Apparatus and method for performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in communication system

Abstract

The present disclosure relates to an apparatus and a method for performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in a communication system. This operating method of a user equipment (UE) may comprise the steps of: synchronizing with a base station; receiving system information from the base station; performing a random access procedure with the base station; receiving control information from the base station; transmitting at least one first message for authentication to the base station; and receiving at least one second message for authentication from the base station. Here, the at least one first message can include message streams encoded by repeatedly using a pre-shared key, and the at least one second message can include measurement bases used in the base station and at least one message stream decoded in the base station.

Description

Device and method for performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in a communication system The following description relates to a communication system that supports quantum communication, and to a device and method for performing quantum authentication (QA) and quantum key distribution (QKD). Wireless access systems are widely deployed to provide various types of communication services, such as voice and data. Typically, wireless access systems are multiple access systems that support communications with multiple users by sharing available system resources (e.g., bandwidth, transmission power). Examples of multiple access systems include code division multiple access (CDMA), frequency division multiple access (FDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA), orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA), and single-carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA). In particular, as numerous communication devices demand greater communication capacity, enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) communication technologies are being proposed, improving upon existing radio access technology (RAT). Furthermore, massive machine type communications (mMTC), which connects multiple devices and objects to provide diverse services anytime and anywhere, as well as communication systems that consider reliability and latency-sensitive services / user equipment (UE), are being proposed. Various technological configurations are being proposed for these solutions. The present disclosure may provide a device and method for performing quantum authentication (QA) and quantum key distribution (QKD) based on a pre-shared key in a communication system. The present disclosure may provide a device and method for simultaneously performing user authentication and quantum key distribution through a quantum channel based on a pre-shared key in a communication system. The present disclosure may provide a device and method for enhancing security based on the correlation between user authentication and quantum key distribution in a communication system. The present disclosure may provide a device and method for generating and transmitting quantum state streams by repeatedly using a pre-shared key in a communication system. The present disclosure may provide an apparatus and method for decoding quantum state streams using a first measurement basis based on a pre-shared key and a randomly selected second measurement basis in a communication system. The present disclosure may provide a device and method for performing user authentication based on at least one message stream obtained by pre-shared key-based decoding and a randomly selected second measurement basis in a communication system. The present disclosure may provide a device and method for performing mutual authentication using at least one message stream obtained based on a pre-shared key as an authentication code in a communication system. The present disclosure can provide a device and method for generating a symmetric key to be used for quantum communication through key shifting at each of a transmitting side and a receiving side in a communication system. The present disclosure can provide a device and method for preventing information on a basis selected identically at a transmitting side and a receiving side from being leaked during quantum key distribution in a communication system. The present disclosure may provide a device and method for performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution using a quantum channel and a classical channel in a communication system. The present disclosure can provide a device and method for controlling the length of a symmetric key by controlling the probability of using the same base in a communication system. The technical objectives to be achieved in the present disclosure are not limited to those mentioned above, and other technical tasks not mentioned can be considered by a person having ordinary skill in the technical field to which the technical configuration of the present disclosure is applied from the embodiments of the present disclosure described below. As an example of the present disclosure, a method of operating a terminal in a wireless communication system may include the steps of receiving at least one synchronization signal from a base station, receiving system information from the base station, performing a random access procedure for the base station, receiving control information from the base station, transmitting at least one first message for authentication to the base station, and receiving at least one second message for authentication from the base station. The at least one first message may include message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, and the at least one second message may include measurement basis(s) used by the base station and at least one message stream decoded by the base station. As an example of the present disclosure, a method of operating a base station in a wireless communication system may include the steps of transmitting at least one synchronization signal, transmitting system information, performing a random access procedure with a terminal, transmitting control information to the terminal, receiving at least one first message for authentication from the terminal, and transmitting at least one second message for authentication to the terminal. In this case, the at least one first message may include message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, and the at least one second message may include measurement basis(s) used by the base station and at least one message stream decoded by the base station. As an example of the present disclosure, in a wireless communication system, a terminal includes a transceiver and a processor connected to the transceiver, wherein the processor is configured to receive at least one synchronization signal from a base station, receive system information from the base station, perform a random access procedure for the base station, receive control information from the base station, transmit at least one first message for authentication to the base station, and receive at least one second message for authentication from the base station. The at least one first message may include message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, and the at least one second message may include measurement basis(s) used by the base station and at least one message stream decoded by the base station. As an example of the present disclosure, in a wireless communication system, a base station includes a transceiver and a processor connected to the transceiver, wherein the processor controls to transmit at least one synchronization signal, to transmit system information, to perform a random access procedure with a terminal, to transmit control information to the terminal, to receive at least one first message for authentication from the terminal, and to transmit at least one second message for authentication to the terminal, wherein the at least one first message includes message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, and the at least one second message includes measurement basis(s) used by the base station and at least one message stream decoded by the base station. As an example of the present disclosure, a communication device includes at least one processor, and at least one computer memory coupled to the at least one processor and storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, direct operations, wherein the operations may include the steps of the communication device receiving at least one synchronization signal from a base station, receiving system information from the base station, performing a random access procedure for the base station, receiving control information from the base station, transmitting at least one first message for authentication to the base station, and receiving at least one second message for authentication from the base station, wherein the at least one first message includes message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, and the at least one second message includes measurement basis(s) used by the base station and at least one message stream decoded by the base station. As an example of the present disclosure, a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing at least one instruction includes at least one instruction executable by a processor, the at least one instruction controlling a device to receive at least one synchronization signal from a base station, receive system information from the base station, perform a random access procedure for the base station, receive control information from the base station, transmit at least one first message for authentication to the base station, and receive at least one second message for authentication from the base station, wherein the at least one first message includes message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, and the at least one second message includes measurement basis(s) used by the base station and at least one message stream decoded by the base station. The above-described aspects of the present disclosure are only some of the preferred embodiments of the present disclosure, and various embodiments reflecting the technical features of the present disclosure can be derived and understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art based on the detailed description of the present disclosure to be described below. The following effects may be achieved by embodiments based on the present disclosure. According to the present disclosure, the security of quantum communication can be improved. The effects that can be obtained from the embodiments of the present disclosure are not limited to the effects mentioned above, and other effects not mentioned can be clearly derived and understood by those skilled in the art to which the technical configuration of the present disclosure is applied, from the description of the embodiments of the present disclosure below. In other words, unintended effects resulting from implementing the configuration described in the present disclosure can also be derived from the embodiments of the present disclosure by those skilled in the art. The accompanying drawings are intended to aid understanding of the present disclosure and, together with detailed descriptions, may provide embodiments of the present disclosure. However, the technical features of the present disclosure are not limited to specific drawings, and the features disclosed in each drawing may be combined with each other to form new embodiments. Reference numerals in each drawing may indicate structural elements. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a communication system applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a wireless device applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 3 illustrates a method for processing a transmission signal applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 4 illustrates an example of a communication structure that can be provided in a 6G (6th generation) system applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 4 illustrates a communication procedure between a terminal and a base station applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a communication structure that can be provided in a 6G (6th generation) system applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 6 illustrates an electromagnetic spectrum applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 7 illustrates a THz communication method applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 8 illustrates a THz wireless communication transceiver applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 9 illustrates a THz signal generation method applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 10 illustrates a wireless communication transceiver applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 11 illustrates a transmitter structure applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 12 illustrates a modulator structure applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 13 illustrates a system information transmission procedure applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 14 illustrates a beam management procedure applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 15 illustrates an example of a man-in-the-middle attack in a communication system. Figure 16 illustrates a message authentication code-based authentication method in a communication system. Figure 17 illustrates a standard authentication method based on WCA (Wegman & Carter Authentication) in a communication system. Figure 18 illustrates an example of collision of a hash function in a communication system. Figure 19 illustrates a structure for obtaining a security key for communication in a wireless communication system. Figure 20 illustrates an example of a frame structure including a quantum authentication header in a communication system. FIG. 21 illustrates an example of a quantum authentication method in a noise-free quantum channel environment applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 22 illustrates an example of a quantum authentication scheme in a noisy quantum channel environment applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 23 illustrates an example of a quantum authentication procedure applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 24 illustrates an example of a quantum key distribution procedure applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 25 illustrates an example of a procedure for transmitting a message stream for quantum authentication in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 26 illustrates an example of a procedure for receiving a message stream for quantum authentication in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 27 illustrates an example of a detailed procedure for quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in a first device of a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 28 illustrates an example of a detailed procedure for quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in a second device of a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 29 illustrates signal exchange for performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 30A illustrates an example of transmitting a message stream for quantum authentication based on a quantum channel in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 30b illustrates an example of performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution based on a message stream for quantum authentication in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 31 illustrates an example of additionally transmitting information of an authentication code section in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 32 illustrates an example of transmitting a shift key generation command in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 33 illustrates an example of controlling a quantum key ratio in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. The following embodiments combine the components and features of the present disclosure in a predetermined form. Each component or feature may be considered optional unless explicitly stated otherwise. Each component or feature may be implemented without being combined with other components or features. Furthermore, some components and / or features may be combined to form embodiments of the present disclosure. The order of operations described in the embodiments of the present disclosure may be changed. Some components or features of one embodiment may be included in another embodiment or may be replaced with corresponding components or features of another embodiment. In the description of the drawings, procedures or steps that may obscure the gist of the present disclosure are not described, and procedures or steps that can be understood by a person skilled in the art are also not described. Throughout the specification, when a part is said to "comprising" or "including" a component, this does not mean that other components are excluded, but rather that other components can be included, unless specifically stated otherwise. In addition, terms such as "part," "unit," and "module" described in the specification mean a unit that processes at least one function or operation, which may be implemented by hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software. In addition, the words "a" or "an," "one," "the," and similar related words may be used in the singular and plural sense in the context of describing the present disclosure (especially in the context of the claims below) unless otherwise indicated herein or clearly contradicted by context. Embodiments of the present disclosure described herein focus on the data transmission and reception relationship between a base station and a mobile station. Here, the base station is understood as a terminal node of a network that directly communicates with the mobile station. Certain operations described herein as being performed by the base station may, in some cases, be performed by an upper node of the base station. That is, in a network consisting of multiple network nodes including a base station, various operations performed for communication with a mobile station may be performed by the base station or other network nodes other than the base station. In this case, the term 'base station' may be replaced by terms such as fixed station, Node B, eNB (eNode B), gNB (gNode B), ng-eNB, advanced base station (ABS), or access point. Additionally, in the embodiments of the present disclosure, the term terminal may be replaced with terms such as user equipment (UE), mobile station (MS), subscriber station (SS), mobile subscriber station (MSS), mobile terminal, or advanced mobile station (AMS). Additionally, a transmitter refers to a fixed and / or mobile node that provides data or voice services, and a receiver refers to a fixed and / or mobile node that receives data or voice services. Therefore, for uplink, a mobile station can be the transmitter, and a base station can be the receiver. Similarly, for downlink, a mobile station can be the receiver, and a base station can be the transmitter. Embodiments of the present disclosure may be supported by standard documents disclosed in at least one of wireless access systems, such as IEEE 802.xx system, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) system, 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) system, 3GPP 5th generation (5G) NR (New Radio) system and 3GPP2 system, and in particular, embodiments of the present disclosure may be supported by 3GPP TS (technical specification) 38.211, 3GPP TS 38.212, 3GPP TS 38.213, 3GPP TS 38.321 and 3GPP TS 38.331 documents. Furthermore, the embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied to other wireless access systems and are not limited to the systems described above. For example, they can be applied to systems implemented after the 3GPP 5G NR system and are not limited to a specific system. That is, obvious steps or parts not described in the embodiments of the present disclosure can be explained by referring to the above documents. In addition, all terms disclosed in this document can be explained by the above standard documents. Hereinafter, preferred embodiments according to the present disclosure will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The detailed description set forth below, together with the accompanying drawings, is intended to illustrate exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure and is not intended to represent the only embodiments in which the technical configurations of the present disclosure may be implemented. Additionally, specific terms used in the embodiments of the present disclosure are provided to aid in understanding of the present disclosure, and the use of such specific terms may be changed to other forms without departing from the technical spirit of the present disclosure. The following technology can be applied to various wireless access systems such as CDMA (code division multiple access), FDMA (frequency division multiple access), TDMA (time division multiple access), OFDMA (orthogonal frequency division multiple access), and SC-FDMA (single carrier frequency division multiple access). For clarity, the following description is based on 3GPP communication systems (e.g., LTE, NR, etc.), but the technical spirit of the present disclosure is not limited thereto. LTE may refer to technology after 3GPP TS 36.xxx Release 8. Specifically, LTE technology after 3GPP TS 36.xxx Release 10 may be referred to as LTE-A, and LTE technology after 3GPP TS 36.xxx Release 13 may be referred to as LTE-A pro. 3GPP NR may refer to technology after TS 38.xxx Release 15. 