Systems, methods, and devices for encrypted communication
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/US2024/040509
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-08-03
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-01
- Publication Date
- 2025-04-10
AI Technical Summary
Existing communication systems lack secure underlying infrastructure, making them vulnerable to malware that can bypass encryption by accessing decrypted conversations on networked devices, leading to a risk of data theft.
A system comprising three chips - a first chip for encrypting data, a network chip for transmitting encrypted data, and a third chip for decrypting data and trapping malware - utilizing one-way data valves to prevent data flow in reverse directions, ensuring secure communication.
The system provides robust security against multiple types of attacks while being cost-effective, effectively protecting encrypted communications from data theft by isolating the decryption process and trapping malware.
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Figure US2024040509_10042025_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
SYSTEMS, METHODS, AND DEVICES FOR ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONCross-Reference to Related Applications
[0001] This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional ApplicationNo. 63 / 517,558, filed August 3, 2023, which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.Field of the Disclosed Subject Matter
[0002] The present specification relates generally to encryption and more specifically to encryption in messaging between computing devices.Background
[0003] Encryption can be used to secure communication of messages between computing devices. Different methods of computer encryption can be used. Users can transmit messages between devices over a network. The network can be an Internet connection. The users may wish to keep the contents of their messages private so that only the intended recipient user can read the messages.Summary
[0004] To achieve these and other advantages and in accordance with the purpose of the disclosed subject matter, as embodied and broadly described, the disclosed subject matter includes systems, methods, and computer program products for encrypted communication.
[0005] The system architecture, methods, and computer program products, as described herein, may be used to handle encrypted communications. For example, what is described herein may be used to securely handle end-to-end encrypted communications. While modern encryption may be considered highly secure, the underlying systems and / or devices on which the encryption operates may not be secure. For example, encryption can secure messages of a conversation in transit. Once the encrypted messages are received by a destination device, these messages can be decrypted and displayed to the user. Malware can bypass encryption by entering a device, capturing the decrypted conversation displayed to the user, and sending the decrypted conversation back to an attacker. A risk of data theft exists as long as sensitive information, such as the conversation, is held on a networked device. There is a lack of consumer systems and / or devices that can fundamentally protect against such a risk. Therefore there is a need to have underlying systems and / or devices that are secure. The systems, methods, and computer program products, presented herein, provide such level of security, while being robust against multiple types of attacks. In addition, systems, methods, and computer program products, presented herein, may be of a relatively low cost as compared to conventional systems and techniques.
[0006] In some embodiments, a computer-implemented system for encrypted communication includes: a first chip; a network chip, wherein the first chip is configured to transmit encrypted data over a one-way valve (also referred to a one-way data valve) to the network chip, the network chip configured to transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device; and a third chip, wherein the network chip is configured to transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data over a second one-way valve to the third chip, the thirdchip configured to decrypt the at least a portion of the encrypted data and trap any malware received at the third chip.
[0007] In some embodiments, the system is an integrated circuit.
[0008] In some embodiments, the system is included in a mobile device.
[0009] In some embodiments, the at least a portion of the encrypted data is displayed in an unencrypted format at the recipient computing device.
[0010] In some embodiments, a computer implemented method for encrypted communication includes: at a first chip, transmitting encrypted data over a one-way valve to a network chip; at the network chip, transmitting at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device and over a second one-way valve to a third chip; and at the third chip, decrypting the at least a portion of the encrypted data and trap any malware received at the third chip.
[0011] In some embodiments, a non-transitory computer readable medium storing a set of machine-interpretable instructions, which, when executed, cause a processor to perform a method for encrypted communication, is provided, the method including: at a first chip, transmitting encrypted data over a one-way valve to a network chip; at the network chip, transmitting at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device and over a second one-way valve to a third chip; and at the third chip, decrypting the at least a portion of the encrypted data and trap any malware received at the third chip.
[0012] In some embodiments, a system for encrypted communication comprises a first chip, a network chip, and a third chip. The first chip is configured to transmit encrypted data, via a first one-way data valve, to the network chip. The network chip is configured to transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device. The first chip or thenetwork chip is configured to receive data input. The network chip is configured to transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data, via a second one-way data valve, to the third chip. The third chip is configured to decrypt the at least a portion of the encrypted data. The first one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip. The second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the second chip.
[0013] In some embodiments, the system may be an integrated circuit. The system may be included in a mobile device. The at least a portion of the encrypted data may be displayed in an unencrypted format at a display connected to the third chip. The recipient computing device may be a second chipset system. The system may comprise an input peripheral switchable between the first chip and the network chip. The system may comprise an output peripheral connected to the third chip and an input peripheral connected to the first chip. No output peripheral may be directly connected to the first chip or to the network chip.
[0014] In some embodiments, a method for encrypted communication is provided. At a first chip, encrypted data is transmitted, via a one-way data valve, to a network chip. At the network chip, at least a portion of the encrypted data is transmitted to a recipient computing device, and via a second one-way data valve, to a third chip. The first chip or the network chip is configured to receive data input. At the third chip, the at least a portion of the encrypted data is decrypted. The first one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip. The second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the second chip.
[0015] In some embodiments, a non-transitory computer readable medium storing a set of machine-interpretable instructions, which, when executed, cause a processor to perform amethod for encrypted communication is provided. The method includes multiple steps. At a first chip, encrypted data is transmitted, via a one-way data valve, to a network chip. At the network chip, at least a portion of the encrypted data is transmitted to a recipient computing device, and via a second one-way data valve, to a third chip. The first chip or the network chip is configured to receive data input. At the third chip, the at least a portion of the encrypted data is decrypted. The first one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip. The second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the second chip.
[0016] In some embodiments, a system for encrypted communication comprises a plurality of one-way data valves, and a plurality of chips. The first chip of the plurality of chips is coupled to a first one-way data valve of the plurality of one-way data valves. The first chip is configured to receive input data, encrypt the input data, and send the encrypted input data, via the first one-way data valve, towards a second chip of the plurality of chips. The second chip of the plurality of chips is coupled downstream of the first chip and to a second one-way data valve of the plurality of one-way data valves. The second chip is configured to decrypt the encrypted input data. The first and the second chips are operatively coupled to a network. The first and the second one-way data valves are configured to block upstream data communications.
[0017] In some embodiments, the plurality of one-way data valves may comprise an optocoupler. Each of the plurality of one-way data valves may comprise a laser or an LED facing a phototransistor across a physical gap. Each of the plurality of one-way data valves may be communicatively coupled between each pair of the plurality of chips. A network interface may be coupled between the first one-way data valve and the second one-way data valve, and the network interface may be coupled to the network. The network interface may be configured toreceive, via the first one-way data valve, the encrypted input data, and send, via the second oneway data valve, at least a portion of the encrypted input data to the second chip. A third chip of the plurality of chips may comprise the network interface. The network interface may be configured to receive, via the network, external data, and send, via the second one-way data valve, at least a portion of the external data to the second chip. The system may be an integrated circuit. The system may be included in a mobile device. The first chip may be coupled to an input peripheral and configured to receive the input data from the input peripheral. The input peripheral may be a keyboard, a camera, a microphone, or a mouse. The second chip may be coupled to an output peripheral and configured to send the decrypted input data to the output peripheral. The output peripheral may be a display. The at least a portion of the decrypted input data may be displayed on the display.
