METHOD AND DEVICES FOR PROVIDING AND RECEIVING MEASUREMENT DATA AND METHOD AND DEVICE FOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN A VEHICLE SENSOR OF A VEHICLE AND A CONTROL UNIT OF THE VEHICLE

Description

State of the art

[0001] The invention relates to a device or a method according to the preamble of the independent claims. The present invention also relates to a computer program.

[0002] In the automotive sector, sensors such as pressure sensors can have various applications, particularly in the engine compartment. Vehicle owners may be tempted to modify the behavior of such sensors for different applications, such as vehicle tuning, i.e., increasing performance beyond the manufacturer's specified values. Such modifications can be made by altering the firmware or the communication between a sensor and a control unit such as an engine control unit (ECU). Modifying the communication can generally be simpler and can be exploited, for example, by tuners in so-called "box tuning." German patent DE 10 2009 002 396 A1 presents a protection method for sensors based on the assumption that there is a bidirectional, not a unidirectional, communication channel between the sensor and the ECU.Furthermore, the so-called rolling code is a common method for a type of keyless access system. German patent DE 10 2013 206 185 A1 describes a method for data transmission between a sensor and an electronic control and / or regulating device, whereby the transmitted sensor data and the sensor itself are protected against manipulation. This method uses two integrity protection values ​​for multiple communication values, resulting in overlapping values ​​among those to be protected. US patent 2009 / 268911 A1 and German patent DE 10 2013 206202 A1 disclose further prior art. Disclosure of the invention

[0003] Against this background, the approach presented here introduces a method, a device that uses this method, and finally a corresponding computer program according to the main claims. Advantageous further developments and improvements of the device specified in the independent claim are possible through the measures listed in the dependent claims.

[0004] According to embodiments, a tamper-proof or secure transmission of measurement data from a vehicle sensor to a control unit can be implemented. For example, additional measurement data from at least one other vehicle sensor, known to both the vehicle sensor and the control unit, is used to generate a message authentication code or similar authentication information. Advantageously, according to embodiments, the security of the communication between the vehicle sensor and the control unit can be increased. In particular, communication security for so-called SENT communication (SENT = Single Edge Nibble Transmission) can be improved. Standard SENT communication is unidirectional communication from the vehicle sensor to the control unit.This way, manipulation attempts, for example in the form of the so-called Freshness Challenge, in which a replay attacker repeats an old message that was saved in another communication round, can be reliably thwarted or at least made more difficult.

[0005] A method for providing measurement data from a vehicle sensor to a vehicle control unit is presented, wherein the method comprises the following steps: determining sender-side authentication information for authenticating the measurement data of the vehicle sensor to be transmitted to the control unit, wherein the sender-side authentication information is determined using a determination rule and further measurement data from at least one other vehicle sensor of the vehicle that is accessible to both the vehicle sensor and the control unit; and

[0006] Generating a message for output to the control unit using the measurement data and the sender's authentication information.

[0007] This method can be implemented, for example, in software or hardware, or in a hybrid form of both, such as in a device. The vehicle can be a motor vehicle, in particular a land vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft, for example, a passenger car or a commercial vehicle, especially one with an internal combustion engine. The authentication information can correspond to, be derived from, or resemble a message authentication code (MAC) or a part thereof. The vehicle sensor can be configured to detect at least one measured quantity. The at least one additional vehicle sensor can be configured to detect at least one further measured quantity, different from the at least one measured quantity of the vehicle sensor. The message can comprise the measurement data and the sender's authentication information.The process can also include a message output step. In this output step, the message can be sent to an interface with the control unit. Further measurement data can be accessed indirectly through physical manipulation of the measurement data. This additional measurement data can also be accessed indirectly by the vehicle sensor, whereby underlying parameters can also influence the measurement data measured by the vehicle sensor.

[0008] According to one embodiment, the vehicle sensor can be a pressure sensor or fuel rail pressure sensor. Additionally or alternatively, the control unit can be an engine control unit. Such an embodiment offers the advantage that measurement data can be transmitted securely, thus providing improved protection against potential tuning, particularly so-called tuning boxes. This enables reliable tamper detection and protection for sensors, especially pressure sensors such as fuel rail pressure sensors.