3GPP 6G may refer to technology after TS Release 17 and / or Release 18. "xxx" refers to a standard document detail number. LTE / NR / 6G may be collectively referred to as a 3GPP system. For background information, terms, abbreviations, etc. used in this disclosure, reference may be made to standard documents published prior to this disclosure. For example, reference may be made to standard documents 36.xxx and 38.xxx. Communication system applicable to the present disclosure Although not limited thereto, the various descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods and / or operational flowcharts of the present disclosure disclosed in this document may be applied to various fields requiring wireless communication / connectivity (e.g., 5G) between devices. Hereinafter, more specific examples will be provided with reference to the drawings. In the drawings / descriptions below, the same drawing reference numerals may represent identical or corresponding hardware blocks, software blocks, or functional blocks, unless otherwise described. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a communication system applied to the present disclosure. Referring to FIG. 1, a communication system (100) applied to the present disclosure includes a wireless device, a base station, and a network. Here, the wireless device refers to a device that performs communication using a wireless access technology (e.g., LTE, LTE-A, LTE-A pro, NR, 5G, 5G-A, 6G) and may be referred to as a communication / wireless / 5G device. Although not limited thereto, the wireless device may include a robot (100a), a vehicle (100b-1, 100b-2), an XR (extended reality) device (100c), a hand-held device (100d), a home appliance (100e), an IoT (Internet of Things) device (100f), and an AI (artificial intelligence) device / server (100g). For example, the vehicle may include a vehicle equipped with a wireless communication function, an autonomous vehicle, a vehicle capable of performing vehicle-to-vehicle communication, etc. Here, the vehicles (100b-1, 100b-2) may include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (e.g., drones). The XR devices (100c) include augmented reality (AR) / virtual reality (VR) / mixed reality (MR) devices, and may be implemented in the form of head-mounted devices (HMDs), head-up displays (HUDs) installed in vehicles, televisions, smartphones, computers, wearable devices, home appliances, digital signage, vehicles, robots, etc. The portable devices (100d) may include smartphones, smart pads, wearable devices (e.g., smartwatches, smart glasses), computers (e.g., laptops, etc.), etc. The home appliances (100e) may include TVs, refrigerators, washing machines, etc. The IoT devices (100f) may include sensors, smart meters, etc.For example, the base station (120) and the network (130) may also be implemented as wireless devices, and a specific wireless device (120a) may act as a base station / network node to other wireless devices. Wireless devices (100a to 100f) can be connected to a network (130) via a base station (120). AI technology can be applied to the wireless devices (100a to 100f), and the wireless devices (100a to 100f) can be connected to an AI server (100g) via a network (130). The network (130) can be configured using a 3G network, a 4G (e.g., LTE) network, a 5G (e.g., NR), or a 6G network. The wireless devices (100a to 100f) can communicate with each other via the base station (120) / network (130), but can also communicate directly (e.g., sidelink communication) without going through the base station (120) / network (130). For example, vehicles (100b-1, 100b-2) can communicate directly (e.g., V2V (vehicle to vehicle) / V2X (vehicle to everything) communication). Additionally, an IoT device (100f) (e.g., a sensor) can communicate directly with another IoT device (e.g., a sensor) or another wireless device (100a to 100f). Wireless communication / connection (150a, 150b, 150c) can be established between wireless devices (100a to 100f) / base stations (120), and base stations (120) / base stations (120). Here, the wireless communication / connection can be established through various wireless access technologies such as uplink / downlink communication (150a), sidelink communication (150b) (or D2D communication), and base station-to-base station communication (150c) (e.g., relay, IAB (integrated access backhaul)). Through the wireless communication / connection (150a, 150b, 150c), the wireless device and base station / wireless device, and base stations and base stations can transmit / receive wireless signals to / from each other. For example, the wireless communication / connection (150a, 150b, 150c) can transmit / receive signals through various physical channels. To this end, based on various proposals of the present disclosure, at least some of various configuration information setting processes for transmitting / receiving wireless signals, various signal processing processes (e.g., channel encoding / decoding, modulation / demodulation, resource mapping / demapping, etc.), resource allocation processes, etc. may be performed. Devices applicable to the present disclosure FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a wireless device applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to FIG. 2, the wireless device (200) can transmit and receive wireless signals via various wireless access technologies (e.g., LTE, LTE-A, LTE-A pro, NR, 5G, 5G-A, 6G). The wireless device (200) includes at least one processor (202) and at least one memory (204), and may additionally include at least one transceiver (206) and / or at least one antenna (208). The processor (202) controls the memory (204) and / or the transceiver (206), and may be configured to implement the descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods, and / or operational flowcharts disclosed in this document. For example, the processor (202) may process information in the memory (204) to generate first information / signal, and then transmit a wireless signal including the first information / signal via the transceiver (206). In addition, the processor (202) may receive a wireless signal including second information / signal via the transceiver (206), and then store information obtained from signal processing of the second information / signal in the memory (204). The memory (204) may be connected to the processor (202) and may store various information related to the operation of the processor (202). For example, the memory (204) may store software code including instructions for performing some or all of the processes controlled by the processor (202), or for performing the descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods, and / or operational flowcharts disclosed herein. Here, the processor (202) and the memory (204) may be part of a communication modem / circuit / chip designed to implement wireless communication technology. The transceiver (206) may be connected to the processor (202) and may transmit and / or receive wireless signals via at least one antenna (208). The transceiver (206) may include a transmitter and / or a receiver. The transceiver (206) may be used interchangeably with an RF (radio frequency) unit. In the present disclosure, a wireless device may also mean a communication modem / circuit / chip. Hereinafter, the hardware elements of the wireless device (200) will be described in more detail. Although not limited thereto, at least one protocol layer may be implemented by at least one processor (202). For example, at least one processor (202) may implement at least one layer (e.g., a functional layer such as physical (PHY), media access control (MAC), radio link control (RLC), packet data convergence protocol (PDCP), radio resource control (RRC), and service data adaptation protocol (SDAP)). At least one processor (202) may generate at least one Protocol Data Unit (PDU) and / or at least one Service Data Unit (SDU) according to the descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods, and / or operation flowcharts disclosed in this document. At least one processor (202) may generate a message, control information, data, or information according to the descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods, and / or operation flowcharts disclosed in this document. At least one processor (202) can generate a signal (e.g., a baseband signal) including a PDU, an SDU, a message, control information, data or information according to the functions, procedures, proposals and / or methods disclosed in this document, and provide the signal to at least one transceiver (206). At least one processor (202) can receive a signal (e.g., a baseband signal) from at least one transceiver (206) and obtain the PDU, SDU, message, control information, data or information according to the descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods and / or operational flowcharts disclosed in this document. At least one processor (202) may be referred to as a controller, a microcontroller, a microprocessor, or a microcomputer. The at least one processor (202) may be implemented by hardware, firmware, software, or a combination thereof. For example, at least one application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), at least one digital signal processor (DSP), at least one digital signal processing device (DSPD), at least one programmable logic device (PLD), or at least one field programmable gate array (FPGA) may be included in the at least one processor (202). The descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods, and / or operation flowcharts disclosed in this document may be implemented using firmware or software, and the firmware or software may be implemented to include modules, procedures, functions, etc. The descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods, and / or operation flowcharts disclosed in this document may be included in the at least one processor (202), or may be stored in at least one memory (204) and driven by the at least one processor (202). The descriptions, functions, procedures, suggestions, methods and / or flowcharts disclosed in this document may be implemented using firmware or software in the form of code, instructions and / or sets of instructions. At least one memory (204) can be connected to at least one processor (202) and can store various forms of data, signals, messages, information, programs, codes, instructions and / or commands. The at least one memory (204) can be configured as a read only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), an erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM), a flash memory, a hard drive, a register, a cache memory, a computer readable storage medium and / or a combination thereof. The at least one memory (204) can be located internally and / or externally to the at least one processor (202). In addition, the at least one memory (204) can be connected to the at least one processor (202) via various technologies such as a wired or wireless connection. At least one transceiver (206) can transmit user data, control information, wireless signals / channels, etc., mentioned in the methods and / or flowcharts of this document to at least one other device. At least one transceiver (206) can receive user data, control information, wireless signals / channels, etc. mentioned in the descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods and / or flowcharts disclosed in this document from at least one other device. For example, at least one transceiver (206) can be connected to at least one processor (202) and can transmit and receive wireless signals. For example, at least one processor (202) can control at least one transceiver (206) to transmit user data, control information, or wireless signals to at least one other device. Furthermore, at least one processor (202) can control at least one transceiver (206) to receive user data, control information, or wireless signals from at least one other device. In addition, at least one transceiver (206) may be connected to at least one antenna (208), and at least one transceiver (206) may be configured to transmit and receive user data, control information, wireless signals / channels, etc. mentioned in the descriptions, functions, procedures, proposals, methods and / or operation flowcharts disclosed in this document through at least one antenna (208). In this document, at least one antenna may be a plurality of physical antennas or a plurality of logical antennas (e.g., antenna ports). At least one transceiver (206) may convert the received wireless signals / channels, etc. from RF band signals to baseband signals in order to process the received user data, control information, wireless signals / channels, etc. using at least one processor (202). At least one transceiver (206) may convert the processed user data, control information, wireless signals / channels, etc. from baseband signals to RF band signals using at least one processor (202).For this purpose, at least one transceiver (206) may include an (analog) oscillator and / or filter. The components of the wireless device described with reference to FIG. 2 may be referred to by different terms in terms of functionality. For example, the processor (202) may be referred to as a control unit, the transceiver (206) as a communication unit, and the memory (204) as a storage unit. In some cases, the communication unit may be used to mean at least a portion of the processor (202) and the transceiver (206). The structure of the wireless device described with reference to FIG. 2 can be understood as the structure of at least a portion of various devices. For example, the structure of the wireless device illustrated in FIG. 2 can be at least a portion of various devices described with reference to FIG. 1 (e.g., a robot (100a), a vehicle (100b-1, 100b-2), an XR device (100c), a portable device (100d), a home appliance (100e), an IoT device (100f), an AI device / server (100g)). Furthermore, according to various embodiments, in addition to the components illustrated in FIG. 2, the device may further include other components. For example, the device may be a portable device such as a smartphone, a smart pad, a wearable device (e.g., a smart watch, smart glasses), or a portable computer (e.g., a laptop, etc.). In this case, the device may further include at least one of a power supply unit that supplies power and includes a wired / wireless charging circuit, a battery, etc., an interface unit that includes at least one port for connection with another device (e.g., an audio input / output port, a video input / output port), and an input / output unit for inputting and outputting image information / signals, audio information / signals, data, and / or information input from a user. For example, the device may be a mobile device such as a mobile robot, a vehicle, a train, an aerial vehicle (AV), a ship, etc. In this case, the device may further include at least one of a driving unit including at least one of an engine, a motor, a power train, wheels, brakes, and a steering unit of the device, a power supply unit including a wired / wireless charging circuit, a battery, etc. that supplies power, a sensor unit that senses status information, environmental information, and user information of the device or its surroundings, an autonomous driving unit that performs functions such as path maintenance, speed control, and destination setting, and a position measurement unit that obtains location information of the mobile device through a global positioning system (GPS) and various sensors. For example, the device may be an XR device such as an HMD, a head-up display (HUD) installed in a vehicle, a television, a smartphone, a computer, a wearable device, a home appliance, a digital signage, a vehicle, a robot, etc. In this case, the device may further include at least one of a power supply unit that supplies power and includes a wired / wireless charging circuit, a battery, etc., an input / output unit that obtains control information, data, etc. from the outside and outputs the generated XR object, and a sensor unit that senses status information, environmental information, and user information of the device or the surroundings of the device. For example, the device may be a robot that can be classified into industrial, medical, household, military, etc. types depending on the purpose or field of use. In this case, the device may further include at least one of a sensor unit that senses status information, environmental information, and user information of the device or its surroundings, and a driving unit that performs various physical actions, such as moving the robot joints. For example, the device may be an AI device such as a TV, a projector, a smartphone, a PC, a laptop, a digital broadcasting terminal, a tablet PC, a wearable device, a set-top box (STB), a radio, a washing machine, a refrigerator, digital signage, a robot, a vehicle, etc. In this case, the device may further include at least one of an input unit that acquires various types of data from the outside, an output unit that generates output related to sight, hearing, or touch, a sensor unit that senses status information, environmental information, and user information of the device or its surroundings, and a training unit that trains a model composed of an artificial neural network using learning data. The structure of the wireless device illustrated in FIG. 2 may be understood as a part of a RAN node (e.g., base station, DU, RU, RRㅗ, etc.). That is, the device illustrated in FIG. 2 may be a RAN node. In this case, the device may further include a wired transceiver for front haul and / or back haul communication. However, if the front haul and / or back haul communication is based on wireless communication, at least one transceiver (206) illustrated in FIG. 2 may be used for front haul and / or back haul communication, and a wired transceiver may not be included. FIG. 3 illustrates