Information interaction method and apparatus, and readable storage medium

Abstract

The present application relates to the technical field of communications, and in particular to an information interaction method and apparatus, and a readable storage medium. The method comprises: upon confirming that a second attester is trustable, a verifier requesting from a first attester the generation of a second EK for the second attester; the first attester receiving the request, and then on the basis of a first EK of the first attester and a first parameter which is carried in the request by the verifier, generating the second EK; the first attester then sending the second EK to the second attester; and the second attester receiving the second EK and then saving same for use as a root key. By using the present application, the security and reliability of a key can be improved, thereby reducing security risks caused by key storage and generation brought about by virtualization.

Description

Information interaction method, device and readable storage medium

[0001] This application claims priority to the Chinese patent application filed with the State Intellectual Property Office of China on August 11, 2023, with application number 202311015300.2, and priority to the Chinese patent application entitled “Information Interaction Method, Device and Readable Storage Medium”, all contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field

[0002] The present application relates to the field of communication technologies, and in particular to an information interaction method, device, and readable storage medium. Background Art

[0003] Network functions virtualization (NFV) can be understood as separating the network functions of traditional network devices (such as servers, switches, and storage) from their physical counterparts and running them as software (or software programs) on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hosts. It can also be understood as leveraging information technology (IT) virtualization technology to create virtual machines (VMs), then deploying traditional communications technology (CT) services onto these VMs.

[0004] Existing network function virtualization architectures may include, but are not limited to, virtual network functions (VNFs) and network function virtualization infrastructure (NFVI). A virtual network function (VNF) can be understood as a software application that provides network functions (such as mobility management, session management, or policy management network elements, etc.). NFVI can be understood as a set of resources used to host and connect virtual functions. Exemplarily, NFVI can provide computing resources, storage resources, programs, etc. for implementing VNFs. In a network function virtualization scenario, remote attestation (RA) is a common security service that can be used to verify the security of VNFs and / or NFVIs. Since remote attestation requires keys, the key security issue in a network function virtualization scenario is worth considering.

[0005] Summary of the Invention

[0006] The embodiments of the present application provide an information interaction method, device, and readable storage medium, which can improve the security and reliability of keys.

[0007] The present application is introduced below from different aspects. It should be understood that the implementation methods and beneficial effects of the following different aspects can be referenced to each other.

[0008] It is understood that the root key is the top-level key of the public key infrastructure (PKI) hierarchy, which is used to verify and sign digital certificates. In this application, the endorsement key (EK) is used as the root key.

[0009] In a first aspect, the present application provides an information interaction method, comprising: a first measurement entity receiving a key generation request from a verifier, the key generation request including a first parameter, the key generation request being used to request generation of a second EK of a second measurement entity based on the first parameter; the first measurement entity generating the second EK based on the first parameter and its own first EK, and then sending a key grant message to the second measurement entity, the key grant message including the second EK. The second EK can be used as a root key of the second measurement entity.

[0010] In the present application, the first measurement party may belong to the network function virtualization infrastructure (NFVI), and may also be referred to as the measurement party of the NFVI layer (or device layer). Because security hardware is deployed in the NFVI, such as a subscriber identification module (SIM) card, etc., the first measurement party has the ability and / or conditions to call the security hardware, so the security of the first measurement party is higher. The second measurement party may belong to the VNF architecture, and may also be referred to as the measurement party of the VNF layer (or business layer). Because the VNF architecture is virtualized and no security hardware is configured, the second measurement party does not have the ability and / or conditions to call the security hardware, so the security of the second measurement party is lower than that of the first measurement party. Exemplarily, the first measurement party is a pluggable device, such as a subscriber identification module (SIM) card, or a device into which a SIM card is inserted, or a root of trust (RoT). Exemplarily, the second measurement party is software installed on a host operating system (Host OS), or a virtual root of trust (vRoT). As another example, the first measurement entity is a program installed in the NFVI that can communicate with or invoke secure hardware (such as a RoT or SIM card). The second measurement entity is software installed in the VNF that does not have the ability and / or conditions to invoke secure hardware. It is understood that the first and second measurement entities will not be described in detail below.

[0011] It can be understood that the first EK of the first measurement party can be pre-configured, for example, the first EK is pre-configured in the first measurement party by hardware burning.

[0012] In this application, the first measurement party utilizes a key deduction architecture to cryptographically link the first EK of the first measurement party and the second EK of the second measurement party, such as using the first EK of the first measurement party to dynamically generate the second EK of the second measurement party to form a key trust chain; thereby improving the security and reliability of the second EK (i.e., the EK of the VNF layer) and reducing the security risks caused by key storage and generation due to virtualization.

[0013] In conjunction with the first aspect, in one possible implementation, the key generation request is further used to indicate that the second measurement party is trusted. It is understood that if the second measurement party is trusted, because the first measurement party's first EK is pre-configured (e.g., burned into the hardware), the first measurement party's first EK is not easily tampered with. Therefore, the second EK dynamically generated based on the first measurement party's first EK and the first parameter is trusted, and the second EK and the first EK form a key trust chain. This can improve the security and reliability of the VNF layer root key (i.e., the second EK) and reduce the security risks of key storage and generation due to virtualization.

[0014] In combination with the first aspect, in one possible implementation, the first measuring party generates a second EK based on the first parameter and its own first EK, including: the first measuring party takes the first parameter and its own first EK as input and executes a first key generation algorithm (such as preconfigured) to generate the second EK. Exemplarily, the first parameter can be a random number, such as Nonce1; it can also be address information, such as the address of the first measuring party, for example, the domain name of the first measuring party, the Internet Protocol (IP) address, the fully qualified domain name (FQDN), etc.; it can also be a counter value, such as the verifier maintains a counter. Exemplarily, there are many key generation algorithms, such as a key derivation function (KDF) and a hash algorithm, which are not limited in this application.

[0015] In conjunction with the first aspect, in one possible implementation, before the first measurement entity receives the key generation request from the verifier, the method further includes: the first measurement entity obtaining a second parameter, and then generating its own first attestation identity key (AIK) based on the second parameter and its own first EK. The second AIK can be used to sign the evidence of the second measurement entity.

[0016] Exemplarily, the first measuring party generates its own first AIK based on the second parameter and its own first EK, including: the first measuring party takes the above-mentioned second parameter and its own first EK as input, executes a second key generation algorithm (such as pre-configured) to generate its own first AIK. Among them, the second parameter is different from the above-mentioned first parameter, or it can be the same, which is not limited in this application. The second key generation algorithm can be the same as the above-mentioned first key generation algorithm, of course, it can also be different, which is not limited in this application. For example, when the second key generation algorithm is the same as the above-mentioned first key generation algorithm, the second parameter is different from the above-mentioned first parameter; when the second parameter is the same as the above-mentioned first parameter, the second key generation algorithm can be different from the above-mentioned first key generation algorithm.

[0017] This application uses symmetric key deduction to generate AIK based on EK, so that AIK and EK also have a cryptographic connection, forming a key trust chain. It can perform remote attestation processes in scenarios without a certificate authority (CA), improve the robustness of measurements, and enhance the ability to resist quantum attacks.

[0018] In combination with the first aspect, in a possible implementation, the first measurement party obtains the second parameter, including: the first measurement party obtains the second parameter from the key management network element. For details, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, which is not detailed here.

[0019] Exemplarily, before the first measuring party obtains the second parameter from the key management network element, the method further includes: the first measuring party receives a remote attestation request from the verification party, the remote attestation request including the identifier of the verification party and the identifier of the first measuring party, and optionally also including a freshness parameter. After the first measuring party generates its own first AIK based on the above-mentioned second parameter and its own first EK, the method further includes: the first measuring party sends a remote attestation response to the verification party, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the second measuring party and the first signature information, the first signature information including the information after the evidence of the second measuring party is signed by the first AIK; the first measuring party receives the remote attestation result from the verification party, the remote attestation result indicating that the remote attestation of the second measuring party is successful. Among them, regarding the specific implementation method of remote attestation, please refer to the relevant description in Example 2 below, which will not be described in detail here. It can be understood that the success of the remote attestation of the second measuring party indicates that the second measuring party is trustworthy.

[0020] The verifier's identifier can be used to inform the measuring party of the identity of the verifier that sent the remote attestation request. The first measuring party's identifier can be used to inform a specific measuring party to perform the measurement. The freshness parameter can be used to prevent replay attacks and ensure the freshness of the evidence. Exemplarily, the freshness parameter can be a random number or a count value, such as a loop count value from 0 to 7.

[0021] The first measurement party of the present application cooperates with the verification party to remotely certify the second measurement party to confirm whether the second measurement party is trustworthy. Only when the second measurement party is trustworthy will the verification party trigger the first measurement party to dynamically generate a second EK for the second measurement party, so that the first EK of the first measurement party and the second EK of the second measurement party have a cryptographic connection to improve the security and reliability of the VNF layer root key (i.e., the second EK).

[0022] In combination with the first aspect, in a possible implementation, the first measuring party obtains the second parameter, including: the first measuring party obtains the second parameter from the verifying party. For details, please refer to the description of embodiment 3 below, which is not detailed here.

[0023] Exemplarily, after the first measurement party generates its own first AIK based on the above-mentioned second parameter and its own first EK, the method further includes: the first measurement party receives a remote attestation request from the verification party, the remote attestation request including the identification of the verification party and the identification of the first measurement party, and optionally also including a freshness parameter; the first measurement party sends a remote attestation response to the verification party, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the second measurement party, the second parameter, and the first signature information, the second parameter can be used to determine the first AIK (for the specific determination method, see the description of Example 3 below), the first signature information includes the information after the evidence of the second measurement party is signed by the first AIK; the first measurement party receives the remote attestation result sent by the verification party, the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful. Among them, for the specific implementation method of remote attestation, please refer to the relevant description in Example 3 below, which will not be described in detail here.

[0024] In the second aspect, the present application provides an information interaction method, which includes: the verifier receives a key request message from the second measurement party, the key request message includes the identifier of the second measurement party, and the key request message is used to request to obtain the second EK of the second measurement party; the verifier generates a first parameter; when the second measurement party is trustworthy, the verifier sends a key generation request to the first measurement party, the key generation request includes the first parameter, and the key generation request is used to request to generate the second EK of the second measurement party based on the first parameter.

[0025] The verification party of the present application requests the first measurement party to dynamically generate a second EK for the second measurement party when the second measurement party is trustworthy, which can improve the security and reliability of the second EK.

[0026] In combination with the second aspect, in one possible implementation, after the verifier generates the first parameter, the method also includes: the verifier stores the identifier of the above-mentioned second measurement party and the first parameter, thereby recording the correspondence between the identifier of the second measurement party and the first parameter for subsequent use.

[0027] In combination with the second aspect, in a possible implementation, after the verification party sends a key generation request to the first measurement party, the method further includes: the verification party receives a key success message from the second measurement party, and the key success message includes the identifier of the second measurement party; the verification party then sends a key generation message to the key management network element, and the key generation message includes the identifier of the second measurement party, the identifier of the first measurement party, and the above-mentioned first parameter. Among them, the key success message can be used to inform the verification party that the second measurement party has obtained the second EK, and the key success message can also serve as a response or subsequent notification to the above-mentioned key request message. The key generation message is used to trigger (the key management network element) to generate the second EK of the second measurement party for subsequent use.

[0028] Exemplarily, the key success message also includes an identifier of the first measurement party. The identifier of the first measurement party can be used to determine a first EK. This first EK can be used in conjunction with the first parameter to generate a second EK for the second measurement party. The specific generation method is described below and is not detailed here.

[0029] In conjunction with the second aspect, in a possible implementation, the second measurement party is trustworthy, which can be understood as: the verification party stores the result of the successful remote attestation of the second measurement party.

[0030] In conjunction with the second aspect, in a possible implementation, before the verifier sends a key generation request to the first measurement party, such as after the verifier receives a key request message from the second measurement party, the method further includes: the verifier sends a remote attestation request to the first measurement party; the verifier receives a remote attestation response from the first measurement party, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the second measurement party and the first signature information, the first signature information including the information after the evidence of the second measurement party is signed by the first AIK of the first measurement party; the verifier obtains the first AIK of the first measurement party, and uses the first AIK to verify whether the first signature information is valid; if the first signature information is valid, the verifier verifies the evidence of the second measurement party; if the evidence of the second measurement party passes the verification, the verifier confirms that the second measurement party is trustworthy. Among them, for the specific implementation of remote attestation, please refer to the relevant description in Example 2 or 3 below, which will not be described in detail here.

[0031] Illustratively, the remote attestation response also includes a second parameter, which can be used to determine the first AIK of the first measuring party. The verifier obtains the first AIK of the first measuring party by: the verifier determines the first AIK corresponding to the second parameter based on a correspondence between the second parameter and the first AIK. This correspondence may be pre-stored. For details, see the description of Example 3 below and will not be elaborated here.

[0032] After receiving the key request message sent by the second measurement party, the verifier of the present application can trigger remote attestation of the second measurement party to confirm whether the second measurement party is trustworthy. If the second measurement party is trustworthy, the verifier requests the first measurement party to dynamically generate a second EK for the second measurement party, thereby improving the security and reliability of the VNF layer root key (i.e., the second EK).

[0033] In combination with the second aspect, in a possible implementation, before the verifier sends a remote attestation request to the first measurement party, the method also includes: the verifier receives a first key request from the first measurement party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the first AIK of the first measurement party; the verifier sends a second key request to the key management network element, the second key request includes the identifier of the first measurement party and the second parameter, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; the verifier receives a second key response from the key management network element, the second key response includes the first AIK; the verifier stores the first AIK and the second parameter for subsequent use; the verifier sends a first key response to the first measurement party, and the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0034] In combination with the second aspect, in a possible implementation, before the verifier sends a remote attestation request to the first measurement party, the method also includes: the verifier receives a first key request from the first measurement party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the first AIK of the first measurement party; the verifier sends a second key request to the key management network element, the second key request includes the identifier of the first measurement party, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; the verifier receives a second key response from the key management network element, the second key response includes the first AIK and the second parameter; the verifier stores the first AIK and the second parameter for subsequent use; the verifier sends a first key response to the first measurement party, and the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0035] In the present application, the second parameter used to generate the first AIK can be generated by the authenticator or by the key management network element; two different implementation methods are provided.

[0036] In conjunction with the second aspect, in one possible implementation, the verifier obtains the first AIK of the first measurement party, including: the verifier sends a key acquisition message to a key management network element, the key acquisition message including an identifier of the first measurement party, and the key acquisition message is used to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; and the verifier receives a key response message from the key management network element, the key response message including the first AIK of the first measurement party. Regarding the manner in which the verifier obtains the first AIK from the key management network element, please refer to the relevant description of Example 2 below and will not be elaborated here.

[0037] In conjunction with the second aspect, in one possible implementation, after the verifier verifies the second measurement party's evidence, the method further includes: the verifier sending a remote attestation result to the first measurement party, the remote attestation result indicating that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful. Passing the verification of the second measurement party's evidence indicates that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful.

[0038] The verification party of this application sends the result of the successful remote certification of the second measurement party to the first measurement party, so that the first measurement party can know the trust status of the second measurement party, and thus generate a root key (i.e., the second EK) for it if the second measurement party is trustworthy.

[0039] In a third aspect, the present application provides an information exchange method, comprising: a second measurement party sending a key request message to a verifier, the key request message including an identifier of the second measurement party, and requesting a second EK of the second measurement party; and the second measurement party receiving a key grant message from a first measurement party, the key grant message including the second EK. The second EK can be generated based on the first EK of the first measurement party and a first parameter. The specific generation method can be found in the description of the first aspect above and is not further described here.

[0040] Exemplarily, after receiving the second EK, the second measurement party may save the second EK and use it as the root key of the second measurement party.

[0041] This application establishes a cryptographic connection between the first EK of the first measurement party and the EK of the second measurement party. For example, the first EK of the first measurement party is used to dynamically generate the second EK of the second measurement party, thereby forming a key trust chain; thereby improving the security and reliability of the second EK and reducing the security risks caused by key storage and generation due to virtualization.

[0042] In conjunction with the third aspect, in one possible implementation, after the second measurement entity receives the key grant message from the first measurement entity, the method further includes: the second measurement entity sending a key success message to the verifier, where the key success message includes an identifier of the second measurement entity. The key success message can be used to inform the verifier that the second measurement entity has obtained the second EK. The key success message can also serve as a response to or subsequent notification of the key request message.

[0043] Exemplarily, the key success message also includes the identifier of the first measurement party. The identifier of the first measurement party can be used to determine the first EK. The specific determination method is described below and is not described in detail here.

[0044] In conjunction with the third aspect, in one possible implementation, after the second measurement entity receives the key grant message from the first measurement entity, the method further includes: the second measurement entity may use the second EK and parameters obtained from the key management network element or the verifier to generate a second AIK of the second measurement entity. The specific implementation method is described in the first embodiment below and is not further explained here. It is understood that the second AIK can be used for measurement evidence.

[0045] After the second measurement party of the present application obtains the second EK, it generates a second AIK based on the second EK, so that the second AIK and the second EK also have a cryptographic connection, forming a key trust chain. This allows for remote attestation processes in scenarios without a certificate authority (CA), improves the robustness of the measurement, and enhances resistance to quantum attacks.

[0046] In the fourth aspect, the present application provides an information interaction method, which includes: a key management network element receives a key generation message from a verification party, the key generation message includes an identifier of a first measurement party, an identifier of a second measurement party, and a first parameter, and the key generation message is used to trigger (the key management network element) to generate a second EK of the second measurement party; the key management network element then generates a second EK based on the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party.

[0047] The first EK is pre-configured, for example, the first EK is pre-configured in the first measurement party by hardware burning.

[0048] Exemplarily, the key generation message may implicitly indicate that the second measuring party is trustworthy. For example, when the key management network element receives the key generation message, it indicates that the second measuring party is trustworthy.

[0049] In the case where the second measurement party is trusted, the key management network element of the present application generates the second EK of the second measurement party based on the first EK and first parameters of the first measurement party. Because the first EK of the first measurement party is pre-configured (e.g., burned into the hardware), it is not easily tampered with. Therefore, the second EK dynamically generated based on the first EK and first parameters of the first measurement party is trusted, and the second EK and the first EK form a key trust chain. This can improve the security and reliability of the second EK (i.e., the EK at the VNF layer) and reduce the security risks of key storage and generation caused by virtualization.

