METHOD FOR SAFELY REPLACING AN INITIAL MANUFACTURER'S CERTIFICATE ALREADY INSTALLED INTO A DEVICE

DE502018015255D1Active Publication Date: 2024-11-14SIEMENS MOBILITY GMBH
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Patent Information

Application Number
DE502018015255
Authority / Receiving Office
DE · DE
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2017-08-17
Filing Date
2018-08-09
Publication Date
2024-11-14
Estimated Expiration
2038-08-09

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing systems lack a method to securely replace manufacturer certificates in devices without returning them to the manufacturer, especially when the certification authority is compromised, leading to trust issues and significant effort in revocation and replacement processes.

Method used

A method to determine device-specific parameters from a trustworthy database, generate a new manufacturer certificate with these parameters, and replace the existing certificate using a second certification authority, allowing for secure updating without physical return of devices.

Benefits of technology

Enables secure and efficient replacement of manufacturer certificates, maintaining device integrity and trust without the need for physical return, optimizing financial and personnel efforts, and ensuring continued operation even after certification authority compromise.

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Description

[0001] The invention relates to a method for securely replacing a first manufacturer certificate already embedded in a device with a second manufacturer certificate without having to return the device to the manufacturer. Furthermore, the invention relates to a system and a corresponding computer program product.

[0002] Authentication of users, machines, and processes is increasingly becoming one of the fundamental requirements for the secure operation of systems and facilities. A proven means of securely implementing this authentication is the use of digital certificates, which are becoming increasingly widespread and are even replacing established password-based processes. Digital certificates are increasingly being used, particularly in highly critical systems in the transportation, energy supply, manufacturing, and medical technology sectors.

[0003] Typical application scenarios for digital certificates, which in particular include a public key for authentication and integrity protection and / or encryption, are for example Certificates used to establish a secure communication connection, for example using the transport layer security protocol TLS, to web servers, certificates for individuals, digital IDs, access control or email, operational certificates for devices for communication, for signing logging data or for decrypting software or configuration data, or manufacturer certificates for devices to prove originality and as a trust anchor for requesting further security-relevant data, which is also known as bootstrapping.

[0004] Most of these certificates are issued for a relatively short period of time, typically one to three years, and are renewed upon expiration. Only manufacturer certificates are intended to be valid for the entire lifetime of the associated device, which can be 30 years or more. Replacing or updating these manufacturer certificates is generally not provided for.

[0005] If a certification authority that issued such a manufacturer certificate is compromised, the manufacturer certificates issued by it can no longer be trusted. If an attacker succeeds in manipulating a peripheral PKI component, such as a local registration authority, they can use this to have the central certification authority create certificates. The attacker can influence or specify parts of the data contained in the certificate, such as the public key or identification characteristics of the certificate holder. Other parts, however, are determined by the certification authority according to the defined certificate profile, such as the time of creation, validity period, serial number of the certificate, and intended use.All certificates issued are typically logged by the certification authority in a database. If misuse is discovered, it is sufficient to identify and revoke the unauthorized certificates. To do this, the certificate serial numbers of the unauthorized certificates are entered into a certificate revocation list and / or into a database for a certificate status protocol, also known as the online certificate status protocol (OCSP). Authentically issued certificates can continue to be used.

[0006] If it is not possible or too costly to identify all certificates issued without authorization individually, all certificates that were requested by the manipulated registration authority during the period of manipulation can also be revoked.

[0007] If an attacker can obtain the certification authority's private signature key by copying or stealing it, they can use it to create certificates with any content, including backdated certificates with a creation date before the time of compromise, as well as with any certificate serial numbers. These certificates are then not included in the certification authority's certificate database. Since their certificate serial numbers are unknown, they cannot be revoked. Furthermore, the attacker can also use the private signature key to create certificate revocation lists that do not include the certificate serial numbers of their forged certificates. In the event of such a serious compromise, no certificate issued by this certification authority can be trusted. The certification authority's certificate must be revoked or revoked by a higher-level certification authority.- if it is a root certification authority (root CA) - must be replaced for all users. This also revokes all certificates issued by the certification authority. A new certification authority must be set up, and all authorized certificate holders must be provided with new certificates.

[0008] Rollout and update procedures are typically available for operational certificates used for communication, signing logging data, etc., as these certificates tend to be short-lived and therefore need to be renewed at regular intervals. These procedures can also be used to distribute new operational certificates after a certificate authority has been compromised.

