Method for dimensioning a shadow train timer

Abstract

A method is described for operating a rail vehicle system (100), the method comprising: i) passing a route by means of a rail vehicle (110), ii) sending a position report (130) of the rail vehicle (110) to a control device, iii) dimensioning a shadow train timer (T_S) based on a distance to the boundary of the current free detection section (TVD1), and a dynamic special time interval, and iv) evaluating whether a shadow train (120) is following the rail vehicle (110) based on the shadow train timer (T_S).

Description

Technical area

[0001] The invention relates to a method for operating a rail vehicle system, the method comprising: passing a route by a rail vehicle, sending a position report of the rail vehicle to a control device, dimensioning a shadow train timer, and evaluating whether a shadow train is following the rail vehicle based on the shadow train timer. Furthermore, the invention relates to the rail vehicle system.

[0002] The invention can therefore relate to the technical field of rail vehicles, in particular in the context of shadow trains. Technical background

[0003] In the field of rail vehicles, a constant trend toward automation and the associated increased efficiency can be observed. Furthermore, in the long term, traditional signaling systems will be replaced by more modern communication systems. An important example of this is the European Train Control System (ETCS), which focuses on communication / interoperability between rail vehicles, the control center, the interlocking system, and the communications center (especially the Radio Block Center, or RBC).

[0004] Various ETCS levels are known in the TSI 2016, with Levels 1 and 2 already being implemented in many cases. ETCS Levels 1 and 2 use axle counters or other physical detection technologies (e.g. track circuits) to report track sections as clear, whereby a train may only enter a physical track section that has been reported clear (track section). With ETCS Level 3, such detection will become obsolete and instead, safe distances between trains will be achieved via integrity and position reports from the trains to the control centre / RBC, which will also enable running in virtual sections that are more densely populated than with physical detection. This can have the advantage of reducing the need for track equipment with axle counters or other detection technologies, or even eliminating the need for any other track equipment.to completely eliminate them, as well as to reduce the necessary spacing between trains (increasing the number of sections without installing an exceptionally large number of physical track detection devices (a cost factor) can implicitly lead to shorter spacing between trains), and to increase the frequency of trains. To bridge the gap between ETCS Level 2 and ETCS Level 3 implementations, the so-called "ETCS Hybrid Level 3" concept was introduced. While train detectors (axle counters, physical track detection sections) are still used, these are supplemented by integrity and position reports from the rail vehicles to the communications center (in particular, the Radio Block Center, RBC).

[0005] TSI 2016: Commission Regulation (EU) 2016 / 919 of 27 May 2016 on the technical specification for interoperability relating to the 'control-command and signalling' subsystems of the rail system in the European Union (https: / / eur-lex.europa.eu / eli / reg / 2016 / 919 / oj).

[0006] In the TSI 2023, the previously defined ETCS levels were reorganized. ETCS Level 3 has been obsolete since the TSI 2023. The concept of track section clearance detection based on physical clearance detection in conjunction with integrity and position reports from the rolling stock was defined as ETCS level-independent. "ETCS Hybrid Level 3" was therefore renamed "ETCS Hybrid Train Detection" (HTD). To combine the advantages of physical clearance detection and fixed-block operation, a fallback level and already known technology, with the advantages of moving-block operation, namely increased track capacity, there are efforts to use so-called Hybrid Train Detection for train tracking.

[0007] TSI 2023: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023 / 1695 of 10 August 2023 on the technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signaling subsystems of the rail system in the European Union and repeating Regulation (EU) 2016 / 919 (https: / / eur-lex.europa.eu / eli / reg_impl / 2023 / 1695 / oj).

[0008] The main feature of the HTD concept is the use of fixed, predefined (projected) virtual sections to regulate the headway of trains. These sections are capable of confirming their integrity and their guaranteed end of train using their position reports. Information about the occupancy and clear detection of these virtual sections is determined by the RBC primarily based on these integrity and position reports. A reduced number of physical clear detection sections along the line serves to regulate the headway for trains with non-integrity and to handle disruption scenarios.

[0009] In other words, while physical track clearance detection devices and thus physical sections are still used, these are supplemented by virtual sections. The evaluation of the status of the virtual sections is then also based on the physical track clearance detection, as well as on the position reports of the rail vehicles and the train completeness reports of the rail vehicles. Thus, the physical sections function as a fallback level, ensuring continued operation in the event of a fault. If no fault occurs, the virtual sections enable higher line utilization. An important consideration here is that an infinite reduction in the size of the virtual sections can be equivalent to the moving-block principle.