[0018] In some embodiments, a device for encrypted communication comprises a first chip, a network chip, a third chip, a first one-way data valve, a second one-way data valve; and a graphical user interface based (GUI-based) system. The first one-way data valve is coupled between the first chip and the network chip. The second one-way data valve is coupled between the network chip and the third chip. The GUI -based system is communicatively coupled to the first chip, the second chip, and the third chip. The first one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip. The second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the network chip. The GUI-based system is configured to receive input data, and send input data to the first chip. The first chip is configured to encrypt the input data, and send the encrypted input data, via the first one-way data valve, to the network chip. The network chip is configured to send the encrypted input data to a recipient computing device, receive encrypted external data, and sendthe encrypted external data, via the second one-way data valve, to the third chip. The third chip is configured to decrypt the encrypted external data. The GUI-based system may further be configured to display the input data or the decrypted external data.
[0019] Other aspects and features according to the present application will become apparent to those ordinarily skilled in the art upon review of the following description of embodiments of the invention in conjunction with the accompanying figures.Brief Description Of The Fi ures
[0020] The principles of the invention may better be understood with reference to the accompanying figures provided by way of illustration of an exemplary embodiment, or embodiments, incorporating principles and aspects of the present invention, and in which:
[0021] FIG. 1 is a schematic view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments;
[0022] FIG. 2 is a schematic view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments;
[0023] FIG. 3 is a schematic view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments;
[0024] FIG. 4 is a schematic view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments;
[0025] FIG. 5 is a schematic view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments;
[0026] FIG. 6 is a schematic front perspective view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments;
[0027] FIG. 7 is a schematic rear view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments;
[0028] FIG. 8 is a schematic front perspective view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments; and
[0029] FIG. 9 is a front view of a chipset system, according to some embodiments.
[0030] FIG. 10 depicts a network chip communicating with a downstream chip using a one-way data diode between the chips, according to some embodiments.
[0031] FIG. 11 depicts the use of a system that uses two one-way valves (implemented using one-way data diodes) between chips to physically disconnect aspects of the system from the network, according to some embodiments.
[0032] FIGS. 12A-12F depict how the system depicted in FIG. 11 can interact with possible malware deployed by an attacker, according to some embodiments.
[0033] FIGS. 13A-13E depict how malware deployed by an attacker can possibly bypass encryption, such as end-to-end encryption, according to some embodiments.
[0034] FIGS. 14A-14G depict how malware deployed by an attacker may be blocked from receiving and / or sending out device data by the system presented herein, according to some embodiments.
[0035] FIG. 15 depicts example information flows for a system that makes use of three chips (computing bases) and two one-way valves between the chips, according to some embodiments.
[0036] FIG. 16 is a flow chart depicting a method for encrypted communication, according to some embodiments.Detailed Description Of Embodiments
[0037] The description that follows, and the embodiments described therein, are provided by way of illustration of an example, or examples, of particular embodiments. These examples are provided for the purposes of explanation, and not of limitation. In the description, like parts are marked throughout the specification and the drawings with the same respective referencenumerals. The drawings are not necessarily to scale and in some instances proportions may have been exaggerated in order to more clearly to depict certain features.
[0038] FIG. 1 is a schematic view of an example chipset system 100 according to some embodiments. In some embodiments, chipset system 100 includes a hardware system for securely handling end to end encrypted message traffic. The hardware system includes at least three isolated chip sets, first chip 110, network chip 120, and third chip 130. For example, chipset system 100 includes three chipsets, one with a networked connection and two without, according to some embodiments.
[0039] In some embodiments, as shown, chipset system 100 includes first peripheral device(s) 150 (interconnected with first chip 110), second peripheral device(s) 140 (interconnected with third chip 130), and third peripheral devices(s) 160 (interconnected with network chip 120), where each of the peripheral device(s) can be device(s) for providing input and / or output such as a display, keyboard (e.g., touch keyboard), camera, microphone, and / or mouse. In some embodiments, first peripheral device(s) 150 includes a display, keyboard, and a mouse; second peripheral device(s) 140 includes a display, keyboard, and a mouse; and third peripheral device(s) 160 includes a display, keyboard, and a mouse. In some embodiments, as described herein, a single device may be include chips 110, 120, and 130. In such embodiments, the first peripheral device(s), such as device(s) 150, may be in communication and / or interconnected with the first chip 110, the second peripheral device(s), such as device(s) 140, may be in communication with and / or interconnected with third chip 130, and the third peripheral device(s), such as device(s) 160, may be in communication with and / or interconnected with the network chip, such as network chip 120, and all of the peripheral device(s) may be connected to the single device that includes chips 110, 120, and 130. The peripheral device(s)may be devices for providing input and / or output such as a display, keyboard (e.g., touch keyboard), camera, microphone, and / or mouse.
[0040] In some embodiments, first peripheral device 150 second peripheral device 140 and third peripheral device 160 each include a display, and first peripheral device 150 and third peripheral device 160 include a single input device (e.g., keyboard) that is switchable between providing input and / or interconnectivity between first chip 110 and network chip 120 while second peripheral device 140 does not include an input device or does not include a keyboard.
[0041] In some embodiments, first peripheral device 150 and third peripheral device 160 do not include an output device (e.g., display) and second peripheral device 140 does include an output device such as a display, while first peripheral device 150 includes an input device such as a keyboard and data derived from the input device is passed from first chip 110 to network chip 120 and / or third chip 130. In some embodiments, other peripheral device combinations and / or configurations can be used.
[0042] Second chipset system 200 is connectible to chipset system 100 such as in communication with network chip 120 Second chipset system 200 is included in a recipient computing device, which, for example, can be a single touchscreen device or other single device with multiple displays, according to some embodiments.
[0043] Data is received at first chip 110. In some embodiments, the data is received via first peripheral device 150 References to a peripheral device can refer to multiple peripheral devices. First peripheral device 150 is configured to receive input and provide the input to first chip 110. First peripheral device 150 can be a keyboard and / or mouse, for example. A separate first peripheral device 150 interconnected with first chip 110 can be a display, according to embodiments. First chip 110 encrypts at least a portion of input received to generate encrypteddata. In some embodiments, first chip 110 packages the encrypted data in a format suitable for transit on a local system on-device (across two data diodes) and across the network via network chip 120 to a recipient at second chipset system 200. Second chipset system 200 is configured to receive incoming encrypted data packets at network chip 220.
