Method, storage medium and electronic device for secure dynamic threshold signature scheme
The dynamic multiparty threshold signature scheme addresses the inflexibility of existing multisignature techniques by enabling secure group membership changes and efficient signature generation in blockchain networks, maintaining security through a trusted execution environment.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2024134741
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2017-05-05
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-13
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-13
- Estimated Expiration
- 2038-04-26
Smart Images

Figure 2024160343000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present invention relates generally to computer-implemented security techniques, including utilizing cryptographic signatures to protect and enhance the security of resources exchanged or transmitted over a computer network. The present invention also relates to distributed ledger (blockchain) technology, and in particular to methods and systems that provide distributed control over exchanges and / or transfers associated with and / or performed by a digital ledger. The present invention is particularly suited, but not limited to, to allowing a threshold number of members of a group to generate valid cryptographic signatures on behalf of the group. [Background technology]
[0002] In this document, the term "blockchain" is used to include all forms of electronic, computer-based, distributed ledgers. These include, but are not limited to, blockchain and transaction chain technologies, permissioned and permissionless ledgers, shared ledgers, and variations thereof. The most widely known application of blockchain technology is the Bitcoin ledger, although other blockchain implementations have been proposed and developed. It should be noted that while Bitcoin may be referred to herein for convenience and illustrative purposes, the present invention is not limited to use with the Bitcoin blockchain, and alternative blockchain implementations and protocols are within the scope of the present invention.
[0003] A blockchain is a consensus-based electronic ledger, realized as a computer-based, distributed, decentralized system of blocks that are made up of transactions and other information. In Bitcoin, each transaction is a data structure that encodes the transfer of control of digital assets between participants in the blockchain system and contains at least one input and at least one output. Each block contains a hash of the previous block with which it is chained together, creating a permanent, immutable record of all transactions written to the blockchain since its inception. Transactions contain small programs, known as scripts, that are embedded in their inputs and outputs, and the programs specify how the transaction's outputs can be accessed and by whom. In the Bitcoin platform, these scripts are written using a stack-based scripting language.
[0004] In order for a transaction to be written to the blockchain, it needs to be "validated." Some network nodes, acting as miners, perform work to ensure that each transaction is valid, and invalid transactions are rejected from the network. For example, a software client installed on the node performs this validation work for transactions that reference unspent balances (UTXOs). Validation may be performed by executing the transaction's lock and unlock scripts. If the execution of the lock and unlock scripts evaluates to TRUE and certain other conditions are met, the transaction is valid and the transaction may be written to the blockchain. Thus, for a transaction to be written to the blockchain, it needs to i) be verified by the node that receives it (if the transaction is valid, the node relays it to other nodes in the network); and ii) be added to a new block constructed by a miner; and iii) be mined, i.e., added to the public ledger of past transactions. A transaction is considered approved when a sufficient number of blocks are added to the blockchain to make the transaction effectively irreversible. Summary of the Invention
[0005] Blockchain protocols often provide multi-party signature features that require signatures from multiple nodes or parties before removing an encumbrance on an unspent balance (UTXO). For example, Bitcoin's multisig feature provides such a feature. A multi-signature script can set a condition where N public keys are recorded in a lock script, and at least M public keys, each associated with one of the N public keys, must provide a signature to release the encumbrance, i.e., unlock the UTXO. Such signature schemes provide advantageous security benefits and provide enhanced control over UTXOs by allowing finer and more sophisticated control over locking / unlocking of UTXOs. However, known multisig techniques provide limited functionality because they do not allow who must contribute to signature generation to change after the lock script is set. Thus, there is a need for improved security mechanisms to control electronic resources such as those transferred over blockchains and other networks.
[0006] Thus, according to the present invention there is provided a method as defined in the accompanying claims.
[0007] As described in more detail below, a dynamic multiparty threshold signature scheme allows control of a resource (e.g., a blockchain transaction output, UTXO) to be shared among a group of participants under a single public key, with each group member holding a private secret. A threshold subset of the participants are required to collectively sign to spend the output. Advantageously, a digital signature scheme is described that allows valid signatures to be generated without requiring any of the participants contributing to the signature generation to reveal their private secrets. To provide security for threshold signature schemes, a trusted execution environment may be used.
[0008] Advantageously, techniques are described for registering and deregistering participants in a manner that allows the single public key used for the group to remain the same, and a trusted execution environment is used to enable secure changes to group membership without the need to change the group's single public key.
[0009] Thus, according to the invention, a computer-implemented method may be provided. The invention may be described as a method of security or control. The invention may be configured to secure or control a resource. The invention may be configured to control access to a resource. The controlled resource may be an electronic resource, entity or item stored on or transmitted over a computer or network. In some cases, it may be referred to as a "digital asset", "output", "piece of cryptocurrency" and / or "UTXO". The invention may be configured to control access to and / or transfer of a resource. The invention may be configured to lock or unlock access / control of a resource. In some cases, the term "spend" may be used to indicate unlocking a resource, i.e. granting control or access to the resource.
[0010] The method may be a cryptographically implemented method. Additionally or alternatively, the invention may be described as a method of generating an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm signature. The signature may include a first signature component r and a second signature component w. The method may be implemented by one or more nodes in a network, such as a blockchain network.
