Key management method and system
By adopting key distribution and revocation schemes in wireless sensor networks, using paired keys, session keys, encryption keys and message authentication keys, the authentication and security between sensor nodes and base stations in a multi-base station environment is solved. Issue, ensuring network security is not affected by individual node corruption.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411403561.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-10-09
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-10-09
AI Technical Summary
The existing wireless sensor network key management protocol cannot effectively deal with the authentication and security issues between sensor nodes and base stations in multiple base station environments, and once the base station is captured or destroyed, the security of the entire network will be affected.
A key management method is adopted, including a key distribution scheme and a key revocation scheme, to ensure authentication and communication between sensor nodes and base stations through paired keys, session keys, encryption keys and message authentication keys. Security, and effectively delete damaged nodes through node revocation list and polynomial sharing mechanism when the base station or sensor node is damaged.
Identity authentication between the base station and the sensor node is realized, ensuring that any base station or sensor node is captured or destroyed does not affect the security of the entire sensor network, and improving the security and performance of the network.
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Figure CN119012189A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of key management, and particularly to a key management method and system. Background Art
[0002] Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) can be applied to many fields and is a promising solution. Security is the main problem faced by WSN currently. Among all security issues of WSN, key management is the most important and is the core mechanism to ensure network service security.
[0003] Currently, when people study the security issues of WSN, they usually only consider the case where there is only one base station in the network. However, with the increase of sensor nodes deployed in the network, one base station cannot well guarantee the network service quality. Therefore, deploying multiple base stations in the sensor network is a good solution, which can reduce the distance between sensor nodes and base stations, reduce the energy consumption of sensor nodes, and improve the performance of the sensor network.
[0004] The following problems exist in the prior art: Existing key management protocols for WSN all assume that the base station is trusted, assume that each sensor node pre-loads the master key, which is shared by all nodes in the sensor network, and loads the pairwise keys shared with the base station. When considering the security of WSN with multiple base stations, the currently proposed key management protocols cannot be directly used. Assuming that all base stations use the same master key or the same pairwise keys, several problems will occur. First, the base station can verify messages from sensor nodes, but sensor nodes cannot verify messages from the base station. Second, once a base station is captured or compromised, the master key and pairwise keys of the entire WSN will be exposed, and any attacker with this key set can access the network. Summary of the Invention
[0005] The present invention provides a key management method and system to solve the problems mentioned in the above background art.
[0006] To solve the above technical problems, the technical solutions adopted by the present invention are: A key management method includes a key distribution scheme and a key revocation scheme. The wireless sensor network consists of at most M base stations and N sensors, where the number of base stations is much less than the number of sensors. Each sensor node has at least γ and γ < m base stations within single-hop reach. Each base station or sensor node in the network is assigned a globally unique digital identifier. The key distribution scheme includes the following: A1: Pairwise keys and single keys; A2: Session key; A3: encryption key and message authentication key; The key revocation scheme includes the following: B1: the base station is damaged, the sensor node is damaged, and both the base station and the sensor node are damaged; B2: Assume that each sensor maintains a list: Node Revocation List (NRL), which includes the identifiers of all failed entities (base stations or sensor nodes) in the network; B3: The revocation list is initially empty and will continue to grow over time.
[0007] Preferably, the pairwise key and the single key: before deploying the sensor node, the configuration server randomly generates a binary t-order polynomial , in a finite field On, where q is a prime number, satisfying ; For sensor i, the configuration server calculates f(x, y) to obtain f(i, y), and loads the univariate polynomial f(i, y) to sensor i; for any two sensor nodes i and j, node i can calculate the shared key with node j as f(i, j) through the univariate polynomial f(i, y); similarly, node j can calculate the shared key with node i as f(j, i) through the univariate polynomial f(j, y). Since f(i, j) = f(j, i), a pairwise key is shared between nodes i and j.
[0008] Preferably, the session key: The session key is a global key shared by all nodes in the network. First, assuming that each base station shares a group key, the session key can be derived from the group key and dynamically distributed to each sensor node; assuming that the group key is , the session key for the ith session Pseudo-random function Export: .
