Method and system for verifying a vehicle's software platform
The TPM-based method and system verify ECU software integrity by comparing hash values, ensuring authenticity and preventing abnormal operation, thus ensuring safe vehicle operation.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- DE102010039963
- Authority / Receiving Office
- DE · DE
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2010-03-02
- Filing Date
- 2010-08-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-28
- Estimated Expiration
- 2030-08-30
AI Technical Summary
Existing methods fail to effectively verify the authenticity and integrity of software in vehicle electronic control units (ECUs), which can lead to abnormal operation during software updates or resets, compromising vehicle safety.
A method and system utilizing a trusted platform module (TPM) and integrity verification modules to generate and compare hash values, ensuring the software's integrity by comparing final confirmation values generated from initial values and data processing sequences, encrypting and transmitting results through a secure channel.
Ensures the authenticity and integrity of vehicle ECU software, preventing abnormal operation and ensuring safe vehicle operation by detecting any software changes or tampering.
Smart Images

Figure 00000000_0000_ABST
Abstract
Description
Cross-reference to related application
[0001] This application claims priority to and the benefit of Korean Patent Application Nos. 10-2009-0119963 and 10-2010-0018689, filed in the Korean Intellectual Property Office on December 4, 2009 and March 2, 2010, respectively, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Background of the invention(a) Field of the invention
[0002] The present invention relates to a method and a system for verifying a software platform of a vehicle. (b) Description of the associated technology
[0003] Electronic control units (ECUs) are electronic control units located within a vehicle.
[0004] In general, the ECU is a microprocessor-based embedded system that contains read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electronically programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), and flash memory.
[0005] The ECU located inside a vehicle can update or reset the ECU software based on the results obtained by flashing (overwriting) the software (S / W). However, during the software update or reset process, the ECU software is deliberately modified, preventing it from performing its existing functions.
[0006] US 2003 / 0 055 552 A1 describes a system and method for detecting tampering with software used by a vehicle controller, software parameters, and calibration data. During an authorized installation of controller memory maps, a hash function is applied to selected areas of the controller memory to obtain stored hash values. Subsequently, during vehicle operation, the hash function is periodically applied to the current contents of the controller memory to obtain calculated hash values. If the stored hash values do not match the calculated hash values, a fault is logged and can be retrieved later by service personnel.
[0007] US 2008 / 0 010 466 A1 describes means by which data security can be ensured in a recorded data sequence through the use of digital signatures. The recorded data sequence contains video, audio, and metadata. The digital signatures are calculated using publicly available hash algorithms and concatenated in a manner described in US 2008 / 0 010 466 A1 to ensure trust in the data integrity and security of the recorded data during playback.
[0008] The Wikipedia entry “Trusted Platform Module” from December 3, 2009, discusses the definition and understanding of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
[0009] US 2006 / 0 020 796 A1 deals with a hash extension technique used to generate an ECGA. In US 2006 / 0 020 796 A1, this can be used to increase the strength of one-way hash functions and / or decrease the number of bits in any situation where an external requirement limits the number of hash bits and this limit is below the value that is (or could be) considered secure against brute-force attacks. To reduce the length of human-entered security codes (while maintaining the same level of security) and / or increase the strength of a human-entered security code (while maintaining the same length of the security code), a security code can be generated and / or authenticated using an extended hash method. Brief description of the invention
[0010] The present invention was made in an effort to provide a method and system for verifying a software platform of a vehicle that advantageously verifies that software from various electronic control units of a vehicle is bona fide, manufacturer-supplied software.
[0011] The objects of the present invention are achieved by means of the subject-matter of the independent claims. The subject-matter of the dependent claims exemplifies some of the possible embodiments.
[0012] An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for verifying a software platform of a vehicle including at least one electronic control unit, comprising: Receiving a first final confirmation value corresponding to a hash value (folding value) of software measured in the electronic control unit by an integrated security device within the vehicle; extending a hash value of normally operating software received from a software manufacturer of the electronic control unit based on an initial value and a data processing sequence input by a driver of the vehicle to generate a second final confirmation value; wherein the first final confirmation value is generated by extending the measured hash value of software with the initial value and the data processing sequence in a trusted platform module (100) included in the integrated security device (10);Verifying the vehicle's software platform based on results obtained by comparing the first final confirmation value with the second final confirmation value; and encrypting the initial value and the data processing sequence input by the vehicle driver and transmitting them to the integrated security device (10) prior to receiving;
[0013] Another embodiment of the present invention provides a system for verifying a software platform of a vehicle including at least one electronic control unit, comprising: a trusted platform module that expands a hash value of normally operating software in the electronic control unit to generate a reference confirmation value; and an integrity verification module that receives a final confirmation value corresponding to a hash value of software measured in the electronic control unit by an integrated security device within the vehicle and verifies the vehicle's software platform based on results obtained by comparing the final confirmation value with the reference confirmation value, wherein the integrated security device (10) includes: an integrity verification processing module (200) that collects the hash value of software measured in the electronic control device (30) and requests the expansion of the collected hash value;and a trusted platform module (100) that extends the hash value based on an initial value and a data processing sequence input by the driver of the vehicle to generate the final confirmation value; Short description of the drawings Fig. 1 is a diagram illustrating a system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention; and Fig. 2 is a diagram illustrating a method for verifying a software platform of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed description of the embodiments
[0014] In the following detailed description, only certain embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described simply for the purpose of illustration. As those skilled in the art would appreciate, the described embodiments may be modified in various different ways, all without departing from the spirit or scope of the present invention. Accordingly, the drawings and description are to be considered illustrative and not restrictive in nature. Like reference characters designate like elements throughout the description.
