Method and device for identifying cyberattack risks
The method generates minimal finite transducers to analyze programmable logic controllers, classifying states and identifying critical transitions to assess and prevent cyberattacks, enhancing the safety and security of industrial systems.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- FR2022014122
- Authority / Receiving Office
- FR · FR
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-12-21
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-12-21
AI Technical Summary
Industrial systems face increased attack surfaces due to the interconnection of information and operational technologies, necessitating a convergence of safety and security analysis to identify cyberattack risks effectively.
A method and device for identifying cyberattack risks on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) by generating a digital representation of minimal finite transducers based on automaton logic, classifying states as sensitive or non-sensitive, and identifying critical transitions and input data associated with risk of corruption, using a processing unit and memory to assess potential attacks.
The method enables effective identification and assessment of cyberattack risks, allowing for proactive risk management and prevention of system compromise by blocking or falsifying critical transitions, thereby ensuring the safety and security of industrial systems.
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Abstract
Description
Title of the invention: Method and device for identifying the risks of cyberattacks Technical field
[0001] The present description relates generally to the field of cybersecurity of industrial systems. Prior art
[0002] An industrial system generally integrates in part several industrial programmable logic controllers (PLC - from the English "Programmable Logic Controller") configured to, for example, operate actuators of an operational part of the industrial system.
[0003] On the one hand, the safety of the industrial system (protection of people, the environment, property and the service provided) is ensured by operational technologies such as hardware and / or software solutions monitoring and controlling processes and devices of the industrial system.
[0004] On the other hand, the security of the industrial system (protection of the integrity, confidentiality and availability of data) is controlled by information technologies, requiring for example cybersecurity techniques.
[0005] However, the interconnection of information technologies with operational technologies increases the attack surface of industrial systems.
[0006] As industrial systems are increasingly frequently attacked, there is a technical need to converge the analysis of the safety and security of said systems. Summary of the invention
[0007] One embodiment provides a method for identifying the risks of cyberattacks on a programmable controller, the method being implemented by a data processing device comprising a processing unit and a memory, the method comprising: - generating, by the device, a digital representation of a minimal finite transducer based on a specification of an automaton logic of the programmable controller, the minimal finite transducer comprising a set of source states, a set of destination states and a set of transitions, each transition going from a source state to a destination state based on an input data value; - generating and storing in memory a second computer file, based on a first computer file identifying a subset of sensitive states from among the set of states, the second file comprising a list of critical transitions associated with the sensitive states, and for each transition, a list of input data; and - the generation and storage in the memory of a fourth computer file, on the basis of a third computer file indicating the presence or absence of a risk of corruption on at least each input data included in the second file, the fourth file indicating, among the input data, input data to be protected which are associated both with critical transitions and with a risk of corruption.
[0008] According to one embodiment, the generation of the second computer file comprises: - the identification in the digital representation of the minimal finite transducer, by a processing unit of the device, of first transitions going from a source state not identified as sensitive, in the first computer file, to a destination state identified as sensitive; and - writing the first transitions in the second file.
[0009] According to one embodiment, the generation of the second computer file further comprises: - the identification in the finished transducer, by the processing unit, of second transitions going from a source state identified as sensitive in the first computer file to a destination state not identified as sensitive; and - writing the second transitions in the first file.
[0010] According to one embodiment, the generation of the second computer file further comprises: - for each first transition, the identification, by the processing unit of the device, in the digital representation of the minimal finite transducer, of first input data whose blocking of the value inhibits the transition to the associated destination state; and - writing the first input data to the second file.
[0011] According to one embodiment, the generation of the second computer file further comprises: - for each second transition, the identification in the digital representation of the minimal finite transducer, of second input data whose modification of the value, in the associated source state, causes said second transition.
[0012] According to one embodiment, the identified risk associated with an element of the second file, in the third file, takes the form of an indication value coded on at least 2 bits.
[0013] According to one embodiment, the value of a bit of the indication value indicates whether a blocking of the value of the input data inhibits a transition among the first transitions and the value of another bit of the indication value indicates whether a change in the value of the input data causes a transition among the second transitions.
[0014] According to one embodiment, the least significant bit of the value indicates whether blocking the value of the input data inhibits a transition among the first transitions and the most significant bit indicates whether a modification of the value of the input data causes a transition among the second transitions.
[0015] According to one embodiment, the above method further comprises a risk analysis, the analysis comprising, for each element of the fourth computer file: - the identification, by the processing unit, of a feared event occurring in the event of an attack on the element; - the calculation, by the processing unit, of a probability of occurrence of the event; - the determination, by the processing unit, of a risk level based on a severity value and probability.
[0016] According to one embodiment, the probability of a feared event is equal to the inverse of the number of elements of the fourth file for which the feared event is identified.
[0017] According to one embodiment, the risk level of a feared event is equal to the product of the probability of the event and its severity value.
[0018] One embodiment provides a non-transitory memory configured to store instructions configured to implement the above method of identifying cyberattack risks when executed by a processing unit.