[0010] A particular danger in these modern rail vehicle systems can arise from objects that are unknown to the communication system, e.g. because they do not (or cannot) conduct radio communication. Such an object can also be a rail vehicle, which can then be referred to as a ghost train. A special form of ghost train is the so-called shadow train, which travels unnoticed behind a known rail vehicle and can therefore pose a high danger. In principle, such a shadow train can be detected using physical train detectors. However, this can be particularly difficult if the distance to the known rail vehicle is short and / or the speed of the shadow train is high (particularly similar to the speed of the known rail vehicle ahead).

[0011] With ETCS Level 2 without HTD, a vehicle is generally only given permission to proceed if the physical detection system indicates that the route to be traveled is "clear." If the physical detection system detects occupancy on the route to be traveled, permission to proceed is only permitted under specific operational conditions.

[0012] If an unknown vehicle (potential shadow train, train 2) follows a known vehicle (known rail vehicle, train 1), the physical track clearance detection system ensures that this shadow train cannot become a hazard for other following vehicles.

[0013] With ETCS Hybrid Train Detection and the associated virtual sections (without a separate train clearance detection system), there is a risk that train 2 will enter the physical train clearance detection section in which train 1 is already located. If train 2 is unknown to the ETCS communication / track control center (e.g., RBC) and is traveling closely behind train 1, there is a risk that the unknown train 2 will travel unhindered behind train 1 and pose a hazard as a so-called shadow train.

[0014] To prevent this risk, a proposed solution already exists that includes a so-called shadow train timer (see ERTMS / ETCS Hybrid Train Detection from EEIG ERTMS Users Group, 20 / 12 / 2022, https: / / ertms.be / wpcontent / uploads / 2023 / 06 / 16E0421F_HTD.pdf). The shadow train timer is reset with each position report from train 1. The shadow train risk can therefore only be eliminated if the following events occur during the running shadow train timer: i) Clearance section 1, on which train 1 was last located, reports "clear" and ii) Train 1 reports that it has left clearance section 1 with its guaranteed end of train

[0015] The assumption so far has been that if the shadow train timer has not yet expired at the time of the clear signal, it can be assumed that no shadow train is present. However, this consideration may not be sufficient, because the shadow train timer is dimensioned at approximately 5 to 10 seconds (see ERTMS / ETCS Hybrid Train Detection Engineering from EEIG ERTMS Users Group, 19 / 12 / 2022, https: / / ertms.be / wpcontent / uploads / 2023 / 03 / 21E087-3_Guideline-HTD-Engineering.pdf). At a line speed of 140 km / h, a distance of 190 to 380 m can already be covered in this time. This would mean that train 2 could theoretically follow train 1 as a shadow train and, at a distance of, for example, 100 m from train 1, could still remain undetected as a shadow train with a length of 90 m.

[0016] The position of the MinSafeRearEnd (minimum safe train end) of a rail vehicle can be determined by subtracting the train length reported by the train from the reported MinSafeFrontEnd position of the train. The EstimatedRearEnd (assumed train end) of the rail vehicle can be offset by the distance L_DOUBTOVER from the MinSafeRearEnd in the train's direction of travel. For an illustration of these definitions, see Figure 8 . Figure 1 shows a first example of the above-described rail vehicles Train 1 (reference numeral 110) and Train 2 (reference numeral 120) in the context of ETCS Hybrid Train Detection. At time t1 = 0, the shadow train timer is restarted if a position report 130 of the rail vehicle 110 with the minimum safe train end (MinSafeRearEnd) 115 is received in the (track) clearance detection section TVD1 and the shadow train timer has not yet expired. Figure 2 based on Figure 1and shows the time t2 = t1 + T_CYCLOC (position report cycle, e.g., a train sends position reports to the RBC at intervals of T_CYCLOC; the T_CYCLOC cycle can be configurable). The shadow train timer is restarted because the position report 130 is received while the rail vehicle 110 with the minimum safe train end 115 is still within the clear detection section TVD1. Figure 3 is based on the Figures 1 and 2 and shows time t3 = t2 + T_CYCLOC (rail vehicle 110 shortly before leaving the clear detection section TVD 1). The shadow train timer is restarted because position report 130 is received while rail vehicle 110 is still within TVD 1 with the minimum safe train end 115. Rail vehicle 110 has almost left TVD 1, and the shadow train timer is restarted one last time before it expires if a shadow train 120 follows.