[0009] Furthermore, in the determination step, the sender-side authentication information can be determined using additional measurement data. This data must represent at least one operating parameter of the vehicle in a physical interaction and, additionally or alternatively, in a functional interaction with the measurement data, and may also represent an environmental condition of the vehicle. Such an embodiment offers the advantage that, in particular, so-called replay attacks on communication between the vehicle sensor and the control unit can be made more difficult or even prevented by using the additional measurement data, which is unpredictable for a potential attacker.

[0010] In particular, during the determination step, the additional measurement data can originate from a position sensor for the position of a vehicle's crankshaft, from a speed sensor for engine speed, and additionally or alternatively from a temperature sensor for the temperature of at least one vehicle component. The vehicle sensor can represent a vehicle component. Thus, rapidly changing measurement data, such as engine speed and additionally or alternatively a crankshaft position, and additionally or alternatively slowly changing measurement data, such as temperature, can be used as the additional measurement data. Such an embodiment offers the advantage that the authenticity of the measurement data transmitted in the message can be reliably and securely determined by the control unit.

[0011] Furthermore, in the determination step, the sender-side authentication information can be determined using a determination rule that includes a cryptographic algorithm, a secret cryptographic key, and additionally or alternatively, a counter value that is incremented with each transmitted message. The vehicle sensor and the control unit can use identical versions of the algorithm and the key. The determination rule can incorporate determination rules according to a so-called rolling code. Such an implementation offers the advantage that common authentication information principles can be used easily, supplemented by the additional measurement data as an extra layer of security.

[0012] Furthermore, during the determination step, the sender-side authentication information can be determined using additional measurement data that is temporally related to the measurement data in a manner known to the control unit and is additionally or alternatively timestamped. Such an embodiment offers the advantage of enabling reliable and accurate detection of a potential attack on the communication between the vehicle sensor and the control unit, since authentication information generated using implausible additional measurement data can be reliably identified.

[0013] The process can also include a step of acquiring measurement data using the vehicle sensor. Additionally or alternatively, the process can include a step of reading further measurement data from at least one additional vehicle sensor. This allows the measurement data(s) to be fed into the process in a precise and easily accessible manner.

[0014] A method for receiving measurement data from a vehicle sensor of a vehicle by a control unit of the vehicle is also presented, the method comprising the following steps: Reading a message generated according to an embodiment of the aforementioned method; dissecting the message to obtain the measurement data and the sender-side authentication information; determining receiver-side authentication information to authenticate the measurement data of the vehicle sensor transmitted to the control unit, wherein the receiver-side authentication information is determined using the specification and the other measurement data; and performing a comparison of the receiver-side authentication information and the sender-side authentication information with each other in order to determine the authenticity of the measurement data depending on the result of the comparison.

[0015] This method can be implemented, for example, in software or hardware, or in a hybrid form of software and hardware, for example in a control unit or in a device.

[0016] According to one embodiment, during the determination step, the measurement data can be checked for plausibility with respect to the other measurement data at the receiver. A physical relationship and, additionally or alternatively, a functional relationship can exist between the measurement data and the other measurement data. Additionally or alternatively, the determination step can be performed using a frequency measurement, a low-pass filter, a phase detector, a quadrature demodulator, and / or a signal characteristic typical of the measured value, in particular a measurement fluctuation amplitude. Such an embodiment offers the advantage that attacks on the communication between the vehicle sensor and the control unit can be further hampered, especially so-called replay attacks.

[0017] For example, in the determination step, plausibility testing can be performed using a frequency measurement, a low-pass filter, a phase detector, a quadrature demodulator, a measurement-typical signal characteristic, in particular a measurement fluctuation amplitude, and additionally or alternatively at least one modeled measurand. Such an embodiment offers the advantage that the authenticity of the measurement data can be determined simply and reliably.

[0018] Furthermore, a method for communication between a vehicle sensor and a vehicle control unit is presented, wherein the method comprises the following steps: Providing measurement data from the vehicle sensor to the control unit according to an embodiment of the aforementioned method for providing; and receiving the measurement data from the vehicle sensor by the control unit according to an embodiment of the aforementioned method for receiving.

[0019] This method can be implemented, for example, in software or hardware, or in a hybrid form of both, such as in a device. Communication between the vehicle sensor and the control unit can be unidirectional, specifically only from the vehicle sensor to the control unit.