[0019] One embodiment provides a data processing device comprising a processing unit and a memory, the device being configured to implement the method for identifying risks of cyberattacks. Brief description of the drawings
[0020] These characteristics and advantages, as well as others, will be explained in detail in the following description of particular embodiments given without limitation in relation to the attached figures among which:
[0021] [Fig.l] is a diagram of a physical process;
[0022] [Fig.2] schematically illustrates an example of automaton logic defining the behavior of the programmable automaton of [Fig.l];
[0023] [Fig.3] schematically illustrates another example of automaton logic;
[0024] [Fig.4] is a graph illustrating an example of a finite transducer;
[0025] [Fig.5] is a block diagram showing a processing device according to a embodiment of the present description;
[0026] [Fig.6] illustrates an example of searching for critical transitions between two states of a finite transducer;
[0027] [Fig.7] illustrates examples of behavior of a finite transducer;
[0028] [Fig.8] is a diagram of the data exchanged between sensors and industrial programmable logic controllers;
[0029] [Fig.8] represents examples of attacks on the industrial programmable controller; and
[0030] [Fig.9] is a flowchart representing different steps of a method for identifying the risks of cyberattacks on a programmable controller, according to an embodiment of the present description. Description of the embodiments
[0031] The same elements have been designated by the same references in the different figures. In particular, the structural and / or functional elements common to the different embodiments may have the same references and may have identical structural, dimensional and material properties.
[0032] For the sake of clarity, only the steps and elements useful for understanding the described embodiments have been represented and are detailed. In particular, the hierarchical structure of an industrial system as well as the methods for converting a PLC logic into one or more finite transducers are not written.
[0033] Unless otherwise specified, when referring to two elements connected to each other, this means directly connected without intermediate elements other than conductors, and when referring to two elements connected (in English "coupled") to each other, this means that these two elements can be connected or be connected by means of one or more other elements.
[0034] In the following description, when reference is made to absolute position qualifiers, such as the terms "front", "back", "top", "bottom", "left", "right", etc., or relative position qualifiers, such as the terms "above", "below", "upper", "lower", etc., or to orientation qualifiers, such as the terms "horizontal", "vertical", etc., reference is made unless otherwise specified to the orientation of the figures.
[0035] Unless otherwise specified, the expressions "about", "approximately", "substantially", and "of the order of" mean to within 10%, preferably to within 5%.
[0036] In the remainder of the description, a programmable logic controller (PLC) refers to a programmable digital electronic device configured to control industrial processes by sequential processing. For example, a programmable logic controller is configured to control the execution of actuators, belonging to an operative part of an automated system, from data for example transmitted by a sensor and / or a detector, instructions and a computer program.
[0037] In the remainder of the description, an automaton logic refers to a computer file comprising a description defining the expected behavior of an industrial automaton. An automaton logic is described in the form of specification logic, such as for example the Grafcet language or in the form of implementation programs, such as for example the Ladder language.
[0038] In the remainder of the description, a finite-state transducer refers to a finite automaton providing one or more output signals. Generally, a finite transducer is characterized by a set E of states of the transducer, the set E being of finite cardinality, and by a set T of transitions between two states, which may or may not be distinct, belonging to the set E. Any transition t eT connects a state, called the source state, to a state, called the destination state. Each transition t GT is further associated with an input / output pair, expressed for example in the form of Boolean functions or a bit sequence.
[0039] A finite-state transducer is defined here as minimal if its number of transitions between states is minimal. Minimizing a transducer then consists of minimizing the number of transitions, as well as their number of inputs. Thus, each Boolean function expresses a transition with a minimal number of inputs.
[0040] [Fig. 1] is an example of an operative part 100 of an industrial system controlled by a PLC logic. More precisely, in the example of [Fig. 1], the PLC logic has the role of controlling the sending of crates 102 and 104 arriving by a conveyor belt 106 to conveyor belts T2 or T3, depending on their size. The crates 102 are, for example, small crates and are directed towards the conveyor belt T2 while the crates 104 are, for example, larger crates and are directed towards the conveyor belt T3. A detector 108 is configured to determine the size of a crate passing in front of it. By way of example, the detector 108 is further configured to activate a Boolean variable PCAISSE when it detects the passage of a crate 102 and to activate a Boolean variable GCAISSE when it detects the passage of a crate 104.For example, the Boolean variables PCAISSE and GCAISSE are stored in a volatile memory 110 of the programmable controller.
[0041] The operative part further comprises a piston PI configured to activate when the detector 108 detects the passage of a box 102 or 104. In the example illustrated by [Fig.l], the piston PI is configured to push the boxes 102 and 104 to the left. In the following, when a piston has been activated, it will be said to be in the front position, and when it is deactivated, it will be said to be in the rear position.
