PRE-PERSONALIZED SECURITY ELEMENT AND ON-BOARD PERSONALIZATION

By generating a derivation key within the operating system of secure elements, the secure element personalization process is optimized for remote, secure, and efficient customization, addressing the complexity and cost issues of existing methods.

FR3125902B1Active Publication Date: 2024-11-22IDEMIA FRANCE SAS
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Patent Information

Application Number
FR2021008327
Authority / Receiving Office
FR · FR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-07-30
Publication Date
2024-11-22
Estimated Expiration
2041-07-30

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing procedures for personalizing secure elements (SEs) are complex, time-consuming, and expensive, requiring secure customization at a third-party site, which involves transferring sensitive data and is prone to security risks.

Method used

The secure element is configured to generate a derivation key within its operating system, allowing for on-board personalization by diversifying a master cryptographic key during the loading of the operating system, enabling remote personalization without direct data transfer and reducing security risks.

Benefits of technology

This approach simplifies and speeds up the manufacturing process, allows for large-scale production of identical SEs, enhances security by avoiding direct data transfer, and reduces the risk of data interception, while enabling flexible personalization throughout the SE's lifecycle.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

A new method for personalizing embedded secure elements (eSEs) allows for simplified manufacturing prior to integration into host devices. An eSE implements services executed by an embedded operating system (OS) when loaded into the eSE. The unpersonalized eSE includes an OS loader and a master cryptographic key common to a plurality of secure elements. It can therefore be mass-produced. The OS loader obtains an operating system package from a server and installs it. In response to the installation, the OS loader generates a derivation cryptographic key by diversifying the master cryptographic key, and then the OS generates personalized data by deriving pre-personalization data with the derivation key. The eSE, deployed in the field in a simple, unpersonalized state, is thus fully personalized without the exchange of secret personalized data. Figure 3
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Description

Title of the invention: PRE-PERSONALIZED SECURE ELEMENT AND ON-BOARD PERSONALIZATION Technical field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of secure elements. Prior art

[0002] A secure element, SE (for "secure element" in English), is a tamper-proof hardware component or platform (typically a chip or a smart card) used in a host terminal (typically a mobile terminal) and capable of hosting, securely under the control of a card operating system (OS) (i.e. a low-level OS or "firmware"), applications and data in compliance with security rules and requirements set by trusted authorities.

[0003] A widely used form factor of the SE is the embedded or integrated secure element, eSE (for "embedded Secure Element"). This embedded secure element is generally soldered to the host terminal.

[0004] The secure elements are programmed according to the desired applications.

[0005] For example, an eSE can form the secure element necessary for many uses or services based on NFC (for "Near Field Communication" in English) communication implemented by a host mobile terminal. For example, an NFC payment service requires secret banking information from the user which is advantageously stored in the eSE, protected from any untimely access. This is also the case for a public transport service where the eSE makes it possible to identify the user at gates.

[0006] Another example of a secure element is the embedded UICC (for “Universal In-tegrated Circuit Card”) which provides a subscriber’s credentials to authenticate on a mobile telephone network. This is for example an eSE configured as a SIM card (for “Subscriber Identity Module”). This is then referred to as an eUICC (for “embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card”).

[0007] Secure elements are manufactured and then personalized, i.e. loaded with data specific to the SE and the subscriber. Some data must be kept secret for security reasons, such as credentials, cryptographic keys or identification data. Other data specific to the SE may be less confidential. Also, during the personalization of a group of SEs, secret data is generally diversified from a secret data, for example a derivation cryptographic key, so that each SE has its own secret data, for example cryptographic keys and identification credentials.

[0008] In particular, customization is a process consisting of loading onto each SE, its operating system (or OS for "Operating System" in English language) and various data.

[0009] For reasons of optimizing the personalization process, the process is broken down into two distinct processes: pre-personalization and personalization. Pre-personalization consists of loading, into the OS, data common to all the OSes of the same batch. Also, the entire batch of OSes can be pre-personalized using the same operation. This common part includes in particular the loading into memory of the operating system and pre-personalized data, also called static data. Personalization is implemented following pre-personalization, and consists of loading into the OS, data specific to it, also called dynamic data, therefore including personalized secret data (keys, credentials, etc.).

[0010] It will be noted that the term "personalization" is generally understood as that commonly used by those skilled in the art in the microcircuit card industry, or as defined by W. Ranki and W. Effing in the document "Smart Card Handbook, Second Edition, Ed. John Wiley & Sans, Ltd" as follows: "The term personalization, in its broadest sense, means that data specific to a card or a person is entered into the card. This data can for example be a name, an address, but also keys associated with the card. The only thing that matters is that this data is specific to this card."

