Recovery using the encrypted alternative key from the metadata
By generating and storing recovery keys in the cryptographic hardware security module and storing encrypted alternative keys in the metadata, the problems of data recovery delay and processing overhead caused by key loss are solved, achieving fast and reliable data recovery and enhanced system trust.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202580027662.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2024-04-17
- Filing Date
- 2025-03-19
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In existing technologies, when keys are lost or unavailable, the data recovery process is delayed and consumes excessive processing power. Manual decryption is not feasible, resulting in user data loss and loss of system trust.
Generate a master password recovery key and store it in the cryptographic hardware security module. Generate an alternative password recovery key and store the encrypted alternative key in the metadata of the dataset. Utilize the recovery key verification mode to ensure rapid data recovery when the operation key is unavailable.
It reduces latency and processing overhead during data recovery, ensuring user data is recovered within seconds, avoiding wasted time locating backup keys and loading resources, and enhancing the reliability of the data storage system and customer trust.
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Figure CN123125833A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Background Technology
[0001] This invention relates to the security of datasets, and more specifically, to cryptographic keys.
[0002] A cryptographic key is information stored in a file that is processed by an encryption algorithm to encrypt and decrypt cryptographic data when used. Keys are typically a string of numbers or letters. Key lifecycle management refers to the creation and retirement of cryptographic keys. This is often referred to as "key rotation." Summary of the Invention
[0003] According to a method, a computer-implemented method (CIM) includes generating a master cryptographic recovery key and generating an alternative cryptographic recovery key, wherein the alternative cryptographic recovery key is generated and stored in a cryptographic hardware security module (HSM). The method also includes storing an encrypted fallback key in metadata associated with the dataset, wherein the encrypted fallback key is an operation key encrypted by the master cryptographic recovery key, and storing a recovery key verification mode (RKVP) in the metadata, wherein the RKVP is associated with and stored for use with the master cryptographic recovery key. In response to determining that the operation key is unavailable, the encrypted fallback key is retrieved to perform a data decryption operation.
[0004] According to another approach, a computer program product (CPP) includes a collection of one or more computer-readable storage media and program instructions stored together in the collection of one or more storage media, the program instructions being used to cause a collection of processors to perform any combination of the features of the aforementioned approach.
[0005] According to another approach, a computer system (CS) includes a set of processors, a set of one or more computer-readable storage media, and program instructions stored together in the set of one or more storage media, the program instructions being used to cause the set of processors to perform any combination of the features of the foregoing method.
[0006] Other aspects and methods of the invention will become apparent from the following detailed description, which, when taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, illustrates the principles of the invention by way of example. Attached Figure Description
[0007] Figure 1 This is a diagram of a computing environment according to a method of the present invention.
[0008] Figure 2A This is a flowchart of a method according to the present invention.
[0009] Figure 2B This is a description of a method according to the present invention. Figure 2AThe flowchart shows an example of the infrastructure-driven approach used by the method.
[0010] Figure 2C This describes a method according to the present invention. Figure 2A The flowchart shows an example of the infrastructure-driven approach used by the method.
[0011] Figure 2D This describes a method according to the present invention. Figure 2A The flowchart shows an example of the infrastructure-driven approach used by the method.
[0012] Figure 2E This describes a method according to the present invention. Figure 2A The flowchart shows an example of the infrastructure-driven approach used by the method.
[0013] Figure 3 A key hierarchy structure according to a method of the present invention is described.
[0014] Figure 4A A loading flowchart according to a method of the present invention is described.
[0015] Figure 4B A loading flowchart according to a method of the present invention is described.
[0016] Figure 5 The structure of one method according to the present invention is described. Detailed Implementation
[0017] The following description is intended to illustrate the general principles of the invention and not to limit the inventive concepts claimed herein. Furthermore, the specific features described herein can be used in a variety of possible combinations and permutations with other described features.
[0018] Unless otherwise expressly defined herein, all terms shall be given the broadest possible interpretation, including the meaning implied in the specification and the meaning as understood by those skilled in the art and / or as defined in dictionaries, papers, etc.
[0019] It should also be noted that, as used in the specification and appended claims, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” include plural objects unless otherwise stated. It will also be understood that the terms “comprising” and / or “including”, when used in this specification, specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and / or groups thereof.
[0020] The following description discloses several preferred methods for systems, methods, and computer program products used for recovery using alternative keys encrypted in metadata.
[0021] In a general approach, CIM includes generating a master cryptographic recovery key and generating an alternative cryptographic recovery key, wherein the alternative cryptographic recovery key is generated and stored in a cryptographic hardware security module (HSM). The method also includes storing an encrypted alternative key in metadata associated with the dataset, wherein the encrypted alternative key is an operation key encrypted with the master cryptographic recovery key, and storing an RKVP in the metadata, wherein the RKVP is associated with and stored for the master cryptographic recovery key. In response to determining that the operation key is unavailable, the encrypted alternative key is retrieved to perform a data decryption operation.
[0022] The technical effects of creating the aforementioned keys (and in particular, alternative keys) and subsequently making the alternative keys available for retrieval in response to the determination that the operating key is unavailable include: mitigating the latency and processing overhead that would otherwise be induced in conventional data storage systems when the operating key becomes unavailable. This also preserves user data that would otherwise be lost, as manual decryption is infeasible for recovering user data encrypted with the lost encryption key. More specifically, the processing and latency avoided as a result of enabling and using the alternative keys described herein can be broken down as follows: recovery of user data can be completed within seconds, rather than being impossible to perform. Furthermore, backup key datasets do not need to be located, and therefore using the alternative keys described herein reduces the time that would otherwise be spent locating such datasets by several minutes. Based on the available alternative keys, at least several minutes that would otherwise be spent searching each backup key dataset for the lost key (in an attempt to recover it from the lost encryption key) are also avoided. This has the technical effects of reducing wait time and reducing processing overhead. Based on the technical effects described in this paper for using alternative keys, the at least several minutes that would otherwise have resulted in determining whether the backup key dataset has the same master key as the active key dataset, and the at least several hours of loading new resources to rotate the master key of the backup key dataset to match the active key dataset, are no longer required. The hours that would otherwise have been incurred from retrieving keys from the backup key dataset are also avoided, thus further refining recovery from the unavailability of the operational key.
[0023] Retrieving an encrypted alternative key may include: determining whether an RKVP associated with a key tag for a request for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key. Retrieving an encrypted alternative key may further include: in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the master cryptographic recovery key: decrypting the encrypted alternative key using the master cryptographic recovery key, encrypting the decrypted alternative key using the current master key stored in the cryptographic HSM, generating a protected key to be used for encrypting and decrypting the dataset, and storing the alternative key encrypted with the master key in a cryptographic key dataset (CKDS).
[0024] The technical benefits of retrieving alternative keys include reduced latency and processing overhead that would otherwise occur in traditional data storage systems. These benefits also include the preservation of user data that would otherwise be lost, as manual decryption is impractical for recovering user data encrypted with a lost encryption key.
[0025] The method may further include determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata, and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, storing the alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the metadata.
[0026] The technical benefits of retrieving alternative keys include reduced latency and processing overhead that would otherwise occur in traditional data storage systems. These benefits also include the preservation of user data that would otherwise be lost, as manual decryption is impractical for recovering user data encrypted with a lost encryption key.
[0027] The determination that the operation key is unavailable may be based on the key tag used to replace the password recovery key being deleted.
[0028] The technical effect of enabling encrypted alternative keys to be used in situations where operational keys are unavailable includes the ability to immediately begin recovery of lost keys once a loss event is determined to have occurred (e.g., malicious deletion, unintentional deletion, etc.), rather than having to perform a time- and resource-intensive recovery process. Note that such a recovery process will only ultimately reveal the conclusion of the loss of the associated dataset and does not provide the recovery enabled in this paper.
[0029] The dataset can be encrypted with an operation key. The method may also include receiving a request for the dataset and, in response to receiving the request, performing a predetermined maintenance procedure. The predetermined maintenance procedure may include causing the cryptographic HSM to generate and return a protected key for encryption and decryption that will be actively used for the dataset; determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag for the request for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key; and, in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the master cryptographic recovery key, generating a new alternative key. The new alternative key can be encrypted with the master cryptographic recovery key.
[0030] The technical effects of performing a pre-defined maintenance process to maintain alternative keys within the infrastructure include: preventing delays in performing the recovery process in the event of a lost encryption key due to RKVP and recovery key mismatch, and also mitigating delays that would otherwise occur in subsequent requests to open the dataset (based on existing mismatches).
[0031] The method may further include comparing the RKVP associated with the key tag with the RKVP stored in the metadata, and in response to determining from the result of the comparison that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, storing a new alternative key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the metadata.
[0032] The technique of storing new alternative keys and RKVPs associated with key tags in the metadata ensures that mismatches are correctly handled for subsequent dataset openings. This reduces the amount of processing that would otherwise be performed if mismatches were allowed to persist.