[0042] The operative part 100 further comprises a detector P2DEV configured to determine whether the box pushed by the piston PI is aligned in front of the conveyor belt T2. PLC logic is then configured to, for example in the case where the PCAISSE variable is activated, stop the PI piston and activate a P2 piston, positioned opposite the T2 conveyor belt, in order to push the box onto the T2 conveyor belt. The PLC logic is further configured to, if for example the GCAISSE variable is activated, not to command the PL piston to stop. When a piston that has been activated is stopped, its position remains the front position. Only deactivation changes the position of a piston to the rear position.
[0043] The operative part 100 further comprises, for example, a detector P3DEV, for example configured to detect when a box is aligned facing the conveyor belt T3. The logic controller is then configured to control the stopping of the piston PI when the detector P3DEV detects the passage of a box and to activate a piston P3, for example placed facing the conveyor belt T3.
[0044] By way of example, the operative part 100 further comprises sensors P1DET, P2DET and P3DET, respectively configured to detect when the pistons P1, P2 or P3 are in the forward position. The automatic logic is for example configured to, for example following a period of time, command the deactivation of an activated piston.
[0045] By way of example, the operative part 100 further comprises sensors T2DET and T3DET configured to detect the passage of a box on the conveyor belt T2 or on the conveyor belt T3.
[0046] By way of example, the measurements taken by the various sensors described take the form of Boolean variables, taking the value TRUE (true) or FALSE (false). For example, the variable PCAISSE takes the value TRUE if the cash register detected by the detector 108 is a small cash register. Variables P2_DEVANT and P3_DEV take, for example, the value TRUE when, respectively, the detectors P2DEV and P3DEV detect the passage of a cash register. Similarly, variables P1_ARRIERE, P2_ARRIERE and P3_ARRIERE take the value TRUE when, respectively, the detectors P1DET, P2DET and P3DET detect that the piston concerned is in the rear position.
[0047] [Fig. 2] illustrates an example of automaton logic describing the programmable automaton of [Fig. 1]. More particularly, [Fig. 2] illustrates a functional diagram 200 of the Grafcet type (Functional Graph for Control of Steps and Transitions). The diagram 200 describes a specification language for the automaton logic controlling the operative part 100.
[0048] The diagram 200 comprises two Grafcet diagrams 202 and 204. For example, the operation of the operating part 100 is controlled by two separate industrial programmable automatons. A first programmable automaton is described by the diagram 202 and controls the operation of the piston PI and a second programmable automaton is described by the diagram 204 and controls the operation of pistons P2 and P3. For example, the pistons are controlled based on the activation and / or deactivation of the Boolean variables PCAISSE and GCAISSE following the measurement carried out by the detector 108.
[0049] By way of example, the part 202 comprises actions 206 (AVP1) and 208 (REPI) respectively controlling the activation and deactivation of the piston PI. The diagram 202 further comprises steps (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), the action 206 being for example associated with steps 2 and 4 and the action 208 being for example associated with steps 3 and 5. Step 1 corresponds for example to the measurement by the detector 106 of the size of a box. The measurement of the box causes for example the activation and / or deactivation of the Boolean variables PCAISSE and GCAISSE.
[0050] The diagram 202 includes conditions (PCAISSE=TRUE), (GCAISSE=TRUE), the condition (PCAISSE=TRUE) corresponding to the configuration in which the value TRUE is assigned to the variable PCAISSE. Similarly, the diagram includes conditions (P2_DEVANT=TRUE) and (P2_DEVANT=FALSE), (P3_DEVANT=TRUE) and (P3_DEVANT=FALSE) corresponding respectively to the assignment of the value TRUE, or the value FALSE to the variables P2_DEVANT or P3_DEVANT. A condition (PCAISSE=TRUE AND GCAISSE=FALSE) is fulfilled when both conditions (PCAISSE=TRUE) and (GCAISSE=FALSE) are fulfilled. Diagram 202 shows the transition from step 1 to step 2 when the conditions (PCAISSE=TRUE AND GCAISSE =FALSE) are met, and the transition from state 1 to state 4 when the condition (PCAISSE=FALSE AND GCAISSE =TRUE) is met. In both cases, the associated action is the activation of the piston PI in order to push the box.In particular, the transition from step 1 to step 2 takes place when the condition (PCAISSE=TRUE AND GCAISSE =FALSE) is met and the condition (P2_DEVANT=TRUE) is not met. For example, if in state 1, the conditions (PCAISSE=TRUE AND GCAISSE =FALSE) and (P2_DEVANT=TRUE) are met, a transition from state 1 to state 3 is performed. The condition (P2_DEVANT=TRUE), or (P3_DEVANT=TRUE), of diagram 200, is for example met when the sensor P2DEV, or P3DEV, detects the passage of the checkout. When the condition (P2_DEVANT=TRUE), or (P3_DEVANT=TRUE) is met, diagram 202 indicates the transition to step 5, or 3, and the associated action is the deactivation of the piston PL. The value TRUE is then assigned to the variable P1_ARRIERE. The diagram then indicates that when the condition (P1_ARRIERE=TRUE) is met, the logic resumes at step 1 for the next body. The transitions between two states of a Grafcet are described by exclusive conditions.
