Detection of terminals embedded in flying devices, such as drones
By analyzing cellular network data for abnormal terminal behaviors and flight plans, the method efficiently detects and identifies drones, addressing the inefficiencies of existing detection methods and ensuring compliance with flight regulations.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- FR2023004706
- Authority / Receiving Office
- FR · FR
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-12
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
Existing methods for detecting drones are complex and inefficient, as cellular networks are not optimized for air connectivity, leading to difficulties in identifying drones and their operators, especially when ADS-B beacons are deactivated, and the identity of remote pilots is unknown.
A method that analyzes current connection data from terminals to cellular network cells, comparing it with reference data to determine if the terminal is embedded in an in-flight device, using handover situations and radio frequency link strength to identify abnormal trajectories and speeds, and interfaces with network entities like NWDAF and GMLC to verify flight plans and identities.
Effectively detects and identifies drones by analyzing cellular network data to determine abnormal behaviors, verifies flight plans, and alerts authorities about unauthorized flights, enhancing security and compliance with regulatory requirements.
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Abstract
Description
Title of the invention: Detection of terminals embedded in flying devices, such as drones technical field
[0001] This disclosure falls within the domain of the detection of flying devices such as drones. Previous technique
[0002] Typically, drones carry terminals, referred to below as "air terminals." An air terminal can be used to transmit a stream of video data (acquired, for example, by a camera mounted on the drone) via a mobile network to which the air terminal is connected. It can also be used to directly pilot the drone by transmitting instructions received from another terminal available to a user, the drone pilot. Thus, in these different situations, an air terminal is connected to a network, for example, a cellular mobile network.
[0003] Detecting a drone to check in particular whether it is authorized to fly often requires a complex installation of radio frequency sensors, and / or radars, and / or means to implement a detection of radio frequency beacons that the drone broadcasts, this broadcast being called "ADS-B" (for "Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast").
[0004] Drone operators can use consumer-grade mobile devices connected to a mobile network to control their drones. However, a drone must have a flight plan to be authorized to fly in a given area. Furthermore, a valid flight license must be issued to the drone operator. Otherwise, the drone operator may be subject to a fine and the revocation of their license. Nevertheless, to do so, it is necessary to detect the drone and determine the identity of the drone operator.
[0005] Furthermore, a malicious drone user may have disabled the aforementioned beacons for ADS-B broadcasting.
[0006] One approach could be to rely on a mobile cellular network to detect the presence of an aerial terminal. However, cellular networks, designed for transmissions to ground-based terminals, are not optimized for aerial connectivity. An aerial terminal (referred to as a "drone" hereafter) can attach itself to secondary lobes of antennas close to the drone or to primary lobes far from the drone. As a result, the mobile modems used to connect drones are not necessarily identified as being of the "drone" type, which complicates the detection of actual drones.
[0007] Furthermore, the identity of a drone owner, used by a pilot who can be very The distance (e.g., "Beyond Visible Line Of Sight") may not be known. Similarly, the identity of a pilot operating a drone within visual line of sight and live-streaming image data captured by the drone, via a mobile network over the internet, for example, may not be known. Summary
[0008] This disclosure improves the situation.
[0009] To this end, it proposes a method for detecting a terminal that may be carried on board an aircraft in flight (typically a drone, but possibly an ultralight aircraft or others). The terminal is connected to a mobile network comprising a plurality of cells covered by respective antennas (typically base stations in a conventional cellular network, but also possibly Wi-Fi hotspots (for example, Wi-Fi relay gateways), or others).
[0010] In particular, this process comprises: - to obtain current connection data of the terminal to successive cells of the mobile network, said current data including at least data from the cells involved in the connection of the terminal to the mobile network, - compare current data to reference connection data for terrestrial terminals, involving at least one cell of said current data, and - Based on the aforementioned comparison, determine if the terminal is installed in a flying device.
[0011] These reference data may correspond to connection data from ground terminals or to theoretical connection values specific to a ground terminal in conventional ground motion (according to a nomogram, for example). Indeed, as detailed later with reference to Figures 1 and 2, the cellular network connectivity of a terminal in flight differs from the conventional connectivity of a ground terminal. For example, attachment to base stations in connection handover situations has been observed to differ between a terminal in flight and a moving ground terminal.
