Zero-trust security access method and system

By using the verification basic data between the access end and the data server in a zero-trust security solution and Toplitz matrix hashing calculation, the problem of quantum computing threat is solved, and strict verification and security strength improvement for each access is achieved. , reduce the risk of unauthorized access.

CN118972154APending Publication Date: 2024-11-15MATRICTIME DIGITAL TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411319609.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-09-23
Publication Date
2024-11-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing zero-trust security solution cannot withstand the threat of quantum computing, causing the network security system to face huge risks.

Method used

Through negotiation between the access side and the data server, we obtain and use pre-save verification basic data, including the access side true random numbers, necessary submission elements and irreducible polynomials, and generate the Toplitz matrix for hash calculation to ensure that each time Verification consistency and transparency of access requests reduces the risk of unauthorized access and increases security strength.

Benefits of technology

It realizes strict verification of each access, reduces the risk of unauthorized access, increases the security strength of zero-trust secure access, can withstand quantum computing attacks, and does not require complex protocols or special hardware, making it easy to deploy and maintain.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a zero-trust security access method and system. The data server side and the access side perform hash calculation on the context instance of the user by using the topology matrix generated by the irreducible polynomial and the true random number of the access side, so that the cracking difficulty is further increased, an attacker is difficult to forge or tamper request data, the security strength of zero-trust security access is improved, and the safety of the zero-trust security access is improved. Therefore, the attack of quantum computing can be resisted. By means of a user context backfilling mode, it is ensured that the user state information in the access request is kept consistent with the previous access application and is associated, so that the access problem caused by information inconsistency is avoided, and the timeliness and the newest of the information are kept by updating necessary submitted information. The data server side and the access side use the same algorithm and parameter to generate the hash value, so that the consistency and transparency of the verification process are ensured. This eliminates the dependency on complex protocols or special hardware, making the method easy to deploy and maintain.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication security technology, and in particular to a zero-trust secure access method and system. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of information technology, network environments are becoming increasingly complex and dynamic, and cyber threats are emerging in a myriad of forms and methods. This poses a severe challenge to traditional network security systems based on perimeter protection and trust models. Traditional security models often rely on the isolation and protection of network perimeters, assuming that as long as the internal network is secure, external threats will be difficult to penetrate. However, the reality is far from this. Advanced persistent threats (APTs), insider misuse or malicious behavior, and supply chain attacks can easily bypass perimeter protections and directly threaten the security of core enterprise data.

[0003] Against this backdrop, the Zero Trust model emerged as a revolutionary security concept that completely overturns traditional cybersecurity thinking. The core of the Zero Trust model is "never trust, always verify." Rather than judging access legitimacy based on network location (internal or external), the model continuously authenticates and authorizes all entities attempting to access network resources (access points, devices, services, etc.). This model requires that regardless of the origin of the request, it undergoes rigorous security checks to ensure that only legitimate and authorized entities can access specific resources.

[0004] However, with the rapid development of quantum computing technology, existing zero-trust security systems based on traditional encryption and authentication face new threats. Quantum computing, with its powerful computing power, has the potential to crack widely used public-key cryptographic algorithms, threatening existing identity authentication and data encryption mechanisms. This means that even if a zero-trust model is adopted, if the underlying security mechanisms cannot withstand quantum computing attacks, the entire security system will still face significant risks.

[0005] Therefore, it is imperative to explore and research zero-trust security solutions that can defend against future quantum computing threats. Summary of the Invention

[0006] Purpose of the invention: This application provides a zero-trust secure access method and system to address the problem that existing zero-trust security solutions are still unable to resist the threat of quantum computing.

[0007] Technical solution: In the first aspect, the present application provides a zero-trust secure access method, the method comprising:

[0008] S1: The access client initiates an access request to the data server, including:

[0009] Obtain pre-saved verification basic data required for accessing the target resource; wherein the verification basic data includes: a true random number of the access end, various necessary submission elements, a target session identifier, and an irreducible polynomial;

[0010] According to the first attribute value of each necessary submission element in the current state, the attribute value of the corresponding element in the saved user context is updated to obtain a first user context instance;

[0011] Determining a first resource permission identifier according to the first user context instance and the resource path of the target resource;

[0012] Determining a first Toplitz matrix according to the access end true random number and the irreducible polynomial;

[0013] Performing a hash calculation on the first resource permission identifier using the first Toplitz matrix to obtain a first hash value;

[0014] Sending the generated access request to the data server; wherein the access request carries the resource path, the target session identifier, the first hash value, and the first attribute value of each necessary submission element;

[0015] S2: The data server verifies the received access request, including:

[0016] Obtaining a session context corresponding to the target session identifier stored by the data server; wherein the session context includes a user context, an irreducible polynomial, and an access terminal true random number;

[0017] updating the attribute value of the corresponding element in the user context according to the first attribute value of each necessary submission element to obtain a second user context instance;

[0018] Determining a second resource permission identifier according to the second user context instance and the resource path;

[0019] Determining a second Toplitz matrix according to the access end true random number and the irreducible polynomial;

[0020] Performing a hash calculation on the second resource permission identifier using the second Toplitz matrix to obtain a second hash value;

[0021] If the second hash value is consistent with the first hash value, allowing the access client to access the target resource;

[0022] If the second hash value is inconsistent with the first hash value, the access end is denied access to the target resource.

[0023] In a second aspect, the present application provides a zero-trust secure access system, which includes an access terminal and a data service terminal as described in the above method.