[0044] Second chipset system 200 can be similar to chipset system 100 or be a separate remote computer, according to embodiments. For example, second chipset system 200 can be a user device, such as intended to receive the data (e.g., a message addressed to the user device) or a computing device providing access to an account intended to receive the data. As another example, second chipset system 200 can include a first chip 210, a network chip 220, and a third chip 230 with functionality analogous to those described in relation to first chip 110, network chip 120, and third chip 130, respectively, of first chipset system 100. A user can be engaged such as at a peripheral device display connected to one or more of the chips, such as peripheral device(s) 250, 260, and / or 240. Where included, in some embodiments, peripheral device(s) 250, 260, and 240 have functionality analogous to those described in relation to peripheral device(s) 150, 160, and 140, respectively, of first chipset system 100.
[0045] First chip 110 transmits the encrypted data over a one-way valve to a network chip 120. In some embodiments, the one-way valve is implemented using optocoupler components that consist of an LED facing a phototransistor across a physical gap. In some embodiments, different implementations of the one-way valve are used. Network chip 120 is configured to receive the encrypted data, for example, as data packets, and transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data over a second one-way valve to a third chip 130. First and third chips 110 and 130 are local on a device, according to some embodiments. The device is the chipset system 100 Second chipset system 200 can be embodied in a separate single device,according to some embodiments. In some embodiments, as shown, first chipset system 100 includes second peripheral device(s) 140. Second peripheral device(s) 140 can be devices for providing input and / or output such as a keyboard, display, and / or mouse, for example. In some embodiments, third chip 130 can be at a display driver of peripheral device 140 to implement a single touch screen device.
[0046] Third chip 130 is configured to decrypt the data received. For example, third chip 130 is included or interconnected with a peripheral device 140 (e.g., display), according to some embodiments. In some embodiments, chip 130 is connected just before a display unit. In some embodiments, there is a separate display driver downstream from chip 130. For example, chipset system 100 can include three screens or display units, one at first chip 110, network chip 120, and third chip 130. In some embodiments, chipset system 100 is instead configured as a single touch screen, with chip 130 at a display driver. For example, chipset system 100 can have a single display.
[0047] A display, such as at peripheral device 140 (or, in some embodiments, at each of peripheral devices 150, 160, and 140), is configured to use at least a portion of the data received, such as to present same to the user. For example, data received is decrypted at third chip 130 and presented to the user at a display such as peripheral device 140. The data can represent a message received as data input to the first chip from a first user at a first peripheral device 150 (e.g., a microphone), for example. The data can be text, voice, picture, video, and / or any format of data generated on or transmitted from first peripheral device 150. In some embodiments, first peripheral device 150 can be a computing device that receives or generates data input and transmits same to first chip 110.
[0048] The third chip 130 is configured to trap any malware received. For example, while it may be possible for malware to arrive at the network chip 120 (or networked device) and be transmitted with encrypted data to the recipient or destination device, once at the destination device the malware will then be trapped on an air gapped computing device. That is, first chip 110 and third chip 130 (and, in embodiments where included, each device connected to 110 and 130) are each air gapped computing devices, with the exception of the one-way valve (diodes that connects first chip 110 to network chip 120 and network chip 120 to third 130). No data can enter first chip 110 except via peripheral computing device 150 (e.g., a microphone or keyboard receiving input from a user) and can only exit via the one-way valve connecting first chip 110 to network chip 120. No data can exit third chip 130 but can only enter third chip 130 via the oneway valve connecting network chip 120 to third chip 130. In some embodiments, the data received at the chipset system 100 is not sanitized but chipset system 100 is configured to prevent a remote attacker from being able to retrieve any unencrypted contents of the encrypted communication channel from chipset system 100 or from a destination device embodying second chipset system 200. Chipset system 100 is configured to restrict transmission of unencrypted data out of chipset system 100 by a remote user, according to some embodiments.
[0049] According to some embodiments, for example, the third chip 130 is interconnected with a peripheral device 140 which is a device that a user can use to read or receive the original message received from first peripheral device 150. In some embodiments, the third chip 130 is configured to trap malware by preventing transmission of data out of chipset system 100 by a remote user since the third chip 130 is the only way data flows to peripheral device 140 and since it is configured with a one-way valve, data cannot flow in the opposite direction.
[0050] In some embodiments, source peripheral device (e.g., at 150) where the original message is received to be encrypted as well as recipient peripheral device (e.g., at 140) where the data is decrypted for receipt (e.g., viewing / hearing) by a user are each configured to have their respective sole external connection with the data diode embodied in chipset system 100. Each of source peripheral device and recipient peripheral device is otherwise entirely air gapped, according to some embodiments.
[0051] In some embodiments, for example, any malware is not permitted to execute functions that affect other components of the system. In some embodiments, chipset system 100 can be implemented with keys stored in secure storage on the networked computer 120, such as a secure enclave used to encrypt / decrypt text without exposing the encryption keys to the networked system.
[0052] In some embodiments, network chip 120 is configured to transmit and / or receive data from a network chip 220 of a second chipset system 200.
[0053] In some embodiments, chipset system 100 is configured as hardware architecture, such as included in a mobile device (e.g., phone). For example, in some embodiments, the mobile device may be configured to only implement chipset system 100 and messaging between one or more devices as described. In some embodiments, chipset system 100 is configured as an integrated circuit that can be included in different devices, such as third party devices that may not be required to be tailored to chipset system 100. In various embodiments, chipset system 100 is configured to securely capture and display content before and after it is encrypted and decrypted, or before and after being in an encrypted state.
[0054] In some embodiments, chipset system 100 is configured as hardware architecture, such as included in a mobile device (e.g., phone). For example, in some embodiments, themobile device may be configured to only implement chipset system 100 and messaging between one or more devices as described. In some embodiments, chipset system 100 is configured as an integrated circuit that can be included in different devices, such as third party devices that may not be required to be tailored to chipset system 100. In various embodiments, chipset system 100 is configured to securely capture and display content before and after it is encrypted and decrypted, or before and after being in an encrypted state.
[0055] In some embodiments, chipset system 100, including first chip 110, network chip 120, and third chip 130, is instantiated in a single touch screen device with a source computer connected to a capacitive touch input (e.g., keyboard connected at first chip 110), bridging to the networked base device, and decrypting at the display driver. This can allow for UX updates to be safely installed as most content can be pre-rendered while sending encrypted data to the display before being decrypted. For example, in some embodiments, first chip 110 encrypts a message received from a peripheral device 150, according to some embodiments. Each peripheral device referenced herein can include a processor, in some embodiments.
[0056] In some embodiments, chipset system 100 includes three processors in a single device, the three processors being first chip 110, network chip 120, and third chip 130. In some embodiments, chipset system 100 is configured to perform encryption (at first chip 110) and subsequent decryption (at third chip 130) on a device(s) separate from a network computing device. 150 and 140 are peripheral devices connected to the three chipsets.
[0057] This is a point of failure in other existing consumer private or secure communications offerings. For example, if two people wish to communicate securely, where the participants know that they alone can access the contents of the communication, they may use end-to-end-encrypted messaging applications such as Signal or WhatsApp. However, while theseapplications may provide encryption while the communication is in transit, these applications still must display the communication to the recipient user in an unencrypted format.
[0058] Malware can be used at a device to read and transmit to an unintended recipient the material that is displayed at the device (e.g., read what is on the screen) or provided to the device as data input (e.g., typed into the device's keyboard). This is being increasingly used to bypass encryption during transit and read the contents of conversations taking place on end-to- end-encrypted platforms.