[0020] The approach presented here further creates a device designed to perform, control, and implement the steps of a variant of the method presented here in appropriate facilities. This embodiment of the invention in the form of a device also allows the problem underlying the invention to be solved quickly and efficiently.

[0021] For this purpose, the device may include at least one processing unit for processing signals or data, at least one storage unit for storing signals or data, at least one interface to a sensor or actuator for reading sensor signals from the sensor or for outputting data or control signals to the actuator, and / or at least one communication interface for reading or outputting data embedded in a communication protocol. The processing unit may, for example, be a signal processor, a microcontroller, or the like, and the storage unit may be RAM, ROM, flash memory, EEPROM, and / or a magnetic storage device.The communication interface can be configured to read or output data wirelessly and / or via wired connections, whereby a communication interface that can read or output wired data can, for example, read this data electrically or optically from or output it into a corresponding data transmission line.

[0022] In this context, a device can be understood as an electrical device that processes sensor signals and outputs control and / or data signals accordingly. The device may have an interface, which can be implemented in hardware and / or software. In the case of a hardware-based interface, the interfaces can, for example, be part of a so-called system ASIC, which incorporates various functions of the device. However, it is also possible that the interfaces are separate integrated circuits or consist at least partially of discrete components. In the case of a software-based interface, the interfaces can be software modules, which, for example, are present on a microcontroller alongside other software modules.

[0023] Also advantageous is a computer program product or computer program with program code that can be stored on a machine-readable carrier or storage medium such as a ROM, a semiconductor memory, a hard disk memory or an optical memory and is used to carry out, implement and / or control the steps of the method according to one of the embodiments described above, in particular if the program product or program is executed on a computer or device.

[0024] Examples of the approach presented here are shown in the drawings and explained in more detail in the following description. It shows: Fig. 1 a schematic representation of a vehicle with a device according to an exemplary embodiment; Fig. 2 a flowchart of a procedure for provisioning according to an exemplary embodiment; Fig. 3 a flowchart of a receiving procedure according to an exemplary embodiment; and Fig. 4 A flowchart of a communication procedure according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0025] Before exemplary embodiments of the present invention are described in more detail below, the background of these exemplary embodiments will first be briefly discussed.

[0026] In the rolling code mentioned earlier, the sender, which in this case would correspond to the vehicle sensor, or more specifically the pressure sensor, has a monolithic counter and increments it with each authorized command or transmission. The receiver, e.g., a door opener, which in this case would correspond to the control unit, or more specifically the engine control unit, also has a copy of the counter. The door opener only accepts a command if the counters are the same or if the counter of the sender command is slightly higher than its own. This ensures that the system also functions if the keyless entry button was pressed when the door opener was out of range. The rolling code concept alone is not suitable for the sensor protection or communication protection case considered in this application.For the rolling code concept to function correctly, the counter value must be stored in non-volatile memory after each authorized communication. Otherwise, an attacker could request a sensor reset and repeatedly use older values ​​or values ​​of their choosing. The frequency of transmitted values ​​may exceed the permissible write cycles of the flash memory technology.

[0027] In a communication protection concept similar to that described in the aforementioned DE 10 2013 206 185 A1, sensor readings are represented by M1 to M6, and MAC values ​​(MAC = Message Authentication Code) represent a cryptographic message authentication code for integrity protection. Following M3, the value MAC11 is sent as the message authentication code for values ​​M1 to M3. If any of these values ​​have been manipulated, this can be detected by verifying MAC11. After M6, MAC12 is sent to protect M4 to M6, and MAC21 follows MAC12 to protect both MAC11 and MAC12. If M4 to M6 have been manipulated, this is detected using MAC12. However, if an attacker replaces M1 to M3 and MAC11 entirely with values ​​from an older session, this can be detected using MAC21.In this way, the chain of values ​​sent after a reset is retained, and any manipulation of each entry can be detected. Such a concept as in DE 10 2013 206 185 A1 is not a suitable solution for the case under consideration, given that with each sensor reset, the older values ​​are lost, and an attacker could use a chain of older values ​​from another session.

[0028] In the following description of favorable embodiments of the present invention, the same or similar reference numerals are used for the elements shown in the various figures and acting similarly, without repeating these elements.