[0009] Preferably, the is the session key of the current i-th session. The session key distribution process is described as follows: A21: Secret sharing allocation: In the pre-allocation phase, the configuration server randomly selects an m 2t-order polynomial , in a finite field On each sensor All pre-loaded with personal secrets , each base station Preload polynomials ; A22: Different shared broadcasts: Given a set of revoked sensor nodes , base station Randomly select a polynomial of order t and , then the base station will and Shared with unrevokated sensors; A23: Session Key Recovery: If any sensor node has not been revoked Receiving such a broadcast message, it calculates the polynomial and ,get , Since the sensor nodes Know and , so we can calculate , ,at last, A new session key can be obtained For the revoked sensor nodes, due to , therefore, the session key cannot be recovered.
[0010] Preferably, the encryption key and message authentication key: Assume is the pairwise key shared between sensor A and sensor B, is the current session key, then the encryption key and message authentication key It can be obtained by the following formula: , The complete message sent by sensor A to sensor B is: , Message M and timestamp By encryption key Encrypted and then attached by the message authentication key Ciphertext After receiving the complete message, sensor B first uses the message authentication key generated by itself to Ciphertext Perform integrity authentication. After authentication, use the generated encryption key Ciphertext Decrypt and get the message M.
[0011] A key management system. When a base station is damaged, it needs to be deleted from the network: because the security of communication is guaranteed by encryption keys and message authentication keys, and both encryption keys and message authentication keys are generated by session keys, if the damaged base station cannot generate the next session key, it will be deleted from the network; for this reason, the damaged base station will be forced to leave the group and generate a new group key, and then generate a new session key from the new group key.
[0012] Preferably, if a sensor node is found to be compromised, the compromised sensor can be deleted using a session key distribution scheme: for a compromised sensor node, its identifier will be added to the revocation list NRL; the revoked sensor cannot recover a new session key because .
[0013] Preferably, once the base station and the sensor nodes are destroyed, the base station needs to be revoked first, and then the sensor nodes.
[0014] Due to the adoption of the above technical solution, the present invention has the following technical advances compared with the prior art: 1. The present invention provides a key management method and system, where a base station and a sensor node can verify each other's identity information; 2. The present invention provides a key management method and system, and the capture or destruction of any base station does not affect the security of the entire sensor network; 3. The present invention provides a key management method and system, and any sensor node being captured or destroyed does not affect the security of the sensor network; 4. The present invention provides a key management method and system, and the capture or destruction of a base station and a sensor node does not affect the security of the sensor network. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0015] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the key distribution scheme of the present invention; Figure 2 It is a flow chart of the key revocation scheme of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a session key flow chart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0016] In order to make the technical means, creative features, objectives and effects achieved by the present invention easy to understand, the present invention is further explained below in conjunction with specific implementation methods.
[0017] like Figure 1-Figure 3As shown in the figure, a key management method includes a key distribution scheme and a key revocation scheme. A wireless sensor network consists of at most M base stations and N sensors, where the number of base stations is much less than the number of sensors. Each sensor node is within single-hop reach of at least γ base stations and γ < M. Each base station or sensor node in the network is assigned a globally unique digital identifier; Each sensor node generates five types of keys: pairwise keys, individual keys, session keys, encryption keys, and message authentication (MAC) keys.
[0018] Pairwise keys: Each sensor node shares a pairwise key with each of its neighbor nodes, and uses the pairwise key to generate encryption keys and MAC keys.
[0019] Individual keys: Each node shares a unique individual key with the base station, and the individual key is used for the base station to authenticate a single sensor node.
[0020] Session keys: These are global keys shared by all nodes in the network and are used for the key revocation scheme.
[0021] Encryption keys and message authentication code keys: The encryption keys and MAC keys are used to ensure the security of communications in the sensor network. The encryption keys and MAC keys can be derived from the pairwise keys and session keys; The key distribution scheme includes the following: A1: Pairwise keys and individual keys; A2: Session keys; A3: Encryption keys and message authentication keys; The key revocation scheme includes the following: B1: The base station is damaged, the sensor node is damaged, and both the base station and the sensor node are damaged; B2: Assume that each sensor maintains a list: the node revocation list (NRL), and the NRL includes the identifiers of all invalid entities (base stations or sensor nodes) in the network; B3: The revocation list is initially empty and will increase over time.
