Control device and control method
The fail-safe CPU with dual microcomputers and resynchronization flags addresses out-of-synchronization issues in dual-system devices, ensuring high availability and reliability in railway safety systems by preventing unnecessary shutdowns.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2023087140
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-26
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-06
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
Conventional dual-system devices face issues with unexpected out-of-synchronization abnormalities, leading to system shutdowns, which are undesirable in critical applications like railway safety due to socio-economic losses.
A fail-safe CPU with two microcomputers and an abnormality detection mechanism that shifts operations to an abnormality processing mode, enabling resynchronization flags to transfer processes to loop processing and return to main processing when synchronization is restored.
This approach avoids system shutdowns for minor synchronization errors, enhancing system availability and maintaining high safety and reliability in railway systems.
Smart Images

Figure 2024170137000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present invention relates to a safety device, such as a railway safety device, for safely controlling field equipment. [Background technology]
[0002] Among the control devices that control equipment, there are quite a few that are used for applications that require high safety and reliability, such as security devices. One example of such a control device is a dual-system or multiple-system control device (hereinafter collectively referred to as a "dual-system device") that has at least two or more processing systems with the same microcomputer circuits arranged in parallel, and causes each processing system to simultaneously execute the same arithmetic processing (for example, Patent Document 1). [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]
[0003] [Patent Document 1] JP 2018-106472 A Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]
[0004] Generally, in a dual-system device operating normally, the same processing is executed in all processing systems in a synchronized state, that is, at the same speed and timing, as described above. However, even in such a dual-system device operating normally, a deviation may suddenly occur between the processings executed in a synchronized state.
[0005] When such an abnormality (hereinafter referred to as "out-of-synchronization abnormality") occurs unexpectedly, conventional dual system devices are unable to resynchronize the processes being executed in the out-of-synchronization state and restore normal operation. For this reason, conventionally, when an out-of-synchronization abnormality occurs unexpectedly, it has been common to stop the process being executed in the dual system device or to stop the operation of the dual system device itself, out of consideration for the safety and reliability of the entire system including the dual system device. Furthermore, conventionally, in such cases, the state of the dual system device has been restored so that the dual system device can operate normally again by a method such as manually operating the dual system device to turn on the power again or remotely resetting the operation of the dual system device.
[0006] However, in the case of dual-system devices such as railway safety devices, the frequent stopping of which can cause significant socio-economic losses and disadvantages, it is not desirable to cancel ongoing processing or to stop the operation of the dual-system device itself every time a synchronization error occurs.
[0007] The present invention has been made in consideration of the above problems, and aims to provide a technique that can avoid stopping the system related to the dual-system device and improve the operating rate of the system when the cause of the synchronization deviation anomaly is minor. [Means for solving the problem]
[0008] The control device according to the present invention is a device consisting of a fail-safe CPU equipped with two or more microcontrollers, and is characterized in having an anomaly detection unit that detects a synchronization error occurring between the operations of the two or more microcontrollers, and a processing unit that, when the anomaly detection unit detects a synchronization error, transitions the operation of each of the two or more microcontrollers to an abnormality processing mode, and in the abnormality processing mode, enables a resynchronization flag for eliminating the synchronization error, and if the resynchronization flag is enabled, transitions the processing executed by each of the two or more microcontrollers to a loop processing, and when synchronization is again established between the operations of the two or more microcontrollers within the loop processing, returns the processing executed by each of the two or more microcontrollers to main processing.
[0009] Other problems and solutions disclosed in the present application will be made clear in the section of the description of the invention and the drawings. Effect of the Invention
[0010] According to the present invention, when the cause of the out-of-synchronization abnormality is minor, it is possible to avoid stopping the system related to the dual system device, thereby improving the availability of the system. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0011] [Figure 1] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a hardware configuration of a control device according to an embodiment. [Diagram 2] FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example of a flow from when a control device according to a conventional technique detects a synchronization error to when the control device stops the system. [Diagram 3] FIG. 11 is a sequence diagram showing a mechanism by which a synchronization error occurs. [Figure 4] 10 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the flow of a synchronization process and a comparison process executed by a control device according to an embodiment when a synchronization error occurs; FIG. [Diagram 5] 11 is a diagram illustrating an example of a flow in which the control device according to the embodiment recovers from a synchronization error abnormality and resumes normal operation. FIG. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0012] In the following description, "I / O" may refer to one or more I / O (Input / Output) interface devices. The one or more I / O (Input / Output) interface devices may be interface devices to at least one of the I / O device and a remote display computer. The I / O interface device to the display computer may be one or more communication interface devices. The at least one I / O device may be a user interface device, e.g., either an input device such as a keyboard and pointing device, or an output device such as a display device.