[0011] The method may include: i) forming, by the node, a signing group with other nodes; ii) obtaining, by the node, based on the secure random number, a) an inverse of the secure random number and b) a first signing component r, where the first signing component is determined based on the secure random number and an elliptic curve generated point; iii) determining, by the node, a partial signature based on a private secret share, the inverse of the secure random number, and the first signing component; iv) receiving, by the node, partial signatures from other nodes in the signing group; and v) generating, by the node, a second signing component w based on the determined and received partial signature.
[0012] The method may include using the signatures to control access to and / or transfer of resources in a computer-implemented network, which may be a blockchain network.
[0013] In some implementations, the obtaining step includes generating the reciprocal and the first signature component. The method may also include transmitting the reciprocal to the other node.
[0014] In some implementations, the obtaining step includes preparing an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment (TEE) of the node to generate the secure random numbers.
[0015] In some implementations, the obtaining step includes receiving the reciprocal and the first signature component from one of the other nodes.
[0016] In some implementations, the method includes signaling an intent to participate in distributed signature generation prior to forming the signature group.
[0017] In some implementations, the partial signature is determined within an enclave associated with the node's trusted execution environment.
[0018] In some implementations, the partial signature is determined by performing Lagrangian interpolation.
[0019] In some implementations, the second signature component is generated within an enclave associated with the trusted execution environment, and the method further includes transmitting an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm from the enclave to a host portion of the node after generating the second signature component.
[0020] In some implementations, the method further includes adding the signature to the blockchain transaction and broadcasting it to a blockchain network.
[0021] In some implementations, the method further includes, prior to forming the signature group, obtaining a secret share based on secret sharing data received from a plurality of existing members of the group.
[0022] In some implementations, the secret sharing is determined within an enclave associated with the node's trusted execution environment.
[0023] In some implementations, the partial signature v i teeth: v i =k -1 rb i s i mod p is determined as:
[0024] b i is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, and k -1 is the inverse of the secure random number, and s i is the secret share, r is the first signature component, and p is the degree.
[0025] According to the present invention, an electronic device may be provided. Any features described above with respect to the method of the present invention may also be applied to the device configured according to the present invention. The device may be configured to implement or perform any embodiment of the method described above. The electronic device may include an interface device, a processor coupled to the interface device, and a memory coupled to the processor. The memory may have computer executable instructions stored therein that, when executed, configure the processor to perform the method described herein.
[0026] According to the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium may be provided that includes computer-executable instructions that, when executed, configure a processor to perform the methods described herein. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0027] These and other aspects of the invention will be apparent from and elucidated with reference to the embodiment(s) described herein, which are described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which various parameters are included.
[0028] [Figure 1] Figure 1 shows a block diagram of an example blockchain network.
[0029] [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of an exemplary electronic device that may function as a node in a blockchain network.
[0030] [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 is a signal diagram of a method for initializing a group.
[0031] [Figure 4] FIG. 4 is a signaling diagram of a method for joining a previously initialized group.
[0032] [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 is a signaling diagram of a method for deregistering a member of a group.
[0033] [Figure 6] FIG. 6 is a signal diagram of a method for generating a signature for a group. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0034] The present invention relates to improved security solutions. These can be used for enhanced security of resources controlled on a computer network. In the following exemplary embodiment, a blockchain network, such as Bitcoin, is used as our network example. A blockchain can be used to transfer control of electronic resources, such as tokens or pieces of cryptocurrency, between nodes on the network. For convenience, we will refer to the controlled resources as "digital assets" hereinafter. However, this should not be construed as limiting in any way and should not be construed to imply any particular type of asset. The present invention has advantages and applications beyond those provided by blockchain transactions and is not limited to use in relation to financially oriented contexts but has a broader applicability. The blockchain example provided below is provided for illustration only.
[0035] Blockchain Network Reference is now made to FIG. 1, which illustrates in block diagram form an exemplary blockchain network 100 associated with blockchain. The blockchain network may be a public blockchain network, which is a peer-to-peer open membership network that anyone can join without being invited or consenting from other members. Distributed electronic devices running an instance of the blockchain protocol on which the blockchain network 100 operates may participate in the blockchain network 100. Such distributed electronic devices may be referred to as nodes 102. The blockchain protocol may be, for example, the Bitcoin protocol.
[0036] The electronic devices that run the blockchain protocol and form the nodes 102 of the blockchain network 100 may be of various types, including computers, such as desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, servers, mobile devices such as smartphones, wearable computers such as smart watches, or other electronic devices.
[0037] The nodes 102 of the blockchain network 100 are coupled to one another using suitable communication technologies, which may include wired and wireless communication technologies. Such communications adhere to a protocol associated with the blockchain. For example, if the blockchain is the Bitcoin blockchain, the Bitcoin protocol may be used.
[0038] Nodes 102 maintain a (possibly global) ledger of all transactions in the blockchain. The ledger is a decentralized, distributed ledger. Each node 102 may store a full or partial copy of the global ledger. In the case of a blockchain secured by proof-of-work, transactions by nodes 102 that affect the global ledger are verified by other nodes 102, thereby maintaining the validity of the global ledger. If the blockchain is a proof-of-work based blockchain, blocks are also verified by inspecting the proof-of-work submitted with the block.