[0024] Beneficial effects of this application:

[0025] 1. Each time the access end accesses the target resource, it needs to go through a strict verification process on the data server side, not just the initial authentication based on network location or identity. This ensures that even in the internal network environment, each resource access requires re-verification, thereby significantly reducing the risk of unauthorized access.

[0026] 2. Both the data service end and the access end perform hash calculations on user context instances by using irreducible polynomials and the toplitz matrix generated by the access end's true random numbers. This, combined with the characteristics of true random numbers, further increases the difficulty of cracking, making it difficult for attackers to forge or tamper with request data, which is conducive to improving the security strength of zero-trust secure access and thus can resist quantum computing attacks.

[0027] 3. By backfilling the user context, not only does this ensure that the user status information in the current access request remains consistent and correlated with the previous access request, thus avoiding access issues caused by inconsistent information, but it also maintains the timeliness and freshness of the information by updating the required submission information. Combined with subsequent security verification mechanisms, this effectively prevents unauthorized devices from impersonating legitimate users by stealing or reusing the first attribute value of the required submission element from the previous access point.

[0028] 4. The data server and access end use the same algorithm and parameters to generate hash values, ensuring consistency and transparency in the verification process. This eliminates the need for complex protocols or specialized hardware, making the method easy to deploy and maintain. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the following is a brief introduction to the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without any creative work.

[0030] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a zero-trust secure access process provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0031] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a specific zero-trust secure access process provided for an embodiment of this application;

[0032] Figure 3A schematic diagram of the structure of a zero-trust secure access system provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0033] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application more clear, this application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the embodiments described are only some of the embodiments of this application, not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making any creative efforts are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0034] In order to improve the security strength of zero-trust secure access and thus resist quantum computing attacks, the embodiments of the present application provide a zero-trust secure access method and system.

[0035] Example 1:

[0036] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a zero-trust secure access process provided in an embodiment of the present application includes:

[0037] S1: The access client initiates an access request to the data server, including:

[0038] Zero Trust is a network security model whose core concept is "never trust, always verify". This concept emphasizes that no matter whether the user or device is inside or outside the enterprise network, it should not automatically obtain access to network resources. Instead, all access requests should go through a strict authentication and authorization process. Based on this, in this application, each time the access end wants to access a resource provided by the data service end (referred to as the target resource), it needs to send an access request to the target resource to the data service end, so that the data service end can verify the access request and respond whether the access request is allowed to access the target resource, thereby ensuring the security of each access.

[0039] The process of sending an access request from the access client to the data server includes the following steps:

[0040] S101: Acquire pre-saved basic verification data required for accessing a target resource; wherein the basic verification data includes: a true random number of the access end, various necessary submission elements, a target session identifier, and an irreducible polynomial.

[0041] In this application, before attempting to access a target resource provided by a data server, a legitimate access point will request permission from the data server to access the target resource. After strictly verifying the access point's identity and the validity of its access rights, the data server can negotiate with the access point to determine the basic verification data required for subsequent access to specific resources. This basic verification data includes: a true random number from the access point, various required submission elements, a target session identifier, and an irreducible polynomial. The required submission elements refer to the elements required for the access point to access the data server's resources, such as user identity authentication information, timestamp, and request type. The target session identifier is a session identifier pre-assigned by the data server to the access point, indicating which access point's session context the data server should use to authenticate the current access point. The target session identifier can be represented by data, a string, or other means, which are not specifically limited here. The true random number from the access point and the irreducible polynomial are used to encrypt the user context instance of the access point, preventing it from being exposed during network transmission and potentially causing data security issues.

[0042] Based on the above embodiment, when the access end obtains the verification basic data agreed with the data service end, the verification basic data can be saved so that when the target resource needs to be accessed in the future, the verification basic data can be quickly obtained and used, that is, the access end true random number, necessary submission elements, target session identifier and irreducible polynomial required to access the target resource are obtained.

[0043] S102: updating the attribute value of the corresponding element in the stored user context according to the first attribute value of each necessary submission element in the current state to obtain a first user context instance.

[0044] User context is the core information set when an access point applies for permission from a data service. It not only carries static elements but also integrates dynamic elements, together forming a comprehensive and reliable access verification system. Among them, static elements, such as username, password, and user role, constitute the basic identity of the access point. Because they remain unchanged for a long time or change very rarely, they become the key basis for identifying the inherent characteristics of the access point, and their reliability also ensures the basic reliability of the subsequent verification process. The dynamic elements, including but not limited to device location, network environment, timestamp, and session token, add a new dimension to the verification process with their real-time and dynamic nature—real-time and security. These dynamic elements can reflect the access point's current operating environment, activity trajectory, and session status in real time, effectively making up for the shortcomings of static elements in reflecting the access point's immediate status.

[0045] In one possible implementation, the user context includes but is not limited to at least one of the following elements: user identity information, user password, user role information, user biometric information, access point location information, access point device information, and access point network information. The user identity information is used to uniquely identify the user. Common user identity information includes user name, email address, mobile phone number, etc., which are provided by the user when registering and are verified and used in subsequent login, access permission control, and other scenarios. The user biometric information uses the user's biometric characteristics for identity authentication, such as fingerprint, facial recognition, iris scanning, etc. User role information defines the user's location and permission level in the system or organization. Access point location information refers to the current geographical location of the access point, such as IP address, GPS positioning, etc. Access point device information includes detailed information about the access point's login device, such as device model, operating system, browser type, etc. Access point network information involves the way and status of the access point's connection to the network, such as network type (Wi-Fi, mobile data), network speed, network provider, etc.