[0013] In the following description, a "communication interface device" may be one or more communication interface devices. The one or more communication interface devices may be one or more homogeneous communication interface devices (e.g., one or more NICs (Network Interface Cards)) or two or more heterogeneous communication interface devices (e.g., a NIC and an HBA (Host Bus Adapter)).
[0014] That is, in the following description, an "interface apparatus" may be one or more interface devices, which may be at least one of one or more I / O (Input / Output) interface devices and one or more communication interface devices.
[0015] In the following description, a "memory" refers to one or more memory devices, which are an example of one or more storage devices, and may typically be a primary storage device. At least one memory device in the memory may be a volatile memory device or a non-volatile memory device.
[0016] In the following description, a "persistent storage device" may be one or more persistent storage devices, which are an example of one or more persistent storage devices. A persistent storage device may typically be a non-volatile storage device (e.g., an auxiliary storage device), and more specifically, may be, for example, a hard disk drive (HDD), a solid state drive (SSD), a non-volatile memory express (NVME) drive, or a storage class memory (SCM).
[0017] Also, in the following description, "storage device" may be at least memory, including memory and persistent storage device.
[0018] In the following description, a "microcomputer" may be one or more processor devices, or a microcontroller (Micro Controller Unit; MCU) including one or more processor devices. The at least one processor device may typically be a microprocessor device such as a CPU (Central Processing Unit), but may also be another type of processor device such as a GPU (Graphics Processing Unit). The at least one processor device may be a single-core or multi-core. The at least one processor device may be a processor core. The at least one processor device may also be a broader processor device such as a circuit that is a collection of gate arrays written in a hardware description language that performs part or all of the processing (e.g., a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), a Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD), or an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)).
[0019] In the following description, functions may be described using the expression "yyy unit", but the functions may be realized by one or more computer programs being executed by a processor, or by one or more hardware circuits (e.g., FPGA or ASIC), or by a combination thereof. When a function is realized by a program being executed by a processor, the function may be at least a part of the processor, since the specified processing is performed using a storage device and / or an interface device, etc., as appropriate. Processing described with a function as the subject may be processing performed by a processor or a device having the processor. A program may be installed from a program source. The program source may be, for example, a program distribution computer or a computer-readable recording medium (e.g., a non-transitory recording medium). The description of each function is an example, and multiple functions may be combined into one function, or one function may be divided into multiple functions.
[0020] In the following description, a process may be described with a "program" as the subject, but the process described with a program as the subject may be a process performed by a processor or a device having the processor. Two or more programs may be realized as one program, and one program may be realized as two or more programs.
[0021] Hereinafter, the present embodiment will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.
[0022] In the following description, the same or similar components will be denoted by common reference symbols, and redundant description may be omitted.
[0023] In addition, when there are multiple elements having the same or similar functions, the multiple elements may be described by using the same reference numerals with different subscripts in order to distinguish between them. On the other hand, when there is no need to distinguish between the multiple elements, the subscripts may be omitted.
[0024] (Configuration example of control device 100) First, a configuration example of a control device 100 according to this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 1. Fig. 1 is a diagram showing an example of a hardware configuration of the control device 100.
[0025] The control device 100 of this embodiment is an electronic interlocking device that controls the operation of various ground devices (hereinafter also referred to as "railway ground devices") that make up a railway system, such as signal lights and points, and is realized by a computer device and / or a control board having the various configurations described below.
[0026] As shown in FIG. 1, the control device 100 is a fail-safe CPU that includes two systems of microcomputer circuits, an A-system circuit 5a and a B-system circuit 5b, each having the same circuit configuration.
