Key distribution between Open Fronthaul (OFH) Media Access Control Security (MACsec) endpoints

By configuring MACsec parameters and generating SAK and KEK at the O-RU controller, and combining them with the NETCONF protocol, the challenges of key management and distribution in the O-RAN architecture are solved, security protection of the OFH interface is achieved, and the cost and performance impact of MACsec are reduced.

CN123125832APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17RAKUTEN SYMPHONY INC
View PDF 1 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202580027592.2
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2024-06-10
Filing Date
2025-03-10
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture, existing technologies lack effective key management and distribution mechanisms to protect the Layer 2 security of the OFH interface, especially the IEEE 1588-2019 Authentication Type Length Value (TLV) of the Synchronization Plane (S-plane). Meanwhile, the implementation of MACsec is costly, has impacts on topology and protocol performance, and presents deployment challenges.

Method used

By configuring MACsec configuration parameters at the O-RU controller, a security authentication key (SAK) and a key encryption key (KEK) are generated, and the NETCONF protocol is used for key management and distribution to ensure secure communication between the O-RU and O-DU.

Benefits of technology

It achieves security protection for the OFH interface, preventing eavesdropping, denial of service, and tampering, while reducing the cost and performance impact of MACsec implementation and adapting to different topologies and protocols.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN123125832A_ABST
    Figure CN123125832A_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

A method (400) is disclosed. The method includes: establishing (402) a session with an O-RU at an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU Controller). In response to the establishment of the session, the method includes: configuring (404) one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters for the O-RU at the O-RU Controller. The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key. The method further includes: at the O-RU Controller, using a random number generator, generating (406) at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key. Furthermore, the method includes: sending (408) at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, and at least one of the SAK and KEK, from the O-RU Controller to the O-RU.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Cross-reference to related applications

[0001] This application claims priority to Indian provisional application 202411044763, filed on June 10, 2024; and Indian non-provisional application 202411044763, filed on December 26, 2024, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0002] This disclosure relates to key distribution between Open Fronthaul (OFH) Media Access Control Security (MACsec) endpoints. Background Technology

[0003] The information disclosed in this Background section is intended only to enhance the understanding of the general background of this disclosure and should not be construed as an admission or in any way implying that the information constitutes prior art known to those skilled in the art.

[0004] In the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture, the Open Fronthaul (OFH) interface connects the O-RAN Distributed Unit (O-DU) of the radio baseband to the O-RAN Radio Unit (O-RU). The OFH interface constitutes the control plane, user plane, and synchronization plane (collectively referred to as the CUS plane) via the Evolved Common Public Radio Interface (eCPRI). The OFH interface may also include a management plane (M plane) for message exchange between the O-DU and O-RU via Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Fronthaul services between the O-RU and O-DU are directly encapsulated over Ethernet, thus exposing the O-RAN fronthaul services to Layer 2 threats and vulnerabilities. This seriously threatens the operation of the O-RAN. Therefore, it is essential to have (multiple) Layer 2 security mechanisms to protect the fronthaul services.

[0005] Currently, there is no protection for the OFH interface used in the CUS plane at Layer 2. Media Access Control Security (MACsec) has been discussed in the O-RAN standard for some time as a solution for protecting some Layer 2 services in OFH. MACsec is a Layer 2 security protocol that provides data confidentiality, frame data integrity, and data origin authenticity. For example, MACsec ensures that data transmitted over Ethernet is protected from eavesdropping, denial-of-service, passive monitoring, and tampering. However, due to implementation and deployment challenges, MACsec as a security solution for Precision Time Protocol (PTP) messages may not be recommended for fronthaul networks. For example, end-to-end tunnel mode MACsec does not have a defined standardized key management and distribution scheme.

[0006] Therefore, another important security mechanism to consider is the IEEE 1588-2019 Authentication Type Length Value (TLV) for protecting the S-plane. However, even with such a security mechanism, key management and distribution are considered important aspects. Summary of the Invention

[0007] This summary is provided to introduce a series of concepts in a simplified format, which will be further described in the specific embodiments of this disclosure. This summary is not intended to identify key or fundamental inventive concepts of the invention, nor is it intended to define the scope of this disclosure.

[0008] This document discloses an apparatus configured to establish a session with an O-RU at an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU Controller). In response to the establishment of the session, the apparatus is configured to configure one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters for the O-RU at the O-RU Controller. The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key. The apparatus is also configured to generate, at the O-RU Controller, at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key, using a random number generator. Furthermore, the apparatus is configured to send at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, along with at least one of the SAK and KEK, from the O-RU Controller to the O-RU.

[0009] This document discloses a method. The method includes establishing a session between an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU controller) and an O-RU. In response to establishing the session, the method includes configuring one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters for the O-RU by the O-RU controller. The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key. The method also includes generating at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key using a random number generator by the O-RU controller. Furthermore, the method includes sending at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, along with at least one of the SAK and KEK, to the O-RU by the O-RU controller.

[0010] This document discloses a non-transient computer-readable medium storing instructions. The instructions include one or more instructions executed by an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU Controller). The O-RU Controller includes one or more processors. The one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to establish a session with the O-RU. In response to the establishment of the session, the one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to configure one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters for the O-RU. The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key. The one or more instructions also cause the one or more processors to use a random number generator to generate at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key. Furthermore, the one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to send at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, and at least one of the SAK and KEK, to the O-RU.