[0051] Diagram 204 describes the logic of pistons P2 and P3, for example following the logic controlling piston PL
[0052] For example, when the condition (PCAISSE AND P2_DEVANT=TRUE), or (GCAISSE AND P3_DEVANT=TRUE), is fulfilled, the diagram 204 indicates the transition to a step 6, or 7, the associated action of which is the activation of the piston P2, or of the piston P3. Once a condition (T2=TRUE), or (T3=TRUE), is fulfilled, corresponding for example to the detection by the conveyor belt T2, or T3, of the passage of a cash register, the diagram 204 indicates the transition to a step 8, or 9, the associated action of which is the deactivation of the piston P2, or P3. The rear position of the sensor P2 or P3 is detected by the detector P2DET or by the detector P3DET and the information is for example temporarily stored in a memory of the programmable controller.Diagram 204 further indicates that, when the detector P2DET or P3DET detects that the piston P2 or P3 is in the rear position, the logic proceeds to a step 11 in which the action is for example to wait until the conditions (PCAISSE ;P2_DEVANT=TRUE) or (GCAISSE ;P3_DEVANT=TRUE) are met.
[0053] [Fig. 3] illustrates another example of automaton logic describing the behavior of a programmable logic controller. More particularly, [Fig. 3] illustrates a 300 diagram in Ladder language.
[0054] The diagram 300 combines input contacts or arguments associated with Boolean variables INPUT1, INPUT2, INPUT3, INPUT4 and INPUT5 with coils, or output results, associated with Boolean variables OUTPU1, OUTPUT2 and OUTPUT3. The diagram 300 is limited on the left and on the right by vertical lines 302 and 304 called respectively the left power bar and the right power bar.
[0055] Diagram 300 includes graphical symbols 306, 308, 310, 312, 314, and 316 connected to power bars 302 or 304 by link arcs 318. Each vertical link arc represents a LOGICAL OR operation. Each link arc takes a Boolean state of TRUE or FALSE, the Boolean state being the same on all link arcs directly connected together. The link arcs 318 connected to power bar 302 are in the TRUE state.
[0056] As an example, the symbol 306 represents a so-called direct contact allowing a Boolean operation between the state of the link arcs 318 which are connected to it and the Boolean variable INPUT1. The state of the link arc to the right of the contact 306 is a LOGICAL AND between the state of the link to the left and the value of the variable INPUT1.
[0057] For example, symbol 312 is that of a direct coil associated with an output, for example OUTPUT1.
[0058] As an example, part 320 of diagram 300 describes that when (INPUT1=TRUE OR INPUT2=TRUE) AND INPUT3=TRUE, the output is OUTPUT1=TRUE. As an example, the Boolean variables INPUT1, INPUT2 and INPUT3 are internal variables of a detector of an operational part of a industrial system and the output variable 0UTPUT1 allows, for example, the activation or not of an actuator, such as, for example, a piston, a motor etc. included in the operational part.
[0059] Symbol 308 describes, for example, a contact with positive edge detection, or rising edge. The state of the link to the right of symbol 308 is forced to the value TRUE when the link to the left of symbol 308 is in the state TRUE and the Boolean variable INPUT4 changes from the state FALSE to the state TRUE. The Boolean variable associated with contact 308 is then reset to the state FALSE.
[0060] Symbols 310 and 314 represent an inverted contact and an inverted coil, respectively. The state of the links to the right of symbols 310 is the LOGICAL AND between the state of the link to the left of the inverted symbol and the logical inverse of the Boolean variable associated with the symbol.
[0061] Symbol 316 represents a falling edge coil. The state of the right link arc is forced to the TRUE state when the state of the left link is TRUE and the state of the associated Boolean variable INPUT5 changes from FALSE to TRUE. Contact 310 therefore changes from TRUE to FALSE
[0062] Grafcet and / or Ladder type diagrams are examples of specification languages. These languages are of course not limiting and other specification languages can be used and are known to those skilled in the art.
[0063] [Fig.4] is a graph 400 illustrating an example of a finite transducer. More particularly, the finite transducer is a Mealy machine.
[0064] The finite transducer 400 is characterized by a set of states {5^,ç j, the state si being the initial state of the transducer as well as a set of transitions {60, tiA, tQA, G;0> h. J- Each transition tk,j, with ke {z, 0,1} and j G {0,1} connects the state sk, then called the source state of the transition tk,j, to the state ''k then called the destination state of the transition hj. A transition is carried out on the basis of an input data 402, for example with a binary value, and produces an output data 404, for example also with a binary value. In other examples, the inputs and / or outputs of a transducer take other forms than binary values, or sequences of bits and can, for example, be Boolean variables or concatenations of binary and Boolean values.