[0027] In electronic interlocking devices that control signal lights and points, a failure of the device can lead to a serious accident. Therefore, a fail-safe configuration that controls the entire device safely even if the device fails is essential. Here, "fail-safe" means that a failure of a part or the like does not result in dangerous control that could lead to a serious accident. In order to prevent dangerous control, a circuit that reliably detects failures is added to provide a configuration that provides safe control. A commonly used configuration is a method in which the same circuit or part is configured as a multiple system, and when an abnormality occurs in a circuit or part of one system, the failure is detected by the difference with another system. One of the most representative fail-safe configurations is a fail-safe CPU that has a redundant configuration with two microcomputers (1a, 1b), as shown in the control device 100 in Figure 1. In other words, this fail-safe CPU has two microcontrollers (1a, 1b) that operate at the same frequency, with the same program, and at the same steps, and a comparator 11 constantly monitors the operation of these two microcontrollers (1a, 1b) to detect whether an abnormality has occurred in one of the microcontrollers (1a or 1b).
[0028] Most general microcomputer circuits have various interfaces, such as memory used as a program storage area and work area for saving programs and performing calculations, and I / O for data input and output, such as for communicating with the outside. In a fail-safe CPU such as the control device 100, there are two systems of this configuration, and on the premise that these two systems of microcomputer circuits (5a, 5b) operate at the same frequency, with the same program, and at the same steps, the address signals, data signals, and control signals input and output by each microcomputer (1a, 1b) are compared in certain time units, and if a different state is detected, one of them is judged to be faulty and an abnormal operation is reported as a comparison mismatch.
[0029] The above content will be specifically described with reference to Fig. 1. Fig. 1 is a diagram showing an example of the hardware configuration of a control device 100 that is a fail-safe CPU. Note that Fig. 1 is a diagram that focuses on parts necessary for explanation, and therefore unnecessary parts are omitted from the illustration.
[0030] As described above, the control device 100 is a fail-safe CPU, and therefore includes two systems of microcomputer circuits having the same circuit configuration, that is, the A system circuit 5a and the B system circuit 5b, as shown in FIG.
[0031] Among these, the A-system microcomputer 1a is connected to the A-system memory 2a and the A-system I / O 3a via the A-system microcomputer bus 4a. Similarly, the B-system microcomputer 1b is connected to the B-system memory 2b and the B-system I / O 3b via the B-system microcomputer bus 4b.
[0032] The A-system memory 2a outputs an A-system status signal 21a that reports its own status. Similarly, the B-system memory 2b outputs a B-system status signal 21b that reports its own status.
[0033] The A-system I / O 3a outputs an A-system interrupt signal 23a for reporting an I / O control state. Similarly, the B-system I / O 3b outputs a B-system interrupt signal 23b for reporting an I / O control state.
[0034] In a fail-safe CPU such as the control device 100, the A-system microcomputer bus 4a and the B-system microcomputer bus 4b are each connected to a comparator 11. This comparator 11 constantly monitors the state of each microcomputer bus (4a, 4b) on the premise that the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b operate at the same frequency, with the same program, and in the same steps, and detects any abnormality in the operation of the two systems of microcomputer circuits (5a, 5b).
[0035] The microcomputer buses (4a, 4b) are transmission paths for address signals, data signals, and control signals. Therefore, the comparator 11 constantly monitors the state of each microcomputer bus (4a, 4b) and compares the voltage levels of these signals at predetermined time intervals. If the comparator 11 detects a difference in state in even one bus, it determines that either the A-system circuit 5a or the B-system circuit 5b has failed, and reports the abnormal operation.
[0036] (Overview of out-of-sync anomalies) In a fail-safe CPU, one of the main types of factors that are detected as an abnormality by the comparator 11 (hereinafter, referred to as "anomaly detection factors") is the aforementioned out-of-synchronization abnormality.
[0037] As mentioned above, this synchronization error occurs when the two systems of microcontrollers (1a, 1b) operate at the same steps and maintain a synchronized state during normal operation, but for some reason, each microcontroller (1a or 1b) executes different processes, causing the two systems of microcontrollers (1a, 1b) to operate at different steps.