[0050] In conjunction with the fourth aspect, in one possible implementation, after the key management network element generates the second EK, the method further includes: the key management network element storing the identifier of the second measurement party and the second EK for subsequent use. For example, generating a second AIK based on the second EK. For details, see the description of Embodiment 1 below and are not detailed here.

[0051] In conjunction with the fourth aspect, in one possible implementation, a correspondence between the first measurement party's identifier and the first EK may be preconfigured at the key management network element, so that the key management network element can subsequently retrieve the first EK based on the first measurement party's identifier. Prior to the key management network element generating the second EK based on the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the first measurement party's identifier, the method further includes: the key management network element determining the first EK corresponding to the first measurement party's identifier based on the aforementioned preconfigured correspondence between the first measurement party's identifier and the first EK.

[0052] Exemplarily, the key management network element generates a second EK based on the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party, including: the key management network element takes the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party as input, and executes a first key generation algorithm (e.g., a preconfigured algorithm) to generate the second EK. The description of the first key generation algorithm is described in the first aspect above and is not repeated here.

[0053] In combination with the fourth aspect, in a possible implementation, before the key management network element receives the key generation message from the verification party, the method also includes: the key management network element receives a first key request from the first measurement party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the first AIK of the first measurement party; the key management network element generates the second parameter, and generates the first AIK of the first measurement party based on the second parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party; the key management network element sends a first key response to the first measurement party, and the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0054] Illustratively, generating the first AIK of the first measuring party based on the second parameter and the first EK of the first measuring party includes: taking the second parameter and the first EK of the first measuring party as input, and executing a second key generation algorithm (e.g., a preconfigured algorithm) to generate the first AIK of the first measuring party. Regarding the relationship between the second key generation algorithm and the first key generation algorithm, refer to the description of the first aspect above and are not repeated here.

[0055] Exemplarily, after the key management network element sends a first key response to the first measurement party, the method also includes: the key management network element receives a key acquisition message from the verification party, the key acquisition message includes the identifier of the first measurement party, and the key acquisition message is used to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; the key management network element sends a key response message to the verification party, the key response message includes the first AIK of the first measurement party.

[0056] This application uses symmetric key deduction to generate AIK based on EK, so that AIK and EK also have a cryptographic connection, forming a key trust chain. It can perform remote attestation processes in scenarios without a certificate authority (CA), improve the robustness of measurements, and enhance the ability to resist quantum attacks.

[0057] In combination with the fourth aspect, in a possible implementation, before the key management network element receives the key generation message from the verifier, the method also includes: the key management network element receives a second key request from the verifier, the second key request including the identifier of the first measurement party and the second parameter, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; the key management network element generates the first AIK of the first measurement party based on the second parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party; the key management network element sends a second key response to the verifier, and the second key response includes the first AIK.

[0058] In combination with the fourth aspect, in a possible implementation, before the key management network element receives the key generation message from the verifier, the method also includes: the key management network element receives a second key request from the verifier, the second key request includes the identifier of the first measurement party, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; the key management network element generates a second parameter, and generates the first AIK of the first measurement party based on the second parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party; the key management network element sends a second key response to the verifier, and the second key response includes the first AIK and the second parameter.

[0059] This application uses symmetric key deduction to generate AIK based on EK, so that AIK and EK also have a cryptographic connection, forming a key trust chain. It can perform remote attestation processes in scenarios without a certificate authority (CA), improve the robustness of measurements, and enhance the ability to resist quantum attacks.

[0060] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a communication device, which may be any one of a first measurement party, a second measurement party, a verification party, a key management network element, or a chip thereof. The communication device includes a unit and / or module for executing the method provided by any one of the first to fourth aspects, or any possible implementation of any one of the aspects, such as a transceiver unit and / or a processing unit. The transceiver unit is used to send and receive various information or signaling, and thus can also achieve the beneficial effects (or advantages) of the method provided in any of the above aspects.

[0061] In a sixth aspect, the present application provides an information interaction method, which includes: the measuring party obtains a second parameter, and generates its own AIK based on the second parameter and its own EK, and the AIK can be used to sign the evidence of the verified party.

[0062] Among them, the measuring party here can be the first measuring party of the first aspect mentioned above, or the second measuring party of the third aspect mentioned above, and this application does not impose any restrictions. When the measuring party is the first measuring party, the verified party can be the second measuring party or other equipment or software program that needs to confirm the trusted status; when the measuring party is the second measuring party, the verified party can be the equipment or software program corresponding to the second measuring party that needs to confirm the trusted status. Accordingly, the EK of the measuring party can be pre-configured or granted. When the measuring party is the first measuring party, the EK is pre-configured; when the measuring party is the second measuring party, the EK can be granted.

[0063] The embodiment of the present application uses symmetric key deduction to generate AIK based on EK, so that AIK and EK have a cryptographic connection and form a key trust chain. It can perform remote certification processes in scenarios without CA, improve the robustness of measurements, and enhance the ability to resist quantum attacks.

[0064] In combination with the sixth aspect, in one possible implementation, the measuring party generates its own AIK based on the second parameter and its own EK, including: the measuring party takes the second parameter and its own EK as input, executes a second key generation algorithm (such as a preconfigured one) to generate its own AIK.

[0065] In combination with the sixth aspect, in a possible implementation, the measuring party obtains the second parameter, including: the measuring party obtains the second parameter from the key management network element. For details, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, which is not detailed here.

[0066] Exemplarily, before the measuring party obtains the second parameter from the key management network element, the method further includes: the measuring party receives a remote attestation request from the verifying party. After the measuring party generates its own AIK based on the second parameter and its own EK, the method further includes: the measuring party sends a remote attestation response to the verifying party, the remote attestation response includes the evidence of the verified party and the second signature information, the second signature information includes the information after the evidence of the verified party is signed by the AIK; the measuring party receives the remote attestation result from the verifying party, the remote attestation result is used to indicate that the remote attestation of the verified party is successful or that the remote attestation of the verified party has failed. Among them, regarding the specific implementation method of remote attestation, please refer to the relevant description in Example 2 below, which will not be described in detail here.

[0067] In conjunction with the sixth aspect, in a possible implementation, the measuring party obtains the second parameter, including: the measuring party obtains the second parameter from the verifying party. For details, please refer to the description of embodiment 3 below, which is not detailed here.

[0068] Exemplarily, after the measuring party generates its own AIK based on the second parameter and its own EK, the method further includes: the measuring party receives a remote attestation request from the verifying party; the measuring party sends a remote attestation response to the verifying party, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the verified party, the second parameter, and the second signature information, the second parameter is used to determine the AIK, and the second signature information includes the information after the evidence of the verified party is signed by the AIK; the measuring party receives the remote attestation result sent by the verifying party, the remote attestation result is used to indicate the success of the remote attestation of the verified party or the failure of the remote attestation of the verified party. Among them, regarding the specific implementation method of remote attestation, please refer to the relevant description in Example 3 below, which will not be described in detail here.

[0069] In the seventh aspect, the present application provides an information interaction method, which includes: a key management network element receives a first key request from a measuring party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the AIK of the measuring party; the key management network element generates the second parameter, and generates the AIK of the measuring party based on the second parameter and the EK of the measuring party; the key management network element sends a first key response to the measuring party, and the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0070] The EK of the measuring party may be pre-configured or granted. When the measuring party is the first measuring party, the EK is pre-configured; when the measuring party is the second measuring party, the EK may be granted.

[0071] This application uses symmetric key deduction to generate AIK based on EK, so that AIK and EK have a cryptographic connection and form a key trust chain. It can support remote attestation processes in scenarios without CA, improve the robustness of measurements, and enhance the ability to resist quantum attacks.

[0072] In combination with the seventh aspect, in one possible implementation method, the AIK of the measuring party is generated based on the second parameter and the EK of the measuring party, including: taking the second parameter and the EK of the measuring party as input, executing a second key generation algorithm (such as a preconfigured one) to generate the AIK of the measuring party.

[0073] In conjunction with the seventh aspect, in a possible implementation, the above-mentioned first key request includes the identifier of the measuring party. If the measuring party here is the first measuring party, the correspondence between the identifier of the measuring party and the EK can be pre-configured at the key management network element, so that the key management network element can subsequently retrieve the EK based on the identifier of the measuring party. If the measuring party here is the second measuring party, the key management network element pre-stores the correspondence between the identifier of the measuring party and the EK for subsequent use. Then, before generating the AIK of the measuring party based on the second parameter and the EK of the measuring party, the method also includes: determining the EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party in the first key request based on the correspondence between the pre-configured / pre-stored identifier of the measuring party and the endorsement key.

[0074] In conjunction with the seventh aspect, in a possible implementation, the above-mentioned first key response also includes a third signature information, and the third signature information includes information after the second parameter is signed by the AIK signature subkey. The third signature information can be used for integrity protection, used to protect / verify the integrity of the second parameter. The AIK signature subkey can be generated based on the AIK of the measuring party. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the AIK of the measuring party itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the key management network element using a third key generation algorithm (such as preconfigured). For details, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, which will not be described in detail here.

[0075] This application uses a third signature information to perform integrity protection, which can improve security.

[0076] In combination with the seventh aspect, in a possible implementation method, after the key management network element sends a first key response to the measuring party, the method also includes: the key management network element receives a key acquisition message from the verification party, the key acquisition message includes the identifier of the measuring party, and the key acquisition message is used to obtain the AIK of the measuring party; the key management network element sends a key response message to the verification party, and the key response message includes the AIK of the measuring party.

[0077] In an eighth aspect, the present application provides an information interaction method, the method comprising: a key management network element receives a second key request from a verifier, the second key request including an identifier of a measuring party and a second parameter, the second key request being used to request obtaining the AIK of the measuring party; the key management network element generates the AIK of the measuring party based on the EK corresponding to the second parameter and the identifier of the measuring party; the key management network element sends a second key response to the verifier, the second key response including the AIK.

[0078] Alternatively, the method includes: the key management network element receives a second key request from the verifier, the second key request includes the identifier of the measuring party, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the AIK of the measuring party; the key management network element generates a second parameter, and generates the AIK of the measuring party based on the second parameter and the EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party; the key management network element sends a second key response to the verifier, and the second key response includes the AIK and the second parameter.

[0079] The EK of the measuring party may be pre-configured or granted. When the measuring party is the first measuring party, the EK is pre-configured; when the measuring party is the second measuring party, the EK may be granted.

[0080] The embodiment of the present application uses symmetric key deduction to generate AIK based on EK, so that AIK and EK have a cryptographic connection and form a key trust chain. It can support remote attestation processes in scenarios without CA, improve the robustness of measurements, and enhance the ability to resist quantum attacks.

[0081] In combination with the eighth aspect, in a possible implementation method, the key management network element generates the AIK of the measuring party based on the second parameter and the EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party, including: the key management network element takes the second parameter and the EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party as input, executes a second key generation algorithm (such as a preconfigured one) to generate the AIK of the measuring party.

[0082] In conjunction with the eighth aspect, in a possible implementation, if the measuring party here is the first measuring party, the correspondence between the measuring party's identifier and the EK can be pre-configured at the key management network element, so that the key management network element can subsequently retrieve the EK based on the identifier of the measuring party. If the measuring party here is the second measuring party, the key management network element pre-stores the correspondence between the measuring party's identifier and the EK for subsequent use. Then, before the key management network element generates the measuring party's AIK based on the second parameter and the EK corresponding to the measuring party's identifier, the method also includes: determining the EK corresponding to the measuring party's identifier in the second key request based on the pre-configured / pre-stored correspondence between the measuring party's identifier and the endorsement key.

[0083] In conjunction with the eighth aspect, in a possible implementation, the above-mentioned second key response also includes third signature information, and the third signature information includes information after the second parameter is signed by the AIK signature subkey. The third signature information can be used for integrity protection, used to protect / verify the integrity of the second parameter. The AIK signature subkey can be generated based on the AIK of the measuring party. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the AIK of the measuring party itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the key management network element using a third key generation algorithm (preconfigured). For details, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, which will not be described in detail here.

[0084] This application uses a third signature information to perform integrity protection, which can improve security.

[0085] Ninthly, the present application provides an information interaction method, which includes: the verifier sends a remote attestation request to the measurement party; the verifier receives a remote attestation response from the measurement party, the remote attestation response includes the evidence of the verified party and the second signature information, the second signature information includes the information after the evidence of the verified party is signed by the AIK of the measurement party; the verifier obtains the AIK of the measurement party, and uses the obtained AIK to verify whether the second signature information is valid; if the second signature information is valid, the verifier verifies the evidence of the verified party; the verifier sends a remote attestation result to the measurement party, the remote attestation result is used to indicate that the remote attestation of the verified party is successful or the remote attestation of the verified party fails. Wherein, if the evidence of the verified party passes the verification, the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the verified party is successful; if the evidence of the verified party fails the verification, the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the verified party fails.

[0086] This application improves security through remote attestation.

[0087] In conjunction with the ninth aspect, in one possible implementation, the verifier obtains the AIK of the measurer, including: the verifier sends a key acquisition message to a key management network element, the key acquisition message including the measurer's identifier, and the key acquisition message is used to obtain the measurer's AIK; and the verifier receives a key response message from the key management network element, the key response message including the measurer's AIK. The manner in which the verifier obtains the AIK of the measurer from the key management network element can be found in the description of Example 2 below and is not detailed here.

[0088] In conjunction with the ninth aspect, in one possible implementation, the remote attestation response further includes a second parameter, which can be used to determine the AIK of the measuring party. The verifier obtains the AIK of the measuring party, including: the verifier determines the AIK corresponding to the second parameter based on a correspondence between the second parameter and the first AIK. This correspondence may be pre-stored. For details, see the description of Example 3 below and will not be elaborated here.

[0089] In combination with the ninth aspect, in a possible implementation, before the verifier sends a remote attestation request to the measurement party, the method also includes: the verifier receives a first key request from the measurement party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the AIK of the measurement party; the verifier sends a second key request to the key management network element, the second key request includes the identification of the measurement party and the second parameter, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the AIK of the measurement party; the verifier receives a second key response from the key management network element, the second key response includes the AIK; the verifier stores the AIK and the second parameter for subsequent use; the verifier sends the first key response to the measurement party, and the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0090] In combination with the ninth aspect, in a possible implementation, before the verifier sends a remote attestation request to the measurement party, the method also includes: the verifier receives a first key request from the measurement party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the AIK of the measurement party; the verifier sends a second key request to the key management network element, the second key request includes the identifier of the measurement party, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the AIK of the measurement party; the verifier receives a second key response from the key management network element, the second key response includes the AIK and the second parameter; the verifier stores the AIK and the second parameter for subsequent use; the verifier sends the first key response to the measurement party, and the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0091] In conjunction with the ninth aspect, in a possible implementation, the above-mentioned first key request includes one or more of the following: an identifier of the measuring party, a request indication, or a request identifier. The request indication can be used to indicate the function or role of the first key request, and the request indication can be used to indicate that the function of the first key request is to request a second parameter. The request identifier can be used to uniquely identify a first key request. This is because the measuring party may request the second parameter multiple times, such as sending multiple first key requests, so if the identifier of the measuring party is used for identification, there may be a problem of unclear identification. Therefore, the present application carries a request identifier in the first key request to uniquely identify a first key request, so that the measuring party can request multiple different second parameters multiple times, generate multiple different AIKs, and improve the security of the measurement.

[0092] In conjunction with the ninth aspect, in a possible implementation, the above-mentioned first key response also includes a third signature information, and the third signature information includes information after the second parameter is signed by the AIK signature subkey. The third signature information can be used for integrity protection, used to protect / verify the integrity of the second parameter. The AIK signature subkey can be generated based on the AIK of the measuring party. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the AIK of the measuring party itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the key management network element using a third key generation algorithm (such as preconfigured). For details, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, which will not be described in detail here.

[0093] This application uses a third signature information to perform integrity protection, which can improve security.

[0094] In a tenth aspect, the present application provides a communication device that can be used to execute the steps or functions performed by the measurement entity in the sixth aspect. The communication device can be the measurement entity in the sixth aspect, or a chip or functional module configured in the measurement entity. The communication device includes a processing unit and a transceiver unit. The transceiver unit is configured to obtain a second parameter; the processing unit is configured to generate the measurement entity's AIK based on the second parameter and the measurement entity's EK. The AIK can be used to sign the evidence of the verified party.

[0095] The EK of the metric party may be pre-configured or granted.

[0096] In combination with the tenth aspect, in a possible implementation, the processing unit is specifically configured to: take the second parameter and the EK of the measuring party as input, and execute a second key generation algorithm to generate the AIK of the measuring party.

[0097] In combination with the tenth aspect, in a possible implementation, the transceiver unit is specifically used to obtain the second parameter from the key management network element.

[0098] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit is further configured to receive a remote attestation request from the verifier before obtaining the second parameter from the key management network element. The transceiver unit is further configured to: send a remote attestation response to the verifier after the processing unit generates the AIK of the measuring party, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the verified party and second signature information, the second signature information including information of the evidence of the verified party signed by the AIK; and receive a remote attestation result from the verifier, the remote attestation result being used to indicate the success or failure of the remote attestation of the verified party.

[0099] In combination with the tenth aspect, in a possible implementation manner, the transceiver unit is specifically used to obtain the second parameter from the verification party.

[0100] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit is further used to: receive a remote attestation request from the verifier after the processing unit generates the AIK of the measuring party; send a remote attestation response to the verifier, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the verified party, a second parameter, and second signature information, the second parameter is used to determine the AIK, and the second signature information includes information after the evidence of the verified party is signed by the AIK; receive a remote attestation result sent by the verifier, the remote attestation result is used to indicate that the remote attestation of the verified party is successful or the remote attestation of the verified party fails.

[0101] In an eleventh aspect, the present application provides a communication device that can be used to execute the steps or functions performed by the key management network element of the seventh aspect. The communication device can be the key management network element of the seventh aspect, or a chip or functional module configured in the key management network element. The communication device includes a processing unit and a transceiver unit. The transceiver unit is used to receive a first key request from a measurement party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the AIK of the measurement party; the processing unit is used to generate the second parameter and generate the AIK of the measurement party based on the second parameter and the EK of the measurement party; the transceiver unit is also used to send a first key response to the measurement party, the first key response including the second parameter.

[0102] The EK of the metric party may be pre-configured or granted.

[0103] In combination with the eleventh aspect, in a possible implementation, the processing unit is specifically configured to take the second parameter and the EK of the measuring party as input, and execute a second key generation algorithm to generate the AIK of the measuring party.