[0015] Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the word "comprise" and variants such as "comprises" or "comprising" in the description are to be understood as implying the inclusion of specified elements but not the exclusion of any other elements.
[0016] In the specification, a data terminal may refer to a mobile station (MS), a data terminal, a mobile data terminal (MT), a subscriber station (SS), a portable subscriber station (PSS), a user equipment (UE), an access data terminal (AT), etc., and may include functions of all or part of the mobile station, mobile data terminal, subscriber station, portable subscriber station, user equipment, access data terminal, etc.
[0017] Hereinafter, a system and a method for verifying a software platform of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.
[0018] First, a trusted platform module (hereinafter referred to as "TPM") is a hardware module that verifies (confirms) that the currently used platform is in a secure state. The TPM embeds a crypto module (not shown) and stores results obtained by measuring the integrity (authenticity) of the platform in a special register, for example, a platform configuration register (hereinafter referred to as "PCR"). Furthermore, the TPM verifies the authentication and integrity of the platform using the crypto module and a random number generator, etc. At this time, hash values (convolution values) are appended to the existing PCR values according to an extension command. For example, new PCR values are generated using a hash function such as SHA-1, so a PCR (number word) stores the newly generated PCR values.This means that one PCR can store many measured values.
[0019] In the case of the mobile TPM used in the mobile device, a reference integrity metric (hereinafter referred to as "RIM") and a target integrity metric (hereinafter referred to as "TIM") verify the integrity of software using the hash values for the software images.
[0020] The RIM generates and stores the values based on measurement results before initiation when loading or executing software or hardware.
[0021] The TIM represents the health metric of target objects or components, which is measured by a measurement agent of objects each time a power supply is switched on.
[0022] Verification that the corresponding software has not been modified is carried out by comparing the measured TIM values with the stored RIM values each time. The RIM is issued in the form of a certificate, such as a RIM certificate, and verified by signing the certificate.
[0023] With reference to Fig. 1, an environment in which the system is used to verify a software platform of a vehicle is described in detail with reference to the technique for verifying the integrity of the TPM.
[0024] Fig. 1 is an environment in which the system for verifying a software platform of a vehicle is used according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0025] First, a system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle may be applied to a driver's data terminal, but is not limited thereto.
[0026] With reference to Fig. 1, the system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle is operated by connecting it to an integrated security device 10 located within the vehicle. At this time, the vehicle contains at least one electronic control unit (hereinafter referred to as "ECUs") 30.
[0027] The system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention verifies the software platform of the vehicle using the integrated security device 10 based on hash values corresponding to the software of the ECU 30. Each ECU 30 includes a software integrity measurement agent (hereinafter referred to as "IMA") 35. The IMA 35 measures the hash values of the software of the corresponding ECU 30.
[0028] The integrated security device 10 includes a trusted platform module (hereinafter referred to as "first TPM") 100 and an integrity verification processing module 200. Furthermore, the system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle includes a second TPM 300 and an integrity verification module 400.
[0029] The first TPM 100 and the second TPM 300 are each hardware modules that verify that the currently used platform is in a secure state.
[0030] The integrity verification processing module 200 collects the hash values from software of the ECU 30 and requests the extension of the collected hash values to the first TPM 100. At this time, the integrity verification processing module 200 requests the extension of the hash values to the first TPM 100 using an initial value and a data processing sequence input to the driver's terminal.
[0031] Furthermore, the integrity verification processing module 200 temporarily stores the collected hash values of software of the ECU 30 in protected areas provided in the first TPM 100.
[0032] Next, the integrity verification processing module 200 receives the results (integrity verification values extended by the specific register of the first TPM) according to the request, that is, the first final confirmation values, from the first TPM 100. The data processing sequence is a sequence that the integrity verification processing module 200 requests the extension of the hash values of the corresponding software of each ECU 30 to the first TPM 100. At this time, the integrity verification processing module 200 encrypts the first final confirmation values and transmits them to the terminal device since the first final confirmation values are modified in accordance with the data processing sequence.