[0038] Another type of anomaly detection factor is called a comparison mismatch anomaly. This comparison mismatch anomaly is an anomaly that is detected when the voltage levels of the address signal, data signal, and control signal are not the same due to component variations, and occurs when the devices are operating in the same step (synchronized state). This comparison mismatch anomaly is a different type of anomaly detection factor from the synchronization deviation anomaly targeted by the control device 100 of this embodiment, so a description of this comparison mismatch anomaly will be omitted here.
[0039] When the comparator 11 detects an abnormality detection factor such as a synchronization error or a comparison mismatch, it reports this as an abnormal operation.
[0040] Specifically, when a synchronization error occurs, the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b, which had been operating at the same step, start operating at different steps, so that the voltage levels of the address signals, data signals, and control signals of the aforementioned microcomputer buses (4a, 4b) all become different when compared at the same time. When such a state occurs, the comparator 11 reports an abnormal operation as a synchronization error.
[0041] (Causes of out-of-sync errors) Here, the causes of the above-mentioned out-of-synchronization anomaly will be described. Note that since the causes differ depending on the system configuration, etc., the following two examples will be described with reference to FIG.
[0042] In the following description of these two examples, the A-system circuit 5a is used as the subject, and the B-system circuit 5b is not mentioned as appropriate. However, it goes without saying that the following description of the A-system circuit 5a also applies to the B-system circuit 5b in the same manner.
[0043] First, an example of the interrupt signals (23a, 23b) input to each of the two microcomputers (1a, 1b) will be described with a focus on the A-system interrupt signal 23a.
[0044] The A-system I / O 3a uses the A-system interrupt signal 23a to report to the A-system microcomputer 1a that some event has occurred in the I / O control. In general, when an interrupt signal is input to a microcomputer, it branches to an interrupt processing program. In the case of the microcomputers (1a, 1b) in a dual-system device, the respective interrupt signals (23a, 23b) must be input to the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b at the same time. If they are not input at the same time, the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b cannot ensure the same step. The A-system interrupt signal 23a output from the A-system I / O 3a may also vary in time due to the manufacturing process of the parts, individual variations, aging, etc. This causes a difference in the input timing of the A-system interrupt signal 23a and the B-system interrupt signal 23b, which causes a synchronization error between the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b.
[0045] Secondly, an example of the status signals (21a, 21b) input to each of the two microcomputers (1a, 1b) will be described with a focus on the A-system status signal 21a.
[0046] When the A-system microcomputer 1a writes or reads data to or from the A-system memory 2a, the A-system memory 2a outputs an A-system status signal 21a indicating the state of the A-system memory 2a itself. This A-system status signal 21a is a status signal indicating whether the A-system memory 2a is in an accessible state or an inaccessible state depending on the internal state of the A-system memory 2a when the A-system microcomputer 1a writes or reads data. If this A-system status signal 21a indicates that the A-system memory 2a is in an inaccessible state, the process can be made to wait or branch until the A-system memory 2a becomes accessible. The time required for this also varies depending on the manufacturing process, individual variations, aging, etc. Therefore, if this state accumulates, it can cause a synchronization error.
[0047] These two factors that cause out-of-synchronization anomalies are both due to variations in the components constituting the microcontroller circuits (5a, 5b) that occur during the manufacturing process, or due to deterioration of the components over time. Such causes such as variations in the components constituting the microcontroller circuits (5a, 5b) and deterioration over time are clearly different from physical failures of the components in terms of the need for repairs involving part replacement. However, in conventional fail-safe CPUs, out-of-synchronization anomalies caused by minor malfunctions of the components constituting the microcontroller circuits (5a, 5b), which are not physical failures of the components, are treated in the same way as out-of-synchronization anomalies caused by physical failures of the components, without distinguishing between them. When an out-of-synchronization anomaly occurs, the system is stopped without distinguishing the underlying cause.
