Anti-SSDF attack communication method and system in CSS with unknown signal-to-noise ratio

By using a weighted SEM algorithm in wireless communication to estimate the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio and dynamically adjust the weights of secondary users, the problem of malicious user attacks under unknown signal-to-noise ratios is solved, improving the accuracy of spectrum sensing and the system's anti-interference capability.

CN119277387APending Publication Date: 2025-01-07CHANGAN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411576686.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-11-06
Publication Date
2025-01-07

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In wireless communication, existing technologies are unable to effectively deal with spectrum sensing data tampering (SSDF) attacks under unknown signal-to-noise ratio conditions, especially in multi-node cooperative spectrum sensing systems, where attacks by malicious users lead to a decline in system performance.

Method used

By employing a weighted SEM algorithm, which estimates the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and combines local energy detection and historical energy values, the collaborative weights of secondary users are dynamically adjusted to identify and process attack reports from malicious users. This proposes a communication method to resist SSDF attacks under unknown SNR conditions.

Benefits of technology

It improves the accuracy of spectrum sensing and the robustness of the system, effectively identifies and suppresses various malicious attacks, enhances the system's anti-interference capability, and maintains good sensing performance, especially under unknown signal-to-noise ratio conditions.

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Abstract

The invention discloses an anti-SSDF attack communication method and system in an unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, and belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and the method comprises the following steps: based on local spectrum sensing, judging whether a PU is used or not according to an energy estimation value ej of a secondary user by monitoring a specified frequency band; according to an energy value of local energy detection, obtaining a probability density function of energy vectors of the secondary user and the malicious user; the SNR in the probability density function is estimated through an SEM algorithm, judgment is carried out according to the weight, and secondary users and malicious users are distinguished; secondary users directly participate in the CSS, malicious users are deleted from the CSS, and safe communication is achieved; the SEM algorithm is used for estimating the instantaneous SNR, not only is the current energy value considered, but also the historical energy is considered, different step lengths are distributed for different energy observation values, and the estimation of the SNR is improved; for malicious user processing, local perception and global decision of each secondary user are calculated, normal secondary users and malicious users are identified, and attack strategies of the normal secondary users and the malicious users are determined.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communications, and in particular relates to a communication method and system for resisting SSDF attacks in an unknown signal-to-noise ratio (CSS). Background Art

[0002] In the context of the rapid development of today's society, science and technology have become the core force leading the way forward, and wireless mobile communication technology has injected new vitality into scientific and technological progress. However, with the surge in the number of wireless devices, the shortage of available radio spectrum resources has become increasingly prominent. Radio spectrum is a precious and limited resource. It is defined as the frequency range used by modern communication technology to transmit data and plays a vital role in information transmission in the radio environment. In order to meet these diverse service needs, spectrum resources must be allocated and managed more efficiently and accurately. As an effective solution to the problems of scarce spectrum resources and low utilization, cognitive radio (CR) technology has been widely recognized. This technology allows the opportunistic use of frequency bands that are heavily utilized by unlicensed users, thereby improving the overall utilization of the radio spectrum.

[0003] Spectrum sensing, as the primary and core part of CR, has been widely studied. According to the number of nodes, it is divided into single-node spectrum sensing and multi-node cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS). Multi-node CSS effectively solves the problem of inaccurate single-node perception by fusing the information perceived by multiple secondary users (SUs), thereby improving the overall perception accuracy. However, in an open wireless environment, multiple SUs are allowed to access the spectrum, which poses a serious threat to CR. Spectrum sensing may be misled by malicious users (MUs) and is vulnerable to attacks, among which spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks are the most common and common attacks.