[0033] Retrieving an encrypted alternative key may include determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag requesting the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key. In response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the master cryptographic recovery key, it may be determined whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches an alternative cryptographic recovery key. In response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the alternative cryptographic recovery key, a failure may be returned to the device from which the request for the dataset was received. Furthermore, in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the alternative cryptographic recovery key, a predetermined recovery process may be performed. The predetermined recovery process may include decrypting the encrypted alternative key using the alternative cryptographic recovery key, encrypting the decrypted encrypted alternative key using the current master key, encrypting the decrypted alternative key using the master cryptographic recovery key, returning the alternative key encrypted with the master cryptographic recovery key and the RKVP associated with the key tag to the device, generating a protected key to be actively used for encryption and decryption of the dataset, and placing the alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the Cryptographic Key Dataset (CKDS).
[0034] The technical benefits of retrieving alternative keys to perform recovery include reducing latency and processing overhead in traditional data storage systems. These benefits also include preserving user data that would otherwise be lost, as manual decryption is impractical for recovering user data encrypted with a lost encryption key.
[0035] The predetermined recovery process may include: determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata, and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, storing the alternative key encrypted by the master cryptographic recovery key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the metadata.
[0036] The technical benefits of retrieving alternative keys to perform recovery include: reducing latency and processing overhead in traditional data storage systems. These benefits also include: preserving user data that would otherwise be lost, since manual decryption is not feasible for recovering user data encrypted with a lost encryption key.
[0037] In another general approach, the CPP includes a collection of one or more computer-readable storage media, and program instructions commonly stored in the collection of one or more storage media, for causing a set of processors to perform any combination of the features of the aforementioned method, thereby achieving similar technical effects.
[0038] In another general approach, CS includes a set of processors, a set of one or more computer-readable storage media, and program instructions co-stored in the set of one or more storage media, for any combination of features of the aforementioned method to cause the set of processors to perform, thereby achieving similar technical effects.
[0039] In a general approach, CIM includes generating a master cryptographic recovery key and generating an alternative cryptographic recovery key, wherein the alternative cryptographic recovery key is generated and stored in a cryptographic hardware security module (HSM). The method also includes storing an encrypted alternative key in metadata associated with the dataset, wherein the encrypted alternative key is an operation key encrypted by the master cryptographic recovery key, and storing an RKVP in the metadata, wherein the RKVP is associated with and stored for the master cryptographic recovery key. In response to determining that the operation key is unavailable, the encrypted alternative key is retrieved to perform a data decryption operation, wherein retrieving the encrypted alternative key includes: determining whether an RKVP associated with a key tag requested for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key. In response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the master cryptographic recovery key: decrypting the encrypted alternative key using the master cryptographic recovery key, encrypting the decrypted alternative key using the current master key stored in the cryptographic HSM, generating a protected key to be used for encrypting and decrypting the dataset, and storing the alternative key encrypted with the master key in CKDS.
[0040] The technical effects of creating the aforementioned keys (and in particular, alternative keys) and subsequently making the alternative keys available for retrieval in response to the determination that the operating key is unavailable include mitigating the latency and processing overhead that would otherwise be induced in conventional data storage systems when the operating key becomes unavailable. This also preserves user data that would otherwise be lost, as manual decryption is infeasible for recovering user data encrypted with the lost encryption key. More specifically, the processing and latency avoided as a result of enabling and using the alternative keys described herein can be broken down as follows: Recovery of user data can be completed within seconds, rather than being impossible to perform. Furthermore, backup key datasets do not need to be located, and therefore, using the alternative keys described herein reduces the time that would otherwise be spent locating such datasets by several minutes. Based on the available alternative keys, at least several minutes that would otherwise be spent searching each backup key dataset for the lost key (in an attempt to recover it from the lost encryption key) are also avoided. This has the technical effects of reducing wait times and reducing processing overhead. Based on the technical effects described herein for using alternative keys, the at least several minutes that would otherwise result in determining whether the backup key dataset has the same master key as the active key dataset, and the at least several hours of loading new resources to rotate the master key of the backup key dataset to match the active key dataset, are no longer required. The hours that would otherwise be incurred from retrieving keys from the backup key dataset are also avoided, thus further refining recovery from the unavailability of the operating key.
[0041] In one application of the technology, CIM includes generating a master password recovery key and generating an alternative password recovery key in a data storage system for storing customer data, such as a dataset that is kept encrypted when the customer does not easily access it and / or when processed by the method. The alternative password recovery key is generated and stored in the cryptographic hardware security module (HSM) of the data storage system. The method also includes storing an encrypted alternative key in metadata associated with the dataset, wherein the encrypted alternative key is an operation key encrypted by the master password recovery key, and storing an RKVP in the metadata, wherein the RKVP is associated with and stored for use with the master password recovery key. In response to determining that the operation key is unavailable, the encrypted alternative key is retrieved to perform a data decryption operation.
[0042] The technical effects of creating the aforementioned key (and particularly the alternative key) and subsequently making the alternative key available for retrieval in response to the determination that the operating key is unavailable include: mitigating the latency and processing overhead that would otherwise be incurred in conventional data storage systems when the operating key becomes unavailable. This also preserves user data (the aforementioned customer data) that would otherwise be lost, since manual decryption is infeasible for recovering user data encrypted with the lost encryption key. This enhances customer trust in the data storage system by preventing loss events.
[0043] Various aspects of this disclosure are described by descriptive text, flowcharts, block diagrams of computer systems, and / or block diagrams of machine logic included in a computer program product (CPP) method. Regarding any flowchart, depending on the technology involved, operations may be performed in a different order than that shown in a given flowchart. For example, again according to the technology involved, two operations shown in consecutive flowchart blocks may be performed in reverse order, as a single integrated step, simultaneously, or in a manner that at least partially overlaps in time.
[0044] Computer program product method (“CPP method” or “CPP”) is a term used in this disclosure to describe any collection of one or more storage media (also referred to as “media”) collectively included in one or more sets of storage devices, said collection of one or more storage devices collectively including machine-readable code corresponding to instructions and / or data for performing computer operations specified in a given CPP claim. A “storage device” is any tangible device capable of holding and storing instructions used by a computer processor. Without limitation, a computer-readable storage medium can be an electronic storage medium, a magnetic storage medium, an optical storage medium, an electromagnetic storage medium, a semiconductor storage medium, a mechanical storage medium, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. Some known types of storage devices that include these media include: magnetic disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), static random access memory (SRAM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disc (DVD), memory sticks, floppy disks, mechanical encoding devices (such as punch cards or pits / platforms formed in the main surface of the disk), or any suitable combination of the foregoing. Computer-readable storage media, as used in this disclosure, should not be construed as storing transient signals themselves, such as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagating through waveguides, optical pulses transmitted through fiber optic cables, or electrical signals transmitted through wires and / or other transmission media. As those skilled in the art will understand, data is typically moved at certain incidental points in time during the normal operation of the storage device, such as during access, defragmentation, or garbage collection; however, this does not make the storage device transient, because the data is not transient when it is stored.
[0045] The computing environment 100 includes examples of environments for executing at least some of the computer code involved in the method of performing the invention, such as the cryptographic key recovery code of block 150, which is used to retrieve an encrypted alternative key from metadata to perform a data decryption operation in response to determining that the operation key (which would be used to perform the data decryption operation if an alternative cryptographic recovery key is available) is unavailable. In addition to block 150, the computing environment 100 includes, for example, a computer 101, a wide area network (WAN) 102, an end-user equipment (EUD) 103, a remote server 104, a public cloud 105, and a private cloud 106. In this method, the computer 101 includes a processor set 110 (including processing circuitry 120 and a cache 121), a communication structure 111, volatile memory 112, persistent storage device 113 (including an operating system 122 and block 150, as described above), a peripheral device set 114 (including a user interface (UI) device set 123, a storage device 124, and an Internet of Things (IoT) sensor set 125), and a network module 115. Remote server 104 includes remote database 130. Public cloud 105 includes gateway 140, cloud coordination module 141, host physical machine set 142, virtual machine set 143, and container set 144.
[0046] Computer 101 can take the form of a desktop computer, laptop computer, tablet computer, smartphone, smartwatch or other wearable computer, mainframe computer, quantum computer, or any other form of computer or mobile device now known or to be developed in the future capable of running programs, accessing networks, or querying databases such as remote database 130. As is well known in the field of computer technology, and depending on the technology, the performance of a computer-implemented method can be distributed across multiple computers and / or multiple locations. On the other hand, in this presentation of computing environment 100, the detailed discussion focuses on a single computer, specifically computer 101, to keep the presentation as simple as possible. Computer 101 can reside in the cloud, even... Figure 1 The document does not show that the computer 101 is in the cloud; on the other hand, the computer 101 does not need to be in the cloud unless to the extent that can be definitively indicated.
[0047] Processor assembly 110 includes one or more computer processors of any type now known or to be developed in the future. Processing circuitry 120 may be distributed across multiple packages, such as multiple cooperating integrated circuit chips. Processing circuitry 120 may implement multiple processor threads and / or multiple processor cores. Cache 121 is memory located within the processor chip package and is typically used for data or code that should be readily accessible by the threads or cores running on processor assembly 110. Cache memory is typically organized into multiple levels based on its relative proximity to the processing circuitry. Alternatively, some or all of the caches in the processor assembly may be located “off-chip.” In some computing environments, processor assembly 110 may be designed to work with qubits and perform quantum computing.