[0012] Thus, it is proposed here to analyze the data brought back by mobile networks to detect in particular undeclared drones carrying terminals using cellular connectivity to broadcast media streams (in particular image, video and / or audio data) and / or exploit piloting data.
[0013] In an embodiment exploiting the aforementioned handover situations, the method may include: - to obtain current connection transfer data from the terminal of one cell to another, said current data including at least data from the cells involved in said transfers, and - compare current data to reference data of connection transfers of terrestrial terminals and involving at least one cell of said current data.
[0014] In particular, if two network cells are deemed to be adjacent because they provide a connection transfer from a terrestrial terminal in one of the two cells to the other, then said data comparison may include the detection in the current data of a connection transfer between two cells that are not deemed to be adjacent.
[0015] It will thus be understood that the detection of a handover between two cells which never occurs for a ground terminal can characterize the presence of a terminal in flight.
[0016] In such an embodiment, if the current data also includes respective times of these transfers, then the current data can be analyzed to detect whether the terminal connects several times successively to two cells which are not considered to be adjacent and in a time period less than a threshold (this situation being referred to hereafter as "ping-pong" between two cells).
[0017] Alternatively or in addition, in this embodiment, if the current data also include respective times of the transfers, the current data can be analyzed to detect whether a trajectory that the terminal makes passes through successive cells that are not considered to be adjacent.
[0018] Thus, the trajectory of the terminal in flight can be determined by handover situations.
[0019] However, as an alternative or variant to handover detections, current data may include, in particular, radio frequency link strength data of the connection of the terminal with each of the aforementioned successive cells of the mobile network, to estimate successive positions of the terminal (possibly but optionally in 3D coordinates).
[0020] Here, "link strength" is understood generically as any physical parameter characterizing this link (intensity or power, or signal-to-noise ratio, of the radio frequency link).
[0021] Thus, by determining the successive positions occupied by the terminal, it is possible to determine its trajectory.
[0022] In the embodiment using handover data or the embodiment using radio frequency link strength, the current data may then further include the respective connection times of said successive cells, and the aforementioned current data may be analyzed to determine a trajectory of the terminal and detect, for example, whether a speed of movement of the terminal on this trajectory is greater than a threshold.
[0023] For the study of the aforementioned radio frequency link strengths, an entity of the network mobile can execute a GMLC type function for "Gateway Mobile Location Center" (references of which are detailed later).
[0024] Alternatively or in addition, the study of the terminal's connections to successive cells, particularly in handover situations, can be implemented by a network entity executing a function of type NWDAF for "Network Data Analytic Function" (detailed later).
[0025] The network entity capable of implementing such functions is typically the core network (or "Core Network" hereafter), or an entity dedicated to this air terminal detection application and connected to the Core Network, as shown later with reference to [Fig.4].
[0026] In one embodiment, the aforementioned current data may typically include at least one terminal identifier and at least one terminal user identifier.
[0027] Indeed, as soon as the data managed by the network (core network) is accessible, the terminal identifiers and the identity of its user are also accessible.
[0028] In such an embodiment, it is then possible to: - consult a platform (for example, of the "USS" type, as detailed below) containing pilot records and / or flight plans for aircraft equipped with terminals, and - determine at least whether the terminal user ID is declared among the said platform records.
[0029] It is also possible to: - consult this platform to determine if at least the terminal's trajectory conforms to a declared flight plan for said terminal, and / or to - check if the detected trajectory includes at least one sensitive site, associated with restrictive overflight conditions (which had not been authorized for example by an administration managing this sensitive site).
[0030] Other control measures can be implemented, particularly to control the timing of overflights of a site during an authorized or unauthorized period (for example, due to a specific event). The detailed description below outlines these various examples.
[0031] This disclosure also relates to a computer program containing instructions for implementing the process described herein, when executed by a processing circuit. According to another aspect, a non-transient recording medium, readable by a processing circuit, is proposed on which such a program is recorded.
[0032] This disclosure also relates to a device comprising a processing circuit for implementing the above process.