[0046] In order to avoid the submission of redundant information and the waste of resources, in this application, each necessary submission element can include a dynamic element in the user context. Each time the access terminal fills in the user context, it can automatically identify and merge repeated static element attribute values, and at the same time, based on the latest attribute value of each necessary submission element (recorded as the first attribute value), update the saved user context record and generate a user context instance (recorded as the first user context instance). Through this "backfilling user context" method, not only is it ensured that the static elements in this access request are consistent with the previous access request and associated, thereby avoiding access problems caused by inconsistent information, but also the timeliness and freshness of the user context are maintained by updating necessary information (such as session ID, timestamp). On this basis, combined with the subsequent security verification mechanism, it can effectively prevent unauthorized devices from impersonating legitimate users to access by stealing or reusing the first attribute value of the necessary submission element of the old access terminal.

[0047] S103: Determine a first resource permission identifier according to the first user context instance and the resource path of the target resource.

[0048] The resource path of the target resource represents the unique address or access path of the target resource, which can accurately point to the specific resource being accessed, such as a file system path, a Web URL (Uniform Resource Locator), an API endpoint, etc.

[0049] After obtaining the first user context instance and the resource path of the target resource, the access terminal can combine the first user context instance and the resource path of the target resource, thereby determining the combined data as a resource permission identifier (recorded as the first resource permission identifier). For example, by splicing the first user context instance and the resource path of the target resource together, the spliced ​​data is determined as the first resource permission identifier. For another example, by performing an XOR operation on the first user context instance and the resource path of the target resource, the processed data is determined as the first resource permission identifier.

[0050] S104: Determine a first Toplitz matrix according to the access end true random number and the irreducible polynomial.

[0051] After obtaining the access side true random number and irreducible polynomial, the access side can construct a toplitz matrix (denoted as the first toplitz matrix) based on the access side true random number and irreducible polynomial. For example, the irreducible polynomial P(x) and the access side true random number U s Generate the first Toplitz matrix as parameters, including:

[0052] 1) The number of rows and columns of the first Toplitz matrix is ​​related to the degree of the irreducible polynomial P(x): Assume that the highest-degree term of P(x) is n;

[0053] 2) The elements in the first row are equal to the access end true random number U s Elements of

[0054] 3) Starting from the second row, the elements of each row are equal to the elements of the previous row shifted right by one position and multiplied by the coefficient of the irreducible polynomial P(x);

[0055] 4) For the access end true random number U s =[s0, s1, ..., s n-1 ] and the irreducible polynomial P(x)=a0*x^0+a1*x^1+…+a n-1 *x^(n-1), the i-th row of the first Toplitz matrix T1 will be [s i , s i-1 *a0,s i-2 *a1,…,s i-n+1 *a n-2 , s i-n *a n-1 ]

[0056] S105: Performing a hash calculation on the first resource permission identifier using the first Toplitz matrix to obtain a first hash value.

[0057] Based on the above embodiment, when the first Toplitz matrix and the first resource permission identifier are obtained, the Toplitz hash function can be determined by the first Toplitz matrix, and the first resource permission identifier can be hashed by the Toplitz hash function to obtain a hash value (recorded as the first hash value). For example,

[0058] (1) Determine the size of the data block according to the dimension of the Toplitz matrix, and then divide the first resource permission identifier into a plurality of data blocks according to the size of the data block, such as: M = [m0, m1, ...], where M represents the first resource permission identifier and m represents the data block obtained by the division;

[0059] (2) Treat each data block as a column vector; for each data block, multiply it with the Toplitz matrix T and obtain the hash value of the first row of the multiplication result;

[0060] (3) Repeat the previous step (2), perform the multiplication operation on each data block, and combine the first row of each result to form the final hash value H p,U (M) = [h0, h1, ...].

[0061] S106: Send the generated access request to the data server; wherein the access request carries the resource path, the target session identifier, the first hash value, and the first attribute value of each necessary submission element.

[0062] After encrypting the first resource permission identifier, the access end may generate an access request based on the resource path of the target resource, the target session identifier, the first hash value, and the first attribute value of each necessary submission element, and then send the access request to the data service end.

[0063] S2: The data server verifies the received access request, including:

[0064] Each time the data server receives an access request from the access client, it needs to verify the access request to determine whether the access client is allowed to access the specific resource this time, so as to ensure the security of each access to the resource.

[0065] In one example, the access end may encrypt and transmit the access request to the data service end, and the data service end needs to decrypt the received encrypted access request to obtain the access request.

[0066] Exemplarily, the access end encrypts the access request using a classic encryption method, and transmits the encrypted access request to the data service end through a traditional network. The data service end obtains a key pre-negotiated with the access end, and decrypts the encrypted access request based on the key and the classic encryption method agreed upon with the access end.

[0067] As another example, the access end may also perform quantum encryption on the access request through quantum encryption, and transmit the quantum encrypted access request to the data service end. After the data service end obtains the quantum encrypted access request, it may obtain the quantum key to decrypt the quantum encrypted access request.

[0068] For example, the access terminal and the data server pre-distribute quantum keys via a QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) network, so that a paired quantum key is stored between the access terminal and the data server. The access terminal can subsequently encrypt the access request based on the quantum key paired with the data server, and then send the encrypted access request to the data server. The data server can decrypt the encrypted access request based on the quantum key paired with the access terminal and perform subsequent processing.