[0048] That is, as described above, in a fail-safe CPU, the two microcomputers (1a, 1b) operate in the same step while maintaining a synchronous state during normal operation, but when a synchronization error occurs, they may operate differently. If this synchronization error is due to a transient failure caused by the variation of the components of the microcomputer circuits (5a, 5b), the difference in processing between the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b may be one bus cycle or more, depending on the variation of the components. Furthermore, if the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b perform completely different processing due to interrupt processing, the synchronization error may become even greater. In this way, even if the components of the microcomputer circuits (5a, 5b) are not physically broken, a synchronization error may occur, which has been a problem for some time.
[0049] In particular, when a synchronization error occurs, it is extremely difficult to resynchronize the operations of the two microcomputers (1a, 1b). Therefore, in conventional fail-safe CPUs, when a synchronization error occurs, the system operation has been stopped as described above. For these reasons, no means for avoiding the system operation being stopped when a synchronization error occurs has been found.
[0050] (Prior Art Processing) Next, with reference to FIG. 2, a flow of operations performed by a fail-safe CPU according to the conventional technology from detection of a synchronization error to system shutdown will be described.
[0051] 2 illustrates an example of a process executed by a fail-safe CPU according to the conventional technology when a synchronization error occurs due to the above-mentioned mechanism, and the process executed by the control device 100 according to the present embodiment is significantly different from the process executed by the control device 100 according to the present embodiment in terms of the content of the process executed when a synchronization error occurs, although the mechanism by which a synchronization error occurs is the same. The process executed by the control device 100 according to the present embodiment will be described later in relation to FIG. 5.
[0052] If the main processing 41a of the A-system microcomputer 1a and the main processing 41b of the B-system microcomputer 1b are both operating normally, they will follow the same steps. Therefore, when viewed from the contents of FIG. 2, the processing positions of the main processing 41a of the A-system microcomputer 1a and the main processing 41b of the B-system microcomputer 1b are kept horizontal on the left and right.
[0053] When a synchronization error occurs, the main processing 41a of the A-system microcomputer 1a and the main processing 41b of the B-system microcomputer 1b are not horizontally aligned, but one of the processes advances ahead, resulting in an unlevel state, as shown in Fig. 2. In the example shown in Fig. 2, the main processing 41a of the A-system microcomputer 1a is ahead.
[0054] Furthermore, the timing for detecting a synchronization error is not when a difference occurs between the progress of processing between the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b. The synchronization error is detected when a comparison process is executed between the operation of the A-system microcomputer 1a and the operation of the B-system microcomputer 1b. This comparison process is executed in the control device 100 of this embodiment in the same way as in the fail-safe CPU of the prior art. Details of the comparison process will be described later with reference to FIG. 3.
[0055] In addition, as will be described later in detail, in the control device 100 of this embodiment, a synchronization process is also performed between the A system microcomputer 1a and the B system microcomputer 1b at this timing, and after synchronization is achieved, data comparison is performed. The details of this synchronization process will be described later with reference to FIG.
[0056] In the fail-safe CPU according to the prior art, when a synchronization error is detected in this state as shown in Fig. 2, the comparator 11 simultaneously issues an A-system error interrupt 25a and a B-system error interrupt 25b to the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b, respectively, and executes an A-system error process 42a and a B-system error process 42b. After the error process, an A-system permanent loop 33a and a B-system permanent loop 33b are executed within each error process, and the system will not return while the power is on.
[0057] (Comparison and synchronization processes) Here, the comparison process and synchronization process executed in the control device 100 of this embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS.
[0058] Fig. 3 is a sequence diagram showing a mechanism by which a synchronization error occurs. Fig. 3 shows a state in which a synchronization error occurs when a comparison process is performed.
[0059] Fig. 4 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the flow of the synchronization process and the comparison process executed by the control device 100 according to the present embodiment when a synchronization error occurs. Fig. 4 shows an operation of adjusting the synchronization error occurring in Fig. 3 by the synchronization process.
[0060] As mentioned above, in the control device 100, which is a fail-safe CPU, the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b execute processing with the same clock, the same program, and the same step. At this time, before inputting and outputting important data (22a, 22b), the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b compare the data, and if they are the same, they are judged to be normal, and if they are different, they are judged to be abnormal. This ensures that the data is not erroneous.