[0004] To solve this problem, more reliable CSS methods are needed to minimize the impact of attackers on the connected vehicle system. Most algorithms and studies assume that the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is known or fixed to the same constant, which only exists in ideal environments. In addition, in order to circumvent the instantaneous SNR estimation, a common method in some studies is to assume that the sensing channel with unknown parameters is a specific distribution. The soft fusion detector proposed based on this method is suitable for the assumed channel distribution. In a mobile environment, the local SNR changes between consecutive energy measurements. Accurately estimating the current SNR is the key to improving spectrum sensing. The weighted sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT) algorithm can assign a reputation value to each SU based on the consistency between its local sensing data and the integrated decision, which is then used as the weight of the SU in the data fusion process. This algorithm performs well in identifying MUs and enhancing system performance. However, a limitation of WSPRT is that it relies on prior probabilistic knowledge of local decision results, which is often difficult to obtain accurately in actual deployment. The maximum likelihood ratio detector is used to identify and eliminate MUs. If MUs are identified by the fusion center (FC), they will be immediately removed from the CSS and these MUs are denied participation in the CSS. However, some MUs can potentially report valuable sensing information to the FC, so the FC can utilize these MUs through specific strategies. Based on the above research, a secure spectrum sensing method that utilizes MUs when the SNR is unknown is still an unresolved problem. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to solve the problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a weighted SEM method for resisting SSDF attacks, solves the problems existing in the prior art, and proposes a new solution to improve the perception performance for the malicious user attack problem in the centralized CSS based on local energy measurement soft fusion. The instantaneous SNR is estimated by using the SEM algorithm. This method not only considers the current energy value, but also the historical energy, and assigns different step sizes to different energy observation values, thereby improving the estimation of SNR.

[0006] In order to achieve the above object, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a communication method for resisting SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, comprising the following steps: based on local spectrum sensing, by monitoring the designated frequency band according to the energy estimation value e of the secondary user j Determine whether PU is used;

[0007] According to the energy value of the local energy detection, the probability density function of the energy vector of the secondary user and the malicious user is obtained;

[0008] Use the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function, make decisions based on the weights, and distinguish between secondary users and malicious users;

[0009] Secondary users with high trust directly participate in CSS, and malicious users with low trust are deleted from CSS according to their attack types, thereby achieving secure communication.

[0010] Furthermore, based on local spectrum sensing, the energy estimation value of the secondary user is obtained by monitoring the designated frequency band. Specifically, based on local spectrum sensing, in each sensing period, all secondary users use energy detection methods to monitor the designated frequency band through sensing channels to obtain the energy estimation value of each secondary user. in, represents the noise power, M is the signal sample, z j (m) represents the signal received by the mth SU.

[0011] Further, estimating the probability density function of the energy vector of the normal secondary user and the malicious user according to the energy value obtained by the local energy detection includes: estimating the SNR in the probability density function by using the SEM algorithm,

[0012]

[0013] Among them, e n The energy finally sent to FC is the energy and vector of normal secondary users and malicious users. e is the entire energy detection value vector of the secondary user. g represents the SNR vector. n represents the SNR vector observed in sensing period n, η is the trust threshold, μ represents the learning rate, also known as the constant forgetting factor, Represents the current SNR vector g n , s represents the PU state, and E represents the conditional expectation.

[0014] Furthermore, based on the energy values ​​obtained by local energy detection, the probability density functions of energy vectors of normal secondary users and malicious users are estimated, including:

[0015] Energy value based on local energy detection The average signal-to-noise ratio between the jth secondary user and the primary user is obtained as Where P is the variance of y(m), h j represents the channel gain between the jth secondary user and the primary user. Let e ​​be the entire energy detection value vector of the secondary user, assuming that it is independent, then the probability density function of the energy detection value vector is:

[0016]

[0017] Among them, J represents the number of signals, g represents the SNR vector, H0 represents that the PU does not occupy the authorized spectrum, and H1 represents that the primary user is using the authorized spectrum. The probability density function of the energy vector of the normal secondary user and the malicious user is obtained:

[0018]

[0019] Where M represents the number of signal samples for estimated energy, Δ represents the attack strength, e' is the vector of the entire energy detection value of the malicious user, and s∈{0,1} represents the state of the primary user.