[0048] Computer-readable program instructions are typically loaded onto computer 101 to cause the processor set 110 of computer 101 to perform a series of operational steps to implement a computer-implemented method, such that the instructions thus executed instantiate the method specified in the flowcharts and / or descriptive descriptions of the computer-implemented method included in this document (collectively, the “method of the invention”). These computer-readable program instructions are stored in various types of computer-readable storage media, such as cache 121 and other storage media discussed below. The program instructions and associated data are accessed by the processor set 110 to control and direct the execution of the computer-implemented method. In computing environment 100, at least some of the instructions for performing the method of the invention may be stored in block 150 of permanent storage device 113.
[0049] Communication structure 111 is a signal transmission path that allows the various components of computer 101 to communicate with each other. Typically, this structure consists of switches and conductive paths, such as switches and conductive paths that form buses, bridges, physical input / output ports, etc. Other types of signal communication paths can be used, such as fiber optic communication paths and / or wireless communication paths.
[0050] Volatile memory 112 is any type of volatile memory now known or to be developed in the future. Examples include dynamic random access memory (RAM) or static RAM. Typically, volatile memory 112 is characterized by random access, but this is not necessary unless explicitly indicated. In computer 101, volatile memory 112 is located in a single package and is internal to computer 101; however, alternatively or additionally, volatile memory may be distributed across multiple packages and / or located externally relative to computer 101.
[0051] The persistent storage device 113 is any form of non-volatile memory known now or developed in the future for use with a computer. The non-volatility of this memory means that the stored data is retained regardless of whether power is supplied to the computer 101 and / or directly to the persistent storage device 113. The persistent storage device 113 may be a read-only memory (ROM), but typically at least a portion of the persistent memory allows data to be written, deleted, and rewritten. Some common forms of persistent memory include hard disks and solid-state storage devices. The operating system 122 may take several forms, such as various known proprietary operating systems or operating systems employing an open-source portable operating system interface type with a kernel. The code included in block 150 typically includes at least some of the computer code involved in performing the methods of the present invention.
[0052] Peripheral device set 114 includes the peripheral device set of computer 101. Data communication connections between peripheral device 114 and other components of computer 101 can be implemented in various ways, such as Bluetooth connectivity, near field communication (NFC) connectivity, connections made by cables (such as Universal Serial Bus (USB) type cables), plug-in connections (e.g., secure digital (SD) cards), connections made through local area communication networks, and even connections made through wide area networks such as the Internet. In various methods, UI device set 123 may include components such as displays, speakers, microphones, wearable devices (such as goggles and smartwatches), keyboards, mice, printers, touchpads, game controllers, and haptic devices. Storage device 124 is an external storage device, such as an external hard drive, or a pluggable storage device, such as an SD card. Storage device 124 can be permanent and / or volatile. In some methods, storage device 124 may take the form of a quantum computing storage device for storing data in the form of qubits. In methods where computer 101 requires a large amount of storage (e.g., where computer 101 locally stores and manages a large database), this storage can be provided by peripheral storage devices designed to store very large amounts of data, such as a storage area network (SAN) shared by multiple geographically distributed computers. The IoT sensor set 125 consists of sensors that can be used in IoT applications. For example, one sensor could be a thermometer, while another could be a motion detector.
[0053] Network module 115 is a collection of computer software, hardware, and firmware that allows computer 101 to communicate with other computers via WAN 102. Network module 115 may include hardware such as a modem or Wi-Fi transceiver, software for packetizing and / or depacketizing data transmitted over the communication network, and / or web browser software for transmitting data over the Internet. In some methods, the network control and network forwarding functions of network module 115 are performed on the same physical hardware device. In other methods (e.g., using software-defined networking (SDN)), the control and forwarding functions of network module 115 are performed on physically separate devices, such that the control function manages several different network hardware devices. Computer-readable program instructions for performing the computer-implemented methods can typically be downloaded to computer 101 from an external computer or external storage device via a network adapter card or network interface included in network module 115.
[0054] A WAN 102 is any wide area network (e.g., the Internet) capable of transmitting computer data over non-local distances using any technology known now or developed in the future for transmitting computer data. In some approaches, a WAN 102 can be replaced by and / or supplemented by a local area network (LAN) designed to transmit data between devices located in a local area (e.g., a Wi-Fi network). WANs and / or LANs typically include computer hardware such as copper transmission cables, fiber optic transmissions, wireless transmissions, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and edge servers.
[0055] End User Equipment (EUD) 103 is any computer system used and controlled by an end user (e.g., a customer of the enterprise operating computer 101) and can take any of the forms discussed above in conjunction with computer 101. EUD 103 typically receives useful and available data from the operation of computer 101. For example, assuming computer 101 is designed to provide recommendations to the end user, these recommendations are typically transmitted from network module 115 of computer 101 to EUD 103 via WAN 102. In this way, EUD 103 can display or otherwise present the recommendations to the end user. In some approaches, EUD 103 can be client equipment such as a thin client, heavy client, mainframe, desktop computer, etc.
[0056] Remote server 104 is any computer system that provides at least some data and / or functionality to computer 101. Remote server 104 can be controlled and used by the same entity operating computer 101. Remote server 104 represents a machine that collects and stores useful and available data used by other computers, such as computer 101. For example, where computer 101 is designed and programmed to provide recommendations based on historical data, that historical data can be provided to computer 101 from a remote database 130 of remote server 104.
[0057] Public cloud 105 is any computer system that can be used by multiple entities, providing on-demand availability of computer system resources and / or other computing capabilities (especially data storage (cloud storage) and computing power) without direct active management by users. Cloud computing typically leverages resource sharing to achieve scalability consistency and economy. Direct and active management of the computing resources of public cloud 105 is performed by the computer hardware and / or software of cloud coordination module 141. The computing resources provided by public cloud 105 are typically implemented by virtual computing environments running on various computers constituting the host physical machine set 142, which is the entire domain of physical computers in and / or available to public cloud 105. Virtual computing environments (VCEs) typically take the form of virtual machines from virtual machine set 143 and / or containers from container set 144. It should be understood that these VCEs can be stored as images and can be transferred between various physical machine hosts as images or after instantiation of VCEs. The cloud coordination module 141 manages the transfer and storage of images, deploys new instantiations of VCE, and manages active instantiations of VCE deployments. Gateway 140 is a collection of computer software, hardware, and firmware that allows the public cloud 105 to communicate via WAN 102.
[0058] Now, we will provide some further explanation of Virtualized Computing Environments (VCEs). A VCE can be stored as an "image." New active instances of a VCE can be instantiated from this image. Two common types of VCEs are virtual machines and containers. A container is a VCE that uses operating system-level virtualization. This refers to an operating system feature where the kernel allows multiple isolated user-space instances, called containers, to exist. From the perspective of the programs running within them, these isolated user-space instances typically appear as actual computers. Computer programs running on a regular operating system can utilize all the resources of that computer, such as connected devices, files and folders, network shares, CPU power, and quantifiable hardware capabilities. However, programs running within a container can only use the contents of the container and the devices allocated to the container; this is a characteristic known as containerization.
[0059] Private cloud 106 is similar to public cloud 105, except that computing resources are available only to a single enterprise. While private cloud 106 is depicted as communicating with WAN 102, in other approaches, private cloud can be completely disconnected from the internet and accessed only via a local / private network. Hybrid cloud is a combination of multiple clouds of different types (e.g., private, community, or public cloud types) typically implemented by different vendors. Each of the multiple clouds remains an independent and discrete entity, but the larger hybrid cloud architecture is bound together by standardization or proprietary technology that enables coordination, management, and / or data / application portability between the multiple component clouds. In this approach, both public cloud 105 and private cloud 106 are part of a larger hybrid cloud.
[0060] Cloud computing services and / or microservices Figure 1 (Not shown separately): Private and public clouds 106 are programmed and configured to deliver cloud computing services and / or microservices (unless otherwise indicated, the term "microservice" should be interpreted to include the larger "service" regardless of size). Cloud services are infrastructure, platforms, or software typically hosted by a third-party provider and available to users via the Internet. Cloud services facilitate the flow of user data from front-end clients (e.g., client-side servers, tablets, desktop computers, laptops) via the Internet to and from the provider's systems. In some approaches, cloud services can be configured and orchestrated according to the "as a service" technology paradigm, where something is presented to internal or external customers as a cloud computing service. As a service providers typically offer various endpoints with which customers interface. These endpoints are typically based on a set of APIs. One type of as a service provider is Platform as a Service (PaaS), where the service provider provides, instantiates, runs, and manages modular code packages that customers can use to instantiate computing platforms and one or more applications without the complexity of building and maintaining the infrastructure typically associated with these things. Another type is Software as a Service (SaaS), where software is centrally hosted and distributed on a subscription basis. SaaS is also known as on-demand software, web-based software, or web-hosted software. The four technical subfields involved in cloud services are: deployment, integration, on-demand, and virtual private networks (VPNs).