[0061] Specifically, when performing the comparison process, a certain comparison target area (A-system memory 2a and B-system memory 2b in Figs. 3 and 4) is provided, and important data input / output (22a, 22b) from the control device 100, which is a fail-safe CPU, is accessed from that area to perform data comparison. The comparison of data performed during this process is the comparison process. This operation corresponds to the operations shown as comparison process 1, comparison process 2, and comparison process 4 of the A-system microcomputer 1a and B-system microcomputer 1b in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively.
[0062] The comparison process is based on the premise that the A-system microcontroller 1a and the B-system microcontroller 1b are synchronized, and is executed when each microcontroller accesses it. Therefore, if the A-system microcontroller 1a and the B-system microcontroller 1b are out of sync, comparison is not possible. If they are out of sync when the comparison process is executed, a process is executed to bring them into sync before the comparison. This is the synchronization process. This operation corresponds to the operation shown in comparison process 3 for the A-system microcontroller 1a and the B-system microcontroller 1b in Figures 3 and 4.
[0063] To explain the synchronization process, let us take as an example a state in which the A-system microcomputer 1a is several cycles ahead in its processing (while the B-system microcomputer 1b is several cycles behind). If comparison processing were to be performed at this time, the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b would be out of sync by several cycles and would therefore not be able to be compared. For this reason, WAIT control is performed to make the A-system microcomputer 1a, whose processing is ahead, go into "WAIT (stop operation)". This WAIT control is performed by a comparator 11, which monitors the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b. By making the A-system microcomputer 1a wait, the processing of the A-system microcomputer 1a is stopped and the B-system microcomputer 1b is allowed to proceed to the same processing as the A-system microcomputer 1a. When the processing of the B-system microcomputer 1b has reached the processing of the A-system microcomputer 1a, the WAIT control to the A-system microcomputer 1a is released and processing continues.
[0064] The comparison process and synchronization process executed by the control device 100 according to this embodiment have been described above.
[0065] If the out-of-sync state is only a small deviation of about a few cycles, it is possible to achieve synchronization by performing synchronization processing. Furthermore, by performing periodic synchronization processing, synchronization can be achieved while the deviation is still small, on the order of a few cycles, and the degree of the out-of-sync state can be minimized before the deviation becomes large. However, since periodic synchronization is a process that is performed when the overall processing load is light and there is ample room, re-synchronization processing is not performed when the processing load is heavy. In this case, the out-of-sync state of about a few cycles accumulates and becomes a large out-of-sync state, and when a comparison process is performed between the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b, a synchronization deviation so large that synchronization processing is not possible occurs.
[0066] (Processing in the control device 100) An example of a process executed by the control device 100 according to this embodiment when a synchronization error occurs will be described with reference to FIG. 1 and FIG.
[0067] FIG. 1 shows an example of a hardware configuration of the control device 100 according to the present embodiment, and details are as described above, so a description thereof will be omitted here.
[0068] FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an example of a flow in which the control device 100 according to this embodiment recovers from a synchronization loss abnormality and resumes normal operation.
[0069] In the case shown in FIG. 5, it is assumed that an abnormality in synchronization has occurred between the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b, causing the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b to be unable to synchronize with each other.
[0070] The A-system main processing 31a of the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system main processing 31b of the B-system microcomputer 1b are out of sync and a lag has occurred to the extent that synchronization cannot be achieved after the comparison process is executed. As a result, an A-system abnormality interrupt 25a and a B-system abnormality interrupt 25b are issued by the comparator 11 to the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system microcomputer 1b, respectively, and the processes branch to the A-system abnormality processing 32a and the B-system abnormality processing 32b, respectively.
[0071] As described above, in a fail-safe CPU according to the prior art, after abnormality processing is executed, the CPU enters a permanent loop in the abnormality processing and does not return as long as power is applied.
[0072] In contrast, in the present invention, an A-system resynchronization flag 43a is provided in the A-system abnormality processing 42a, and a B-system resynchronization flag 43b is provided in the B-system abnormality processing 42b, and when a synchronization deviation abnormality causes branching to the A-system abnormality processing 42a and the B-system abnormality processing 42b, the A-system resynchronization flag 43a and the B-system resynchronization flag 43b are enabled, and the processing of each system is returned to the A-system main processing 41a and the B-system main processing 41b, respectively.