[0020] Further, estimating the SNR in the probability density function using the SEM algorithm includes:

[0021] Data collection: Collect spectrum data, including the energy values ​​of normal secondary users, malicious users, and other background noise signals;

[0022] Set initial values ​​for the mean and variance in the probability density function based on prior knowledge or data-driven methods;

[0023] Step E: Based on the current parameter estimation, the posterior probability of each data point belonging to the Gaussian distribution of normal secondary users and malicious users is calculated.

[0024] In the M step, the mixture weight, mean value and covariance matrix estimate of each Gaussian component are updated according to the calculated posterior probability;

[0025] Repeat the E step and the M step until the convergence condition is met or the maximum number of iterations is reached; and obtain the probability density function of the energy vectors of normal secondary users and malicious users.

[0026] Furthermore, the decision rule of the weighted SEM detector is:

[0027]

[0028] The collaboration weight of the jth secondary user is:

[0029]

[0030] Among them, γ0 represents the spectrum occupancy judgment value, c j represents the vehicle trustworthiness, c L Indicates the minimum trust, c H Indicates the highest level of trust.

[0031] Based on the above concept, the present invention can provide a communication system for resisting SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, including a perception module, a probability density function acquisition module, a judgment module and an execution module;

[0032] The sensing module is based on local spectrum sensing and monitors the energy estimation value of the secondary user by monitoring the specified frequency band. j Determine whether PU is used;

[0033] The probability density function acquisition module obtains the probability density function of the secondary user and malicious user energy vectors according to the energy value of the local energy detection;

[0034] The decision module uses the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function and makes decisions based on the weights to distinguish between secondary users and malicious users;

[0035] The execution module allows secondary users with high trust to directly participate in CSS, and deletes the reports of malicious users with low trust from CSS according to their attack types to achieve secure communication.

[0036] Furthermore, the present invention also provides a vehicle networking system for communication against SSDF attacks in an unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, characterized in that the communication method against SSDF attacks in an unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS is used for communication.

[0037] The present invention can also provide a computer device, including a processor and a memory, the memory is used to store a computer executable program, the processor reads the computer executable program from the memory and executes it, and when the processor executes the computer executable program, it can implement the anti-SSDF attack communication method in the unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS of the present invention.

[0038] At the same time, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, in which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the anti-SSDF attack communication method in the unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS of the present invention can be implemented.

[0039] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects: Different from the existing research on anti-SSDF attacks, it mainly targets the problem of malicious user attacks in centralized CSS based on local energy measurement soft fusion, and proposes a new solution to improve the perception performance. The SEM algorithm is used to estimate its instantaneous SNR. This method not only considers the current energy value, but also the historical energy, and assigns different step sizes to different energy observation values, thereby improving the estimation of SNR. For the processing of malicious users, three common attacks are estimated, and a weighted data fusion method is proposed. In each round of spectrum perception, the local perception of each secondary user is calculated with the global decision to identify normal secondary users and malicious users and determine their attack strategies. The assigned collaboration weight is provided according to the trust of each secondary user, and is applied to the SEM detector based on the GLRT detector to improve the CSS performance. Compared with the existing methods, the algorithm has better perception performance without prior information. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0040] Figure 1 It is a flow chart for implementing the present invention.

[0041] Figure 2 It is a graph of the relationship between attack intensity and ROC curve;

[0042] Figure 3 It is the relationship between the number of malicious users and the probability of correct perception (AY attacker) graph;

[0043] Figure 4 It is the relationship between the number of malicious users and the probability of correct perception (AF attacker) graph;

[0044] Figure 5 is the relationship between the number of malicious users and the probability of correct perception (AY, AN and AF attackers) graph;

[0045] Figure 6 It is a graph of the relationship between the number of malicious users and the probability of false perception (weighted SEM method). DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0047] In cognitive radio networks, primary users have priority and are entitled to occupy any frequency band at any time. Secondary users (SU) need to detect the presence of primary users through spectrum sensing and other technologies so that they can communicate using idle spectrum resources without interfering with primary users. In some cases, malicious users (MU) may also be involved, who may try to interfere with or deceive secondary users, causing them to be unable to work properly.