[0061] In some aspects, a system according to various methods may include a processor and logic integrated with and / or executable by the processor, the logic being configured to perform one or more of the processing steps described herein. The processor may be any configuration as described herein, such as a discrete processor or processing circuitry including many components such as processing hardware, memory, I / O interfaces, etc. "Integrated with" means that the processor has logic embedded therewith as hardware logic, such as application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), FPGAs, etc. "Executable by the processor" means that the logic is hardware logic; software logic, such as firmware, part of an operating system, part of an application; etc., or some combination of hardware and software logic that is accessible to the processor and configured to cause the processor to perform a certain function when executed by the processor. The software logic may be stored on local and / or remote memory of any memory type, as is known in the art. Any processor known in the art may be used, such as software processor modules and / or hardware processors, such as ASICs, FPGAs, central processing units (CPUs), integrated circuits (ICs), graphics processing units (GPUs), etc.
[0062] Of course, depending on the method, this logic can be implemented as a method or computer program product on any device and / or system.
[0063] As mentioned above, a key is information stored in a file and, when used, is processed by a cryptographic algorithm to encrypt and decrypt cryptographic data. Keys are typically in the form of a string of numbers or letters. Key lifecycle management refers to the creation and retirement of cryptographic keys. This is often referred to as "key rotation."
[0064] An encryption key is a prerequisite for accessing encrypted data in plaintext. Losing an encryption key is equivalent to losing any data protected by that key. In situations with general encryption strategies and dataset-level encryption capabilities, the impact of a lost encryption key would be widespread and catastrophic.
[0065] Encryption keys in a key store can be unintentionally or maliciously overwritten or deleted, or the key store itself can be corrupted. Additionally, keys may be lost when restoring a backup copy of the key store. In these cases, any associated encrypted data will become unusable. Any situation where encrypted data becomes unusable is problematic for a variety of reasons. For example, unusable encrypted data often results in the loss of customer data, leading to a loss of customer satisfaction and a loss of trust in the infrastructure associated with the lost data. Furthermore, unusable encrypted data causes significant computer processing and processing delays in handling data loss, such as processing requests for data before it is determined to be unusable, troubleshooting-related processes to determine if the encrypted data is recoverable, and processes associated with making the data storage space required by the unusable encrypted data reclaimable. More specifically, in some cases, this resulting processing and delay may be broken down into unusable data, making data recovery impossible, at least several minutes to locate the backup key dataset, at least several minutes to search each backup key dataset to find the lost key, at least several minutes to determine if the backup key dataset has the same master key as the active key dataset, several hours to load new resources to rotate the master key of the backup key dataset to match the active key dataset, several hours to extract the key from the backup key dataset, and at least several seconds to write the key to the active key dataset.
[0066] To mitigate the aforementioned additional processing load and loss of customer trust, the method described herein employs a technique that enables the operation key (which in some deployments may be the source dataset encryption (DSE) key) to act as the source data encryption key to be encrypted by a recovery key and stored externally as an alternative key. This ensures that even if the operation key becomes unavailable or unavailable in the key storage, the alternative key remains accessible and can be recovered.
[0067] More specifically, the technique described herein implements a mechanism for generating and maintaining recovery keys within a cryptographic hardware security module (HSM). Once a dataset is opened, a backup key (which is the source DSE key encrypted with the recovery key) is stored in the dataset's metadata. For any subsequent dataset access where the operation key is determined to be unavailable or undeliverable in the HSM, the operation key can be recovered by decrypting the backup key stored in the metadata, where the backup key is decrypted using the recovery key.
[0068] Below is a list of infrastructure terms used in this description and their configuration definitions. Key Official: A trusted official who can be relied upon to authenticate the Trusted Key Encryption (TKE) used for TKE loading components. TKE Loading Component: A component configured to load password recovery keys into a TKE workstation. TKE workstation: A component configured to load a portion of the password recovery key into an alternative password recovery key register on a pre-defined card (such as IBM's Encryption Fast Adapter). Fast Cryptographic Adapter: An HSM for generating and processing security keys, which can maintain the master key and may include a recovery key register to protect and manage the master key and alternative recovery keys. Hardware Security Module (HSM): A physical computing device that acts as a cryptographic key store by protecting and managing cryptographic keys used for critical functions such as encryption and decryption. Password recovery key: Persistently stored in the recovery key register on the fast encryption adapter and must be a 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key loaded on the TKE workstation. Master password recovery key: An encryption key used to create and recover alternative keys. Alternate password recovery key: An encryption key used to recover the alternative encryption key, which is encrypted using an encryption key different from the current master encryption recovery key. The alternative password recovery key is not used to create a new alternative key. Alternate cryptographic keys: Cryptographic keys created by deriving the data encryption key (DEK) encrypted by the master key under the master key recovery key. Alternate cryptographic keys reside with the encrypted data (e.g., dataset encryption unit) and can be recovered to protect the cryptographic keys by importing them under the local cryptographic master key. Operational cryptographic key: A type of operational cryptographic key generated using enhanced security, specifically designed for encrypting and decrypting datasets. In certain methods, it is specifically used for associated logical partitions (LPARs) to encrypt and decrypt datasets processed within the LPAR. Protected cryptographic key: A type of operational cryptographic key generated using enhanced security measures, specifically designed for encrypting and decrypting datasets. In certain methods, it is particularly used for associated logical partitions (LPARs) to encrypt and decrypt datasets processed within the LPAR. Data Management Subsystem (DMS): Software configured to create and manage datasets. Hardware security module (HSM): A physical device that protects cryptographic keys and can be used to perform encryption and decryption processes using cryptographic keys. Recovery Key Verification Mode (RKVP): A predefined mode (e.g., a token) that acts as a fingerprint or index of the associated cryptographic recovery key. This allows the HSM to determine which cryptographic recovery key to use when multiple cryptographic recovery keys are used to manage one or more datasets. Dataset Encryption Unit: A dedicated logical and / or physical portion of the memory that stores metadata, including key tags, alternative cryptographic keys, and RKVP information. Key tag: A pointer to the associated key. Dataset: Data stored on storage devices and protected by encryption (such as client data). System Authorization Facility (SAF): An interface (such as an Application Protocol Interface (API)) that enables programs to use system authorization services to control access to resources such as datasets. System Authorization Facility (SAF) Database: A database that includes datasets associated with SAF. Key Dataset (CKDS): A dataset containing cryptographic keys that are protected using a master key. Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility (ICSF): A component that provides secure cryptographic services, including the ability to perform encryption and decryption operations. CP Auxiliary for Cryptographic Functions: An algorithm for encrypting and decrypting datasets using a protected key returned to the component running the algorithm.
[0069] Regarding the infrastructure terminology above, the techniques described herein involve a master key loaded onto a cryptographic fast adapter that can encrypt operational keys stored as security keys in a key store. This solution enhances the cryptographic fast adapter to support recovery keys. A cryptographic middleware (ICSF) invokes a new function on the cryptographic fast adapter to encrypt the operational key using the recovery key, thereby creating a cryptographic alternative key. The cryptographic alternative key is returned to the caller as metadata of the encrypted data stored outside the key store. When the caller invokes the ICSF and cannot retrieve a valid cryptographic operational key from the key store, the original cryptographic key can be recovered from the cryptographic alternative key using the cryptographic recovery key on the cryptographic fast adapter. Furthermore, these techniques describe how the cryptographic recovery key is rotated.
[0070] Now for reference Figure 2A A flowchart of method 200 according to one method is shown. According to the present invention, method 200 can be performed... Figure 1-5It can be executed in any environment described herein, wherein it can be executed in various ways. Of course, as those skilled in the art will understand upon reading this specification, method 200 may include more or fewer operations than those specifically described in Figure 2.
[0071] Each step of method 200 can be performed by any suitable component of the operating environment. For example, in various methods, method 200 can be performed partially or entirely by processing circuitry or some other device having one or more processors therein. One or more steps of method 200 can be performed in any device using a processor (e.g., processing circuitry, chips, and / or modules implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably having at least one hardware component). Illustrative processors include, but are not limited to, central processing units (CPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing devices known in the art.
[0072] As an introduction, Method 200 can be performed in any type of data storage environment in which cryptographic keys are used to defend and protect the dataset. For the context, Method 200 includes a relatively high-level description of establishing and subsequently retrieving an encrypted alternative key to perform a data decryption operation in response to determining that the operating key is unavailable. Further descriptions herein elaborate on this. Figure 2A The infrastructure-driven use of the method, for example, see Figure 2B-2E The flowchart.
[0073] Continue to refer to Figure 2A Operation 202 includes generating a master cryptographic recovery key. The master cryptographic recovery key can be a type of cryptographic key that will become obvious to a person skilled in the art after reading this description. Furthermore, the master cryptographic recovery key can include any predetermined number of bits. In some methods, the master cryptographic recovery key is generated by a cryptographic key generation engine in response to a determination that the dataset is scheduled for storage and / or stored in a predetermined storage module. In some preferred methods, the master cryptographic recovery key is stored in a cryptographic HSM.