[0011] To further illustrate the advantages and features of this disclosure, a more specific description will be given with reference to the specific embodiments shown in the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that these drawings depict only typical embodiments of this disclosure and are therefore not intended to limit its scope. This disclosure will be described and explained with additional specificity and detail in the accompanying drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0012] The features, aspects, and advantages of embodiments of the present disclosure will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein like reference numerals denote like elements, and in the drawings: Figure 1 The illustration shows components of an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture according to an embodiment of the present disclosure; Figure 2a , Figure 2b and Figure 2c A signal flow diagram is depicted relating to the operation of establishing an end-to-end Media Access Control Security (MACsec) tunnel between an O-RAN Radio Unit (O-RU) and an O-RAN Distributed Unit (O-DU) according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure; Figure 3a , Figure 3b and Figure 3c A signaling flow diagram is depicted, according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure, relating to key management and distribution between O-RU and O-DU for IEEE 1588-2019 Authentication Type-Length-Value (TLV); Figure 4 The illustration shows a flowchart depicting a method for key distribution between Open Fronthaul (OFH) MACsec endpoints according to embodiments of the present disclosure; and Figure 5 An embodiment of the device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is illustrated. Detailed Implementation

[0013] The following detailed description of exemplary embodiments is with reference to the accompanying drawings. This disclosure provides illustrations and descriptions, but is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit implementation to the precise forms disclosed. Modifications and variations are possible according to this disclosure, or may be obtained from the practice of implementation. Furthermore, one or more features or components of one embodiment may be incorporated into or combined with another embodiment (or one or more features of another embodiment). Additionally, the flowcharts and operational descriptions provided below relate to at least one embodiment of the embodiments in this disclosure. It should be noted that other embodiments may be made that do not perfectly match the flowcharts and their descriptions. It should be understood that in other embodiments, one or more operations may be omitted, one or more operations may be added, and one or more operations may be performed (at least partially) simultaneously.

[0014] It is evident that the systems and / or methods described herein can be implemented in various forms of hardware, software, or combinations of hardware and software. The actual dedicated control hardware or software code used to implement these systems and / or methods should not limit their implementation. Therefore, the operation and behavior of the systems and / or methods are described herein without reference to specific software code. It should be understood that software and hardware can be designed to implement the system and / or method based on the description herein.

[0015] Even if specific combinations of features are listed in the claims and / or disclosed in the specification, these specific combinations are not intended to limit the disclosure of implementation. In fact, many of these features can be combined in ways not specifically listed in the claims and / or not disclosed in the specification. Even if a dependent claim directly depends on only one claim, this disclosure may indicate that a dependent claim depends on other claims in the claim set.

[0016] Unless explicitly stated otherwise, no element, action, or instruction used herein should be construed as critical or necessary. Furthermore, as used herein, the articles “a” and “one” (in other words, nouns not mentioned in plural form) are intended to include one or more items and may be used interchangeably with “one or more”. Additionally, as used herein, the terms “have,” “possess,” “contain,” “include,” “include,” etc., are intended to be open-ended terms. Furthermore, unless explicitly stated otherwise, the phrase “based on” is intended to mean “at least partially based on.” Furthermore, expressions such as “at least one of [A] and [B],” “[A] and / or [B],” or “at least one of [A] or [B]” should be understood to include only A, only B, or both A and B.

[0017] The Open Fronthaul (OFH) interface has high requirements for latency, time, delay, and performance. Due to these factors, implementing Media Access Control Security (MACsec) for encryption of the Synchronization Plane (S-plane) (which requires hop-by-hop encryption) may be considered impractical in some scenarios. Instead, in some scenarios, the IEEE 1588-2019 Authentication Type, Length, and Value (TLV) can be recommended for protecting S-plane Precision Time Protocol (PTP) messages. Therefore, effective key management and distribution are crucial for securing S-plane PTP messages. However, one of the main challenges in protecting the S-plane is the lack of a usable key distribution mechanism for establishing a IEEE 1588 Authentication TLV security mechanism, which is neither available nor discussed in the standard.

[0018] MACsec is considered a potential security solution for OFH interfaces. However, implementing MACsec may present at least three challenges: all OFH network elements would have to be MACsec-aware, which is not a cost-effective solution; the impact of MACsec on the performance of different OFH topologies and protocols; and the deployment and implementation challenges of using MACsec to protect the S-plane.

[0019] Therefore, an important security mechanism is needed (in addition to or as an alternative to MACsec), namely the IEEE 1588-2019 certified TLV mechanism for protecting the S-plane. Furthermore, key management and distribution are also considered important aspects of the security mechanism.

[0020] Therefore, the use of MACsec is needed to protect fronthaul traffic transmitted over Ethernet networks from at least: eavesdropping, denial-of-service, passive monitoring, and tampering, while overcoming at least two of the aforementioned challenges associated with the use of MACsec. Furthermore, in addition to or as an alternative to the aforementioned needs, the use of IEEE 1588-2019 certified TLVs is needed to protect the S-plane, while overcoming challenges (due to latency, time, delay, and performance issues that may be associated with the implementation of MACsec used for encrypting the S-plane), as described above.

[0021] This disclosure relates to key distribution between Open Fronthaul (OFH) MACsec endpoints. Specifically, this disclosure introduces the configuration and enabling of MACsec, and key management for OFH network elements of Open Random Access Network (O-RAN) Distributed Units (O-DUs) and O-RAN Radio Units (O-RUs) that use the Management Device (M-plane) Network Configuration (NETCONF) protocol to configure and pre-share keys. This disclosure also provides the generation of Security Associated Keys (SAKs) and the sharing of SAKs from the NETCONF controller to the OFH network elements.