[0069] For another example, the access terminal and the data service terminal are both connected to the access base station of the global quantum security network, and through the key center in the global quantum security network, the access terminal obtains the quantum key paired with the access base station (recorded as the first access base station) to which the access terminal is connected, and the data service terminal obtains the quantum key paired with the access base station (recorded as the second access base station) to which the data service terminal is connected. Subsequently, after encrypting the access request based on the first quantum key, the access terminal can send the first key index of the first quantum key to the first access base station. The first access base station can obtain the first quantum key based on the first key index and relay the first quantum key to the second access base station through the global quantum security network. After the second access base station obtains the first quantum key, it can encrypt the first quantum key using the second quantum key paired with the data service terminal. The second access base station sends the second key index of the second quantum key and the encrypted first quantum key to the data service terminal. The data service terminal can obtain the second quantum key based on the second key index and decrypt the encrypted first quantum key based on the second quantum key to obtain the first quantum key. The data server can decrypt the received encrypted access request based on the first quantum key.

[0070] S201: Acquire a session context corresponding to the target session identifier stored by the data server; wherein the session context includes a user context, an irreducible polynomial, and an access-side true random number.

[0071] In this application, the data service end will save the session identifier and session context corresponding to different access ends, so as to quickly determine the session context corresponding to the target session identifier based on the target session identifier carried in the received access request, and verify the access request of the access end based on the session context.

[0072] The session context stores the user context, the irreducible polynomial, and the access-side true random number.

[0073] S202: According to the first attribute value of each necessary submission element, the attribute value of the corresponding element in the user context is updated to obtain a second user context instance.

[0074] S203: Determine a second resource permission identifier according to the second user context instance and the resource path.

[0075] S204: Determine a second Toplitz matrix according to the access end true random number and the irreducible polynomial.

[0076] S205: Perform hash calculation on the second resource permission identifier using the second Toplitz matrix to obtain a second hash value.

[0077] It should be noted that the specific processes of S202 to S205 mentioned above can refer to the processes of S102 to S105 mentioned above, and will not be described in detail here.

[0078] S206: If the second hash value is consistent with the first hash value, the access terminal is allowed to access the target resource; if the second hash value is inconsistent with the first hash value, the access terminal is denied access to the target resource.

[0079] Under normal and secure circumstances, the user context, first attribute values ​​of each necessary submission element, target session identifier, irreducible polynomial, and true random number used by the data server and the access client should be consistent, and the second hash value determined by the data server and the first hash value determined by the access client should also be determined using the same method. Furthermore, the second hash value determined by the data server and the hash value determined by the access client should also be consistent. Therefore, after the data server determines the second hash value, it can compare the second hash value with the first hash value determined by the access client to determine whether the access client has passed verification based on the comparison result. Specifically, if the second hash value determined by the data server is consistent with the first hash value determined by the access client, it indicates that the user context, first attribute values ​​of each necessary submission element, target session identifier, irreducible polynomial, and true random number used by the data server and the access client are completely consistent, and the second hash value determined by the data server and the first hash value determined by the access client are determined using the same method. The data server can then determine that the access client is trustworthy and allow the access client to access the target resource this time. If the second hash value determined by the data server is inconsistent with the first hash value determined by the access end, it means that the user context, the first attribute value of each necessary submission element, the target session identifier, the irreducible polynomial and the true random number of the access end used by the data server and the access end are not completely consistent, or the method of determining the second hash value by the data server is different from that of determining the first hash value by the access end. In this case, the data server can determine that the access end is untrustworthy and deny the access end access to the target resource this time.

[0080] Beneficial effects of this application:

[0081] 1. Each time the access end accesses the target resource, it needs to go through a strict verification process on the data server side, not just the initial authentication based on network location or identity. This ensures that even in the internal network environment, each resource access requires re-verification, thereby significantly reducing the risk of unauthorized access.

[0082] 2. Both the data service end and the access end perform hash calculations on user context instances by using irreducible polynomials and toplitz matrices generated by the access end's true random numbers, further increasing the difficulty of cracking and making it difficult for attackers to forge or tamper with request data. This is conducive to improving the security strength of zero-trust secure access, thereby resisting quantum computing attacks.

[0083] 3. By backfilling the user context, not only does this ensure that the user status information in the current access request remains consistent and correlated with the previous access request, thus avoiding access issues caused by inconsistent information, but it also maintains the timeliness and freshness of the information by updating the required submission information. Combined with subsequent security verification mechanisms, this effectively prevents unauthorized devices from impersonating legitimate users by stealing or reusing the first attribute value of the required submission element from the previous access point.

[0084] 4. The data server and access end use the same algorithm and parameters to generate hash values, ensuring consistency and transparency in the verification process. This eliminates the need for complex protocols or specialized hardware, making the method easy to deploy and maintain.

[0085] Example 2:

[0086] To further improve access security, based on the above embodiment, in the present application, if the session context further includes a verification element set and verification conditions corresponding to each element in the verification element set, after the data server obtains the session context, before updating the attribute value of the corresponding element in the user context based on the first attribute value of each required submission element to obtain a second user context instance, the method further includes:

[0087] Obtaining the attribute value of each element in the verification element set;

[0088] For each element, it is determined whether the attribute value of the element satisfies the verification condition corresponding to the element.