[0029] Fig. 1 Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of a vehicle 100 with a device according to an exemplary embodiment. The vehicle 100 is a motor vehicle, which can be, for example, a land vehicle, a watercraft, or an aircraft. According to the exemplary embodiment shown here, the vehicle 100 is, by way of example, a passenger car. The vehicle 100 has an engine 102, of which the illustration of Fig. 1 only a fuel rail 104 and a crankshaft 106 are shown, a vehicle sensor, here referred to as the first vehicle sensor 110, with at least one sensor element 111, and by way of example only two further vehicle sensors, here referred to as the second vehicle sensor 114 and the third vehicle sensor 116, and a control unit 120.

[0030] The vehicle sensor, or first vehicle sensor 110, is configured to output measurement data 112. More precisely, at least one sensor element 111 of the first vehicle sensor 110 is configured to detect at least one measured quantity, and the first vehicle sensor 110 is configured to output the detected measured quantity or quantities as the measurement data 112. The second vehicle sensor 114 and the third vehicle sensor 116 are configured to output further measured quantities 115.

[0031] According to one embodiment, the vehicle sensor, or first vehicle sensor 110, is configured as a pressure sensor or fuel rail pressure sensor. Specifically, the first vehicle sensor 110 is configured as a fuel rail pressure sensor for detecting pressure in the fuel rail 104. Thus, the measurement data 112 represent pressure readings in the fuel rail 104. Additionally or alternatively, the control unit 120 is configured as an engine control unit. The control unit 120 is therefore designed to control the engine 102. The other vehicle sensors, i.e., the second vehicle sensor 114 and the third vehicle sensor 116, optionally include a speed sensor for detecting the rotational speed of the engine 102, a position sensor for detecting the position of the crankshaft 106, and / or a temperature sensor for detecting ambient temperature, engine temperature, or another temperature.Thus, the additional measurement data 115 represent rotational speed measurements, position measurements and / or temperature measurements.

[0032] Furthermore, a provisioning device 130 and a receiving device 140 are provided. According to the in Fig. 1 In the illustrated embodiment, the provisioning device 130 is implemented as part of the vehicle sensor or first vehicle sensor 110, and the receiving device 140 is implemented as part of the control unit 120. According to another embodiment, the provisioning device 130 and / or the receiving device 140 can also be implemented as independent devices.

[0033] The provisioning device 130 is configured to provide the measurement data 112 of the vehicle sensor or first vehicle sensor 110 to the control unit 120. The provisioning device 130 is configured, for example, to read the measurement data 112 from the at least one sensor element 111 of the first vehicle sensor 110 and the further measurement data 115 from the second vehicle sensor 114 and the third vehicle sensor 116. This further measurement data 115 does not need to be directly accessible to the vehicle sensor 110; rather, the underlying quantities can also influence the measurement data 112 measured by the vehicle sensor 110, e.g., due to the opening / closing of an intake / exhaust valve or fuel injection processes related to the crankshaft position.

[0034] The provisioning device 130 comprises a determination device 132 and a generation device 136. The determination device 132 is configured to determine a transmitter-side authentication information 135 for authenticating the measurement data 112 of the vehicle sensor or first vehicle sensor 110 to be transmitted to the control unit 120. The determination device 132 is configured to determine the transmitter-side authentication information 135 using a determination rule 133 and the further measurement data 115, which are accessible to both the first vehicle sensor 110 and the control unit 120. The determination device 132 is further configured to forward the determined transmitter-side authentication information 135 to the generation device 136.The generating unit 136 is configured to generate a message 137 for output to the control unit 120 using the measurement data 112 and the transmitter-side authentication information 135. The message 137 thus comprises the measurement data 112 and the transmitter-side authentication information 135.

[0035] The receiving device 140 is configured to receive the measurement data 112 contained in the message 137, i.e., to receive the measurement data 112 of the first vehicle sensor 110 from the control unit 120. For this purpose, the receiving device 140 comprises a reading device 142, a decomposition device 144, a detection device 146, and a transmission device 148.