[0011] By extension, the pre-personalization of SEs consists of similar operations except that the data entered into the SEs are common to a batch of SEs or to a type of entity (for example smart cards). This is for example configuration data of programs contained in a rewritable non-volatile memory (for example of the Flash, EEPROM or other type) which aims to determine a behavior or operation common to all these SEs of the same batch or of the same type of entity.

[0012] Today, SEs are customized outside the manufacturing site. For example, customization can be implemented in a third-party site.

[0013] Personalization sites must therefore set up personalization systems according to strict procedures and respecting security requirements, in particular with regard to the personalized secret data handled. It should be noted that sending personalization data to the personalization site also requires compliance with very strict security requirements, in particular the establishment of a secure link (transport key, session key) between the personalization system and the His.

[0014] Furthermore, the customization operation is specific to each SE, therefore requiring separate operations for each SE before or after its physical integration (soldering for an eSE) to a host device.

[0015] Also, the existing procedures for customizing SEs are complex (in terms of time and security, in particular) and therefore costly.

[0016] There is therefore a need to improve this situation. Summary of the invention

[0017] For this purpose, the present invention aims to optimize the personalization of secure elements.

[0018] It proposes to generate (by diversification or “rotation”), within the OS itself and upon loading a new operating system, the derivation key used for the personalization of the OS and thus allow the derivation of the personalization data also within the OS from pre-personalized data.

[0019] Thus, batches of similar SEs can be manufactured and sold without a dedicated customization operation before their sale. These SEs only contain common data and therefore pre-personalization, their manufacture in large numbers is simple.

[0020] Furthermore, the customization of the SEs can then be carried out later in the field, remotely, thus reducing the time from the production phase to the sale.

[0021] Finally and above all, the invention improves the security of SEs. On the one hand, no secret personalized data is now transferred directly to the SE and therefore likely to be intercepted. This eliminates the need for a highly secure personalization site. On the other hand, thanks to the in situ diversification of the derivation key used for personalization, it is possible to repeat such diversification throughout the life of the card, consequently reducing the risks of compromise.

[0022] To this end, the present invention proposes a secure element configured to be integrated into a host device and to implement services executed by an operating system when the operating system is loaded into the secure element, the secure element comprising an operating system loader and at least one master cryptographic key. This key is initially common to a plurality of secure elements. The operating system loader and the cryptographic key (and possibly any other common pre-personalization data) are in particular loaded into the secure element during its manufacture, before or after integration into the host device.

[0023] According to the invention, the secure element is configured to: - obtain an operating system package from a server and install the system operating, - in response to the installation of the operating system, have the operating system loader generate a derivation (cryptographic) key by diversifying the master cryptographic key.

[0024] Thus, the presence of the operating system loader (or firmware loader) in the eSE secure element from its manufacture makes it possible to load an operating system at any time, whether it is the first operating system loaded in the eSE or an update version, and to generate locally (“on board”) the derivation key in order to allow the operating system to generate (derive) its own personalized data. Such personalized data, specific to the operating system and / or to the embedded secure element, gives, for example, secure access to services of the operating system or external services, for example of a telecommunications or banking network (e.g. telephone calls, data services, authentication with a server, etc.).

[0025] Such a secure element has the advantage of not being personalized when integrated into the host device. Identical secure elements can therefore be manufactured in large numbers, while allowing remote on-board personalization in the field.

[0026] Also, according to some embodiments, the operating system package includes pre-customization data, possibly associated with the operating system, and

[0027] the secure element is configured to generate personalized data by deriving the pre-personalization data with the derivation key.

[0028] Thanks to this derivation, the secure element becomes personalized.

[0029] It should be noted that pre-customization data may also be loaded initially with the operating system loader and used during this diversification for customization. Similarly, personalized data may also be loaded concomitantly with the loading of the operating system.

[0030] In one embodiment, the operating system loader is configured to generate the derivation key from the master cryptographic key, a unique identifier of the operating system loader, a unique identifier of the operating system package or the loaded and installed operating system, and a derivation counter updated each time the derivation key is generated. Optionally, a random number or a one-time password (OTP) known to the server or another server may be added as a diversification parameter of the master cryptographic key.

[0031] This configuration allows secure customization of the derivation key, different from one secure element to another and different from one diversification to another within the same eSE.

[0032] Diversification can be performed directly from the initial master cryptographic key or from the previous derivation key obtained (which becomes the new master key for the next generation). In the latter case, it may be considered to overwrite the old derivation key (initially the master or root key) with the new derivation key.

[0033] When the secure element is manufactured and before an operating system is loaded, the derivation counter has an initial value, for example zero. The value of the derivation counter is incremented as new versions of the operating system are obtained and installed, and as new derivation keys are generated.