[0104] In conjunction with the eleventh aspect, in one possible implementation, the first key request includes an identifier of the measuring party. The processing unit is further configured to determine, based on a correspondence between the identifier of the measuring party and the endorsement key (e.g., a preconfigured one), an EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party in the first key request.

[0105] In conjunction with the eleventh aspect, in a possible implementation, the above-mentioned first key response also includes third signature information, and the third signature information includes information after the second parameter is signed by the AIK signature subkey. The third signature information can be used for integrity protection, used to protect / verify the integrity of the second parameter. The AIK signature subkey can be generated based on the AIK of the measurement party. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the AIK of the measurement party itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the key management network element using a third key generation algorithm. For details, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, which will not be described in detail here.

[0106] In combination with the eleventh aspect, in a possible implementation method, the transceiver unit is also used to: receive a key acquisition message from the verification party, the key acquisition message including the identifier of the measurement party, and the key acquisition message is used to obtain the AIK of the measurement party; and send a key response message to the verification party, the key response message including the AIK of the measurement party.

[0107] In a twelfth aspect, the present application provides a communication device that can be used to execute the steps or functions performed by the key management network element in the eighth aspect. The communication device can be the key management network element in the eighth aspect, or a chip or functional module configured in the key management network element. The communication device includes a processing unit and a transceiver unit. The transceiver unit is configured to receive a second key request from the verifier; the processing unit is configured to generate the AIK of the measuring party based on the second parameter and the EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party; and the transceiver unit is further configured to send a second key response to the verifier.

[0108] Illustratively, the second key request includes an identifier of the measurement party and a second parameter, and is used to request the measurement party's AIK; the second key response includes the AIK. Alternatively, the second key request includes an identifier of the measurement party, and is used to request the measurement party's AIK; the second key response includes the AIK and the second parameter.

[0109] The EK of the metric party may be pre-configured or granted.

[0110] In combination with the twelfth aspect, in a possible implementation, the processing unit is specifically configured to take the second parameter and the EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party as input, and execute a second key generation algorithm to generate the AIK of the measuring party.

[0111] In combination with the twelfth aspect, in a possible implementation method, the processing unit is further used to determine the EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party in the second key request based on the correspondence between the identifier of the measuring party and the endorsement key (such as pre-configured).

[0112] In conjunction with the twelfth aspect, in a possible implementation, the above-mentioned second key response also includes third signature information, and the third signature information includes information after the second parameter is signed by the AIK signature subkey. The third signature information can be used for integrity protection, used to protect / verify the integrity of the second parameter. The AIK signature subkey can be generated based on the AIK of the measuring party. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the AIK of the measuring party itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the key management network element using a third key generation algorithm. For details, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, which is not described in detail here.

[0113] In a thirteenth aspect, the present application provides a communication device, which can be used to execute the steps or functions performed by the verification party in the ninth aspect. The communication device can be the verification party in the ninth aspect, or a chip or functional module configured in the verification party. The communication device includes a processing unit and a transceiver unit. The transceiver unit is used to send a remote attestation request to the measurement party; the transceiver unit is also used to receive a remote attestation response from the measurement party, the remote attestation response includes the evidence of the verified party and the second signature information, the second signature information includes the information after the evidence of the verified party is signed by the AIK of the measurement party; the processing unit is used to obtain the AIK of the measurement party, and use the obtained AIK to verify whether the second signature information is valid; the processing unit is also used to verify the evidence of the verified party when the second signature information is valid; the transceiver unit is used to send a remote attestation result to the measurement party, the remote attestation result is used to indicate that the remote attestation of the verified party is successful or the remote attestation of the verified party fails. Among them, if the evidence verification of the verified party passes, the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the verified party is successful; if the evidence verification of the verified party fails, the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the verified party fails.

[0114] In combination with the thirteenth aspect, in a possible implementation method, the processing unit is specifically used to control the transceiver unit: sending a key acquisition message to the key management network element, the key acquisition message including the identifier of the measuring party, and the key acquisition message is used to obtain the AIK of the measuring party; receiving a key response message from the key management network element, the key response message including the AIK of the measuring party.

[0115] In conjunction with the thirteenth aspect, in one possible implementation, the remote attestation response further includes a second parameter, which can be used to determine the AIK of the measuring party. The processing unit is specifically configured to determine the AIK corresponding to the second parameter based on a correspondence between the second parameter and the first AIK. The correspondence may be pre-stored.

[0116] In conjunction with the thirteenth aspect, in one possible implementation, the transceiver unit is further configured to: receive a first key request from a measurement party, the first key request being used to request a second parameter, the second parameter being used to generate the measurement party's AIK; send a second key request to a key management network element, the second key request including the measurement party's identifier and the second parameter, the second key request being used to request the measurement party's AIK; and receive a second key response from the key management network element, the second key response including the AIK. The processing unit is further configured to store the AIK and the second parameter. The transceiver unit is further configured to send the first key response to the measurement party, the first key response including the second parameter.

[0117] In conjunction with the thirteenth aspect, in one possible implementation, the transceiver unit is further configured to: receive a first key request from a measurement party, the first key request being used to request a second parameter, the second parameter being used to generate the measurement party's AIK; send a second key request to a key management network element, the second key request including an identifier of the measurement party, the second key request being used to request the measurement party's AIK; and receive a second key response from the key management network element, the second key response including the AIK and the second parameter. The processing unit is further configured to store the AIK and the second parameter. The transceiver unit is further configured to send the first key response to the measurement party, the first key response including the second parameter.

[0118] In conjunction with the thirteenth aspect, in one possible implementation, the first key request includes one or more of the following: a measurement party identifier, a request indication, or a request identifier. The request indication may be used to indicate a function or effect of the first key request, and the request indication may be used to indicate that the function of the first key request is to request a second parameter. The request identifier may be used to uniquely identify a first key request.

[0119] In conjunction with the thirteenth aspect, in a possible implementation, the above-mentioned first key response also includes third signature information, and the third signature information includes information after the second parameter is signed by the AIK signature subkey. The third signature information can be used for integrity protection, used to protect / verify the integrity of the second parameter. The AIK signature subkey can be generated based on the AIK of the measuring party. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the AIK of the measuring party itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the key management network element using a third key generation algorithm. For details, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, which is not described in detail here.

[0120] In a fourteenth aspect, the present application provides a communication device, which may include a processor and a transceiver. The transceiver is used to send and receive various information or signaling, and the computer program includes program instructions. When the processor runs the program instructions, the communication device executes the information interaction method described in any one of the first to fourth aspects, or any one of the sixth to ninth aspects, or any possible implementation of any one of these aspects. The transceiver may be a radio frequency module in the communication device, or a combination of a radio frequency module and an antenna, or an input and output interface of a chip or circuit. Optionally, the communication device also includes a memory for storing the computer program.

[0121] In the fifteenth aspect, the present application provides a readable storage medium having program instructions stored thereon, which, when executed on a communication device, enables the communication device to execute the information interaction method described in any one of the first to fourth aspects, or any one of the sixth to ninth aspects, or any possible implementation of any one of these aspects.

[0122] In the sixteenth aspect, the present application provides a program product comprising instructions, which, when executed, enables the information interaction method described in any possible implementation of any of the first to fourth aspects to be executed.

[0123] In the seventeenth aspect, the present application provides a program product comprising instructions, which, when executed, enables the information interaction method described in any possible implementation of any of the above-mentioned aspects from the sixth aspect to the ninth aspect to be executed.

[0124] In an eighteenth aspect, the present application provides a communication device, which can be implemented in the form of a chip or in the form of a device, and the device includes a processor. The processor is used to read and execute a program stored in a memory to execute one or more of any one of the first to fourth aspects above, or one or more of any one of the sixth to ninth aspects above, or one or more of any possible implementation methods of any one of these aspects. Optionally, the device also includes a memory, which is connected to the processor via a circuit. Further optionally, the device also includes a communication interface, and the processor is connected to the communication interface. The communication interface is used to receive information and / or signaling to be processed, and the processor obtains the information and / or signaling from the communication interface, processes the information and / or signaling, and outputs the processing results through the communication interface. The communication interface can be an input and output interface.

[0125] Optionally, the processor and memory may be physically independent units, or the memory may be integrated with the processor.

[0126] In the nineteenth aspect, the present application provides a communication system, which includes the first measurement party described in the first aspect, the verification party described in the second aspect, the second measurement party described in the third aspect, and the key management network element described in the fourth aspect.

[0127] In the twentieth aspect, the present application provides a communication system, which includes the measurement party described in the sixth aspect, the key management network element described in the seventh aspect or the key management network element described in the eighth aspect, and the verification party described in the ninth aspect.

[0128] The technical effects achieved in the above-mentioned aspects can be referred to each other or to the beneficial effects in the method embodiments shown below, and will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0129] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a network function virtualization architecture;

[0130] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the 5G network architecture defined in 3GPP TS 23.501;

[0131] FIG3 is a simplified flowchart of a challenge-response protocol for remote attestation provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0132] FIG4 is a flowchart of a method for using an EK certificate and an AIK certificate provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0133] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of joint metrics of the NFVI layer and the VNF layer provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0134] FIG6 is a flow chart of an information interaction method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0135] FIG7 is another flow chart of the information interaction method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0136] FIG8 is another flow chart of the information interaction method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0137] FIG9 is a schematic diagram of a key derivation architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0138] FIG10 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0139] FIG11 is another schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0140] FIG12 is another structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0141] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application.

[0142] In the description of this application, unless otherwise specified, " / " means "or", for example, A / B can mean A or B. "And / or" in this article is merely a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships. For example, A and / or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, "at least one" means one or more, and "plurality" means two or more. "At least one of the following items" or similar expressions refers to any combination of these items, including any combination of single items or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b, or c can mean: a, b, c; a and b; a and c; b and c; or a, b, and c. Among them, a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0143] In the description of this application, words such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish different objects and do not limit the quantity or execution order. Moreover, words such as "first" and "second" do not necessarily mean different. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product, or device that includes a series of steps or units is not limited to the listed steps or units, but may optionally include steps or units that are not listed, or may optionally include other steps or units inherent to the process, method, product, or device.

[0144] In this application, words such as "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate examples, illustrations, or descriptions. Any embodiment or design described in this application as "exemplary," "for example," or "for example" should not be construed as being preferred or advantageous over other embodiments or designs. Rather, the use of words such as "exemplary," "for example," or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a concrete way.

[0145] It should be understood that in this application, "when", "if" and "if" all mean that the device will perform corresponding processing under certain objective circumstances, and do not limit the time. It does not require that the device must perform a judgment action when it is implemented, nor does it mean that there are other limitations.

[0146] Elements used in the singular herein are intended to mean "one or more" rather than "one and only one" unless specifically stated otherwise.

[0147] Additionally, the terms "system" and "network" are often used interchangeably herein.

[0148] It is understood that in each embodiment of the present application, "A corresponds to B" means that there is a corresponding relationship between A and B, and B can be determined based on A. However, it should also be understood that determining B based on A does not mean determining B based solely on A, and B can also be determined based on A and / or other information.

[0149] The following briefly introduces the network architecture of the present application. It should be understood that the network architecture described in the present application is for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application and does not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application.

[0150] The technical solution provided in this application can be applied to various communication systems deployed with virtual network functions. For example: fifth generation (5G) communication systems or new radio (NR), equipped with network functions virtualization infrastructure (NFVI) or other long term evolution (LTE) networks with virtual network functions, MulteFire networks (creating new wireless networks by independently running LTE technology on unlicensed spectrum (such as the global 5GHz unlicensed spectrum)), or home base station networks, mobile networks with wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) access, wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA) networks, fixed-mobile converged networks (fixed access networks access mobile networks), and other future communication systems, such as sixth generation mobile communication systems.

[0151] Refer to Figure 1, which is a schematic diagram of a network function virtualization architecture. As shown in Figure 1, the network function virtualization architecture may include, but is not limited to, the following components: virtual network functions (VNFs), network function virtualization infrastructure (NFVI), virtualized infrastructure manager (VIM), management automation and orchestration (MANO), network function virtualization orchestrator (NFVO), or virtual network function manager (VNFM).

[0152] A virtual network function (VNF) is a software application that provides network functions (such as file sharing, directory services, and IP address configuration, as well as mobility management, session management, or policy management network elements). It consists of two components: the VNF and the element management system (EMS). A virtual network function (VNF) can also be referred to as a "virtual network element" or "network element," which will not be discussed further below. The element management system configures and manages the VNF's functions. Generally, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the EMS and VNFs. Simply put, a VNF is a software component that provides network services and is deployed in virtual machines, containers, or physical machines using the infrastructure provided by NFVI. Compared to VNFs, traditional hardware-based network elements can be referred to as physical network functions (PNFs). VNFs and PNFs can be networked independently or in combination to form a service chain. It should be understood that a VNF can be installed in one or more virtual instances. A virtual instance is a generalized concept that refers to any virtualization solution, such as a virtual machine (VM) or a container.

[0153] NFVI is a set of resources used to host and connect virtual functions. Specifically, NFVI is a cloud data center that includes servers, hypervisors, operating systems (OSs), virtual machines, containers, virtual switches, and network resources. NFVI encompasses the platform's infrastructure components, such as hypervisors or container management systems, as well as physical devices like switches, compute, and storage. NFVI virtualizes physical resources into virtual resources for use by VNFs. In short, NFVI provides the compute resources, storage resources, and programs needed to implement VNFs.

[0154] VIM manages NFVI and controls the allocation of virtual resources to VNFs, such as virtual computing, virtual storage, and virtual networking. It can be understood that VIM is a cloud platform manager responsible for hardware management, VM deployment, VM coordination, and scheduling.

[0155] The VNFM manages the VNF lifecycle, including onboarding and offboarding, status monitoring, and image onboarding. The VNFM manages VNFs based on the VNF descriptor (VNFD). Simply put, the VNFM is responsible for VNF lifecycle management, such as adding, deleting, querying, and modifying VNF virtual machines.

[0156] NFVO manages the lifecycle of network services (NSs). For example, it coordinates NS lifecycle management, VNF lifecycle management (requiring support from VNFM), and NFVI resource management (requiring support from VIM), ensuring optimal configuration of all required resources and connections. NFVO operates based on the Network Service Description (NSD), which includes service chaining, NFV, and performance goals. Simply put, NFVO is responsible for the deployment of network services.

[0157] MANO provides a framework for managing NFV infrastructure and provisioning new VNFs. Simply put, MANO can be understood as an integrated management and scheduling of network services. MANO includes VIM, VNFM, and NFVO.

[0158] In one possible implementation, the first measurement party of the present application belongs to NFVI. As shown in FIG1 , security hardware, such as a SIM card, is deployed in NFVI, so that the first measurement party has the ability and / or conditions to call security hardware, so the security of the first measurement party is relatively high. Exemplarily, the first measurement party in the present application can also be referred to as the measurement party of the NFVI layer (or device layer). The second measurement party of the present application belongs to the VNF (software group providing network services) architecture. As shown in FIG1 , the VNF architecture is virtualized and is not configured with security hardware, so the second measurement party does not have the ability and / or conditions to call security hardware, so the security of the second measurement party is lower than that of the first measurement party. Exemplarily, the second measurement party in the present application can also be referred to as the measurement party of the VNF layer (or business layer). The description of the first measurement party and the second measurement party will not be repeated below.

[0159] For example, the technical solution provided in this application can be applied to the 5G network architecture defined in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specifications (3GPP TS) 23.501.

[0160] Refer to Figure 2, which is a schematic diagram of the 5G network architecture defined by 3GPP TS23.501. As shown in Figure 2, the 5G network architecture is divided into two parts: the access network and the core network. The access network is used to implement functions related to wireless access, which may include the radio access network (RAN) and user equipment (UE). The core network may include but is not limited to the following logical functions: network slice selection function (NSSF), network exposure function (NEF), network repository function (NRF), policy control function (PCF), unified data management (UDM) function, application function (AF), network slice specific authentication and authorization function (NSSAAF), authentication server function (AUSF), access and mobility management function (AMF), session management function (SMF), or user plane function (UPF), etc. It can be understood that "Nnssf", "Nnef", "Nnrf", "Npcf", "Nudm", "Naf", "Nnssaaf", "Nausf", "Namf", and "Nsmf" in Figure 2 represent the names of service interfaces. For details, please refer to the relevant description in the 3GPP standard protocol, which is not explained in detail here.

[0161] Optionally, the UE may access the data network by establishing a session from the UE to the RAN, then to the UPF, and then to the data network (DN), ie, a protocol data unit (PDU) session (PDU session).

[0162] A UE can be a terminal device, such as a mobile phone, IoT terminal device, smart terminal, vehicle-mounted terminal, vehicle-mounted device, wearable device, multimedia device, streaming media device, etc. The RAN provides wireless access for terminal devices and includes, but is not limited to, 5G base stations (Next-Generation Node B, gNB), wireless base stations (evolved Node B, eNodeB or eNB) in LTE networks, wireless fidelity access points (Wi-Fi APs), worldwide interoperability for microwave access base stations (WiMAX BSs), and relay stations. In the 5G RAN architecture, a gNB can include a centralized unit (CU) and a distributed unit (DU). The gNB can also include a radio unit (RU). The CU and DU can be understood as a logical functional division of the base station. The CU and DU can be physically separated or deployed together. For example, multiple DUs can share a CU, or a single DU can be connected to multiple CUs. The CU and DU can be connected via the F1 interface.

[0163] AMF is mainly responsible for mobility management in mobile networks, such as user location update, user registration network, user switching, etc. SMF is mainly responsible for session management in mobile networks, such as session establishment, modification, and release. Specific functions include allocating Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to users and selecting UPF that provides message forwarding functions. PCF is responsible for providing policies to AMF and SMF, such as quality of service (QoS) policies and slice selection policies. UDM can be used to store user data, such as contract information, authentication or authorization information. NSSAAF is mainly responsible for the authentication and authorization of network slices, and can interact with the authentication, authorization, and accounting server (AAA-S) through the authentication, authorization, and accounting proxy (AAA-P). UPF is mainly responsible for processing user messages, such as forwarding and billing.

[0164] It is understood that the various network functions shown in Figure 2 can refer to relevant protocols or standards, etc., and this application does not elaborate on them. It should also be understood that N1, N2, N3, N4, N6, etc. shown in Figure 2 are all interface sequence numbers. For example, the meaning of these interface sequence numbers can be found in the meaning defined in the 3GPP standard protocol, and this application does not limit the meaning of these interface sequence numbers.