[0074] In some methods, an alternative cipher recovery key is generated, see, for example, operation 204. In some methods, the alternative cipher recovery key is a copy of the master cipher recovery key. In some methods, the alternative cipher recovery key may be generated and stored in a cipher HSM.
[0075] Method 200 preferably includes generating an encrypted alternative key. In some methods, the encrypted alternative key is an operation key, since the alternative key is configured to be actively used within the data storage system to encrypt and decrypt datasets therein; for example, the encrypted alternative key, once decrypted, can be used as a dataset encryption key for encrypting and decrypting the dataset. In some methods, the operation key is a Dataset Encryption (DSE) key from IBM, etc. Furthermore, in some preferred methods, the encrypted alternative key is encrypted with a master cryptographic recovery key. Once encrypted, the encrypted alternative key is stored in metadata associated with the dataset, for example, see operation 206. More specifically, the encrypted alternative key can be stored in dataset encryption units (also referred to herein as “metadata”). Each dataset encryption unit may include information detailing the association between the dataset encryption unit and the encrypted dataset, thus serving as metadata for the encrypted dataset. In other words, in some methods, multiple dataset encryption units can be managed and updated according to the techniques described herein. In addition to or as a substitute for the encrypted alternative key, the dataset encryption unit may include a dataset encryption key and / or a dataset encryption key label, which is a label for the cryptographic dataset encryption key used to encrypt the encrypted dataset.
[0076] The dataset encryption unit may additionally and / or optionally store the RKVP associated with the current cryptographic recovery key, see, for example, operation 208. In some other methods, the current cryptographic recovery key is the master cryptographic recovery key, while in other methods, the current cryptographic recovery key is the substitute cryptographic recovery key.
[0077] As described elsewhere in the preceding text, in some cases, the operation key may become unavailable. For example, the operation key may be maliciously or unintentionally overwritten. To prevent processing overhead and time loss that would otherwise render the operation key unavailable, method 200 includes continuously determining whether the operation key is unavailable. In some methods, the operation key may be determined to be unavailable in response to receiving a notification that the operation key has been unintentionally overwritten. In some other methods, the operation key may be determined to be unavailable in response to determining that an attempt to access the dataset has failed. In some other methods, the operation key may be determined to be unavailable in response to determining that an attempt to access the dataset has failed and that a predetermined recovery action performed in the attempt to obtain the operation key for accessing the dataset has also failed.
[0078] In response to determining that the operation key is available, such as in the "No" logical path of decision 210, monitoring for loss of access to the operation key may optionally continue. Conversely, in response to determining that the operation key is unavailable, such as in the "Yes" logical path of decision 210, an encrypted alternative key is retrieved to perform a data decryption operation, for example, see operation 212. It should be noted that the data decryption operation may include decrypting a dataset in response to, for example, a dataset requested by a user device. Furthermore, it can be noted that the data decryption operation is initially intended to be performed by the operation key, as the operation key will be used additionally to perform the data decryption operation if it becomes available.
[0079] The technical effects of creating the aforementioned keys (and in particular, alternative keys) and subsequently making the alternative keys available for retrieval in response to the determination that the operating key is unavailable include: mitigating the latency and processing overhead that would otherwise be induced in conventional data storage systems when the operating key becomes unavailable. This also preserves user data that would otherwise be lost, as manual decryption is infeasible for recovering user data encrypted with the lost encryption key. More specifically, the processing and latency avoided as a result of enabling and using the alternative keys described herein can be broken down as follows: recovery of user data can be completed within seconds, rather than being impossible to perform. Furthermore, backup key datasets do not need to be located, and therefore using the alternative keys described herein reduces the time that would otherwise be spent locating such datasets by several minutes. Based on the available alternative keys, at least several minutes that would otherwise be spent searching each backup key dataset for the lost key (in an attempt to recover it from the lost encryption key) are also avoided. This has the technical effects of reducing wait time and reducing processing overhead. Based on the technical effects described in this paper for using alternative keys, the at least several minutes that would otherwise have resulted in determining whether the backup key dataset has the same master key as the active key dataset, and the at least several hours of loading new resources to rotate the master key of the backup key dataset to match the active key dataset, are no longer required. The hours that would otherwise have been incurred from retrieving keys from the backup key dataset are also avoided, thus further refining recovery from the unavailability of the operational key.
[0080] Now for reference Figure 2B-2E The invention illustrates several methods described herein. Figure 2A The flowchart shows an example of the infrastructure-driven approach used by the method. Figure 2B-2E The infrastructure shown includes the various components detailed in the list of terms described elsewhere above. For example, in some methods, Figure 2B-2EThe infrastructure shown includes CKDS that communicates with the ICSF of system 224 via API 222. In some approaches, the ICSF may further communicate with a physical cryptographic card, on which the key register may be stored, for example, see Crypto Express.
[0081] Figure 2B-2E The infrastructure shown may additionally and / or alternatively include an SAF database controllable by the SAF, and a hardware cryptographic engine, such as IBM's CP Assistant for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF), communicating with the API's DMS. In some methods, the DMS may be configured to cause and / or be instructed to cause information to be written to a dataset stored on a storage module, e.g., see the dataset and / or its associated metadata, e.g., see the dataset encryption unit including key tags, encrypted alternative keys, and RKVP. These operations may be performed by the infrastructure and / or by components such as processing circuitry configured to perform... Figure 2B-2E The methods described in detail. In other words, in some methods, by... Figure 2B-2E Operations performed on the infrastructure can be based on instructions published to the associated infrastructure.
[0082] It should be noted that, Figure 2B-2E Some operations performed within the system involve both an operational cryptographic key and a protected cryptographic key. While the protected key can be used in an LPAR-based infrastructure, in some other approaches, an operational key configured to encrypt and decrypt non-LPAR-based datasets can be used instead of the protected cryptographic key. In preferred approaches, the protected cryptographic key is always used for dataset encryption and decryption operations for the processing referenced in this disclosure.
[0083] First refer to Figure 2B A flowchart of method 220 according to one method is shown. According to the present invention, method 220 can be performed... Figure 1-5 This can be performed in any environment described herein, wherein it can be performed in various ways. Of course, as those skilled in the art will understand upon reading this specification, method 220 may include methods other than... Figure 2B The specific operations described in the text may include more or fewer operations.
[0084] Each step of method 220 can be performed by any suitable component of the operating environment. For example, in various methods, method 220 can be performed partially or entirely by processing circuitry or some other device having one or more processors. One or more steps of method 220 can be performed in any device using a processor (e.g., processing circuitry, chips, and / or modules implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably having at least one hardware component). Illustrative processors include, but are not limited to, central processing units (CPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing devices known in the art.
[0085] Figure 2B It shows Figure 2A This section provides an example of infrastructure-driven use of the method, detailing a dataset creation operation. For instance, a storage administrator might create a dataset by invoking the Data Management System (DMS). The DMS might invoke, or be instructed to invoke, the Storage Application Firewall (SAF) to determine whether a data encryption key label has been specified for the dataset. For this context, ensuring a data encryption key label is specified for the dataset is crucial for organizing and determining which encryption key(s) will subsequently be used to decrypt and encrypt the dataset, for example, as described in the further use case examples and operations below. In response to determining that a data encryption key label has been specified for the dataset, the key label is stored in the metadata, for example, by instructing the DMS to store the key label in the dataset encryption unit (see Operations 226 and 228).
[0086] In operation 230, the data owner requests an open operation to open the dataset, such as creating the dataset. In response to determining that such a request has been received and / or such an action has been taken, the DMS is invoked. A check is performed to verify the authorization of the key tag associated with the request for the dataset. Note that this key tag may be stored in CKDS. Once invoked, the DMS then invokes (e.g., in some methods, may be instructed to invoke) the SAF to check the authorization of the key tag, see, for example, operation 232. In some methods, the DMS invokes the ICSF with the key tag.
[0087] Operation 234 involves the ICSF locating the key tag in the key storage, i.e., CKDS. Furthermore, the ICSF can invoke the HSM (e.g., the Encryption Fast Adapter in some methods) and firmware to generate two keys, see, for example, operation 236. In some methods, these keys are preferably returned to the DMS. The first of these keys includes the operation key that will be effectively used for encryption and decryption of the dataset. (Regarding...) Figure 2BThe infrastructure allows for the use of hardware cryptographic engines such as CPACF to perform encryption and decryption of the dataset. The second of the generated keys includes a backup key, which is the operation key encrypted by the recovery key (and more specifically, by the master recovery key). This backup key can be used later to recover the operation key if the operation key in the HSM becomes unavailable during a subsequent dataset opening (an attempt to access the dataset based on a request for the dataset). The Recovery Key Verification Mode (RKVP) associated with the current recovery key used in system 224 is stored in metadata. In some approaches, this RKVP is associated with an alternative cryptographic recovery key. In other approaches, the RKVP is associated with the master cryptographic recovery key and is stored for use with the master cryptographic recovery key. For example, the RKVP can (by the HSM) be used to determine which cryptographic recovery key to use when multiple cryptographic recovery keys are used to manage one or more datasets.