[0089] Considering that in the process of verifying the access request of the access terminal, the network environment, behavior information, permissions, etc. of the access terminal are verified, the security strength of each access can be further improved. Based on this, in the present application, the data service terminal can also save a verification element set and the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the verification element set for each access terminal, and save the verification element set and the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the verification element set in the session context of the access terminal. After obtaining the session context corresponding to the target session identifier based on the above embodiment, the data service terminal can obtain the verification element set and the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the verification element set from the session context. Then obtain the attribute value of each element in the verification element set. Among them, these attribute values ​​may be directly provided by the access terminal when sending the access request, or they may be indirectly obtained by the data service terminal through other means (such as log analysis, network monitoring). For each element, determine whether the attribute value of the element meets the verification condition corresponding to the element. If the attribute value of the element does not meet the verification conditions corresponding to the element, it means that the access end is untrustworthy, and the access end is denied access to the target resource; if the attribute value of the element meets the verification conditions corresponding to the element, the attribute value of the next element is verified until the end.

[0090] In one possible implementation, the verification element set includes one or more of the following:

[0091] A. Required submission element set.

[0092] The set of necessary submission elements includes the necessary submission elements that the access terminal needs to submit in order to allow access. These necessary submission elements can prove the reliability of the current network environment of the access terminal. For example, when accessing a protected web page, the access terminal may need to submit the access terminal location information and the access terminal network environment information as two necessary submission elements. The access terminal location information can be the current geographical location of the access terminal (such as country, city) or more specific coordinate information. The access terminal network environment information can include network type (such as WiFi, mobile network), network speed, whether to use a proxy or VPN, and other information. For the access terminal location information, the data service end can determine whether the attribute value of the access terminal location information belongs to a pre-configured location range. For the access terminal network environment information, the data service end can determine whether the attribute value of the access terminal network environment information meets the preset network environment information requirements.

[0093] B. Set of necessary detection elements.

[0094] The set of necessary detection elements includes necessary detection elements that the access terminal that is allowed to access should detect by the data service terminal. These necessary detection elements are usually used to further verify the legitimacy or behavior pattern of the access terminal. For example, the data service terminal may detect the access time information, access count information, access traffic information, etc. of the access terminal to determine whether the access terminal has abnormal behavior. Access traffic information refers to the amount of data accessed by the access terminal to a certain resource per unit time (such as per second, per minute, etc.), which reflects whether the activity level of the access terminal is abnormal. Access time information refers to the time point or time period when the access behavior occurs. It can be a specific date or time (such as 12:00:00 on April 1, 2023), or a relative time period (such as peak period, non-peak period). Access count information refers to the number of times an access terminal accesses a specific resource within a preset time period.

[0095] For example, the data service end may detect the number of accesses by the access end within a preset time period, and then determine whether the number of accesses by the access end within the preset time period exceeds a preset access number threshold.

[0096] C. The target resource set corresponding to the target session identifier.

[0097] The target resource set corresponding to the target session identifier includes resource paths corresponding to at least one minimum resource granularity. For example, the data server can determine whether the resource path of the target resource belongs to the target resource set, thereby determining whether the access terminal has permission to access the target resource.

[0098] In one possible implementation, in order to facilitate the allocation of access rights to the access terminal, in this application, the data service terminal may predetermine different resource sets, and any resource set contains at least one minimum-granularity resource. The minimum-granularity resource refers to the smallest accessible unit resource. For example, in a database system, a table may be a minimum-granularity resource; in a file system, a file or directory may be a minimum-granularity resource. These minimum-granularity resources are the basic units for permission allocation because access control to them is the most fine-grained. The data service terminal can subsequently quickly open permissions for one or more minimum-granularity resources to the access terminal by allocating a certain resource set to the access terminal.

[0099] When determining a resource collection, the data service can identify the resource services it supports, such as database services, file services, and API interfaces. For each resource service, the data service determines the resource types it includes, such as tables, files, and interfaces. The minimum resource granularity corresponding to each resource type is then determined. This minimum resource granularity refers to the smallest unit of resource that can be individually assigned permissions under that resource type. For example, for a web service, the minimum resource granularity can be broken down to each access request; for a file service, the minimum resource granularity can be broken down to each file; for a data service, the minimum resource granularity can be broken down to each data record, or even to the granularity of data elements and metadata. Based on the minimum resource granularity corresponding to each resource type, the resources included in the resource service are divided into minimum-granularity resources. Next, the data service groups the divided minimum-granularity resources according to preset grouping conditions (i.e., preset grouping rules) to form different resource collections. Each resource collection contains at least one minimum-granularity resource, and these minimum-granularity resources typically share some logical connection or common characteristics. The data server can subsequently authorize the access client by assigning a resource set to the access client. For example, the data server predetermines unique resource identifiers for different resource sets and assigns these resource identifiers to the access client, thereby assigning the resource set corresponding to each resource identifier to the access client. The resource identifiers corresponding to different resource sets are different.

[0100] The preset grouping rules can be based on a variety of factors, including but not limited to the resource type, purpose, department, security level, etc. In particular, these grouping rules can also include attributes of the access points allowed to access the resource collection, such as user role, permission level, etc., to ensure that only access points that meet specific conditions are assigned permission to access the resource collection.

[0101] It should be noted that the verification factor set may include one or more of the above. If the verification factor set only includes one of the above methods, that is, it only includes the necessary submission factor set, or only includes the necessary detection factor set, or only includes the target resource set, then the data service end determines that the attribute value of any element in the subset does not meet the corresponding verification condition, and then determines that the access end has not passed the verification of the verification factor set. If the verification factor set includes multiple methods mentioned above, that is, it includes the necessary submission factor set and the necessary detection factor set, or includes the necessary detection factor set and the target resource set, or includes the necessary submission factor set and the target resource set, or includes the necessary submission factor set, the necessary detection factor set and the target resource set, then the data service end determines that the attribute value of any element in the verification factor set does not meet the corresponding verification condition, and then determines that the access end has not passed the verification of the verification factor set.