[0036] The reading device 142 is configured to read the message 137 from the provisioning device 130. The reading device 142 is also configured to forward the read message 137 to the segmentation device 144. The segmentation device 144 is configured to segment the message 137 into the measurement data 112 and the sender-side authentication information 135. Furthermore, the segmentation device 144 is configured to forward the measurement data 112 to the detection device 146 and the sender-side authentication information 135 to the implementation device 148. The detection device 146 is configured to determine receiver-side authentication information 145 for authenticating the measurement data 112 of the vehicle sensor or first vehicle sensor 110 transmitted to the control unit 120.The detection device 146 is configured to determine the receiver-side authentication information 145 using the determination procedure 133 and, in doing so, also to check the plausibility of the further measurement data 115 with respect to the receiver-side measurement data 112 and / or to carry out the determination using a frequency measurement, a low-pass filter, a phase detector, a quadrature demodulator and / or a measurement-typical signal characteristic, in particular a measurement fluctuation amplitude. The detection device 146 is also configured to forward the receiver-side authentication information 145 to the implementation device 148.The implementation device 148 is designed to compare the receiver-side authentication information 145 and the sender-side authentication information 135 in order to determine the authenticity of the measurement data 112 based on the result of this comparison. If the implementation device 148 detects a difference between the receiver-side authentication information 145 and the sender-side authentication information 135, the measurement data 112 can be deemed inauthentic. This is the case, for example, if a potential attacker sends a similar or partially identical message to the control unit 120 instead of message 137.

[0037] According to one embodiment, the receiving device 140 is configured to provide the measurement data 112 to the control unit 120 once the authenticity of the measurement data 112 has been established by the feedthrough device 148. The control unit 120 is configured, for example, to generate a control signal for controlling the motor 102 using the measurement data 112.

[0038] The determination device 132 of the provisioning device 130 is designed according to an exemplary embodiment to determine the sender-side authentication information 135 using such further measurement data 115, which represent at least one operating parameter of the vehicle 100 in a physical and / or functional relationship with the measurement data 112 and / or an environmental condition of the vehicle 100 and / or which are in a temporal relationship with the measurement data 112 known to the control unit 120 and / or are provided with a timestamp, and / or using such a determination instruction 133 which has a cryptographic algorithm, a secret cryptographic key and / or a counter value incremented with each message 137 issued.

[0039] Fig. 2 Figure 200 shows a flowchart of a method 200 for providing data according to an exemplary embodiment. Method 200 can be implemented to provide measurement data from a vehicle sensor to a vehicle control unit. Method 200 is used in conjunction with or by means of the device or provisioning device. Fig. 1 or a similar device.

[0040] Procedure 200 for provisioning comprises a step 210 of determination and a step 220 of generation. In step 210, determination, sender-side authentication information is determined to authenticate the measurement data from the vehicle sensor to be transmitted to the control unit. This sender-side authentication information is determined using a determination rule and additional measurement data from at least one other vehicle sensor of the vehicle, which is accessible to both the vehicle sensor and the control unit. Subsequently, in step 220, generation, a message for output to the control unit is generated using the measurement data and the sender-side authentication information determined in step 210.

[0041] According to one embodiment, the method 200 for providing the data also includes a step 202 of acquiring the measurement data using the vehicle sensor. Additionally or alternatively, the method 200 for providing the data also includes a step 204 of reading the further measurement data from at least one additional vehicle sensor.

[0042] Fig. 3 Figure 3 shows a flowchart of a receiving method 300 according to an exemplary embodiment. The receiving method 300 can be implemented to receive measurement data from a vehicle sensor of a vehicle from a control unit of the vehicle. The receiving method 300 is carried out in conjunction with or using the device or receiving device made of Fig. 1 or a similar device.

[0043] Procedure 300 for receiving comprises a reading step 310, a parsing step 320, a determining step 330, and an execution step 340. In reading step 310, a message is read in, which, according to the procedure, consists of Fig. 2 or was generated by a similar process. Subsequently, in step 320 of the decomposition process, the message read in step 310 is decomposed to obtain the measurement data and the sender's authentication information. Following this, in step 330 of the determination process, receiver-side authentication information is determined to authenticate the measurement data from the vehicle sensor transmitted to the control unit. This receiver-side authentication information is determined using the specification and the other measurement data. Finally, in step 340 of the execution process, a comparison is performed between the receiver-side and sender-side authentication information to determine the authenticity of the measurement data based on the result of this comparison.