[0039] At least some of the nodes 102 act as miners 104 in the blockchain network 100. The blockchain network 100 of FIG. 1 is a proof-of-work blockchain, where miners 104 perform costly computations to facilitate transactions in the blockchain. For example, a proof-of-work blockchain may require miners to solve a cryptographic problem. In Bitcoin, miners 104 find a nonce, which causes the block header to hash with SHA-256 to a number less than a value determined by the current difficulty. The hashing power required for the proof-of-work algorithm means that a transaction is considered effectively irreversible after a predefined number of blocks have been mined on top of it. A miner 104 that solves the cryptographic problem creates a new block for the blockchain and broadcasts the new block to the other nodes 102. The other nodes 102 verify that the miner 104 has indeed solved the cryptographic problem and therefore demonstrated sufficient proof-of-work before accepting that the block should be added to the blockchain. Blocks are added to the blockchain (i.e., a distributed global ledger) by consensus of nodes 102.
[0040] Blocks created by miners 104 contain transactions (TXs) that have been broadcast to the blockchain by nodes 102. For example, a block may contain a transaction from an address associated with one of the nodes 102 to an address associated with another of the nodes 102. In this way, a block serves as a record of transfers from one address to another. Those who request that a transaction be included in a block prove that they are authorized to initiate the transfer (e.g., in the case of Bitcoin, to spend the output) by signing the request with a private key that corresponds to their public key. The transfer can be added to the block only if the request is validly signed.
[0041] In Bitcoin, there is a one-to-one correspondence between public keys and addresses; that is, each public key is associated with a single address. Thus, for the purposes of this specification, transferring a controlled resource (e.g., a digital asset) to or from a public key (e.g., paying a public key) and transferring a digital asset to or from an address associated with that public key refer to common actions.
[0042] Some nodes 102 may not act as miners, but instead participate as validating nodes. Validating transactions may include checking signatures, verifying references to valid UTXOs, etc.
[0043] The example of FIG. 1 includes six nodes 102, three of which participate as miners 104. In practice, the number of nodes 102 or miners 104 may vary. In many blockchain networks, the number of nodes 102 and miners 104 may be much greater than the number shown in FIG. 1.
[0044] As described below, various nodes 102 may cooperate to form groups 110 that may cooperatively generate digital signatures under a threshold signature scheme. In the illustrated example, three nodes 102 are shown participating in group 110. However, the actual number of members of group 110 may be much larger.
[0045] Below, techniques for joining, leaving, and participating in groups 110 are described in detail.
[0046] Electronic devices acting as nodes 2 is a block diagram illustrating components of an exemplary electronic device 200 that may function as a node 102 (FIG. 1) in a peer-to-peer blockchain network 100 (FIG. 1). The exemplary electronic device 200 may be referred to as a processing device. The electronic device may take a variety of forms including, for example, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a tablet computer, a server, a mobile device such as a smartphone, a wearable computer such as a smart watch, or other types of forms.
[0047] The electronic device 200 includes a processor 210, a memory 220, and an interface device 230. These components may be directly or indirectly coupled to each other and may communicate with each other. For example, the processor 210, the memory 220, and the interface device 230 may communicate with each other via a bus 240. The memory 220 stores computer software programs including machine-readable instructions and data for performing functions described herein. For example, the memory may include processor-executable instructions that, when executed by the processor 210, cause the electronic device to perform methods described herein. The processor-executable instructions may include instructions that, when executed by the processor 210, cause the electronic device to perform a protocol associated with the blockchain network 100 (FIG. 1). For example, the instructions may include instructions for implementing the Bitcoin protocol.
[0048] The memory 220 may store the global ledger of the blockchain network 100 (FIG. 1) or a portion thereof, i.e., the memory 220 may store all blocks of the blockchain or a portion of the blocks, such as the most recent block, or a portion of the information in some blocks.
[0049] 2, in reality, electronic device 200 may include multiple memory components. The memory components may be of various types including, for example, RAM, HDD, SSD, flash drive, etc. Different types of memory may be suitable for different purposes. Additionally, while memory 220 is shown separate from processor 210, processor 210 may include embedded memory.
[0050] As shown in FIG. 2, the processor 210 may include a secure domain such as a trusted execution environment (TEE) 250. The TEE 250 is an isolated execution environment that provides additional security to the electronic device 200, such as isolated execution, integrity of trusted applications, and confidentiality of assets. The TEE 250 provides an execution space that ensures that computer instructions and data loaded into the TEE 250 are protected in terms of confidentiality and integrity. The TEE 250 may be used to protect the integrity and confidentiality of critical resources, such as keys. The TEE 250 is at least partially implemented at the hardware level, such that instructions and data executed within the TEE 250 are protected against access and manipulation from the rest of the electronic device 200 and from outsiders, such as the owner of the electronic device. Data and computations within the TEE 250 are protected from those operating the node 102 that includes the TEE 250.