[0088] The RKVP and alternative key are stored in the dataset encryption unit. For example, operation 238 includes having the DMS store the alternative key, such as in operation 242, and the RKVP, such as in operation 244, in the dataset encryption unit. Operation 240 includes a DMS call, for example, instructed to call CPACF, to encrypt the dataset using the operation key. In this way, the dataset remains in a secure, for example, encrypted state when no authorized read is actively performed on the dataset.
[0089] As described elsewhere above, the technical effects of creating the aforementioned key (and in particular, the alternative key) and subsequently making the alternative key available for retrieval in response to the determination that the operating key is unavailable include: mitigating the latency and processing overhead that would otherwise be induced in conventional data storage systems when the operating key becomes unavailable. This also preserves user data that would otherwise be lost, since manual decryption is infeasible for recovering user data encrypted with the lost encryption key. More specifically, the processing and latency avoided as a result of enabling and using the alternative key described herein can be broken down as follows: recovery of user data can be completed within seconds, rather than being impossible to perform. Furthermore, the backup key dataset does not need to be located, and therefore the use of the alternative key described herein reduces the time that would otherwise be spent locating such a dataset. Based on the available alternative key, at least several minutes that would otherwise be spent searching each backup key dataset for the lost key (in an attempt to recover it from the lost encryption key) are also avoided. This has the technical effects of reducing wait time and reducing processing overhead. Based on the technical effects described in this paper for using alternative keys, the at least several minutes that would otherwise have resulted in determining whether the backup key dataset has the same master key as the active key dataset, and the at least several hours of loading new resources to rotate the master key of the backup key dataset to match the active key dataset, are no longer required. The hours that would otherwise have been incurred from retrieving keys from the backup key dataset are also avoided, thus further refining recovery from the unavailability of the operational key.
[0090] Now for reference Figure 2C The document describes a flowchart illustrating techniques for opening the dataset after creating a candidate key and for further maintaining the candidate key. More specifically, Figure 2C The flowchart details how, during subsequent accesses to the dataset (after the alternative key is added to the dataset's metadata), the RKVP in the dataset's metadata is used to verify the alternative password recovery key (of the HSM) to verify the recovery key stored in the HSM.
[0091] exist Figure 2C The diagram shows a flowchart of method 250 according to a method. According to the present invention, method 250 can be performed... Figure 1-5 In any environment described herein, including execution in various methods. Of course, as those skilled in the art will understand upon reading this specification, method 250 may include more than Figure 2C The specific operations described in the text may include more or fewer operations.
[0092] Each step of method 250 can be performed by any suitable component of the operating environment. For example, in various methods, method 250 can be performed partially or entirely by processing circuitry or some other device having one or more processors. One or more steps of method 250 can be performed in any device using a processor (e.g., processing circuitry, chips, and / or modules implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably having at least one hardware component). Illustrative processors include, but are not limited to, central processing units (CPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing devices known in the art.
[0093] It should be noted that the operation of method 250 can be performed relative to the dataset mentioned in other methods described herein, for example, see methods 200 and 220. In other words, it can be assumed that the dataset is encrypted with the operation key described elsewhere above. At any time, a request for the dataset can be received, for example, from a client device being used by the owner of the dataset. In some preferred methods, in response to receiving a request for the dataset, a pre-defined maintenance procedure can be performed, as will now be described below. In some methods, in response to determining that such a request has been received, the DMS can be invoked, for example, see operation 254. The DMS can invoke or be prompted to invoke (instructed to invoke) the SAF to check authorization for the key tag, for example, see operation 252.
[0094] The DMS call, or being prompted to call, an ICSF with a key tag and RKVP, for example, see operation 256. This causes the ICSF to locate the key tag in the key storage, i.e., CKDS, for example, see operation 258.
[0095] In some preferred methods, the predetermined maintenance process includes, for example, instructing the cryptographic HSM to generate and return a protected key that will be actively used for encryption and decryption of the dataset, see, for example, operation 260. In some methods, this encryption and decryption of the dataset can be performed using a hardware cryptographic engine (e.g., IBM's CP Assist Cryptographic Functlons CPACF). Furthermore, the ICSF invokes the cryptographic HSM and firmware to generate and return a protected key that will be actively used for encryption and decryption of the dataset using a hardware cryptographic engine such as CPACF.
[0096] Operation 260 of the predetermined maintenance process preferably further includes: verifying whether the RKVP matches the current recovery key. For example, it can be determined whether the RKVP associated with the key tag used for the request for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key. In response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the master cryptographic recovery key, a new alternative key is generated. In some methods, the new alternative key is encrypted with the master cryptographic recovery key. In other words, in some methods, in response to determining that no match exists, a new alternative key is generated, encrypted with the current recovery key, and the new RKVP is returned to the DMS.
[0097] The predetermined maintenance process preferably further includes comparing the RKVP associated with the key tag with the RKVP stored in the metadata. This comparison can be performed as part of the maintenance process to ensure that requests for the dataset are authorized (a match exists) and the correct dataset is opened. About Figure 2C For infrastructure 5, DMS preferably compares, or makes DMS compare, and the returned RKVP has an encrypted RKVP, for example, see operations 262, 264, and 266. In response to determining from the comparison result that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, a new alternative key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are stored in the metadata. More specifically, if no match exists, DMS stores the returned alternative key and RKVP in the dataset encryption unit. This storage of the new alternative key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the metadata ensures that the mismatch is correct for subsequent opening of the dataset.
[0098] Operation 268 involves the DMS using the returned protected key to invoke (instructed to invoke) CPACF to encrypt (e.g., write operation) or decrypt (e.g., read operation) the dataset.
[0099] The technical effects of performing a scheduled maintenance process to maintain alternative keys within the infrastructure include: preventing delays in performing the recovery process in the event of a lost encryption key due to RKVP and recovery key mismatch, and also mitigating delays that would otherwise occur in subsequent requests to open the dataset (based on existing mismatches).
[0100] Now for reference Figure 2D The document describes a flowchart including techniques for recovering a key from an alternative key. More specifically, Figure 2D The flowchart describes in detail how, in response to the detection that the DSE key has been lost from the key repository, the operation key (DSE key) is recovered using an alternative key and the recovered DSE key is stored in the key repository.
[0101] exist Figure 2DThe diagram shows a flowchart of method 270 according to one method. According to the present invention, method 270 can be performed... Figure 1-5 In any environment described herein, wherein, it is performed in various ways. Of course, as those skilled in the art will understand upon reading this specification, method 270 may include methods other than... Figure 2D The specific operations described in the text may include more or fewer operations.
[0102] Each step of method 270 can be performed by any suitable component of the operating environment. For example, in various methods, method 270 can be performed partially or entirely by processing circuitry or some other device having one or more processors. One or more steps of method 270 can be performed in any device using a processor (e.g., processing circuitry, chips, and / or modules implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably having at least one hardware component). Illustrative processors include, but are not limited to, central processing units (CPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing devices known in the art.
[0103] As a preface, in some methods, the operation of method 270 can be performed in response to determining that the key is unavailable. For example, an alternative key can be used in response to determining that the operation key is unavailable. In some methods, this unavailability can be based on the deletion of the key tag used as an alternative password recovery key. In some methods, this unavailability can be determined when attempting to open the dataset. In some other methods, this unavailability can be determined when performing a preventative check to ensure that the RKVP matches the master password recovery key.
[0104] In some methods, method 270 includes determining that the owner of the dataset is attempting and / or requesting to open the existing dataset. In response, the DMS may be invoked, for example, see operation 272. In some methods, the DMS invokes the SAF to check authorization for the key tag.
[0105] Furthermore, the DMS can invoke the ICSF with the key tag and RKVP, for example, see operation 274. The ICSF may not be able to locate the key tag in the key memory (in CKDS), therefore, in this method, it may return a failure, for example, see operation 276.
[0106] In response to failure, an alternative encryption key is retrieved. For example, the DMS can retrieve or be instructed to retrieve an alternative key from the dataset encryption unit, and the ICSF can be invoked using the key tag, RKVP, and alternative key, for example, see operations 278, 280, 282, and 284.
[0107] The process of retrieving the encrypted alternative key may further include: causing the ICSF to invoke the HSM and firmware to determine whether the RKVP associated with the key tag requested for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key, for example, see operation 286. In some methods, this determination includes verifying that the RKVP matches the master recovery key. In other words, verification is performed to ensure that an instance-specific recovery key is being retrieved. In response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the master cryptographic recovery key, method 270 includes decrypting the encrypted alternative key using the master cryptographic recovery key and encrypting the decrypted alternative key using the current master key stored in the cryptographic HSM. Note that in some methods, the master key may be defined as the key used to mark the operational key in the cryptographic HSM. In other words, the alternative key is decrypted from the master recovery key, and the resulting key is encrypted with the current master key.