[0022] As Figure 1-Figure 3 shown, the pairwise keys and individual keys: Before deploying the sensor nodes, the configuration server randomly generates a binary polynomial of degree t , over the finite field , where q is a prime number and satisfies ; For sensor i, the configuration server calculates f(x, y) to get f(i, y), and loads the univariate polynomial f(i, y) to sensor i; For any two sensor nodes i and j, node i can calculate the shared key with node j as f(i, j) through the univariate polynomial f(i, y); Similarly, node j can calculate the shared key with node i as f(j, i) through the univariate polynomial f(j, y). Since f(i, j) = f(j, i), nodes i and j share a pairwise key; The generation of a single key is similar to that of a pairwise key. Before base station j is deployed, the configuration server loads the univariate polynomial f(j, y) to base station j. The base station and the sensor node can calculate the same single key by exchanging their respective identifiers.
[0023] like Figure 1-Figure 3 As shown, the session key: The session key is a global key shared by all nodes in the network. First, assume that each base station shares a group key. The session key can be derived from the group key and dynamically distributed to each sensor node; assume that the group key is , the session key for the ith session Pseudo-random function Export: .
[0024] like Figure 1-Figure 3 As shown, is the session key of the current i-th session. The session key distribution process is described as follows: A21: Secret sharing allocation: In the pre-allocation phase, the configuration server randomly selects an m 2t-order polynomial , in a finite field On each sensor All pre-loaded with personal secrets , each base station Preload polynomials ; A22: Different shared broadcasts: Given a set of revoked sensor nodes , base station Randomly select a polynomial of order t and , then the base station will and Shared with unrevoked sensors; the message format is as follows: , The cancellation polynomial .
[0025] A23: Session Key Recovery: If any sensor node has not been revoked Receives such a broadcast message, and it calculates the polynomial and , obtaining , . Since the sensor node knows and , it can then calculate , . Finally, can obtain the new session key . For the revoked sensor node, since , therefore, the session key cannot be recovered; Since each sensor node is at least γ-hop reachable from γ and γ < m base stations, an unrevoked sensor node can recover multiple copies of the session key. Only when the node obtains at least γ copies of the session key can the session key be accepted.
[0026] As Figure 1-Figure 3 shown, the encryption key and the message authentication key: Assume that is the pairwise key shared between sensor A and sensor B, is the current session key, then the encryption key and the message authentication key can be obtained through the following formulas: , The complete information sent by sensor A to sensor B is: , The message M and the timestamp are encrypted by the encryption key , and then the message authentication code formed by the message authentication key for the ciphertext is attached; After receiving the complete message, sensor B first uses the message authentication key generated by itself to perform integrity authentication on the ciphertext . After the authentication passes, it then uses the generated encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the message M.
[0027] As Figure 1-Figure 3As shown, a key management system is shown. When a base station is damaged, the base station needs to be deleted from the network: because the security of communication is guaranteed by encryption keys and message authentication keys, and both encryption keys and message authentication keys are generated by session keys, if the damaged base station cannot generate the next session key, it will be deleted from the network; for this reason, the damaged base station will be forced to leave the group and generate a new group key, and then generate a new session key by the new group key. Because a sensor node can only accept the session key if it obtains at least γ copies of the session key, the attacker must control γ base stations at the same time to launch an attack.
[0028] If a sensor node is found to be compromised, the compromised sensor can be removed using the session key distribution scheme: for a compromised sensor node, its identifier will be added to the revocation list NRL; the revoked sensor cannot recover a new session key because ,Therefore, the revoked sensor is also unable to generate new encryption keys and ,message authentication keys., Although the revoked sensor still has pairwise keys with ,neighboring nodes, it cannot decrypt and authenticate all messages in the network.
[0029] Once the base station and sensor nodes are destroyed, the base station needs to be revoked first, and then the sensor nodes. The detailed steps are the same as described above.