[0059] In some embodiments, chipset system 100 is configured to place the unencrypted content onto physically separate devices than the base device (e.g., a recipient's mobile device) with an internet connection. This new computer architecture is configured to prevent a remote attacker from reading the contents of encrypted messaging in the manner described above for existing messaging applications. Chipset system 100 is configured to protect messages sent between users at remote devices from third party exploitation, according to some embodiments.
[0060] In some embodiments, chipset 100 is included as part of a chat client adapted to interoperate with chipset system 100.
[0061] In some embodiments, a user is engaged at chipset system 100 and can create a message, which is received at chipset system 100 and presented to the user, whether after encryption at first chip 110 and decryption at third chip 130 or without having been in an encrypted state, such as at a display at first peripheral device 150. Chipset system 100 is configured to transmit the message, after encryption, to a second chipset system 200 at network chip 220, which is configured to present the message to a user after decryption at third chip 230.
[0062] Various embodiments will now be further described. FIG. 2 shows an example chipset system 100 interconnected with an example chipset system 200, according to someembodiments. FIG. 3 shows an example chipset system 100 interconnected with an example chipset system 200 implementing a communication system, according to some embodiments. FIG. 4 shows an example chipset system 100 having an input device (e.g., capacitive touch button keyboard) switchable between direct interconnection with a first chip 110 and a network chip 120, where each of first chip 110, network chip 120, and third chip 130 are interconnected with an output device (e.g., display), according to some embodiments. FIG. 5 shows an example chipset system 100 having one or more input devices interconnected at first chip 110 and a single display device interconnected at third chip 130, according to some embodiments.
[0063] FIG. 6 and 7 show a schematic front perspective and rear view, respectively, of an example chipset system 100 embodied on a single device, according to some embodiments.
[0064] FIG. 8 and 9 show a schematic perspective front and front view, respectively, of an example chipset system 100 embodied on a single device, according to some embodiments.
[0065] There may be many ways to implement one-way data flow. In various embodiments, a one-way data diode may be implemented using a hardware component that enforces one-way flow of electrical current. In various embodiments, a one-way data diode may be implemented optically. In particular, components such as optocouplers, also referred to as opto-isolators, may be used to implement a one-way data diode. For example, an optocoupler may include a package containing an LED facing a phototransistor across a physical gap. As another example, an optocoupler may include a package containing lasers instead of LEDs.
[0066] FIG. 10 depicts a network chip 1020 communicating with a downstream chip 1030 using a one-way data diode 1025 between the chips. The one-way data diode 1025 is implemented using an optocoupler, which is connected to the network chip 1020, and which includes a package containing a laser, communicating with a photo-receptor, which is connectedto the downstream chip 1030. In various embodiments, the network chip 1020 may communicate data, via the laser, across a physical air gap, to the downstream chip 1030, which may receive that data via a photo-receptor. Any malware that is communicated to the downstream chip 1030 may be trapped because of the physical air gap and the one-way data flow of the one-way data diode 1025. There may be numerous other examples of optocoupler and photo-receptor packages that may be used to enforce one-way data flow.
[0067] The architecture, as described herein, enforces downstream-only data flow between three computing bases, such as the chips described herein. Such use of one-way data valves (implemented using one-way data diodes), as described herein, may allow for the severing of the conventional bidirectional connection between a trusted computing base, where plaintext may be exposed, and the network. The systems, techniques, and computer program products described herein may include an architecture for networked endpoint devices in which air gapped computational elements within the device are connected by physical data diodes to prevent backwards flow of information from a source towards a final destination within the device. Such an architecture may be used for splitting out the trusted computing base of an endpoint device into send-only and / or receive-only communication with a network, in addition to a traditional bidirectional network connection. An application of such an architecture may be to provide a new level of protection for the content of encrypted communications in a general sense. However, there may be other benefits that result from having air gapped or semi-air gapped locations within networked endpoint devices that may be accessible to the end user.
[0068] FIG. 11 depicts the use of a system 1100 that uses two one-way data valves (implemented using one-way data diodes) between chips to physically disconnect aspects of the system from the network. In some embodiments, system 1100 may be included within a singledevice. In some embodiments, system 1100 may be included within multiple devices. The oneway data valves, 1115 and 1125, used in such a system may be send-only or receive-only oneway data valves. For example, FIG. 11 depicts a system 1100 that includes three chips, which may use such one-way data valves in communications between the three chips. In particular, system 1100 includes an encryption chip 1110 (also referred to herein as a source or first computing base) that uses one-way data valve 1115 to communicate with a network chip 1120. Network chip 1120 uses one-way data valve 1125 to communicate with a decryption chip 1130 (also referred to as a destination computing base or a trusted computing base).
[0069] Encryption chip 1110 may encrypt any data that it receives, such as via a peripheral, or any data that it generates. The data, which may initially be plaintext, may be encrypted using any suitable encryption protocol, such as an asymmetric key encryption protocol, to produce cyphertext, in which the data has been encrypted. Encryption chip 1110 may transmit the encrypted data, via one-way data valve 1115, to a network chip 1120. In various embodiments, network chip 1120 may not decrypt the data that it receives from encryption chip 1110. Network chip 1120 may transmit the encrypted data, via one-way data valve 1125, to a decryption chip 1130. Network chip 1120 may also receive data, such as network traffic, from an external source, such as a server, an external device, and / or the Internet. In some embodiments described herein, any network chip, such as network chip 1120, may include a network interface, which is connected to a network and / or an external device. The network interface may be able to send and / or receive data from an external source, such as a device, a server, and / or the Internet. In some embodiments described herein, a stand-alone network interface, which is connected to a network and / or an external device, may be connected to an encryption chip, such as encryption chip 1110, and / or decryption chip, such as decryptionchip 1130. The stand-alone network interface may be used to send and / or receive such data from an external source, such as a device, a server, and / or the Internet. Network chip 1120 may also transmit the data that it receives from any external source, via one-way data valve 1125, to decryption chip 1130. Decryption chip 1130 may decrypt the data that it receives using a decryption protocol corresponding to the one used to encrypt data by encryption chip 1110.
[0070] System 1100 may allow for the “trapping” of malware arriving on the isolated destination computing base. In particular, once it is across the physical air gap, any malware will then be trapped on an otherwise air gapped destination computing base with no external connections beyond the display. In particular, in system 1100, malware may be trapped at the decryption chip 1130 where decryption takes place. The decryption chip 1130 may include no connection back to the network. Thus, malware may be physically trapped by the data diode without the need for the malware to be detected. Network chip 1120 may communicate with server 1140, and access the Internet, via a network connection. One or both of encryption chip 1110 and decryption chip 1130 may be connected to peripheral devices, such as a keyboard, a mouse, a microphone, a camera, a display, and / or the like to receive input or to provide output. For example, plaintext inputs may be entered by a user, via an input peripheral such as a keyboard, a mouse, a microphone, a camera, and / or the like, and encrypted by the encryption chip 1110 to be transmitted via a data diode to the network chip 1120. As another example, the decryption chip 1130 may receive encrypted data from the network chip, decrypt the data, and display the plaintext content of the data via an output peripheral such as a display.