[0017] The situation in Figure 3can be particularly relevant for evaluating the shadow train risk, because the rail vehicle detector 140 can, in principle, physically detect the presence of the shadow train 120 in TVD 1. However, the detector (axle counter) only detects the axles. So instead of, for example, twelve axles, sixteen axles are counted that have entered TVD 2. The detector cannot know whether this is just one train or two trains. Figures 4 to 6 Below we will show how the dimensioning of the shadow move timer can influence the risk of an undetected shadow move. Summary of the invention

[0018] There may be a need to safely and reliably detect and / or eliminate a shadow train in a rail vehicle system.

[0019] Two methods, a control device and a rail vehicle system are described below.

[0020] According to one aspect of the invention, a method for dimensioning a shadow train timer is described, wherein the dimensioning is based on a distance of a rail vehicle to the boundary of the current clear detection section, and a dynamic special (or specific) time interval (in particular, in an exemplary embodiment, the shadow train risk can be eliminated based on this optimized calculation if the clear detection section 1 on which the train 1 was last located reports "clear" as long as the shadow train timer is still running).

[0021] According to one aspect of the invention, a method is described for operating a rail vehicle system (or a rail vehicle infrastructure), the method comprising: i) Passing (driving) a route (e.g. a track or a rail) with at least one (physical) track clearance section by means of a rail vehicle (e.g. a train); ii) Sending a position report (from the rail vehicle) of the rail vehicle to a control device (e.g. a control center, a signal box, and / or a communication center such as a radio block center; in particular, position reports are sent to the RBC (and may be forwarded from there)); iii) Dimensioning (setting) a shadow train timer (e.g. a time in which no shadow train is to be expected orin which the risk of an undetected shadow train is mitigated) based on a) a distance to the boundary of the clear detection section (in particular a time to reach the boundary by means of the minimum safe end of the train with the current train speed), and b) a dynamic specific time interval; and iv) in particular evaluating (determining, monitoring) whether a shadow train (which is not known in the rolling stock system) is following the rolling stock, based on (taking into account) the shadow train timer (e.g. if the shadow train timer has expired and then another train is detected in the clear detection section).

[0022] According to one aspect of the invention, a control device is described which is arranged to: dimension a shadow train timer based on i) a distance of a rail vehicle to the boundary of the current track clearance section, and ii) a dynamic specific time interval.

[0023] According to one aspect of the invention, a rail vehicle system (or a rail vehicle infrastructure) is described, comprising: i) a route with at least one (physical) clear detection section; ii) a rail vehicle which is arranged to pass the route and to send position reports to a control device; and iii) a control device (e.g. a computer, one or more processors, e.g. trackside, e.g., in the RBC, in remote operation, etc.), which is arranged to: a) dimension a shadow train timer based on ai) a distance to the boundary of the clear detection section, and aii) a dynamic specific time interval, b) in particular evaluating whether a shadow train is following the rail vehicle based on the shadow train timer.

[0024] In the context of this document, the term "shadow train" can specifically refer to an object such as a rail vehicle that is unknown in the rail vehicle system (ghost train) and is following another rail vehicle. For example, the shadow train does not have a (functioning) communication device, so communication with the control center and / or RBC is not possible. Such unknown objects can pose a particular threat, especially in an (at least partially) automated system based on communication.

[0025] In the context of this document, the term "special time interval" may specifically refer to a dynamically determined time used in dimensioning a shadow move timer. For example, the shadow move timer may be set as the sum of a first time (T_TVD, see below) and the special time interval. In one embodiment, the special time interval is not a fixed value, but rather a dynamic value that is adapted to the prevailing conditions / parameters. In a first embodiment, the dynamic special time interval may be a difference between a second time (T_PM) (PM for position reporting) and a fourth time (T_DO) (see explanation below). In a second embodiment, the dynamic special time interval may be a sum of a third time (T_free) and an estimated additional time interval (T_ZI) (see explanation below).