[0065] In the example of the finite transducer 400, the finite transducer takes as input a set of bit strings, each bit representing the value of a variable, and provides an output vector. For example, the finite transducer processes the input bit by bit, going from the most significant bit to the least significant bit. If the most significant bit of the input is a 1, the transducer transitions from the initial state to the state via the transition and returns a 0. If the most significant bit is a 0, the finite transducer goes from state si to state Ao via transition Lo and also returns a 0.
[0066] When the finite transducer is in state 51, it is configured to remain in this state when the input bit is equal to 1, via the transition ^1,1, and outputs a bit equal to 0. In state $1, the finite transducer is further configured to go to state 5o, when the input bit is equal to 0, via the transition and outputs a bit equal to 1.
[0067] When the finite transducer is in state 5'o, it is configured to remain in this state when the input bit is equal to 0, via the transition ^oo, and generates at output a bit equal to 0. In state 5o, the finite transducer is further configured to go to state 5i, when the input bit is equal to 1, via the transition A)j, and generates at output a bit equal to 1
[0068] Thus, for example, if the value of the input data is the sequence of successive bits 011001, the transducer takes the path S- A), b ?l,b ^1,0 ^0,0 Vh ^0, b and the output data value is the bit sequence 010101.
[0069] A state of a Mealy machine corresponds to one of the combinations of the steps of the automaton logic. For example, the Boolean variables PCAISSE, GCAISSE, P2_DEVANT etc. are the inputs allowing the execution of the transitions. The actions taken in the destination state, for example moving a piston back, are the outputs of the transitions.
[0070] [Fig. 5] is a block diagram representing a processing device 500 according to an embodiment of the present description. The processing device 500 is for example configured to implement a method for identifying the risks of cyberattacks on a programmable logic controller.
[0071] The processing device 500 comprises, for example, a processing unit 502 (CPU), such as a processor, and a non-volatile memory 504 (NV MEM). The processing device 500 further comprises, for example, a volatile memory 506 (RAM), for example a random access memory (in English “Random Access Memory”).
[0072] The processing unit 502 is for example coupled to the memories 504 and 506 via a bus 508.
[0073] According to one embodiment, the non-volatile memory 504 comprises a digital representation of a PLC logic, for example in the form of a Grafcet or Ladder type file. The non-volatile memory 504 further comprises, for example, instructions which, when executed by the processing unit 502, make it possible to convert the digital representation of the PLC logic into a digital representation of a minimal finite transducer.
[0074] As an example, a minimal finite transducer is generated from the logic automaton of a single programmable automaton. A global minimal finite transducer is then obtained, by the processing unit 502, by performing the Cartesian product of the set of minimal finite transducers. It is, in fact, less time-consuming to individually minimize several finite transducers, each associated with a single programmable automaton, rather than minimizing a transducer describing the entire automaton logic of an entire operational part. The decomposition into a finite transducer for a programmable automaton is presented as an example and is of course not limiting.
[0075] As an example, a minimal finite transducer is generated, from a logic controller, using a computer tool known as "Teloco" (the name "Teloco" may be protected by one or more trademarks). An example of the use of the "Teloco" tool is, for example, given in the publication "Translating Grafcet specifications into Mealy machines for conformance test purposes" published in the journal Control Engineering Practice, vol. 19, no. 9, pp. 947-957, Sept. 2011 by the authors J. Provost, J.-M. Roussel, and J.-M. Faure. The minimization of the transducer is, for example, carried out by executing the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. The Quine-McCluskey algorithm makes it possible, for example, to minimize a set of Boolean expressions into a minimal expression.
[0076] In relation to the example described in Figures 1 and 2, the processing unit 502 is configured to generate a digital representation of a first minimal finite transducer from the Grafcet 202 and another digital representation of a second minimal finite transducer from the Grafcet 204. The Cartesian product of the two minimal finite transducers is then a minimal transducer for the entire logic controller 200.
[0077] By way of example, the non-volatile memory 504 is further configured to store a first computer file, for example stored following the conversion of the PLC logic into at least one minimal finite transducer. By way of example, the first computer file comprises a subset of the states of the finite transducers. In another example, the first file comprises at least one subset of the states of at least one of the finite transducers. The states included in the first file are, for example, states, identified beforehand as states being sensitive, or not associated with a safety property, that is to say states in which the safety of the industrial system is compromised in the event of malicious action.
[0078] In the example of [Fig.l], if at least one of the pistons P1, P2 or P3 remains in the forward position, the industrial system is for example compromised, and this is therefore a sensitive state. Indeed, the passage of the other boxes will be blocked.
[0079] In another example, in which an operational part comprises for example the filling of a tank, a sensitive state is for example that in which a valve tank filling valve is open. Indeed, if the tank is filled and the valve remains open, the safety of the system is compromised.
[0080] In yet another example, a state in which a circuit breaker is not tripped is a sensitive state. Indeed, if the circuit breaker remains operational in the presence of an electrical fault, the system is, for example, in danger.
[0081] By way of example, the first file is also configured to store the states previously identified as not being sensitive, or associated with a safety property. For example, the states in which the pistons P1 and / or P2 and / or P3 are in the rear position are states ensuring the safety of the system.