[0071] In some embodiments, "out of band" monitoring may be performed by a system, such as system 1100. Out of band monitoring may effectively relay system data via another network separate from the main local network, such as one connected to a network 1120. Datasent in this manner may still remain subject to a one-way data flow. This may be because the separate network relaying the data may have no connection to the network chip 1120, or any other chip and / or computing base in the system above its level, such as chips 1110, 1120, or 1130.
[0072] In some embodiments, a system similar to system 1100 may be used for encrypted communications. The system may include two (or more) one-way data valves, such one-way data valves 1115 and 1125, and two (or more) chips, such an encryption chip 1110 and a description chip 1130. A first chip, such as encryption chip 1110, of the multiple chips may be coupled to a first one-way data valve, such as one-way data valve 1115, of the multiple one-way data valves. The first chip, such as encryption chip 1110, may be configured to receive input data, encrypt the input data, and send the encrypted input data, via the first one-way data valve, such as one-way data valve 1115, towards the second chip, such as decryption chip 1130. The second chip of the multiple chips may be coupled downstream of the first chip and to a second one-way data valve, such as one-way data valve 1125, of the multiple one-way data valves. The second chip may be configured to decrypt the encrypted input data. The first and the second chips may be operatively coupled to a network, such as via a network interface. The first and the second one-way data valves may be configured to block upstream data communications.
[0073] One example of the use of such a similar system may be within a first device, such as an external drive or update device. The first device may be used to upgrade and / or update a second device, such as an external input peripheral (e.g., an IP security camera). The system may include the aforementioned chips, one-way data valves, and network interface. The first device and the second device may be connected to each other and possibly other devices via a network connection. In such an example, information processed at the second device may beencrypted, such as with a key, in an offline environment. In such an example, decryption of the encrypted data may occur using a key that is stored by the first device. The decryption may be performed by the first device, such as by using a decryption chip and the key within the first device. The decrypted data may then be viewed on a display / screen of the first device. In particular, in this example, data that is encrypted by the second device may only be decrypted for viewing on the display / screen of the first device, with no plaintext existing between the two devices, such as on a network that interconnects the two devices.
[0074] The systems and techniques described herein, such as system 1100 and its related techniques, may aid in protecting corporations from data theft. For example, downloads of sensitive data may be sent to and / or encrypted for an offline chip with no built-in mechanism for the user to extract the data once it is received. Such systems and techniques may also represent and / or include the ability to reduce down time due to endpoint system corruption. In particular, in the event that the networked and / or downstream computing bases and / or chips experience a problem, these elements may be reset using a backup residing on the first chip, which may be an offline chip. This may be beneficial in reducing down time due to faulty updates, attacks, or user error that reduce the performance of an endpoint system, as described herein.
[0075] FIGS. 12A-12F depict how system 1100 can interact with possible malware deployed by an attacker.
[0076] FIG. 12A depicts an encryption chip, which communicates encrypted data (cyphertext) with a network chip, which communicates data (cyphertext) with a decryption chip. FIG. 12A also shows that an attacker may transmit or receive data, via a network connection, to or from the network chip.Il
[0077] FIG. 12B depicts malware operating on the network chip. In particular, FIG. 12B depicts malware, deployed by an attacker, and included in data communicated by the attacker via the network connection, entering a system, such as system 1100, via the network chip and operating on the network chip. The malware may attempt to capture any data that is received by the network chip, such as the data from the encryption chip, and send this captured data to the attacker.
[0078] FIG. 12C depicts an attacker attempting to receive data from the system, such as system 1100. In particular, FIG. 12C depicts that the attacker that attempts to receive any data, by using the deployed malware operating at the network chip, may only be able to receive the cyphertext from the network chip. This is because the network chip receives encrypted data from the encryption chip, and the network chip does not decrypt this data.
[0079] FIG. 12D depicts that malware is blocked from entering the encryption chip. In particular, FIG. 12D depicts that the malware operating on the network chip, as shown in FIG. 12B, is blocked from entering the encryption chip because the one-way data valve between the encryption chip and the network chip does not allow data to be sent from the network chip to the encryption chip.
[0080] FIG. 12E depicts malware that is transmitted from the network chip to the decryption chip. In particular, FIG. 12E shows that if the malware deployed by an attacker is transmitted by the network chip, via a one-way data valve, to the decryption chip, that the malware may operate on the decryption chip. However, the malware would then be trapped at the decryption chip.
[0081] FIG. 12F depicts that system 1100 thwarts the attackers attempts to acquire usable data from system 1100 in the scenario depicted at FIG. 12E. In particular, FIG. 12F depicts thatthe malware operating on the decryption chip, as shown in FIG. 12E, is blocked from sending any data to the attacker because the one-way data valve between the decryption chip and the network chip does not allow data to be sent from the decryption chip to the network chip. Any data arriving at the decryption chip may be read and interpreted on an air gapped machine. In that sense, all data received, via the network chip (and eventually received by the decryption chip), and any malware that this data may contain, may be trapped at the decryption chip. In some embodiments, plaintext may be exposed at a network chip, however, it is contemplated that the systems described herein may nonetheless be able to protect such exposed data.
[0082] FIGS. 13A-13E depict how malware deployed by an attacker can possibly bypass encryption, such as end-to-end encryption.
[0083] FIG. 13 A depicts that the malware can enter a device from an external source via a network connection at the device. For example, the device may be a mobile phone device. For example, the external source may be an Internet source. The malware can then operate on the device.
[0084] FIG. 13B depicts that encrypted messages may also be received at the device via the network connection. For example, the encrypted messages may pertain to a sensitive conversation occurring on a messaging application operating on the device.
[0085] FIG. 13C depicts that encrypted messages may be decrypted at the device and displayed on the device. For example, once the messages are decrypted, the device may display, on a display of the device, the sensitive conversation within the messaging application operating on the device.
[0086] FIG. 13D depicts that malware can receive and / or view the messages decrypted by the device.
[0087] FIG. 13E depicts that malware can send the decrypted messages that it receives and / or views, from the device, to an external attacker, via the network connection at the device.
[0088] FIGS. 14A-14G depict how malware deployed by an attacker may be blocked from receiving and / or sending out device data by the system presented herein.
[0089] FIG. 14A depicts that a system, which uses three chips and two one-way data valves, described herein, operating within a device that includes a network connection to an external source. The system may be similar in form and function to system 1100 of FIG. 11, described herein. The device may include a single graphical user interface (GUI) displayed to the user via a display of the device. For example, the device may be a mobile phone device. For example, the external source may be an Internet source.
[0090] FIG. 14B depicts that the malware can enter the device, for example at a network chip of the system, from an external source via the network connection at the device. The malware can then operate at the network chip of the device.
[0091] FIG. 14C depicts that one or more encrypted message may also be received at the device, for example at a network chip of the system, via the network connection. For example, the encrypted messages may pertain to a sensitive conversation occurring on a messaging application operating on the device.