[0048] Based on local spectrum sensing, the energy estimation value of secondary users is estimated by monitoring the specified frequency band. j Determine whether the primary user is in use, so as to obtain the probability density function of the energy vector of the secondary user and the malicious user, and further use the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function, and finally make a decision based on the weight. The weighted SEM algorithm is used to improve the estimation of SNR, and the algorithm has better perception performance without prior information. Because by setting the weight, the FC can determine the type of attack and then adopt different defense strategies. For AY and AN attackers, the reports they send have no reference significance and can be deleted directly; for AF attackers, each time they send a report that is opposite to the global perception, which can be used to participate in CSS, making the perception information more reliable.

[0049] The present invention is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0050] The present invention provides a method for communication against SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, comprising the following steps:

[0051] Step 1: Local spectrum sensing. In each sensing cycle, all secondary users use energy detection methods to monitor the specified frequency band through sensing channels. The signal received by the jth secondary user is:

[0052]

[0053] Among them, y(m) is the signal transmitted by the primary user, h j represents the channel gain from PU to the jth secondary user, r j (m) is the noise at the jth secondary user, H0 means that the PU is not occupying the licensed spectrum, and H1 means that the primary user is using the licensed spectrum;

[0054] Then we get the energy estimate of each secondary user To determine whether the primary user (PU) is in use, represents the noise power, z j (m) represents the signal received by the mth SU.

[0055] Step 2: According to the energy value of local energy detection The average signal-to-noise ratio between the jth secondary user and the primary user can be obtained as Where P is the variance of y(m), h j represents the channel gain between the jth secondary user and the primary user. Let e ​​be the entire energy detection value vector of the secondary user, assuming that it is independent, then the probability density function of the energy detection value vector is:

[0056]

[0057] Among them, g represents the SNR vector, J represents the signal quantity sample, and then the probability density function of the energy vector of normal secondary users and malicious users is obtained:

[0058]

[0059] Among them, J represents the number of signals, M represents the number of signal samples of estimated energy, Δ represents the attack intensity, e' is the vector of the entire energy detection value of the malicious user, and s∈{0,1} represents the state of the primary user.

[0060] Step 3, use the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function:

[0061]

[0062] Among them, e n The energy finally sent to FC is the energy and vector of normal secondary users and malicious users, e is the entire energy detection value vector of the secondary user, and g n represents the SNR vector observed in sensing period n, η is the trust threshold, μ represents the learning rate, also known as the constant forgetting factor, Represents the current SNR vector g n E represents the conditional expectation.

[0063] It is divided into two steps: Step E: The main task is to calculate the posterior probability of each data point belonging to each Gaussian distribution. According to the current parameter estimate, the expected value of the latent variable is calculated, usually expressed as the posterior probability; Step M: Update the mixture weight, mean value and covariance matrix estimate of each Gaussian component. According to the expected value of the latent variable calculated in step E, the parameter value is updated through maximum likelihood estimation.

[0064] Step 4: When performing CSS and the SNR of the signal is unknown, a commonly used detection technique is the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT). In this method, the unknown parameters in the test are replaced by their maximum likelihood estimates. The decision process of this method can be expressed as:

[0065]

[0066] in, Indicates g j The maximum likelihood estimate of is, and γ0 represents the decision threshold. Only under H1, that is, when the primary user signal exists, the pdf of the energy vector is related to the SNR and is calculated as

[0067] Then the decision rule of the SEM detector with weights can be expressed as:

[0068]

[0069] The collaboration weight of the jth secondary user is expressed as:

[0070]

[0071] Among them, ω j is the cooperation weight of the jth SU, c j represents the vehicle trustworthiness, c L Indicates the minimum trust, c H Indicates the highest level of trust.

[0072] The above SEM algorithm combines the collaborative information between secondary users to improve the detection accuracy. The weight is calculated according to the detection performance of the secondary user and the degree of influence of the malicious user. The decision process comprehensively considers the energy estimation value, probability density function and weight of the secondary user to achieve efficient identification of malicious users. Without increasing the additional communication overhead, the detection capability of malicious users is improved, and the normal operation of the network is guaranteed.