[0102] Example 3:

[0103] In order to strictly control the access rights of the access terminal, based on the above embodiments, in this application, the data service terminal notifies the access terminal of the verification basic data through an access authorization response, including:

[0104] Receive and decrypt the encrypted access request sent by the access terminal; wherein the access request carries the user context obtained by the access terminal and the access terminal true random number;

[0105] Verifying the legitimacy of the user context;

[0106] If it is determined that the user context is legitimate, generating a server-side true random number, the target session identifier, and an authorization context for the access terminal; wherein the authorization context includes the necessary submission elements;

[0107] Generate an irreducible polynomial based on the server-side true random number;

[0108] The generated access authorization response is returned to the access end; wherein the access authorization response carries the target session identifier, the irreducible polynomial, and the necessary submission elements.

[0109] In this application, before accessing a specific resource for the first time, the access client sends an encrypted access request to the data server. This access request contains the user context currently obtained by the access client and a true random number generated by the access client. After receiving this encrypted access request, the data server uses the corresponding decryption algorithm to decrypt it to obtain the specific content of the request.

[0110] It should be noted that the encryption and decryption methods of the access application request by the access end and the data service end are similar to the encryption and decryption methods of the access request by the access end and the data service end in the above embodiment. Please refer to the above embodiment for details and will not be described in detail here.

[0111] After receiving the access request, the data server can parse and process it, extracting the user context and the access client's true random number contained in the request. It then verifies the legitimacy of the user context. For example, this includes checking whether the access client's identity is valid and whether the access client has access rights.

[0112] Once the user context is determined to be legitimate, the data server authorizes the client to access the resource and generates a server-side true random number, a target session identifier, and an authorization context for the client. The authorization context includes the necessary submission elements that the client must submit each time it subsequently accesses the resource.

[0113] In one possible implementation, the data service end may allocate a pre-configured resource set to the access end based on the user context, thereby authorizing the access end to access resources. The resource set includes at least one minimum granularity resource. For example, for different pre-configured resource sets, whether to allocate the resource set to the access end is determined based on whether the user context meets the allocation conditions corresponding to the resource set. The allocation conditions can be set based on multiple factors such as user identity, role, time, and geographic location to ensure the accuracy and rationality of the authority allocation. Specifically, if the user context meets the allocation conditions corresponding to the resource set, the resource set corresponding to the resource set is saved in the session context corresponding to the access end. If the user context does not meet the allocation conditions corresponding to the resource set, the next resource set is obtained until the end.

[0114] After obtaining the server-side true random number based on the above embodiment, the data server can generate an irreducible polynomial based on the server-side true random number. For example, based on the server-side true random number U e Generates an irreducible polynomial P(x) of order n over GF(2).

[0115] After obtaining the irreducible polynomial, the data server can generate an access authorization response based on the target session identifier, the irreducible polynomial, and the required submission elements. After generating the access authorization response, the data server can return it to the access client. Upon receiving this access authorization response, the access client can use the information contained in the access authorization response to obtain the target session identifier, irreducible polynomial, and the required submission elements required for each subsequent resource access.

[0116] At the same time, the data service end may store the target session identifier in correspondence with the session context of the access end, so as to subsequently verify the access request of the access end based on the session context corresponding to the target session identifier.

[0117] In one embodiment, to ensure the security of the irreducible polynomial during network transmission, in this application, the data service end can encrypt the irreducible polynomial based on the access end's true random number to obtain a response true random number. It then generates an access authorization response containing the target session identifier, the response true random number, and the necessary submission elements. The access end can then extract the target session identifier, the response true random number, and the necessary submission elements from the access authorization response and decrypt the response true random number based on the stored access end true random number to obtain the irreducible polynomial.

[0118] In a possible implementation, when the data service end returns the generated access authorization response to the access end, the data service end may also use an encrypted transmission method to return the access authorization response to the access end.

[0119] Example 4:

[0120] The following describes the zero-trust secure access method provided by this application through specific embodiments. Figure 2 The specific zero-trust security access process diagram provided in the embodiment of this application mainly includes three stages: data server preprocessing stage, authorization stage, and access stage. Each stage is introduced below:

[0121] Phase 1: Data server preprocessing phase.

[0122] S301: The data server determines different resource sets, the resource set AIDs corresponding to different resource sets, and the allocation conditions, and determines the necessary submission element set and the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the necessary submission element set, and the necessary detection element set and the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the necessary detection element set.

[0123] In one possible implementation, the necessary submission elements include but are not limited to at least one of the following: user identity information, user password, user role information, user biometric information, access point location information, access point device information, and access point network information.

[0124] In a possible implementation, the necessary detection elements include but are not limited to at least one of the following: access flow information, access time information, and access number information.

[0125] In one possible implementation, the data server determines the resource set in the following manner:

[0126] For any resource service supported by the data server, determine the resource types included in the resource service; determine the minimum resource granularity corresponding to each resource type; and divide the resources included in the resource service into minimum granularity resources according to the minimum resource granularity corresponding to each resource type;

[0127] According to each preset grouping condition, each minimum granularity resource is grouped to obtain different resource sets; wherein any preset grouping rule includes the attributes of the access terminal that is allowed to access the resource set.

[0128] Phase 1 is the pre-configuration policy phase of the data server. After the steps of Phase 1 are completed, Phase 2 can be entered, that is, the data server authorizes the access client to access resources.