[0033] The communication between the integrated security device 10 disposed within the vehicle and the system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention uses a crypto module (not shown) of the TPM and an attestation procedure, etc., to establish the attestation and the secure communication channel for each of them.
[0034] The vehicle software platform verification system 20 receives the hash values of normally operating software from the software of each ECU 30 and stores them in protected areas (not shown). At this time, the software platform verification system 20 receives the software hash values in the form of a certificate. During the first verification attempt, it also receives the initial value beforehand via the data terminal.
[0035] An integrity verification module 400 decrypts the encrypted first final confirmation values.
[0036] Next, the integrity verification module 400 requests the extension of the hash values stored in the previously protected areas from software of the ECU 30 to the second TPM 300 using the set initial values and the data processing sequence input by the driver into the terminal.
[0037] The integrity verification module 400 receives the results according to the request, that is, the second final confirmation values augmented by the special PCR of the second TPM 300, to compare whether the second final confirmation values are equal to the first final confirmation values. Since the second final confirmation values are values generated based on the hash values of normally operating software by software manufacturers of the ECU 30, they are, at this time, reference confirmation values that the software determines according to the first final confirmation values.
[0038] If the first final confirmation values are not equal to the second final confirmation values, the integrity verification module 400 determines that the software of the ECU 30 within the vehicle has been modified. Furthermore, the integrity verification module 400 informs the driver that the software of the ECU 30 has been modified so that the driver can take the appropriate action.
[0039] When the first final confirmation values are equal to the second final confirmation values, the integrity verification module 400 determines that the software of the ECU 30 of the vehicle is not changed, that is, its software is operating normally.
[0040] Furthermore, when the software of the ECU 30 is operating normally or the software of the ECU 30 is changed, the integrity verification module 400 receives the initial value and the data processing sequence from the driver through the terminal, thereby updating the corresponding data processing sequence and initial values. Next, the integrity verification module 400 encrypts the newly set data processing sequence and the initial value and transmits the encrypted results to the integrated security device 10. At this time, the integrated security device 10 updates the values stored in the protected areas to the encrypted result values.
[0041] Next, a method for verifying a software platform of a vehicle will be described with reference to Fig. 2 described in detail.
[0042] Fig. 2 is a diagram illustrating a method for verifying a software platform of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0043] First, the system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle can be applied to a driver's terminal and includes the integrity verification processing module 200 and the second TPM 300.
[0044] The system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention verifies the software platform of the vehicle using the integrated security device 10 located within the vehicle based on the hash values corresponding to the software of the ECU 30. The integrated security device 10 includes the first TPM 100 and the integrity verification processing module 200.
[0045] The system 20 for verifying a vehicle's software platform can be applied when the driver starts the vehicle. When the driver starts the vehicle, the IMA 35 of the ECU 30 measures the hash values of the ECU software.
[0046] With reference to Fig. 2, the integrated security device 10 collects the hash values of the software of each ECU 30 (S201). The hash values of the software of the ECU 30 are values measured by the IMA 35 contained in each ECU 35.
[0047] The integrity verification processing module 200 in the integrated security device 10 temporarily stores the collected hash values of the software of the ECU 30 in the protected areas provided in the first TPM 100 (S202).
[0048] The integrity verification processing module 200 requests the extension of the hash values to the first TPM 100 using the initial value and the data processing sequence received from the terminal (S203). The data processing sequence is a sequence in which the integrity verification processing module 200 requests the extension of the hash values of the corresponding software of each ECU 30 to the first TPM 100.
[0049] Next, the integrity verification processing module 200 receives the integrity verification values (the first final confirmation values that extend the hash values) according to the request (S204).
[0050] The integrated security device 10 generates the trusted channel to the system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle using the authentication procedure of the TPM and exchanges public keys generated by the first TPM 100 and the second TPM 300 on the trusted channel (S205).
[0051] The integrated security device 10 encrypts the first final confirmation values and transmits them to the system 20 for verifying a software platform of a vehicle (S206).
[0052] The integrity verification module 400 decrypts the encrypted first final confirmation values (S207). The integrity verification module 400 requests the extension of the previously stored hash values of the software of the ECU 30 to the second TPM 300 using the initial value and the data processing sequence (S208). The previously stored hash values of the software of the ECU 30 are values stored in the protected areas by allowing the terminal to access the hash values of normally operating software from the software manufacturers of each ECU 30.
[0053] The integrity verification module 400 receives the integrity verification values (the second final confirmation values that extend the hash values) according to the request (S209).
[0054] The integrity verification module 400 compares the first final confirmation values with the second final confirmation values to determine whether they are equal to each other (S210).