[0033] This device may typically include a connection to a core of the mobile network, on the one hand, and to a platform of the aforementioned type, of pilot recordings and / or flight plans of devices carrying terminals, on the other hand.
[0034] Such a device can then be arranged to perform at least one function among less one function of type NWDAF - "Network Data Analytic Function" and one function of type GMLC - "Gateway Mobile Location Center".
[0035] This type of function interfaces advantageously with a NEF (for "Network Exposition Function") type function implemented by a USS type gateway.
[0036] Thus, the device can be arranged to perform said NWDAF or GMLC type function, in connection with the USS platform, via such a NEF type function. Brief description of the drawings
[0037] Other features, details and advantages will become apparent from reading the detailed description below and from analyzing the accompanying drawings, in which: Fig. 1
[0038] [Fig.1] illustrates an example of connecting a terminal on board an aircraft in flight. Fig. 2
[0039] [Fig.2] illustrates an example of connections from the on-board terminal B to antennas successive connections of the mobile cellular network, to be compared with the usual connections of a terminal A, on the ground. Fig. 3
[0040] [Fig. 3] illustrates an example of a process within the meaning of this disclosure, according to a method of implementation. Fig. 4
[0041] [Fig.4] illustrates an example of a system including a SER device within the meaning of the present disclosure, according to one embodiment. Description of the implementation methods
[0042] The term "normal terminal" hereafter refers to a conventional, terrestrial terminal. It is denoted UE_A (for "User Equipment" (UE) terrestrial), and is assumed to be connected to the antenna of a base station within direct line of sight of the ground terminal. A conventional terminal is, for example, a smartphone or an IoT (Internet of Things) terminal.
[0043] By contrast, the term "abnormal terminal" hereafter refers to a terminal mounted on an "aerial" vehicle. It is denoted UE_B. Being mounted on a vehicle at altitude, the UE_B terminal does not necessarily lock onto the antenna that would normally be closest to a ground-based terminal, but can connect to much more distant cells. because the secondary lobe of the nearest antenna emits less for the abnormal terminal than a distant antenna that the normal terminal could not have in view.
[0044] This situation is illustrated in the example of [Fig. 1] where an in-flight terminal UE_B is covered by the main lobe LP2 (dashed line) of an antenna, here from a more distant base station BS2, whereas on the ground it would have been covered by the main lobe LP1 (solid line) of the nearest station BS1, as is the case for a normal terminal UE_A. The secondary lobe(s) LSI of the nearest base station BS1 is / are insufficient to cover the in-flight terminal UE_B, so it naturally attaches to the station BS2, even though it is more distant than the station BS1 for the terminal UE_B.
[0045] One embodiment of the present disclosure proposes to take advantage of this observation to detect onboard terminals, in particular by drones.
[0046] The analysis of connections to the base stations of the cellular network (or more generally "antennas" hereafter) makes it possible to study in particular the trajectories of the terminals (as well as the so-called "ping-pong" effects and the speeds of movement of the terminals, as will be seen later).
[0047] In the present embodiment, it is proposed to detect trajectories that do not correspond to a normal trajectory for a normal terminal UE_A, terrestrial.
[0048] For example, with reference to [Fig. 2], the list of antennas used to connect a terminal is collected during mobility procedures, also called handovers, between antennas (to move from a cell covered by one station to a cell covered by another station). This list of antennas defines a trajectory as illustrated in [Fig. 2], with, in particular: - for terminal UE_A, the trajectory A is defined by: 3,t1; 2,t2; 3,t3; 2,t4; 4,t5; 5,t6, and - for terminal UE_B, the trajectory B defined by: 10,t1 ; 3t2 ; 10t3 ; 3,t4 ; 1 ,t5 ; 8,t6 ; 10,t7.
[0049] It then appears that trajectory B shows the use of cells which are not necessarily "adjacent" (in the sense of their usual use for "normal" ground terminals) during handovers, which then makes it possible to detect an anomaly characterizing the boarding of terminal UE_B into a flying machine.
[0050] Thus, the analysis of mobile network control data between each borrowed antenna and the mobile core network via probes can, under certain circumstances, allow the analysis of the movement of abnormal terminals.