[0044] Fig. 4 Figure 400 shows a flowchart of a communication method according to an exemplary embodiment. The communication method is executable to manage communication between a vehicle sensor and a vehicle control unit. The communication method is executable in conjunction with, or using, a device comprising the provisioning device and the receiving device. Fig. 1 or similar devices.

[0045] The communication procedure 400 comprises a step 410 of providing and a step 420 of receiving. In step 410, providing, the following are performed according to the procedure. Fig. 2 or a similar procedure provides measurement data from the vehicle sensor to the control unit. Thus, step 410 of the provisioning process includes as sub-steps the steps of the procedure from Fig. 2 or a similar procedure. The following steps, in 420 of the receipt process, are carried out according to the procedure from Fig. 3 or a similar process receives the measurement data from the vehicle sensor from the control unit. Thus, step 420 of the reception process identifies the steps of the procedure as sub-steps. Fig. 3 or a similar procedure.

[0046] With reference to the figures described above, exemplary embodiments are explained again below in other words and in summary.

[0047] Message 137, containing authentication information 135, is similar to a so-called rolling code. However, the counter used there is augmented or replaced by physical values ​​from the additional measurement data 115, which are accessible to both the first vehicle sensor 110 and the control unit 120 and exhibit high dynamics. These can be, for example, engine speed and / or crankshaft position. While neither value is directly accessible to the vehicle sensor 110, both influence the pressure measured by the vehicle sensor 110, for example, due to the opening / closing of an intake / exhaust valve or fuel injection processes. Therefore, crankshaft position and engine speed affect the pressure profile recorded by the first vehicle sensor 110. Furthermore, the engine speed could change suddenly, for example...due to braking, acceleration, or a gear change of the vehicle 100. Such a change is unpredictable. Since the authentication information 135 and 145 is calculated over a certain period of time, e.g., on the order of 100 milliseconds, a potential attacker cannot react if the engine speed changes during this period of, for example, 100 milliseconds, in the case of a replayed data set and authentication information, leading to a deviation of the current crankshaft position from a replayed pressure pattern. Such a deviation can be detected by the control unit 120, more precisely by the receiver 140, so that the replay itself, or a so-called replay attack, is detected.

[0048] One possible response of a fraudulent device would be, for example, to detect the deviation itself, i.e., the pressure from the real first vehicle sensor 110 compared to the replayed pressure pattern, and to falsify a reset of the first vehicle sensor 110, thereby initiating a new MAC cycle. A few sensor resets might occur in a real vehicle environment, so this would only be an indication of fraud, but not proof, unless it happens too frequently. To prevent such an attack, another measurement from the first vehicle sensor 110 can also be included in the MAC calculation or in the determination of the sender-side authentication information 135. Preferably, this is a continuous, slowly changing signal, such as a sensor temperature, which can be modeled by the receiving control unit 120.Since the temperature changes over time, and these changes are unpredictable (e.g., weather changes during a driving cycle, engine compartment heating, etc.), the temperature of subsequently re-entered data does not reflect the then-current temperature. Even after a fake reset of the first vehicle sensor 110, the temperature of newly appended re-entered data should, however, match both the modeled temperature and the temperature before the reset without any suspicious jump, as it is a continuous measurement. Consequently, the fraudulent device would need a re-entered data set covering the entire relevant four-dimensional range of pressure, engine speed, crankshaft position (at the beginning of the MAC cycle), and temperature. At least two such re-entered data sets would be required, with rising and falling temperature gradients to reflect real temperature changes.Such an effort required for fraud would hardly be practical, considering that this amount of replay data would have to be generated for each individual vehicle sensor due to the unique secret AES key.

[0049] Exemplary checks in the control unit 120, more precisely in the receiver 140, include, but are not limited to, rather simple algorithms such as frequency measurement, e.g., FFT or the like, usually after the application of a low-pass filter to suppress harmonics, phase detector, quadrature demodulator (also called IQ demodulator), or the like, and a check for a time delay between, for example, a fuel injection and a correspondingly measured pressure drop in the fuel rail 104. The inclusion of signal characteristics such as a pressure fluctuation amplitude could further increase protection if these can be modeled by the control unit 120.