[0034] According to one feature, the secure element is further configured to, after the generation of the derivation key, send to a server the unique identifier of the operating system loader, the unique identifier of the operating system package or the loaded and installed operating system, the derivation counter, and optionally a label designating the master cryptographic key. In other words, it transmits all of the parameters used (the possible random number or OTP is already known to the server) for the generation. The key label is transmitted in particular in the case where a plurality of keys are stored in the secure element, in order to identify the key used for diversification and then for generation of the personalized data.

[0035] The server can thus generate on its side the derivation key specific to the eSE for the embedded operating system, and thus also generate the personalized data specific to this eSE, without secret data being exchanged. It therefore has, in mirror, the same personalized and secret data as the eSE. Such a server is then able to carry out secure identification, authentication, etc. operations with the secure element.

[0036] In one embodiment, the secure element is configured to send to the server a request to obtain the operating system package, the request comprising a unique identifier of the operating system loader and a unique identifier of an operating system package or of an already installed operating system if there is one, and

[0037] obtaining the operating system package is in response to the request.

[0038] Each batch of secure elements has, in common, an operating system loader and a master key, and unique to each eSE, a unique loader identifier. Thus, identical eSEs can be personalized in a distinct and targeted.

[0039] According to one feature, the secure element is configured to generate the derivation key in response to an end of installation event of the operating system.

[0040] Alternatively, the secure element is configured to generate the derivation key in response to a first start (first boot) of the installed operating system.

[0041] Also, each time an operating system is loaded again (e.g., an update), a new derivation key is generated. Incidentally, new personalized data is also generated, by derivation from this new key.

[0042] According to one feature, the secure element comprises a flag set to a first non-diversified state value, during installation of the operating system and to a second diversified state value, during generation of the derivation key. This flag thus allows the secure element to know whether the generation of the derivation key has already taken place. This is useful in particular for identifying the first startup of the operating system and thus avoiding untimely generations at each restart of the operating system. Optionally, the flag can be set to a third personalized state value, during generation of the personalized data.

[0043] According to one feature, the master cryptographic key is stored in secure memory and accessible only by the operating system loader. Also, the parameters received by the loader to generate the derivation key only include a label (or identifier) ​​of the master cryptographic key to be used (e.g., for the case where several master keys are stored) for the generation, and not the key itself. This enhances security.

[0044] Correlatively, the invention also proposes a method for customizing a secure element configured to be integrated into a host device and to implement services executed by an operating system when the operating system is loaded into the secure element, the secure element comprising an operating system loader and at least one master cryptographic key (initially common to a plurality of secure elements), said method comprising the following steps: - obtain an operating system package from a server and install the operating system, - in response to the installation of the operating system, have the operating system loader generate a derivation key by diversifying the master cryptographic key.

[0045] The generation method has characteristics and advantages similar to those described previously in relation to the integrated circuit.

[0046] The method may further incorporate optional steps or features set out above in connection with device characteristics (secure element). Brief description of the drawings

[0047] Other features and advantages of the invention will become apparent in the description below, illustrated by the attached figures which illustrate exemplary embodiments which are not in any limiting nature.

[0048] [Fig.l] schematically represents a secure element in which the present invention can be implemented.

[0049] [Fig.2a] illustrates a secure element at the end of the manufacturing process when it is integrated into a host device.

[0050] [Fig.2b] illustrates the secure element after installing a new operating system package.

[0051] [Fig.2c] illustrates the secure element after diversification of the master key to obtain a derivation key.

[0052] [Fig.2d] illustrates the secure element after an operation of generating personalized data by derivation from the derivation key.

[0053] [Fig. 3] schematically illustrates different steps for the personalization of a secure element according to embodiments of the invention. Detailed description

[0054] The invention proposes a new scenario for customizing embedded secure elements (or "embedded Secure Element", eSE) which allows simpler and faster manufacturing of eSEs before integration into their host equipment. An eSE implements services executed by an embedded operating system (or "firmware") when the operating system is loaded into the secure element. For example, such services include identification or authentication with a banking or wireless telecommunications operator or network or with a reader to carry out a transaction (financial or banking for example), services for verifying access to functions or services (for example, verification of access code), data or message confidentiality services (integrity and / or confidentiality of data), non-repudiation services, etc.

[0055] According to the invention, such an eSE intended to be integrated into a host device comprises an operating system loader (OS or firmware loader) and at least one master cryptographic key common to a plurality of secure elements. Such an eSE is not personalized at this stage, thus allowing its identical production in large numbers. Optionally, pre-personalized data may also be loaded into the eSE during its manufacture (i.e. before integration into the host device). Similarly, certain already personalized data may also be loaded at this stage. The pre-personalized and personalized data can cover any type of data, including application data (for the operation of applications) and security data (for operations preventing fraudulent use of the secure element) such as cryptographic keys or “keysets”.