[0073] Secondary users with high trust can directly participate in CSS. For malicious users with low trust, reports of malicious users will be deleted from CSS according to their attack types to achieve secure communication.

[0074] Based on the technical concept of the above method, the present invention also provides a communication system for resisting SSDF attacks in an unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, including a perception module, a probability density function acquisition module, a judgment module and an execution module;

[0075] The sensing module is based on local spectrum sensing and monitors the energy estimation value of the secondary user by monitoring the specified frequency band. j Determine whether PU is used;

[0076] The probability density function acquisition module obtains the probability density function of the secondary user and malicious user energy vectors according to the energy value of the local energy detection;

[0077] The decision module uses the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function and makes decisions based on the weights to distinguish between secondary users and malicious users;

[0078] The execution module allows secondary users with high trust to directly participate in CSS, and deletes the reports of malicious users with low trust from CSS according to their attack types to achieve secure communication.

[0079] The effect of the present invention can be further illustrated by the following simulation example.

[0080] Each numerical analysis takes into account the random characteristics of the wireless channel, all simulations are performed in MATLAB R2019a environment, and the numerical results are obtained by running more than 1000 Monte Carlo simulations.

[0081] Table 1 Meaning of each parameter

[0082]

[0083] Figure 2 The relationship between the ROC curve of the system and the four attack intensities of malicious users is described, where the default number of malicious users is 5 (the data growth trend is most obvious when the number of malicious users is 5). The ROC curve is an important tool for evaluating the performance of a classifier. It shows the overall effectiveness of the classification system by depicting the relationship between the True Positive Rate (TPR) and the False Positive Rate (FPR) under different decision thresholds. When the attack intensity is low (less than 3dB), the ROC curve is close to the upper left corner, which means that the system has a high TPR and a low FPR. The system can effectively distinguish between normal users and malicious users, and even under the interference of attackers, the system can still maintain high performance. As the attack intensity increases, the ROC curve gradually moves to the lower right, indicating that the system performance begins to deteriorate. When the attack intensity is 4dB, the system performance reaches a balance point, which can maintain a certain resistance to attackers and make it less easy for attackers to succeed. It is considered to be a suitable default setting.

[0084] Figure 3The correct perception probabilities of the traditional LRT method, the WSPRT method and the weighted SEM method proposed in the present invention are compared. The malicious users are set as AY attackers, and the number is set from 0 to 5. Among them, the performance of the traditional LRT method decreases significantly with the increase in the number of malicious users, because the LRT method does not consider the trust differences between secondary users, nor does it weight the perception results of secondary users, resulting in the attacker's erroneous report having a greater impact on the overall decision. Although the WSPRT method performs well when dealing with a small number of attackers, its performance begins to decline when the number of AY attackers exceeds 3. This shows that although the WSPRT method can resist malicious attacks to a certain extent, its robustness still needs to be improved when the number of attackers is large. The weighted SEM method proposed in the present invention shows a more stable and high correct perception probability when facing AY attackers. Even when the number of AY attackers reaches 5, the weighted SEM method can still maintain a high correct perception probability, showing its excellent robustness and resistance to malicious attacks.

[0085] Figure 4 The figure shows a comparison of the three methods for attacking the most destructive AF attackers, and the number of AF attackers is set from 0 to 5. It can be seen from the figure that the correct perception probability of the traditional LRT method decreases significantly when the number of AF attackers increases from 2 to 5, and the performance is the worst. When the number of malicious users is large, it cannot effectively distinguish between normal secondary users and malicious users, making the system vulnerable to interference and damage by attackers. The WSPRT method shows good robustness when facing AF attackers, and the decrease in the correct perception probability is relatively slow even when the number of attackers is large. The proposed weighted SEM method performs better when dealing with AF attackers. As the number of AF attackers increases, the weighted SEM method can more effectively distinguish between normal secondary users and AF attackers, thereby reducing the impact of attackers during data fusion. In particular, when the number of AF attackers exceeds 3, the correct perception probability of the weighted SEM method is slightly higher than that of the WSPRT method, showing its superior performance.