[0055] If the first final confirmation values are not equal to the second final confirmation values, the integrity verification module 400 informs the driver that the software of the ECU 30 within the vehicle has been changed (S211).
[0056] When the first final confirmation values are equal to the second final confirmation values, the integrity verification module 400 determines that the software of the ECU 30 of the vehicle is not changed, that is, its software is operating normally (S212).
[0057] Next, the integrity verification module 400 updates the data processing sequence and the initial value when the software of the ECU 30 is operated normally or the software of the ECU 30 is changed (S213).
[0058] As described above, the present invention can verify the software integrity of various ECUs in the vehicle using the TPM, the trusted platform module, and the driver's terminal. Furthermore, the present invention verifies the software integrity of the ECU to prevent the ECU from operating abnormally and enable the driver to drive the vehicle safely.
[0059] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the method and system for verifying a software platform of a vehicle may verify the integrity of software located within various electronic control units using the trusted security module in a vehicle.
[0060] By verifying the integrity of software of electronic control units, abnormal operation of electronic control units can be further prevented and the driver can drive a vehicle safely.
[0061] The above-mentioned embodiments of the present invention are not embodied only by an apparatus and a method. Alternatively, the above-mentioned embodiments may be embodied by a program that performs functions corresponding to the configuration of the embodiments of the present invention, or a recording medium on which the program is recorded. These embodiments can be easily devised by a person skilled in the art to which the present invention belongs from the description of the above-mentioned embodiments.
Claims
[1] A method for verifying a software platform of a vehicle containing at least one electronic control unit (30), comprising: Receiving a first final confirmation value corresponding to a hash value of software measured in the electronic control unit (30) by an integrated security device (10) within the vehicle, Extending a hash value of normally operating software received from a software manufacturer of the electronic control unit (30) based on an initial value and a data processing sequence input by a driver of the vehicle to generate a second final confirmation value; wherein the first final confirmation value is generated by extending the measured hash value by software with the initial value and the data processing sequence in a trusted platform module (100) included in the integrated security device (10); Verifying the vehicle’s software platform based on results obtained by comparing the first final confirmation value with the second final confirmation value, and Encrypting the initial value and data processing sequence input by the driver of the vehicle and transmitting them to the integrated security device (10) before receiving. [2] The method of claim 1, wherein verifying comprises determining that the software of the electronic control unit (30) within the vehicle is changed when the first final confirmation value is not equal to the second final confirmation value, and informing the driver that the software is changed. [3] The method of claim 1, wherein verifying comprises determining that the software of the electronic control unit (30) within the vehicle is operating normally when the first final confirmation value is equal to the second final confirmation value. [4] The method of claim 1, 2, or 3, wherein the data processing sequence corresponds to a sequence that extends the hash value of software in the integrated security device (10). [5] System for verifying a software platform of a vehicle containing at least one electronic control unit (30), comprising: a trusted platform module (100) that extends a hash value of normally operating software in the electronic control unit (30) to generate a reference confirmation value; and an integrity verification module (200) that receives a final confirmation value corresponding to a hash value of software measured in the electronic control unit (30) by an integrated security device (10) within the vehicle, and verifies the software platform of the vehicle based on results obtained by comparing the final confirmation value with the reference confirmation value, wherein the integrated safety device (10) comprises: an integrity verification processing module (200) that collects the hash value of software measured in the electronic control device (30) and requests the extension of the collected hash value; and a trusted platform module (100) that the hash value is extended based on an initial value and a data processing sequence entered by the driver of the vehicle to generate the final confirmation value. [6] The system of claim 5, wherein the integrity verification module (200) determines that the software of the electronic control unit within the vehicle is changed if the first final confirmation value is not equal to the second final confirmation value. [7] The system of claim 5, wherein the integrity verification module (200) determines that the software of the electronic control unit (30) within the vehicle is operating normally when the first final confirmation value is equal to the second final confirmation value. [8] The system of claim 5, 6 or 7, wherein the trusted platform module (100) includes a register that stores results that verify the integrity of the software platform. [9] System according to one of claims 5 to 8, wherein the electronic control unit (30) includes an integrity measurement agent (35) that measures a hash value of software. [10] The system of any one of claims 5 to 9, wherein the data processing sequence corresponds to a sequence that extends the hash value of software in accordance with a request from the integrity verification processing module (200) to the trusted platform module (100). [11] The system of any one of claims 5 to 10, wherein the reference confirmation value corresponds to a hash value of normally operating software provided by a software manufacturer of the electronic control unit (30).
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Computing device and communications framework
KR1020090119963A
Method of predicting acoustic fields based on generalized moving frame acoustic holography and system thereof
KR1020100018689A
Tamper detection for vehicle controller
US20030055552A1
Human input security codes
US20060020796A1
Digital identifier chaining
US20080010466A1