[0056] The OS or firmware loader is a minimal piece of program allowing certain basic functions to be performed on the secure element, such as executing a script, loading an OS and associated data, installing an OS and associated data, calculating key values, etc.

[0057] “Pre-personalized data” or “static data” means any data common to a batch of secure elements, for example an operating system, a common cryptographic key, an operating system loader, a set of authentication keys dedicated to securing communications with one or more third-party servers (secure channel), data and / or counter initialization values, data and / or key identification label values, etc.

[0058] “Personalized data” or “dynamic data” means any data specific to a secure element (and therefore indirectly to a user or subscriber or a device including the secure element), for example a diversification or identification key, user or subscriber data, a specific registry or file value, credentials, operator data (for example addresses of servers in the operator's network), user or application personal identification codes (“PIN” or “personal identification number” in English), application data values, etc. The personalized data may be derived from certain pre-personalized data. The derivation may be a diversification of a cryptographic key or more generally a mathematical calculation on pre-personalized data.

[0059] The OS loader, and more generally the secure element, is configured to obtain, from a remote server (for example the server of a telephone or banking operator, or of the manufacturer or manager of the secure element), an operating system package and to install the operating system in the secure element. The mechanisms for loading and installing OS are widely known and therefore not detailed here. An operating system package is understood in the computer sense, namely a set of software and files provided together, for example in the form of a single computer structure (file or archive). In certain embodiments, an operating system package can be reduced to a single operating system.

[0060] Furthermore, the secure element is provided, in response to the installation of the operating system, to cause the operating system loader to generate a (cryptographic) derivation key by diversification of the master cryptographic key. The charger can indeed be designed to have access to the secure memory storing secret data, such as the master cryptographic key.

[0061] The derivation key, once generated, then allows the secure element to generate personalized data by deriving pre-personalization data (present in the eSE) with the derivation key. Alternatively, personalization data (e.g., personalized keys) may be directly generated from the derivation key alone.

[0062] These operations (loading the OS, diversification and derivation of personalized data) can take place while the secure element is already integrated into its host device, i.e. in the field. This eliminates the need for a personalization site.

[0063] [Fig.l] schematically represents a secure element 100 in which the present invention is implemented. This secure element 100 comprises a microprocessor 101, with which is associated on the one hand one or more random access memories 102, for example by means of a bus 103, and on the other hand one or more non-volatile memories 104 (for example of the ROM and / or EEPROM and / or flash type), for example through a bus 105. The non-volatile storage memory 104 stores data and software (loader, operating system and other applications) intended to implement the invention but also any data necessary for the execution of the programs. The volatile working memory 102 stores the executable code of the computer programs as well as the registers adapted to record variables and parameters necessary for their execution.

[0064] Buses 103 and 105 may be a single bus. Microprocessor 101 may be a secure cryptoprocessor.

[0065] The secure element 100 further comprises, connected to the bus(es), one or more communication interfaces 106 with the host device embedding the secure element, typically implementing APDU type commands.

[0066] The secure element 100 may be an eSE (“embedded SE”), an eUICC (“embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card”), an eSIM (“embedded SIM”), intended to be integrated, by soldering for example, into a host device such as a smartphone, a digital tablet, a laptop, a personal assistant, an entertainment device (e.g. game console).

[0067] Figures 2a, 2b, 2c schematically illustrate a functional structure of the secure element 100 according to different states in a process of personalizing the secure element. [Fig.3] schematically illustrates different steps for the personalization of a secure element according to embodiments of the invention.

[0068] [Fig.2a] illustrates a secure element 100 at the factory outlet, i.e. at the end of the manufacturing process when it is integrated into a host device 200. Avanta Conveniently, a batch of secure elements identical to that of [Fig.2a] can be manufactured and then integrated into a fleet of host devices because these secure elements are preferably not yet personalized at this stage. However, in certain embodiments, it can be provided that from the manufacturing process, personalized data is loaded into the memory of the secure element 100.

[0069] The secure element 100 leaving the manufacturing site comprises, in non-volatile memory 104, a card operating system loader 110 and pre-personalized data 112 including in particular one or more secret data such as a master or root cryptographic key, MSK, of numeric or alphanumeric type. The secret data are in particular stored in a protected sector (from a security point of view) of the non-volatile memory, for example using a dedicated security domain (for example ISD (for “issuer security domain” in English) according to the Global Platform Card Specification version 2.3 document). In a variant, each secret data item, typically the MSK key, is stored in a computer object associated with the loader 110. This computer object can be protected, by encryption in confidentiality and integrity. It is preferably stored in a partition of the non-volatile memory associated with the loader 110.These different configurations ensure secure access to the MSK key (and generally to secret data) by the 110 charger only.