[0086] Figure 5 This is a comparison of the three methods under several attack strategies. Three types of attackers are considered in the simulation. The number of malicious users is set from 3 to 6. a =3, set AY, AN and AF attackers to 1 each; J a =4, there are 1 attacker each at AY and AN, and 2 attackers at AF; J a =5, there is 1 AY attacker, 2 AN attackers, and 2 AF attackers; J a=6, there are 2 AY, AN and AF attackers respectively. The simulation results show that the proposed method outperforms the traditional LRT and WSPRT methods in hybrid attacks and improves the CSS performance. This method not only considers the historical and current perception behavior of each secondary user, but also dynamically adjusts the weight of each secondary user, so that the system can more accurately identify and suppress the influence of malicious users. In addition, the method improves the adaptability and response speed to malicious behavior by continuously updating the trust of secondary users.

[0087] Figure 6 The false perception probabilities of the proposed method under the above three conditions are compared. As the number of malicious users increases, Pe increases slightly. Among them, the hybrid attack has the best performance and the AF attack has the worst performance. When the number of malicious users reaches half of the total, that is, J a =6, the false perception probability of the method of the present invention does not exceed 0.1.

[0088] In summary, the present invention is based on local spectrum sensing, and monitors the energy estimation value e of the secondary user by monitoring the designated frequency band. j Determine whether PU is used, obtain the probability density function of the energy vector of secondary users and malicious users, use the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function, make judgments based on weights, and distinguish between secondary users and malicious users. Aiming at the malicious user attack problem in centralized CSS based on local energy measurement soft fusion, a new scheme is proposed to improve the perception performance. The instantaneous SNR is estimated by using the SEM algorithm. This method not only considers the current energy value, but also the historical energy, and assigns different step sizes to different energy observation values, thereby improving the estimation of SNR. For the processing of malicious users, three common attacks are estimated, and a weighted data fusion method is proposed. In each round of spectrum sensing, the local perception of each secondary user is calculated with the global decision to identify normal secondary users and malicious users and determine their attack strategies. Provide the assigned cooperation weight according to the trust of each secondary user, and apply it to the SEM detector based on the GLRT detector to improve the CSS performance. Compared with the existing methods, the algorithm has better perception performance without prior information. Secondary users with high trust can directly participate in CSS. For malicious users with low trust, their reports can be deleted from CSS according to their attack types to achieve secure communication. Because by setting weights, FC can determine the type of attack and adopt different defense strategies. For AY and AN attackers, the reports they send are of no reference value and can be deleted directly. For AF attackers, they send reports that are contrary to global perception every time, which can be used to participate in CSS, making the perception information more reliable.

[0089] On the other hand, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the anti-SSDF attack communication method in the unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS of the present invention can be implemented.

[0090] The present invention can also provide a computer device, including a processor and a memory, the memory is used to store a computer executable program, the processor reads the computer executable program from the memory and executes it, and when the processor executes the computer executable program, it can implement the anti-SSDF attack communication method in the unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS described in the present invention.

[0091] The computer device may be a laptop computer, a desktop computer or a workstation.

[0092] The processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or an off-the-shelf field programmable gate array (FPGA).

[0093] The memory of the present invention may be an internal storage unit of a laptop computer, a desktop computer or a workstation, such as a memory or a hard disk; or an external storage unit, such as a mobile hard disk or a flash memory card.

[0094] Computer-readable storage media may include computer storage media and communication media. Computer storage media include volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable media implemented by any method or technology for storing information such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Computer-readable storage media may include: read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), solid-state drive (SSD) or optical disk, etc. Among them, random access memory may include resistance random access memory (ReRAM) and dynamic random access memory (DRAM).