[0165] The above content briefly describes the network architecture of the embodiment of the present application. In order to better understand the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application, several terms or nouns related to the present application are briefly introduced below.

[0166] 1. Remote Attestation (RA)

[0167] The number of embedded systems, cyber-physical systems, and IoT devices has increased dramatically in recent years. This continued growth has already reached many parts of our daily lives, including homes, offices, and factories. As users become increasingly reliant on smart devices, the security of these devices is becoming increasingly important.

[0168] Remote attestation (RA) is a security service that allows a measuring party (also known as an attester) to obtain data from the "verified party". This data will be sent as evidence to the "verifier". The "verifier" verifies or interprets the data sent by the measuring party (that is, evidence) to determine whether the internal state of the "verified party" (including memory and storage) is secure or can be trusted. Remote attestation can also be extended to allow remote code updates, which can be used to securely update the software running on the device, reset the device, or wipe the device.

[0169] Among them, the "verified party" refers to a device or function that needs to confirm the security status, or a device or function that needs to confirm the trust status / trusted status. The "Attester (certifier or measurer)" is used to cooperate with the "Verifier (verifier)" to measure the trusted status of the "verified party". Attester can perform integrity measurements on the device or function that needs to be proved, and generate a set of statements called evidence (Evidence), which is mainly used to measure the trusted status of resources (such as virtual machines VM), applications (APP), and hardware (Hardware) in the device. Attester is usually in the same physical location as the "verified party", that is, Attester can be combined with the "verified party". Exemplarily, Attester can be a pluggable device, such as a subscriber identification module (SIM) card, or a device with a SIM card inserted.

[0170] "Verifier (verifier or verifier)" is the executor used to verify the evidence of the "verified party". It can complete the verification and return the verification result, or sign and send a credential. The specific verification method is not limited in this application. For example, verification can be performed locally based on pre-configured evidence reference values, or it can be verified on a remote server. The Verifier in this application is usually a function that can be set independently, or it can be a function of the management plane, such as the verification function on the cloud management in NFVI, or the function used to provide verification services in the roaming domain.

[0171] A possible remote attestation method is the "challenge and response" protocol. See Figure 3, which is a simplified flow chart of the challenge-response protocol of remote attestation provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 3, the Verifier generates a request message (this request message is also called a "challenge") and sends it to the Attester. The request message (i.e., the "challenge") is used to request the Attester to perform a measurement. The request message contains a random number to ensure that the evidence obtained by the Attester is the latest. After receiving the request message, the Attester obtains the evidence of the "verified party" and calculates a hash value of the evidence through measurement and other means, and then performs an XOR operation on the hash value and the random number contained in the request message to generate a response, which the Attester then sends to the Verifier. After receiving the response, the Verifier obtains the evidence in the response and verifies the validity of the evidence; the specific verification method is not limited in this application. If the verification passes, it means that the remote attestation is successful, that is, the "verified party" is safe or trustworthy, that is, there is no security risk for the "verified party". If the verification fails, it means that the remote attestation has failed, that is, there may be a security risk for the "verified party".

[0172] 2. EK Certificate and AIK Certificate in Remote Attestation

[0173] Certificates are required in the remote attestation process. The functions of certificates include but are not limited to: 1. Using a long-term certificate to apply for a temporary certificate; 2. Using a temporary certificate to endorse the obtained evidence to facilitate the Verifier to confirm the identity of the Attester. Generally speaking, the remote attestation process includes an endorsement key (EK) certificate and an attestation identity key (AIK) certificate. Among them, the EK certificate is a long-term certificate preset in the Attester and can be verified by the certificate authority (CA). The AIK certificate is a session certificate used for measurement and is obtained by the Attester. The following introduces the use of the EK certificate and the application and use process of the AIK certificate.

[0174] See Figure 4, which is a flowchart of the method for using the EK certificate and AIK certificate provided in an embodiment of the present application. Among them, the EK certificate can be pre-configured at Attester, and it can be pre-configured by hardware burning or software pre-setting. The specific method of pre-configuration depends on the security capabilities of Attester. As shown in Figure 4, the application process of the AIK certificate (which can also be understood as the use process of the EK certificate) includes but is not limited to steps S1 to S7; the use process of the AIK certificate includes but is not limited to steps S8 to S14.

[0175] S1. Attester prepares an AIK acquisition request, including Attester's EK certificate signature and a request instruction. The request instruction can be used to indicate the function / purpose of the AIK acquisition request, such as the AIK acquisition request being used to obtain the public and private keys of the AIK certificate. It is understood that an EK certificate, also known as an endorsement certificate, is generally created by or embedded in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) by the manufacturer of the TPM, and can sometimes be issued by the platform manufacturer. The EK certificate uniquely identifies the TPM chip.

[0176] S2, Attester uses the public key of the certificate authority (CA) to encrypt the AIK acquisition request.

[0177] S3, Attester sends an encrypted AIK acquisition request.

[0178] S4: The CA verifies the received AIK acquisition request. For example, the CA decrypts the received AIK acquisition request using its own private key, obtains the EK certificate signature, and then verifies the validity of the EK certificate signature.

[0179] S5: If the validity verification of the EK certificate signature is passed, the CA assigns an AIK certificate to Attester and encrypts the public and private keys of the AIK certificate using the EK's public key.

[0180] S6, CA sends the encrypted AIK certificate public and private keys to Attester.

[0181] S7, Attester decrypts and saves the AIK certificate public and private keys.

[0182] S8, Verifier generates a random number (Nonce).

[0183] S9, Verifier sends a remote attestation request to Attester, which contains Nonce.

[0184] In step S10, after receiving the remote attestation request, the Attester obtains the Platform Configuration Register (PCR) value of the evidence through measurement and digitally signs the PCR value and Nonce of the evidence using the AIK certificate private key saved in step S7. It can be understood that the Platform Configuration Register (PCR) is used to store trusted measurement values, verify platform integrity, and protect data.

[0185] S11, Attester sends a remote attestation response to Verifier, which includes the AIK certificate public key, the PCR value of the evidence, Nonce, and digital signature.

[0186] S12, Verifier receives the remote attestation response, verifies the digital signature in the remote attestation response and checks the Nonce.

[0187] S13, Verifier requests CA to verify the validity of the AIK certificate public key in the remote attestation response.

[0188] S14, if the AIK certificate public key is valid, the Verifier verifies the validity of the evidence based on the PCR value of the evidence in the remote attestation response, obtains the remote attestation result, and determines the next action. This application does not limit the specific verification method of the evidence.

[0189] 3. Joint Measurement of NFVI and VNF Layers

[0190] As shown in Figure 1, the network function virtualization architecture can be divided into two layers: the network function virtualization infrastructure (NFVI) layer (or device layer) and the VNF layer (or service layer). Alternatively, it can be divided into multiple layers, such as the hardware layer (including hardware resources), virtualization layer, and VNF layer (or service layer) shown in Figure 1. This will not be discussed in detail below. For ease of description, the following uses a two-layer architecture (NFVI layer and VNF layer) as an example.

[0191] In one possible implementation, in a network function virtualization scenario, remote attestation typically requires a joint effort at both the network function virtualization infrastructure (NFVI) layer (or device layer) and the VNF layer (or service layer) to verify the security of the VNF and / or the resources corresponding to the VNF (i.e., the various resources in the NFVI). See Figure 5, which is a schematic diagram of the joint measurement of the NFVI and VNF layers provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 5, Verifier 1 in the MANO performs remote attestation of the NFVI layer and checks the results. The cloud service provider (cloud service provider) provides domain deployment. When the MANO initializes a new VNF (such as the AMF), it notifies the management function (MnF) of the event. The MnF then configures the 3GPP layer (or service layer, or VNF layer) settings for the new VNF. Verifier 2 in the MnF performs measurements at the 3GPP layer (or service layer, or VNF layer) through remote attestation. To build a complete attestation chain for the VNF, the MnF can also collect the corresponding remote attestation (RA) results in the NFVI from the MANO. If the RA result for any VM included in the VNF fails, the MnF can take measures to mitigate potential security risks. For example, the MnF might request the VIM (Virtualization Infrastructure Management) to migrate the VM or recreate a new VM, or issue an alert to the manager based on local policies for further action. If the RA results for all VMs included in the VNF are successful, the MnF reports the VNF initialization success to the MANO.

[0192] As can be seen from this, measurement in network function virtualization scenarios involves sequential measurement of the NFVI layer and the VNF layer, requiring the coordinated cooperation of Attester1 and Attester2, and Verifier1 and Verifier2. However, the current EK security of Attester2 is not high.

[0193] In view of this, the embodiments of the present application provide an information interaction method, device and readable storage medium, which utilize a key deduction architecture to establish a cryptographic connection between the root key of the NFVI layer (such as EK) and the root key of the VNF layer (such as EK), such as using the EK of the NFVI layer measurer to generate the EK of the VNF layer to form a key trust chain; thereby improving the security and reliability of the VNF layer root key (such as EK) and reducing the security risks caused by key storage and generation due to virtualization.

[0194] In addition, as can be seen from the process shown in Figure 4 above, remote attestation needs to rely on an AIK certificate, and the AIK certificate requires the Attester to apply for it from the CA. For some scenarios without a CA, remote attestation cannot be used. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application also provides an information interaction method, device, and readable storage medium, which can generate an AIK based on the EK by using symmetric key deduction instead of applying for an AIK certificate from the CA, and execute the remote attestation process; it can be applied to scenarios without a CA, improve the robustness of the measurement, and enhance the ability to resist quantum attacks.

[0195] In this application, the endorsement key (EK) can be referred to as the root key, and the two can be used interchangeably. The authentication key (AIK) can be referred to as the measurement key, and the two can be used interchangeably. The root key of the NFVI layer (i.e., the first EK of the first measurement party in this application) can be a symmetric key pre-burned by the operator, and this application does not impose any restrictions.

[0196] The technical solution provided in this application will be described in detail below with reference to more drawings.

[0197] The technical solutions provided in this application are described through a plurality of embodiments, with specific reference to the description of each embodiment below. Among them, the same or similar parts between each embodiment or implementation can refer to each other. In each embodiment in this application, and each implementation method / implementation method / implementation method in each embodiment, if there is no special explanation and logical conflict, the terms and / or descriptions between different embodiments and each implementation method / implementation method / implementation method in each embodiment are consistent and can be referenced to each other, and the technical features in different embodiments and each implementation method / implementation method / implementation method in each embodiment can be combined to form new embodiments, implementation methods, implementation methods, or implementation methods according to their inherent logical relationships. The implementation methods of this application described below do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this application.

[0198] Each embodiment is described in detail below.

[0199] In the present application, the first measurement party may be a measurement party at the NFVI layer (or device layer), such as Attester1 in FIG5 above. Exemplarily, Attester1 is a pluggable device, such as a SIM card, or a device into which a SIM card is inserted, or a root of trust (RoT). As another example, the first measurement party is a program installed in the NFVI, which can communicate with or call security hardware (such as RoT or SIM card). The second measurement party may be a measurement party at the service layer (or 3GPP layer, or VNF layer), such as Attester2 in FIG5 above. Exemplarily, Attester2 is software installed on the host operating system (Host OS), or a virtual root of trust (vRoT). As another example, the second measurement party is software installed in the VNF and does not have the ability and / or conditions to call security hardware.

[0200] The key management network element in this application may also be referred to as a "key management function," which may belong to the VNF layer, such as the MnF in Figure 5 . The key management network element in this application may be used to store and derive root keys. Exemplarily, the key management network element (such as the MnF) is a UDM function or an Operation, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) function.

[0201] In each embodiment of the present application, "network element A sends information A to network element B" can be understood as the destination of the information A is network element B, the source of the information A is network element A, and there may be forwarding by intermediate network elements in the transmission path from the source to the destination of the information A. The embodiments of the present application only show the source and destination of the information A. It can be understood that the information may undergo necessary processing between the source and destination of the information, such as format changes, but the destination can understand the valid information from the source. Similar expressions in this application can be understood similarly and will not be elaborated here.

[0202] In each embodiment of the present application, each network element that performs an action / operation (such as a first measurement party, a second measurement party, a verification party, a key management network element, etc.) can be a node in an open access network ORAN (open RAN, ORAN) system, or a node in a non-terrestrial network (NTN), or a node in any future communication system, and this application is not limited.

[0203] Example 1

[0204] Example 1 of the present application mainly introduces that when the measurement party of the VNF layer (such as Attester2 in the aforementioned Figure 5) is confirmed to be trustworthy, the verification party of the NFVI layer (such as Verifier1 in the aforementioned Figure 5) requests the measurement party of the NFVI layer (such as Attester1 in the aforementioned Figure 5) to generate an EK for the measurement party of the VNF layer and informs the measurement party of the VNF layer. After receiving the EK, the measurement party of the VNF layer saves it and uses it as a root key.

[0205] In one possible implementation, the verifier in the embodiment of the present application belongs to NFVI, which corresponds to the first measurement party and can be the verifier in MANO, such as Verifier1 in Figure 5 above.

[0206] See Figure 6, which is a flow chart of an information interaction method provided in an embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to the scenario of the network function virtualization architecture shown in Figure 1 above. As shown in Figure 6, the information interaction method includes but is not limited to the following steps:

[0207] S101: A second measurement party (Attester2) sends a key request message to a verifier (Verifier1), the key request message including the second measurement party's identifier, and the key request message is used to request the second EK of the second measurement party. Correspondingly, the verifier (Verifier1) receives the key request message.

[0208] In one possible implementation, the key request message includes an identifier (ID) of the second measurement party, such as Attester2 ID, which can be used to indicate the source of the message. Exemplarily, the identifier of the second measurement party can be the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the second measurement party. In another possible implementation, the key request message may not include the identifier of the second measurement party, but is implemented by implicit carrying. For example: the source of the key request message can be determined by the fact that the address sending the key request message is the second measurement party; or it can be determined by the message name of the key request message.

[0209] S102: The verifier (Verifier 1) generates a first parameter. The verifier (Verifier 1) may also store the identifier of the second measuring party and the first parameter.

[0210] In step S103, if the second measurement party is trustworthy, the verifier (Verifier1) sends a key generation request to the first measurement party (Attester1). The key generation request includes a first parameter and is used to request generation of a second EK of the second measurement party based on the first parameter. In response, the first measurement party (Attester1) receives the key generation request.

[0211] In one possible implementation, after receiving the key request message, the verifier (Verifier1) generates a first parameter. Exemplarily, the first parameter can be a random number, such as Nonce1; or address information, such as the address of the first measurement party (Attester1), such as the domain name, IP address, or fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the first measurement party; or a counter value, such as the verifier maintaining a counter that increments by 1 each time a key request message is received. The verifier (Verifier1) can also store the identifier of the second measurement party and the first parameter, thereby recording the correspondence between the first parameter (such as Nonce1) and the identifier of the second measurement party (Attester2 ID) for subsequent use. The verifier (Verifier1) can then confirm the trust status of the second measurement party (Attester2). For example, the verifier can determine whether there is a remote attestation result for the second measurement party locally. If there is a remote attestation result for the second measurement party locally, and the remote attestation result is successful, the verifier confirms that the second measurement party is trustworthy. For example, if Verifier1 records the Attester1 identifier (e.g., Attester1 ID) corresponding to Host OS / Attester2, then if Verifier1 locally stores evidence from Attester1 ID and a history of successful verification, it indicates that Verifier1 has locally stored the successful remote attestation result of Attester2. Of course, if the remote attestation result of the second measurement party is locally stored but the remote attestation result indicates a failure, the Verifier will determine that the second measurement party is untrustworthy.

[0212] If there is no remote attestation result of the second measurement party locally, or if it is determined according to the preconfigured rules that the remote attestation result of the second measurement party (remote attestation success or remote attestation failure) has expired, the verifier (Verifier1) can trigger the remote attestation process for the second measurement party (Attester2). Among them, the remote attestation process of the verifier for the second measurement party, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, or refer to the description of Example 3 below, such as the description of steps S308 to S312, which are only briefly explained here and not described in detail. For example, the verifier (Verifier1) sends a remote attestation request to the first measurement party (Attester1). After receiving the remote attestation request, the first measurement party obtains the evidence of the second measurement party (Attester2) and sends a remote attestation response to the verifier. The remote attestation response includes the evidence of the second measurement party and the first signature information, and the first signature information includes the information after the evidence of the second measurement party is signed by the first AIK of the first measurement party. The verifier obtains the first AIK of the first measurement party and uses the first AIK to verify whether the first signature information is valid. If the first signature information is valid, the verifier verifies the second measurement party's evidence. If the second measurement party's evidence verification passes, the verifier confirms that the second measurement party is trustworthy. Of course, if the second measurement party's evidence verification fails, the verifier confirms that the second measurement party is untrustworthy.

[0213] In one possible implementation, when the second measurement party is trustworthy, the verifier (Verifier1) sends a key generation request to the first measurement party (Attester1), and the key generation request includes the above-mentioned first parameter (such as Nonce1). Optionally, the key generation request also includes the identifier of the second measurement party (Attester2 ID). The key generation request can be used to request (the first measurement party) to generate the second EK of the second measurement party based on the first parameter. In some scenarios, the key generation request is also used to indicate that the second measurement party is trustworthy. This can be an implicit indication, such as an implicit indication through the message name, that is, the first measurement party receives the key generation request, which indicates that the second measurement party is trustworthy; it can also be an explicit indication, such as carrying an indication information in the key generation request to indicate that the second measurement party is trustworthy.

[0214] If the second measurement party is untrusted, the verifier (Verifier1) may not send a key generation request to the first measurement party (Attester1), and may return a key response message to the second measurement party (Attester2). The key response message can be used to reject the second measurement party's key request. Optionally, the key response message can also carry a rejection reason, such as the second measurement party is untrusted.

[0215] S104, the first measurement entity (Attester1) generates a second EK according to the first parameter and the first EK of the first measurement entity.

[0216] S105: The first measurement party (Attester1) sends a key granting message to the second measurement party (Attester2), where the key granting message includes the second EK. Correspondingly, the second measurement party (Attester2) receives the key granting message.

[0217] In one possible implementation, after the first measurement party (Attester1) receives the above-mentioned key generation request, it can generate a second EK based on the first parameter (such as Nonce1) in the key generation request and the first measurement party's own first EK. For example, the first measurement party can use the first parameter (such as Nonce1) and its own first EK as input to execute a preconfigured first key generation algorithm to generate a second EK. It can be understood that there are many key generation algorithms, such as key derivation function (KDF) and hash algorithm. The embodiment of the present application does not limit the specific key generation algorithm used. Exemplarily, the first key generation algorithm is KDF, and the second EK = KDF (first EK, first parameter). Among them, the first EK of the first measurement party can be preconfigured, such as preconfigured by hardware burning.