[0009] Manufacturer certificates and associated private keys, which are typically imprinted into a device during production or in another secure environment at the manufacturer, are typically not updated. Replacing the manufacturer certificates would require the devices to be returned to production or another secure environment at the manufacturer, which entails enormous effort.

[0010] It is therefore the object of the present invention to identify devices and their manufacturer certificates that were issued by a compromised issuing authority and to enable a secure exchange or replacement of the manufacturer certificate that is already incorporated into a device with little effort, i.e. without removing the device from its place of use or returning the device to the manufacturer.

[0011] Documents DE102013205051 and US2006 / 236379 are considered relevant prior art.

[0012] This object is achieved by the measures described in the independent claims. Advantageous further developments of the invention are presented in the subclaims.

[0013] According to a first aspect, the invention relates to a method for securely replacing a first manufacturer certificate already inserted into a device with a second manufacturer certificate, wherein at least one specific device-related parameter that uniquely identifies the device and is contained in the first manufacturer certificate and uniquely identifies the device is determined from a trusted device database, generating a second manufacturer certificate containing at least the specific device-related parameter of the first certificate and a public key of the device, and replacing the first manufacturer certificate with the second certificate in the device.

[0014] Such a device database is often available in the manufacturer’s production system.

[0015] A certification authority also usually includes a certificate database in which all certificates issued by this

[0016] Certificates issued by a certification authority are stored with all the parameters contained in the certificate. This certificate database can also be used as a device database DB within the meaning of the invention if it is still trustworthy and not considered compromised.

[0017] In manufacturer certificates, a device serial number is used in particular as a unique, specific parameter of a device.

[0018] The manufacturer certificate thus confirms that a device is from a specific manufacturer and has a specific device serial number and other properties specified in the certificate's parameters. This allows a certificate to be uniquely assigned to a device, and a new, second manufacturer certificate can be created with the same specific device-specific parameters. Depending on the requirements, the second manufacturer certificate can essentially contain the parameters of the first certificate, for example, it can simply be issued by a new certification authority and thus signed by that authority.

[0019] In an advantageous embodiment, the second manufacturer certificate is inserted into the device by a technician during a maintenance process, in particular when the device's configuration is changed, or when an operational certificate is updated, or is loaded and installed by the device itself from a data storage device (server, network drive, etc.).

[0020] The second manufacturer certificate is published by the manufacturer or made available to the device owner or a third party. If the second manufacturer certificate was issued by a second certification authority, a new certificate chain is also transmitted with the second manufacturer certificate. The second manufacturer certificate can then be inserted into the device by a technician during a maintenance process or when updating an operational certificate, or it can be loaded and installed by the device itself from a data storage device, such as a server, network drive, etc. If the device does not have the functionality to insert a new manufacturer certificate, this can be added as part of a firmware update.

[0021] This has the advantage that no additional new processes are required to replace the manufacturer's certificate, thus optimizing the financial and personnel effort required to replace the certificate.

[0022] In an advantageous embodiment, at least one certificate-related parameter, in particular a certificate serial number of the second manufacturer certificate or a validity period of the second manufacturer certificate, is generated independently of the corresponding parameters of the first certificate.

[0023] This makes it possible, for example, to extend the validity period of a manufacturer's certificate and, in particular, when the second certificate is issued by a second certification authority, a certificate serial number from its number range can be used for the second manufacturer's certificate.

[0024] According to the invention, the device database is used to determine for which devices a first manufacturer certificate was issued by a compromised first certification authority, and in the determined devices the first manufacturer certificate is replaced by a manufacturer certificate generated by the second certification authority.

[0025] This makes it possible, for example, to identify all devices whose certificates were created before the compromise occurred and to generate second vendor certificates for these devices.

[0026] In an advantageous embodiment, at least one additional device-related parameter of the first certificate is determined from the device database and adopted as a parameter in the second manufacturer certificate.

[0027] This makes it possible to issue second certificates with slightly different parameters from the first certificate, for example, to enter a changed manufacturer name. On the other hand, less device-related parameters can also be included in the second manufacturer certificate.

[0028] Furthermore, it is advantageous if a public key of the device in the first manufacturer certificate is transferred as the public key to the second manufacturer certificate. In this case, no new key pair needs to be generated for the device. The relationship between the public key and the other device-related parameters of the certificate, such as the device's serial number, is maintained.