[0073] In the returned A-system main processing 41a and B-system main processing 41b, an A-system synchronization flag checkpoint 44a that checks the A-system resynchronization flag 43a and a B-system synchronization flag checkpoint 44b that checks the B-system resynchronization flag 43b are provided, and if the A-system resynchronization flag 43a and the B-system resynchronization flag 43b are valid at the A-system synchronization flag checkpoint 44a and the B-system synchronization flag checkpoint 44b, respectively, a branch is made to an A-system loop processing 46a in the A-system main processing 41a and a B-system loop processing 46b in the B-system main processing 41b.
[0074] In the A-system loop processing 46a and the B-system loop processing 46b, the A-system abnormality interrupt 25a and the B-system abnormality interrupt 25b are masked and the synchronization processing is executed many times to wait for synchronization to be achieved. Note that in the control device 100 of this embodiment, a hard register is used to check whether the processing of the two systems is synchronized.
[0075] When the delayed system catches up with the advanced system, the two systems can be synchronized and can return by A-system main processing return 47a and B-system main processing return 47b. At this time, the A-system main processing 41a of the A-system microcomputer 1a and the B-system main processing 41b of the B-system microcomputer 1b are synchronized, and it becomes possible to return to online operation.
[0076] In the above description of this embodiment, the control device 100 is assumed to be a dual-system device equipped with two microcomputers (1a, 1b), but the control device may be a multiple-system fail-safe CPU, and the specific degree of redundancy may be changed as appropriate. For example, the control device that executes the various processes described above may be a triple-system fail-safe CPU, or a quadruple or higher system fail-safe CPU. Increasing the redundancy of the control device, which is a railway safety device, can further increase the safety and reliability of the railway system.
[0077] The above-described embodiment of the present invention can be summarized as follows.
[0078] (1) The control device 100 is a device including a fail-safe CPU having two or more microcomputers (1a, 1b), and includes an abnormality detection unit that detects a synchronization error occurring between the operations of the two or more microcomputers (1a, 1b), and when the abnormality detection unit detects a synchronization error, the control device 100 shifts the operation of each of the two or more microcomputers (1a, 1b) to an abnormality processing mode (42a, 42b), respectively, and in the abnormality processing mode (42a, 42b), sets a resynchronization flag (43a, The control device 100 is characterized by having a processing unit that performs processing for returning the processing performed by each of the two or more microcomputers (1a, 1b) to the main processing (41a, 41b) when the resynchronization flag (43a, 43b) is enabled and the processing unit that performs processing for returning the processing performed by each of the two or more microcomputers (1a, 1b) to the main processing (41a, 41b) when the synchronization between the operations of the two or more microcomputers (1a, 1b) is established again in the loop processing (46a, 46b). The control device 100 is a multiplexed device, and can improve the safety and reliability of the system that is the control target. In addition, since the control device 100 is configured in this way, when the cause of the occurrence of the synchronization deviation abnormality is minor, the control device 100 can avoid stopping the system that is the control target of the control device 100 and improve the operation rate of the system. As a result, the system can achieve both high safety and reliability and high operation rate.
[0079] (2) The control device 100 is a dual-system device equipped with two microcomputers (1a, 1b). As a result, the control device 100 can achieve high safety and reliability for the system that is the control target of the control device 100, while making the physical size of the control device 100 compact. As a result, the control device 100 can be installed in various locations, and the manufacturing cost of the control device 100 can be reduced.
[0080] (3) The control device 100 is an electronic interlocking device for railway safety that controls the operation of ground equipment in a railway system. As a result, when the cause of the synchronization deviation abnormality is minor, the control device 100 can avoid stopping the ground equipment in the railway system that is the target of control by the control device 100, thereby improving the availability of the railway system. As a result, the railway system can achieve both high safety and reliability and high availability.
[0081] (4) The ground device is a signal light. In this manner, when the cause of the out-of-synchronization abnormality is minor, the control device 100 can avoid stopping the signal lights in the railway system that are the object of control of the control device 100, thereby improving the availability of the railway system. As a result, the railway system can achieve both high safety and reliability and high availability.