[0070] The loader 110 can directly manipulate these objects or have an API interface 111 allowing access to the security domain and therefore to the secret data using labels (or identifiers or tags or pointers or equivalents) identifying each of the secret data separately. For the purposes of the following, the label identifying the MSK master key is called "MSK label". For example, the MSK label can be the object identifier assigned to the computer object created and instantiated to store the MSK key.

[0071] The card operating system loader 110 is identified using a unique IDioader identifier, different from one secure element to another. This identifier is comparable to a serial number of the secure element 100. The primary function of the loader is to obtain and execute package installation scripts in memory 104 of the secure element. The loader 110 may be provided with session or transport keys (possibly unique or common to a batch of eSEs) to enable secure remote communication with an external server.

[0072] Furthermore, a derivation counter 114 is provided in non-volatile (rewritable) memory which counter is initialized to an initialization value (for example 0) and is incremented at each diversification of the master key MSK by the loader 110. The increment can be carried out in steps of 1 or another positive integer. Key diversification is an operation known to those skilled in the art which generates one or multiple secret keys from an initial secret value (the master key MSK).

[0073] If several secret keys are stored, several derivation counters 114 can be provided, each associated with one of the secret keys to count their diversifications.

[0074] An OS state flag 116 is also provided in rewritable non-volatile memory to track the personalization state of the secure element. This flag is initially set to a first non-diversified state value Ei (for example 0). This flag is intended to change value and therefore move to a second diversified state value E2 (for example 1) when diversifying the master key MSK into a derivation key for customizing the operating system (and therefore the secure element). The flag can be reset to the first state value Ei when installing a new operating system (including for example an OS update). Optionally, the flag can be set to a third personalized state value E3, when generating personalized data.

[0075] This flag thus allows the secure element to know whether the generation of the derivation key has already taken place and / or whether the generation of the personalized data has also taken place. This is useful in particular for identifying the first startup of the operating system and thus avoiding untimely generations each time the operating system is restarted.

[0076] As shown in the figure, other data 118, in particular already personalized, can also be loaded into the eSE 100, optionally.

[0077] The communication interface 106 of the secure element notably allows communication (for example using APDU commands) with an agent 202 executed in the host device 200. Such an agent can communicate with the outside of the host device 200 using appropriate communication interfaces (typically wireless communication modules). For example, it may be an agent specific to an operator (telephone, banking, automobile, etc.), which is configured to connect to an infrastructure 250 of the operator composed of one or more servers connected to each other, which are referred to hereinafter as a “server” (in the singular).

[0078] This infrastructure 250 of the operator manages a fleet of eSEs in the field (i.e. embedded in host devices) by storing, in a dedicated database 252 (shown in [Fig.3]), an image of each of the eSEs (therefore associated with each IDioader) in the field in order to efficiently and securely carry out operations with them. This image may for example include a copy of the secret data of the eSEs, the operating systems and software installed. Also, in the case of customization carried out in the field as provided by the invention, this “image” of the eSEs must also evolve to reflect this customization, without the personalized data being exchanged and therefore subject to the risk of being intercepted. The database 252 thus initially includes a copy of the master key MSK.

[0079] With reference to [Fig. 3], an event 300 triggers an initial customization process according to the invention. This event may be the first power-up of the host device 200 or the eSE 100 (therefore corresponding to a first use of the eSE). Alternatively, it may also be a voluntary action by a user in a menu of the host device 200. In another variant, it may be the detection of the absence of an OS in the eSE 100 or the availability of an OS update on the server 250. Another variant may be the expiration of a timer for a periodic query of OS availability or OS update.

[0080] Here it is the agent 202 of the host equipment 200 which conducts the customization of the eSE 100. In step 302, the agent 202 sends a request, for example APDU, to the eSE 100 for the purpose of obtaining the identifier IDioader as well as an operating system package identifier IDpackage already installed in the eSE.

[0081] At the state of [Fig.2a], no operating system has yet been installed. A NULL value can then be used as the IDpackage to indicate this state.

[0082] Generally speaking, the IDpackage identifier can follow different formats according to different embodiments: - an identifier linked to the OS alone: ​​IDpackage= OS version, - an identifier linked to the OS and the data accompanying the OS, whether pre-customized and / or customized. For example, IDpackage = version of the package {OS, data] installed, or IDpackage= version of the package {OS, pre-custom data] installed II version of the customized data loaded, with "Il" the concatenation operator, - an identifier linked to the OS and an identifier linked to the data accompanying the OS (pre-custom and / or custom). For example, IDpackage = OS version II version of the loaded data, or IDpackage = OS version II version of the loaded pre-custom data II version of the loaded custom data.

[0083] In response to the request, the eSE 100 (the loader 110) retrieves the two identifiers requested in step 304 and returns them to the agent 202 in step 306.