[0029] In an advantageous embodiment, the second manufacturer certificate is generated by a second certification authority and signed with the private key of the second certification authority and transmitted to the device with a certificate of the second certification authority, and the second manufacturer certificate is adopted in the device as a new manufacturer certificate if the second certificate of the second certification authority is confirmed as trustworthy by a root certificate present in the device.

[0030] Thus, if a root certificate is available for the certificate of the second certification authority, the trustworthiness of the second manufacturer certificates can be ensured without further exchange of root certificates.

[0031] In an advantageous embodiment, the second manufacturer certificate is generated by the first certification authority and signed with the private key of the first certification authority and the second manufacturer certificate is adopted in the device as the new manufacturer certificate.

[0032] This makes it possible to replace a first certificate with a second certificate issued by the same, namely the first, certification authority. For example, modified or new device-specific or certificate-specific parameters can be introduced. The trustworthiness of the first certification authority is established by the existence of a certificate from the first certification authority. Only if such a certificate from the first certification authority is revoked will such a second certificate not be accepted by the device.

[0033] In an advantageous embodiment, the certification authority generates a new, second asymmetric key pair for each device, incorporates the second public key, which is different from the public key of the first manufacturer certificate, into a second manufacturer certificate, and provides the second private key belonging to the second public key to the device cryptographically protected with the first public key of the first manufacturer certificate.

[0034] This also allows new key material to be generated for the device and inserted into the devices. A private key requires additional protection, as it should only be known within the device. By encrypting the second private key with the device's first public key, the second private key can be transmitted confidentially and thus securely. Since the device received the first private key during manufacturing, it can decrypt the encrypted second private key and replace the first private key. Like the second manufacturer certificate, the second private key can be inserted by a technician during maintenance or by loading it from a network storage device.

[0035] A second aspect of the invention relates to a system with a security function based on a public key infrastructure comprising at least one device, at least one trusted device database and at least one certification authority, which are designed to carry out the described method.

[0036] A further aspect of the present invention relates to a computer program product that can be loaded directly into a memory of a digital computer, comprising program code parts that are suitable for carrying out the steps of the method.

[0037] The computer program product can be stored and executed in digital computers or microprocessors that are part of a device, a device database or a certification authority of the system according to the invention.

[0038] Embodiments of the method and system according to the invention are illustrated by way of example in the drawings and are explained in more detail in the following description. They show: Figure 1 shows an embodiment of a system according to the invention in a schematic representation; and Figure 2 shows an embodiment of a method according to the invention as a flow chart.

[0039] Corresponding parts are provided with the same reference numerals in all figures.

[0040] Figure 1 shows a simplified system 1 with a system network 2, in which devices D1, D2, such as control and signal components of a railway safety network or field devices and control systems in an automation network, are interconnected and communicate with each other. Similar systems are also used in the energy supply sector or in medical technology.

[0041] In order to verify the integrity and authenticity of communication between devices D1, D2, as well as the authenticity of a device D1, D2, a so-called public key infrastructure is set up in System 1. Asymmetric cryptographic functions based on key pairs consisting of a public key and a corresponding private key are used to encrypt messages, sign data, and prove the authenticity of device D1, D2.

[0042] A digital manufacturer certificate, for example, is incorporated into device D1, D2 during its manufacture, i.e., it is stored in device D1, D2. It is a digital data set that confirms certain properties of device D1, D2 and whose authenticity and integrity can be verified using cryptographic methods. The digital certificate contains, in particular, the data required for its verification. The manufacturer certificate is issued, for example, by a certification authority (CA1).

[0043] A manufacturer certificate contains information, hereinafter also referred to as parameters, particularly certificate-related parameters and device-related parameters. Certificate-related parameters are hereinafter referred to as: a name or other unique designation of the issuer of the certificate, in particular the issuing certification authority CA1, also referred to as "issuer", a unique certificate serial number, information on the validity period of the certificate.

[0044] Device-related parameters include: a unique identifier for the device to which the certificate provides information, also referred to as the "subject", such as the device serial number, device type and manufacturer name, MAC addresses and other communication parameters, a public key of the device, and other information about the device, such as information on the permissible scope and application of the public key.

[0045] A private key belonging to the public key is stored confidentially in the device as securely as possible and should not be known to any other component in System 1.