[0092] FIG. 14D depicts a network chip communicating the one or more encrypted message with a downstream chip using a one-way data diode between the chips. The one-way data diode is implemented using an optocoupler, which is connected to the network chip, and which includes a package containing a laser, communicating with a photo-receptor, which is connected to the downstream chip. In various embodiments, the network chip may communicate message(s), via the laser, across a physical air gap, to the downstream chip, which may receivethe message(s) via a photo-receptor. The downstream chip may be a decryption chip, which may receive the one or more encrypted message from the network chip, decrypt the message, and display the plaintext content of the message via the GUI on the device’s display.
[0093] FIG. 14E depicts that malware that may be transmitted from the network chip to the downstream chip, such as a decryption chip, on the device. In particular, FIG. 14E shows that if the malware is transmitted by the network chip, via a one-way data valve, to the downstream chip, that the malware may operate on the downstream chip. However, the malware would then be trapped at the decryption chip. In particular, any malware that is communicated to the downstream chip may be trapped because of the physical air gap and the one-way data flow of the one-way data diode. FIG. 14E also depicts that the malware operating on the downstream chip is blocked from sending any message(s) to an external attacker because the one-way data valve between the downstream chip and the network chip does not allow message(s) to be sent from the downstream chip to the network chip across the air gap.
[0094] FIG. 14F depicts that malware operating at the network chip may be blocked from accessing plaintext input at the encryption chip. In particular, an encryption chip may receive plaintext input from an input peripheral and may encrypt this input as one or more encrypted message. FIG. 14F depicts the encryption chip communicating the one or more encrypted message with a network chip using a one-way data diode between the chips. The one-way data diode is implemented using an optocoupler, which is connected to the encryption chip, and which includes a package containing a laser, communicating with a photo-receptor, which is connected to the network chip. In various embodiments, the encryption chip may communicate encrypted message(s), via the laser, across a physical air gap, to the network chip, which may receive the message(s) via a photo-receptor. The network chip may receive the one or moreencrypted message from the encryption chip. FIG. 14F also depicts that the malware operating on the network chip is blocked from accessing any plaintext input or being sent to the encryption chip because of the air gap between the encryption chip and the network chip. The malware, operating on the network chip, may receive and send any encrypted message(s), which the network chip receives from the encryption chip, to an attacker. However, any encrypted message(s) would only include cyphertext, which cannot be decrypted or read by the attacker. Indeed, the one-way data valve between the encryption chip and the network chip does not allow malware to be sent from the network chip to the encryption chip across the air gap. In addition, the network chip has access to encrypted message(s) and therefore any attacker may solely access encrypted messages, but cannot view the plaintext associated with the encrypted message(s).
[0095] FIG. 14G depicts a system, which includes 3 separate chips and 2 physical air gaps, operating on the device, as described with reference to FIGS. 14A-14F. The system may be similar in form and function to system 1100 depicted in FIG. 11. In particular, the two oneway data valves (implemented using one-way data diodes) prevent malware or data from flowing upstream because of the use of a one-way micro-laser and a one-way photoreceptor in the implementation of the one-way data valves.
[0096] Conventional use of an air gapped computer may involve receiving encrypted messages on a networked computer, transferring the encrypted messages to an external storage, such as a USB drive, and physically moving the encrypted messages to an air gapped computer, which is not connected to any network, to be decrypted and viewed. The drawback of such a conventional technique operates only in a single direction for the flow of messages, such as send or receive only. Another drawback is that the conventional technique is difficult to implement,not automated, and tedious to perform. Systems and techniques, as described herein, that make use of two one-way data valves, each implemented using a one-way data diode operating on a single device to enable bi-directional, encrypted, air gapped communications overcome the drawbacks of such conventional techniques. The systems and techniques that make use of two (or more) one-way data valves to air gap communications, as described herein, are easier to implement, operate automatically, and are not tedious to perform.
[0097] In addition, the systems and techniques described herein may operate on a single device that includes a single graphical user interface displayed on the display(s) of the device. This can provide a platform on which general desktop workflows can occur using the new level of data and network protection. Such general desktop workflows can include secure communications (text, voice, and video), secure email, secure cloud document storage, access, and editing, secure web-browsing, and / or the like. A single device that includes the systems and techniques described herein may be the first devices available to the public that would passively frustrate malware, such as the Pegasus spy ware, by design and at the hardware level. The systems and techniques presented herein also represent an increase in protection from malware that relies on host-to-host propagation like ransomware. For example, a normal data entry points for malware to a network, such as an email attachment. In this example, using the systems and techniques described herein, the data, such as the email attachment, may be opened offline on the air gapped destination computer (e.g., using an air gapped decryption chip described herein). In particular, malware entering a local network may be introduced via incoming data traffic from outside. This incoming data traffic can include data loaded from websites or email attachments. In addition to protection from data exfiltration, providing an offline location for untrusted data packets to be read, such as what may be provided by the systems and techniques describedherein, may be helpful for protecting the local network from malware, such as ransomware, that attempts to propagate out from an infected host. Another benefit of the systems and techniques described herein is that login portals may be held on an offline source computer, such as one utilizing an encryption chip described herein. This may mean that any attackers would need to be physically present at the source computer to authenticate as a user. In particular, in addition to encryption keys used to encrypt communications, in some embodiments, an architecture where the first computing base and / or the first chip may store / hold encryption keys or other measures for user authentication / attestation may be used. For example, many multi-factor authentication protocols such as OAuth may be compatible with such an architecture. In such an architecture, authentication tokens can be sent by the user from the first chip. This may be used to provide improved user experience for login and authentication in addition to keeping login portals offline, where they may otherwise be exposed to remote attempts to fraudulently authenticate as a valid user or to guess login credentials.
[0098] FIG. 15 depicts example information flows for system 1500, which makes use of three chips (computing bases) and two one-way data valves between the chips, such as the chips and data valves as described with relation to system 1100. System 1500 may be a single device. The single device may include a system, such as system 1100, with three chips and two one-way data valves. System 1500 may include a software system, which may be operating on a device. The software system may include a user display interface 1550, which may be a graphical user interface (GUI), that is operating within the software system. Thus, the software system may be referred to herein as a GUI-based system. User display interface 1550 may be used to display, within the display of the device, information to a user. Information flow 1510 shows that theGUI-based system may send, via a network chip (network computing base), such as networkchip 1120 connected to a network, an authentication token (e.g., input authentication data) to a server 1560. Information flow 1520 shows that user input data 1570, which may be received via an input peripheral, may be encrypted and sent by an encryption chip (source computing base), such as encryption chip 1110, via a one-way data valve, such as one way data valve 1115, to the network chip (network computing base) and to the GUI-based system. In some embodiments, this user input data may be used and / or displayed by user display 1550 of the GUI-based system. In some embodiments, the authentication token shown in information flow 1510 may first be input by a user and sent in a manner as shown by information flow 1520 to the network chip, before being sent to the server in a manner as shown by information flow 1510. Information flow 1530 shows that some non-sensitive elements (e.g., data elements) of the GUI-based system and / or user display 1550 may be synchronized with the server 1560, for example, by encrypting and sending these elements via an encryption chip (source computing base), and the via a oneway data valve, to the network chip (network computing base), which may then send the elements to server 1560. Information flow 1540 shows that sensitive encrypted data (e.g., external data) may be sent from server 1560 to a network chip, which may send the encrypted data, via a one-way data valve, such as one-way data valve 1125, to a decryption chip (destination computing base), such as decryption chip 1130, to be decrypted and displayed on user display 1550 of the GUI-bases system. In information flows 1510, 1520, 1530, and 1540, data sent by or received by the GUI-based system and / or user display 1550 may be encrypted, such as by an encryption chip, such as encryption chip 1110, or by other means.