[0051] The TEE 250 can operate to instantiate an enclave and then hash pages of memory one page at a time while cumulatively adding them. Similar operations can also be performed on a remote machine (which may be a developer machine or another machine) so that the remote machine determines and stores the expected hash. Thus, the contents of the enclave can be verified by any remote machine to ensure that the enclave is running an approved algorithm. This verification may be performed by comparing hashes. Once the enclave is fully constructed, it is locked down. It is possible to run code on the TEE 250 and send it secrets, but the code cannot be modified. The final hash can be signed by an attestation key and made available to the data owner to verify it before sending any secrets to the enclave.
[0052] The enclave is physically secure from access through the architecture of the host system, including the host system's system memory, BIOS, and operating system. Thus, the enclave enables the secure and verifiable execution of software on a remote computer owned and controlled by an untrusted party. The memory of a process running on the enclave is accessible only to that process, and only when the enclave software is running. The contents of the memory are encrypted when transmitted from the enclave to a remote computer, or to the host system itself. Decryption of the enclave data relies on keys that are only available to code that hashes to a specific value. If the enclave code has been modified, it no longer has access to these keys. Thus, the enclave code cannot be modified to access the data.
[0053] Additionally, the TEE 250 can enable remote attestation, which can be used by a node 102 (FIG. 1) to prove to other nodes 102 that the TEE 250 is authentic and is executing computer-executable instructions approved for the protocol implemented by the group 110. Remote attestation can be provided by the TEE 250 by executing a particular piece of code and sending, internally to the enclave, a hash of that code signed by an internal attestation key for the enclave. In effect, remote attestation allows an enclave in the TEE 250 to prove to any remote system that it is executing computer-executable instructions that hash to a particular value.
[0054] Remote attestation allows code running within a secure enclave to obtain a signed certificate from the enclave that the code is executing within that enclave along with a given hash of the enclave page cache, which may be referred to as a quote, and which is a section of protected memory where specified code and data reside during the execution of such code.
[0055] The TEE 250 may include a secure random number generator internal to the TEE's enclave that may be used to generate secret keys, random challenges, or other random data. The TEE 250 may also be configured to read data from and write data to external memory. Such data may be encrypted by a secret key maintained only within the enclave. ("random" may be interpreted herein to include "pseudo-random").
[0056] The TEE 250 may be implemented, for example, using Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which supports remote attestation: third-party attestation services, such as the Intel Attestation Service (IAS), can certify that these signed statements come from authentic CPUs that comply with the SGX specification.
[0057] An electronic device 200 operates as a node 102 (FIG. 1) in a blockchain network 100 (FIG. 1) and can join or otherwise participate in a group 110 (FIG. 1). As described below, group members (which may be referred to herein as participants or nodes) cooperate to generate valid signatures to release encumbrances associated with a group public key.
[0058] Threshold Signature Group 110 may be a permissioned or unauthorized group. Group 110 may be joined by any node 102 (FIG. 1) in blockchain network 100 (FIG. 1) (i.e., by any node that monitors and stores at least a portion of the information in the blockchain).
[0059] A group 110 is associated with a public key, which may be referred to as a group public key. This group public key may control and impose restrictions on access to resources, such as tokens, cryptocurrencies, etc., that are transferred to the group public key. For example, a transaction locking script may lock resources using the group public key such that such resources cannot be transferred or "spent" without the approval of the group 110.
[0060] The group 110 may operate according to a threshold signature scheme. More specifically, if a threshold number of nodes that are group members cooperate to generate a valid signature, resources bound (encumbranced) by the group public key may be unlocked (i.e., unencumbranced). The signature is valid under the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). ECDSA is a cryptographic algorithm used in Bitcoin and other blockchain networks to ensure that resources can only be used by their rightful owners, and the threshold signature scheme described herein allows valid ECDSA signatures to be generated by a threshold number of nodes in the group.
[0061] To enable group members to collaboratively generate valid signatures, member nodes hold private secrets that are generated as separate units (i.e., private secrets generated by the nodes themselves). As explained in more detail below, these private secrets can be used by member nodes to generate valid signatures for transactions without revealing their private secrets to other member nodes. In this way, an improved security mechanism is provided for controlling access to resources.
[0062] A threshold signature scheme is described below that allows member nodes to join and leave a group without having to change the group public key. A number of nodes 102 (FIG. 1) in a blockchain network 100 (FIG. 1) may implement a threshold signature scheme as described herein. Such nodes 102 may include computer-executable instructions stored in memory 220 (FIG. 2) that implement a threshold signature scheme protocol. Such instructions, when executed by a processor 210 (FIG. 2), cause the node 102 (such as an electronic device 200 of the type described with reference to FIG. 2) to perform one or more methods of the threshold signature scheme protocol. Such methods may include any or combination of methods 300, 400, 500, and 600 of FIGS. 3-6. The methods may be performed by the node in coordination with other nodes associated with other group members.
[0063] Group Initialization Referring now to Figure 3, a method 300 of initializing a group is shown. The group is initialized for use in a threshold signature scheme. That is, the group is initialized to allow member nodes to cooperatively generate valid digital signatures to remove encumbrance on digital assets. The encumbrance that is removed by a valid digital signature is an encumbrance based on the group public key.