[0051] Mobile network control (or "CDR") makes it possible to obtain metering data necessary for billing purposes, among other things. These CDRs can be generated by analyzing the signaling, for example, on SI interfaces to the core network between the base stations or "eNodeBs" of the network and the S-GW gateway ("Serving Gateway”) or the MME (for “Mobility Management Entity”) manager at the core of the mobile network, with the help of probes.
[0052] The signaling between the MME manager and the eNodeBs contains cell ID information, IMEI terminal ID, IP session ID, and usage ID (USIM / ISIM). Thus, from all the cells used to connect a terminal, it is possible to reconstruct the trajectory of the vehicle carrying the terminal. The signaling data can therefore provide information such as the terminal ID, the operator name, the connection date, the IDs of the cells (current and previous) used to connect the terminal, the type of service, etc.
[0053] The analysis of signaling data (control plane, transfer plane) can be performed in a function of type NWDAF (for "Network Data Analytic Function" according to standard TS 23.288) or in a management plane with the MD AF function (for "management data analytic function" according to standard TS 28.533, of the 5G network). The 5G MD AF and NWDAF functions can also collect desired data from the control plane and transfer plane functions of the 5G network without using probes. An inventory of antenna locations at given times provides information on the distances traveled between cells and the geographical area that has been overflown. Each antenna can be identified using longitude and latitude information.
[0054] It is then proposed to enrich a function of this type NWDAF to analyze the trajectories of terminals, from a list of antennas to which the terminal has been connected with the associated connection dates, this list being taken from the analysis of signaling data of the mobile network.
[0055] In this context, a service offering the detection of abnormal terminal behavior can be created to detect abnormal mobile trajectories. This detection can be notified to an application having: - subscribed to the "abnormal behaviour" service, and - requested statistics or trajectory predictions over a given area and duration, the list of terminal types or the identities of terminals with abnormal behavior (@IP, IMEI, IMSI, first name-last name, etc.).
[0056] Such a service may offer tools such as: - "Unexpected UE location" (detection of an unexpected terminal location), - "Ping-ponging across neighbouring cells" (exchanges between supposedly neighbouring cells, particularly for a handover), - "Unexpected wakeup" (unexpected appearance of a terminal at a given cell), - "Unexpected radio link failures" (unexpected interruption of a radio link with a cell).
[0057] The table below gives (left column) a more exhaustive list of these possible tools and (right column) the description of the pre-existing, standardized parameters allowing the implementation of these tools. Identifiants d’incidents Paramètres de comportements de terminaux à fournir Unexpected UE location Expected UE Moving Trajectory Stationary Indication Unexpected long-live / large rate flows Periodic Time Scheduled Communication Time Communication Duration Time Unexpected wakeup Periodic Time Communication Duration Time Scheduled Communication Time Suspicion of DDoS attack Periodic Time Communication Duration Time Scheduled Communication Time Scheduled Communication Type Traffic Profile Expected transaction Dispersion Too frequent Service Access Periodic Time Unexpected radio link failures Expected UE Moving Trajectory Ping-ponging across neighbouring cells Expected UE Moving Trajectory Stationary Indication
[0058] The implementation of an NWDAF type function allows access to these parameters (right column), and from there, by enrichment in the sense of this disclosure of this function, access to incident detections (left column) characterizing the presence of a terminal on board a flying device such as a drone.
[0059] Alternatively or in addition (to enhance trajectory determination), a GMLC-type location function (for "Gateway Mobile Location Center"—as described in particular in 3GPP document TS 29.515 V18.1.0 (2023-03)) can also be used. Such a function determines the current position of a terminal more precisely by relying on the power measurement of the radio frequency link with nearby antennas. The determination of the terminal's position is then carried out by trilateration.
[0060] More generally, for a function of type MD AF, NWDAF, or GMLC, data collection can be carried out on existing mobile networks for all terminals, usually to generate billing tickets. This collection is implemented for regulatory purposes (emergency services, or other). With the 5G standard, collection can be carried out on demand and for a given area for any terminal.