[0026] In the context of this document, the term "confidence interval" can be considered specifically as a quantity of odometry (distance measurement). Essentially, the on-board unit calculates the distance traveled; however, since it can never be said with absolute certainty how far a train has actually traveled, a safety margin can be applied. This means that the calculated distance traveled can determine the "Estimated Front End." For this purpose, there are a MinSafeFrontEnd and a MaxSafeFrontEnd (see also Figure 8 This creates an interval in which the real Zugspitze is very likely to be located.

[0027] According to an exemplary embodiment, the invention can be based on the idea that the presence of a shadow train in a rail vehicle system can be safely and reliably detected if a dynamic shadow train timer is used. As described above, a shadow train timer is known per se, which specifies a certain period of time (e.g. 5-10 seconds) during which no shadow train is to be expected when a rail vehicle passes through a clear-signaling section. The shadow train is detected when the timer has expired and the passed-through clear-signaling section is still occupied. Accordingly, the shadow train timer should be as short as possible, but at the same time it should not expire before the clear-signaling section is reported to be clear, because otherwise there is a risk that a shadow train will be mistakenly assumed each time the vehicle passes.

[0028] However, conventional approaches to dimensioning the shadow train timer are not sufficiently reliable (see discussion on Figures 1 to 3 (see above). However, it has now been recognized that a particularly efficient and reliable shadow train timer can be provided if it is dimensioned depending on the distance of the rail vehicle to the boundary of the clear detection section and a current dynamic specific time interval.

[0029] As a result, the described shadow train timer can consider a significantly smaller distance / time within which a shadow train could be located, enabling significantly increased accuracy and reliability in detecting a shadow train. The described approach can be implemented directly into existing systems, particularly in the context of ETCS Hybrid Train Detection. Exemplary implementation examples

[0030] According to one embodiment, determining the distance to the boundary of the clear detection section comprises determining a first time (T_TVD) required by the rail vehicle at the current speed (V) to reach the boundary of the clear detection section with the minimum safe rear end of the train. The term "minimum safe rear end" was defined above. The minimum safe rear end of the train can vary depending on the specific operating conditions, the speed of the trains, the nature of the track, and the safety systems used (see also the quality of odometry above).

[0031] According to one embodiment, determining the dynamic special time interval comprises determining a second time (T_PM) required by the rail vehicle to send the position report after the rail vehicle has passed the boundary of the track clearance detection section with the minimum safe train end. The time T_PM can be a fixed value. The position report is usually sent to the central communications center (RBC); the RBC can forward the position report. However, other communication channels (e.g., to the control center / interlocking system) are also possible. After the time T_PM has elapsed, it can be assumed that the position report has arrived at the RBC.

[0032] According to one embodiment, determining the dynamic special time interval comprises determining a third time (T_free) required to report the free signal to the control device, in particular (from the control center / interlocking station to) the Radio Block Center (RBC). The time T_free can be a fixed value.

[0033] In a specific embodiment, the second time (T_PM) can be described as follows: the RBC configures, and then requests, the train to send a position report when it calculates that its MinSafeRearEnd is crossing the boundary of the physical section. Sending and processing the position report takes a certain amount of time. This time can be determined empirically and can be assumed to be constant for all recurring situations regarding "passing the boundary of the physical section and sending and processing the position reports."

[0034] In a specific embodiment, the third time (T_free) can be described as follows: when a train passes an axle counter and thus clears the previous section, the axle counter informs the interlocking that this section is now clear. This doesn't happen in zero time, but usually faster than sending the position report and processing. This time, which takes the axle counter to report the section clear from the axle counter to the interlocking and from the interlocking to the RBC, can be called "T_free."

[0035] In a specific embodiment, the second time and the third time are not related, T_free can be represented smaller than T_PM, since usually (not necessarily) this processing is faster than sending the position report.

[0036] According to one embodiment, the method further comprises: dimensioning the shadow move timer (T_S) such that the time of the shadow move timer is shorter than the sum (T_TVD + T_PM) of the first time and the second time. Additionally or alternatively, the method further comprises: dimensioning the shadow move timer (T_S) such that the time of the shadow move timer is longer than the sum (T_TVD + T_free) of the first time and the third time. In the first case (see detailed Figure 5 ) the shadow train timer may be too long, so that a close and / or fast shadow train could go undetected. In the second case (see detailed Figure 6 ) the shadow train timer may be too short, because the timer could run out before the free reporting section (in the system) is even reported free.