[0022] Figure 1 The illustration shows components of an O-RAN architecture 100 according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure. Figure 1 As shown, the O-RAN architecture 100 may include a cell site 102, which may further include one or more antennas 102-2 and one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8. The O-RAN architecture 100 may also include a core network (CN) 104, which may further include O-DUs 104-2, one or more Operation and Control Unit (O-CU-CP) control planes 104-4, and one or more Operation and Control Unit (O-CU-UP) user planes 104-6. The O-RAN architecture 100 may also include an Open RAN Intelligent Controller (O-RIC) 106, which may further include a near real-time RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC) 106-4 (near RT-RIC 106-4) and a non-near real-time RIC 106-2 (non-RT-RIC 106-2). Additionally, the O-RAN architecture 100 may include a mobile backhaul network 108. O-RAN is considered to revolutionize next-generation mobile networks by decomposing the proprietary components of traditional RAN through hardware-software deconvergence and by further enabling a vendor-neutral, interoperable ecosystem through open interfaces. It should be understood that O-RAN, including its architecture and key technologies, is fundamental to the wireless network field. An overview of O-RAN is provided below. Furthermore, key enabling technologies in O-RAN are discussed below. O-RAN has the potential to provide multi-vendor interoperability, cost / time-efficient RAN deployment, and the intelligence to enable big data. However, traditional RANs are far from open. Traditional RANs consist of proprietary hardware and software offered by only a few vendors, serving as a highly integrated solution with limited interoperability. This solution severely hinders the evolution of mobile networks in the following ways: Supplier lock-in enables an open, multi-vendor ecosystem and further hinders innovation and new business opportunities. • Inefficient, primarily manual, reconfigurability to accommodate a wide range of business applications, from bandwidth-intensive video games to low-data-rate Internet of Things (IoT) communications, and • The limited controllability of different network components means they cannot be managed and optimized in a managed manner. To address these issues, a shift towards O-RAN has been observed. The O-RAN architecture deconverges hardware and software, hosts virtualized network functions in the cloud, and connects network components via open, interoperable interfaces across different vendors. O-RAN also enables the integration of big data and artificial intelligence (AI) / machine learning (ML) for the automation and intelligent control of the RAN. Compared to traditional RAN, O-RAN significantly improves the scalability of RAN deployments and reduces capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating expenditure (OPEX).

[0023] The implementation of O-RAN faces several challenges, including standardization, real-world performance verification, and potential threats. However, the rapid growth in the volume and variety of mobile services has led to a technological trend that makes RAN increasingly open and intelligent.

[0024] O-RAN was proposed based on two fundamental pillars: further de-aggregation and openness. Figure 1 An embodiment of an O-RAN architecture 100 according to one or more embodiments of this disclosure is illustrated. De-aggregation between hardware and software enables the design, expansion, and configuration of different functions via commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software-defined technologies. Open interfaces further eliminate vendor lock-in by allowing multi-vendor RAN deployments.

[0025] In addition, key enabling technologies for O-RAN include depolymerization, O-RIC 106, and open interfaces.

[0026] Regarding de-aggregation, such as Figure 1The O-RAN architecture 100 presented herein decomposes the base station (BS) into three main building blocks: one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8, an O-DU 104-2, and O-CU-CP 104-4 and O-CU-CP 104-6 (which can also be collectively referred to as O-CU 104-4 and 104-6). In a conventional RAN, the baseband unit (BBU) function is split into DU and CU, while the remote radio headend (RRH) function is primarily handled by the RU. In the O-RAN context, the RU, DU, and CU become O-RU, O-DU, and O-CU, respectively. One or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 are used for radio frequency (RF) signal transmission and reception, amplification, analog-to-digital conversion, and beamforming at the physical (PHY) layer. One or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 are deployed near or integrated into antenna(s) 102-2. O-DU 104-2 handles the remaining PHY, Media Access Control (MAC), and Radio Link Control (RLC) layers, as their operation is closely synchronized. O-DU 104-2 is typically physically located near one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8, and the operation of one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 is controlled by one or more O-CUs 104-4 and 104-6. One or more O-CUs 104-4 and 104-6 in the O-RAN are further subdivided into logical elements for the Control Plane (CP) and User Plane (UP), respectively, enabling separate deployment on different hardware platforms. One or more O-CUs 104-4 and 104-6 operate higher layers, including the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, the Serving Data Adaptation Protocol (SDAP) layer, and the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer. One or more O-CUs 104-4 and 104-6 are located in or near CN 104.

[0027] Furthermore, one or more O-RIC 106s are another key component in the O-RAN architecture 100. The O-RIC 106 is a software-defined component capable of orchestrating and optimizing O-RAN functions using closed-loop control. The functionality of the O-RIC 106 can be implemented through Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs) and Software-Defined Networking (SDN), where the former creates a cloud environment and software application infrastructure for the O-RIC 106, and the latter allows for applications used for network management.

[0028] According to the O-RAN concept, O-RIC 106 can be either a non-RT RIC 106-2 or a near-RT RIC 106-4. Non-RT RIC 106-2 orchestrates events with an operational scale longer than 1 second, while near-RT RIC 106-4 typically takes 10 milliseconds to 1 second to complete optimized actions.

[0029] Furthermore, the open interface for the RAN is not new. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has standardized two interfaces: the air interface and the S1 interface. In addition to the open interface, 3GPP also defines the X2 interface as an optional interface to support information exchange between two or more BSs. However, the X2 interface is not open and has not yet been widely implemented.