[0061] This data can then be analyzed to determine the identity of the terminal, as well as the identity of its user. Typically, it can be verified whether the user has registered with an air traffic control authority to operate a drone and, if so, whether they have submitted a flight plan to that authority that conforms to the observed trajectory of that drone, by implementing the aforementioned analysis function (e.g., NWDAF). Furthermore, as a complement or alternative, it can also be verified whether the type of flight plan itself conforms to a prior declaration by the pilot.For example, a high-altitude flight (regardless of the drone's precise trajectory), particularly for surveillance, police, and / or military applications, can be detected by an analysis function (e.g., NWDAF) if the rate of abnormal behavior (e.g., an attachment rate to unusual cells, especially during handovers) exceeds a first threshold, THR1. Conversely, a lower-altitude flight, particularly for goods delivery or other applications, can be characterized by a rate of abnormal behavior between the first threshold, THR1, and a second threshold, THR2, which is lower than THR1, and below which the terminal could be classified as ground-based, for example.
[0062] In one embodiment, this analysis function (for example, NWDAF and / or GMLC) can interface with a UAS (Unique Service Supplier) type platform (UAS stands for UAV System and UAV for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle). This platform is a service provider for drone systems (such systems including drones and the infrastructure for controlling them). Such a USS platform manages airspace use by providing services to the operator and / or pilot of a drone to meet the operational requirements of a UTM (Uncrewed Aerial System Traffic Management) drone manager.
[0063] The interface of the NWDAF type analysis function and the USS then makes it possible to check if the conditions for subscribing to a third party's services are met, and otherwise to alert an authority that wishes to detect drones in a given space-time or to detect and identify drones that have not declared themselves or that fly over an unauthorized area, or others.
[0064] Reference is now made to [Fig.3] illustrating one possible form of a process within the meaning of this disclosure.
[0065] It is proposed to analyze the data from the mobile network control plan for at least one of the following actions: - detect drones connected to the mobile network, - to identify if a terminal is potentially a UAV drone (for "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle", therefore an aerial vehicle without a human on board, typically a drone), - to detect non-compliant drone behavior in relation to flight parameters declared for that drone, - to find the identity of the drone operator (e.g., the pilot) controlling a device identified as a "UAV" type via a service subscription profile associated with that device, - to issue notifications to air security services that a drone not using an air service operated by a USS has been detected, and possibly that this drone is arriving or has been detected in an unauthorized flight area or one requiring a special subscription.
[0066] For example, a subscriber to such a drone detection service may be an entity linked to the USS and imposing surveillance of a given airspace (for example a sensitive site, such as a military or nuclear site, a prison, or others) or an entity in charge of certain air corridors (particularly for civil aviation).
[0067] Thus, a drone pilot can register at a subscription stage (S0), via an application function, with an air traffic control service managed by one or more USS entities linked to one or more authorities, such as a civil aviation authority of a given country, or one or more actors responsible for the security of sensitive sites (nuclear power plants, prisons, etc.). The USS platform (or ultimately the pilot via the USS) can further register the association between the drone, the pilot's identity, and the authorized flight zones with a mobile network operator to typically detect these drones via a mobile network service exposure function (called NEF for "network exposure function"). During a flight of such a registered drone, the aforementioned NWDAF function can then interface with the USS, more specifically via this NEF-type function, in order to identify, for example, whether the drone is crossing into an unauthorized zone.
[0068] More generally, actors requesting the USS may wish to: - to detect undeclared drones, by subscribing to a service with a mobile network operator, and - to identify drones that may have been declared but are flying over sensitive sites (for example, by default around an airport if the only actor involved is a management of civil aviation).
[0069] The USS, via the NEF function, then requests a function of type NWDAF (for "Network Data Analytic Function") for the drone detection service, which can then operate: - within a given 3D geographical area, and possibly - for a given duration (for an event such as a festival, for example).
[0070] With reference to [Fig. 3], after this initial S0 step of service declaration and subscription, during a routine SI service implementation step, the NEF function requests data from an NWDAF-type function to obtain abnormal terminal behaviors, i.e., abnormal for terrestrial terminals and likely to correspond to drone (or terminal within a drone) behaviors in a current geographic area. This operation makes it possible to obtain a list of requested antennas or directly the geographic coordinates of each terminal exhibiting erratic behavior during a given time interval, as detailed below.