[0082] Similarly, in the tank example, a state in which the tank valve is closed is a safe state, and the same is true, in the circuit breaker example, for a state in which the circuit breaker is tripped.
[0083] [Fig.6] illustrates an example of searching for critical transitions between two states of a finite transducer.
[0084] By way of example, the memory 504 stores a computer file 600 corresponding to an example of the first computer file described in relation to [Fig.5]. The computer file 600 comprises a subset 602 of states El to En and a subset 604 of states EN1 to ENm. The states El to En and EN1 to ENm of a minimal finite transducer, or of a set of minimal finite transducers. By way of example, the states El to En are states identified as not being sensitive and the states EN1 to ENm are states identified as being sensitive.
[0085] According to one embodiment, so-called critical transitions are identified. Critical transitions are, for example, transitions which, when forced or when prevented, compromise the safety of the industrial system. For example, a critical transition 606 is, for example, a transition starting from a source state ENj belonging to the subset 604, and therefore sensitive, and going to a destination state Ei belonging to the subset 602. The identified critical transitions are, for example, identified by the processing unit 502 and then written in a second computer file stored in the memory 504. The critical transitions are distinguished into two types. A first type of critical transitions are the transitions going from a sensitive state to a non-sensitive state.Indeed, a blockage of information, for example a malicious blocking attack, can prevent the transition from taking place and the system remains in the sensitive state when it should move to the non-sensitive state. A second type of critical transitions are, conversely, transitions going from a non-sensitive state to a sensitive state. Indeed, the modification of data, for example during an injection attack, can cause this type of transition, leading the system into a sensitive state when it should remain in a non-sensitive state.
[0086] More generally, in the source state of a critical transition, a possible information blocking attack would leave the system in a sensitive state. In the destination state of a critical transition, a possible injection attack would return the system to a sensitive state.
[0087] In the example described in relation to figures 1 and 2, the transition going from a source state in which the piston PI is moved back to a destination state in which the piston PI is moved forward is for example a critical transition.
[0088] [Fig.7] represents examples of attacks on the behavior of an automaton logic.
[0089] A first type of attack, illustrated by diagram 700, is the information blocking attack. In an information blocking attack, the refreshing of the value of a variable, or a set of variables, is prevented. This type of attack results in the inhibition of a transition. If the inhibited transition is a transition identified as critical, the system remains in a state in which safety and security are compromised.
[0090] For example, the system is in state ENi and the transition to state Ej, a non-sensitive state, is executed when an input variable takes the value A and the output value is, for example, a value B. In relation to the example illustrated by figures 1 and 2, the value B corresponds, for example, to an output such as AV_P1, AV_P2, etc.
[0091] If the transducer remains involuntarily blocked in the ENi state, whereas in normal operation the transition 606 should be triggered, the safety of the industrial system is then compromised. For example, the piston PI remains in the forward position while the box has been sent onto one of the belts T2 or T3 and other boxes on the belt T1 are then blocked by the piston PL
[0092] The state ENi is then identified as sensitive because the security of the system risks being compromised if the system remains in this state while the transition 606 should be triggered. Indeed, if an attacker blocks the value of the variable at non-A, the system remains in the state ENi and the transition to the non-sensitive state Ej is not executed.
[0093] A second type of attack, illustrated by diagram 702, is the data injection attack, or information injection. In an injection attack, the value of an input variable or set of variables is falsified. This type of attack forces a transition to execute. If the destination state of the forced transition is a sensitive state, the system goes to a state in which safety and security are compromised.
[0094] In the example illustrated by diagram 702, when the transducer is in state Ej, a data injection, for example by modifying the value of an input variable so that it is equal to C, is carried out. A transition to a destination state ENk is then forced. For example, the output of the forced transition is different from the value B, implying an action, for example opening a valve, putting the system in a sensitive state.
[0095] According to one embodiment, following the identification of critical transitions, the data whose blocking leads to the inhibition of an identified transition or whose modification or falsification leads to the execution are in turn identified by the processing unit 502 and are added to the second computer file. For example, a list of data, said to be at risk of being compromised, is associated with each critical transition identified in the second file.
[0096] In the example illustrated by figures 1 and 2, the variables P2_DEVANT and P3_DEVANT are for example among the variables identified as being at risk of being compromised. Indeed, their change from FALSE to TRUE implies, in the PLC logic, the recoil of the piston PI and the following boxes can accumulate and be blocked.
[0097] [Fig. 8] illustrates an example of data exchanged between a sensor and an industrial programmable logic controller. More particularly, [Fig. 8] illustrates an example of the data exchanged between the sensors 108, P1DET, P2DET, P3DET, P2DEV, P3DEV, T1DET and T2DET and two programmable logic controllers PLC1 and PLC2, for example controlled by the logic controllers 202 and 204 described in relation to [Fig. 2].