[0030] While two open interfaces exist, they are insufficient to enable O-RAN. First, the interface between O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 and O-DU 104-2 (referred to as the fronthaul) heavily relies on the Common Public Radio Interface (CPRI) protocol. The CPRI protocol is typically vendor-specific and therefore not necessarily open. Therefore, the fronthaul used for O-RAN development requires an open interface. Second, the O-RAN architecture splits the virtualized BBU into one or more O-CUs 104-4 and 104-6, and an O-DU 104-2. Therefore, a similar requirement for an open interface applies to O-CU and O-DU connections.

[0031] As mentioned above, Open RAN introduces both flexibility and complexity. However, potential attacks on different components of O-RAN (e.g., open software and interfaces) at multiple layers need to be considered. For example, threats may exist against the open cloud, open-source code, and the entire system and physical infrastructure. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the key security objectives at each layer (especially Layer 2) and to standardize corresponding security policies for potential threats. This disclosure provides a mechanism for standardizing security policies against potential threats at Layer 2.

[0032] Figure 2a , Figure 2b and Figure 2c A signal flow diagram 200 depicts the operation related to establishing an end-to-end MACsec tunnel between one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 and O-DU 104-2, according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure. Specifically, Figure 2a , Figure 2b and Figure 2cThis document introduces the configuration and enabling of MACsec, as well as key management, M-plane network configuration (NETCONF), and pre-shared keys for O-DU 104-2 and one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 OFH network elements. Furthermore, O-RIC (e.g., a NETCONF controller) 106 can generate SAKs and share SAKs with the OFH network elements. In this method, the following paragraphs describe a sequence flow diagram 200 related to the operation of establishing an end-to-end MACsec tunnel between one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 and O-DU 104-2. Sequence flow diagram 200 can illustrate the sequence of operations between O-RU 202, O-RU controller 204, and Carrier Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Authority (CA) 206. O-RU 202 may correspond to one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6 and 102-8, and O-RU controller 204 may correspond to O-DU 104-2 and / or O-RIC 106 (including non-RT RIC 106-2 and near-RT RIC 106-4).

[0033] At step S208, in one or more embodiments, O-RU 202 searches for factory-pre-supplied supplier X.509 certificates with MAC addresses and stores them in the extension.

[0034] At step S210, the O-RU 202 can be "powered on" using one or more techniques known in the art. Next, at step S212, the O-RU 202 can successfully authenticate using the IEEE 802.1x standard. For example, when "powered on," the O-RU 202 (which supports IEEE 802.1x) can perform Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) authentication using a valid carrier-signed certificate. An O-RU 202 without a valid carrier-signed certificate can use a manufacturer-installed certificate for EAP-TLS authentication.

[0035] In the event of EAP-TLS authentication failure, O-RU 202 can block service for unsuccessful IEEE 802.1x operation at step S214. Optionally, at step S216, O-RU 202 can register and install the operator certificate at the operator PKI CA 206. Then, at step S218, O-RU 202 can reinitialize and perform a restart procedure (by jumping to step S210).

[0036] Furthermore, through steps S220-S230, O-RU 202 can call home and begin registration with O-RU controller 204 (e.g., NETCONF controller). Specifically, at step S220, a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) session can be established as part of the NETCONF call home registration process. Additionally, at step S222, a TLS session can be established using an operator certificate (e.g., an operator-signed X.509 certificate). Furthermore, at step S224, one or more NETCONF sessions can be established. Additionally, at step S226, the configuration and software management of O-RU 202 can be implemented by O-RU controller (e.g., NETCONF / TLS server) 204. For example, as part of the configuration and software management process, O-RU controller (e.g., NETCONF controller) 204 can enable MACsec on O-RU 202 and configure a pre-shared key (e.g., a pre-shared root key) including the Connection Association Key Name (CKN) and its own Connection Association Key (CAK). This is the first step in establishing a secure MACsec link between two OFH network elements. Next, at step S228, the MACsec configuration may require one or more parameters, such as MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) + MACsec, O-RU MAC address, pre-shared key, key priority, CKN, key server priority [configured to 0], Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) (e.g., SCI association number), Membership Identifier (MI), and key number. One or more MACsec configuration parameters are generated or obtained by the O-RU controller 204. Furthermore, MKA + MACsec is enabled using an IEEE 802.1x type yang configuration, where the peer MAC address is defined to ensure that packets are tunneled through the network environment to reach the destination peer, in this case, O-RU 202.

[0037] In addition, at step S230, the O-RU controller 204 may supply one or more MACsec configuration parameters to the O-RU 202.

[0038] Furthermore, through steps S232-S240, the generation of the SAK can be performed at O-DU 104-2 (i.e., O-RU controller 204) using the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)-NETCONF-KEYSTORE model. Moreover, the IETF-NETCONF-KEYSTORE model can be used as a centralized keystore mechanism for key generation and configuration. The IETF-NETCONF-KEYSTORE model supports various types of keys (e.g., Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)); and certificates (e.g., X.509). The centralized keystore mechanism allows for the import and export of keys and certificates to facilitate interoperability and secure key distribution. For example, at step S232, O-RU controller 204 can use a keystore container to configure symmetric or asymmetric keys for SAK generation. In one embodiment, an additional key encryption key (KEK) is also derived from an existing CAK. Furthermore, at step S234, the O-RU controller 204 can generate a SAK using strong random number generation (RNG) and store the generated SAK in a keystore container encrypted with a KEK. The encryption key in the configuration of the NETCONF keystore (Article 4) allows the generation of encryption keys (e.g., KEK) that can be used to protect the SAK. The root keys configured through the O-RU controller 204 and the keystore container enable (multiple) other security mechanisms to use (multiple) root keys for new key derivation or for encryption.