[0071] A network entity such as the core network can then implement the NWDAF function in the next general step S2 by collecting mobile network data and analyzing abnormal terminal behavior. At least one of the following test operations can be implemented for this purpose.
[0072] A first possible operation S21 proposes to analyze the probability of so-called "ping-pong" effects when terminals attach themselves several times to neighboring antennas during a short period of time (typically less than 5 seconds). This situation can be detected because the terminal connects to antennas with the same identifiers several times within a short period. For example, the ping-pong sequence for a normal terrestrial terminal UE_A (3:2:3:2), which is quasi-static, can identify abnormal behavior with the following sequence for the in-flight terminal UE_B (10:3:10:3). Indeed, the probability of finding ping-pong effects with 3:10 antennas is low, or even zero, for a terrestrial terminal. Moreover, the distance between antennas 3 and 10 is greater than the ping-pong distances for terrestrial terminals in this area.A terrestrial terminal cannot, in principle, connect to the 10:3 antennas in a short period of time (typically less than 5 seconds). The distance between the antennas is analyzed using the coordinates of the different antennas in the mobile network.
[0073] A second possible operation S22 proposes to compare an ongoing trajectory with the trajectory probabilities analyzed for ground terminals (a normal trajectory being 3:2:3:2:4:5 according to the example in [Fig. 2]). A terminal that obtains a trajectory outside the probabilities specific to ground terminals can fall into the category of "probably air terminals". This probability of An abnormal trajectory is identified in operation S22 because the probability of a terminal passing from antenna 10 to antenna 3 is very low, and similarly, the probability between antennas 8 and 10 is very low (10:3:10:3:1:8:10). The probability that a trajectory is likely aerial can be validated / confirmed by analyzing the distance between the antennas. For example, if the distance between antennas 8 and 10 is greater than 20 km, this sequence of antennas is unlikely for a ground-based terminal, and its use characterizes the trajectory of a drone.
[0074] A third possible operation S23 proposes to analyze the speed of the terminals by estimating the distances traveled between non-adjacent cells (10:3:1:8:10). Such an operation also makes it possible to improve drone detection predictions, as drones do not, in principle, have the same speeds of movement as ground terminals (pedestrians, cyclists, cars often on roads with high traffic density, etc.), the speed of a drone generally being greater.
[0075] Thus, the implementation of the NWDAF function makes it possible to obtain, after the implementation of the general step S2, a list of terminals with the associated probabilities that they are carried on board respective drones, based on observations of abnormal ping-pong, and / or abnormal trajectory (handover), and / or abnormal speed (for a ground terminal). This list can be provided to the air traffic controller with the identifiers of the terminals exhibiting such abnormal behavior, in association with information on the identity of the respective owners of the network subscriptions (particularly in cases where this air traffic control authority already has such user information, such as, for example, an air traffic control authority, civil defense, or others).
[0076] Thus, these three types of analysis can be added to the usual analysis services already handled by the NWDAF function: - the detection of abnormal S21 ping-pong (repetitive mobility towards identical antennas in a very short period of time, for example less than a threshold of five seconds or less), - the detection of an abnormal trajectory S22 (series of antennas ensuring successive handovers having a very low probability compared to a set of trajectories of terminals considered terrestrial), - the detection of an abnormal speed of the S23 terminal (characterized by a distance traveled, according to the handovers recorded by the antennas, greater than a threshold (for example of 20 km) for a latency less than a threshold for example of a few minutes).
[0077] It should be noted that these different detections can be performed for a drone that is piloted via a mobile network implementing this NWDAF function, but also for a drone that uses a mobile connection to transmit a stream media (such as a video stream captured by a drone camera) and which is not necessarily controlled by a pilot connected via mobile access.
[0078] Following this step S2, in the next general step S3, these analyses make it possible to find the identities of each terminal (the type of terminal (hardware, software provider, etc.), the unique terminal identifier (for example of type IMEI), the subscription identifier (for example of type IMSI), the identity of the SIM card enabling the connection to the cellular network), which makes it possible to find the identities of the drone pilot possibly in violation (mobile service subscription profile identity (ISIM), connection identity used such as the IP address on the network, billing identity associated with the pilot (name, surname, address, postal code, etc.)).