[0082] (5) The ground equipment is a point machine. As a result, when the cause of the out-of-synchronization anomaly is minor, the control device 100 can avoid stopping the point machine in the railway system that is the control target of the control device 100, thereby improving the availability of the railway system. As a result, the railway system can achieve both high safety and reliability and high availability.
[0083] The present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiment, and can be implemented using any components without departing from the spirit of the present invention.
[0084] The above-mentioned embodiments, examples, and modifications are merely examples, and the present invention is not limited to these contents as long as the characteristics of the invention are not impaired. In addition, although various embodiments, examples, and modifications have been described above, the present invention is not limited to these contents. Other aspects that are conceivable within the scope of the technical idea of the present invention are also included in the scope of the present invention.
[0085] In the above figures, the control lines and information lines are shown as those considered necessary for the explanation, and do not necessarily show all the control lines and information lines in the actual implementation. For example, it may be considered that almost all the components are actually connected to each other.
[0086] The above-described layout of the functional units of the control device 100 is merely an example. The layout of the functional units may be changed to an optimal layout in terms of the performance, processing efficiency, communication efficiency, and the like of the hardware and software included in the control device 100. [Explanation of symbols]
[0087] 100: Control device (fail-safe CPU) 1a A-series microcontroller 1b B series microcontroller 2a A-series memory 2b B-series memory 3a A-series I / O 3b B-series I / O 4a A-series microcomputer bus 4b B series microcomputer bus 5a A system circuit 5b B system circuit 21a A-series status 21b B-type status 22a A system input / output 22b B system input / output 11 Comparator 23a A-system interrupt signal 23b B-system interrupt signal 24a A-weight 24b B weight 25a A system abnormal interrupt 25b B system abnormal interrupt 31a, 41a A system main processing 31b, 41b B system main processing 32a, 42a A system abnormality processing 32b, 42b B system abnormality processing 33a A series eternal loop 33b B-Series Perpetual Loop 46a A-system loop processing 46b B series loop processing 45a A-system loop processing branch 45b B series loop processing branch 44a A-system resynchronization flag checkpoint 44b B series resynchronization flag checkpoint 47a A-series main processing return 47b B-series main processing return 43a A-system resynchronization flag 43b B system resynchronization flag
Claims
1. A control device comprising a fail-safe CPU having two or more microcomputers, an anomaly detection unit that detects an anomaly caused by a loss of synchronization between operations of the two or more microcomputers; When the abnormality detection unit detects the synchronization error, shifting the operation of each of the two or more microcomputers to an abnormality processing mode; In the abnormality processing mode, a resynchronization flag for eliminating the out-of-synchronization abnormality is enabled; if the resynchronization flag is valid, the process executed by each of the two or more microcomputers is shifted to a loop process; When the synchronization between the operations of the two or more microcomputers is established again within the loop processing, the processing executed by each of the two or more microcomputers is returned to the main processing. A processing unit that performs processing; A control device comprising:
2. The control device according to claim 1 , wherein the control device is a dual system device having two microcomputers.
3. The control device according to claim 1 , wherein the control device is an electronic interlocking device for railway safety that controls the operation of ground equipment in a railway system.
4. The control device according to claim 3 , wherein the ground device is a signal light.
5. The control device according to claim 3 , wherein the ground equipment is a point machine.
6. A control method using a fail-safe CPU having two or more microcomputers, The fail-safe CPU includes: an anomaly detection unit that detects an anomaly caused by a loss of synchronization between operations of the two or more microcomputers; When the abnormality detection unit detects the synchronization error, shifting the operation of each of the two or more microcomputers to an abnormality processing mode; In the abnormality processing mode, a resynchronization flag for eliminating the out-of-synchronization abnormality is enabled; if the resynchronization flag is valid, the process executed by each of the two or more microcomputers is shifted to a loop process; When the synchronization between the operations of the two or more microcomputers is established again within the loop processing, the processing executed by each of the two or more microcomputers is returned to the main processing. A processing unit that performs processing; A control method comprising the steps of:
Citation Information
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Control device
JP2018106472A