[0037] According to one embodiment, determining the dynamic special time interval comprises determining a fourth time (T_DO) required by the rail vehicle to travel (pass) the distance between the minimum safe train end and the estimated train end (L_DOUBTOVER) at the current speed (V). The fourth time can thus be a dynamic / variable value that depends on the distance traveled by the rail vehicle and its speed. T_DO can be calculated from the current speed V and the distance L (L_DOUBTOVER) between the minimum safe train end and the estimated train end as T_DO = V * L. The fourth time can be considered in particular to determine whether the dynamic special time interval for dimensioning the shadow train timer should be assumed to be T_PM - T_DO or T_free + T_ZI.

[0038] According to one embodiment, the dimensioning of the shadow move timer is further based on: the sum (T_TVD + T_PM) of the first time and the second time, and the difference (T_TVD + T_PM - T_DO) of this sum and the fourth time. In other words, the shadow move timer can be dimensioned particularly efficiently and reliably as follows: T_S = T_TVD + T_PM - T_DO. According to one embodiment, the dimensioning of the shadow move timer outlined above is used when the fourth time (T_DO) is smaller than the difference (T_PM - T_free) between the second time and the third time.

[0039] According to one embodiment, the dimensioning of the shadow train timer is further based on: the sum (T_TVD + T_free + T_ZI) of the first time, the third time, and a further time interval T_ZI. This further time interval (T_ZI) may be required to increase the availability of the method. This value is configurable and can thus be adapted to the safety objectives of the rail vehicle system (dynamic). A value of, for example, T_ZI = 0.5 s appears realistic. According to one embodiment, the dimensioning of the shadow train timer outlined above is used when the fourth time (T_DO) is greater than or equal to the difference (T_PM - T_free) between the second time and the third time.

[0040] According to one embodiment, the method (or the rail vehicle system / infrastructure) is used in the context of the European Train Control System (ETCS), in particular ETCS Hybrid Train Detection. As already discussed above, shadow trains can pose a particular challenge in ETCS-HTD systems. The described method, or rather the dimensioning of the shadow train timer, can therefore be particularly well suited for ETCS-HTD applications and significantly increase the reliability of this modern system.

[0041] According to one embodiment, a clear signal for the clear detection section before the shadow train timer (T_S) expires indicates that (it can be assumed that) no shadow train is present. This works particularly reliably when the shadow train timer is optimally dimensioned. With this timely received clear signal, it can be assumed that the rail vehicle train 1 is in the next clear detection section, and its integrity and position reports can subsequently be used to reliably report the virtual sections left by the train as clear.

[0042] According to one embodiment, the track clearance detection section, particularly at the boundary of the track clearance detection section, has a rail vehicle detector, in particular an axle counting point / axle counter. This can have the advantage of providing a proven and reliable physical detection of rail vehicles. This can provide important additional security, particularly with ETCS Hybrid Train Detection. Existing rail vehicle detectors can be used, thus avoiding additional costs.

[0043] According to one embodiment, the track-clearance section is a physical track-clearance section. According to one embodiment, the track-clearance section has two or more virtual track-clearance sections. Using the virtual track-clearance sections, more track-clearance sections can be provided, allowing more trains to run closer together. However, the shadow train problem, among other things, must be taken into account.

[0044] According to one embodiment, the rail vehicle is a self-propelled, in particular autonomous, and furthermore, in particular, air-controlled, rail vehicle. This application, which is particularly important for the future, can particularly benefit from efficient monitoring of shadow trains.

[0045] In an exemplary embodiment, the dynamic special time interval can be described as follows: i) consisting of the time to send the position message less the time to travel the distance between the minimum safe end of the train and the estimated end of the train at the current train speed (if the time to travel the distance between the minimum safe end of the train and the estimated end of the train at the current train speed is less than the time to send the position message less the time to receive the physical clearance message), or ii) consisting of the time to receive the physical clearance message plus an additional time interval (e.g. 0.5 seconds) to increase availability (if the time to travel the distance between the minimum safe end of the train and the estimated end of the train at the current train speed is greater than the time to send the position message less the time to receive the clearance message).