[0218] In one possible implementation, after the first measurement party generates the second EK, the first measurement party (Attester1) sends a key grant message to the second measurement party (Attester2), where the key grant message includes the second EK. Optionally, the key grant message also includes the identifier of the first measurement party (such as Attester1 ID). The identifier of the first measurement party (such as Attester1 ID) in the key grant message can be used to allow the second measurement party (Attester2) to report to the network side (such as Verifier1 or MnF) and record the relationship between the two. For details, please refer to the following text and will not be described in detail here.

[0219] S106: The second metric (Attester2) saves the second EK and uses the second EK as the root key.

[0220] S107: The second measuring party (Attester2) sends a key success message to the verifier (Verifier1), where the key success message includes the identifier of the second measuring party. Correspondingly, the verifier (Verifier1) receives the key success message.

[0221] In one possible implementation, after receiving the key grant message, the second measurement party (Attester2) can save the second EK in the key grant message and use the second EK as the root key for subsequent use. It can be understood that when the second measurement party is trusted, the second EK of the second measurement party is generated based on the first EK and the first parameter of the first measurement party. Because the first EK of the first measurement party is pre-configured (such as hardware burned), the first EK of the first measurement party is not easily tampered with. Because the first parameter can be a random number, when the second measurement party is trusted, the second EK generated based on the first EK and the first parameter of the first measurement party is trusted, forming a key trust chain. This can improve the security and reliability of the VNF layer root key (i.e., the second EK) and reduce the security risks of key storage and generation caused by virtualization.

[0222] In one possible implementation, after receiving the key grant message, the second measurement party (Attester2) may send a key success message to the verification party (Verifier1), and the key success message may include the identifier of the second measurement party (such as Attester2 ID). The key success message can be used to inform the verification party that the second measurement party has obtained the second EK. The key success message can also serve as a response or subsequent notification to the key request message. Optionally, the key success message also includes the identifier of the first measurement party (such as Attester1 ID), and the identifier of the first measurement party can be used to determine the first EK.

[0223] It is understood that the embodiment of the present application does not limit the execution order of step S106 and step S107. For example, step S106 can be executed before step S107, or after step S107, or simultaneously (or in parallel) with step S107.

[0224] S108: The verifier (Verifier1) sends a key generation message to the key management network element (MnF). The key generation message includes the identifier of the second measurement party, the identifier of the first measurement party, and the first parameter. The key generation message is used to trigger the generation of the second EK of the second measurement party. In response, the key management network element (MnF) receives the key generation message.

[0225] S109: The key management network element (MnF) generates a second EK according to the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party. The key management network element (MnF) may also store the identifier of the second measurement party and the second EK.

[0226] In one possible implementation, after receiving the key success message, the verifier (Verifier1) may send a key generation message to the key management network element (MnF). The key generation message may include the identifier of the second metric (e.g., Attester2 ID), the identifier of the first metric (e.g., Attester1 ID), and the first parameter (e.g., Nonce1). The key generation message may be used to trigger the key management network element (MnF) to generate a second EK for the second metric (based on the first parameter).

[0227] In one possible implementation, the correspondence between the identifier of the first measurement party (such as Attester1 ID) and the first EK is pre-configured in the key management network element (MnF) for subsequent retrieval. After receiving the above-mentioned key generation message, the key management network element (MnF) can determine the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party (such as Attester1 ID) in the key generation message based on the pre-configured correspondence. The key management network element (MnF) can use the first parameter (such as Nonce1) in the key generation message and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party (such as Attester1 ID) as input to execute the pre-configured first key generation algorithm to generate the second EK. It can be understood that the way the key management network element (MnF) generates the second EK is the same as the way the first measurement party (Attester1) generates the second EK, and will not be repeated here. After the key management network element (MnF) generates the second EK, it can also store the identifier of the second measurement party (such as Attester2 ID) and the second EK, thereby recording the correspondence between the identifier of the second measurement party (such as Attester2 ID) and the second EK for subsequent use.

[0228] In a possible implementation, after the above-mentioned step S109, the information interaction method shown in Figure 6 may also include: a process in which the second measurement party (such as Atester2) applies to obtain a second AIK. For example, the second AIK of the second measurement party is generated according to the second EK by using a symmetric key deduction method. For specific implementation, please refer to the description of Example 2 below, such as the description of steps S202 to S205 in Example 2, or refer to the description of Example 3 below, such as the description of steps S301 to S307 in Example 3, which are not described in detail here. It can be understood that after the second measurement party obtains the second AIK, it can be used to measure the evidence of the "verified party", such as using the second AIK to sign the evidence of the "verified party". The "verified party" here can be any device or software program that needs to confirm the trust status / trusted status, etc., and the embodiments of this application are not limited.

[0229] In the embodiment of the present application, when confirming that the second measurement party of the VNF layer is trustworthy, the key deduction architecture is used to make the root key of the NFVI layer (i.e., the first EK of the first measurement party) and the root key of the VNF layer (i.e., the EK of the second measurement party) have a cryptographic connection, such as: using the first EK of the first measurement party of the NFVI layer to generate the second EK of the second measurement party of the VNF layer, forming a key trust chain; thereby improving the security and reliability of the root key of the VNF layer (i.e., the second EK) and reducing the security risks caused by key storage and generation due to virtualization.

[0230] It is understood that the embodiments of the present application are applicable not only to scenarios involving a two-layer architecture (including the NFVI layer and the VNF layer) of network function virtualization, but also to scenarios involving a multi-layer architecture (such as the hardware layer, virtualization layer, and VNF layer (or service layer) in FIG1 ). In a multi-layer architecture of network function virtualization, the root key of the upper layer can be generated according to the method provided in the embodiments of the present application. That is, if the upper layer is confirmed to be trustworthy, the root key of the upper layer can be generated based on the root key of the lower layer.

[0231] Example 2

[0232] Example 2 of the present application mainly introduces the use of symmetric key deduction to generate AIK and execute the remote certification process.

[0233] In one possible implementation, the second embodiment of the present application can be implemented in combination with the aforementioned first embodiment, or it can be implemented alone, and this application does not limit it. When the second embodiment of the present application is implemented in combination with the aforementioned first embodiment, the measurement party (Attester) in the embodiment of the present application can be the first measurement party (Attester1) or the second measurement party (Attester2). Correspondingly, the verifier (Verifier) ​​in the embodiment of the present application can belong to NFVI, such as Verifier1 shown in Figure 5 above, or it can belong to the VNF architecture, such as Verifier2 shown in Figure 5 above. It can be understood that when the measurement party in the embodiment of the present application is Atester1, the verifier in the embodiment of the present application is Verifier1; when the measurement party in the embodiment of the present application is Atester2, the verifier in the embodiment of the present application is Verifier2; see the description below for details.

[0234] In addition, when the second embodiment of the present application is implemented in combination with the aforementioned first embodiment, if the measurement party (Attester) in the embodiment of the present application is the first measurement party (Attester1), then the verified party in the embodiment of the present application can be the second measurement party (Attester2), see the description below for details.

[0235] See Figure 7, which is another flow diagram of the information interaction method provided in an embodiment of the present application. This method is applicable to scenarios without CA, and is also applicable to scenarios with a network function virtualization architecture as shown in Figure 1 above. As shown in Figure 7, the information interaction method includes but is not limited to the following steps:

[0236] S201: The Verifier sends a remote attestation request to the Attester, and the Attester receives the remote attestation request.

[0237] In one possible implementation, the remote attestation request may include the identifier of the verifier (such as Verifier ID) and the identifier of the measurement party (such as Attester ID), and optionally also include a freshness parameter. The Verifier ID may be used to inform the measurement party of the identity of the Verifier that sent the remote attestation request. Exemplarily, the Verifier ID may be the IP address of the Verifier, such as 10.10.4.1; or it may be a preconfigured serial number, such as 001, 002, etc. If the Verifier is set by the equipment vendor, the Verifier ID may also be the equipment vendor's identity identifier, such as equipment vendor 1, equipment vendor 2, etc. The embodiment of the present application does not limit the specific implementation of the Verifier ID. The Attester ID may be used to inform a specific measurement party to perform the measurement. Exemplarily, the Attester ID may be the IP address of the Attester. The Attester ID may be carried explicitly or implicitly in the remote attestation request, such as by implicitly carrying the Attester ID by using the Attester as the address of the data packet sent or the message name. The freshness parameter may be used to prevent replay attacks and ensure the freshness of the evidence. Exemplarily, the freshness parameter can be a random number or a count value, such as a loop count value from 0 to 7. It is understood that replay attacks, also known as replay attacks or playback attacks, refer to an attacker sending a packet that has already been received by the destination host to deceive the system. This is mainly used in the identity authentication process to undermine the correctness of the authentication.

[0238] In one possible implementation, the remote attestation request can be used to trigger the generation of the AIK by the Attester, such as triggering step S202 below. In another possible implementation, step S202 below does not require a trigger condition and is initiated by the Attester based on its own needs. In other words, step S201 is executed after step S202 to initiate the remote attestation process; illustratively, step S201 can be executed after step S202 and before step S206.

[0239] S202: The Attester sends a first key request to the Key Management Network Element (MnF), where the first key request is used to request a second parameter, wherein the second parameter can be used to generate the Attester's AIK.

[0240] Correspondingly, the key management network element (MnF) receives the first key request.

[0241] In one possible implementation, the above-mentioned first key request may include an identifier of the measurement party (such as Attester ID), and / or a request indication. Among them, the Attester ID can be used to inform the network side (such as MnF) of the sending end (or source end) of the first key request. For the implementation method of Attester ID, please refer to the description in the above step S201, which will not be repeated here. The request indication can be used to indicate the function or role of the first key request, and the request indication can be used to indicate that the function of the first key request is to request a second parameter. The request indication can be carried explicitly or implicitly, for example, the request indication can be implicitly carried through the message name.

[0242] S203: The key management network element (MnF) generates a second parameter, and generates the AIK of the measuring party according to the second parameter and the EK of the measuring party.

[0243] S204: The key management network element (MnF) sends a first key response to the metric (Attester), where the first key response includes a second parameter.

[0244] Correspondingly, the Attester receives the first key response.

[0245] In one possible implementation, after receiving the first key request, the key management network element (MnF) generates a second parameter. Exemplarily, the second parameter can be a random number, such as Nonce2; or address information, such as the domain name, IP address, or FQDN of the measurement entity; or a counter value, such as the key management network element maintaining a counter that increments by 1 each time a first key request is received. The key management network element (MnF) can then obtain the measurement entity's EK and generate the measurement entity's AIK based on the measurement entity's EK and the second parameter. For example, the key management network element uses the measurement entity's EK and the second parameter as input and executes a preconfigured second key generation algorithm to generate the measurement entity's AIK. It is understood that there are many key generation algorithms, such as a key derivation function (KDF) or a hash algorithm, and the embodiments of the present application do not limit the specific key generation algorithm used. Exemplarily, the second key generation algorithm is a KDF, and AIK = KDF(EK, second parameter). It can be understood that the second key generation algorithm in the embodiment of the present application can be the same as or different from the first key generation algorithm in the aforementioned embodiment 1, and the embodiment of the present application does not limit this.

[0246] In one possible implementation, the metric (Attester) in the embodiment of the present application may be the first metric (Attester1) or the second metric (Attester2). When the metric (Attester) in the embodiment of the present application is the first metric (Attester1), the correspondence between the identifier of the first metric (such as Atester ID) and the first EK may be pre-configured in the key management network element (MnF) to facilitate subsequent retrieval. Therefore, the key management network element obtains the EK of the metric, which may include: the key management network element determines the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first metric in the above-mentioned first key request based on the correspondence between the identifier of the pre-configured metric and the EK. The key management network element then uses the first EK and the second parameter to generate the first AIK of the first metric.

[0247] When the measurement entity (Attester) in the embodiment of the present application is the second measurement entity (Attester2), since the key management network element (MnF) stores the identifier of the second measurement entity (such as Atester2 ID) and the second EK in step S109 of the aforementioned embodiment 1, the key management network element obtains the EK of the measurement entity, which may include: the key management network element obtains the second EK corresponding to the identifier of the second measurement entity in the above-mentioned first key request from the local storage space. The key management network element then uses the second EK and the second parameters to generate the second AIK of the second measurement entity.

[0248] In one possible implementation, after the key management network element (MnF) generates the AIK of the measurement party, it can store the measurement party's identifier (e.g., Attester ID) and the AIK, thereby recording the correspondence between the two for subsequent use. The key management network element (MnF) can send a first key response to the measurement party (Attester). The first key response can include a second parameter (e.g., Nonce2). Optionally, the first key response also includes: the measurement party's identifier (e.g., Attester ID) and / or third signature information. The Attester ID can be used to indicate the receiving end (or destination end) of the first key response. The third signature information can include information signed by the AIK signature subkey, or the third signature information is information signed by the AIK signature subkey on the entire message itself (e.g., the first key response). This embodiment of the present application is not limited thereto. It is understood that the third signature information can be used for integrity protection to protect / verify the integrity of the second parameter. The AIK signature subkey can be generated based on the measurement party's AIK. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the measurement party's AIK itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the key management network element (MnF) using a preconfigured third key generation algorithm. For example, the AIK and other parameters of the measuring party are used as input, and the preconfigured third key generation algorithm is executed to generate the AIK signature subkey. Among them, the third key generation algorithm can be the same as the aforementioned second key generation algorithm, or it can be different from the aforementioned second key generation algorithm, and the embodiment of the present application does not limit it. Whether the third key generation algorithm is the same as the first key generation algorithm is also not limited by the embodiment of the present application. The other parameters here can be the algorithm identifier of the signature algorithm, such as Algorithm ID; it can also be the address information of the measuring party; it can also be a counter value; the embodiment of the present application does not limit this. For example, if the third key generation algorithm is KDF and the other parameter is Algorithm ID, the generation method of the AIK signature subkey can be KDF (AIK, Algorithm ID).

[0249] It can be understood that when the measuring party in the embodiment of the present application is the first measuring party (Attester1), the EK, AIK, AIK signature subkey, etc. in the embodiment of the present application are all corresponding to the first measuring party (Attester1). When the measuring party in the embodiment of the present application is the second measuring party (Attester2), the EK, AIK, AIK signature subkey, etc. in the embodiment of the present application are all corresponding to the second measuring party (Attester2). For ease of distinction, when the measuring party in the embodiment of the present application is the first measuring party, the EK, AIK, and AIK signature subkey in the embodiment of the present application can be replaced by the first EK, the first AIK, and the first AIK signature subkey respectively. When the measuring party in the embodiment of the present application is the second measuring party, the EK, AIK, and AIK signature subkey in the embodiment of the present application can be replaced by the second EK, the second AIK, and the second AIK signature subkey respectively. They are not listed here one by one.

[0250] S205: The Attester generates its AIK based on the second parameter and its EK, wherein the AIK can be used to sign the evidence of the verified party.

[0251] In one possible implementation, after receiving the first key response, the Attester can generate its own AIK based on the second parameter in the first key response and its own EK. Exemplarily, the Attester can use the second parameter and its own EK as input and execute a preconfigured second key generation algorithm to generate its own AIK. It is understood that the method used by the Attester to generate the AIK is similar to the method used by the Key Management Element (MnF) to generate the AIK, and will not be further described here. The Attester's EK can be preconfigured or granted. If the Attester is the first Attester (Attester1), its EK is preconfigured, such as by hardware flashing. For example, if Attester1 is a device capable of storing an EK, the EK can be pre-configured, such as a programmable SIM card or chip. If the chip is a root of trust (RoT) and Attester1 is software, the chip can provide the EK to Attester1 through a program. It is understood that the root of trust (RoT) refers to a consistently trustworthy source in a cryptographic system. If the measuring party is the second measuring party (Attester2), the EK of the measuring party may be granted, for example, by generating a second EK through the method of the aforementioned embodiment 1 and granting the second EK to the second measuring party.

[0252] In one possible implementation, if the above-mentioned first key response includes the third signature information, after the measurer (Attester) generates its own AIK, it can generate an AIK signature subkey based on the AIK. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the measurer's AIK itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the measurer (Attester) using a preconfigured third key generation algorithm. It can be understood that the way the measurer generates the AIK signature subkey is the same as the way the key management network element (MnF) generates the AIK signature subkey, and will not be repeated here. The measurer (Attester) can then use the AIK signature subkey to verify the third signature information. If the third signature information is verified, the AIK generated by the measurer (Attester) can be saved for subsequent use. If the third signature information verification fails, the measurer (Attester) can discard the generated AIK and can re-request the second parameter from the key management network element (MnF).

[0253] Of course, if the first key response does not include the third signature information, after the Attester generates its own AIK, it can directly save the AIK for subsequent use.

[0254] S206, the Attester sends a remote attestation response to the Verifier. The remote attestation response includes the evidence of the verified party and the second signature information. The second signature information includes information after the evidence of the verified party is signed by the AIK.

[0255] Correspondingly, the verifier receives the remote attestation response.

[0256] In one possible implementation, after the measuring party (Attester) receives the above-mentioned remote proof request, it can obtain the evidence of the verified party, such as obtaining the PCR value of the evidence of the verified party. It can be understood that if the measuring party is the first measuring party (Attester1), then the verified party in the embodiment of the present application can be the second measuring party (Attester2) in the aforementioned embodiment one; of course, it can also be other devices or software programs that need to confirm the trust status / trusted status, etc., and the embodiment of the present application does not limit it. If the measuring party is the second measuring party (Attester2), the verified party in the embodiment of the present application can be a management device or software program that needs to confirm the trust status / trusted status corresponding to the second measuring party.

[0257] The measuring party (Attester) can then use the AIK generated in the above step S205 to sign the evidence of the party being verified (such as the PCR value) to obtain the second signature information. Alternatively, the measuring party (Attester) can then use the AIK generated in the above step S205 to sign the evidence of the party being verified (such as the PCR value) and the identification of the party being verified to obtain the second signature information. If the party being verified is the second measuring party (Attester2) in the aforementioned embodiment one, then the identification of the party being verified can be the Attester2 ID, or the Host OS ID. This is because the Host OS is composed of software, and part or all of its software is Attester2. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application may not distinguish between Attester2 and Host OS. In other words, the first measuring party obtaining the evidence of the second measuring party may be the first measuring party obtaining the evidence of the Host OS.

