If both the public key and the security capability parameters pass the dual verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is determined to be secure and compliant; if either the public key or the security capability parameters fail the verification, the node carrying the trust root to be verified is determined to have a security risk.

8. The node security attestation system of claim 7, wherein, The security management module also sends the control policy constraints to the security authentication module, and the control policy constraints include verification rules and security level matching rules; The security authentication module parses the security capability parameters stored in the target leaf node according to the verification rules and verifies their compliance, and compares the security levels of the root of trust to be verified with the trusted benchmark root of trust according to the security level matching rules. In response to the fact that the security level of the root of trust to be verified is lower than the security level of the trusted baseline root of trust, the security authentication module triggers the security management module to perform re-encryption on the ciphertext of the business key and / or the business encrypted data, and generates ciphertext that is adapted to the security capability parameters of the root of trust to be verified.

9. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory for running on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the node security trust verification method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the node security trust verification method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.