[0129] Phase 2: Authorization phase.

[0130] S302: The access terminal obtains the user context UCtx and generates a true random number U S .

[0131] S303: The access end calculates the user context UCtx and the access end true random number U S , construct an access application request.

[0132] S304: The access end encrypts the access application request and sends it to the data service end through the global quantum security network.

[0133] S305: The data server decrypts the received encrypted access request to obtain the user context UCtx and the access terminal true random number U carried in the access request. S .

[0134] S306: The data server verifies the validity of the user context UCtx. If it is determined that the user context UCtx passes the validity check, S307 is executed. Otherwise, the access application request is rejected.

[0135] S307: The data server allocates a corresponding target resource set to the user terminal according to the allocation conditions corresponding to each resource set and the user context UCtx.

[0136] S308: The data server generates an authorization context AuCtx based on the resource set AID corresponding to the target resource set, the necessary submission element set and the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the necessary submission element set, the necessary detection element set and the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the necessary detection element set.

[0137] S309: The data server assigns a target session identifier SID and a server-side true random number U to the access client.e .

[0138] S310: The data server uses the true random number U e , generating an irreducible polynomial P(x).

[0139] S311: The data server stores the target session identifier SID in correspondence with the session context SCtx of the access terminal, wherein the session context SCtx includes the authorization context AuCtx, the user context UCtx, the irreducible polynomial P(x), and the access terminal true random number U S .

[0140] S312: The data server uses the real random number U of the access terminal to S Encrypt the irreducible polynomial P(x) to obtain the response true random number P e .

[0141] For example, the data server is based on the true random number U of the access terminal S Encrypt the irreducible polynomial P(x) to obtain the response true random number P e It is expressed by the following formula:

[0142] P e =U S ⊕Pr

[0143] S313: The data server responds to the true random number P e , target session identifier SID and necessary submission elements A C , generating an access authorization response.

[0144] S314: The data server encrypts the access authorization response and sends it to the access client through the global quantum security network.

[0145] S315: The access terminal decrypts the received encrypted access authorization response to obtain the response true random number P carried in the access authorization response. e , target session identifier SID and necessary submission elements A C .

[0146] S316: The access terminal uses the stored access terminal true random number U S The true random number P in response to this e Decryption is performed to obtain the irreducible polynomial P(x)′.

[0147] S317: The access terminal saves the verification basic data, which includes the access terminal true random number U S , irreducible polynomial P(x)′, target session identifier SID and necessary submission elements A C .

[0148] Based on the above embodiment, after the access end obtains the authorization of the data service end, it can initiate an access request to the data service end for a specific resource, that is, enter the third stage.

[0149] Phase 3: Visit phase.

[0150] For each access request from the access client, the following steps are performed:

[0151] S318: The access terminal obtains pre-saved basic verification data required for accessing the target resource.

[0152] S319: The access terminal submits the necessary elements A according to the current state C The first attribute value of the user context UCtx is updated to obtain the first user context instance UCtx1.

[0153] S320: The access end connects the first user context instance UCtx1 and the resource path P of the target resource c Perform splicing to determine the first resource permission identifier RID1.

[0154] S321: The access end uses the access end true random number U S and the irreducible polynomial P(x)′, determine the first Toplitz matrix T1.

[0155] S322: The access end performs a hash calculation on the first resource permission identifier RID1 using the first Toplitz matrix T1 to obtain a first hash value H1.

[0156] S323: The access end uses the resource path P c , the first hash value H1, the target session identifier SID and the necessary submission elements A C The first attribute value of generates an access request.

[0157] S324: The access end encrypts the access request and sends it to the data service end through the global quantum security network.

[0158] S325: The data server decrypts the received encrypted access request to obtain the resource path P carried in the access request. c , the first hash value H1, the target session identifier SID and the necessary submission elements A C The first attribute value of .

[0159] S326: The data server obtains the session context SCtx corresponding to the target session identifier SID.

[0160] S327: The data server obtains the necessary detection element set and the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the necessary detection element set from the authorization context AuCtx, detects the attribute value of each necessary detection element in the necessary detection element set, and determines for each necessary detection element whether the attribute value of the necessary detection element meets the verification condition corresponding to the necessary detection element.

[0161] S328: When the data service end determines that the attribute values ​​of each necessary detection element meet the corresponding verification conditions, it obtains the verification conditions corresponding to each element in the necessary submission element set from the authorization context AuCtx, and determines for each necessary submission element whether the attribute value of the necessary submission element meets the verification condition corresponding to the necessary submission element.

[0162] S329: When the data server determines that the attribute values ​​of each necessary submission element meet the corresponding verification conditions, it determines the resource path P c Whether it belongs to the target resource collection corresponding to the resource collection AID.

[0163] S330: The data server determines the resource path P c In the case of the target resource set corresponding to the resource set AID, the element A is submitted according to each necessary C The first attribute value of the user context UCtx′ is used to update the attribute value of the corresponding element in the saved user context UCtx′ to obtain a second user context instance UCtx2.

[0164] S331: The data server sends the second user context instance UCtx2 and the resource path P of the target resource to the data server. c Perform splicing to determine the second resource permission identifier RID2.

[0165] S332: The data server generates a random number U from the access terminal according to the stored random number U. S ' and the irreducible polynomial P(x), determine the second Toplitz matrix T2.

[0166] S333: The data server performs a hash calculation on the second resource permission identifier RID2 using the second Toplitz matrix T2 to obtain a second hash value H2.