[0258] It can be understood that when the verified party is the second measurement party (Attester2) in the aforementioned embodiment 1, the second signature information is the same as the first signature information in the aforementioned embodiment 1.

[0259] In one possible implementation, the measurement party (Attester) sends a remote attestation response to the verification party (Verifier). Exemplarily, the measurement party can forward the remote attestation response to the verification party through the Host OS. The remote attestation response may include evidence of the verified party (such as PCR value) and second signature information. Optionally, the remote attestation response also includes the identification of the measurement party (such as Attester ID) and / or the identification of the verification party (Verifier ID). Among them, Attester ID and Verifier ID can respectively represent the sending end (source end) and receiving end (destination end) of the remote attestation response. For the specific implementation of Attester ID and Verifier ID, please refer to the description in the above step S201, which will not be repeated here.

[0260] S207, the Verifier sends a key acquisition message to the key management network element (MnF), where the key acquisition message includes the identifier of the metric, and is used to acquire the AIK of the metric.

[0261] Correspondingly, the key management network element (MnF) receives the key acquisition message.

[0262] S208: The key management network element (MnF) sends a key response message to the verifier (Verifier), where the key response message includes the AIK of the measuring party. Correspondingly, the verifier (Verifier) ​​receives the key response message.

[0263] In one possible implementation, after the key management network element (MnF) receives the key acquisition message, if the key management network element stores the metric's identifier (Attester ID) and the metric's AIK after step S203, the key management network element may search for the AIK corresponding to the metric's identifier based on the metric's identifier in the key acquisition message. The key management network element (MnF) may send a key response message to the verifier (Verifier), which may include the metric's AIK. If the key management network element does not store the metric's AIK, the key management network element may search for the EK corresponding to the metric's identifier based on the metric's identifier in the key acquisition message, and then generate the metric's AIK based on the second parameter and the metric's EK. The key management network element (MnF) may send a key response message to the verifier (Verifier), which may include the metric's AIK.

[0264] In one possible implementation, if the key management network element (MnF) records the generation time of the second parameter (such as Nonce1) in the above step S203, the key management network element can determine whether the generation time of the second parameter has expired before sending the key response message. If the generation time of the second parameter has exceeded the preconfigured time threshold, the key management network element (MnF) can send a key acquisition failure message to the verifier (Verifier) ​​and inform the verifier of the reason for the key acquisition failure. If the generation time of the second parameter does not exceed the preconfigured time threshold, the key management network element (MnF) can send a key response message to the verifier (Verifier), and the key response message carries the AIK of the metric.

[0265] S209, the verifier uses the AIK of the measuring party to verify whether the second signature information in the remote attestation response is valid. If the second signature information is valid, the verifier verifies the evidence of the party being verified.

[0266] S210, the verifier sends a remote attestation result to the attester, where the remote attestation result is used to indicate whether the remote attestation of the verified party succeeds or fails.

[0267] In one possible implementation, after receiving the key response message, the Verifier can use the AIK carried in the key response message to verify whether the second signature information is valid. For example, the Verifier uses the AIK carried in the key response message to sign the evidence of the verified party in the remote attestation response, and compares the signed information with the second signature information to see if they are consistent. If they are consistent, the second signature information is valid; if they are inconsistent, the second signature information is invalid. If the second signature information is valid, the Verifier can verify the evidence of the verified party (such as the PCR value). If the evidence of the verified party (such as the PCR value) passes the verification, the remote attestation of the verified party is successful. If the evidence of the verified party (such as the PCR value) fails the verification, the remote attestation of the verified party fails. The Verifier can send the remote attestation result to the Attester, which is used to indicate that the remote attestation of the verified party is successful or that the remote attestation of the verified party has failed. Among them, the verification method of the evidence can refer to the existing technology, and this application does not limit the specific verification method of the evidence.

[0268] In a possible implementation, if the second signature information is invalid, the verifier may discard the remote attestation response and resend the remote attestation request, requesting the measurer to re-measure the evidence of the party being verified.

[0269] The embodiment of the present application uses symmetric key deduction to generate AIK based on EK, so that AIK and EK have a cryptographic connection and form a key trust chain. Not only can the remote certification process be performed in scenarios without CA, but the robustness of the measurement can also be improved, and the ability to resist quantum attacks can be enhanced.

[0270] Example 3

[0271] Example 3 of the present application mainly introduces the use of symmetric key deduction to generate and save AIK in advance, and then execute the remote certification process when needed, thereby realizing the decoupling of AIK generation and remote certification process.

[0272] In one possible implementation, embodiment three of the present application can be implemented in combination with embodiment one, or can be implemented alone, and this application does not limit this. When embodiment three of the present application is implemented in combination with embodiment one, the measurement party (Attester) in the embodiment of the present application can be the first measurement party (Attester1) or the second measurement party (Attester2). Correspondingly, the verifier (Verifier) ​​in the embodiment of the present application can belong to NFVI, such as Verifier1 shown in Figure 5 above, or can belong to VNF architecture, such as Verifier2 shown in Figure 5 above. It can be understood that when the measurement party in the embodiment of the present application is Atester1, the verifier in the embodiment of the present application is Verifier1; when the measurement party in the embodiment of the present application is Atester2, the verifier in the embodiment of the present application is Verifier2; see the description below for details.

[0273] In addition, when embodiment three of the present application is implemented in combination with the aforementioned embodiment one, if the measurement party (Attester) in the embodiment of the present application is the first measurement party (Attester1), then the verified party in the embodiment of the present application may be the second measurement party (Attester2), see the description below for details.

[0274] See Figure 8, which is another flow chart of the information interaction method provided in an embodiment of the present application. This method is applicable to scenarios without CA, and is also applicable to scenarios with network function virtualization architectures such as those shown in Figure 1 above. As shown in Figure 8, the information interaction method includes but is not limited to the following steps:

[0275] S301: The Attester sends a first key request to the Verifier, where the first key request is used to request a second parameter. The second parameter can be used to generate the Attester's AIK. The Verifier receives the first key request.

[0276] In one possible implementation, the above-mentioned first key request may include one or more of the following: an identifier of the measuring party (such as an Attester ID), a request indication, or a request identifier. Among them, the implementation of the Attester ID and the request indication can be found in the description of step S202 in the aforementioned embodiment 2, which will not be repeated here. The request identifier (such as the request ID) can be used to uniquely identify a first key request. This is because the measuring party (Attester) may request the second parameter multiple times, such as sending multiple first key requests. Therefore, if the Attester ID is used for identification, there may be a problem of unclear identification. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application carries a request ID in the first key request for uniquely identifying a first key request, so that the measuring party can request multiple different second parameters multiple times, generate multiple different AIKs, and improve the security of the measurement.

[0277] S302, the verifier sends a second key request to the key management network element (MnF), where the second key request includes the identifier of the measuring party, or the second key request includes the identifier of the measuring party and a second parameter, and the second key request is used to request the AIK of the measuring party.

[0278] Correspondingly, the key management network element (MnF) receives the second key request.

[0279] In one possible implementation, after receiving the first key request, the verifier (Verifier) ​​may send a second key request to the key management network element (MnF). This second key request may be used to request the AIK of the measurer. This second key request may include the measurer's identifier (e.g., Attester ID). This measurer's identifier can be used to enable the key management network element to search for the corresponding EK, thereby generating the measurer's AIK.

[0280] In another possible implementation, after receiving the first key request, the verifier may generate a second parameter and send a second key request to the key management network element (MnF). The second key request may be used to request the AIK of the measurer. The second key request may include the identifier of the measurer (e.g., Attester ID) and the second parameter. The implementation of the second parameter can be found in the description of the aforementioned embodiment 2 and is not repeated here.

[0281] In one possible implementation, after the verifier receives the above-mentioned first key request, it can maintain a corresponding relationship to facilitate subsequent use. For example, the verifier locally maintains a corresponding relationship table between AttesterID, request ID, and the second parameter (such as Nonce2), as shown in Table 1 below. Among them, the AttesterID and request ID in Table 1 can come from the first key request sent by the measurement party. The second parameter (such as Nonce2) in Table 1 can be generated by the verifier itself, or it can be notified by the key management network element (MnF) in step S304 below through the second key response. It can be understood that if the second parameter is generated and notified by the subsequent key management network element (MnF), the second parameter in Table 1 below will be recorded after the verifier (Verifier) ​​receives the second key response.

[0282] Table 1

[0283] S303: The key management network element (MnF) generates the AIK of the measuring party according to the second parameter and the EK corresponding to the identifier of the measuring party.

[0284] S304: The key management network element (MnF) sends a second key response to the verifier (Verifier), where the second key response includes the AIK, or the second key response includes the AIK and a second parameter.

[0285] Correspondingly, the verifier receives the second key response.

[0286] In one possible implementation, after the key management network element (MnF) receives the second key request, if the second key request includes the measurement party's identifier (such as an Attester ID) but does not include the second parameter, the key management network element (MnF) may generate the second parameter and generate the measurement party's AIK based on the generated second parameter and the EK corresponding to the measurement party's identifier. The key management network element (MnF) may then send a second key response to the verifier, where the second key response includes the measurement party's AIK and the second parameter.

[0287] If the second key request includes the metric's identifier (e.g., Attester ID) and a second parameter, the key management network element can generate the metric's AIK based on the second parameter in the second key request and the EK corresponding to the metric's identifier. The key management network element (MnF) can then send a second key response to the verifier, including the metric's AIK. Of course, the second key response can also include the second parameter.

[0288] In short, for the second parameter, if the above-mentioned second key request does not carry the second parameter, the second key response needs to carry the second parameter (generated by the key management network element); if the above-mentioned second key request carries the second parameter (generated by the verification party), the second key response may not carry the second parameter or may carry the second parameter.

[0289] Among them, the implementation method of the key management network element (MnF) generating the AIK of the measuring party according to the second parameter and the EK corresponding to the identification of the measuring party can refer to the corresponding description in step S203 of the aforementioned embodiment 2, which is not repeated here.

[0290] In one possible implementation, the second key response may also include fourth signature information. The fourth signature information may include information signed by the AIK signature subkey of the measuring party's AIK, or the fourth signature information may be information signed by the entire message itself (e.g., the second key response) using the AIK signature subkey, although this is not limited in this embodiment of the present application. It is understood that the fourth signature information may be used for integrity protection, to protect / verify the integrity of the measuring party's AIK. The AIK signature subkey may be generated based on the measuring party's AIK. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey may be the measuring party's AIK itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by a key management network element (MnF) using a preconfigured key generation algorithm. For example, the measuring party's AIK and other parameters are used as input, and a preconfigured key generation algorithm is executed to generate the AIK signature subkey. The other parameters may be an algorithm identifier of the signature algorithm, such as an Algorithm ID; may also be the measuring party's address information; or may be a counter value; although this is not limited in this embodiment of the present application. For example, the preconfigured key generation algorithm is KDF, and the other parameters are Algorithm IDs. Then, the AIK signature subkey may be generated in the following manner: KDF(AIK, Algorithm ID).

[0291] It can be understood that when the measuring party in the embodiment of the present application is the first measuring party (Attester1), the EK, AIK, AIK signature subkey, etc. in the embodiment of the present application are all corresponding to the first measuring party (Attester1). When the measuring party in the embodiment of the present application is the second measuring party (Attester2), the EK, AIK, AIK signature subkey, etc. in the embodiment of the present application are all corresponding to the second measuring party (Attester2). For ease of distinction, when the measuring party in the embodiment of the present application is the first measuring party, the EK, AIK, and AIK signature subkey in the embodiment of the present application can be replaced by the first EK, the first AIK, and the first AIK signature subkey respectively. When the measuring party in the embodiment of the present application is the second measuring party, the EK, AIK, and AIK signature subkey in the embodiment of the present application can be replaced by the second EK, the second AIK, and the second AIK signature subkey respectively. They are not listed here one by one.

[0292] S305: The Verifier stores the AIK and the second parameter.

[0293] In one possible implementation, after receiving the second key response, the Verifier can obtain the AIK of the measuring party from the second key response and store the AIK and the second parameter of the measuring party, thereby recording the correspondence between the AIK of the measuring party and the second parameter (such as Nonce2) for subsequent use. It is understood that if the measuring party here is the first measuring party, the Verifier stores the first AIK and second parameter of the first measuring party; similarly, if the measuring party here is the second measuring party, the Verifier stores the second AIK and second parameter of the second measuring party.

[0294] For example, the verifier maintains a correspondence table among the AttesterID, the request ID, the second parameter (such as Nonce2), and the AIK locally, as shown in Table 2 below.

[0295] Table 2

[0296] It can be understood that the verifier can maintain a corresponding relationship table locally, as shown in Table 2 above; it can also maintain multiple corresponding relationship tables, as shown in Table 1 and Table 2 above; the embodiment of the present application does not limit this.

[0297] In one possible implementation, if the second key response includes a fourth signature information, the Verifier can generate an AIK signature subkey based on the AIK after obtaining the AIK of the measurer from the second key response. Exemplarily, the AIK signature subkey can be the AIK of the measurer itself. Alternatively, the AIK signature subkey is generated by the Verifier using a preconfigured key generation algorithm. It can be understood that the way the Verifier generates the AIK signature subkey is the same as the way the key management network element (MnF) generates the AIK signature subkey, which will not be repeated here. The Verifier can then use the AIK signature subkey to verify the fourth signature information. If the fourth signature information is verified, the AIK and second parameters of the measurer can be stored for subsequent use. If the fourth signature information verification fails, the Verifier can use the AIK in the second key response and can re-request the AIK of the measurer from the key management network element (MnF).

[0298] It can be understood that if the second key response does not include the fourth signature information, the verifier can directly store the AIK and the second parameter of the measuring party after receiving the second key response for subsequent use.

[0299] S306: The verifier sends a first key response to the attester, where the first key response includes a second parameter.

[0300] Correspondingly, the Attester receives the first key response.

[0301] In a possible implementation manner, the implementation manner of the first key response can refer to the relevant description of step S204 in the aforementioned embodiment 2, which will not be repeated here.

[0302] It is understood that the embodiment of the present application does not limit the execution order of step S305 and step S306. For example, step S305 can be executed before step S306, or after step S306, or simultaneously (or in parallel) with step S306.

[0303] S307: The Attester generates its AIK based on the second parameter and its EK, wherein the AIK can be used to sign the evidence of the verified party.

[0304] In one possible implementation, the implementation of step S307 in the embodiment of the present application can refer to the implementation of step S205 in the aforementioned embodiment 2, and will not be repeated here.

[0305] In one possible implementation, after step S307, when the Verifier has a remote attestation requirement, the information interaction method shown in FIG8 may further include but is not limited to the following steps:

[0306] S308: The Verifier sends a remote certification request to the Attester, and the Attester receives the remote certification request.

[0307] In one possible implementation, when the verifier has a remote certification requirement, it can check the local storage records. If at least one AIK corresponding to the Attester ID is valid, the verifier can send a remote certification request to the measurement party (Attester) identified by the Attester ID. Exemplarily, the verifier can judge whether each AIK corresponding to the AttesterID is valid based on the comparison of the reception time of the request ID or the recording time of the AIK with the threshold; if the reception time of a request ID or the recording time of a certain AIK does not exceed the threshold, it means that the AIK corresponding to the AttesterID is valid; if it exceeds the threshold, it means that the AIK corresponding to the AttesterID is invalid. Alternatively, the verifier judges based on the existence of the AIK. For example, if the local storage record contains an AIK corresponding to a certain Attester ID, it means that the AIK corresponding to the Attester ID is valid. The embodiment of the present application does not limit the triggering conditions for the verifier to send a remote certification request.

[0308] It is understood that if the Verifier determines that multiple AIKs corresponding to the Attester ID are valid, then in the subsequent remote attestation process, the Attester can select an AIK to sign the evidence based on pre-configured rules, and the Verifier can select an AIK to verify the validity of the signature based on the same pre-configured rules. Exemplary pre-configured rules can be: sort the multiple AIKs corresponding to the Attester ID by the recording time, and select the AIK with the closest current time.

[0309] In a possible implementation, the implementation of the remote certification request can refer to the relevant description of step S201 in the aforementioned embodiment 2, which will not be repeated here.

[0310] S309, the Attester sends a remote attestation response to the Verifier, which includes the evidence of the verified party, a second parameter, and second signature information. The second parameter is used to determine the AIK, and the second signature information includes information after the evidence of the verified party is signed by the AIK.

[0311] Correspondingly, the verifier receives the remote attestation response.

[0312] In one possible implementation, after receiving the above-mentioned remote proof request, the measuring party (Attester) can obtain the evidence of the verified party, such as obtaining the PCR value of the evidence of the verified party. It can be understood that if the measuring party is the first measuring party (Attester1), then the verified party in the embodiment of the present application can be the second measuring party (Attester2) in the aforementioned embodiment one; of course, it can also be other devices or software programs that need to confirm the trust status / trusted status, etc., and the embodiment of the present application does not limit it. If the measuring party is the second measuring party (Attester2), the verified party in the embodiment of the present application can be the management device or software program corresponding to the second measuring party that needs to confirm the trust status / trusted status, etc.

[0313] The measuring party (Attester) can then use the AIK generated in the above step S307 to sign the evidence of the party being verified (such as the PCR value) to obtain the second signature information. Alternatively, the measuring party (Attester) can then use the AIK generated in the above step S307 to sign the evidence of the party being verified (such as the PCR value) and the identification of the party being verified to obtain the second signature information. If the party being verified is the second measuring party (Attester2) in the aforementioned embodiment one, then the identification of the party being verified can be the Attester2 ID, or the Host OS ID. This is because the Host OS is composed of software, and part or all of its software is Attester2. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application may not distinguish between Attester2 and Host OS. In other words, the first measuring party obtaining the evidence of the second measuring party may be the first measuring party obtaining the evidence of the Host OS.

[0314] It can be understood that when the verified party is the second measurement party (Attester2) in the aforementioned embodiment 1, the second signature information is the same as the first signature information in the aforementioned embodiment 1.

[0315] In one possible implementation, the measurement party (Attester) sends a remote attestation response to the verification party (Verifier). Exemplarily, the measurement party can forward the remote attestation response to the verification party through the Host OS. The remote attestation response may include evidence of the verified party (such as PCR value), a second parameter and / or request ID, and a second signature information. Optionally, the remote attestation response also includes the identification of the measurement party (such as Attester ID) and / or the identification of the verification party (Verifier ID). Among them, Attester ID and Verifier ID can respectively represent the sending end (source end) and receiving end (destination end) of the remote attestation response. For the specific implementation of Attester ID and Verifier ID, please refer to the description in the above step S201, which will not be repeated here. The second parameter or request ID can be used by the verification party to determine the AIK, specifically refer to the description of the following step S310.