[0046] In an exemplary embodiment, the dynamic special time interval can be described as follows: The dynamic special time interval is the additional part that, when added to T_TVD, results in the shadow train timer. If T_DO > T_PM - T_free, T_S = T_TVD + T_free + T_ZI, where the dynamic special time interval is T_free + T_ZI. If T_DO < T_PM - T_free, T_S = T_TVD + T_PM - T_DO, where the dynamic special time interval is T_PM - T_DO.

[0047] The above-defined aspects and further aspects of the present invention have been described with regard to the method. However, these aspects are also applicable in the same way to the control device or the rail vehicle system. The above-defined aspects and further aspects of the present invention emerge from the examples of embodiments to be described below and are explained with reference to the examples of embodiments. The invention is described in more detail below with reference to embodiments, to which, however, the invention is not limited. Short description of the drawings

[0048] The Figures 1 to 3 each show a rail vehicle system according to exemplary embodiments of the invention.

[0049] The Figures 4 to 6 each show an implementation of a shadow move timer according to exemplary embodiments of the invention. Figure 7shows a preferred implementation of a shadow move timer according to an exemplary embodiment of the invention. Figure 8 shows an illustration of definitions related to the rail vehicle. Detailed description of the drawings

[0050] The representations in the drawings are schematic. It should be noted that in different figures, similar or identical elements or features are provided with the same reference numerals or with reference numerals that differ from the corresponding reference numerals only within the first digit. To avoid unnecessary repetition, elements or features that have already been explained with reference to a previously described embodiment will not be explained again at a later point in the description.

[0051] Furthermore, spatially relative terms such as "front" and "back," "top" and "bottom," "left" and "right," etc., are used to describe the relationship of one element to another, as illustrated in the figures. Thus, the spatially relative terms may apply to orientations used that differ from the orientation illustrated in the figures. Obviously, these spatially relative terms refer only to simplify the description and to the orientation shown in the figures and are not necessarily limiting, since a device according to an embodiment of the invention may assume orientations other than those illustrated in the figures, particularly when used.

[0052] The following abbreviations are used in the exemplary embodiments: T_TVD (first time) = the time required by the rail vehicle at current speed V to reach the boundary of the train-free detection section with the minimum safe end of the train (this can be a dynamic value). T_PM (second time) = the time required to send a position report after the rail vehicle, according to its own calculations, has passed the boundary of the train-free detection section with the minimum safe end of the train (this can be a fixed value). T_free (third time) = the time required to report the physical train-free signal to the RBC (this can be a fixed value). T_DO (fourth time) = the time required to travel the distance between the minimum safe end of the train 115 and an estimated rear end 112 at the current speed V, e.g. T_DO = V * L (L_DOUBTOVER). T_S = Schattenzug Timer , z . B . T_S = T_TVD + T_PM − T_DO D_SHTR = distance representing the remaining shadow train risk, e.g., D_SHTR = (T_PM - T_free - T_DO) * V. D_SHTR can serve as a reference to quantify the remaining risk of a shadow train. For example, once D_SHTR is less than 20 m, there can be virtually no shadow train at all if a single locomotive is approximately 20 m long.

[0053] Figure 4shows the rail vehicle system 100 with the rail vehicle 110 and the potential shadow train 120. In this example, the shadow train timer was set as follows: T_S > / = T_TVD + T_CYCLOC. T_CYCLOC is the trigger for the first position report 130 after the rail vehicle 110 has left the TVD 1 clear detection section with the minimum safe train end 115. This can involve considering that the RBC does not actively request a position report and the rail vehicle assumes that it will cross the boundary with the MinSafeRearEnd. The most extreme case would then be that a position report is sent immediately before crossing the boundary, and the next position report is then sent depending on the position report cycle (T_CYCLOC).

[0054] The rail vehicle 110 has entered the following clear detection section TVD 2 at a distance of D = T_CYCLOC * V and sends another position message 130, which states that the minimum safe train end 115 of the rail vehicle 110 has left the clear detection section TVD 1. The rail vehicle 110 can, for example, travel at a speed of 140 km / h (38.88 m / s), whereby the estimated train end 112 can already be located at a distance of D = 3 s * 38.88 m / s = 117 m from the boundary of the clear detection section.

[0055] If shadow train 120 follows rail vehicle 110 very closely, the risk of an undetected shadow train cannot be eliminated. For example, a single locomotive can be assumed to be 20 m long. This means that even at a distance of 90 m from rail vehicle 110, shadow train 120 can enter the further track clearance section TVD 2 undetected. This is because the shadow train timer has not yet expired. The condition T_S > / = T_TVD + T_CYCLOC therefore still presents an increased risk.