Claims

1. Method (200) for providing measurement data (112) of a vehicle sensor (110) of a vehicle (100) for a control unit (120) of the vehicle (100), wherein the method (200) comprises the following steps: determining (210) transmitter-side authentication information (135) for authenticating the measurement data (112) of the vehicle sensor (110) that are to be transmitted to the control unit (120), wherein the transmitter-side authentication information (135) is determined using a determination rule (133); and generating (220), using the measurement data (112) and the transmitter-side authentication information (135), a message (137) to be output to the control unit (120), characterized in that, in the determination step (210), the transmitter-side authentication information (135) is determined using further measurement data (115) of at least one further vehicle sensor (114, 116) of the vehicle (100) that are accessible to both the vehicle sensor (110) and the control unit (120), wherein the further measurement data (115) come from a position sensor (114) for a position of a crankshaft (106) of the vehicle (100) and / or from a speed sensor (116) for an engine speed of the vehicle (100).

2. Method (200) according to Claim 1, wherein the vehicle sensor (110) is implemented as a pressure sensor or fuel rail pressure sensor and / or the control unit (120) is implemented as an engine control unit.

3. Method (200) according to either of the preceding claims, wherein, in the determination step (210), the transmitter-side authentication information (135) is determined using further measurement data (115) which represent at least one operating parameter of the vehicle (100) in a physical and / or functional causal relationship with the measurement data (112) and / or environmental condition of the vehicle (100).

4. Method (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein, in the determination step (210), the transmitter-side authentication information (135) is determined using a determination rule (133) which comprises a cryptographic algorithm, a secret cryptographic key, and / or a counter value that is incremented each time a message (137) is output.

5. Method (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein, in the determination step (210), the transmitter-side authentication information (135) is determined using further measurement data (115) which are in a temporal relationship with the measurement data (112) that is known to the control unit (120) and / or are provided with a time stamp.

6. Method (200) according to one of the preceding claims, having a step (202) of detecting the measurement data (112) using the vehicle sensor (110) and / or having a step (204) of reading the further measurement data (115) from the at least one further vehicle sensor (114, 116).

7. Method (300) for receiving measurement data (112) of a vehicle sensor (110) of a vehicle (100) by a control unit (120) of the vehicle (100), wherein the method (300) comprises the following steps: reading (310) a message (137) generated in accordance with the method (200) according to one of the preceding claims; parsing (320) the message (137) in order to obtain the measurement data (112) and the transmitter-side authentication information (135); ascertaining (330) receiver-side authentication information (145) for authenticating the measurement data (112) of the vehicle sensor (110) that are transmitted to the control unit (120), wherein the receiver-side authentication information (145) is ascertained using the determination rule (133) and the further measurement data (115); and carrying out (340) a comparison of the receiver-side authentication information (145) and the transmitter-side authentication information (135) with each other in order to establish authenticity of the measurement data (112) on the basis of a result of the comparison.

8. Method (300) according to Claim 7, wherein, in the ascertainment step (330), the further measurement data (115) are checked for plausibility with respect to the measurement data (112) for ascertaining the receiver-side authentication information (145), and / or wherein the ascertainment step (330) is carried out using a frequency measurement, a low-pass filtering, a phase detector, a quadrature demodulator, and / or a signal characteristic that is typical of a measurement value, in particular a measurement value fluctuation amplitude.

9. Method (300) according to Claim 8, wherein, in the ascertainment step (330), the plausibility check is carried out using a frequency measurement, a low-pass filtering, a phase detector, a quadrature demodulator, a signal characteristic that is typical of a measurement value, in particular a measurement value fluctuation amplitude, and / or at least one modelled measurement variable.

10. Method (400) for communication between a vehicle sensor (110) of a vehicle (100) and a control unit (120) of the vehicle (100), wherein the method (400) comprises the following steps: providing (410) measurement data (112) of the vehicle sensor (110) for the control unit (120) in accordance with the method (200) according to one of Claims 1 to 6; and receiving (420) the measurement data (112) of the vehicle sensor (110) by the control unit (120) in accordance with the method (300) according to one of Claims 7 to 9.

11. Vehicle (100) having a device (130, 140) which is set up to implement and / or control the steps of a method (200, 300, 400) according to Claim 10 in corresponding units (132, 136, 142, 144, 146, 148).

12. Computer program which is set up to implement and / or control the steps of a method (200, 300, 400) according to one of Claims 1 to 10.

13. Machine-readable storage medium on which the computer program according to Claim 12 is stored.