[0108] In some methods, operation 286 further includes generating a protected key to be used for encrypting and decrypting the dataset. In other words, in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the master cryptographic recovery key, a protected key is generated and returned for proactive use with a hardware cryptographic engine (e.g., CPACF) for encrypting and decrypting the dataset.
[0109] The alternative key encrypted with the master key is stored in CKDS. Furthermore, in some methods, both the protected key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are returned to the API of the system managing the use of the alternative key and the dataset. For example, for the infrastructure of method 270, ICSF stores the MK-encrypted key in CKDS and returns the protected key and RKVP to DMS.
[0110] The CIM of claim 2 includes: determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata; and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, storing the alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the metadata (thereby effectively replacing the RKVP stored in the metadata with the RKVP associated with the key tag).
[0111] The returned RKVP can be compared with the RKVP in the metadata, see, for example, operations 288, 290, and 292. More specifically, in some methods, the DMS compares the returned RKVP with the RKVP in the encryption unit. In response to determining that no match exists, the DMS stores the returned alternative key and RKVP in the metadata (e.g., in the dataset encryption unit).
[0112] In operation 294, DMS calls CPACF to encrypt (e.g., write operation) or decrypt (e.g., read operation) the dataset using the returned protected key.
[0113] The technical benefits of retrieving and using alternative keys (as described in method 270 above) include reducing latency and processing overhead in traditional data storage systems. These benefits also include preserving user data that would otherwise be lost, since manual decryption is not feasible for recovering user data encrypted with a lost encryption key.
[0114] Now for reference Figure 2E The document describes a flowchart including techniques for performing key recovery (using an alternative recovery key) from an alternative key. More specifically, Figure 2E The flowchart details how, in response to the detection of a mismatch between the RKVP and the alternative HSM recovery key, a new alternative key is generated from the HSM and stored in the dataset's metadata. In other words, when a mismatch is detected between the RKVP from the dataset metadata and the recovery key in the HSM, a request is made to generate a new alternative key from the HSM, which is then stored along with the new RKVP as part of the dataset metadata.
[0115] exist Figure 2E The diagram shows a flowchart of method 201 according to a method. According to the present invention, method 201 can be performed... Figure 1-5 In any environment described herein, wherein it is performed in various ways. Of course, as those skilled in the art will understand upon reading this specification, method 201 may include methods other than... Figure 2E The specific operations described in the text may include more or fewer operations.
[0116] Each step of method 201 can be performed by any suitable component of the operating environment. For example, in various methods, method 201 can be performed partially or entirely by processing circuitry or some other device having one or more processors therein. One or more steps of method 201 can be performed in any device using a processor (e.g., processing circuitry, chips, and / or modules implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably having at least one hardware component). Illustrative processors include, but are not limited to, central processing units (CPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing devices known in the art.
[0117] In some methods, one or more operations of method 201 match one or more operations of method 270. For example, it can be noted that method 201 includes operations 272, 274, 276, 278, 280, 282, and 284. Therefore, one or more operations described in method 270 can be performed in method 201.
[0118] Method 201 also includes an ICSF call and / or being instructed to call the HSM and firmware to determine whether the RKVP associated with the key tag for the request for the dataset matches the master password recovery key, for example, see operation 203. In response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the master password recovery key, it is determined whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the alternative password recovery key. In response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the alternative password recovery key, a failure is returned, for example, to the device from which the request for the dataset was received.
[0119] Conversely, a match can be determined. For example, in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches an alternative cipher recovery key, a predetermined recovery process can be performed. In some methods, the predetermined recovery process includes decrypting the encrypted alternative key using the alternative cipher recovery key and encrypting the decrypted encrypted alternative key using the current master key stored in the cipher HSM. In other words, in response to such a determination, the alternative key is decrypted from the alternative recovery key, and the resulting key is encrypted using the current master key.
[0120] In some methods, the predetermined recovery process also includes encrypting the decrypted alternative key with the master cryptographic recovery key, and returning the alternative key encrypted with the master cryptographic recovery key (the newly encrypted alternative key) and the RKVP associated with the key tag to the device (e.g., the caller). A protected key can be generated for proactive use in the encryption and decryption of the dataset, for example, where a hardware cryptographic engine (e.g., CPACF) can be used to perform encryption and decryption. The alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are stored in the CKDS, and the protected key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are returned to the DMS. In other words, in some methods, ICSF stores the MK-encrypted key in the CKDS and returns the protected key and RKVP to the DMS.
[0121] In some methods, the predetermined recovery process may include: determining (by comparison) whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata, for example, see operations 205, 207, and 209. In response to the determination that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, an alternative key encrypted with the master cipher recovery key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are stored in the metadata (by instructing the DMS). In some methods, in response to the DMS receiving an erroneous determination from the ICSF, it causes the open operation to fail. Otherwise, the DMS compares the returned RKVP with the RKVP in the encryption unit. If they do not match, the DMS stores the returned alternative key and RKVP in the dataset encryption unit.
[0122] In some methods, DMS can call CPACF to encrypt (e.g., write operation) or decrypt (e.g., read operation) a dataset using the returned protected key, see, for example, operation 211.
[0123] The technical benefits of retrieving alternative keys to perform recovery include reducing latency and processing overhead in traditional data storage systems. These benefits also include preserving user data that would otherwise be lost, as manual decryption is impractical for recovering user data encrypted with a lost encryption key.
[0124] Figure 3 A key hierarchy 300 according to one method is described. Alternatively, the current key hierarchy 300 can be implemented by combining features from any other methods listed herein, such as those described with reference to the other figures. Of course, this key hierarchy 300, and other systems presented herein, can be used for various applications and / or permutations, which may or may not be specifically described in the illustrative methods listed herein. Furthermore, the key hierarchy 300 presented herein can be used in any desired environment.
[0125] According to ISO 11568, a key hierarchy 300 can be defined as a conceptual structure where the confidentiality of some keys depends on the confidentiality of others. The recovery key is considered the top-level key. For example, in some methods, the recovery key is a 256-bit AES key, persistently stored in the recovery key register on the encryption fast adapter, and must be loaded using a TKE workstation. Conversely, in some methods, the master recovery key can be used to create and recover alternative keys. Alternate recovery keys are used to recover alternative keys encrypted with recovery keys different from the current master recovery key. Alternate recovery keys are not used to create new alternative keys.
[0126] Alternate keys are created by exporting the data encryption key (DEK) encrypted with the master key under the master recovery key. Alternate keys can reside with the encrypted data (e.g., a dataset encryption unit) and can be restored as secure keys by importing them under the local master key.
[0127] Figures 4A-4B Load flowcharts 400 and 450 according to several methods are depicted. Alternatively, these load flowcharts 400 and 450 can be implemented by combining features from any other methods listed herein, such as those described with reference to the other figures. Of course, however, such load flowcharts 400 and 450, and other flowcharts presented herein, can be used for various applications and / or substitutions, which may or may not be specifically described in the illustrative methods listed herein. Furthermore, the load flowcharts 400 and 450 presented herein can be used in any desired environment.
[0128] First refer to Figure 4A The first TKE used for TKE loading component 402 can be authenticated by a first key officer (e.g., see KO1). Similarly, the second TKE used for TKE loading component 402 can be authenticated by a second key officer (e.g., see KO2). TKE loading component 402 is configured to load the password recovery key into TKE workstation 404. Furthermore, TKE workstation is configured to load a portion of the password recovery key into the master password recovery key register on a predetermined card, such as see crypto express. More specifically, in Figure 4A In operation 406, the recovery password recovery key portion is loaded into the master password recovery key register on the pre-defined card. Conversely, in loading flowchart 450, in Figure 4B In operation 452, the TKE workstation is configured to load a portion of the password recovery key into the alternative password recovery key register on the predetermined card. More specifically, in Figure 4B In operation 452, the recovery password recovery key portion is loaded into the alternative password recovery key register on the pre-defined card.
[0129] Figure 5 A structure 500 according to one method is depicted. Alternatively, this structure 500 can be implemented by combining features from any other methods listed herein, such as those described with reference to other figures; however, such a structure 500 and other structures presented herein can be used for various applications and / or substitutions, which may or may not be specifically described in the illustrative methods listed herein. Furthermore, the structure 500 presented herein can be used in any desired environment.
[0130] According to a method of the present invention, structure 500 includes a dataset encryption unit 502 and an encrypted dataset 504. Within the dataset encryption unit 502, a DSE key tag encrypts the dataset, and an alternative key is encrypted by a recovery key. Within the techniques described herein, the dataset encryption (DSE) key (also referred to herein as the "operation key") can be stored in two locations, for example, in a CKDS encrypted by a master key and in the dataset encryption unit encrypted by a recovery key (e.g., an alternative key).
[0131] The DSE key is preferably encrypted with a recovery key and stored as an alternative key in the dataset encryption unit. The RKVP may also be stored in the encryption unit to ensure that the recovery key on the cipher fast adapter matches the recovery key used to create the alternative key. If the dataset encryption key is removed from CKDS, the recovery key can be used to decrypt the alternative key stored with the encrypted dataset.