[0099] FIG. 16 is a flow chart 1600 depicting a method for encrypted communication. At step 1602, the method may include, at a first chip, transmitting encrypted data, via a one-way data valve, to a network chip. At step 1604, the method may include, at the network chip,transmitting at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device, and via a second one-way data valve, to a third chip, and the first chip or the network chip is configured to receive data input. At step 1606, the method may include, at the third chip, decrypting the at least a portion of the encrypted data, the first one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip, and the second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the second chip.
[0100] In some embodiments, the systems and techniques may use two (or more) oneway data valves, such as one-way data diodes, within a single device, as described herein. The use of such number of data valves may be advantageous over the use of a single data valve architecture, such as an architecture using only a single data diode. For example, such use of multiple data valves may include the increased security of having multiple separate communication channels using multiple data valves, the separation of communications between chips using multiple data valves, the added bandwidth using multiple data valves, the ability to use any multiple of the data valves simultaneously when communicating between chips, and / or the like. In addition, the use of multiple one-way data valves within a single device may include technical changes and / or enhancements from architectures involving only a single one-way data valve. For example, such use of multiple one-way data valves may include splitting content rendering between the network chip and the third chip (e.g., the decryption chip) within systems, such as what is described herein. As another example, external modifications, such as modifications to make applications work with such systems, may be needed to make use of the multiple one-way data valves. Such modifications may include changes such as adding another encryption key on a server (e.g., connected to the network chip), and / or changes such as creatingnew types of interfaces for applications, working in conjunction with such systems, such as email clients.
[0101] While the architecture, related to the systems and techniques described herein, may often be used in conjunction with encryption, device(s) using such an architecture may be used to intentionally transmit or receive unencrypted communications. For example, unencrypted files, messages, or web pages may be received on an offline chip (e.g., the encryption chip) simply to protect the network from potential malware that it may contain. As another example, a user may wish to intentionally send unencrypted communications from the first chip (e.g., the encryption chip) to people and / or applications with whom an encrypted channel has not been or cannot be established, or for setup and / or diagnostics on downstream systems, such as to set up a network connection.
[0102] The present disclosure may include a system, a method, and / or a computer program product. The computer program product may include a computer readable storage medium (or media) having computer readable program instructions thereon for causing a processor to carry out aspects of the present disclosure.
[0103] The computer readable storage medium can be a tangible device that can retain and store instructions for use by an instruction execution device. The computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but is not limited to, an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of the computer readable storage medium includes the following: a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), a static randomaccess memory (SRAM), a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD), a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanically encoded device such as punch-cards or raised structures in a groove having instructions recorded thereon, and any suitable combination of the foregoing. A computer readable storage medium, as used herein, is not to be construed as being transitory signals per se, such as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagating through a waveguide or other transmission media (e.g., light pulses passing through a fiber-optic cable), or electrical signals transmitted through a wire.
[0104] Computer readable program instructions described herein can be downloaded to respective computing / processing devices from a computer readable storage medium or to an external computer or external storage device via a network, for example, the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network and / or a wireless network. The network may comprise copper transmission cables, optical transmission fibers, wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers and / or edge servers. A network adapter card or network interface in each computing / processing device receives computer readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer readable program instructions for storage in a computer readable storage medium within the respective computing / processing device.
[0105] Computer readable program instructions for carrying out operations of the present disclosure may be assembler instructions, instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state-setting data, or either source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including an object oriented programming language such as Smalltalk, C++ or the like, and conventional procedural programming languages, such as the “C”programming language or similar programming languages. The computer readable program instructions may execute entirely on the user’s computer, partly on the user’s computer, as a stand-alone software package, partly on the user’s computer and partly on a remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or server. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user’s computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer (for example, through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider). In some embodiments, electronic circuitry including, for example, programmable logic circuitry, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), or programmable logic arrays (PLA) may execute the computer readable program instructions by utilizing state information of the computer readable program instructions to personalize the electronic circuitry, in order to perform aspects of the present disclosure.
[0106] Aspects of the present disclosure are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the disclosure. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer readable program instructions.
[0107] These computer readable program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions / acts specified in the flowchart and / or block diagram block or blocks. These computer readable program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable storage medium thatcan direct a computer, a programmable data processing apparatus, and / or other devices to function in a particular manner, such that the computer readable storage medium having instructions stored therein comprises an article of manufacture including instructions which implement aspects of the function / act specified in the flowchart and / or block diagram block or blocks.
[0108] The computer readable program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus or other device to produce a computer implemented process, such that the instructions which execute on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device implement the functions / acts specified in the flowchart and / or block diagram block or blocks.
[0109] The flowchart and block diagrams in the Figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods, and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. In this regard, each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of instructions, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s). In some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of the block diagrams and / or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and / or flowchart illustration, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-basedsystems that perform the specified functions or acts or carry out combinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.
[0110] The descriptions of the various embodiments of the present disclosure have been presented for purposes of illustration, but are not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the embodiments disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The terminology used herein was chosen to best explain the principles of the embodiments, the practical application or technical improvement over technologies found in the marketplace, or to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.
[0111] While the disclosed subject matter is described herein in terms of certain preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art will recognize that various modifications and improvements may be made to the disclosed subject matter without departing from the scope thereof. Moreover, although individual features of one embodiment of the disclosed subject matter may be discussed herein or shown in the drawings of the one embodiment and not in other embodiments, it should be apparent that individual features of one embodiment may be combined with one or more features of another embodiment or features from a plurality of embodiments.
[0112] In addition to the specific embodiments claimed below, the disclosed subject matter is also directed to other embodiments having any other possible combination of the dependent features claimed below and those disclosed above. As such, the particular features presented in the dependent claims and disclosed above can be combined with each other in other manners within the scope of the disclosed subject matter such that the disclosed subject matter should be recognized as also specifically directed to other embodiments having any otherpossible combinations. Thus, the foregoing description of specific embodiments of the disclosed subject matter has been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the disclosed subject matter to those embodiments disclosed.
[0113] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and variations can be made in the method and system of the disclosed subject matter without departing from the spirit or scope of the disclosed subject matter. Thus, it is intended that the disclosed subject matter include modifications and variations that are within the scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.
[0114] Various embodiments have been described in detail. Changes in and or additions to the description may be made. Section headings herein are provided as organizational cues. These headings shall not limit or characterize the embodiments.