[0046] Furthermore, the manufacturer's certificate contains a digital signature from the certification authority (CA1) over all other parameters. The certification authority (CA1) creates the signature using a private key of the certification authority, also known as the certification authority's signature key. However, to verify this signature from the certification authority (CA1), a mapping of the public key of the certification authority (CA1) to its identity is required, i.e., a certificate from the certification authority. The trustworthiness of the certification authority's certificate is, in turn, confirmed by a trusted certification authority using a so-called root certificate. Between the issuing certification authority and the trusted certification authority, further certification authorities can confirm the certificate of the previous certification authority.This hierarchy of certificates forms a public key infrastructure (PKI). To verify the trustworthiness of the vendor certificate, the verifying entity must have the entire certificate chain from the issuing certificate authority's certificate D1, D2 up to the root certificate.

[0047] Each device D1, D2 contains a device-specific first manufacturer certificate issued by the first certification authority CA1, which was, for example, inserted into the device D1, D2 during production and stored there. Typically, the manufacturer maintains a device database DB containing device-related key data for all manufactured devices, such as the device serial number, serial numbers of the components installed in the device, information on installed firmware, MAC addresses, and at least one piece of key data relating to the manufacturer certificate inserted into the device D1, D2, such as the certificate serial number and validity period. These key data stored in the device database DB correspond at least partially to the device-related or certificate-related parameters contained in the certificate.Preferably, the database DB contains information about the issuing certification authority CA1 of a device certificate inserted into a device.

[0048] If the issuing first certification authority (CA1) is compromised, the initial certificates it issued can no longer be trusted. The measures that must be taken after a compromise is discovered depend on the type of compromise. If an attacker was able to force the first certification authority (CA1) to create individual certificates without obtaining the first certification authority's private key, e.g., by copying the key, and all unauthorized certificates are known, it is sufficient to revoke these initial certificates.

[0049] If there is suspicion that an attacker has unauthorizedly issued certificates through the first certification authority during a known period without knowing the exact details of these certificates, it is sufficient to revoke all initial certificates generated during this period. However, this requires that the certificate serial numbers of these certificates be known.

[0050] For non-self-signed and operational certificates used for device communication with other devices or for signing logging data, certificate revocation can be performed by the issuing certificate authority via a standardized certificate revocation list according to the Internet Engineering Task Force IETF Standard RFC 5280 or according to an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), see IETF RFC 6960. Self-signed certificates must be removed from the trusted certificate store to be revoked.

[0051] If an attacker were able to obtain the certificate authority's private key, they could use it to regenerate any certificate at any time. They could also create backdated certificates with a "validity - notBefore" value in the past, i.e., before the time of compromise, and assign them any certificate serial number. These externally generated certificates are typically not included in the certificate authority's database.

[0052] This means that a third party can no longer trust any of the certificates generated by this first CA1. The CA's certificate must be revoked, and a new CA instance must be created.

[0053] Users, especially the certificate holders, subsequently require new certificates. For operational certificates, for example, this is possible, albeit laborious, through established processes for rolling out and updating these certificates. However, this option is not available for manufacturer certificates, as updating these certificates is not provided for. To replace the manufacturer certificates, the devices would have to be returned to production or to another secure environment at the manufacturer's site. This represents an enormous effort and is likely not feasible in many cases.

[0054] To replace manufacturer certificates, a first certification authority CA1 or a second certification authority CA2 is arranged in a manufacturer network 3 within system 1, and these are configured to issue manufacturer certificates. The first certification authority CA1 and a second certification authority CA2 are typically not present simultaneously in system 1. The second certification authority CA2 is typically only present in the manufacturer network 3 if the first certification authority CA1 is taken out of service, for example, due to a detected compromise. Furthermore, the manufacturer network 3 includes a trusted database DB, for example, a database DB in the manufacturer's production system, as already described.A database assigned to the first certification authority CA1, which has not been compromised by the first certification authority CA1, can also be used as a trusted database DB. The manufacturer network 3 is preferably separated from the system network 2 or only temporarily connected to the system network 2 and thus to the devices D1, D2, for example, for replacing manufacturer certificates during a certificate update.

[0055] Replacing a no longer trusted first manufacturer certificate with a second manufacturer certificate issued by the second certification authority is done using the method specified in Figure 2 The flow chart shown is explained in more detail.