[0316] S310, the verifier determines the AIK corresponding to the second parameter according to a pre-stored correspondence between the second parameter and the AIK.

[0317] In one possible implementation, after the verifier receives the above-mentioned remote attestation response, it can determine the AIK corresponding to the second parameter or request ID based on the second parameter and / or request ID in the remote attestation response, and the correspondence between the second parameter and the AIK pre-stored locally (as shown in Table 2 above).

[0318] S311, the verifier uses the AIK corresponding to the second parameter to verify whether the second signature information in the remote attestation response is valid. If the second signature information is valid, the verifier verifies the evidence of the party being verified.

[0319] S312, the verifier sends a remote attestation result to the attester, where the remote attestation result is used to indicate whether the remote attestation of the verified party succeeds or fails.

[0320] In one possible implementation, the implementation of steps S311 to S312 in the embodiment of the present application can refer to the implementation of steps S209 to S210 in the aforementioned embodiment 2, and will not be repeated here.

[0321] The embodiment of the present application uses symmetric key deduction to generate AIK based on EK and caches AIK in Verifier, and then executes the remote attestation process when needed. In the scenario where there is no CA (certificate authority), the remote attestation process can also be performed. It can also achieve decoupling of AIK generation and remote attestation process. During remote attestation, there is no need to request AIK from MnF, saving the key generation step; and it can improve the robustness of measurement and enhance the ability to resist quantum attacks.

[0322] The above content introduces the process of the information interaction method provided in the embodiments of the present application. In order to better understand the relationship between the keys in the above three embodiments, a brief explanation is given below through diagrams.

[0323] See Figure 9, which is a schematic diagram of the key derivation architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application. The first EK is the root key of Attester1, the second EK is the root key of Attester2, the first AIK is the measurement key of Attester1, and the second AIK is the measurement key of Attester2. As shown in Figure 9, the second EK is generated based on the first EK and the first parameter (such as Nonce1), such as second EK = KDF (first EK, Nonce1). The first AIK is generated based on the first EK and the second parameter (such as Nonce2), such as first AIK = KDF (first EK, Nonce2). The second AIK is generated based on the second EK and the third parameter (such as Nonce3), such as second AIK = KDF (first EK, Nonce3). The first AIK signature subkey is generated based on the first AIK and the fourth parameter (such as Algorithm ID 1), such as first AIK signature subkey = KDF (first AIK, Algorithm ID 1). The second AIK signature subkey is generated based on the second AIK and a fifth parameter (e.g., Algorithm ID 2), such as second AIK signature subkey = KDF(second AIK, Algorithm ID 2). The first AIK signature subkey and the second AIK signature subkey are used for integrity protection. The first, second, third, and fourth parameters can be different or partially the same.

[0324] The above content elaborates on the method of the present application in detail. In order to facilitate better implementation of the above scheme of the embodiment of the present application, the embodiment of the present application also provides corresponding devices or equipment.

[0325] The present application divides the functional modules of each network element of the present application according to the above-mentioned method embodiment. For example, each functional module can be divided according to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The above-mentioned integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the present application is schematic and is only a logical functional division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation. The communication device of the embodiment of the present application will be described in detail below with reference to Figures 10 to 12.

[0326] Referring to Figure 10, Figure 10 is a schematic diagram of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 10, the communication device includes a transceiver unit 10 and a processing unit 20. The transceiver unit 10 can implement corresponding communication functions, and the processing unit 20 is used for data processing.

[0327] In some embodiments of the present application, the communication device may be the first measurement entity shown above. That is, the communication device shown in FIG10 may be used to execute the steps or functions performed by the first measurement entity in the above method embodiment. Exemplarily, the communication device may be the first measurement entity or a chip or functional module configured in the first measurement entity, etc., which is not limited in the embodiments of the present application. The transceiver unit 10 is used to execute the operations related to the transmission and reception of the first measurement entity in the above method embodiment, and the processing unit 20 is used to execute the operations related to the processing of the first measurement entity in the above method embodiment.

[0328] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is used to receive a key generation request from the verification party, the key generation request including a first parameter, the key generation request being used to request generation of a second EK of the second measurement party based on the first parameter; the processing unit 20 is used to generate the second EK based on the first parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is used to send a key grant message to the second measurement party, the key grant message including the second EK, the second EK being used as the root key of the second measurement party.

[0329] Exemplarily, the key generation request is further used to indicate that the second measurement party is trustworthy.

[0330] Exemplarily, the processing unit 20 is specifically configured to take the first parameter and the first EK of the first measuring party as input, and execute a first key generation algorithm to generate the second EK.

[0331] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is further used to obtain a second parameter; the processing unit 20 is further used to generate a first AIK of the first measurement party based on the second parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party, and the first AIK is used to sign the evidence of the second measurement party.

[0332] Exemplarily, the processing unit 20 is specifically configured to take the second parameter and the first EK of the first measuring party as input, and execute a second key generation algorithm to generate the first AIK of the first measuring party.

[0333] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is further specifically configured to obtain a second parameter from a key management network element.

[0334] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is also used to: receive a remote attestation request from a verification party; send a remote attestation response to the verification party, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the second measurement party and first signature information, the first signature information including information after the evidence of the second measurement party is signed by the first AIK; receive a remote attestation result from the verification party, the remote attestation result indicating that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful.

[0335] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is further specifically configured to obtain a second parameter from the verification party.

[0336] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is also used to: receive a remote attestation request from the verifier; send a remote attestation response to the verifier, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the second measurement party, the second parameter, and the first signature information, the second parameter is used to determine the first AIK, the first signature information including the information of the evidence of the second measurement party signed by the first AIK; receive the remote attestation result sent by the verifier, the remote attestation result indicating that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful.

[0337] Illustratively, the first EK of the first metric is preconfigured.

[0338] In the embodiment of the present application, the specific description of the key generation request, key grant message, remote attestation request, remote attestation response, etc. can be referred to the method embodiment 1 shown above, and will not be described in detail here.

[0339] It can be understood that the specific description of the transceiver unit and the processing unit shown in the embodiment of the present application is only an example. For the specific functions or execution steps of the transceiver unit and the processing unit, please refer to the above-mentioned method embodiment 1, which will not be described in detail here.

[0340] Reusing Figure 10, in other embodiments of the present application, the communication device can be the authenticator shown above. That is, the communication device shown in Figure 10 can be used to execute the steps or functions performed by the authenticator in the above method embodiment. Exemplarily, the communication device can be the authenticator or a chip or functional module configured in the authenticator, etc., and the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this. The transceiver unit 10 is used to perform the authenticator's transceiver-related operations in the above method embodiment, and the processing unit 20 is used to perform the authenticator's processing-related operations in the above method embodiment.

[0341] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is used to receive a key request message from the second measurement party, the key request message including the identifier of the second measurement party, and the key request message is used to request to obtain the second EK of the second measurement party; the processing unit 20 is used to generate a first parameter; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to send a key generation request to the first measurement party when the second measurement party is trusted, the key generation request including the first parameter, and the key generation request is used to request to generate the second EK of the second measurement party based on the first parameter.

[0342] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is also used to receive a key success message from the second measurement party, and the key success message includes the identifier of the second measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to send a key generation message to the key management network element, and the key generation message includes the identifier of the second measurement party, the identifier of the first measurement party, and the first parameter. The key generation message is used to trigger the generation of the second EK of the second measurement party.

[0343] Exemplarily, the key success message further includes an identifier of the first measurement party, and the identifier of the first measurement party is used to determine a first EK, and the first EK is used to generate a second EK of the second measurement party in conjunction with the first parameter.

[0344] Exemplarily, the second measurement party is trustworthy, including: there is a successful remote attestation result of the second measurement party in the verification party.

[0345] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is also used to send a remote attestation request to the first measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to receive a remote attestation response from the first measurement party, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the second measurement party and the first signature information, the first signature information including the information after the evidence of the second measurement party is signed by the first AIK of the first measurement party; the processing unit 20 is also used to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party, and use the first AIK to verify whether the first signature information is valid; the processing unit 20 is also used to verify the evidence of the second measurement party when the first signature information is valid; the processing unit 20 is also used to confirm that the second measurement party is trustworthy when the evidence verification of the second measurement party passes.

[0346] Exemplarily, the remote attestation response further includes a second parameter, which is used to determine the first AIK of the first measurement party. The processing unit 20 is specifically configured to determine the first AIK corresponding to the second parameter based on the corresponding relationship between the second parameter and the first AIK.

[0347] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is further used to receive a first key request from the first measurement party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the first AIK of the first measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to send a second key request to the key management network element, the second key request includes the identifier of the first measurement party and the second parameter, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to receive a second key response from the key management network element, the second key response includes the first AIK; the processing unit 20 is also used to store the first AIK and the second parameter; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to send a first key response to the first measurement party, the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0348] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is further used to receive a first key request from the first measurement party, the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the first AIK of the first measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is further used to send a second key request to the key management network element, the second key request includes the identifier of the first measurement party, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is further used to receive a second key response from the key management network element, the second key response includes the first AIK and the second parameter; the processing unit 20 is further used to store the first AIK and the second parameter; the transceiver unit 10 is further used to send a first key response to the first measurement party, the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0349] Exemplarily, the processing unit 20 is specifically used to: control the transceiver unit 10 to send a key acquisition message to the key management network element, the key acquisition message including the identifier of the first measurement party, and the key acquisition message is used to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; control the transceiver unit 10 to receive a key response message from the key management network element, the key response message including the first AIK of the first measurement party.

[0350] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is further used to send a remote attestation result to the first measurement party, where the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful, wherein when the evidence verification of the second measurement party passes, the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful.

[0351] In the embodiments of the present application, for specific descriptions of the key request message, key generation request, key generation message, remote attestation request, remote attestation response, first key request, second key request, first key response, second key response, key acquisition message, key response message, etc., please refer to the method embodiment 1 shown above, and will not be described in detail here.

[0352] It can be understood that the specific description of the transceiver unit and the processing unit shown in the embodiment of the present application is only an example. For the specific functions or execution steps of the transceiver unit and the processing unit, please refer to the above-mentioned method embodiment 1, which will not be described in detail here.

[0353] Reusing Figure 10, in some other embodiments of the present application, the communication device may be the second measurement party shown above. That is, the communication device shown in Figure 10 can be used to execute the steps or functions performed by the second measurement party in the above method embodiment. Exemplarily, the communication device may be the second measurement party or a chip or functional module configured in the second measurement party, etc., which is not limited in the embodiments of the present application. The transceiver unit 10 is used to perform the transceiver-related operations of the second measurement party in the above method embodiment, and the processing unit 20 is used to perform the processing-related operations of the second measurement party in the above method embodiment.

[0354] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is used to send a key request message to the verification party, where the key request message includes the identifier of the second measurement party, and the key request message is used to request to obtain the second EK of the second measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to receive a key grant message from the first measurement party, where the key grant message includes the second EK, which is generated based on the first EK and the first parameter of the first measurement party, and the second EK is used as the root key of the second measurement party.

[0355] Exemplarily, the processing unit 20 is configured to generate a key request message.

[0356] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is further configured to send a key success message to the verification party, where the key success message includes an identifier of the second measurement party.

[0357] Exemplarily, the key success message further includes an identifier of the first measurement party, and the identifier of the first measurement party is used to determine the first EK.

[0358] Exemplarily, the processing unit 20 is further configured to store the second EK.

[0359] In the embodiment of the present application, the specific description of the key request message, key grant message, key success message, etc. can be referred to the method embodiment 1 shown above, and will not be described in detail here.

[0360] It can be understood that the specific description of the transceiver unit and the processing unit shown in the embodiment of the present application is only an example. For the specific functions or execution steps of the transceiver unit and the processing unit, please refer to the above-mentioned method embodiment 1, which will not be described in detail here.

[0361] Reusing Figure 10, in still other embodiments of the present application, the communication device may be the key management network element shown above. That is, the communication device shown in Figure 10 may be used to execute the steps or functions performed by the key management network element in the above method embodiment. Exemplarily, the communication device may be a key management network element or a chip or functional module configured in a key management network element, etc., which is not limited in the present embodiment. The transceiver unit 10 is used to execute the key management network element's transceiver-related operations in the above method embodiment, and the processing unit 20 is used to execute the key management network element's processing-related operations in the above method embodiment.

[0362] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is used to receive a key generation message from the verification party, the key generation message including the identifier of the first measurement party, the identifier of the second measurement party, and a first parameter, and the key generation message is used to trigger the generation of the second EK of the second measurement party; the processing unit 20 is used to generate the second EK based on the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party.

[0363] Exemplarily, the processing unit 20 is further configured to determine the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party according to a correspondence between the identifier of the first measurement party and the first EK.

[0364] Exemplarily, the processing unit 20 is specifically configured to take the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party as input, and execute a first key generation algorithm to generate the second EK.

[0365] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is also used to receive a first key request from the first measuring party, where the first key request is used to request a second parameter, and the second parameter is used to generate the first AIK of the first measuring party; the processing unit 20 is also used to generate the second parameter, and generate the first AIK of the first measuring party based on the second parameter and the first EK of the first measuring party; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to send a first key response to the first measuring party, where the first key response includes the second parameter.

[0366] Exemplarily, the processing unit 20 is specifically configured to take the second parameter and the first EK of the first measuring party as input, and execute a second key generation algorithm to generate the first AIK of the first measuring party.

[0367] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is also used to: receive a key acquisition message from the verification party, the key acquisition message including the identifier of the first measurement party, and the key acquisition message is used to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; and send a key response message to the verification party, the key response message including the first AIK of the first measurement party.

[0368] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is further used to receive a second key request from the verification party, the second key request including the identifier of the first measurement party and a second parameter, the second key request being used to request the first AIK of the first measurement party; the processing unit 20 is further used to generate the first AIK of the first measurement party based on the second parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is further used to send a second key response to the verification party, the second key response including the first AIK.

[0369] Exemplarily, the transceiver unit 10 is also used to receive a second key request from the verification party, the second key request including the identifier of the first measurement party, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; the processing unit 20 is also used to generate a second parameter, and generate the first AIK of the first measurement party based on the second parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party; the transceiver unit 10 is also used to send a second key response to the verification party, the second key response including the first AIK and the second parameter.

[0370] Exemplarily, the first EK is pre-configured.

[0371] In the embodiment of the present application, for specific descriptions of the key generation message, the first key request, the first key response, the key acquisition message, the key response message, the second key request, the second key response, etc., please refer to the method embodiment 1 shown above, and they will not be described in detail here.

[0372] It can be understood that the specific description of the transceiver unit and the processing unit shown in the embodiment of the present application is only an example. For the specific functions or execution steps of the transceiver unit and the processing unit, please refer to the above-mentioned method embodiment 1, which will not be described in detail here.

[0373] The above describes the communication device according to the embodiment of the present application. The following describes possible product forms of the communication device. It should be understood that any product having the functions of the communication device described in FIG. 10 falls within the scope of protection of the embodiment of the present application. It should also be understood that the following description is merely illustrative and does not limit the product forms of the communication device according to the embodiment of the present application to these examples.

[0374] In one possible implementation, in the communication device shown in FIG10 , the processing unit 20 may be one or more processors, and the transceiver unit 10 may be a transceiver. Alternatively, the transceiver unit 10 may be a transmitting unit and a receiving unit, wherein the transmitting unit may be a transmitter and the receiving unit may be a receiver, and the transmitting unit and receiving unit are integrated into a single device, such as a transceiver. In the embodiments of the present application, the processor and transceiver may be coupled, etc., and the connection method between the processor and transceiver is not limited in the embodiments of the present application. During the execution of the above-described method, the process of sending information in the above-described method can be understood as the process of the processor outputting the above-described information. When outputting the above-described information, the processor outputs the above-described information to the transceiver for transmission by the transceiver. After being output by the processor, the above-described information may require further processing before reaching the transceiver. Similarly, the process of receiving information in the above-described method can be understood as the process of the processor receiving the above-described input information. When the processor receives the input information, the transceiver receives the above-described information and inputs it into the processor. Furthermore, after the transceiver receives the above-described information, the above-described information may require further processing before being input into the processor.

[0375] Refer to Figure 11, which is another structural diagram of the communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 11, the communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application can be used to implement the method described in the above method embodiment, and reference can be made to the description in the above method embodiment. The communication device can be any one of the aforementioned first measurement party, second measurement party, verification party, and key management network element. Exemplarily, the communication device includes one or more processors 1001 and a transceiver 1002. The communication device may further include a memory 1003. In one implementation, the communication device also includes an input and output device (not shown in the figure).

[0376] Processor 1001 is primarily used to process communication protocols and communication data, control the entire communication device, execute software programs, and process software program data. Memory 1003 is primarily used to store software programs and data. Transceiver 1002 may include control circuitry and an antenna. The control circuitry is primarily used to convert baseband signals into radio frequency signals and process radio frequency signals. The antenna is primarily used to transmit and receive radio frequency signals in the form of electromagnetic waves. Input / output devices, such as a touch screen, display, and keyboard, are primarily used to receive user input and output data to the user.

[0377] When the communication device is powered on, the processor 1001 can read the software program in the memory 1003, interpret and execute the instructions of the software program, and process the data of the software program. When data needs to be sent wirelessly, the processor 1001 performs baseband processing on the data to be sent and outputs the baseband signal to the radio frequency circuit. The radio frequency circuit performs radio frequency processing on the baseband signal and then transmits the radio frequency signal to the outside in the form of electromagnetic waves through the antenna. When data is sent to the communication device, the radio frequency circuit receives the radio frequency signal through the antenna, converts the radio frequency signal into a baseband signal, and outputs the baseband signal to the processor 1001. The processor 1001 converts the baseband signal into data and processes the data.

[0378] In another implementation, the RF circuit and antenna may be provided independently of the processor performing baseband processing. For example, in a distributed scenario, the RF circuit and antenna may be remotely arranged independent of the communication device.

[0379] The processor 1001 , the transceiver 1002 , and the memory 1003 may be connected via a communication bus.