[0098] For example, the detectors P2DEV and P3DEV transmit data, for example the value of the variables P2_DEV and P3_DEV, to the two programmable logic controllers PLC1 and PLC2. The detector 108 transmits for example the values of the Boolean variables PCAISSE and GCAISSE to the programmable logic controllers PLC1 and PLC2. The programmable logic controller PLC1 controls the action of the piston PI on the basis of the values of the variables PCAISSE and GCAISSE and the programmable logic controller PLC2 controls either the detection by the sensor P2DEV or by the sensor P3DEV, depending on the size of the box.
[0099] For example, the P1DET sensor only exchanges data with the programmable controller PLC1, controlling the operation of the piston PL
[0100] The graphical representation of the data exchanged between the different sensors and the different programmable automatons allows, for example, the identification of variables passing through unsecured channels. These variables are then subject to blocking or falsification.
[0101] [Fig.9] is a flowchart representing different steps of a method for identifying the risks of cyberattacks on a programmable controller, according to an embodiment of the present description. This method is for example implemented by the processing device of [Fig.5].
[0102] In a step 901 (PLC LOGIC), a digital representation of a logic PLC controlling one or more programmable logic controllers of an industrial system are generated. For example, the digital representation takes the form of one or more Grafcet or Ladder type diagrams.
[0103] In a step 902 (CONVERSION TO MINIMIZED FINITE-STATE TRANSDUCER), the digital representation(s) of the automaton logic are converted, for example by the processing unit 502, into one or more minimal finite transducers, which are digital representations also stored in the memory 506. For example, the generated transducer(s) are Mealy machines, generated by the processing unit 502 based on the Teloco tool and are minimized based on an execution of the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. For example, two states of each finite transducer are linked by a set of possible Boolean combinations. In the example illustrated by Figures 1 and 2, the states of the minimized finite transducer are for example linked by the concatenation of the values of the Boolean variables recorded by the different sensors, such as PCAISSE and GCAISSE, P2_DEVANT and P3_DEVANT, P1_ARRIERE etc.
[0104] In a step 903 (STATES CLASSIFICATION), a computer file containing classifications of the different states of the minimal finite transducer(s) is for example received by the processing device 500, and stored for example in the memory 504 or 506. This classification has for example been carried out by a safety expert.
[0105] The classification identifies a subset of states for which a safety property of the industrial system is, for example, not ensured. For example, these states are identified as being sensitive. For example, in these states, the safety of the system is at risk of being compromised.
[0106] For example, the classification also identifies another subset of states for which the industrial system is safe and has no, or low, risk of incident or accident. For example, these states are identified as not being sensitive and are for example associated with a safety property.
[0107] The subsets of states, as well as the other subset of states, are for example included in the first computer file, stored in the memory 504 or 506.
[0108] In a step 904 (CRITICAL TRANSITIONS IDENTIFICATION) the transitions of the finished translator(s) going for example from a sensitive source state to a non-sensitive destination state are identified, for example by the processing unit 502. By way of example, the processing unit 502 further identifies transitions going to a sensitive destination state. The identified transitions are for example called critical and are written in a second computer file, for example stored in the memory 504.
[0109] In a step 905 (SENSITIVE DATA IDENTIFICATION), the input data which, if blocked or falsified, inhibit or cause a critical transition, are identified for example by the processing unit 502. For example, the identified input data are written into the second computer file, in association with the critical transitions.
[0110] According to one embodiment, each identified data item is stored in association with an indication value indicating whether a blocking of the data item inhibits a critical transition or whether a modification of its value forces the execution of a critical transition. For example, the indication value is coded on two bits. The most significant bit takes, for example, the value 1 if a modification of the value forces the execution of a critical transition and the least significant bit takes, for example, the value 1, if a blocking of the value inhibits a critical transition. Indeed, an injection is based on a modification of data and the blocking of information is based on a denial, but the modification of data uses a greater privilege than a denial. A blocking is then associated with a value greater than or equal to 1(01 - 10) and an injection is associated with a value greater than or equal to 2(10 - 11).For example, the value 10 is meaningless because a modification allows a denial. In another example, the blocking is coded on the most significant bit. This 2-bit coding is given as an example of implementation and is of course not limiting.
[0111] In a step 906 (CYBERSECURITY RISKS EVALUATION), an assessment of the cybersecurity risks on the operational part is carried out. For example, the risk assessment is carried out using a Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool to generate a data flow diagram (DFD), for example in the form of the graph illustrated in relation to [Fig.8]. The generated diagram allows a cybersecurity expert to identify data passing through unsecured channels and therefore likely to be blocked and / or falsified.
[0112] For example, the data identified in step 906 are written to a third computer file, stored in memory 504.
[0113] In a step 907 (OVERLAP?), the processing unit 502 is configured to determine, for example, which data belongs to both the second and third computer files. The common data is for example stored in a fourth computer file. For example, the data is stored in association with the indication value associated with it in the second file.
[0114] In a step 908 (RISKS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION), the risk(s) for the industrial system in the event of an attack on at least one piece of data are analyzed and evaluated.