[0079] It is then possible in step S4 to determine typically whether the pilot has subscribed to a service of the aforementioned type in accordance with civil aviation regulations, by searching for the pilot's identity in a database generated, for example, in the declaration step S0. If the pilot is not identified as having subscribed to this service in step S0, an alert can be generated in step S6.
[0080] It is then possible in step S5 to determine whether the drone, even if declared in step S0, is authorized to fly over a current area. Thus, in this step S5, the terminal is identified as potentially being carried on a drone, and if it is predicted that this drone is approaching a restricted flight area by analyzing data collected from the mobile network antennas, an alert can be generated in step S6.
[0081] In step S5, for a more general and automated verification of flight zones against prior declarations of authorized flight plans, the NWDAF function can be expected to verify, in the message exchanges returned by a network entity in charge of UDM (Unified Data Management), that an identified drone does indeed have flight authorization. Such an implementation typically allows the retrieval of a drone flight identifier and an authorization level for zones that may or may not be overflown.
[0082] Furthermore, an exchange of messages between a USS entity and the NWDAF function can provide information on the drone's planned trajectory, allowing for comparison with an expected UE Moving Trajectory (EWT) for confirmation. Thus, the NWDAF function can inform the USS entity of the drone's exact location, or notify a third party that has subscribed to a monitoring service for one of its sensitive sites that a drone has been detected there, in order to monitor its own airspace.
[0083] Following this S6 alert step, if the USS consultation confirms that the terminal (detected as aerial) is not authorized to be mounted on a drone, the Air traffic controllers can block the drone by requesting the mobile network to suspend its connectivity. Air traffic controllers can also classify the drone as a drone to block any connection to the mobile network if it does not have an expected flight plan, by adding the drone to a blacklist of devices held by mobile operators. Air traffic controllers can also require the drone operator to provide the identity of the user who used mobile connectivity in a restricted area, or take any other action necessary to ensure the safety of airspace.
[0084] Figure 4 illustrates a possible embodiment of a system for implementing the method described above. The RESM mobile network is controlled by an entity such as the core network (CN), to which a SER device can be connected for implementing the method presented above with reference to Figure 3. This device can, for example, be implemented as a SER server comprising a processing circuit equipped with: - a COM communication interface (particularly with the CN network core), - of a PROC processor, and - of a MEM memory storing instruction data of a computer program for the implementation of the above process, when these instructions are read and executed by the PROC processor.
[0085] The server's COM communication interface allows a connection to be established (for example, via a wide area network, RE) with a USS platform of the aforementioned type. Typically, the SER server, connecting to the CN core network, can implement NWDAF or GMLC type functions, which can address a NEF type function of the USS platform, as described previously.
[0086] Of course, the USS platform can also receive data from authorities such as civil aviation AC, or military authorities MIL or industrialists IND wishing to restrict overflight of sensitive areas (typically military or industrial sites).
[0087] This disclosure is not limited to the embodiments described above by way of example: it extends to other variants.
[0088] Thus, for example, the aforementioned SER server can be an integral part of the CN core network, which can directly execute the NWDAF and / or GMLC functions in connection with the USS NEF function. Therefore, the device within the meaning of this disclosure can directly be the CN core network.
[0089] Furthermore, the interconnection of the SER server (or directly from the CN core network) to a USS-type platform is an example of such an implementation. In addition, or as an alternative, industrial or military authorities (or others) can share an SER interconnection server with the CN core network to directly receive alerts from network monitoring through the implementation of functions NWDAF in particular, typically to determine if a drone carrying a terminal with abnormal behavior has flown over a sensitive area (military or industrial).
[0090] In addition, the steps S21 to S23 above are illustrated by way of examples with respect to what is possible with respect to the execution of a function of type NWDAF: on the one hand, another type of function such as GMLC can be implemented, as a variant or in addition to the function of type NWDAF, and, on the other hand, the implementation of only one or two of these steps S21 to S23 is possible.
[0091] Moreover, the embedded UE object has been referred to above as the "terminal". In 3GPP terminology, the terminal can also be referred to as the "user agent" (and always denoted UE).