[0056] Figure 5shows the rail vehicle system 100 with the rail vehicle 110 and the potential shadow train 120. In this example, the shadow train timer was set as follows: T_S > / = T_TVD + T_PM. T_PM is the time required to send the position report after the minimum safe end of the train 115 has passed the boundary of the TVD1 clear detection section (see T_TVD) (see also the problem explained above). The trigger for the first position report after the rail vehicle 110 has left the TVD1 clear detection section with the minimum safe end of the train 115 is the request for the position report by the RBC.

[0057] In this example, rail vehicle 110 has moved the distance D = T_PM * V into the further train-clearance section TVD2 and sends a position report stating that the minimum safe end of the train 115 of rail vehicle 110 has left the train-clearance section TVD1. The train is traveling at, for example, 140 km / h (38.88 m / s), so the estimated train end 112 of rail vehicle 110 can already be at a distance D = T_PM * 38.88 m / s from the boundary of the train-clearance section TVD1. This position report is triggered by assuming that rail vehicle 110 has left the train-clearance section TVD1 with the minimum safe end of the train 115 (position report requested by the RBC with dynamic position report parameters). The time until this position report is sent can be approximately 2 seconds, which is why a distance D < 77.76 m can be assumed.

[0058] If the shadow train 120 follows the rail vehicle 110 very closely, the risk of an undetected shadow train 120 cannot be eliminated. A single locomotive can be assumed to be 20 m long, which means that even at a distance of 57 m from the rail vehicle 110, the shadow train 120 can enter the further clear detection section TVD2 undetected, because the shadow train timer has not yet expired. In principle, the shadow train timer should therefore be reduced so that T_S < T_TVD + T_PM applies, thus reducing the risk of an undetected shadow train.

[0059] Figure 6shows the rail vehicle system 100 with the rail vehicle 110 and the potential shadow train 120. In this example, the shadow train timer was set as follows: T_S < T_TVD + T_free. T_free describes the time the interlocking system needs to report to the communication center (RBC) that the clear signal section TVD1 is now clear. However, in this example, the shadow train timer would expire before the clear signal is received. This means that T_S > T_TVD + T_free should be.

[0060] Figure 7 shows the rail vehicle system 100 with the rail vehicle 110 and the potential shadow train 120, according to a preferred embodiment of the invention. Since the shadow train timer consists of Figure 6 leads to a higher risk of an undetected shadow move, seems Figure 5to describe the more suitable variant to reduce the risk of an undetected shadow move without falsely assuming a shadow move regularly.

[0061] Two conditions can arise from this consideration: Condition 1 (see Figure 5 ): T_S < T_TVD + T_PM Condition 2 (see Figure 6 ): T_S > T_TVD + T_free

[0062] In other words: In the case where no shadow train is following the rail vehicle, it should be ensured that the shadow train timer has not yet expired before the section clear signal is received from TVD1. At the same time, the shadow train timer should be as short as possible to minimize the risk of an undetected shadow train.

[0063] To achieve this, T_S = T_TVD + T_free should be increased by a safety factor that is smaller than the difference T_PM - T_free. Additionally or alternatively, T_S = T_TVD + T_PM should be reduced by a time to be determined. In order not to choose this adjustment arbitrarily, it should be done based on the confidence interval of the rail vehicle 110. The rail vehicle 110 necessarily passes the boundary of the TVD1 clear detection section before (or at the latest with) its minimum safe train end, therefore this time T_DO can be safely used to shorten the shadow train timer in a defined way. The time in which the estimated train end 112 of the rail vehicle 110 physically passed the boundary of the TVD1 clear detection section before the minimum safe train end 115 can be calculated from the distance L between 112 and 115 and the current speed V of the rail vehicle 110 as T_DO = L L_DOUBTOVER * V .

[0064] This results in the following updated condition for the Shadow Move Timer: T_S = T_TVD + T_PM − T_DO .

[0065] In order not to violate condition 2 (see above), a further condition can be that if T_DO > / = T_PM - T_free (due to large confidence interval), the following should apply: T_S = T_TVD + T_free + T_ZI z . B . 0,5 s .