[0039] Furthermore, step S236 involves security considerations. Specifically, the SAK can be securely distributed from O-DU 104-2 to O-RU 202, and both O-DU 104-2 and O-RU 202 have been successfully authenticated using IEEE 802.1x and a NETCONF active session has been established. Additionally, the key in the keystore container is encrypted during the transmission of the fronthaul service. Furthermore, at step S238, O-DU 104-2 can supply the SAK at O-RU 202 using the NETCONF secure channel. Furthermore, at step S240, according to IEEE 802.1AE, an end-to-end MACsec tunnel is established between O-DU 104-2 and O-RU 202, wherein the key supplied by the O-RU controller (NETCONF controller) 204 provides encryption for messages between O-DU 104-2 and O-RU 202.

[0040] In one or more embodiments, MKA can use the Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (EAPoL) as the transport protocol for sending MKA messages. By default, EAPoL uses the destination multicast MAC address: 01:80:c2:00:00:03 to multicast packets to multiple destinations. EAPoL is a standards-based protocol, and other authentication mechanisms such as IEEE 802.1X also use the same protocol. Devices in the service provider cloud can consume this packet (based on the destination multicast MAC address), attempt to process the EAPoL packet, and ultimately discard the packet. This causes the MKA session to fail. Furthermore, this method is not applicable to the end-to-end tunneling mode concept. Changing the destination MAC address of EAPoL packets sent to the service provider on the interface using the EAPoL destination address command ensures that the service provider tunnels the packets like any other packet, rather than consuming them. This ensures that the packets are not discarded.

[0041] Some of the technical advantages provided in this disclosure are: • The transmission network elements do not require MACsec capability or awareness, and CUS plane and M plane messages are encrypted. Furthermore, the key management solution in this case is secure and does not rely on the MACsec key negotiation protocol defined in IEEE 802.1x for enabling MACsec in peer-to-peer scenarios. Furthermore, using the same key management process, (multiple) root keys can be used to derive keys for (multiple) other security mechanisms.

[0042] One variation of this disclosure that can work in different scenarios or use cases is that an O-RIC 106, which can be a Service Management Operation (SMO) or an O-DU 104-2, can act as an entity supplying MACsec configuration parameters for the O-DU 104-2 and one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8. In a hybrid operating mode, one (or both) of the SMO or O-DU 104-2 can provide different MACsec configuration parameters.

[0043] Figure 3a , Figure 3b and Figure 3c A signal flow diagram 300 depicts key management and distribution related to one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 and an O-DU 104-2 for IEEE 1588-2019 certified TLV, according to one or more embodiments of this disclosure. Specifically, by means of... Figure 3a , Figure 3b and Figure 3cThe key management and distribution between one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 and O-DU 104-2 is illustrated as follows: Figure 2a , Figure 2b and Figure 2c Another variation of key management and distribution between one or more O-RU 102-4, 102-6 and 102-8 and O-DU 104-2. Figure 3a , Figure 3b and Figure 3c This involves configuring the root key via the IETF-NETCONF keystore and allowing one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8, as well as O-DU 104-2, to derive the SAK via the Key Derivation Function (KDF). In this scenario, the KDF function can reside at one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 and / or O-DU 104-2.

[0044] Furthermore, the root key or pre-shared key transmitted through this mechanism can be used for key management and distribution in solutions such as IEEE 1588-2019 certified TLV. Figure 3a , Figure 3b and Figure 3c This document introduces the configuration and enabling of the IEEE 1588-2019 certified TLV, as well as key management, M-plane network configuration (Netconf) configuration, and pre-shared keys for the O-DU 104-2 and one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 OFH network elements. Furthermore, the O-RIC (e.g., a NETCONF controller) 106 can generate SAKs and can share SAKs with the OFH network elements. In this method, the following paragraphs describe a signal flow diagram 300 related to the key management and distribution operations between one or more O-RUs 102-4, 102-6, and 102-8 and the O-DU 104-2 for the IEEE 1588-2019 certified TLV. The sequence flow diagram 300 can illustrate the operational sequence between the O-RU 202, the O-RU controller 204, and the operator PKI CA 206. O-RU 202 may correspond to one or more O-RU 102-4, 102-6 and 102-8, and O-RU controller 204 may correspond to O-DU 104-2 and / or O-RIC 106 (including non-RTRIC 106-2 and near-RTRIC 106-4).

[0045] Figure 3a and Figure 3b Steps S302 to S320 are similar Figure 2a and Figure 2bSteps S208 to S226, and therefore, for the sake of brevity of this disclosure, Figure 3a and Figure 3b The descriptions of steps S302 to S320 will not be repeated here.

[0046] At step S322, the O-RU controller 204 (e.g., O-DU 104-2) can configure the root key to be shared with the O-RU 202. Then, at step S324, the O-RU controller 204 can supply the root key at the O-RU 202 using the NETCONF secure channel.