[0092] Furthermore, in step S0 described above, during the subscription process, the user may be asked whether the drone is associated with only one user agent (or terminal) or with a SIM / IMEI pair associated with a drone, within this flight space, as described above. Otherwise (if the user is carrying several terminals or user agents), the user provides the identifiers of the other user agents (SIM, IMEI, PEI) in order to complete the analysis on trajectories of different user agents carried together in the same device.
Claims
Claims
1. Method for detecting a terminal likely to be on board an aircraft during flight, the terminal being connected to a mobile network comprising a plurality of cells covered by respective antennas, the method comprising: - obtaining (SI) current connection data of the terminal to successive cells of the mobile network, said current data comprising at least data from the cells involved in the connection of the terminal to the mobile network, - comparing (S2) the current data with reference connection data of terrestrial terminals and involving at least one cell of said current data, and - based on said comparison, determining (S3) whether the terminal is on board an aircraft in flight.
2. Method according to claim 1, comprising: - obtaining (SI) current data of connection transfers of the terminal from one cell to another cell, said current data comprising at least data of the cells involved in said transfers, and - comparing (S2) the current data with data of connection transfers of terrestrial terminals and involving at least one cell of said current data.
3. Method according to claim 2, in which, two cells of the network being deemed to be adjacent if they provide a connection transfer from a terrestrial terminal of one of the two cells to the other, said comparison of the data comprises the detection (S21; S22) in the current data of a connection transfer between two cells which are not deemed to be adjacent.
4. Method according to claim 3, in which the current data further comprises respective instants of said transfers, and said current data is analyzed to detect (S21) whether the terminal connects several times successively to two cells which are not deemed to be adjacent and in a time period less than a threshold.
5. Method according to one of claims 3 and 4, in which the current data further comprises respective instants of said transfers, and said current data is analyzed to detect (S22) whether a The trajectory that the terminal takes passes through successive cells that are not considered to be adjacent.
6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, in which the current data comprises data on the strength of the radiofrequency link connecting the terminal with each of said successive cells of the mobile network, for estimating successive positions of the terminal.
7. Method according to one of claims 2 to 6, in which the current data further comprises respective times of connection to said successive cells, and said current data is analyzed to determine a trajectory of the terminal and detect whether a speed of movement of the terminal on said trajectory is greater than a threshold.
8. Method according to one of claims 2 to 5 and 7, implemented by an entity of the mobile network and by the execution of a function of the NWDAF type - “Network Data Analytic Function”.
9. Method according to one of claims 6 and 7, implemented by an entity of the mobile network and by the execution of a GMLC - “Gateway Mobile Location Center” type function.
10. Method according to one of the preceding claims, in which said current data comprises (S3) at least one identifier of the terminal and at least one user identifier of the terminal.
11. Method according to claim 10, further comprising: - consulting a platform (USS) of pilot records and / or flight plans of devices carrying terminals, and - determining (S4) at least whether the user identifier of the terminal is declared among said records of the platform.
12. Method according to claim 11, taken in combination with one of claims 5 and 7, further comprising: - consulting said platform to determine (S5) whether at least the trajectory of the terminal is in accordance with a flight plan declared for said terminal.
13. Method according to one of claims 11 and 12, taken in combination with one of claims 5 and 7, further comprising: - checking (S5) whether said trajectory includes at least one sensitive site, associated with restrictive overflight conditions.
14. Computer program comprising instructions for implementing the method according to one of the preceding claims, when executed by a processing circuit.
15. Device comprising a processing circuit for implementing the method according to one of claims 1 to 13.
16. Device according to claim 15, comprising a connection (COM) to a core (CN) of the mobile network, on the one hand, and to a platform (USS) for recording pilots and / or flight plans of devices carrying terminals, on the other hand.
17. Device according to one of claims 15 and 16, arranged to execute at least one function among at least one function of the NWDAF type - “Network Data Analytic Function” and one function of the GMLC type - “Gateway Mobile Location Center”.
18. Device according to claim 16 combined with claim 17, the device being arranged to perform said function, in connection with said USS platform, via a function of the NEF type - “Network Exposition Function”.
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