[0084] In step 308, the agent 202 transmits a request to obtain an operating system package to the server 250, in a conventional manner, for example via HTTPS or OTA (“over-the-air”). The request includes the two identifiers IDioader and ID package. A periodic query for OS availability or OS update can also be likened to such a request for obtaining.

[0085] Upon receipt of the request, the server 250 extracts (step 310) the two identifiers, and on the basis of these, checks (step 312) the availability of a new operating system package version. Depending on the format of the IDpackage identifier, it can This is to check whether a new OS is available and / or whether new pre-personalized data (static data) is available and / or whether new personalized data (dynamic data) is available.

[0086] This verification may consist of a query in the database 252 to check the package associated with the IDioader. If this is different from the package bearing the identifier IDpackage, then a new package must be installed.

[0087] This verification can be performed separately for the OS and the pre-customized and / or customized data according to the format of the IDpackage identifier. In this case, the elements (OS and / or data) identified as new are compiled into a new single package (the one to be installed).

[0088] In step 314, the new elements (OS, data) to be installed are identified in the base 252, then retrieved (step 316) by the server 250.

[0089] In step 318, the new operating system package is formed: installation script and elements (operating system, possibly only an update and / or pre-personalized data and / or already personalized data), then returned by the server 250 to the agent 202 in response to the request 308.

[0090] In step 320, the eSE receives said new package from the agent 252, typically via APDU.

[0091] If no OS is already installed on the eSE 100, it is the OS loader 110 that receives the package for execution of the installation script. If an OS is already installed, it is the active OS itself that receives the package (OS update) for execution of the installation script.

[0092] After verifying the integrity of the received package, the OS loader 110 or the active OS loads the installation script and the contents of the package (new OS and the related data) into working memory (RAM memory 102) and then installs the whole thing into non-volatile memory 104 during step 322 by executing the installation script.

[0093] At the end of the installation, the diversification state flag 116 is set to 0 (state EJ (step 324) to indicate that diversification is necessary after this new installation. Optionally, a verification of the integrity of the installed OS can be carried out, in order to continue the process only in the event of confirmed integrity.

[0094] [Fig.2b] illustrates the secure element 100 after the installation of a new operating system package. As shown in the figure, the installation leads to the presence, in non-volatile memory 104, of the package 120 identified by the identifier ID loader*. The installed package 120 comprises, for example, a new OS 122, new pre-personalized data 124 associated with the OS and optionally new personalized data 126.

[0095] At this stage, if optionally certain personalized data 118, 126 may be present, the eSE 100 is still in a non-diversified state (flag 116 to 0, i.e. state Ei) with regard to the diversification of the master key MSK. Incidentally, state Ei also indicates a non-personalization of the SE with regard to the derivation of personalized data from pre-personalized data 112, 124 and / or the derivation key (not yet generated at this stage).

[0096] Returning to [Fig.3], the personalization of the secure element using the master key MSK is triggered by event 326. As a reminder, this personalization comprises two phases: the diversification of the master key MSK into a derivation key, then the derivation of personalized data from this derivation key.

[0097] In one embodiment, event 326 is an end of installation event of the operating system (steps 322, 324). This event may simply consist of the detection of a last command of the script, for example via a particular end of script field in its header or simply because the last script command is pre-known. Alternatively, a particular lifecycle state change of the OS may be detected which corresponds to an end of installation.

[0098] In a variant, the event 326 is the detection of a first start (first boot) of the newly installed operating system 122. In this case, to identify such a first start, the eSE 110 verifies in step 326a that the flag 116 is indeed at the first non-diversified state value Ei (i.e. 0).

[0099] If so (event detected and possibly flag 116 to Ei), the eSE 100 launches diversification 328 of the master cryptographic key to generate a derivation (cryptographic) key.

[0100] This diversification operation is controlled by the charger 110.

[0101] Also, if the loader 110 directly detects the event 326 (in particular if it installs the package 120 itself for the first time), then it directly initiates the diversification operation 328. If the OS 122 detects the event 326 (and optionally 326a), then it calls a service of the loader 110, typically the API 111, to have the latter initiate the diversification operation 328. Alternatively, the loader 110 can also use the API 111 to carry out the diversification operation 328 if it does not have direct access to the MSK key.

[0102] The loader 110 increments the derivation counter 114 for the purposes of this operation, then retrieves the following parameters (possibly partially received from the OS 122 when the latter initiates the diversification) to control the API 111: the IDioader identifier, the IDpackage identifier of the loaded and installed operating system and the current value Vderiv of the derivation counter 114. If several secret data or master keys are in memory of the secure element, the MSK label designating the master cryptographic key MSK to be used can also be retrieved to select the appropriate MSK key.

[0103] In step 328, a new derivation key is generated from these parameters, for example using a state-of-the-art diversification formula.