[0064] FIG. 3 illustrates a method performed by multiple nodes in cooperation with each other. More specifically, each node that is a group member performs the operations of the method 300 described below. These nodes are participants P i In the following description, each of the nodes executing the method 300 may be referred to as a node or member. Initially, a group U of n participants (i.e., i=1, 2, ..., n) is involved in performing the method 300. In the illustrated example, the group is formed by three nodes (i.e., n=3). However, a different number of nodes may be used to form the group. The nodes executing the method 300 each belong to an SGX enclave Ei It includes a certified TEE that implements
[0065] Prior to the method 300 being performed, the nodes 102 that will form the group establish a secure communication channel with each other and all agree on a signature threshold (t+1). After each node and the enclave establishes a secure channel (e.g., using a Diffie-Hellman exchange), they can privately communicate point-to-point and can also securely broadcast information to other participants. The participants also jointly determine an elliptic curve generation point G and a degree p. The operations described below are performed using this elliptic curve generation point G and the degree p. For example, the reference "mod p" describes a modulo operation performed according to the degree p. After the communication setup, the nodes perform a dealer-free polynomial generation according to the method 300 described below.
[0066] In operation 302, each participant P i is a polynomial f of randomness t i To generate (x), each enclave E i where x is a variable in the polynomial function. A polynomial of random degree t is a polynomial of degree t (in the finite field of integers modulo p) with each of the coefficients of the polynomial chosen randomly.
[0067] In operation 304, authentication is performed such that each enclave confirms to each of the other enclaves that it is executing an approved set of initialization instructions. During authentication, each enclave can send a quote to each of the other enclaves, and thus each enclave receives a quote from each of the other enclaves. Each of these received quotes is evaluated to determine whether authentication is successful.
[0068] In operation 304, each enclave E iis another enclave E j For each of the points f i (j) mod p, where j=1,...,n. Thus, in operation 304, each enclave E i is receiving points from other enclaves.
[0069] In Operation 306, each enclave acquires secret shares i More specifically, in operation 306, each enclave E i sums over all received points to determine the shared polynomial f(x): 1 (i)+f 2 (i)+···+f n (i) mod p. That is, the shared polynomial is the sum of all the randomly generated polynomials of the participants. Then, the secret is shared mod p. i =f(i) mod p, which is the P i point (i.e., the point at x=i), where
[0070]
number
[0071] Thus, each secret share is determined as the sum of all the points (i.e., values) of the random polynomials of the other participants. Each participant only has a different point in the shared polynomial, and therefore a different polynomial (and therefore a shared secret (a 0 ) can be reconstructed (by interpolation) by t+1 points.
[0072] In operation 306, each secret share s i is each enclave E iEach enclave is protected by i can also attest to the other enclave that it executed authorized instructions to generate the secret share. Thus, a remote attestation may be performed in operation 306 to ensure that the secret share was properly generated.
[0073] Once the secret share is generated, a group public key (which is an elliptic curve public key) may be generated in operation 308. In operation 308, the shared secret a 0 Lagrange interpolation may be used to determine the group public key corresponding to P. More specifically, for a participant P i (where i = 1, , t+1) each prepare their own enclave to compute their own public key share based on the Lagrange interpolation coefficients, the elliptic curve generation points, and their secret share. That is, the public key share is i s i It may be calculated as ×G.
[0074] where b i teeth
number
[0075] The public key agreement is broadcast by the participant to all other participants during operation 308. Remote authentication may be used to verify that the public key agreement is properly generated.
[0076] Upon receiving all public key shares (i.e., after receiving a public key share from each of the other participants), each participant can calculate a group public key A based on the received public key shares. More specifically, the group public key may be determined as the sum of all public key shares:
[0077]
number
[0078] Notably, the initialization phase proceeds in an untrusted manner and there is no single point of failure, since there is no trusted dealer. Performing the polynomial generation and subsequent processing within the enclave protects the secret sharing, which allows deregistration (described below with reference to Figure 5) to remain secure.
[0079] Joining a group after group initialization Referring now to Figure 4, there is shown a registration method 400. Registration method 400 may be performed to allow a node to join a pre-existing group that has been initialized for use in a threshold signature scheme without having to issue a new group public key. Method 400 is performed after the group has already been initialized (such initialization may follow method 300 of Figure 3).
[0080] FIG. 4 illustrates a method performed by multiple nodes in cooperation with one another. More specifically, nodes that are existing group members perform at least some of the operations of method 400, which will be described below, and future members perform at least some of the operations of method 400. n+1 A prospective member (which may be designated as a prospective member) is a node that is registering to the group.
[0081] Prior to execution of method 400, at least a threshold group (t+1) of participants notify each other that they wish to enroll future members. These participants are referred to as an enrollment group U. EThe nodes that make up the registration group and the prospective member establish a secure communication channel. The prospective member may also authenticate itself to the nodes in the registration group.
[0082] In the example of FIG. 4, the registration group U E contains three nodes (i.e., n=3). However, a different number of nodes may be used to form the enrollment group, as long as the number of nodes forming the enrollment group is at least the threshold (t+1) number of nodes. In the illustrated example, the future member P n+1 , P 4 Each node executing the method 400 is represented as an SGX enclave E i This includes a certified TEE implementing the
[0083] In operation 402, future member P 4 The registration group U will ensure that prospective members are running the authentication protocol. E Provide all members of the Registered Group with an attestation quote, which will be received by the Registered Group members, who will then evaluate the quote to ensure that the prospective member has implemented the attestation protocol.