[0047] Furthermore, through steps S326-S334, key configuration can be performed at O-RU 202 and O-RU controller 204 (i.e., O-DU 104-2) using the IETF-NEFCONF-KEYSTORE model. Specifically, step S326 includes configuring a symmetric or asymmetric key by at least O-RU controller 204 using a keystore according to steps S322 and S324. Furthermore, step S328 includes supplying a root key at O-RU 202 by O-RU controller 204 using a NETCONF secure channel. As part of the key configuration management process, O-RU controller 204 can configure the root key on O-RU 202. In one or more embodiments, the root key can then be used to derive encryption keys for (multiple) other security mechanisms. In one or more embodiments, the root key can be used as a pre-shared key for message encryption.

[0048] Then, at step S330, O-RU 202 can derive the key used for encryption. Furthermore, step S332 may be related to security considerations. At step S332, the key can be distributed to O-RU 202, which has been successfully authenticated using 802.1x and has established a NETCONF active session. Additionally, the key in the keystore container is encrypted during transmission. Furthermore, step S334 includes using the key derived at O-RU 202 for a security mechanism process using an IEEE 1588-2019 certified TLV.

[0049] Figure 4 The illustration shows a flowchart depicting a method 400 for key distribution between OFH MACsec endpoints according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure. Method 400 may be executed by an O-RU controller 204. The O-RU controller 204 may correspond to one or more of O-DU 104-2 and O-RIC 106, where the O-RIC includes non-RT RIC 106-2 and near-RT RIC 106-4.

[0050] At step 402, the O-RU controller 204 may establish a session with the O-RU 202. At step 404, in response to establishing the session, the O-RU controller 204 may configure one or more MACsec configuration parameters for the O-RU 202. In an embodiment, the one or more MACsec configuration parameters may include at least a pre-shared key. In one embodiment, the one or more MACsec configuration parameters may include one or more of the following: an MKA-MACsec indication, an O-RU MAC address, a key priority, a CKN, and a key number. The MKA-MACsec indication may indicate support for MACsec for the O-RU 202. The O-RU MAC address may correspond to an address used by the O-RU 202 to implement MACsec. The key priority may indicate the entity used to generate at least one of the SAK and KEK. The CKN may correspond to the name of the CAK. The key number may indicate a number associated with the pre-shared key that will be used to generate at least one of the SAK and KEK.

[0051] At step 406, the O-RU controller 204 may use a random number generator to generate at least one of SAK and KEK based on the pre-shared key. At step 408, the O-RU controller 204 may send at least one of one or more MACsec configuration parameters, and at least one of SAK and KEK, to the O-RU 202.

[0052] In one embodiment, the O-RU controller 204 may receive a session establishment request before establishing a session with the O-RU 202. In this embodiment, the session establishment request corresponds to a NETCONF call home registration request.

[0053] In one embodiment, in response to establishing a session with O-RU 202, O-RU controller 204 may send one or more configuration commands to O-RU 202 to instruct O-RU 202 to perform one or more configuration changes at O-RU 202. In this embodiment, the one or more configurations correspond to at least one of the configurations and applications corresponding to MACsec configurations.

[0054] In one embodiment, in order to generate at least one of SAK and KEK, O-RU controller 204 may use a keystore container to configure at least one of one or more symmetric keys and at least one of one or more asymmetric keys, and generate at least one of SAK and KEK based on the configured at least one of one or more symmetric keys and at least one of one or more asymmetric keys.

[0055] Although shown and described in a specific order Figure 4The steps described above are the same, but according to various embodiments, these steps can occur in a different order. Furthermore, with... Figure 4 Detailed descriptions of each step have been included in the relevant section. Figures 2a to 3c The relevant descriptions are omitted here for the sake of brevity.

[0056] Figure 5 The illustration shows an embodiment of a wireless communication device 500 according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure. In the embodiment, the wireless communication device 500 may correspond to one or more of O-RU 102-4, 102-6 and 102-8, O-DU 104-2 and O-RIC 106. Figure 5 As shown, the wireless communication device 500 includes a processor 510, a memory 520, a storage component 530, an input component 540, an output component 550, a communication interface 560, and a bus 570.

[0057] As used herein, processor 510 refers to any type of computing circuit that may include hardware and software elements. Processor 510 may be embodied as a multi-core processor, a single-core processor, or a combination of one or more multi-core processors and / or one or more single-core processors, a distributed processing system, etc. Processor 510 may be a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), an accelerated processing unit (APU), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or another type of processing component.

[0058] Memory 520 may include a non-transient computer-readable medium. Memory 520 may include random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), and / or another type of dynamic or static storage device (e.g., flash memory, magnetic storage, and / or optical storage) for storing information and / or instructions for use by processor 510. Memory 520 may include machine-readable instructions executable by processor 510. When executed by processor 510, these machine-readable instructions may cause processor 510 to perform one or more method steps of the embodiments described above.

[0059] Storage component 530 may store information and / or software related to the operation and use of wireless communication device 500. For example, storage component 530 may include hard disk (e.g., magnetic disk, optical disk, magneto-optical disk and / or solid-state disk), optical disk (CD), digital versatile disk (DVD), floppy disk, cassette tape, magnetic tape, and / or another type of non-transient computer-readable medium, and corresponding drive.

[0060] Input component 540 can be configured to receive information, such as user input. For example, input component 540 may include, but is not limited to, a touchscreen display, keyboard, keypad, mouse, button, switch, and / or microphone. Additionally or alternatively, input component 540 may include sensors for sensing information (e.g., Global Positioning System (GPS), accelerometer, gyroscope, and / or actuator).

[0061] Output component 550 can be configured to provide output information from wireless communication device 500. For example, output component 550 can be, but is not limited to, a display, speaker, instruction device of an external device, and / or one or more light-emitting diodes (LEDs).