a method for processing a transmission signal applicable to the present disclosure. For example, the transmission signal may be processed by a signal processing circuit. At this time, the signal processing circuit (300) may include a scrambler (310), a modulator (320), a layer mapper (330), a precoder (340), a resource mapper (350), and a signal generator (360). At this time, as an example, the operations / functions of FIG. 3 may be performed in the processor (202) and / or the transceiver (206) of FIG. 2. Furthermore, as an example, the hardware elements of FIG. 3 may be implemented in the processor (202) and / or the transceiver (206) of FIG. 2. As an example, blocks 310 to 360 may be implemented in the processor (202) of FIG. 2. Additionally, blocks 310 to 350 may be implemented in the processor (202) of FIG. 2, and block 360 may be implemented in the transceiver (206) of FIG. 2, and are not limited to the above-described embodiment. A codeword can be converted into a wireless signal through the signal processing circuit (300) of FIG. 3. Here, the codeword is an encoded bit sequence of an information block. The information block may include a transport block (e.g., an UL-SCH transport block, a DL-SCH transport block). The wireless signal may be transmitted through various physical channels (e.g., a physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH), a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH)). Specifically, the codeword can be converted into a bit sequence scrambled by a scrambler (310). The scramble sequence used for scrambling is generated based on an initialization value, and the initialization value may include ID information of the wireless device, etc. The scrambled bit sequence can be modulated into a modulation symbol sequence by a modulator (320). Modulation schemes may include pi / 2-BPSK (pi / 2-binary phase shift keying), m-PSK (m-phase shift keying), m-QAM (m-quadrature amplitude modulation), etc. A complex modulation symbol sequence can be mapped to at least one transmission layer by a layer mapper (330). The modulation symbols of each transmission layer can be mapped to corresponding antenna port(s) by a precoder (340). The output z of the precoder (340) can be obtained by multiplying the output y of the layer mapper (330) by a precoding matrix W of NХM, where N is the number of antenna ports and M is the number of transmission layers. Here, the precoder (340) can perform precoding after performing transform precoding (e.g., discrete Fourier transform (DFT) transform) on the complex modulation symbols. Additionally, the precoder (340) can perform precoding without performing transform precoding. The resource mapper (350) can map modulation symbols of each antenna port to time-frequency resources. The time-frequency resources can include multiple symbols (e.g., CP-OFDMA symbols, DFT-s-OFDMA symbols) in the time domain and multiple subcarriers in the frequency domain. The signal generator (360) generates a wireless signal from the mapped modulation symbols, and the generated wireless signal can be transmitted to another device through each antenna. To this end, the signal generator (360) can include an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) module, a cyclic prefix (CP) inserter, a digital-to-analog converter (DAC), a frequency uplink converter, and the like. The signal processing process for a received signal in a wireless device may be configured in reverse order of the signal processing process (310 to 360) of FIG. 3. For example, a wireless device (e.g., 200 of FIG. 2) may receive a wireless signal from the outside through an antenna port / transceiver. The received wireless signal may be converted into a baseband signal through a signal restorer. For this purpose, the signal restorer may include a frequency downlink converter, an analog-to-digital converter (ADC), a CP remover, and a fast Fourier transform (FFT) module. Thereafter, the baseband signal may be restored to a codeword through a resource demapper process, a postcoding process, a demodulation process, and a descrambling process. The codeword may be restored to the original information block through decoding. Therefore, a signal processing circuit (not shown) for a received signal may include a signal restorer, a resource demapper, a postcoder, a demodulator, a descrambler, and a decoder. Figure 4 illustrates a communication procedure between a terminal and a base station applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 4 illustrates operations of a terminal (410) and a base station (420) transmitting and / or receiving data and operations performed prior thereto. Referring to FIG. 4, in step 401, the terminal (410) and the base station (420) perform synchronization. For example, the terminal (410) performs an initial cell search operation. Specifically, the terminal (410) can detect at least one synchronization signal transmitted from the base station (420) according to a predefined rule. Here, the synchronization signal can include multiple synchronization signals classified according to structure or purpose (e.g., primary synchronization signal, secondary synchronization signal). Through this, the terminal (410) can check the boundary of the frame, subframe, slot, and / or symbol of the base station (420) and obtain information about the base station (420) (e.g., cell identifier). In step 403, the terminal (410) obtains system information transmitted from the base station (420). The system information is information related to the properties, characteristics, and / or capabilities of the base station (420) required to access the base station (420) and use the service, and may be classified according to the content (e.g., whether it is essential for access), transmission structure (e.g., channel used, whether provided on-demand), etc., and may be classified into, for example, a master information block (MIB) and a system information block (SIB). If necessary, the terminal (410) may transmit a signal requesting system information before receiving the system information. However, the request and provision of the system information may be performed after the random access procedure described below. In step 405, the terminal (410) and the base station (420) perform a random access procedure. The terminal (410) may transmit and / or receive at least one message (e.g., a random access preamble, a random access response (RAR) message, etc.) for the random access procedure based on information related to the random access channel of the base station (420) obtained through system information (e.g., channel position, channel structure, supported preamble structure, etc.). For example, the terminal (410) may transmit a preamble (e.g., MSG1) through the random access channel, receive an RAR message (e.g., MSG2), transmit a message (e.g., MSG3) including information related to the terminal (410) (e.g., identification information) to the base station (420) using scheduling information included in the RAR message, and receive a message (e.g., MSG4) for contention resolution and / or connection establishment. As another example, MSG1 and MSG3 may be sent and received as one message, or MSG2 and MSG4 may be sent and received as one message. In step 407, the terminal (410) and the base station (420) perform signaling of control information. Here, the control information may be defined in various layers, such as a layer that controls a connection (e.g., a radio resource control (RRC) layer), a layer that handles mapping between logical channels and transport channels (e.g., a media access control (MAC) layer), and a layer that handles physical channels (e.g., a physical (PHY) layer). For example, the terminal (410) and the base station (420) may perform at least one of signaling for establishing a connection, signaling for determining settings related to communication, and signaling for indicating allocated resources. In step 409, the terminal (410) and the base station (420) transmit and / or receive data. In other words, the terminal (410) and the base station (420) can process, transmit, and / or receive data based on the signaling of the control information. For example, when transmitting data, the terminal (410) or the base station (420) can perform at least one of channel encoding, rate matching, scrambling, constellation mapping, layer mapping, waveform modulation, antenna mapping, and resource mapping on the information bits. Conversely, when receiving data, the terminal (410) or the base station (420) can perform at least one of signal extraction from resources, waveform demodulation for each antenna, signal arrangement considering layer mapping, constellation demapping, descrambling, and channel decoding. 6G communication systems and core implementation technologies of 6G systems The 5G system defines various operating bands within FR1 (frequency range 1), which covers 410 MHz to 7125 MHz, and FR2 (frequency range 2), which covers 24,250 MHz to 71,000 MHz. Various frequencies are being discussed as operating bands for the subsequent 6G system, and the use of higher frequencies than 5G systems is also being considered for wider bandwidth and higher transmission speeds. One such band is the THz (terahertz) frequency band, which covers approximately 100 GHz to 10 THz. The THz frequency band is a band that has both the transparency of radio waves and the straightness of light waves, and communications using the THz frequency band are expected to play a transitional role from existing radio-centered communications to lightwave-based communications. 6G systems utilizing the THz frequency band have the following goals: i) very high data rates per device, ii) a very large number of connected devices, iii) global connectivity, iv) very low latency, v) reduced energy consumption of battery-free IoT devices, vi) ultra-reliable connectivity, and vii) connected intelligence with machine learning capabilities. The vision of the 6G system can be divided into four aspects: “intelligent connectivity,” “deep connectivity,” “holographic connectivity,” and “ubiquitous connectivity,” and the 6G system can be designed to satisfy the requirements as shown in [Table 1] below. Per device peak data rate1 TbpsE2E latency1 msMaximum spectral efficiency100 bps / HzMobility supportup to 1000 km / hrSatellite integrationFullyAIFullyAutonomous vehicleFullyXRFullyHaptic CommunicationFully At this time, the 6G system may have key factors such as enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), ultra-reliable low latency communications (URLLC), massive machine type communications (mMTC), AI integrated communication, tactile internet, high throughput, high network capacity, high energy efficiency, low backhaul and access network congestion, and enhanced data security. Figure 5 illustrates an example of a communication structure that can be provided in a 6G system applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to Figure 5, a 6G system is expected to have 50 times higher simultaneous wireless communication connectivity than a 5G wireless communication system. URLLC, a key feature of 5G, is expected to become an even more important technology in 6G communications by providing end-to-end latency of less than 1 ms. Furthermore, 6G systems will have significantly superior volumetric spectral efficiency, unlike the frequently used area spectral efficiency. 6G systems can provide extremely long battery life and advanced battery technologies for energy harvesting, so mobile devices in 6G systems may not need to be separately charged. As core implementation technologies of the 6G system, technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), THz (terahertz) communication, optical wireless technology, FSO backhaul network, massive MIMO technology, blockchain, 3D networking, quantum communication, unmanned aerial vehicles, cell-free communication, wireless information and energy transfer (WIET), integration of sensing and communication, integration of access backhaul networks, holographic beamforming, big data analysis, and large intelligent surface (LIS) can be adopted. THz communication utilizes a spectrum in the frequency band between 0.1 THz and 10 THz with corresponding wavelengths ranging from 0.03 mm to 3 mm, as shown in Fig. 6. THz communication can be implemented as follows. Fig. 7 illustrates a THz communication method applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to Fig. 7, THz wireless communication refers to wireless communication using THz waves having a frequency of approximately 0.1 to 10 THz (1 THz = 1012 Hz), and may refer to terahertz (THz) band wireless communication using a very high carrier frequency of 100 GHz or higher. THz waves are located between the RF (Radio Frequency) / millimeter (mm) and infrared bands, and (i) compared to visible light / infrared rays, they penetrate non-metallic / non-polarizable materials well, and compared to RF / millimeter waves, they have a shorter wavelength, thus having high linearity and enabling beam focusing. In addition, since the photon energy of THz waves is only a few meV, it has the characteristic of being harmless to the human body. The frequency band expected to be used for THz wireless communication may be the D-band (110 GHz to 170 GHz) or H-band (220 GHz to 325 GHz) bands where propagation loss due to absorption of molecules in the air is small. In addition to 3GPP, standardization discussions for THz wireless communication are being centered around the IEEE 802.15 THz WG (working group), and standard documents issued by the IEEE 802.15 TG (task group) (e.g., TG3d, TG3e) may specify or supplement the contents described in this specification. THz wireless communication can be applied to wireless cognition, sensing, imaging, wireless communication, THz navigation, etc. Specifically, referring to Fig. 7, THz wireless communication scenarios can be categorized into macro networks, micro networks, and nanoscale networks. In macro networks, THz wireless communication can be applied to vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) connections and backhaul / fronthaul connections. In micro networks, THz wireless communication can be applied to fixed point-to-point or multi-point connections such as indoor small cells, wireless connections in data centers, and near-field communication such as kiosk downloading. Table 2 below shows examples of technologies that can be utilized in THz waves. Transceivers DeviceAvailable immature: UTC-PD, RTD and SBDModulation and codingLow order modulation techniques (OOK, QPSK), LDPC, Reed Soloman, Hamming, Polar, TurboAntennaOmni and Directional, phased array with low number of antenna elementsBandwidth69 GHz (or 23 GHz) at 300 GHzChannel modelsPartiallyData rate100 GbpsOutdoor deploymentNoFee space lossHighCoverageLowRadio Measurements300 GHz inddorDevice sizeFew micrometers Fig. 8 illustrates a THz wireless communication transceiver applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to Fig. 8, THz wireless communication can be classified based on the method for generating and receiving THz. The THz generation method can be classified into optical device-based or electronic device-based technology. Here, the method for generating THz using electronic devices includes a method using a semiconductor device such as a resonant tunneling diode (RTD), a method using a local oscillator and a multiplier, a method using a monolithic microwave integrated circuit (MMIC) using a compound semiconductor high electron mobility transistor (HEMT)-based integrated circuit, and a method using a Si-CMOS-based integrated circuit. In the case of Fig. 8, a doubler (tripler, multiplier) is applied to increase the frequency, and it passes through a subharmonic mixer and is radiated by an antenna. Since the THz band forms a high frequency, a doubler is essential. Here, the multiplier is a circuit that provides an output frequency that is N times that of the input, matches it to the desired harmonic frequency, and filters out all remaining frequencies. In addition, beamforming can be implemented by applying an array antenna, etc. to the antenna of Fig. 8. In Fig. 8, IF represents an intermediate frequency, a tripler and a multiplier represent a multiplier, PA represents a power amplifier, LNA represents a low noise amplifier, and PLL represents a phase-locked loop. FIG. 9 illustrates a THz signal generation method applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 10 also illustrates a wireless communication transceiver applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to FIGS. 9 and 10 , the optical device-based THz wireless communication technology refers to a method of generating and modulating a THz signal using an optical device. The optical device-based THz signal generation technology is a technology that generates an ultra-high-speed optical signal using a laser and an optical modulator, and converts it into a THz signal using an ultra-high-speed photodetector. Compared to a technology that uses only electronic devices, this technology makes it easy to increase the frequency, enables high-power signal generation, and can obtain a flat response characteristic over a wide frequency band. For the optical device-based THz signal generation, as illustrated in FIG. 9 , a laser diode, a wideband optical modulator, and an ultra-high-speed photodetector are required. In the case of FIG. 9 , light signals from two lasers with different wavelengths are combined to generate a THz signal corresponding to the wavelength difference between the lasers. In Fig. 9, an optical coupler refers to a semiconductor device that transmits an electrical signal using optical waves to provide electrical isolation and coupling between circuits or systems, and a uni-travelling carrier photo-detector (UTC-PD) is a type of photodetector that uses electrons as active carriers and reduces the travel time of electrons through bandgap grading. The UTC-PD is capable of photodetection at 150 GHz or higher.In Fig. 10, EDFA (erbium-doped fiber amplifier) ​​represents an erbium-doped fiber amplifier, PD (photo detector) represents a semiconductor device that can convert an optical signal into an electrical signal, OSA represents an optical module (optical sub assembly) that modularizes various optical communication functions (e.g., photoelectric conversion, electro-optical conversion, etc.) into a single component, and DSO represents a digital storage oscilloscope. Fig. 11 illustrates a transmitter structure applicable to the present disclosure. In addition, Fig. 12 illustrates a modulator structure applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to Figs. 11 and 12, a signal phase, etc. can be changed by passing an optical source of a laser through an optical wave guide. At this time, data is loaded by changing the electrical characteristics through a microwave contact, etc. Accordingly, the optical modulator output is formed as a modulated waveform. An opto-electrical modulator (O / E converter) can generate a THz pulse by optical rectification operation by a nonlinear crystal, photoelectric conversion (O / E conversion) by a photoconductive antenna, emission from a bunch of relativistic electrons, etc. Terahertz pulses (THz pulses) generated in the above manner can have lengths ranging from femtoseconds to picoseconds. The optical / electrical converter (O / E converter) performs down conversion by utilizing the non-linearity of the device. Considering the THz spectrum usage, it is likely that THz systems will use multiple contiguous gigahertz bands for fixed or mobile service purposes. Based on the outdoor scenario criteria, the available bandwidth can be classified based on the oxygen attenuation of 10^2 dB / km in the spectrum up to 1 THz. Accordingly, a framework in which the available bandwidth is composed of multiple band chunks can be considered. As an example of the above framework, if the THz