[0084] In operation 404, the registered group members each register their own secret shares s i More specifically, each participant P i (i=1, ,t+1) is each person's secret share s i Prepare their enclave to multiply the modified secret share s by the Lagrange interpolation coefficients determined at the new point (n+1). i ' may be determined as follows:
[0085]
number
[0086] Then, each enclave has s i Generate secure random numbers such that each of ' is divided into t+1 parts (where the sum of all such parts is s i '), which may be called the secret sharing part: s i '=s 1,i +s 2,i +···+s t+1,i
[0087] In Figure 4, (e.g., s s,1 The subscript s in i is split into t+1 parts.
[0088] Each Enclave E i The secret sharing part i,i , and exchange the remaining secret shared parts with other t enclaves in the enrollment group UE, so that each enclave E i will have the following secret shared part: s i,1 ,s i,2 ,...,s i,t+1
[0089] Next, each enclave E i is U E All secret shares received from all other members of the enclave E i The secret sharing part maintained by i,i , and the total secret share v j Get:
[0090]
number
[0091] In operation 406, each enclave E iThe secret shared data is then sent to the prospective member enclave E. n+1 More specifically, in operation 406, the participant P i Each then has its associated enclave E i This secret share sum v j Future members of the Enclave E n+1 Send privately to the prospective member of the enclave E n+1 receives these secret share sums from all members of the registration group, and then (in operation 408) determines the new secret share s by determining the sum of all the received secret share sums. n+1 Build:
[0092]
number
[0093] In the example shown, n is equal to 3, so the new secret share is s 4 It is shown as:
[0094] Thus, the prospective member derives a new secret share based on secret share data received from a plurality of existing members of the group, more particularly, the prospective member derives a new secret share based on secret share data from at least a threshold number of existing members of the group.
[0095] As an additional verification step, operation 308 of method 300 may be performed after operation 406 of method 400 to generate the group public key. The participants can then verify that the group public key has not changed from its previous value (i.e., the value before method 400 of FIG. 4 was performed).
[0096] Leaving a group A group member may disenroll from a group from time to time. As used herein, disenrolling refers to the de-enrollment or removal of a member from membership of a group. Such de-enrollment may occur at the request of the member being de-enrolled or at the request of other members (e.g., if the member to be de-enrolled is not participating in group activities according to predefined criteria, etc.). Referring now to FIG. 5, an exemplary method 500 for de-enrolling a member is shown. The method may be performed by a node 102 in cooperation with other nodes 102 of the group. The method may be used to de-enroll a member without modifying the group public key. Thus, the present invention provides an improved cryptographically secure method that provides enhanced control over resources compared to what was previously possible in the prior art.
[0097] To accomplish deregistration, a threshold number n-1 of the existing group members cooperate to perform the method 500 of FIG. 5. More specifically, all group members remaining in the group participate in the method 500 of FIG. 5. However, group members that are to be deregistered do not participate in the method. In some cases, the number of deregistrations d n More than one group member may be deregistered at a time as long as d is less than or equal to the difference between the number of existing group members and the threshold of the threshold signature scheme. n ≦n-(t+1).
[0098] That is, the number of group members who are not about to leave the group must be at least equal to the threshold t+1 of the threshold signature scheme.
[0099] In the example in Figure 5, an existing group of four members is split into two groups, one of which, P 4 ), which leaves only three group members.
[0100] Prior to performing the method 500 of FIG. i(i=1,...,n-1) communicate with each other and group participants P n Cancel the share and unsubscribe from group U D This will inform the consensus to form the Unsubscribe Group U D Remote attestation may be used to ensure that all enclaves in a de-registration group are running an approved de-registration instruction set. More specifically, each member of the de-registration group verifies that other members of the de-registration group are running an approved de-registration instruction set.
[0101] In operation 502, each participant P i Unsubscribe Group U D More specifically, each participant P i Unsubscribe Group U D In the randomness polynomial f i 0 Prepare your enclave (a 0 =f i 0 (0)=0).
[0102] In operation 502, each enclave E i (i=1,...,n-1) is then the new random polynomial f i 0 For each point j in (j), j It then securely transmits to each of the enclaves (j=1,...,n-1). Each enclave authenticates the other enclaves via remote attestation.
[0103] In operation 504, each enclave E i (i=1,...,n-1) generate new secret shares. More specifically, each enclave E i Then, a new secret share s i ', all received points f j'(i)(j=1,...,n-1|j≠i) is the original secret share s i For example, a new secret share may be determined as follows:
[0104]
number
[0105] As an additional verification step, operation 308 of method 300 may be performed after operation 504 of method 500 to generate a group public key. The participants can then verify that the group public key has not changed from its previous value (i.e., the value before method 500 of FIG. 5 was performed).
[0106] In operation 504, the previous secret share is overwritten with the new secret share and the deregistered participant P n This effectively disables secret sharing in the enclave, and the member is now unregistered from the group.
[0107] Notably, the security of this scheme only relies on nt participants verifiably overwriting their stale key shares with new values during the de-registration method 500. Thus, a threshold number of enclaves, t+1, need to be compromised to affect security. Even if the de-registered participants were (hopefully) able to breach their own enclaves to recover their key shares, the shares are useless to a concerted attack as long as at least nt enclaves are operating correctly.