[0062] Communication interface 560 can be an interface that provides communication connections to other devices, such as external and internal devices. The connection via communication interface 560 can be a wired connection, a wireless connection, or a combination of wired and wireless connections, and can be a direct or indirect connection via a communication network existing between wireless communication device 500 and other devices. In other words, the standard of communication interface 560 is not limited.

[0063] Bus 570 can serve as an interconnect between the processor 510, memory 520, storage component 530, input component 540, output component 550, and communication interface 560 of the wireless communication device 500. Bus 570 can include wired or wireless interconnects.

[0064] Figure 5 The number and arrangement of components shown are provided as an example. In practice, device 500 may include more than Figure 5 The additional components, fewer components, different components, or components arranged differently shown. Additionally or alternatively, a set of components of device 500 (e.g., one or more components) can perform one or more functions described as being performed by another set of components of device 500. Furthermore, one or more method steps described in any embodiment can be performed using multiple devices 500 communicating with each other.

[0065] An apparatus is described. The apparatus is configured to establish a session with an O-RU at an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU controller). In response to the establishment of the session, the apparatus is configured to configure one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters for the O-RU at the O-RU controller. The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key. The apparatus is also configured to, at the O-RU controller, use a random number generator to generate at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key. Furthermore, the apparatus is configured to send at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, and at least one of the SAK and KEK, from the O-RU controller to the O-RU.

[0066] According to the apparatus described in

[0065] , the apparatus is configured to: At the O-RU controller, a session establishment request is received from the O-RU, where the session establishment request corresponds to a network configuration (NetConf) call home registration request.

[0067] The apparatus according to any one of

[0065] to

[0066] , wherein in order to generate at least one of SAK and KEK, the apparatus is configured to: Use a keystore container to configure at least one of one or more symmetric keys and one or more asymmetric keys; and At least one of SAK and KEK is generated based on at least one of one or more symmetric keys and at least one of one or more asymmetric keys configured.

[0068] The apparatus according to any one of

[0065] to

[0067] , wherein in response to the establishment of a session with the O-RU, the apparatus is configured to: Send one or more configuration commands to the O-RU to instruct the O-RU to perform one or more configuration changes at the O-RU.

[0069] The apparatus according to any one of

[0065] to

[0068] , wherein one or more configuration changes correspond to at least one of the configurations and applications associated with one or more MACsec configuration parameters.

[0070] The apparatus according to any one of

[0065] to

[0069] , wherein: One or more MACsec configuration parameters include: MASsec Key Negotiation-MACsec (MKA-MACsec) indication, O-RU MAC address, key priority, connection association key name (CKN), and key number, one or more of these. The MKA-MACsec instruction indicates support for MACsec used with O-RU. The O-RU MAC address corresponds to the address used by O-RU to implement MACsec. The key priority indicates the entity used to generate at least one of SAK and KEK. CKN corresponds to the name of CAK, and The key number indicates the number associated with the generated pre-shared key that will be used in at least one of SAK and KEK.

[0071] A method is described. The method includes establishing a session between an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU controller) and an O-RU. In response to establishing the session, the method includes configuring one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters for the O-RU by the O-RU controller. The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key. The method also includes generating at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key using a random number generator by the O-RU controller. Furthermore, the method includes sending at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, along with at least one of the SAK and KEK, to the O-RU by the O-RU controller.

[0072] According to the method described in

[0071] , the method includes, prior to establishing a session with the O-RU: The O-RU controller receives a session establishment request, which corresponds to a network configuration (NetConf) call home registration request.

[0073] According to any one of

[0071] to

[0072] , the method wherein generating at least one of SAK and KEK comprises: The O-RU controller uses a keystore container to configure at least one of one symmetric keys and one or more asymmetric keys; and At least one of SAK and KEK is generated based on at least one of one or more symmetric keys and at least one of one or more asymmetric keys configured.

[0074] The method according to any one of

[0071] to

[0073] , wherein in response to establishing a session with the O-RU, the method includes: Send one or more configuration commands to the O-RU to instruct the O-RU to perform one or more configuration changes at the O-RU.

[0075] According to any one of

[0071] to

[0074] , one or more configurations correspond to at least one of the configurations and applications corresponding to the MACsec configuration.

[0076] The method according to any one of

[0071] to

[0075] , wherein: One or more MACsec configuration parameters include: MASsec Key Negotiation-MACsec (MKA-MACsec) indication, O-RU MAC address, key priority, connection association key name (CKN), and key number, one or more of these. The MKA-MACsec instruction indicates support for MACsec used with O-RU. The O-RU MAC address corresponds to the address used by O-RU to implement MACsec. The key priority indicates the entity used to generate at least one of SAK and KEK. CKN corresponds to the name of CAK, and The key number indicates the number associated with the generated pre-shared key that will be used in at least one of SAK and KEK.

[0077] A non-transient computer-readable medium storing instructions is described. The instructions include one or more instructions executed by an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU Controller). The O-RU Controller includes one or more processors. The one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to establish a session with the O-RU. In response to the establishment of the session, the one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to configure one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters for the O-RU. The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key. The one or more instructions also cause the one or more processors to use a random number generator to generate at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key. Furthermore, the one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to send at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, and at least one of the SAK and KEK, to the O-RU.

[0078] While this disclosure is described in specific language, it is not intended to impose any limitations. As will be apparent to those skilled in the art, various working modifications can be made to the method to achieve the inventive concepts taught herein.