[0056] In the initial state 10, there is a request to exchange first manufacturer certificates that are already installed in a device and are to be replaced with a new second manufacturer certificate. For example, if all first certificates of a compromised first certification authority CA1 are to be replaced, in process step 11, information is retrieved from the database DB regarding which devices have received first manufacturer certificates from the first certification authority CA1. This information includes at least one specific device-related parameter contained in the first manufacturer certificate that uniquely identifies the device. This is preferably the device's serial number, which is specified in the "subject" field in the certificate.Furthermore, the first public key of the device is determined from the database DB, which is either contained in the second manufacturer certificate or used to encrypt the second private key.

[0057] Furthermore, the database DB can be used to determine when the first certificate was created or when device D1, D2 received the first certificate, as well as other device-related information, such as the device type, etc. This information can also be included as device-related parameters in the first certificate. This information, or device- or certificate-related parameters of the first certificate, is transmitted to a second certification authority (CA2) or read directly from the database DB by the second certification authority (CA2).

[0058] In process step 12, the second certification authority (CA2) generates a new second manufacturer certificate for each of these devices. Additional parameters contained in the first manufacturer certificate can be incorporated into the second manufacturer certificate. Such additional parameters include, for example, the device's public key or certificate extensions, which in a digital certificate, for example, according to the ITU Standard X.509, are referred to as "public key" or "extensions." Only the corresponding value of the second certification authority (CA2) is used as the certificate issuer, also referred to as the "issuer." Preferably, additional certificate-related parameters, such as the validity and serial number of the certificate, are newly generated in the second manufacturer certificate as "Validity" and "serial number."The second manufacturer certificate is then signed with the private key of the second certification authority CA 2.

[0059] The transport of the second certificates and, if applicable, the encrypted second private keys to the devices can be carried out in many ways, for example by email or physical data carrier or via a web portal of the manufacturer to a service technician, who then imports the certificates locally or via, for example, the system network 2 into the devices D1, D2 or for downloading by the devices D1, D2 on a storage device, not in Figure 1 shown, in plant network 2.

[0060] These second manufacturer certificates are then imported into the second devices D1, D2 in process step 13. This can be done, for example, as part of standard maintenance processes such as a configuration update or an update of operational certificates of the devices D1, D2.

[0061] If a multi-level PKI hierarchy is used, a trusted CA signs the certificate of CA1, and CA1 signs the device's vendor certificate. If the trustworthiness of the first and second CAs (CAs1 and CA2) are confirmed by the same trusted root CA, only the certificate of the second CA is provided to the devices.

[0062] If the trusted root certification authority is also compromised—which will happen less frequently, as it can be better protected—a certificate exchange of the root certificate must be secured through additional processes. Alternatively, a second root certificate from another trusted certification authority can be inserted into the device D1, D2 beforehand, for example, during production.

[0063] The private key of the second root certificate is either stored in a specially secured location just for this emergency, or is used for other tasks, such as creating certificates for software or firmware signatures.

[0064] It is not necessary to bring the devices D1, D2 back to production, generate a new key pair for each device and sign the public key in a certificate, since the relationship between the public key and other device-related parameters, in particular the device serial number, has been preserved in the second manufacturer certificate, the same as in the first manufacturer certificate.

[0065] In another advantageous embodiment, it is possible to provide devices D1, D2 with new, second manufacturer certificates without compromising the first certification authority CA1. This can be useful, for example, if devices D1, D2 are to be replaced with manufacturer certificates with different validity periods, different algorithms, or different parameters, for example, in the event of an error in the first certificate, a change in the manufacturer's name, or a change in data for legal reasons.

[0066] In an advantageous embodiment, it is also possible to generate and distribute not only new manufacturer certificates, but also new, second key pairs consisting of a second private key and a second public key for devices D1, D2 whose public keys are still trusted despite the compromise of the first certification authority CA1, since they can be read from a trusted database. A second manufacturer certificate is generated for a device D1, D2, which contains the second public key as a parameter instead of the first public key. The other first parameters are incorporated into the second manufacturer certificate as second parameters, if desired. The second manufacturer certificate is signed by the issuing certification authority, as already described.

[0067] The second private key of devices D1, D2 is transmitted, for example, in the form of a Public Key Cryptography Standard PKCS#12 file.