pulse length for one carrier is set to 50 ps, ​​the bandwidth (BW) becomes approximately 20 GHz. Effective down-conversion from the infrared band to the terahertz band (THz band) depends on how to utilize the nonlinearity of the optical / electrical converter (O / E converter). In other words, to down-convert to the desired terahertz band (THz band), it is necessary to design an O / E converter with the most ideal non-linearity for transferring to the corresponding terahertz band (THz band). If an O / E converter that is not suitable for the target frequency band is used, errors are likely to occur in the amplitude and phase of the corresponding pulse. A terahertz transmission and reception system can be implemented using a single optical-to-electrical converter in a single-carrier system. Depending on the channel environment, an optical-to-electrical converter may be required equal to the number of carriers in a multi-carrier system. This phenomenon will be particularly noticeable in a multi-carrier system that utilizes multiple broadbands according to the aforementioned spectrum usage plan. In this regard, a frame structure for the multi-carrier system may be considered. A signal down-converted using an optical-to-electrical converter may be transmitted in a specific resource region (e.g., a specific frame). The frequency region of the specific resource region may include a plurality of chunks. Each chunk may be composed of at least one component carrier (CC). Transmitting system information (e.g., MIB) in the THz frequency band can be inefficient because the beam width becomes narrower in high-frequency bands, requiring more beam sweeps to cover the entire cell area. This method of transmitting system information is particularly inefficient when there are only a few users within the cell. Therefore, a system information transmission procedure, such as that illustrated in FIG. 13, may be used. Figure 13 illustrates a system information transmission procedure applicable to the present disclosure. Figure 13 illustrates an example of a procedure for transmitting system information for THz communication. The procedure illustrated in Figure 13 can be combined with various embodiments of the present disclosure described below. For example, the embodiments described below can be performed based on the system information acquired by the procedure illustrated in Figure 13. As another example, information and / or data transmitted in the procedure illustrated in Figure 13 can be generated and / or processed according to the embodiments described below. Referring to FIG. 13, in step 1301, the base station (1320) transmits system information of cell #1 through cell #2. That is, the base station (1320) provides at least two cells, cell #1 uses a THz frequency band, and cell #2 uses a frequency band other than the THz frequency band. Here, the system information includes at least one of an SFN (system frame number), a PDCCH (physical downlink control channel) configuration for SIB1, cell barring, cell re-selection, and subcarrier spacing generated in a higher layer, and may include at least one of an SFN, a half frame indicator, and an SSB index generated in a physical layer. For this purpose, as an example, cell #1 and cell #2 may have a relationship of a secondary cell and a primary cell. In step 1303, UE (1310) acquires synchronization for cell #1. Synchronization can be acquired by detecting a synchronization signal. Typically, synchronization is acquired before receiving system information. However, since system information for cell #1 is received from cell #2, synchronization acquisition for cell #1 can be performed after receiving the system information. For example, UE (1310) can acquire synchronization based on system information. However, unlike FIG. 13, in another example, synchronization acquisition can be performed before step 1301. In step 1305, UE (1310) transmits a signal for accessing cell #1. For example, the signal may include a random access preamble. The structure of the signal and the resources (e.g., channels) for transmitting the signal can be identified through system information. Subsequently, in step 1307, UE (1310) and base station (1320) perform an access procedure for cell #1 and communicate. In this step, operations according to various embodiments described below may be performed. The procedure described with reference to FIG. 13 may be performed when UE (1301) first accesses cell #1 of base station (1320). Alternatively, a similar procedure may be performed when UE (1301) hands over to cell #1 of base station (1320). However, in the case of handover, system information of cell #1 may be received from a cell of a base station other than cell #2 of base station (1320). Communications in the THz band are expected to experience extremely severe path loss, and to overcome this, terminals and base stations must use extremely sharp beams. The use of sharp beams means that terminals and base stations must perform beam control in addition to beamforming, and the number of beams used increases significantly. Consequently, it takes a very long time to align the transmit and receive beams between the base station and terminals. Furthermore, if the beam alignment between the base station and terminals is misaligned due to the movement or movement of the terminals, frequent re-alignment of the beams is required, which can lead to link instability. Accordingly, a beam management procedure, such as that illustrated in FIG. 14 below, may be employed. FIG. 14 illustrates a beam management procedure applicable to the present disclosure. FIG. 14 illustrates an example of a procedure for searching and / or selecting beams for THz communication. The procedure illustrated in FIG. 14 can be combined with various embodiments of the present disclosure described below. For example, the embodiments described below can be performed using at least one beam acquired by the procedure illustrated in FIG. 13. As another example, information and / or data transmitted in the procedure illustrated in FIG. 14 can be generated and / or processed according to the embodiments described below. Here, the beam may be referred to as a 'spatial domain filter', a 'spatial domain transmit filter', a 'spatial domain receive filter', and other terms having equivalent technical meanings thereto. Referring to FIG. 14, in step 1401, a base station (1420) configures resources for beam management. Here, the resources may include at least one of time-frequency resources, channels, and spatial resources (e.g., antenna ports). For example, the base station (1420) may utilize a beam search signal (BSS) that is transmitted spatially separated from an existing downlink signal / channel for beam search. Here, the BSS may be transmitted based on a dedicated port for beam search. The dedicated port may be a different port from a port for transmitting an existing downlink signal / channel (e.g., SSB, PDSCH, etc.). BSS is a term defined for convenience of explanation, and the technical concept according to the present embodiment is not limited to the term BSS itself. That is, a signal transmitted based on a dedicated port defined / configured for beam search may be included in the technical concept according to the present embodiment. In step 1403, the base station (1401) transmits measurement signals using multiple transmission beams. For example, the measurement signals may include at least one of a reference signal and a synchronization signal. At this time, the measurement signals may be transmitted as many times as the number of beams that require measurement, and may be transmitted in a multi-beam transmission method that forms multiple beams simultaneously to reduce sweeping time. Here, the multi-beam transmission may be performed based on at least one of a multi-panel, a sub-array, and a true time delay (TTD). In step 1405, the UE (1410) transmits a feedback signal to the base station (1420). The feedback signal indicates at least one beam selected by the UE (1410). The UE (1410) may select at least one preferred beam based on the measurement signals received in step 1403. In step 1407, the UE (1410) and the base station (1420) perform communication. At this time, the UE (1410) and the base station (1420) may perform communication using the beam selected in step 1405. If channel reciprocity is established, the transmission beam of the UE (1410) may also be determined through steps 1403 and 1405, and thus, the transmission operation of the UE (1410) may also be performed using the beam selected in step 1405. If channel reciprocity is not established, a procedure including transmitting measurement signals of the UE (1410) and transmitting feedback signals of the base station (1420) may be performed to determine the transmission beam of the UE (1410). In step 1407, operations according to various embodiments described below may be performed. Specific embodiments of the present invention The present disclosure relates to a technology for performing quantum authentication (QA) and quantum key distribution (QKD) in a communication system supporting quantum communication. Specifically, the present disclosure relates to a technology for simultaneously performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution based on a pre-shared key. Unlike conventional communication methods that use wavelengths or amplitudes to transmit signals, quantum communication techniques utilize single photons, the smallest unit of light. Quantum communication techniques ensure the security of information transmitted via quantum channels by leveraging the non-cloning theorem, a quantum mechanical property. In other words, the security of messages transmitted in quantum communication systems can be guaranteed by detecting eavesdropping by third parties by estimating the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) based on some of the information transmitted via the quantum channel. However, as illustrated in FIG. 15, if a third party Eve (1520) attempts a man-in-the-middle attack between Alice (1510), the sender, and Bob (1530), pretending to be the receiver Bob to Alice (1510), and pretending to be the sender Alice to Bob (1530), it is impossible to determine whether Eve (1520) is committing a man-in-the-middle attack based solely on the QBER (quantum bit error rate) estimation of information transmission between Alice (1510) and Eve (1520) and information transmission between Eve (1520) and Bob (1530). In this case, Eve, the third party, can not only know the contents of the data while relaying the data between Alice (1510) and Bob (1530), but can also attempt to forge and / or modify the data. Therefore, in order to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack by a third party, user authentication needs to be performed so that the sender and the receiver can verify each other. User authentication techniques can be divided into hash function-based authentication techniques, which possess cryptographic strength, and authentication techniques based on information-theoretic security. Hash function-based authentication techniques rely on the computational complexity of hash function collision probabilities. A representative example is the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based authentication technique. However, hash function-based authentication techniques rely on computational complexity, and thus may face security threats in the future due to the emergence of quantum computers. Therefore, to enhance security in quantum cryptography communication systems, authentication techniques utilizing a family of keyed hash functions, which combine symmetric keys and hash functions based on information-theoretic security, are being used. For example, authentication techniques utilizing a family of keyed hash functions have been adopted as standard authentication techniques by quantum standards organizations such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Authentication techniques utilizing the key-based hash function family utilize a hash function called strongly universal hashing (SHU) as a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm to generate a message authentication code (MAC) used in the authentication process. Here, a symmetric key generated by a one-time pad (OTP) is used when generating the MAC. Therefore, if the symmetric key information is unknown, the possibility of recovering the original information from the MAC is very low. Therefore, authentication techniques utilizing symmetric keys are known to be the most secure among currently available authentication techniques. A representative technique is the Wegman & Carter Authentication (WCA) technique proposed by M. Wegman and J. Carter.The WCA technique uses MAC to verify the integrity of a message. It operates based on the fact that a third party who does not know the one-time symmetric key information previously shared between the sender and receiver cannot know the algorithm used to generate the MAC. The structure of the WCA technique is shown in Figure 16. Figure 16 illustrates an authentication method based on a message authentication code in a communication system. Referring to Figure 16, the sender Alice (1610) and the receiver Bob (1620) share the same symmetric key information and MAC algorithms before performing the authentication process. Alice (1610) selects an algorithm (1613) to be used for MAC generation among the MAC algorithms based on the pre-shared key (1611) value, and uses the selected MAC algorithm (1613) to generate a MAC for a plaintext message (1615), i.e., MAC K (M)(1617) is obtained. Alice (1610) receives the plaintext message (1615) and the MAC K (M)(1617) is transmitted to the receiver Bob (1620) via a classical channel. A classical channel may be understood as a channel for transmitting and receiving electromagnetic wave-based signals used in a wireless communication system or a channel defined in the protocol stack of a communication system. For example, a classical channel may include at least one of a data channel (e.g., PDSCH, PUSCH) or a control channel (e.g., PDCCH, PUCCH) defined in the 3GPP standard. This is merely an example to aid understanding, and the classical channel of the present disclosure is not limited thereto. Bob (1620) selects a MAC algorithm (1623) based on a pre-shared key (1621) and generates a MAC for the received plaintext message (1625) using the selected MAC algorithm (1623). At this time, since the pre-shared key (1621) is the same as the key (1611) of the sender Alice (1610), the MAC algorithm (1623) selected by Bob (1620) is the same as the MAC algorithm (1613) selected by Alice (1610). Bob (1620) compares the generated MAC with the received MAC. K By determining whether (M)(1627) matches, it is possible to determine whether authentication is successful. The generated MAC and the received MAC K If (M)(1627) matches, it is determined that the authentication for Alice was successful, and the generated MAC and the received MAC K If (M)(1627) does not match, it can be determined that the authentication for Alice has failed. As mentioned above, the pre-shared symmetric key information is not transmitted over a classical channel and is only known to the sender and receiver. This means that third parties, lacking the pre-shared symmetric key, cannot know which MAC algorithm was used. Therefore, when using a MAC-based authentication technique, security can be guaranteed even if a third party obtains message information. Furthermore, in the case of MAC-based authentication techniques, security can be enhanced by configuring a variety of MAC algorithms. The WCA technique described above is currently being used as a standard authentication technology in the quantum key distribution protocol, which is being applied as a security technology for 4G LTE and 5G. According to the WCA-based authentication method, the sender generates a tag corresponding to the MAC using a symmetric key generated by an OTP and a strong universal hash class, and the receiver performs authentication using the tag generated by the sender. Here, authentication may include user authentication to verify whether the sender or receiver has been modified during message transmission, and message authentication to verify whether the content and / or order of the message has been modified. Figure 17 illustrates a WCA-based authentication scheme in a communication system. Referring to Figure 17, the sender Alice uses a pre-shared key (1711) and a MAC algorithm (H) (1713) to tag information Tag for a message (1715). A (1717) is generated. Here, the tag information corresponds to the MAC, and the MAC algorithm (H) (1713) may be a set of hash functions H of a strong universal hash class. At this time, among the hash function set H, the function h to be used for generating tag information K is determined by a pre-shared key (1711). At this time, the length of the pre-shared key (1711) is assigned as log2|H| bits, and |H| means the number of hash functions constituting the hash function set. In addition, the tag information is T = h k (m), which is a hash function h chosen by a pre-shared key K. K This means that the result is obtained by entering message m in . Alice enters message (1715) and tag information Tag A (1717) is transmitted to the receiver Bob through the classical channel. Bob uses the pre-shared key (1721) and the MAC algorithm (H) (1723) to tag the received message (1731). B (1727) and generate tag information Tag B (1727) and received tag information Tag A (1733) is compared to determine whether authentication is successful. In the WCA-based authentication method described above, the hash function takes a message of arbitrary length and outputs a fixed-length hash value. In other words, the hash function converts input information of arbitrary length into a fixed-length value, which is why it's also called a message digest. Creating a MAC using a hash function has the following three characteristics: (1) Preimage resistance: For any given output value y, it is computationally impossible to find an input value x that satisfies y = h(x). (2) Second phase resistance (2) nd Preimage resistance): Given an input value x with h(x) and h(x)=h(x'), it is computationally infeasible to find another input value x' that satisfies x≠x'. (3) Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find two input values ​​x and x' that satisfy the hash value h(x) = h(x'). In a WCA-based authentication scheme, assuming that a third party, Eve, replaces the message m sent by the sender with m' through a man-in-the-middle attack and sends the guessed tag information, Eve cannot know which hash function the sender and receiver used, so she estimates the tag information using a random hash function. In this case, the probability that the estimated tag information matches the tag information generated by the sender is 1 / |T|. Here, T represents the number of tags. Since the number of tags is determined by the number of hash functions available to the sender and receiver, the more hash functions are used, the lower the probability that Eve will guess the tag. In other words, as shown in [Mathematical Formula 1] and [Mathematical Formula 2] below, the greater the number of hash functions, the lower the collision probability of the hash functions. Here, a collision of hash functions means that tag information for different messages obtained using hash functions matches. Figure 18 illustrates an example of a collision of hash functions in a communication system. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 18, the first message (m1) (1801) is hashed using a hash function h K The tag information obtained by inputting the second message (m2) (1803) into the hash function h K If the tag information obtained by inputting t(1811) is identical to each other, it can be referred to as a hash function collision. The number of collisions of a hash function can be calculated as shown in [Mathematical Formula 1] below. In [Mathematical Formula 1], m1 and m2 represent messages included in the possible message set M, h represents a hash function included in the hash function set H, and t represents tag information included in the tag set T. In addition, means whether the hash functions for message m1 and message m2 collide, means the number of collisions of the set of hash functions for message m1 and message m2. The collision probability can be calculated as shown in [Mathematical Formula 2] below. In [Mathematical Formula 2], H represents the number of collisions of the set of hash functions for message x and message y. Meanwhile, a wireless communication system supporting an existing 5G network acquires security keys in a manner as illustrated in FIG. 19. FIG. 19 illustrates a structure for acquiring a communication security key in a wireless communication system. Referring to FIG. 19, a UDM / ARPF (Unified Data Management / Authentication Credential Repository Processing Function) on the network side (1910) and a USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module) on the UE side (1920) share a root key K (1931) through a predefined method. The root key is a key corresponding to user-specific information and may have a length of 128 bits or 256 bits depending on the operator. The network side (1910) and the UE side (1920) generate a ciphering key CK and an integrity key IK (1933) based on the root key, and generate an anchor key K through 5G AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) or EAP-AKA' (Extensible Authentication Protocol-AKA'), which is a user authentication process, based on the ciphering key and the integrity key. SEAF (1935) is generated. Through this process, the network side (1910) performs user authentication for the UE side (1920), and then generates keys (e.g., K) to be applied for secure communication such as encryption. AMF , K N3IWF , KgNB , K RRCint , K RRCenc , K UPint , K UPenc , K NASint , K NASenc ) can be shared with the UE side (1920). Figure 20 illustrates an example of a frame structure for quantum communication in a communication system. Referring to FIG. 20, a frame (2000) for quantum communication may include a QA header (2010) used for quantum authentication and a payload (2020) used for quantum key distribution and quantum communication. The QA header (2010) includes a quantum state generated to correspond to an authentication message according to a quantum basis selected based on a pre-shared key. That is, quantum authentication in quantum communication may be performed by Alice and Bob exchanging QA headers including quantum states as illustrated in FIG. 21 or FIG. 22. Figure 21 illustrates an example of a quantum authentication method in a noise-free quantum channel environment applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to Figure 21, Alice (2110) selects a quantum basis (2113) based on a pre-shared key (2111). The quantum basis may be selected from either an orthogonal basis or a cross basis. The orthogonal basis includes polarization components perpendicular to and parallel to the optical axis of the medium, while the cross basis includes polarization components at a 45-degree angle and a 135-degree angle with the optical axis of the medium. Here, the quantum basis may be selected based on a pre-shared key agreed upon between Alice and Bob. For example, it can be predefined that when the value of the nth bit of the pre-shared key (2111) is 0, an orthogonal basis is selected as the basis for the nth bit, and when the value of the nth bit is 1, a diagonal basis is selected as the basis for the nth bit. Accordingly, Alice (2110) can determine the quantum basis as +××+ when the pre-shared key (2111) is 0110. Alice (2110) generates an authentication message (2115) and generates a quantum state corresponding to the authentication message (2115) based on the selected quantum basis (2113). Here, the quantum state can be selected based on the quantum basis according to a prior agreement between Alice and Bob. For example, if the value of the nth bit of the authentication message (2115) is 0, the polarization state of the nth bit can be determined as 0 degrees or 45 degrees depending on the selected basis, and if the value of the nth bit of the authentication message (2115) is 1, the polarization state of the nth bit can be determined as 90 degrees or 135 degrees depending on the selected basis. Therefore, when the authentication message (2115) is 0101 and the quantum basis is +××+, Alice (2110) can generate quantum states corresponding to the authentication message (2115), including a 0-degree polarization state, a 45-degree polarization state, a 135-degree polarization state, and a 90-degree polarization state. Alice (2110) transmits the generated quantum state to Bob (2110) through a quantum channel. At this time, the quantum state can be included in a QA header (2010) as illustrated in FIG. 20 and transmitted to Bob (2120). Bob (2120) selects a measurement basis (2123) based on a pre-shared key (2121). The pre-shared key (2121) is a key previously shared with Alice (2110) and may be the same key as Alice's (2110) pre-shared key (2111). Bob (2120) decodes the received quantum state based on the measurement basis (2123) to obtain an authentication code (2125), which is an authentication message corresponding to the quantum state. Here, the quantum state can be decoded based on the measurement basis according to a pre-arrangement between Alice and Bob. For example, if the nth quantum state is a polarization state of 0 degrees or 45 degrees, the nth bit of the authentication code is interpreted as 0, and if the nth quantum state is a polarization state of 90 degrees or 135 degrees, the nth bit of the authentication code is interpreted as 1, and thus the authentication code (2125) can be generated. Accordingly, if the received quantum state includes a 0 degree polarization state, a 45 degree polarization state, a 135 degree polarization state, and a 90 degree polarization state, Bob (2120) can generate an authentication code (2125) of 0101. Bob (2120) can perform an authentication function for Bob (2120) by feeding back the acquired authentication code (2125) to Alice (2110) through a classical channel, using whether the authentication code (2119) generated by Alice (2110) matches the authentication code acquired by Bob (2120). If the pre-shared key (2121) is normal, the authentication code (2119) generated by Alice (2110) will be identical to the authentication message (2115) generated by Alice (2110). If the generated authentication code (2119) matches the received authentication code (2127), Alice (2110) determines that the authentication is successful. On the other hand, if the generated authentication code (2119) does not match the received authentication code (2127), Alice (2110) determines that the authentication is unsuccessful. FIG. 21 assumes a noise-free quantum channel environment, where Alice as the sender and Bob as the receiver authenticate each other using a pre-shared symmetric key to determine whether the other party is an authorized entity. However, in an actual quantum channel environment, channel errors may occur due to the influence of quantum decoherence or a hijacking attempt by a third party, Eve. Therefore, even when Alice as the sender and Bob as the receiver use a pre-shared symmetric key, there may be cases where at least a portion of the authentication code generated by Alice and the authentication code obtained by Bob are different. FIG. 22 illustrates an example of a quantum authentication method in a noisy environment applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to FIG. 22, Alice (2210) and Bob (2220) select a quantum basis and a measurement basis based on a pre-shared symmetric key, and generate an authentication code based on the selected quantum basis and the measurement basis. At this time, the authentication code (2211) generated from Alice (2210) is 0101, and the authentication code (2221) generated from Bob (2220) is 0001, which means they are different. Alice (2210) can estimate an error rate (2231) by comparing an authentication code received from Bob (2220) through a classical channel with an authentication code generated by Alice (2210), and determine whether the estimated error rate exceeds a specified QBER threshold (2233). Alice (2210) can determine authentication success (2225) or authentication failure (2227) based on whether the estimated error rate exceeds a specified QBER threshold. Here, the QBER threshold may be a value determined in advance in consideration of the channel environment. Therefore, the fact that the estimated error rate does not exceed the QBER threshold means that only a part of the authentication code is inconsistent due to quantum decoherence, etc., and that a third party has not interfered with the information transmitted through the quantum channel. Accordingly, Alice (2210) can determine that user authentication is successful if the estimated error rate is less than the QBER threshold, and can determine that user authentication is failed if the estimated error rate is greater than or equal to the QBER threshold. That is, if the estimated error rate exceeds the QBER threshold, Alice (2210) can determine that the authentication code is inconsistent due to third-party intervention and stop the user authentication process for quantum key sharing. A specific procedure for quantum authentication based on the QA header is illustrated in FIG. 23. FIG. 23 illustrates an example of a quantum authentication procedure applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to FIG. 23, Alice (2310), the transmitter, and Bob (2320), the receiver, have pre-shared keys. For example, the pre-shared key may be user-specific information of a USIM utilized in 3GPP 4G and / or 5G. The pre-shared key is discarded after being used n times and may be updated with a new value. Alice (2310) selects (2301) a quantum basis K based on a pre-shared key K, and generates and stores (2303) an authentication message to be used as an authentication code A. At this time, the generated authentication message may be a classical message, randomly selected by a pure random characteristic such as a Quantum random number generator (QRNG), or may be a message generated by Alice's (2310) selection. Alice (2310) generates (2305) a quantum state K(A) corresponding to the authentication message based on the selected quantum basis K. For example, Alice (2310) can generate a quantum message including the quantum state by encoding the authentication message based on the selected quantum basis. Alice (2310) transmits the quantum message including the generated quantum state to Bob (2320) through a quantum channel. Bob (2320) selects (2307) a measurement basis K based on a pre-shared key K, then measures a quantum message received through a quantum channel based on the selected measurement basis K, and obtains (2309) an authentication code A' as a measurement result. For example, Bob (2320) can obtain an authentication code A' by decoding a quantum message based on the selected measurement basis K. Bob (2320) transmits authentication code A' to Alice (2310) through a classical channel. Alice (2310) compares the authentication code A that she generated with the authentication code A' received from Bob (2320) and estimates (2313) the QBER based on the comparison result. Alice (2310) determines that the authentication is successful if the estimated QBER is lower than a specified QBER threshold, and determines that the authentication is failed if the estimated QBER is higher than or equal to the specified QBER threshold. Thereafter, Alice (2310) transmits an ACK / NACK message indicating whether the authentication was successful to Bob (2320). Bob (2320) confirms whether the authentication was successful through the received ACK / NACK message (2311). Unlike quantum authentication, which operates based on the QA header, quantum key distribution operates based on the payload. The operation of the BB84 protocol, which is a representative example of a quantum key distribution protocol, is as shown in FIG. 24. FIG. 24 illustrates an example of a quantum key distribution procedure applicable to the present disclosure. Referring to FIG. 24, first, Alice (2410) selects (2401) a quantum basis R for key generation. The quantum basis may be randomly selected by a purely random characteristic such as a QRNG, or may be selected under Alice's control. Alice (2410) generates and stores (2403) a message M. At this time, the generated message M is a classical message, and may be randomly selected by a purely random characteristic such as a QRNG, or may be selected under Alice's control. Alice (2410) generates (2405) a quantum state R(M) corresponding to the message M based on the selected quantum basis R. For example, Alice (2410) can generate a quantum message including a quantum state R(M) by encoding the message M based on a selected quantum basis R. Alice (2410) transmits the quantum message including the generated quantum state to Bob (2420) through a quantum channel. Bob (2420) selects (2407) a measurement basis R' for key measurement. Here, the measurement basis R' can be randomly selected by a purely random property such as a QRNG, or can be selected under Bob's control. Bob (2320) obtains and stores (2409) a measured message M' by measuring a quantum message received through a quantum channel based on the selected measurement basis R'. For example, Bob (2420) can obtain the measured message M' by decoding the quantum message based on the selected measurement basis. Bob (2420) selects (2411) at least some indices of the measured message M' for QBER estimation, and feeds back QBER estimation information including information on the selected indices to Alice (2410). For example, Bob (2420) selects at least some information bits among a plurality of information bits included in the measured message M', and feeds back QBER estimation information including index information indicating the positions of the selected information bits, measurement basis information used to obtain the selected information bits, and values ​​of the selected information bits to Alice (2410). At this time, Bob (2420) can feed back the entire measurement basis R' used to obtain the measured message M' to Alice (2410). Alice (2410) estimates QBER (2413) based on the QBER estimation information. For example, Alice (2410) checks the positions of the information bits selected by Bob (2420) and the measurement basis of the information bits selected by Bob (2420) from the QBER estimation information, and compares them with the quantum basis used to generate her message M. Through this, Alice (2410) can check the positions where the same basis is used by Bob (2420) and Alice (2410). Alice (2410) compares the information bits of the message M generated by Alice (2410) at positions where the same basis is used, and the information bits of the information bits received from Bob (2420) at positions where the same basis is used, and estimates QBER based on the comparison result. Alice (2410) can determine that there is no third party, i.e., an eavesdropper, between Alice (2410) and Bob (2420) if the estimated QBER is lower than the predefined QBER threshold, and can determine that there is an eavesdropper between Alice (2410) and Bob (2420) if the estimated QBER is higher than the predefined QBER threshold. If it is determined that there is no eavesdropper between Alice (2410) and Bob (2420), Alice (2410) can send index information indicating a position where the same basis is used to Bob (2420), and generate (2415) a shifted key through key sifting. For example, Alice (2410) can generate a shifted key including only the selected information bits by performing key shifting to select only the information bits at positions where the same basis is used among the multiple information bits included in the generated message M. Bob (2420) can receive index information indicating a position where the same base is used from Alice (2410) and generate a shift key (2417) by performing key shifting based on the received index information. For example, Bob (2420) can generate a shift key including only the selected information bits by performing key shifting to select only the information bits at positions where the same base is used among the plurality of information bits included in the generated message M'. Alice (2410) and Bob (2420) can generate the same shift key in the same manner as described above, and can use the generated shift key to perform secure communication or generate keys for other purposes through post-processing on the shift key. The shift key can be understood as a key that serves as the basis for generating other keys, for example, corresponding to an anchor key in a 5G system. As mentioned above, quantum authentication operates based on the QA header, whereas quantum key distribution, unlike quantum authentication, operates based on the payload. However, quantum authentication and quantum key distribution are separate operations and have no correlation with each other. Therefore, if Alice and Bob perform quantum key distribution using the payload, a third party, Eve or a man-in-the-middle, can perform an intercept-and-resend attack by evading the location of the QA header and intercepting and retransmitting only the payload. In this case, Eve or the man-in-the-middle can send other information to Alice or Bob regardless of user authentication, which may undermine the security of the quantum key distribution operation. Accordingly, the present disclosure proposes a technique for enhancing the security of quantum communication in a communication system supporting quantum communication. Specifically, the present disclosure relates to a technique for simultaneously performing user authentication and quantum key distribution via a quantum channel based on a pre-shared key. By simultaneously performing user authentication and quantum key distribution based on a pre-shared key, the present disclosure can provide correlation and dependency between user authentication and key distribution operations. This prevents a third party from evading user authentication by attacking only the payload, and thereby prevents information related to the pre-shared key from being leaked, thereby preventing a third party from deducing the quantum key. In the present disclosure, a first device acting as Alice and a second device acting as Bob possess a pre-shared key using a pre-defined method. For example, the pre-shared key may be a root key based on user-specific information in a USIM utilized in 3GPP 4G and / or 5G. However, the embodiments described below can also be applied equally to cases where a pre-shared key is used according to another method. FIG. 25 illustrates an example of a procedure for transmitting a message stream for quantum authentication in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 25 also illustrates an operating method of a terminal acting as Alice. Referring to FIG. 25, in step S2501, the terminal receives at least one synchronization signal. The terminal receives a synchronization signal block (SSB) containing at least one synchronization signal through a cell search operation and acquires synchronization with the base station. In step S2503, the terminal receives system information from the base station. For example, the terminal may receive a master information block (MIB) and at least one system information block (SIB). Through this, the terminal may obtain information for connecting to the base station and information for performing procedures for subsequent communication with the base station. According to one embodiment, the system information may include information necessary for quantum communication with the base station. For example, the system information may