[0030] A key distribution scheme to support multiple base stations in the network; a key revocation scheme to effectively remove compromised nodes in the network.
[0031] The above shows and describes the basic principles and main features of the present invention and the advantages of the present invention. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. The above embodiments and descriptions are only for explaining the principles of the present invention. Without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, the present invention may have various changes and improvements, which fall within the scope of the present invention to be protected. The scope of protection of the present invention is defined by the attached claims and their equivalents.
Claims
1. A key management method, including a key distribution scheme and a key revocation scheme, characterized in that: The wireless sensor network consists of at most M base stations and N sensors, where the number of base stations is much less than the number of sensors. Each sensor node is within single-hop reach of at least γ < m base stations. Each base station or sensor node in the network is assigned a globally unique digital identifier; The key distribution scheme includes the following: A1: Pairwise keys and individual keys; A2: Session keys; A3: Encryption keys and message authentication keys; The key revocation scheme includes the following: B1: Base station compromised, sensor node compromised, and both base station and sensor node compromised; B2: Assume that each sensor maintains a list: Node Revocation List (NRL), and the NRL includes the identifiers of all expired entities in the network; B3: The revocation list is initially empty and will increase over time.
2. A key management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The pairwise key and the single key: Before deploying the sensor node, the configuration server randomly generates a binary t-order polynomial, , in a finite field On, where q is a prime number, satisfying ; For sensor i, the configuration server calculates f(x, y) to obtain f(i, y), and loads the univariate polynomial f(i, y) to sensor i; for any two sensor nodes i and j, node i can calculate the shared key with node j as f(i, j) through the univariate polynomial f(i, y); similarly, node j can calculate the shared key with node i as f(j, i) through the univariate polynomial f(j, y). Since f(i, j) = f(j, i), a pairwise key is shared between nodes i and j.
3. A key management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The session key is a global key shared by all nodes in the network. First, assume that each base station shares a group key. The session key can be derived from the group key and dynamically distributed to each sensor node. Assume that the group key is , the session key for the ith session Pseudo-random function Export: .
4. A key management method according to claim 3, characterized in that: Said is the session key of the current i-th session. The session key distribution process is described as follows: A21: Secret sharing allocation: In the pre-allocation phase, the configuration server randomly selects m and 2t order polynomials , in a finite field On each sensor All pre-loaded with personal secrets , each base station Preload polynomials ; A22: Different shared broadcasts: Given a set of revoked sensor nodes , base station Randomly select a polynomial of order t and , then the base station will and Shared with unrevokated sensors; A23: Session Key Recovery: If any sensor node has not been revoked Receiving such a broadcast message, it calculates the polynomial and ,get , Since the sensor nodes Know and , so we can calculate , ,at last, A new session key can be obtained For the revoked sensor nodes, due to , therefore, the session key cannot be recovered.
5. A key management method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The encryption key and message authentication key are assumed to be: is the pairwise key shared between sensor A and sensor B, is the current session key, then the encryption key and message authentication key It can be obtained by the following formula: , The complete information sent from sensor A to sensor B is: , Message M and timestamp By encryption key Encrypted and then attached by the message authentication key Ciphertext After receiving the complete message, sensor B first uses the message authentication key generated by itself to Ciphertext Perform integrity authentication. After authentication, use the generated encryption key Ciphertext Decrypt and get the message M.
6. A key management system, implemented based on a key management method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: When the base station is compromised, the base station needs to be removed from the network: Since the security of communication is guaranteed by encryption keys and message authentication keys, and both encryption keys and message authentication keys are generated from session keys, if the compromised base station cannot generate the next session key, it will be removed from the network; To this end, the compromised base station will be forced to leave the group and generate a new group key, and then a new session key will be generated from the new group key.
7. A key management method according to claim 6, characterized in that: If a sensor node is found to be compromised, the compromised sensor can be removed using the session key distribution scheme: for a compromised sensor node, its identifier will be added to the revocation list NRL; the revoked sensor cannot recover a new session key because .
8. A key management method according to claim 7, characterized in that: Once the base station and sensor node are compromised, the base station needs to be revoked first, and then the sensor node.
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