[0068] The second private key is encrypted with the device's first public key, thus providing cryptographic protection. This means that only the device that possesses the first private key can decrypt and use the second private key.

[0069] Using the trusted database DB, the manufacturer of devices D1 and D2 can determine which initial manufacturer certificates they can still trust despite the compromise of the first certification authority, and thus securely supply the affected devices with new key material.

[0070] This allows information from an existing trusted database (DB) at the manufacturer to be used to create new manufacturer certificates without the affected devices (D1, D2) having to be removed and returned to the manufacturer for re-certificate imprinting in the field. This is only possible because the manufacturer knows this database (DB) and thus knows which initial certificates from a compromised initial certification authority (CA1) can still be trusted. Third parties who cannot access this database (DB) cannot distinguish whether a manufacturer certificate was actually created by the initial certification authority (CA1) before that point in time or whether an attacker created it later without authorization and backdated it.

[0071] This allows new manufacturer certificates to be created by a second CA2 certification authority for all devices whose public keys, along with the device's identifying data (e.g., the device's serial number), are known with certainty. The devices can remain in the field while the manufacturer certificates are being replaced. The key pair in the device can either continue to be used or be securely replaced.

[0072] All described and / or illustrated features can be advantageously combined within the scope of the invention. The invention is not limited to the described embodiments. The method is applicable not only for manufacturer certificates on devices, but in principle also for all other certificates, provided a suitable, uncompromised database is available. However, it is particularly advantageous for manufacturer certificates, since replacing rolled-out certificates is not provided for in these cases and is therefore particularly difficult.

Claims

1. Method for securely replacing a first manufacturer certificate, already introduced into a device (D1, D2), with a second manufacturer certificate, having the steps of: - ascertaining (11) at least one specific device-related parameter that explicitly characterizes the device (D1, D2), which is contained in the first manufacturer certificate, and uniquely identifies the device (D1, D2), from a trusted device database (DB), - generating (12) a second manufacturer certificate containing at least the explicitly characterizing device-related parameter of the first certificate and a public key of the device (D1, D2), and - replacing (13) the first manufacturer certificate with the second manufacturer certificate in the device (D1, D2), wherein the device database (DB) is used to ascertain those devices to which a first manufacturer certificate has been issued by a compromised first certification authority (CA1) and the first manufacturer certificate is replaced in the ascertained devices (D1, D2) with a second manufacturer certificate generated by a second certification authority (CA2).

2. Method according to the preceding claim, wherein the specific device-related parameter is a unique serial number of the device (D1, D2).

3. Method according to either of the preceding claims, wherein the second manufacturer certificate is introduced into the device (D1, D2) during a maintenance operation, in particular during a change of configuration of the device (D1, D2), or while an operative certificate is being updated.

4. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein at least one certificate-related parameter, in particular the certificate serial number of the second manufacturer certificate and / or the validity period of the second manufacturer certificate, is generated independently of the corresponding parameters of the first certificate.

5. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein at least one further device-related parameter of the first certificate is ascertained from the device database (DB) and is transferred to the second manufacturer certificate as a parameter.

6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein a second certification authority (CA2) generates the second manufacturer certificate and signs it using the private key of the second certification authority (CA2), and the second manufacturer certificate is transmitted with a certificate of the second certification authority (CA2) to the device (D1, D2), and the device (D1, D2) accepts the second manufacturer certificate as a new manufacturer certificate.

7. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the first certification authority (CA1) generates the second manufacturer certificate and signs it using the private key of the first certification authority (CA1), and the second manufacturer certificate is accepted in the device (D1, D2) as a new manufacturer certificate.

8. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein a public key of the device (D1, D2) in the first manufacturer certificate is transferred to the second manufacturer certificate as a public key.

9. Method according to one of Claims 1 to 6, wherein a second public key different from the public key of the first manufacturer certificate is introduced into a second manufacturer certificate, and a second private key associated with the second public key is delivered to the device (D1, D2) in a manner cryptographically protected by the first public key.

10. System having a security function based on a public key infrastructure, comprising at least one trusted device database (DB), at least one certification authority (CA1, CA2) and at least one device (D1, D2), which are configured to perform the method according to one of Claims 1 to 9.

11. System according to Claim 10, which is in the form of part of an industrial installation.

12. Computer program product directly loadable into a memory of a digital computer, comprising program code parts suitable for performing the steps of the method according to one of Claims 1 to 9.