[0079] The accompanying drawings and the foregoing description provide examples of embodiments. Those skilled in the art will understand that one or more of the described elements can be well combined into a single functional element. Alternatively, certain elements may be split into multiple functional elements. Elements in one embodiment may be added to another embodiment. For example, the order of processes described herein may be changed and is not limited to the manner described herein.

[0080] Furthermore, the actions in any flowchart do not need to be performed in the order shown; nor is it necessary to execute all actions. Additionally, actions that do not depend on other actions can be executed in parallel with other actions. The scope of the embodiments is not intended to be limited to these specific examples. Many variations are possible, such as differences in structure, size, and material use, whether or not explicitly given in the specification. The scope of the embodiments is at least as broad as that given by the following claims.

[0081] The benefits, other advantages, and solutions to problems have been described above with reference to specific embodiments. However, the benefits, advantages, solutions to problems, and any components(s) that may cause any benefit, advantage, or solution to occur or become more apparent should not be construed as key, essential, or essential features or components of any or all claims.

[0082] The description of the specific embodiments above will fully reveal the general nature of the embodiments herein, enabling others to easily modify and adapt these specific embodiments for various applications by applying present knowledge without departing from the general concept. Therefore, such adaptations and modifications should and are intended to be understood within the equivalent meaning and scope of the disclosed embodiments. It should be understood that the wording or terminology used herein is for descriptive purposes and not for limitation. Therefore, although embodiments herein have been described according to at least one embodiment, those skilled in the art will recognize that the embodiments herein can be practiced using modifications within the spirit and scope of the embodiments described herein.

Claims

1. An apparatus configured as follows: Establish a session with the O-RU at the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU Controller); In response to the establishment of the session, one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters are configured for the O-RU at the O-RU controller, wherein the one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key; At the O-RU controller, a random number generator is used to generate at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key; and The O-RU controller sends at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, as well as at least one of the SAK and the KEK, to the O-RU.

2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein prior to establishing the session with the O-RU, the apparatus is configured to: At the O-RU controller, a session establishment request is received from the O-RU, wherein the session establishment request corresponds to a Network Configuration (NetConf) call home registration request.

3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein, in order to generate at least one of the SAK and the KEK, the apparatus is configured to: Use a keystore container to configure at least one of one or more symmetric keys and one or more asymmetric keys; and The at least one of the SAK and the KEK is generated based on at least one of the one or more symmetric keys and the one or more asymmetric keys configured.

4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein in response to the establishment of the session with the O-RU, the apparatus is configured to: Send one or more configuration commands to the O-RU to instruct the O-RU to perform one or more configuration changes at the O-RU.

5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the one or more configuration changes correspond to at least one of the configurations and applications associated with one or more MACsec configuration parameters.

6. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein: The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include one or more of the following: MASsec Key Negotiation-MACsec (MKA-MACsec) indication, O-RU MAC address, key priority, connection association key name (CKN), and key number. The MKA-MACsec indication specifies support for MACsec used with the O-RU. The O-RU MAC address corresponds to the address used by O-RU to implement MACsec. The key priority indicates the entity used to generate at least one of the SAK and the KEK. The CKN corresponds to the name of the CAK, and The key number indicates a number associated with the pre-shared key that will be used in the generation of at least one of the SAK and the KEK.

7. A method comprising: A session is established between the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU Controller) and the O-RU; In response to establishing the session, the O-RU controller configures one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters for the O-RU, wherein the one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key; The O-RU controller uses a random number generator to generate at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) based on the pre-shared key; as well as The O-RU controller sends at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, as well as at least one of the SAK and the KEK, to the O-RU.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein before establishing the session with the O-RU, the method comprises: The O-RU controller receives a session establishment request, which corresponds to a Network Configuration (NetConf) call home registration request.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein generating at least one of the SAK and the KEK comprises: The O-RU controller uses a keystore container to configure at least one of one or more symmetric keys and one or more asymmetric keys. as well as The at least one of the SAK and the KEK is generated based on at least one of the one or more symmetric keys and the one or more asymmetric keys configured.

10. The method of claim 7, wherein in response to establishing the session with the O-RU, the method comprises: Send one or more configuration commands to the O-RU to instruct the O-RU to perform one or more configuration changes at the O-RU.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein the one or more configurations correspond to at least one of the configurations and applications corresponding to the MACsec configuration.

12. The method according to claim 7, wherein: The one or more MACsec configuration parameters include one or more of the following: MASsec Key Negotiation-MACsec (MKA-MACsec) indication, O-RU MAC address, key priority, connection association key name (CKN), and key number. The MKA-MACsec indication specifies support for MACsec used with the O-RU. The O-RU MAC address corresponds to the address used by O-RU to implement MACsec. The key priority indicates the entity used to generate at least one of the SAK and the KEK. The CKN corresponds to the name of the CAK, and The key number indicates a number associated with the pre-shared key that will be used in the generation of at least one of the SAK and the KEK.

13. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions, the instructions comprising: One or more instructions, when executed by an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) - Radio Unit Controller (O-RU Controller) comprising one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to: Establish a session with the O-RU; In response to the establishment of the session, one or more Media Access Control Security (MACsec) configuration parameters are configured for the O-RU, wherein the one or more MACsec configuration parameters include at least a pre-shared key; Using a random number generator, at least one of a Security Authentication Key (SAK) and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) is generated based on the pre-shared key; as well as Send at least one of the one or more MACsec configuration parameters, and at least one of the SAK and the KEK, to the O-RU.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Communication group processing method and device, and computer equipment

    CN121456494A