[0104] The new derivation key can overwrite, in secure memory 104 (non-volatile rewritable), the MSK key and therefore become the new MSK master key always identified by the MSK label.

[0105] Alternatively, the new derivation key may be stored, in the secure memory, alongside the original MSK. In this case, a dedicated key label (identifying the derivation key) may be obtained by the loader 110 or the API 111, typically an identifier assigned to the computer object created to store the new derivation key. Alternatively, the loader or the API may internally maintain the same MSK key label to designate the last generated derivation key.

[0106] MSK key diversification is also known as “rotation” of the MSK key value. Rotation or diversification of the MSK key value means calculating (generating, modifying, updating) a new MSK key value and storing it in a rewritable non-volatile memory 104 of the flash, EEPROM or other type.

[0107] At the end of step 328, the flag 116 is set to state E2 indicating a diversified state (generated derivation key) but not personalized state of the secure element 100. This intermediate state allows the secure element, in the event of a restart, to know whether the following personalization operations must be executed.

[0108] [Fig.2c] illustrates the secure element 100 after the diversification of the master key to obtain the derivation key, denoted MSKn. It can again be seen that the personalization of the eSE is not complete, the flag 116 being in state E2. Compared to the state of [Fig.2b], the counter 114 has been updated and the new derivation key MSKn has overwritten the old master key MSK or is stored in addition.

[0109] Returning to [Fig.3], the optional step 330 consists of a restart of the OS 122, in particular if the event 324 is not such a restart. During this restart, the state of the flag 116 can be checked and the following steps can be executed only if the state is E2.

[0110] This restart 330 or the end of the diversification operation 328 triggers the step 332 of generating personalized data.

[0111] This generation may consist of deriving this personalized data from the pre-personalization data 112 and / or 124 in memory using the derivation key MSKn. This therefore involves deriving specific data (dynamic or personalized) for the operation of the secure element 100 from the pre-personalized data 112, 124. As indicated above, this specific data may include identification credentials, cryptographic keys, subscriber data or profiles), operator data (for example addresses of servers in the operator's network), personal identification codes ("PIN" or "personal identification number » in English) of user or applications, application data values, etc.

[0112] Alternatively or in combination, personalized data, for example new personalized cryptographic keys, can be generated by a new diversification directly of the MSKn derivation key without using other pre-personalized data. This involves simply diversifying the derivation key in order to obtain one or more personal cryptographic keys, i.e. specific to the secure element.

[0113] The OS 122 can, for example, call the API 111 of the loader 110 to cause the latter to initiate the operation 332 of generating personal data.

[0114] It is this operation of customizing the eSE 100 which allows a saving of time compared to known techniques, because it is carried out in the field, without a customization phase on a dedicated site.

[0115] Once the customization operation 332 has been carried out, the flag 116 is set (step 334) to the state E3 indicating a personalized state of the eSE 100.

[0116] [Fig.2d] illustrates the secure element 100 after this operation of generating personalized data by derivation from the derivation key. The eSE 100 thus includes new personalized data 130 resulting from this derivation. In addition, the flag 116 is now at the value E3.

[0117] Optionally, the pre-personalized data 124 used for this derivation can be deleted if they are no longer useful.

[0118] Returning to [Fig.3], once the eSE 100 has been personalized, the latter sends an end of personalization message to the server 250 at step 336. This sending is carried out via the agent 202 and the message includes the parameters used for the diversification 328, namely the IDioader identifier, the IDpackage identifier of the loaded and installed operating system and the Vdeiiv value of the derivation counter 114 during the diversification. If several keys are present in the secure element, the MSK label designating the master cryptographic key MSK used can also be sent to the server, so that the latter can know which key was used.

[0119] Thanks to these elements, the server 250 is able to identify the eSE 100 concerned (thanks to the IDioader), to carry out the same MSK master key diversification as the operation 328 (thanks to all of these parameters), then to derive the personalized data from the eSE (thanks to the derivation key obtained and to the IDioader and IDpackage which make it possible to know the pre-personalized data 112, 124 used). These steps are illustrated in the figure under the reference 338. The database 252 is then updated (step 340).

[0120] In this way, the server 250 maintains a mirror of the state of each eSE, in its base 252, without any exchange of secret data being carried out.

[0121] Advantageously, the method of [Fig. 3] is carried out, namely the rotation / diversification of the value of the MSK key and the derivation of the personalized data 130, at each installation and / or update of the OS on the secure element 100. This makes it possible to increase the security aspect with respect to this OS by uniquely allocating a new master key (derivation key) to it.