[0108] signature generation Secret shares held by members of the group may be used to allow a valid ECDSA signature to be generated for a transaction. More specifically, at least a threshold number of secret shares may be used to allow group participants to generate a valid signature. The signature may be applied to a transaction that uses a digital asset that was previously restricted by the group public key. That is, a valid signature removes any encumbrance previously placed on the resource. An ECDSA signature includes two components: a first component r and a second component w.
[0109] 6, an example method 600 for generating an ECDSA signature is shown. Method 600 may be performed by a node 102 in cooperation with other nodes 102 of a previously formed group. Members of the group (i.e., the nodes that cooperatively perform method 600) may be pre-determined using the techniques described above.
[0110] Prior to the method being executed, multiple participants (i.e., members) in a group can signal to other participants that they wish to participate in a distributed signature generation to authenticate a particular transaction Tx. That is, a node can indicate its willingness to participate in a distributed signature generation for transaction Tx. Transaction (Tx) is a transaction that will use an output that is restricted by the group public key. That is, the effect of the transaction will be to remove the restriction based on the group public key from the output. Transaction Tx may, for example, be proposed by one of the participants in the group.
[0111] A signing group is formed by a node in cooperation with other nodes once a threshold number of participants have signaled their willingness to join. In the illustrated example, the signing group includes three participants (i.e., three nodes). However, a signing group can include a different number of nodes.
[0112] In operation 602, the nodes forming the signing group determine a hash z for a transaction Tx. The hash is determined as: z=H(Tx), where H represents a hash function. The hash is determined by consensus of the signing group. For example, the hash may be proposed by one of the participants of the signing group, and other members may confirm a match with the hash.
[0113] In operation 604, the nodes forming the signing group calculate, based on the secure random number k: a) the inverse k of the secure random number -1 and b) obtain a first signature component r. The first signature component r is determined based on a secure random number k and an elliptic curve generation point G. More specifically, in operation 604, one of the participants, e.g., P 1 generates a secure random number k and calculates the inverse of this secure random number k -1 , and each enclave E 1 (which is associated with the participant node's trusted execution environment). The first signature component r may be determined as follows: r = (k × G) x mod p
[0114] In operation 604, the inverse k of this secure random number is -1 and the enclave E that computed the first signature component r 1 Let us consider these values (e.g., the inverse k of this secure random number). -1 and the first signing component r) to the enclave E associated with other participants in the signing group. 2 ,...,E t+1 The enclave that sends these values remotely authenticates their integrity and authenticates that they were generated using an approved instruction set. 2 ,...,E t+1 The enclave that generated these values is E 1,and verify the integrity of the values (e.g., by verifying that the instruction set used to generate these values is an approved,instruction set).
[0115] In operation 606, each node in the signing group generates a partial signature v based on the private secret share, the inverse of the secure random number, and the first signing component. i Determine the partial signature v i is generated in each node’s enclave. For example, the signing group’s enclave E i (i=1,...,t+1) computes the partial signature as follows: v i =k -1 rb i s i mod p where b i teeth:
number
[0116] Thus, determining the partial signature may involve performing Lagrangian interpolation.
[0117] In operation 606, each enclave E i (i=1,...,t+1) is a set of nodes (or more specifically, enclaves) that receive partial signatures from other nodes in the signing group, such that their partial signatures v i to other enclaves in the signing group.
[0118] In operation 608, each node (more specifically, each enclave) in the signing group may generate a second signature component w based on the partial signature determined and received in operation 606. For example, the second signature component may be determined as follows:
[0119]
number
[0120] In operation 608, each node in the signing group may send an ECDSA signature including the first signature component and the second signature component from its enclave to the host portion of the node (i.e., the portion of the node that is not the enclave), and the node may verify the signature against the transaction hash (z) and the group public key (A).
[0121] Any participant in the signing group can then add their signature to the corresponding transaction and broadcast it to the blockchain network.
[0122] The security of the signature scheme described above relies on the value of an ephemeral private key, a secure random number that is generated by one enclave and secretly distributed to other enclaves in the signing group, remaining hidden. If this value were to be retrieved by compromising just one of the enclaves, the shared private key could be determined from the transaction signature and used to sign an entirely different transaction. However, the impact is minimal, since a physical compromise of the enclave needs to occur within a very short time window (the confirmation time of a transaction in the blockchain).
[0123] It should be noted that the above-described embodiments are illustrative rather than limiting of the invention, and that those skilled in the art can design many alternative embodiments without departing from the scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims. In the claims, any reference signs placed in parentheses shall not be construed as limiting the scope of the claims. Words such as "comprises" and "comprises" do not exclude the presence of elements or steps other than those listed in any claim or the specification as a whole. In this specification, "comprises" means "comprises or consists of" and "has" means "comprises or consists of". The sole reference of an element does not exclude such elements and vice versa. The invention can be implemented by means of hardware comprising several distinct elements, and by means of a suitably programmed computer. In a device claim enumerating several means, several of these means may be embodied by one and the same item of hardware. The mere fact that certain items are recited in mutually different dependent claims does not indicate that a combination of these items cannot be used to advantage.