include information for establishing a quantum channel. As another example, the system information may include configuration information related to at least one of quantum authentication and quantum key distribution. The configuration information for quantum authentication may include at least one of information related to the length of a pre-shared key used to generate quantum states or information related to the number of message streams to be included in a first message for authentication. In step S2505, the terminal performs a random access procedure. Specifically, based on random access-related information obtained from system information, the terminal transmits a random access preamble to the base station and receives a random access response message from the base station. Accordingly, the terminal can enter a state for communicating with the base station. In step S2507, the terminal receives control information. The control information includes at least one of scheduling information and configuration information for performing communication, and may include at least one of physical layer signaling, MAC CE, and upper layer signaling. According to one embodiment, the control information may include configuration information for quantum authentication. However, if the system information includes configuration information for quantum authentication, the control information may not include configuration information for quantum authentication. In step S2509, the terminal transmits a first message for authentication. The first message may be generated based on a pre-shared key. That is, the first message may include information or data generated based on the pre-shared key, and the terminal may initiate an authentication procedure by transmitting the first message. According to one embodiment, the terminal may generate a first message including encoded message streams by repeatedly using the pre-shared key to encode a plurality of message streams. The encoded message streams are quantum state streams, and the terminal may transmit the generated first message to a base station via a quantum channel. Specifically, the terminal may select a quantum basis for generating the first message based on the pre-shared key, and generate a plurality of message streams having a length indicated by configuration information for quantum authentication included in system information or control information. Here, the length of each of the plurality of message streams may be determined based on information related to the length of the pre-shared key. The terminal can generate a first message including quantum state streams corresponding to the plurality of message streams according to the repeatedly used quantum basis by repeatedly using the selected quantum basis to encode the plurality of message streams. In step S2511, the terminal receives a second message for authentication. The second message is a message caused by the first message and includes information or data generated based on information or data included in the first message. According to one embodiment, the terminal receives the second message including measurement bases used by the base station and at least one message stream decoded by the base station. Here, the second message may be received via a classical channel. Specifically, the first message may include the result of decoding measurement bases randomly selected by the base station and at least one quantum state stream based on a pre-shared key. Although not illustrated in FIG. 25, after transmitting the first message, the terminal receiving the second message can perform authentication for the second user based on multiple message streams generated by the terminal and the second message received from the base station. Furthermore, the terminal can generate a quantum key through a key shifting operation. The quantum key generated through the key shifting operation may be identical to the quantum key generated by the base station. In other words, the quantum key may be a symmetric key held by the terminal and the base station for quantum communication. FIG. 26 illustrates an example of a procedure for receiving a message stream for quantum authentication in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. FIG. 26 also illustrates an operating method of a base station operating as a bob. Referring to FIG. 26, in step S2601, the base station transmits at least one synchronization signal. To this end, the base station transmits an SSB including at least one synchronization signal. In step S2603, the base station transmits system information. For example, the terminal may receive a MIB and at least one SIB. Through this, the terminal may obtain information for connecting to the base station and information for performing procedures for subsequent communication with the base station. According to one embodiment, the system information may include information for establishing a quantum channel. As another example, the system information may include information necessary for quantum communication with the base station. For example, the system information may include configuration information related to at least one of quantum authentication or quantum key distribution. The configuration information for quantum authentication may include at least one of information related to the length of a pre-shared key used to generate quantum states or information related to the number of message streams to be included in a first message for authentication. In step S2605, the base station performs a random access procedure. Specifically, the base station may receive a random access preamble transmitted from a terminal during one of the RACH opportunities included in the RACH resources indicated by the system information, and transmit a random access response message to the terminal. Accordingly, the base station may enter a state for communicating with the terminal. In step S2607, the base station transmits control information. The control information includes at least one of scheduling information and configuration information for performing communication, and may include at least one of physical layer signaling, MAC CE, and upper layer signaling. According to one embodiment, the control information may include configuration information for quantum authentication. However, if the system information includes configuration information for quantum authentication, the control information may not include configuration information for quantum authentication. In step S2609, the base station receives a first message for authentication. The first message may include information or data generated based on a pre-shared key, and an authentication procedure may be initiated upon receipt of the first message. In one embodiment, the first message may include quantum state streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key between the terminal and the base station. The first message is received over a quantum channel and may include quantum state streams corresponding to a plurality of message streams generated by the terminal. In step S2611, the base station transmits a second message for authentication. The second message is a message caused by the first message and includes information or data generated based on information or data included in the first message. According to one embodiment, the base station can obtain or measure a plurality of message streams by decoding quantum state streams included in the first message based on a first measurement basis selected based on a pre-shared key and second measurement basis that are randomly selected. The base station can select at least one message stream measured based on the first measurement basis among the plurality of measured message streams and generate a second message including the selected at least one message stream and the second measurement basis. In the embodiment described with reference to FIG. 26, the base station generates a second message by mixing at least one message stream measured by the first measurement basis and the second measurement basis, in order to perform user authentication and quantum key distribution simultaneously. In addition, the base station can estimate the message streams generated by the terminal by repeatedly using a pre-shared key to decode the encoded quantum state streams included in the first message. The base station can generate a quantum key by performing key shifting based on the estimated message streams and the second message. At this time, the generated quantum key may be a symmetric key identical to the quantum key generated in step S2511 of FIG. 25. In the embodiments described with reference to FIGS. 25 and 26, the case where the terminal operates as Alice and the base station operates as Bob has been described. However, various embodiments of the present disclosure are not limited thereto. For example, the terminal may operate as Bob and the base station may operate as Alice. In this case, after the terminal receives a first message from the base station, it may transmit a second message to the base station. That is, steps S2509 and S2511 in FIG. 25 may be performed by the base station, and steps S2609 and S6511 in FIG. 26 may be performed by the terminal. FIG. 27 illustrates an example of a detailed procedure for quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in a first device of a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. According to one embodiment, the detailed procedure for quantum authentication and quantum key distribution of FIG. 27 can be understood as a specific procedure for steps S2509 and S2511 of FIG. 25. Referring to FIG. 27, in step S2701, the terminal generates quantum state streams using a pre-shared key. The terminal selects a quantum basis having a specified length based on the pre-shared key. In addition, the terminal can generate multiple message streams having a specified length. The specified length can be determined based on the length of the pre-shared key or configuration information. The terminal can encode each of the multiple message streams using the selected quantum basis. That is, the terminal can obtain quantum state streams by repeatedly using the selected quantum basis to encode each of the multiple message streams. In step S2703, the terminal transmits a first message containing quantum state streams to the base station. The first message is a quantum state message transmitted to the base station for quantum authentication, and can be transmitted to the base station via a quantum channel. In step S2705, the terminal receives a second message including a randomly selected measurement basis and at least one measured message stream. The terminal may receive the second message for authentication via a classical channel. The second message may include at least one message stream measured based on a pre-shared key at the base station and a randomly selected measurement basis. For example, some of the message streams included in the second message are at least one message stream measured by decoding a first part of the first message based on the first measurement basis, and the remaining parts include second measurement basis randomly selected for decoding a second part of the first message. Here, the first measurement basis means a measurement basis selected based on a pre-shared key at the base station. In step S2707, the terminal performs second message-based authentication. The terminal may perform authentication on the base station by comparing the plurality of message streams generated in step S2701 with the second message received from the base station. For example, the terminal may perform an exclusive OR operation on the plurality of message streams generated on the terminal and the second message received from the base station, and check whether an authentication section with a value of 0 for a specified length exists in the exclusive OR operation result. The existence of an authentication section with a value of 0 in the exclusive OR operation result means that a specific section of the second message corresponds to a message stream measured based on a pre-shared key. In other words, if an authentication section with a value of 0 for a specified length exists in the exclusive OR operation result, it means that the second message was received from a base station that holds the pre-shared key, and if an authentication section with a value of 0 for a specified length does not exist in the exclusive OR operation result, it may mean that the second message was received from a third party that does not hold the pre-shared key. At step S2709, the terminal determines whether authentication is successful. If there is an authentication interval with a 0 value for the specified length in the exclusive-OR operation result, the terminal may determine that authentication is successful. If there is no authentication interval with a 0 value for the specified length in the exclusive-OR operation result, the terminal may determine that authentication has failed. If the authentication is successful, in step S2711, the terminal notifies the base station of the authentication success and generates a quantum key. The message notifying the base station of the authentication success may be an ACK message. The terminal may transmit a shift key generation command message together with the message notifying the authentication success. The terminal compares the quantum basis used when generating the first message in the terminal and the measurement basis received from the base station to identify indices of positions where the same basis is used in the terminal and the base station. The terminal may perform key shifting to select only message information of positions corresponding to the identified indices among the plurality of message streams generated in step S2701, thereby generating a quantum key including only the selected message information. According to one embodiment, when generating a quantum key, the quantum basis and message stream of the authentication section may be excluded. If authentication fails, the terminal notifies the base station of the authentication failure at step S2713 and terminates the quantum authentication and quantum key distribution procedures. The message notifying the authentication failure may be a NACK message. FIG. 28 illustrates an example of a detailed procedure for quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in a second device of a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. According to one embodiment, the detailed procedure for quantum authentication and quantum key distribution of FIG. 28 can be understood as a specific procedure for steps S2609 and S2611 of FIG. 26. Referring to FIG. 28, in step S2801, the base station receives a first message containing quantum state streams. The first message is a message for authentication and may be received via a quantum channel. The quantum state streams may contain quantum states corresponding to multiple message streams generated by the terminal. In step S2803, the base station decodes the first message using a first measurement basis based on a pre-shared key and randomly selected second measurement basis. The base station may select a first measurement basis to be used for decoding some of the quantum state streams of the first message based on the pre-shared key, and may randomly select second measurement basis to be used for decoding the remaining quantum state streams. The base station may measure the first plurality of message streams by decoding some of the quantum state streams using the selected first measurement basis and decoding the remaining quantum state streams using the second measurement basis. In step S2805, the base station transmits a second message including a measured message stream based on the first measurement basis and second measurement basis. The measured message stream based on the first measurement basis refers to a message stream obtained by decoding a portion of a quantum state stream using the first measurement basis. The base station transmits the second message to the terminal via a classical channel. In step S2807, the base station determines whether authentication is successful. The base station can determine whether authentication is successful by receiving a message indicating whether authentication is successful from the terminal. For example, if an ACK message is received from the terminal, the base station can determine authentication is successful, and if a NACK message is received from the terminal, the base station can determine authentication is unsuccessful. In one embodiment, the ACK message may be received together with a shift key generation command message. In one embodiment, the message indicating authentication success may instruct quantum key generation. If the authentication is successful, the base station generates a quantum key in step S2809. The base station generates a quantum key based on the first plurality of message streams measured in step S2803. In step S2803, the base station compares the first measurement basis and the second measurement basis used when measuring the first plurality of message streams with information repeatedly configuring the first measurement basis, thereby identifying indices of positions where the same basis is used in the terminal and the base station. In step S2803, the base station performs key shifting to select only message information corresponding to indices that are confirmed to have been used identically through comparison between the basis among the first message streams measured in advance, thereby generating a quantum key including only the selected message information. According to one embodiment, when generating the quantum key, the measurement basis and message stream of the authentication section may be excluded. If the authentication fails, the base station terminates the quantum authentication and quantum key distribution procedures. FIG. 29 illustrates signal exchanges for performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. In the description referring to FIG. 29 , Alice (2910) may be a terminal or a base station, and Bob (2920) may be a terminal or a base station capable of communicating with Alice (2910). At least some of the operations of FIG. 29 described below may be performed sequentially or in parallel. For example, some of the operations of FIG. 29 may be performed at least temporarily at the same time. In addition, in the description referring to FIG. 29, at least some of the operations will be described with reference to FIG. 30A and FIG. 30B. FIG. 30A illustrates an example of transmitting a message stream for quantum authentication based on a quantum channel in a communication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, and FIG. 30B illustrates an example of performing quantum authentication and quantum key distribution based on a message stream for quantum authentication in a communication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Referring to FIG. 29, in step S2901, Alice (2910) selects a quantum basis based on a pre-shared key. For example, Alice (2910) may select (3001) a quantum basis K based on a pre-shared key K, as illustrated in FIG. 30a. At this time, the pre-shared key is K = [K1, … K L ], the length of the selected quantum basis K has the same length as the length L of the pre-shared key. In one embodiment, the length L of the pre-shared key can be 128 or 256. The quantum basis can be selected according to the pre-shared key based on a predefined manner among an orthogonal basis and a diagonal basis. For example, Alice (2910) and Bob (2920) can select an orthogonal basis as a quantum basis for a specific bit value of the pre-shared key if the bit value is 0, and can select a diagonal basis as a quantum basis for the specific bit value if the bit value is 1. For example, if the pre-shared key is K=