[0122] In one embodiment, the event 326 triggering the personalization operations (diversification of the master key MSK then generation of the personalized data by derivation) can be decorrelated from the installation of a new OS (including an update). For example, this personalization can be triggered at any time during the life of the secure element 100, without installation or update of the OS. The event can then correspond, for example, to the expiration of a time delay (time duration), to the explicit reception of a command, to the detection of a counter or threshold of use of the current MSK, etc. The flag 116 can be reset to the state Ei at the time when a new personalization is necessary (e.g. voluntary triggering by the mobile or banking operator) and the personalization is triggered at the next restart (event 326) of the OS (more generally of the eSE 100).

[0123] Thanks to the invention, a secure element 100 can be soldered into a final host device 200 without an operating system. In the field, the end user requests the activation of a service which requires the installation of the OS. The administrator (network operator, bank, mobile, etc.) then triggers the loading of the OS on the secure element using the loader 110. The eSE then generates the derivation key and then the installed OS generates the diversified credentials from pre-personalized data (credentials). The OS can now connect securely to a remote server and the user can use the activated service.

[0124] Separately, a device manufacturer may manufacture a large stock of devices 200 incorporating a secure element 100. The devices are sold, for example, in two different regions, each requiring a different OS. Also, the manufacturer may have the correct OS loaded and generate personalized data after production and from the same stock of devices, and this by region before shipping the configured devices to the relevant regions.

[0125] Finally, during the life of the secure element 100, the current OS may become obsolete and require replacement (update) in the field. The new OS is installed using the loader 110, which generates the derivation key. The OS can then derive the personalized credentials from the pre-personalized data and this key. The OS can now securely connect to a telecommunications network or a remote server.

[0126] Although the present invention has been described above with reference to embodiments of specific embodiments, the present invention is not limited to these specific embodiments, and modifications, which fall within the scope of the present invention, will be apparent to a person skilled in the art.

[0127] Many other modifications and variations will occur to those skilled in the art by reference to the above illustrative embodiments, which are given by way of example only and which do not limit the scope of the invention, which is determined solely by the appended claims. In particular, the different features of the different embodiments may be interchanged, where appropriate.

[0128] In the claims, the word "comprising" does not exclude other elements or steps, and the indefinite article "a" or "an" does not exclude a plurality. The mere fact that different features are recited in mutually different dependent claims does not indicate that a combination of those features cannot be used to advantage.

Claims

Claims

1. A secure element (100) configured to be integrated into a host device (200) and to implement services executed by an operating system (122) when the operating system is loaded into the secure element, the secure element comprising an operating system loader (110) and at least one master cryptographic key (MSK), the secure element being configured to: - obtain, from a server (250), an operating system package (120) and install the operating system (122), and - in response to the installation of the operating system, cause the operating system loader to generate a derivation key (MSKn) by diversifying the master cryptographic key.

2. The secure element of claim 1, wherein the operating system package comprises pre-personalization data (124), and the secure element is configured to generate personalized data (130) by deriving the pre-personalization data with the derivation key.

3. Secure element according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the operating system loader is configured to generate the derivation key from the master cryptographic key (MSK), a unique identifier of the operating system loader (IDioader), a unique identifier of the operating system package or the loaded and installed operating system (IDpackage), and a derivation counter (Vderiv) updated each time the derivation key is generated.

4. Secure element according to claim 3, further configured to, after generation of the derivation key, send to a server (250) the unique identifier of the operating system loader (IDioader), the unique identifier of the operating system package or the loaded and installed operating system (IDpackage), the derivation counter (Vderiv) and optionally a label designating the master cryptographic key.

5. Secure element according to one of the preceding claims, further configured to send, to the server, a request (308) to obtain the operating system package, the request comprising a unique identifier of the operating system loader (IDioader) and a unique identifier (IDpackage) of an operating system package or of a already installed operating system if there is one, and getting the operating system package is in response to the request.

6. Secure element according to one of claims 1 to 5, configured to generate the derivation key in response to an end of installation event of the operating system.

7. Secure element according to one of claims 1 to 5, configured to generate the derivation key in response to a first start-up of the installed operating system.

8. Secure element according to one of the preceding claims, comprising a flag (116) set to a first non-diversified state value (Ei) during installation of the operating system and to a second diversified state value (E2) during generation of the derivation key.

9. Secure element according to one of the preceding claims, in which the master cryptographic key is stored in secure memory and accessible by the operating system loader only.

10. A method for customizing a secure element (100) configured to be integrated into a host device (200) and to implement services executed by an operating system when the operating system is loaded into the secure element, the secure element comprising an operating system loader (110) and at least one master cryptographic key (MSK), said method comprising the following steps: - obtaining (318, 320) from a server (250) an operating system package (120) and installing (322) the operating system (122), - in response to the installation of the operating system, generating (328), by the operating system loader (110), a derivation key (MSKn) by diversifying the master cryptographic key (MSK).

11. The method of claim 10, further comprising the step of: generating (332) personalized data (130) by deriving pre-personalization data stored in the secure element, with the derivation key.