[0124] (Appendix 1) 1. A computer-implemented security method comprising generating an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm signature including a first signature component r and a second signature component w, said generating step comprising: forming a signing group with other nodes by the node; obtaining, by the node, a) an inverse of the secure random number and b) the first signature component r based on a secure random number, the first signature component being determined based on the secure random number and an elliptic curve generation point; determining, by the node, a partial signature based on a private secret share, the inverse of the secure random number, and the first signature component; receiving, by the node, partial signatures from other nodes in the signing group; and generating, by the node, the second signature component w based on the determined and received partial signature; A computer-implemented method comprising: (Appendix 2) 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the obtaining step includes generating the inverse and the first signature component, the method further including transmitting the inverse to the other node. (Appendix 3) 3. The computer-implemented method of claim 2, wherein the obtaining step includes preparing an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment of the node to generate the secure random number. (Appendix 4) 4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the obtaining step includes receiving the inverse and the first signature component from one of the other nodes. (Appendix 5) 5. The computer-implemented method of any one of claims 1-4, further comprising signaling an intent to participate in distributed signature generation prior to forming the signature group. (Appendix 6) 6. The computer-implemented method of any one of claims 1-5, wherein the partial signature is determined within an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment of the node. (Appendix 7) 7. The computer-implemented method of any one of claims 1-6, wherein the partial signature is determined by performing Lagrangian interpolation. (Appendix 8) 8. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the second signature component is generated within an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment, the method further comprising the step of transmitting the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm from the enclave to a host portion of the node after generating the second signature component. (Appendix 9) 9. The computer-implemented method of any one of claims 1-8, further comprising adding the signature to a transaction and broadcasting it to a blockchain network. (Appendix 10) 10. The computer-implemented method of any one of claims 1-9, further comprising, prior to forming the signature group, deriving the secret share based on secret share data received from a plurality of existing members of the group. (Appendix 11) 11. The computer-implemented method of claim 10, wherein the secret share is determined within an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment of the node. (Appendix 12) Said partial signature v i teeth: v i =k -1 rb i s i mod p is determined as b i is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, and k -1 is the inverse of the secure random number, and s i 12. The computer-implemented method of any one of claims 1-11, wherein x is the secret share, r is the first signature component, and p is a degree. (Appendix 13) A computer-readable storage medium comprising computer-executable instructions that, when executed, configure a processor to perform a method according to any one of claims 1-12. (Appendix 14) Interface devices; a processor coupled to the interface; a memory coupled to the processor; 13. An electronic device comprising: a memory storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed, configure the processor to perform a method according to any one of claims 1-12. (Appendix 15) 15. The electronic device of claim 14, wherein the processor includes a trusted execution environment, and the computer-executable instructions are executed within the trusted execution environment.
Claims
1. 1. A computer-implemented method performed by a processing resource for controlling access to the resource, the method comprising: generating an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm signature including a first signature component r and a second signature component w, the generating step comprising: forming a signing group with a plurality of other nodes by the node; obtaining, by the node, based on a secure random number, a) an inverse of the secure random number, and b) the first signature component r, the first signature component being determined based on the secure random number and an elliptic curve generation point; determining, by the node, a partial signature; receiving partial signatures from a plurality of other nodes in the signing group; generating the second signature component; utilizing said signature to control access to and / or transfer of resources over a computer network; The method includes:
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the partial signature is determined based on a private secret share, an inverse of the secure random number, and the first signature component.
3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second signature component w is generated based on a determined and received partial signature.
4. 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the obtaining step includes generating the reciprocal and the first signature component, the method further including transmitting the reciprocal to the plurality of other nodes.
5. 5. The computer-implemented method of claim 4, wherein the obtaining step comprises preparing an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment of the node to generate the secure random number.
6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the obtaining step includes receiving the reciprocal and the first signature component from one of the plurality of other nodes.
7. 10. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising signaling an intent to participate in distributed signature generation prior to forming the signature group.
8. 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the partial signature is determined within an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment of the node.
9. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the partial signature is determined by performing Lagrangian interpolation.
10. 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the second signature component is generated within an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment, the method further comprising transmitting the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm from the enclave to a host portion of the node after generating the second signature component.
11. 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising adding the signature to a transaction and broadcasting it to a blockchain network.
12. 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising, prior to forming the signature group, deriving the secret share based on secret share data received from a plurality of existing members of a group.
13. 13. The computer-implemented method of claim 12, wherein the secret share is determined within an enclave associated with a trusted execution environment of the node.
14. The partial signature v i teeth: v i = k -1 rb i s i mod p is determined as b i is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, k -1 is the inverse of the secure random number, and s i 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein: r is the secret share, r is the first signature component, and p is a degree.
15. 13. A computer-readable storage medium containing computer-executable instructions that, when executed, configure a processor to perform the method of claim 1.
16. interface devices; a processor coupled to the interface; a memory coupled to the processor; 13. An electronic device comprising: a memory storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed, configure the processor to perform the method of claim 1.
17. The electronic device of claim 16 , wherein the processor includes a trusted execution environment, and the computer-executable instructions are executed within the trusted execution environment.
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