[0115] Example embodiments of the invention are defined by the following numbered embodiments:
[0116] 1. A computer-implemented system for encrypted communication, the system comprising: a first chip; a network chip, wherein the first chip is configured to transmit encrypted data over a one-way valve to the network chip, the network chip configured to transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device; the first chip or the network chip configured to receive data input; and a third chip, wherein the network chip is configured to transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data over a second one-way valve to the third chip, the third chip configured todecrypt the at least a portion of the encrypted data and trap any malware received at the third chip.
[0117] 2. The computer-implemented system of claim 1 , wherein the system is an integrated circuit.
[0118] 3. The computer-implemented system of claim 1 , wherein the system is included in a mobile device.
[0119] 4. The computer-implemented system of claim 1 , wherein the at least a portion of the encrypted data is displayed in an unencrypted format at a display connected to the third chip.
[0120] 5. The computer-implemented system of claim 1 , wherein the recipient computing device is a second chipset system.
[0121] 6. The computer-implemented system of claim 1 , further comprising an input device switchable between the first chip and the network chip and no keyboard directly connected to the third chip.
[0122] 7. The computer-implemented system of claim 1 , further comprising a display connected to the third chip and an input device connected to the first chip and no display directly connected to the first chip or to the network chip.
[0123] 8. A computer implemented method for encrypted communication, the method comprising: at a first chip, transmitting encrypted data over a one-way valve to a network chip;at the network chip, transmitting at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device and over a second one-way valve to a third chip; the first chip or the network chip configured to receive data input; and at the third chip, decrypting the at least a portion of the encrypted data and trap any malware received at the third chip.
[0124] 9. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a set of machine- interpretable instructions, which, when executed, cause a processor to perform a method for encrypted communication, the method comprising: at a first chip, transmitting encrypted data over a one-way valve to a network chip; at the network chip, transmitting at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device and over a second one-way valve to a third chip; the first chip or the network chip configured to receive data input; and at the third chip, decrypting the at least a portion of the encrypted data and trap any malware received at the third chip.
Claims
What is claimed is:
1. A system for encrypted communication, the system comprising: a first chip; a network chip, wherein the first chip is configured to transmit encrypted data, via a first one-way data valve, to the network chip, the network chip is configured to transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device, and the first chip or the network chip is configured to receive data input; and a third chip, wherein the network chip is configured to transmit at least a portion of the encrypted data, via a second one-way data valve, to the third chip, the third chip is configured to decrypt the at least a portion of the encrypted data , the first one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip, and the second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the network chip.
2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the system is an integrated circuit.
3. The system of claim 1, wherein the system is included in a mobile device.
4. The system of claim 1 , wherein the at least a portion of the encrypted data is displayed in an unencrypted format at a display connected to the third chip.
5. The system of claim 1, wherein the recipient computing device is a second chipset system.
6. The system of claim 1 , further comprising an input peripheral switchable between the first chip and the network chip.
7. The system of claim 1 , further comprising an output peripheral connected to the third chip and an input peripheral connected to the first chip, wherein no output peripheral is directly connected to the first chip or to the network chip.
8. A method for encrypted communication, the method comprising: at a first chip, transmitting encrypted data, via a one-way data valve, to a network chip; at the network chip, transmitting at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device, and via a second one-way data valve, to a third chip, and the first chip or the network chip is configured to receive data input; and at the third chip, decrypting the at least a portion of the encrypted data, the first one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip, and the second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the network chip.
9. A non- transitory computer readable medium storing a set of machine-interpretable instructions, which, when executed, cause a processor to perform a method for encrypted communication, the method comprising: at a first chip, transmitting encrypted data, via a one-way data valve, to a network chip; at the network chip, transmitting at least a portion of the encrypted data to a recipient computing device, and via a second one-way data valve, to a third chip, and the first chip or the network chip is configured to receive data input; and at the third chip, decrypting the at least a portion of the encrypted data, the first one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip, and the second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the network chip.
10. A system for encrypted communication, the system comprising: a plurality of one-way data valves; and a plurality of chips, wherein:a first chip of the plurality of chips is coupled to a first one-way data valve of the plurality of one-way data valves; the first chip being configured to: receive input data, encrypt the input data, and send the encrypted input data, via the first one-way data valve, towards a second chip of the plurality of chips; and the second chip of the plurality of chips is coupled downstream of the first chip and to a second one-way data valve of the plurality of one-way data valves, the second chip being configured to decrypt the encrypted input data, the first and the second chips being operatively coupled to a network, and the first and the second one-way data valves being configured to block upstream data communications.
11. The system of claim 10, wherein each of the plurality of one-way data valves comprises an optocoupler.
12. The system of claim 10, wherein each of the plurality of one-way data valves comprises a laser or an LED facing a phototransistor across a physical gap.
13. The system of claim 10, wherein each of the plurality of one-way data valves is communicatively coupled between each pair of the plurality of chips.
14. The system of claim 12, wherein a network interface is coupled between the first one-way data valve and the second one-way data valve, and the network interface is coupled to the network.
15. The system of claim 14, wherein the network interface is configured to: receive, via the first one-way data valve, the encrypted input data, and send, via the second one-way data valve, at least a portion of the encrypted input data to the second chip.
16. The system of claim 15, wherein a third chip of the plurality of chips comprises the network interface.
17. The system of claim 15, wherein the network interface is configured to: receive, via the network, external data, and send, via the second one-way data valve, at least a portion of the external data to the second chip.
18. The system of claim 10, wherein the system is an integrated circuit.
19. The system of claim 10, wherein the system is included in a mobile device.
20. The system of claim 10, wherein the first chip is coupled to an input peripheral and configured to receive the input data from the input peripheral.
21. The system of claim 20, wherein the input peripheral is a keyboard, a camera, a microphone, or a mouse.
22. The system of claim 10, wherein the second chip is coupled to an output peripheral and configured to send the decrypted input data to the output peripheral.
23. The system of claim 22, wherein the output peripheral is a display.
24. The system of claim 23, wherein the at least a portion of the decrypted input data is displayed on the display.
25. A device for encrypted communication, the device comprising: a first chip; a network chip; a third chip; a first one-way data valve; a second one-way data valve; anda graphical user interface based (GUI-based) system; wherein the first one-way data valve is coupled between the first chip and the network chip, the second one-way data valve is coupled between the network chip and the third chip, the GUI-based system is communicatively coupled to the first chip, the second chip, and the third chip, the first oneway data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the network chip to the first chip, and the second one-way data valve is configured to block data from being transmitted from the third chip to the network chip; and wherein the GUI-based system is configured to receive input data, and send input data to the first chip; the first chip is configured to encrypt the input data, and send the encrypted input data, via the first one-way data valve, to the network chip; the network chip is configured to send the encrypted input data to a recipient computing device, receive encrypted external data, and send the encrypted external data, via the second one-way data valve, to the third chip; and the third chip is configured to decrypt the encrypted external data.
26. The device of claim 25, wherein the GUI-based system is further configured to display the input data or the decrypted external data.
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