[0380] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods or functions performed by the first measurement party in the above-mentioned method embodiment 1, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S104 in Figure 6, and / or used to execute other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute step S105 in Figure 6, and / or used for other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0381] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods or functions performed by the second measurement party in the first embodiment of the above-mentioned method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S106 in Figure 6, and / or for executing other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute steps S101 and S107 in Figure 6, and / or for other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0382] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods or functions performed by the verifier in the first embodiment of the above-mentioned method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S102 in Figure 6, and / or for executing other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute steps S103 and S108 in Figure 6, and / or for other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0383] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods, or functions performed by the key management network element in the first embodiment of the above-mentioned method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S109 in Figure 6, and / or to execute other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to receive key generation messages, and / or other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0384] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods, or functions performed by the measuring party in the second embodiment of the above-mentioned method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S205 in Figure 7, and / or for executing other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute steps S202 and S206 in Figure 7, and / or for other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0385] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods or functions performed by the verifier in the second embodiment of the above-mentioned method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S209 in Figure 7, and / or for executing other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute steps S201, S207 and S210 in Figure 7, and / or for other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0386] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods or functions performed by the key management network element in the second embodiment of the above-mentioned method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S203 in Figure 7, and / or for executing other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute steps S204 and S208 in Figure 7, and / or for other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0387] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods or functions performed by the measuring party in the third embodiment of the above method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S307 in Figure 8, and / or used to execute other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute steps S301 and S309 in Figure 8, and / or used for other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0388] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods or functions performed by the verifier in the third embodiment of the above-mentioned method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute steps S305, S310 and S311 in Figure 8, and / or other processes for executing the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute steps S302, S306, S308 and S312 in Figure 8, and / or other processes for the technology described in this document.

[0389] Exemplarily, when the communication device is used to execute the steps, methods or functions performed by the key management network element in the third embodiment of the above method, the processor 1001 can be used to execute step S303 in Figure 8, and / or used to execute other processes of the technology described in this document; the transceiver 1002 can be used to execute step S304 in Figure 8, and / or used for other processes of the technology described in this document.

[0390] In any of the above implementations, the processor 1001 may include a transceiver for implementing receiving and transmitting functions. For example, the transceiver may be a transceiver circuit, an interface, or an interface circuit. The transceiver circuit, interface, or interface circuit for implementing the receiving and transmitting functions may be separate or integrated. The transceiver circuit, interface, or interface circuit may be used for reading and writing code / data, or the transceiver circuit, interface, or interface circuit may be used for transmitting or delivering signals.

[0391] In any of the above implementations, the processor 1001 may store instructions, which may be computer programs. The computer programs, when executed on the processor 1001, may cause the communication device to perform the methods described in the above method embodiments. The computer programs may be embedded in the processor 1001, in which case the processor 1001 may be implemented by hardware.

[0392] In one implementation, the communication device may include a circuit that can implement the functions of sending, receiving, or communicating in the aforementioned method embodiment. The processor and transceiver described in this application can be implemented in an integrated circuit (IC), an analog IC, a radio frequency integrated circuit (RFIC), a mixed signal IC, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a printed circuit board (PCB), an electronic device, etc. The processor and transceiver can also be manufactured using various IC process technologies, such as complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS), N-type metal oxide semiconductor (nMetal-oxide-semiconductor, NMOS), P-channel metal oxide semiconductor (positive channel metal oxide semiconductor, PMOS), bipolar junction transistor (bipolar junction transistor, BJT), bipolar CMOS (BiCMOS), silicon germanium (SiGe), gallium arsenide (GaAs), etc.

[0393] It is understood that the communication device shown in the embodiment of the present application may also have more components than those in Figure 11, and the embodiment of the present application is not limited to this. The method performed by the processor and transceiver shown above is only an example. For the specific steps performed by the processor and transceiver, please refer to the description of the method embodiment above.

[0394] In another possible implementation, in the communication device shown in Figure 10, the processing unit 20 can be one or more logic circuits, and the transceiver unit 10 can be an input / output interface, or a communication interface, or an interface circuit, or an interface, etc. Or the transceiver unit 10 can also be a sending unit and a receiving unit, the sending unit can be an output interface, and the receiving unit can be an input interface, and the sending unit and the receiving unit are integrated into one unit, such as an input / output interface. Referring to Figure 12, Figure 12 is another structural diagram of the communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 12, the communication device shown in Figure 12 includes a logic circuit 901 and an interface 902. That is, the above-mentioned processing unit 20 can be implemented with a logic circuit 901, and the transceiver unit 10 can be implemented with an interface 902. Among them, the logic circuit 901 can be a chip, a processing circuit, an integrated circuit or a system on chip (SoC) chip, etc., and the interface 902 can be a communication interface, an input / output interface, a pin, etc. Exemplarily, Figure 12 is shown as an example of the above-mentioned communication device being a chip, and the chip includes a logic circuit 901 and an interface 902.

[0395] In the embodiment of the present application, the logic circuit and the interface may also be coupled to each other. The embodiment of the present application does not limit the specific connection method between the logic circuit and the interface.

[0396] Exemplarily, the communication device shown in FIG12 can be used to implement the method described in the above method embodiment, and reference can be made to the description in the above method embodiment. The communication device can be any one of the above-mentioned first measurement party, second measurement party, measurement party, verification party, and key management network element.

[0397] It can be understood that the communication device shown in the embodiment of the present application can implement the method provided in the embodiment of the present application in the form of hardware, or can implement the method provided in the embodiment of the present application in the form of software, etc., and the embodiment of the present application is not limited to this.

[0398] For the specific implementation of each embodiment shown in FIG12 , reference may also be made to the above embodiments, which will not be described in detail here.

[0399] An embodiment of the present application also provides a communication system, which includes a first measurement party, a second measurement party, a verification party and a key management network element. The first measurement party, the second measurement party, the verification party and the key management network element can be used to execute the method in the aforementioned method embodiment 1.

[0400] An embodiment of the present application also provides another communication system, which includes a measurement party, a verification party, and a key management network element. The measurement party, the verification party, and the key management network element can be used to execute the method in the second or third embodiment of the aforementioned method.

[0401] In addition, the present application also provides a computer program, which is used to implement the operations and / or processing performed by the first measurement party in the method provided by the present application.

[0402] The present application also provides a computer program, which is used to implement the operations and / or processing performed by the second measurement party in the method provided by the present application.

[0403] The present application also provides a computer program, which is used to implement the operations and / or processing performed by the measurement party in the method provided by the present application.

[0404] The present application also provides a computer program, which is used to implement the operations and / or processing performed by the verification party in the method provided by the present application.

[0405] The present application also provides a computer program, which is used to implement the operations and / or processing performed by the key management network element in the method provided by the present application.

[0406] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores computer code. When the computer code runs on a computer, it enables the computer to execute the operations and / or processing performed by the first measurement party in the method provided by the present application.

[0407] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores computer code. When the computer code runs on a computer, it enables the computer to execute the operations and / or processing performed by the second measurement party in the method provided by the present application.

[0408] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer code stored therein. When the computer code runs on a computer, the computer executes the operations and / or processing performed by the measurement party in the method provided by the present application.

[0409] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer code stored therein. When the computer code is run on a computer, the computer executes the operations and / or processing performed by the verification party in the method provided by the present application.

[0410] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores computer code. When the computer code runs on a computer, it enables the computer to execute the operations and / or processing performed by the key management network element in the method provided by the present application.

[0411] The present application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer code or computer program. When the computer code or computer program runs on a computer, the operations and / or processing performed by the first measurement party in the method provided by the present application are executed.

[0412] The present application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer code or computer program. When the computer code or computer program runs on a computer, the operations and / or processing performed by the second measurement party in the method provided by the present application are executed.

[0413] The present application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer code or computer program. When the computer code or computer program runs on a computer, the operations and / or processing performed by the measurement party in the method provided by the present application are executed.

[0414] The present application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer code or computer program. When the computer code or computer program runs on a computer, the operations and / or processing performed by the verification party in the method provided by the present application are executed.

[0415] The present application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer code or computer program. When the computer code or computer program runs on a computer, the operations and / or processing performed by the key management network element in the method provided by the present application are executed.

[0416] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, or can be electrical, mechanical or other forms of connection.

[0417] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the technical effects of the solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application.

[0418] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated into a single processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into a single unit. The aforementioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional units.

[0419] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a readable storage medium, including a number of instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned readable storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk or optical disk, and other media that can store program code.

[0420] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included in the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. An information interaction method, characterized in that: include: The first measurement party receives a key generation request from the verification party, the key generation request including a first parameter, and the key generation request is used to request generation of a second endorsement key EK of the second measurement party according to the first parameter; The first measurement party generates the second EK according to the first parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party; The first measurement party sends a key granting message to the second measurement party, where the key granting message includes the second EK, and the second EK is used as a root key of the second measurement party.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The key generation request is also used to indicate that the second measurement party is trustworthy.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The first measurement party generates the second EK according to the first parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party, including: The first metric takes the first parameter and the first EK of the first metric as inputs, and executes a first key generation algorithm to generate the second EK.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that Before the first measuring party receives the key generation request from the verifying party, the method further includes: The first measuring party obtains the second parameter; The first measurement party generates a first authentication key AIK of the first measurement party according to the second parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party, and the first AIK is used to sign the evidence of the second measurement party.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The first measurement party generates a first authentication key AIK of the first measurement party according to the second parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party, including: The first measuring party takes the second parameter and the first EK of the first measuring party as input, and executes a second key generation algorithm to generate a first authentication key AIK of the first measuring party.

6. The method according to claim 4 or 5, characterized in that: The first measuring party obtains the second parameter, including: The first measurement party obtains the second parameter from the key management network element.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that Before the first measurement party obtains the second parameter from the key management network element, the method further includes: The first measurement party receives a remote attestation request from the verification party; After the first measurement party generates a first authentication key AIK of the first measurement party according to the second parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party, the method further includes: The first measurement party sends a remote attestation response to the verifier, where the remote attestation response includes the evidence of the second measurement party and first signature information, where the first signature information includes information after the evidence of the second measurement party is signed by the first AIK; The first measurement party receives a remote attestation result from the verification party, and the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful.

8. The method according to claim 4 or 5, characterized in that: The first measuring party obtains the second parameter, including: The first measuring party obtains a second parameter from the verifying party.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that After the first measurement party generates a first authentication key AIK of the first measurement party according to the second parameter and the first EK of the first measurement party, the method further includes: The first measurement party receives a remote attestation request from the verification party; The first measurement party sends a remote attestation response to the verifier, the remote attestation response including the evidence of the second measurement party, the second parameter, and first signature information, the second parameter is used to determine the first AIK, the first signature information includes the second measurement party The information of the party's evidence signed by the first AIK; The first measurement party receives the remote attestation result sent by the verification party, and the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that The first EK of the first metric is preconfigured.

11. An information interaction method, characterized in that: include: The verifying party receives a key request message from the second measuring party, where the key request message includes an identifier of the second measuring party, and the key request message is used to request to obtain a second endorsement key EK of the second measuring party; The verification party generates a first parameter; In the case that the second measurement party is trustworthy, the verification party sends a key generation request to the first measurement party, the key generation request includes the first parameter, and the key generation request is used to request generation of a second EK of the second measurement party according to the first parameter.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that After the verification party sends a key generation request to the first measurement party, the method further includes: The verification party receives a key success message from the second measurement party, wherein the key success message includes an identifier of the second measurement party; The verification direction sends a key generation message to the key management network element, where the key generation message includes an identifier of the second measurement party, an identifier of the first measurement party, and the first parameter, and the key generation message is used to trigger generation of a second EK of the second measurement party.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that The key success message also includes an identifier of the first measurement party, where the identifier of the first measurement party is used to determine a first EK, and the first EK is used to generate a second EK of the second measurement party in conjunction with the first parameter.

14. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 13, characterized in that The second metric is credible, including: The verification party has a result of successful remote attestation of the second measurement party.

15. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 14, characterized in that Before the verification party sends a key generation request to the first measurement party, the method further includes: The verification party sends a remote attestation request to the first measurement party; The verifier receives a remote attestation response from the first measurement party, where the remote attestation response includes evidence of the second measurement party and first signature information, where the first signature information includes information after the evidence of the second measurement party is signed by a first authentication key AIK of the first measurement party; The verifier obtains the first AIK of the first measuring party, and uses the first AIK to verify whether the first signature information is valid; If the first signature information is valid, the verifier verifies the evidence of the second measurement party; If the evidence of the second measurement party passes the verification, the verification party confirms that the second measurement party is credible.

16. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that The remote attestation response further includes a second parameter, wherein the second parameter is used to determine a first AIK of the first measuring party; The verifier obtains the first AIK of the first measurement party, including: The verifier determines the first AIK corresponding to the second parameter according to the corresponding relationship between the second parameter and the first AIK.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that Before the verification party sends a remote proof request to the first measurement party, the method further includes: The verifier receives a first key request from the first measurement party, where the first key request is used to request a second parameter; The verification party sends a second key request to the key management network element, where the second key request includes the identifier of the first measurement party and the second parameter, and the second key request is used to request to obtain the first AIK of the first measurement party; The verifier receives a second key response from the key management network element, where the second key response includes the first AIK; The verifier sends a first key response to the first measuring party, where the first key response includes the second parameter.

18. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that Before the verification party sends a remote proof request to the first measurement party, the method further includes: The verifier receives a first key request from the first measurement party, where the first key request is used to request a second parameter; The verification party sends a second key request to the key management network element, where the second key request includes an identifier of the first measurement party, and the second key request is used to request to obtain a first AIK of the first measurement party; The verifier receives a second key response from the key management network element, where the second key response includes the first AIK and the second parameter; The verifier sends a first key response to the first measuring party, where the first key response includes the second parameter.

19. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that The verifier obtains the first AIK of the first measurement party, including: The verification party sends a key acquisition message to the key management network element, where the key acquisition message includes an identifier of the first measurement party, and the key acquisition message is used to acquire a first AIK of the first measurement party; The verifier receives a key response message from the key management network element, where the key response message includes the first AIK of the first measurer.

20. The method according to any one of claims 15 to 19, characterized in that After the verification party verifies the evidence of the second measurement party, the method further includes: The verification party sends a remote attestation result to the first measurement party, and the remote attestation result indicates that the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful, wherein when the evidence verification of the second measurement party passes, the remote attestation of the second measurement party is successful.

21. An information interaction method, characterized in that: include: The second measurement party sends a key request message to the verification party, where the key request message includes an identifier of the second measurement party, and the key request message is used to request to obtain a second endorsement key EK of the second measurement party; The second measurement party receives a key grant message from the first measurement party, where the key grant message includes the second EK, where the second EK is generated based on the first EK and a first parameter of the first measurement party, and where the second EK is used as a root key of the second measurement party.

22. The method according to claim 21, characterized in that After the second measurement party receives the key grant message from the first measurement party, the method further includes: The second measurement party sends a key success message to the verification party, where the key success message includes an identifier of the second measurement party.

23. The method according to claim 22, characterized in that The key success message also includes an identifier of the first measurement party, and the identifier of the first measurement party is used to determine the first EK.

24. The method according to any one of claims 21 to 23, characterized in that After the second measurement party receives the key grant message from the first measurement party, the method further includes: The second metric stores the second EK.

25. An information interaction method, characterized in that: include: The key management network element receives a key generation message from the verification party, where the key generation message includes an identifier of the first measurement party, an identifier of the second measurement party, and a first parameter, and the key generation message is used to trigger generation of a second endorsement key EK of the second measurement party; The key management network element generates the second EK according to the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party.

26. The method according to claim 25, characterized in that Before the key management network element generates the second EK according to the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party, the method further includes: The key management network element determines the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party according to the corresponding relationship between the identifier of the first measurement party and the first EK.

27. The method according to claim 25 or 26, characterized in that The key management network element generates the second EK according to the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party, including: The key management network element takes the first parameter and the first EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party as input, and executes a first key generation algorithm to generate the second EK.

28. The method according to any one of claims 25 to 27, characterized in that Before the key management network element receives the key generation message from the verification party, the method further includes: The key management network element receives a first key request from the first measurement party, where the first key request is used to request a second parameter, where the second parameter is used to generate a first authentication key AIK of the first measurement party; The key management network element generates a second parameter, and generates a first AIK of the first measurement party according to the second parameter and a first endorsement key EK of the first measurement party; The key management network element sends a first key response to the first measurement party, where the first key response includes the second parameter.

29. The method according to claim 28, characterized in that The generating the first AIK of the first measurement party according to the second parameter and the first endorsement key EK of the first measurement party includes: Taking the second parameter and the first endorsement key EK of the first measuring party as input, a second key generation algorithm is executed to generate a first AIK of the first measuring party.

30. The method according to claim 28 or 29, characterized in that After the key management network element sends the first key response to the first measurement party, the method further includes: The key management network element receives a key acquisition message from the verifier, where the key acquisition message includes an identifier of the first measurement party, and the key acquisition message is used to acquire a first AIK of the first measurement party; The key management network element sends a key response message to the verifier, where the key response message includes the first AIK of the first measuring party.

31. The method according to any one of claims 25 to 27, characterized in that Before the key management network element receives the key generation message from the verification party, the method further includes: The key management network element receives a second key request from the verification party, where the second key request includes an identifier of the first measurement party and a second parameter, and the second key request is used to request to obtain a first authentication key AIK of the first measurement party; The key management network element generates a first AIK of the first measurement party according to the second parameter and a first endorsement key EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party; The key management network element sends a second key response to the authenticator, where the second key response includes the first AIK.

32. The method according to any one of claims 25 to 27, characterized in that Before the key management network element receives the key generation message from the verification party, the method further includes: The key management network element receives a second key request from the verification party, where the second key request includes an identifier of the first measurement party, and the second key request is used to request to obtain a first authentication key AIK of the first measurement party; The key management network element generates a second parameter, and generates a first AIK of the first measurement party according to the second parameter and a first endorsement key EK corresponding to the identifier of the first measurement party; The key management network element sends a second key response to the verifier, where the second key response includes the first AIK and the second parameter.

33. The method according to any one of claims 25 to 32, characterized in that The first EK is pre-configured.

34. A communication device, characterized in that: Comprising units or modules for executing the method according to any one of claims 1 to 33.

35. A readable storage medium, characterized in that: The readable storage medium stores program instructions, and when the program instructions are executed on a communication device, the communication device executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 33.

36. A communication system, characterized in that: include: A first measurement party for executing the method described in any one of claims 1 to 10, a verification party for executing the method described in any one of claims 11 to 20, a second measurement party for executing the method described in any one of claims 21 to 24, and a key management network element for executing the method described in any one of claims 25 to 33.

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