[0101] In this case, Alice (2910) can choose the quantum basis as +×+×. In step S2903, Alice (2910) generates quantum state streams by encoding message streams. To this end, Alice (2910) encodes N message streams M=[M1, …, M], as illustrated in FIG. 30a. N ](3003) can be generated. At this time, the length of each message stream becomes L, and the length of the entire message stream |M| containing N message streams becomes L×N. The i-th message stream among the entire message streams is M i =[m1 (i) , … , m L (i) ] can be a binary message generated by a purely random characteristic such as a QRNG, or generated based on Alice's (2910) choice. Alice (2910) generates quantum states corresponding to each of the N message streams by encoding each of the N message streams based on the selected quantum basis. Here, encoding means generating a quantum state corresponding to the message stream according to a predefined rule based on the selected quantum basis. For example, if the nth bit value of the i-th message stream is 0, if the quantum basis corresponding to the nth bit is an orthogonal basis, a quantum state of 0 degree can be generated for the nth bit of the i-th message stream by encoding, and if the quantum basis corresponding to the nth bit is a diagonal basis, a quantum state of 45 degree can be generated for the nth bit of the i-th message stream by encoding. In addition, if the nth bit value of the i-th message stream is 1, if the quantum basis corresponding to the nth bit is an orthogonal basis, a 90-degree quantum state can be generated for the nth bit of the i-th message stream by encoding, and if the quantum basis corresponding to the nth bit is a diagonal basis, a 135-degree quantum state can be generated for the nth bit of the i-th message stream by encoding. In this way, Alice (2910) can generate quantum state streams [K(M1), …, K(M)] corresponding to N message streams. N )](3005) can be generated. Here, K(M i ) is the i-th message stream M generated by a quantum basis based on a pre-shared key K. i It means the quantum state of . In one embodiment, Alice (2910) and Bob (2920) share information necessary for configuring a quantum state stream, for example, the length L of a pre-shared key and the number N of message streams, by a predefined method. For example, Alice (2910) and Bob (2920) may share information necessary for configuring a quantum state stream during the system design phase, or may share information necessary for configuring a quantum state stream through system information (e.g., MIB, SIB) or control information (e.g., physical layer signaling, MAC CE, upper layer signaling). Information necessary for configuring a quantum state stream may be shared by Alice (2910) acting as Alice and being instructed to Bob (2920) acting as Bob. Alternatively, information necessary for configuring a quantum state stream may be shared to Alice (2910) and Bob (2920) by being broadcast or multicast by a coordinator for controlling a quantum communication system. At step S2905, Alice (2910) transmits quantum state streams to Bob (2920) through a quantum channel. For example, Alice (2910) transmits quantum state streams [K(M1), …, K(M N )] is transmitted to Bob (2920) through the quantum channel. In step S2907, Bob (2920) selects a first measurement basis and a second measurement basis for measuring message streams corresponding to quantum state streams. Bob (2920) selects a first measurement basis having a specified length L based on a pre-shared key. The first measurement basis K is K = [K1, …, K L] can be expressed as. In addition, Bob (2920) selects N measurement bases and determines the selected measurement bases as the second measurement bases. Each base included in the second measurement bases is randomly selected by a pure random characteristic such as QRNG or is randomly selected by the control of Bob (2920). Since the second measurement bases are a set of randomly determined bases, they can be referred to as a 'random basis stream'. The second measurement bases R = [R1, … , R N ] contains N measurement bases, and the i-th second measurement basis R i = [r1 (i) , … , r L (i) ] contains L quantum bases, where r1 (i) means the basis at the position of the first index among the L basis belonging to the i-th second measurement basis. That is, R i Since has a specified length L, the total length |R| of the second measurement basis becomes L×N. In step S2909, Bob (2920) constructs a measurement basis stream by mixing the first measurement basis and the second measurement basis. For example, Bob (2920) constructs a measurement basis stream B=[R1, …, K, …, R] by mixing the first measurement basis selected based on the pre-shared key and the randomly selected second measurement basis, as illustrated in FIG. 30a. N ](3007). Specifically, Bob (2920) can replace L basis among the basis included in the randomly selected second measurement basis with the first measurement basis. For example, by replacing the i-th second measurement basis with the length L among the measurement basis included in the second measurement basis with the first measurement basis, the measurement basis stream B=[R1, …, R i-1 , K, R i+1 , … , R N] can be configured. The measurement basis stream includes N measurement bases, and the length of each measurement base is L, so the length |B| of the measurement basis stream becomes L×N. Here, for convenience of explanation, the second measurement bases are divided into N measurement bases having length L, and the replacement position of the first measurement base is determined based on the measurement base unit, but the replacement position of the first measurement base can be selected at any position regardless of the measurement base unit. For example, Bob (2920) is r among the L×N bases included in the second measurement base. j (i) From r j-1 (i+1) By selecting L bases corresponding to up to and replacing the selected L bases with the first measurement base, the measurement basis stream B can be constructed. However, in this case, the first measurement basis can be replaced after being cyclically shifted by j. For example, the first measurement basis K is [K1, …, K L ] cyclically shifted by j from [K j , … , K L , K1, … , K j-1 ] can be replaced after being changed. In step S2911, Bob (2920) measures and stores the first message streams corresponding to the quantum state streams by decoding the received quantum state streams using the measurement basis stream. For example, Bob (2920) measures and stores the first message streams corresponding to the quantum state streams [K(M1), …, K(M)], as illustrated in FIG. 30a. N )] measure the basis streams [R1, …, K, …, R N ] by decoding the measured first message streams [R1{K(M1)}, … , K{K(M i )}, … , R N {K(M N)}](3009) can be generated. Here, the measured first message streams can be defined and stored as follows: ME = [R1{K(M1)}, … , K{K(M i )}, … , R N {K(M N )}] = [ME1, … , ME i , … , ME N ] At this time, the probability that each basis included in Alice's (2910) quantum basis and each basis included in Bob's (2920) second measurement basis are identical is 50%, and when the basis of both sides are identical, the probability that the first message streams measured in Bob (2920) and the message streams generated in Alice (2910) are identical is 100%. On the other hand, the probability that the basis of both sides are not identical is 50%, and when the basis of both sides are not identical, the probability that the first message streams measured in Bob (2920) and the message streams generated in Alice (2910) are identical is 50%. Therefore, the first message streams measured by the second measurement basis randomly selected among the measured message streams (e.g., R1{K(M1)}, R N {K(M N )}) matches the message streams generated by Alice (2910) (e.g., M1, MN) is statistically 75%. On the other hand, the probability that at least one message stream measured by the first measurement basis selected based on the pre-shared key among the measured first message streams matches at least one message stream generated by Alice (2910) is statistically 100%. Therefore, at least one message stream measured by the first measurement basis can be used as an authentication message or authentication code for quantum authentication. In step S2913, Bob (2920) transmits QBER estimation information to Alice (2910) via a classical channel. For example, Bob (2920) may transmit QBER estimation information (3013) to Alice (2910) including at least one of selected index(es), selected basis(s), and result for QBER, as illustrated in FIG. 30b. Here, the indices selected for QBER refer to some indices among quantum state streams or measured first message streams to be used for QBER calculation, and may be selected by Bob (2920). In addition, the basis refers to a measurement basis corresponding to the positions of the selected indices, and the result refers to measurement message values ​​corresponding to the positions of the selected indices among the measured first message streams. At this time, the number of indices selected for QBER measurement may be predefined. For example, Alice (2910) and Bob (2920) can predefine 10% of the total indices of the quantum state streams or measured first message streams to be used as indices for QBER measurements. The indices for QBER measurements can be randomly selected by a purely random property such as a QRNG, or can be randomly selected under the control of Bob (2920). In step S2915, Alice (2910) estimates QBER and checks whether there is a third party intervention based on the QBER estimation result. For example, Alice (2910) can estimate QBER (3015) based on QBER estimation information fed back from Bob (2920), as illustrated in FIG. 30b. Alice (2910) verifies the indices selected by Bob (2920) and the measurement basis of the selected indices from the QBER estimation information, and verifies the quantum basis corresponding to the indices selected by Bob (2920) among the quantum basis used to generate the quantum state streams of Alice (2910). Alice (2910) compares the measurement basis and quantum basis of the selected indices to check where the same basis is used by Alice (2910) and Bob (2920). Alice (2910) compares the message values ​​in the message streams of Alice (2910) at positions where the same basis is used with the message values ​​in the message values ​​received from Bob (2920) at positions where the same basis is used, and calculates the QBER based on the comparison result. If the estimated QBER is lower than a predefined QBER threshold, Alice (2910) determines that there is no eavesdropper in the quantum channel between Alice (2910) and Bob (2920). On the other hand, if the estimated QBER is higher than or equal to the predefined QBER threshold, Alice determines that there is an eavesdropper in the quantum channel between Alice (2910) and Bob (2920), and terminates the quantum authentication and quantum key distribution protocol. At this time, Alice (2910) can instruct Bob (2920) to terminate the protocol according to the time difference. At step S2917, Bob (2920) transmits the randomly selected second measurement basis and at least one measured message stream to Alice (2910) via the classical channel. For example, as illustrated in FIG. 30b, Bob (2920) transmits the measured first message streams [R1{K(M1)}, …, M i , … , RN {K(M N )}](3011) the i-th message stream M measured by the first measurement basis i and second measurement bases included in the measurement base stream [R1, …, R N ] can be mixed to generate feedback information and transmit (3017) the feedback information to Alice (2910). Here, the i-th message stream M measured by the first measurement basis i Since it is measured by the first measurement basis selected based on the pre-shared key, it can be used as an authentication code. The mixing method of the authentication code and the second measurement basis can be determined based on the mixing method of the first measurement basis and the second measurement basis in step S2909. For example, in the measured first message streams, the i-th message stream measured by the first measurement basis can be maintained, and the other message streams can be replaced with the second measurement basis used for measuring the corresponding message stream. As another example, the measurement basis stream B=[R1, …, R i-1 , K, R i+1 , … , R N ] in which the first measurement basis K is the i-th message stream M measured by the first measurement basis. i is replaced, and other second measurement bases can be maintained. Accordingly, the feedback information is F=[R1, …, R i-1 , M i , R i+1 , … , R N ]. Here, for the convenience of explanation, the case where the first measurement basis is replaced based on the measurement basis unit is described as an example, but even if the first measurement basis exists at any location, the feedback information F can be generated in the same manner. For example, if the measurement basis stream is B=[R1, …, r j-1 (i) , K, r j (i+1) , … , R N], the first measurement basis K is m j (i) From m j-1 (i+1) is replaced by , and the other second measurement bases are maintained, so that the feedback information is F=[R1, …, r j-1 (i) , m j (i) , … , m j-1 (i+1) , r j (i+1) , … , R N ] becomes. In step S2919, Alice (2910) performs an authentication operation using the second measurement bases and at least one measured message stream received from Bob (2920) and the message streams generated by Alice (2910). In other words, Alice (2910) can determine whether the authentication for Bob (2920) is successful by checking whether an authentication code exists in the second measurement bases and at least one measured message stream received from Bob (2920) using the message streams generated by Alice (2910). For example, Alice (2910) may perform an authentication operation using the message streams generated by Alice (2910) [M1, …, M i , … , M N ] and at least one measured message stream [R1, …, M] received from Bob (2920). i , … , R N ] can be performed (3019) on the exclusive logical operation, and whether an authentication code exists based on the result of the exclusive logical operation. If there is an interval with a length L consecutively having 0 values ​​as specified in the result of the exclusive logical operation, Alice (2910) can determine the interval as an authentication interval including an authentication code. For example, message streams [M1, …, M] generated by Alice (2910) i , … , MN ] and the stream [R1, …, M] fed back from Bob (2920). i , … , R N ] when XORing, M i In the corresponding section, all 0 values ​​are output, and in other sections, 0 or 1 is output with a statistical 50% probability. This means that the fed-back stream is [R1, …, r j-1 (i) , m j (i) , … , m j-1 (i+1) , r j (i+1) , … , R N ] is the same. That is, the message streams [M1, …, m] generated by Alice (2910) j-1 (i) , m j (i) , … , m j-1 (i+1) , m j (i+1) , … , M N ] and the stream [R1, …, r] fed back from Bob (2920) j-1 (i) , m j (i) , … , m j-1 (i+1) , r j (i+1) , … , R N ] when XORing, m j (i) From … , m j-1 (i+1) Up to , all 0 values ​​are output, and in other sections, 0 or 1 is output with a statistical 50% probability. This means that M i or m j (i) From … , m j-1 (i+1) Because it is a message stream measured based on a pre-shared key. Therefore, a third party who does not know the pre-shared key cannot intercept M i or m j (i) From … , mj-1 (i+1) The probability of constructing a message stream such that all output values ​​in the corresponding interval are 0 is 1 / (2 L ) is very low. For example, if the USIM root key of the 3GPP standard is used as a pre-shared key, the probability that a third party who does not know the pre-shared key will guess the authentication code is 1 / (2 256 ) is very low. If there is a section with 0 values ​​consecutively for a specified length L in the result of the exclusive OR operation, Alice (2910) determines that the authentication is successful because there is an authentication section including the authentication code in the feedback information. If there is no section with 0 values ​​consecutively for a specified length L in the result of the exclusive OR operation, Alice (2910) determines that the authentication is unsuccessful because there is no authentication section including the authentication code in the feedback information. According to one embodiment, Alice (2910) can determine whether the authentication is successful by considering the error rate by the actual quantum channel. For example, Alice (2910) can determine whether the authentication is successful by applying a moving average filter with a length L to the entire message stream and checking whether there is an authentication section in the result of the exclusive OR operation that achieves an error rate lower than or equal to that allowed by the quantum channel. At step S2921, Alice (2910) transmits to Bob (2920) whether the authentication was successful or not and a shift key generation command via a classical channel. For example, Alice (2910) may transmit a shift key generation command (3023) together with an ACK / NACK message indicating whether the authentication was successful or not, as illustrated in FIG. 30b. The shift key generation command may be transmitted if the authentication was successful, and may not be transmitted if the authentication failed. That is, if the authentication was successful, Alice (2910) may transmit a shift key generation command together with ACK information to Bob (2920). On the other hand, if the authentication failed, Alice (2910) may transmit a protocol termination or protocol restart command together with NACK information to Bob (2920). In step S2923, Alice (2910) generates a shift key. Specifically, Alice (2910) compares the quantum basis repeatedly used in generating the quantum state streams with the second measurement basis received from Bob (2920) to identify the indices of the positions where the same basis is used by Alice (2910) and Bob (2920). Alice (2910) can generate a shift key that includes only the selected message information by performing key shifting to select only the message values ​​corresponding to the indices identified as the positions where the same basis is used among the message streams generated by Alice (2910). For example, Alice (2910) may generate the second measurement basis [R1, …, R] excluding the authentication code section from the information fed back from Bob (2920). i-1 , R i+1 , … , R N ] and the quantum basis [K, …, K, …, K] selected in step S2901 are XORed to determine the position where the result value is 0. Alice (2910) selects only the message values ​​of the confirmed position among the message streams generated by Alice (2910), as shown in FIG. 30b, using key shifting. (3027) can be performed. Alice (2910) uses the message values ​​[k1, …, kp] selected by key shifting as a quantum key K. SEAF Save it as . Here, is in M1 This means deriving the indices whose value is 0 as quantum keys. This process is identical to the key shifting process of the BB84 protocol among existing quantum key distribution techniques. In addition, P refers to the length of the key stored as a quantum key through the shifting process. The length of the quantum key can be dynamically changed by the measurement basis stream of Bob (2920). In step S2925, Bob (2920) generates a shift key. Specifically, Bob (2920) measures and stores the first message streams corresponding to the quantum state streams by decoding them using the measurement basis stream in step S2911. Bob (2920) compares the repeated use information of the second measurement basis generated in step S2907 with the first measurement basis actually used by Alice (2910), thereby checking the indices of positions where the same basis is used by Alice (2910) and Bob (2920). Bob (2920) stores the streams ME = [ME1, …, ME] stored as a result of measuring the first message. i , … , ME N ], a quantum key including only the selected message information can be generated by performing key sifting that selects only the message values ​​corresponding to the indices identified as the same base usage location. For example, Bob (2920) can generate a quantum key including only the selected message information by performing key sifting that selects only the message values ​​corresponding to the indices identified as the same base usage location among the second measurement bases [R1, …, R ] excluding the authentication code section. i-1 , R i+1 , … , R N] and Alice (2910) perform an XOR operation on the quantum basis [K, … , K, … , K] used to generate the first message, thereby checking the position where the resulting value is 0. Bob (2920) checks the position where the message streams ME = [ME1, … , ME] measured in Bob (2920) as shown in Fig. 30b. i , … , ME N ] Key shifting to select only the message values ​​at the confirmed location (3025) can be performed. Bob (2920) selects message values ​​[k1, …, kp] by key shifting, using the shift key K. SEAF Save as . Through the procedure described above, Alice (2910) can perform user authentication for Bob (2920), and at the same time, Alice (2910) and Bob (2920) can obtain the same quantum key. That is, the quantum key obtained in the present disclosure is a key obtained through user authentication, and may be a key dependent on user authentication. The quantum key obtained through the procedure described above is a symmetric key, and is an anchor key K obtained through the user authentication process of the 3GPP standard, 5G AKA or EAP-AKA, as illustrated in FIG. 19. SEAF It can perform the same function. That is, if user authentication is successful, Bob (2920) and Alice (2910) can generate keys to be used for secure communication, such as encryption, in subsequent communications based on quantum keys. In the embodiment described with reference to FIG. 29, Bob (2920) transmits second measurement bases and at least one measurement message stream as information for authentication. According to another embodiment, Bob (2920) may further transmit an index indicating a section of an authentication code through a classical channel. For example, when Bob (2920) feeds back the second measurement bases and at least one measured message stream, at least one measured message stream M corresponding to an authentication code i or m j (i) … , m j-1 (i+1) The index information indicating the section of the authentication code can be fed back together. In this case, Alice (2910) can identify the authentication code section and perform authentication based on the index information indicating the section of the authentication code. On the other hand, since Alice (2910) utilizes the disclosed authentication code section, the mutual authentication function that Alice (2910) authenticates to Bob (2920) cannot be utilized. Mutual authentication based on authentication code interval In Fig. 29, Alice (2910) performed user authentication for Bob (2920). However, according to various embodiments, Alice (2910) may additionally transmit index information for an authentication code section to Bob (2920) for mutual authentication with Bob (2920), as illustrated in Fig. 31. Fig. 31 illustrates an example of additionally transmitting information for an authentication code section in a communication system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. As illustrated in Fig. 31, Alice (2910) transmits Mi or m, which are sections of the authentication code identified by Alice (2910), when transmitting a shift key generation command and whether authentication is successful. j (i) … , m j-1 (i+1)The index information (3111) of the authentication code can be transmitted to Bob (2920). That is, at least one message stream measured by Bob (2920) using the first measurement basis based on the pre-shared key can be measured only by Alice (2920) who has the same pre-shared key. Accordingly, Bob (2920) can determine that the user authentication for Alice (2910) is successful if the index information for the section of the authentication code received from Alice (2910) is identical to the index information of at least one message stream measured by Bob (2920) using the first measurement basis. Through this, Alice (2910) and Bob (2920) can be mutually authenticated. In the mutual authentication described with reference to FIG. 31, the shift key generation command may be transmitted after the mutual authentication is completed. FIG. 32 illustrates an example of transmitting a shift key generation command in a communication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As illustrated in FIG. 32, Alice (2910) transmits an index (3211) for whether authentication was successful and an authentication code section to Bob (2920). Thereafter, Bob (2920) may perform user authentication for Alice (2910) based on the authentication code section, and transmit a shift key generation command (3213) to Alice (2910) along with whether the user authentication was successful through the classical channel. At this time, the shift key generation command is transmitted only when the authentication for Alice (2910) is successful, and is omitted if the authentication fails. Adaptation of the authentication code section In the above-described embodiments, the length of the pre-shared key and the length of the authentication code are assumed to be the same, L. However, the length of the pre-shared key and the length of the authentication code may be set differently. In this case, Alice (2910) and Bob (2920) may agree in advance on the length of the pre-shared key and the length of the authentication code, or Bob (2920) may determine the length of the authentication code and then instruct Alice (2920) on the information about the length of the authentication code. Alternatively, the length of the authentication code to be selected by Bob (2920) may be quantized and agreed upon in advance. Additionally, in the aforementioned embodiments, the authentication codes were arranged sequentially and formed into a single section. However, in various embodiments, the authentication codes may be divided into multiple sub-authentication codes, each of which may be arranged discontinuously. In this case, Alice (2910) may transmit the indices of the discontinuously arranged locations to Bob (2920) for mutual authentication. In various embodiments, the authentication code may exist in a random location rather than a specific location. In this case, Alice (2910) may perform authentication using the statistical value of the result of the exclusive or, rather than searching for an interval in which 0s exist consecutively in the result of the exclusive or, when authenticating Bob (2920). For example, authentication may be performed based on the matching probability of the message streams generated by Alice (2910) and the information fed back from Bob (2910) as a result of the exclusive or performed in S2919. That is, if the authentication code exists in L random locations in the information fed back from Bob (2910), the matching probability of the message streams generated by Alice (2910) and the information fed back from Bob (2910) is 50% + 1 / N × 100%. Therefore, Alice (2910) may perform authentication based on 50% + 1 / N × 100%. However, in this case, mutual authentication cannot be performed because Alice (2910) cannot specify the location of the authentication code. Control the sifted key rate In the above description, Bob (2920) generated a measurement basis stream based on randomly selected second measurement basis, even though he knew the quantum basis used by Alice (9210). If Bob (2920) selected the second measurement basis with purely random characteristics, the probability that Bob (2920) and Alice (2910) will use the same basis in the remaining sections excluding the authentication code section, i.e., the basis matching probability, is statistically 50%. At this time, since Bob (2920) knows the quantum basis used by Alice (2910), he can intentionally increase the basis matching probability, as illustrated in FIG. 33. FIG. 33 illustrates an example of controlling a quantum key ratio in a communication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. For example, Bob (2920) can increase the basis matching probability from 50% to 70% by configuring the second measurement basis by considering the quantum basis used by Alice (9210). In this case, the length of the quantum key generated by using the same base can be increased. However, if information about Bob (2910) intentionally increasing the base matching probability is leaked to Eve, a third party, there is a possibility that some of the pre-shared key information may be leaked. Therefore, Eve and Alice must be kept in the dark about how Bob controls the base matching probability, thereby preventing information about the pre-shared key from being leaked. In one embodiment, the quantum key rate can be controlled by Alice's instructions. For example, Alice could instruct Bob on the basis matching probability based on a lookup table or a set of possible basis matching probabilities agreed upon in advance with Bob. Bob could then select the second measurement basis based on the instructed basis matching probability. However, this approach risks Eve's knowledge of this information, potentially leading to the disclosure of the pre-shared key. In the above description, quantum state streams are transmitted and received through quantum channels, and message streams, information, and / or command signals other than quantum state streams are transmitted and received through classical channels. However, message streams, information, and / or command signals other than quantum state streams may also be transmitted and received through quantum channels. For convenience of explanation, the present disclosure assumes a situation in which there are no errors due to decoherence or quantum loss in the quantum channel. However, it is self-evident that the aforementioned quantum authentication and quantum key distribution operations can be performed even if errors due to decoherence or quantum loss in the quantum channel exist. For example, by setting the QBER threshold value differently, the error rate in the quantum channel can be statistically reflected. As described above, the present disclosure simultaneously performs quantum authentication and quantum key distribution based on a pre-shared key, thereby obtaining a symmetric key dependent on user authentication as a quantum key, and enabling the transmitting and receiving sides to perform mutual authentication. Furthermore, the quantum key ratio can be controlled. The proposed methods described above can be implemented independently, but they can also be implemented as a combination (or merge) of some of the proposed methods. Rules can be defined so that the base station notifies the terminal of the applicability of the proposed methods (or information about the rules of the proposed methods) through a predefined signal (e.g., a physical layer signal or a higher layer signal). The present disclosure may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the technical ideas and essential features described herein. Therefore, the above detailed description should not be construed as limiting in all respects but rather as illustrative. The scope of the present disclosure should be determined by a reasonable interpretation of the appended claims, and all modifications within the equivalent scope of the present disclosure are intended to be included within the scope of the present disclosure. Furthermore, claims that are not explicitly cited in the claims may be combined to form an embodiment or incorporated into a new claim through a post-filing amendment. Embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied to various wireless access systems. Examples of various wireless access systems include the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) or 3GPP2 systems. The embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied not only to the various wireless access systems described above, but also to all technical fields that utilize these various wireless access systems. Furthermore, the proposed method can also be applied to mmWave and THz communication systems utilizing ultra-high frequency bands. Additionally, embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied to various applications such as autonomous vehicles and drones.