[0115] For example, for each data item, the analysis and risk assessment includes the determination of a consequence. The consequence corresponds, for example, to the occurrence of a feared event. The feared event is, for example, an event that may occur when the transducer is in a sensitive state. For example, the accumulation of crates on a conveyor belt, the overflow of a filling tank, or a fire, for example triggered if an electrical fault occurs and a circuit breaker remains closed.
[0116] For example, for each feared event, a probability of occurrence is calculated. For example, the probability P is equal to l / nbr_entry, the value nbr_entry corresponding to the number of input variables to be corrupted so that the feared event can take place.
[0117] For example, a risk level for the feared event is then evaluated. For each event, a consequence value Cons is determined, for example in the form of a score between 0 and 10 or between 0 and 100 corresponding to the severity of the event. For example, the consequence value for an accumulation of crates on a conveyor belt has a lower score than a fire. The risk level R of an event is, for example, equal to the product between the consequence value and the probability of occurrence of the event.
[0118] For example, a risk assessment for an industrial system comprises a set of scenarios S, each scenario S describing for example a feared event, each scenario being for example associated with a probability and a risk level Rn.
[0119] An advantage of the described embodiments is that they allow risks to be assessed based on a security analysis of an industrial system and a cybersecurity risk analysis.
[0120] Various embodiments and variations have been described. Those skilled in the art will understand that certain features of these various embodiments and variations could be combined, and other variations will occur to those skilled in the art.
[0121] Finally, the practical implementation of the embodiments and variants described is within the reach of the person skilled in the art from the functional indications given above. In particular, with regard to the conversion of logic controllers into minimal finite transducers.
Claims
Claims
1. A method for identifying the risks of cyberattacks on a programmable controller, the method being implemented by a data processing device (500) comprising a processing unit (502) and a memory (504, 506), the method comprising: - generating, by the device (500), a digital representation of a minimal finite transducer based on a specification of a controller logic of the programmable controller, the minimal finite transducer comprising a set of source states, a set of destination states and a set of transitions, each transition going from a source state to a destination state based on an input data value;- generating and storing in the memory a second computer file, based on a first computer file identifying a subset of sensitive states from among the set of states, the second file comprising a list of critical transitions associated with the sensitive states, and for each transition, a list of input data; and - generating and storing in the memory a fourth computer file, based on a third computer file indicating the presence or absence of a risk of corruption on at least each input data item included in the second file, the fourth file indicating, among the input data, input data to be protected which are both associated with critical transitions and with a risk of corruption.;
2. Method according to claim 1, in which the generation of the second computer file comprises: - the identification in the digital representation of the minimal finite transducer, by a processing unit of the device, of first transitions going from a source state not identified as sensitive, in the first computer file, to a destination state identified as sensitive; and - the writing in the second file of the first transitions.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein generating the second computer file further comprises: - identifying in the finite transducer, by the processing unit, second transitions from a source state identified as sensitive in the first computer file to a destination state not identified as sensitive; and - writing to the first file of the second transitions.
4. Method according to claim 2 or 3, in which the generation of the second computer file further comprises: - for each first transition, the identification, by the processing unit of the device, in the digital representation of the minimal finite transducer, of first input data whose blocking of the value inhibits the transition to the associated destination state; and - the writing in the second file, of the first input data.
5. Method according to claim 4 in its dependency on claim 3, in which the generation of the second computer file further comprises: - for each second transition, the identification in the digital representation of the minimal finite transducer, of second input data whose modification of the value, in the associated source state, causes said second transition.
6. A method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the identified risk associated with an element of the second file, in the third file, takes the form of an indication value coded on at least 2 bits.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the value of one bit of the indication value indicates whether a blocking of the value of the input data inhibits one of the first transitions and the value of another bit of the indication value indicates whether a change in the value of the input data causes one of the second transitions.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the least significant bit of the value indicates whether a blocking of the value of the input data inhibits one of the first transitions and the most significant bit indicates whether a change in the value of the input data causes one of the second transitions.
9. Method according to claim 1 to 8, further comprising a risk analysis, the analysis comprising, for each element of the fourth computer file: - the identification, by the processing unit (502), of a feared event occurring in the event of an attack on the element; - the calculation, by the processing unit (502), of a probability occurrence of the event; - the determination, by the processing unit (502), of a risk level on the basis of a severity value and the probability.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the probability of a feared event is equal to the inverse of the number of elements of the fourth file for which the feared event is identified.
11. A method according to claim 9 or 10, wherein the risk level of a feared event is equal to the product of the probability of the event and its severity value.
12. Non-transitory memory (504, 506) configured to store instructions configured to implement the method for identifying cyberattack risks of any one of claims 1 to 11 when executed by a processing unit.
13. A data processing device (500) comprising a processing unit (502) and a memory (504, 506), the device being configured to implement the method for identifying the risks of cyberattacks of any one of claims 1 to 11.