[0167] S334: The data server determines whether the second hash value H2 is consistent with the first hash value H1. If so, execute S335; otherwise, execute S336.

[0168] S335: The data server allows the access client to access the target resource.

[0169] S336: The data server denies the access client access to the target resource.

[0170] By verifying the access end through the above method, it can be ensured that the access end identity is legal, the access resource scope is compliant, the access end environment and the data end environment are secure, and it is determined that the access request is a real, legal, compliant and meets the conditions. The core principle of zero trust "never trust, always verify" is achieved, and the principle of least privilege, precise access and comprehensive auditing are also achieved. It is highly adaptable, easy to audit, and continuously updated, making it a reliable and trustworthy zero trust security access system.

[0171] Example 5:

[0172] Based on the same principle as above, this application also provides a zero-trust security access system. Figure 3 A structural diagram of a zero-trust secure access system provided in an embodiment of the present application is provided, wherein the system includes an access terminal 31 and a data access terminal 32 as described in any of the methods in the above embodiments.

[0173] Since the principle of solving the problem by the above-mentioned zero-trust security access system is similar to that of the zero-trust security access method, the implementation of the above-mentioned zero-trust security access system can refer to the embodiment of the method, and the repeated parts will not be repeated.

[0174] Obviously, those skilled in the art may make various changes and modifications to this application without departing from the spirit and scope of this application. Thus, if these modifications and variations of this application fall within the scope of the claims of this application and their equivalents, this application is intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A zero-trust secure access method, characterized in that: The method comprises: S1: The access end initiates an access request to the data server, including: Acquire pre-saved basic verification data required for accessing the target resource; wherein the basic verification data includes: a true random number of the access end, each necessary submission element, a target session identifier, and an irreducible polynomial; According to the first attribute value of each necessary submission element in the current state, the attribute value of the corresponding element in the saved user context is updated to obtain a first user context instance; Determine a first resource permission identifier according to the first user context instance and the resource path of the target resource; Determine a first Toplitz matrix according to the access end true random number and the irreducible polynomial; Performing hash calculation on the first resource permission identifier through the first Toplitz matrix to obtain a first hash value; Sending the generated access request to the data server; wherein the access request carries the resource path, the target session identifier, the first hash value, and the first attribute value of each necessary submission element; S2: The data server verifies the received access request, including: Obtaining a session context corresponding to the target session identifier stored by the data server; wherein the session context includes a user context, an irreducible polynomial, and a true random number of the access terminal; According to the first attribute value of each necessary submission element, the attribute value of the corresponding element in the user context is updated to obtain a second user context instance; Determine a second resource permission identifier according to the second user context instance and the resource path; Determine a second Toplitz matrix according to the access end true random number and the irreducible polynomial; Performing hash calculation on the second resource permission identifier by using the second Toplitz matrix to obtain a second hash value; If the second hash value is consistent with the first hash value, allowing the access end to access the target resource; If the second hash value is inconsistent with the first hash value, the access end is denied access to the target resource.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that If the session context further includes a verification element set and verification conditions corresponding to each element in the verification element set, after the data server obtains the session context, before updating the attribute value of the corresponding element in the user context according to the first attribute value of each necessary submission element to obtain the second user context instance, the method further includes: Obtaining the attribute value of each element in the verification element set; For each of the elements, it is determined whether the attribute value of the element satisfies the verification condition corresponding to the element.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The verification element set includes one or more of the following: a necessary submission element set, a necessary detection element set, and a target resource set corresponding to the target session identifier; wherein the necessary submission element set includes necessary submission elements that the access terminal allowed to access needs to submit, the detection element set includes necessary detection elements that the access terminal allowed to access should be detected by the data service terminal, and the target resource set contains resource paths corresponding to at least one minimum resource granularity.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The necessary detection elements include but are not limited to at least one of the following: access flow information, access time information, and access number information.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The data server determines the resource set in the following manner: For any resource service supported by the data service end, determine the resource types included in the resource service; determine the minimum resource granularity corresponding to each resource type; and divide the resources included in the resource service into minimum granularity resources according to the minimum resource granularity corresponding to each resource type; According to each preset grouping condition, each of the minimum granularity resources is grouped to obtain the different resource sets; wherein any preset grouping rule includes the attributes of the access terminal that is allowed to access the resource set.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The data service end notifies the access end of the verification basic data through an access authorization response, including: Receive and decrypt the access application request sent encrypted by the access end; wherein the access application request carries the user context obtained by the access end and the access end true random number; Verifying the legitimacy of the user context; If it is determined that the user context is legitimate, generating a server true random number, the target session identifier and an authorization context for the access end; wherein the authorization context includes the necessary submission elements; Based on the server-side true random number, generate an irreducible polynomial; The generated access authorization response is returned to the access end; wherein the access authorization response carries the target session identifier, the irreducible polynomial, and the necessary submission elements.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The data server generates the access authorization response, including: Based on the access terminal true random number, encrypt the irreducible polynomial to obtain a response true random number; The access authorization response is generated according to the target session identifier, the response true random number, and the necessary submission elements.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The access end obtains the irreducible polynomial based on the access authorization response sent by the data service end, including: Based on the saved access terminal true random number, the response true random number in the access authorization response is decrypted to obtain the irreducible polynomial.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The user context includes but is not limited to at least one of the following elements: user identity information, user password, user role information, user biometric information, access point location information, access point device information, and access point network information.

10. A zero-trust security access system, characterized in that: The system includes an access terminal and a data service terminal as described in any method of claims 1-9.

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