[0066] In summary, the dimensioning of the shadow train timer can preferably be set as follows: If T_DO < T_PM - T_free, then: T_S = T_TVD + T_PM - T_DO. If T_DO > / = T_PM - T_free, then the following applies: T_S = T_TVD + T_free + T_ZI.

[0067] It should be noted that the term "comprising" does not exclude other elements or steps, and the use of the article "a" does not exclude a plurality. Elements described in connection with different embodiments may also be combined. It should also be noted that reference signs in the claims should not be construed to limit the scope of the claims.

[0068] Regardless of the grammatical gender of a particular term, it includes persons of male, female or other gender identity. Reference symbol

[0069] 100Railway vehicle system 110Railway vehicle 112Estimated end of train 115Minimal safe end of train 120Shadow train 130Position report 140Railway vehicle detector T_SShadow train timer T_TVDFirst time T_PMSecond time T_freeThird time T_DOFourth time T_ZIAdditional time interval TVD, TVD1Free detection section (physical) TVD2Further free detection section (physical)

Claims

1. A method for dimensioning a shadow train timer (T_S), wherein the dimensioning is based on a distance of a rail vehicle (110) to the boundary of the current track clearance section (TVD), and a dynamic specific time interval.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein determining the distance to the boundary of the clear detection section (TVD) comprises: determining a first time (T_TVD) required by the rail vehicle (110) at the current speed (V) to reach the boundary of the clear detection section (TVD) with the minimum safe train end (115).

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein determining the dynamic special time interval comprises: determining a second time (T_PM) required by the rail vehicle (110) to send a position report (130) after the rail vehicle (110) has passed the boundary of the free-detection section (TVD) with the minimum safe train end (115); and / or determining a third time (T_free) required to report a free report to the control device, in particular the Radio Block Center (RBC).

4. The method according to one of the preceding claims, further comprising: dimensioning the shadow train timer (T_S) such that the time of the shadow train timer is shorter than the sum (T_TVD + T_PM) of the first time and the second time, and / or longer than the sum (T_TVD + T_free) of the first time and the third time.

5. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein determining the dynamic special time interval comprises: determining a fourth time (T_DO) required for the rail vehicle (110) to pass the distance between the minimum safe train end (115) and an estimated train end (112) at the current speed (V).

6. The method according to one of the preceding claims, comprising: dimensioning the shadow train timer (T_S) as the difference (T_TVD + T_PM - T_DO) between the sum (T_TVD + T_PM) of the first time and the second time, and the fourth time.

7. The method according to claim 6, wherein the fourth time (T_DO) is less than the difference (T_PM - T_free) between the second time and the third time.

8. The method according to one of the preceding claims, further comprising: dimensioning the shadow train timer (T_S) as the sum (T_TVD + T_free + T_ZI) of the first time, the third time and a further time interval.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the fourth time (T_DO) is greater than or equal to the difference (T_PM - T_free) between the second time and the third time.

10. The method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the method is used in the context of the European Train Control System, ETCS, in particular ETCS Hybrid Train Detection.

11. The method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the free-detection section (TVD), in particular at the boundary of the free-detection section (TVD), has a rail vehicle detector (140), in particular an axle counter and / or a physical free-detection section.

12. The method according to one of the preceding claims, comprising at least one of the following features: wherein the free-detection section (TVD) is a physical free-detection section comprising two or more virtual free-detection sections; wherein expiration of the shadow train timer (T_S) after the free-detection section (TVD) has been cleared indicates that no shadow train (120) is present.

13. A method for operating a rail vehicle system (100), the method comprising: passing a route with at least one clear detection section (TVD) by means of a rail vehicle (110); sending a position report (130) of the rail vehicle (110) to a control device; dimensioning a shadow train timer (T_S) according to one of the preceding claims; and evaluating whether a shadow train (120) is following the rail vehicle (110) based on the shadow train timer (T_S).

14. A control device for a rail vehicle system (100), which is arranged to dimension a shadow train timer (T_S) based on a distance of a rail vehicle (110) to the boundary of the current free detection section (TVD), and a dynamic special time interval.

15. A rail vehicle system (100), comprising: a route with at least one free-detection section (TVD); a rail vehicle (110) configured to pass the route and send a position report (130) to a control device; and a control device according to claim 14; in particular, wherein the control device is further configured to evaluate whether a shadow train (120) is following the rail vehicle (110) based on the shadow train timer (T_S).

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