Claims

1. In a method of operating a terminal in a wireless communication system, A step of receiving at least one synchronization signal from a base station; A step of receiving system information from the base station; A step of performing a random access procedure for the above base station; A step of receiving control information from the base station; a step of transmitting at least one first message for authentication to the base station; and A step of receiving at least one second message for authentication from the base station, wherein said at least one first message comprises message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, A method wherein said at least one second message comprises measurement basis(s) used at said base station and at least one message stream decoded at said base station.

2. In claim 1, A method wherein the system information or the control information comprises at least one of information related to the length of a pre-shared key used to generate quantum states as setting information for the authentication or information related to the number of message streams included in the at least one first message.

3. In claim 1, wherein at least one first message is transmitted through a quantum channel, A method wherein at least one second message is received via a classical channel.

4. In claim 1, A method in which the above measurement bases and at least one message stream decoded at the base station are used for authentication of the base station.

5. In claim 1, A method wherein the encoded message streams include streams of quantum states corresponding to the message streams generated at the terminal.

6. In claim 5, A method in which message streams generated from the terminal and the measurement bases are used to determine a symmetric key of the terminal and the base station.

7. In claim 5, A step of determining the success of authentication based on confirming that an authentication code exists in at least one of the second messages; and Further comprising the step of transmitting a third message indicating the success of the above authentication to the base station, A method wherein the authentication code comprises at least one message stream decoded based on the pre-shared key at the base station.

8. In claim 7, A method wherein the third message includes at least one of a key generation command and index information indicating the location of the authentication code.

9. In claim 1, determining locations where the same basis is used among the quantum basis used to generate the encoded message stream and the measurement basis used at the base station; and A method further comprising the step of generating a key containing message values ​​of the above locations.

10. In a method of operating a base station in a wireless communication system, A step of transmitting at least one synchronization signal; Step of transmitting system information; A step of performing a terminal and random access procedure; A step of transmitting control information to the terminal; A step of receiving at least one first message for authentication from the terminal; and A step of transmitting at least one second message for the above authentication to the terminal, wherein said at least one first message comprises message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, A method wherein said at least one second message comprises measurement basis(s) used at said base station and at least one message stream decoded at said base station.

11. In claim 10, A method wherein at least one of the decoded message streams is obtained by decoding at least one of the encoded message streams based on the pre-shared key.

12. In claim 10, The above measurement bases are selected randomly.

13. In claim 10, A step of selecting a first measurement basis based on the above pre-shared key; A step of randomly selecting second measurement bases; A step of generating a measurement basis stream by replacing a specified number of continuously arranged basis among the basis included in the second measurement basis with the first measurement basis; A step of obtaining a first measurement message stream by decoding the encoded message stream using the measurement base stream; and Further comprising the step of storing the first measurement message stream obtained above, The above specified number is determined based on the length of the pre-shared key, The length of the second measurement bases or the length of the measurement base stream is the same as the length of the encoded message stream.

14. In claim 13, Further comprising a step of generating the second message by mixing at least one message stream decoded by the first measurement basis among the first measurement message stream and second measurement basis streams included in the measurement basis stream, A method wherein at least one message stream decoded by the first measurement base is an authentication code for authentication of the base station.

15. In claim 14, In the second message, the authentication code is arranged sequentially or is divided into multiple sub-authentication codes, and the multiple sub-authentication codes are arranged discontinuously.

16. In claim 14, Further comprising a step of receiving a third message indicating whether authentication was successful from the terminal, A method wherein the third message further includes at least one of a key generation command and index information indicating the location of the authentication code.

17. In claim 16, A method further comprising a step of authenticating the terminal based on index information indicating the location of the authentication code.

18. In claim 16, After the third message is received, a step of comparing the measurement basis stream generated to measure the first message stream with information that repeatedly configures the first measurement basis; A step of determining a location where the same base is used in the base station and the terminal based on the comparison result; and A method further comprising the step of generating a key including values ​​corresponding to the determined locations in the stored first measurement message.

19. In a wireless communication system, at a terminal, Transmitter and receiver; and A processor connected to the above transmitter and receiver is included, The above processor, Receive at least one synchronization signal from a base station, Receive system information from the above base station, Perform a random access procedure for the above base station, Receive control information from the above base station, Transmit at least one first message for authentication to the base station, Control to receive at least one second message for authentication from the base station, wherein said at least one first message comprises message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, A terminal wherein said at least one second message comprises measurement basis(s) used by said base station and at least one message stream decoded by said base station.

20. In a base station in a wireless communication system, Transmitter and receiver; and A processor connected to the above transmitter and receiver is included, The above processor, Transmit at least one synchronization signal, Transmit system information, Perform terminal and random access procedures, Transmit control information to the above terminal, Receive at least one first message for authentication from the terminal, Control to transmit at least one second message for the above authentication to the terminal, wherein said at least one first message comprises message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, A base station, wherein said at least one second message comprises measurement basis(s) used at said base station and at least one message stream decoded at said base station.

21. In communication devices, At least one processor; At least one computer memory connected to said at least one processor and storing instructions that direct operations when executed by said at least one processor, The above actions are performed by the communication device, A step of receiving at least one synchronization signal from a base station; A step of receiving system information from the base station; A step of performing a random access procedure for the above base station; A step of receiving control information from the base station; a step of transmitting at least one first message for authentication to the base station; and A step of receiving at least one second message for authentication from the base station, wherein said at least one first message comprises message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, A communication device wherein said at least one second message comprises measurement basis(s) used by said base station and at least one message stream decoded by said base station.

22. In a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing at least one instruction, comprising at least one instruction executable by the processor, At least one of the above commands causes the device to: Receive at least one synchronization signal from a base station, Receive system information from the above base station, Perform a random access procedure for the above base station, Receive control information from the above base station, Transmit at least one first message for authentication to the base station, Control to receive at least one second message for authentication from the base station, wherein said at least one first message comprises message streams encoded repeatedly using a pre-shared key, A computer-readable medium comprising at least one second message, wherein the at least one second message comprises measurement basis(s) used at the base station and at least one message stream decoded at the base station.

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