[0132] In some illustrative methods, an alternative key can be re-encrypted in the event of a compromised recovery key or for periodic recovery key rotation. For example, a new multipart recovery key can be generated and loaded using TKE, and the encrypted dataset can be opened. In some methods, at the dataset opening time, the DMS calls the ICSF to retrieve the protected key. At this time, the ICSF can also call the adapter to retrieve the RKVP (for comparison) or the alternative key (for replacement). Furthermore, the DMS can be instructed to store the updated alternative key in the dataset encryption unit. It should be noted that in some methods, migrated or archived datasets will need to be recovered so that the alternative key can be re-encrypted.
[0133] It is clear that the various features of the aforementioned systems and / or methods can be combined in any way, resulting in multiple combinations from the description presented above.
[0134] It should also be understood that the method of the present invention can be provided in the form of a service deployed on behalf of a customer, so as to provide services on demand.
[0135] Various methods of the present invention have been described for illustrative purposes, but are not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the disclosed methods. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described methods. The terminology used herein has been chosen to best explain the principles of the methods, their practical application, or improvements to the technology found in the market, or to enable others skilled in the art to understand the methods disclosed herein.
Claims
1. A computer-implemented method for CIM, the CIM comprising: Generate the master password recovery key; Generate an alternative password recovery key, wherein the alternative password recovery key is generated and stored in the cryptographic hardware security module HSM; The encrypted alternative key is stored in metadata associated with the dataset, wherein the encrypted alternative key is an operation key encrypted by the master password recovery key; The Recovery Key Verification Mode (RKVP) is stored in the metadata, wherein the RKVP is associated with and stored for use with the master password recovery key; and In response to determining that the operation key is unavailable, the encrypted alternative key is retrieved to perform a data decryption operation.
2. The CIM of claim 1, wherein, Retrieving the encrypted alternative key includes: determining whether an RKVP associated with a key tag for a request for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key, and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the master cryptographic recovery key: using the master cryptographic recovery key to decrypt the encrypted alternative key; using the current master key stored in the cipher HSM to encrypt the decrypted alternative key; generating a protected key for encrypting and decrypting the dataset; and storing the alternative key encrypted with the master key in the encrypted key dataset CKDS.
3. The CIM of claim 2, comprising: Determine whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata; And in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, the alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are stored in the metadata.
4. The CIM of claim 1, wherein, The determination that the operation key is unavailable is based on the deletion of the key tag used for the alternative password recovery key.
5. The CIM of claim 1, wherein, The dataset is encrypted by the operation key, and the CIM includes: receiving a request for the dataset; and in response to receiving the request for the dataset, performing a predetermined maintenance process, wherein the predetermined maintenance process includes: causing the cipher HSM to generate and return a protected key for active use in the encryption and decryption of the dataset; determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag of the request for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key; and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the master cryptographic recovery key, generating a new alternative key, wherein the new alternative key is encrypted by the master cryptographic recovery key.
6. The CIM of claim 5, comprising: The RKVP associated with the key tag is compared with the RKVP stored in the metadata; And in response to determining from the comparison result that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, the new alternative key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are stored in the metadata.
7. The CIM of claim 1, wherein, Retrieving the encrypted alternative key includes: determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag for the request for the dataset matches the master password recovery key; in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the master password recovery key, determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the alternative password recovery key; in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the alternative password recovery key, returning a failure to the device from which the request for the dataset was received; and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the alternative password recovery key. The key executes a predetermined recovery process, wherein the predetermined recovery process includes: decrypting the encrypted alternative key using the alternative cryptographic recovery key; encrypting the decrypted encrypted alternative key using the current master key; encrypting the decrypted alternative key using the master cryptographic recovery key; and returning the alternative key encrypted with the master cryptographic recovery key and the RKVP associated with the key tag to the device; generating a protected key that will be actively used for encryption and decryption of the dataset; and placing the alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the cryptographic key dataset CKDS.
8. The CIM of claim 7, wherein, The predetermined recovery process includes: determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata; and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, storing the alternative key for encrypting the master password recovery key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the metadata.
9. A computer program product (CPP), the CPP comprising: A collection of one or more computer-readable storage media; as well as Program instructions, collectively stored in a set of one or more storage media, are used to cause the processor set to perform the following computer operations: Generate the master password recovery key; Generate an alternative password recovery key, wherein the alternative password recovery key is generated and stored in the cryptographic hardware security module HSM; The encrypted alternative key is stored in metadata associated with the dataset, wherein the encrypted alternative key is an operation key encrypted by the master password recovery key; The Recovery Key Verification Mode (RKVP) is stored in the metadata, wherein the RKVP is associated with and stored for use with the master password recovery key; and In response to determining that the operation key is unavailable, the encrypted alternative key is retrieved to perform a data decryption operation.
10. The CPP of claim 9, wherein, Retrieving the encrypted alternative key includes: determining whether an RKVP associated with a key tag for a request for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key, and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the master cryptographic recovery key: using the master cryptographic recovery key to decrypt the encrypted alternative key; using the current master key stored in the cipher HSM to encrypt the decrypted alternative key; generating a protected key for encrypting and decrypting the dataset; and storing the alternative key encrypted with the master key in the encrypted key dataset CKDS.
11. The CPP of claim 10, comprising: Program instructions, collectively stored in a set of one or more storage media, are used to cause the set of processors to perform the following computer operation: determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata; And in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, the alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are stored in the metadata.
12. The CPP of claim 9, wherein, The determination that the operation key is unavailable is based on the deletion of the key tag used for the alternative password recovery key.
13. The CPP of claim 9, wherein, The dataset is encrypted by the operation key, and the CPP includes: program instructions, collectively stored in a set of the one or more storage media, for causing the set of processors to perform the following computer operations: receiving a request for the dataset; and in response to receiving the request for the dataset, performing a predetermined maintenance process, wherein the predetermined maintenance process includes: causing the cryptographic HSM to generate and return a protected key for proactive use in encrypting and decrypting the dataset; determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag for the request for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key; and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the master cryptographic recovery key, generating a new alternative key, wherein the new alternative key is encrypted by the master cryptographic recovery key.
14. The CPP of claim 13, comprising program instructions, collectively stored in a set of the one or more storage media, for causing the set of processors to perform the following computer operations: comparing the RKVP associated with the key tag with the RKVP stored in the metadata; and in response to determining from the result of the comparison that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, such that the new alternative key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are stored in the metadata.
15. The CPP of claim 9, wherein, Retrieving the encrypted alternative key includes: determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag for the request for the dataset matches the master password recovery key; in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the master password recovery key, determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the alternative password recovery key; in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the alternative password recovery key, returning a failure to the device from which the request for the dataset was received; and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the alternative password recovery key. The key executes a predetermined recovery process, wherein the predetermined recovery process includes: decrypting the encrypted alternative key using the alternative cryptographic recovery key; encrypting the decrypted encrypted alternative key using the current master key; encrypting the decrypted alternative key using the master cryptographic recovery key; and returning the alternative key encrypted with the master cryptographic recovery key and the RKVP associated with the key tag to the device; generating a protected key that will be actively used for encryption and decryption of the dataset; and placing the alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the cryptographic key dataset CKDS.
16. The CPP of claim 15, wherein, The predetermined recovery process includes: determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata; and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, storing the alternative key for encrypting the master password recovery key and the RKVP associated with the key tag in the metadata.
17. A computer system CS, the CS comprising: Processor set; A collection of one or more computer-readable storage media; Program instructions, collectively stored in a set of one or more storage media, are used to cause the set of processors to perform the following computer operations: Generate the master password recovery key; Generate an alternative password recovery key, wherein the alternative password recovery key is generated and stored in the cryptographic hardware security module HSM; The encrypted alternative key is stored in metadata associated with the dataset, wherein the encrypted alternative key is an operation key encrypted by the master password recovery key; The Recovery Key Verification Mode (RKVP) is stored in the metadata, wherein the RKVP is associated with and stored for use with the master password recovery key; and In response to determining that the operation key is unavailable, the encrypted alternative key is retrieved to perform a data decryption operation.
18. The CS of claim 17, wherein, Retrieving the encrypted alternative key includes: determining whether an RKVP associated with a key tag for a request for the dataset matches the master cryptographic recovery key, and in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the master cryptographic recovery key: using the master cryptographic recovery key to decrypt the encrypted alternative key; using the current master key stored in the cipher HSM to encrypt the decrypted alternative key; generating a protected key for encrypting and decrypting the dataset; and storing the alternative key encrypted with the master key in the encrypted key dataset CKDS.
19. The CS of claim 18, comprising: Program instructions, collectively stored in a set of one or more storage media, are used to cause the set of processors to perform the following computer operation: determining whether the RKVP associated with the key tag matches the RKVP stored in the metadata; And in response to determining that the RKVP associated with the key tag does not match the RKVP stored in the metadata, the alternative key encrypted with the master key and the RKVP associated with the key tag are stored in the metadata.
20. The CS of claim 17, wherein, The determination that the operation key is unavailable is based on the deletion of the key tag used for the alternative password recovery key.