[0095] The above contents are only for explaining the technical idea of ​​the present invention and cannot be used to limit the protection scope of the present invention. Any changes made on the basis of the technical solution in accordance with the technical idea proposed by the present invention shall fall within the protection scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A communication method for resisting SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Based on local spectrum sensing, the energy estimation value of secondary users is estimated by monitoring the specified frequency band. j Determine whether PU is used; According to the energy value of the local energy detection, the probability density function of the energy vector of the secondary user and the malicious user is obtained; Use the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function, make decisions based on the weights, and distinguish between secondary users and malicious users; Secondary users with high trust directly participate in CSS, and malicious users with low trust are removed from CSS according to their attack types to achieve secure communication.

2. The communication method for resisting SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS according to claim 1, characterized in that: Based on local spectrum sensing, the energy estimation value of the secondary user is obtained by monitoring the designated frequency band. Specifically, based on local spectrum sensing, in each sensing period, all secondary users use energy detection methods to monitor the designated frequency band through sensing channels to obtain the energy estimation value of each secondary user. in, represents the noise power, M is the signal sample, z j (m) represents the signal received by the mth SU.

3. The communication method for resisting SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS according to claim 1, characterized in that: According to the energy value obtained by the local energy detection, estimating the probability density function of the energy vector of the normal secondary user and the malicious user includes: using the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function, Among them, e n The energy finally sent to FC is the energy and vector of normal secondary users and malicious users. e is the entire energy detection value vector of the secondary user. g represents the SNR vector. n represents the SNR vector observed in sensing period n, η is the trust threshold, μ represents the learning rate, also known as the constant forgetting factor, Represents the current SNR vector g n , s represents the PU state, and E represents the conditional expectation.

4. The method for resisting SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS according to claim 3, characterized in that: According to the energy value obtained by local energy detection, the probability density function of estimating the energy vector of normal secondary users and malicious users includes: Energy value based on local energy detection The average signal-to-noise ratio between the jth secondary user and the primary user is obtained as Where P is the variance of y(m), h j represents the channel gain between the jth secondary user and the primary user, and e is the entire energy detection value vector of the secondary user. Assuming that it is independent, the probability density function of the energy detection value vector is obtained as follows: Among them, g represents the SNR vector, H0 represents that the PU does not occupy the authorized spectrum, H1 represents that the primary user is using the authorized spectrum, and J represents the number of SUs. The probability density function of the energy vectors of normal secondary users and malicious users is obtained: Among them, J represents the number of signals, M represents the number of signal samples of estimated energy, Δ represents the attack intensity, e' is the vector of the entire energy detection value of the malicious user, and s∈{0,1} represents the state of the primary user.

5. The communication method against SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS according to claim 3, characterized in that: Estimating the SNR in the probability density function using the SEM algorithm includes: Data collection: Collect spectrum data, including the energy values ​​of normal secondary users, malicious users, and other background noise signals; Set initial values ​​for the mean and variance in the probability density function based on prior knowledge or data-driven methods; Step E: Based on the current parameter estimation, the posterior probability of each data point belonging to the Gaussian distribution of normal secondary users and malicious users is calculated. In the M step, the mixture weight, mean value and covariance matrix estimate of each Gaussian component are updated according to the calculated posterior probability; Repeat the E step and the M step until the convergence condition is met or the maximum number of iterations is reached; and obtain the probability density function of the energy vectors of normal secondary users and malicious users.

6. The communication method against SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS according to claim 3, characterized in that: The decision rule for the weighted SEM detector is: The collaboration weight of the jth secondary user is: Among them, γ0 represents the spectrum occupancy judgment value, c j represents the vehicle trustworthiness, c L Indicates the minimum trust, c H Indicates the highest level of trust.

7. A communication system for resisting SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, characterized in that: It includes a perception module, a probability density function acquisition module, a judgment module and an execution module; The sensing module is based on local spectrum sensing and monitors the energy estimation value of the secondary user by monitoring the specified frequency band. j Determine whether PU is used; The probability density function acquisition module obtains the probability density function of the secondary user and malicious user energy vectors according to the energy value of the local energy detection; The decision module uses the SEM algorithm to estimate the SNR in the probability density function and makes decisions based on the weights to distinguish between secondary users and malicious users; The execution module allows secondary users with high trust to directly participate in CSS, and deletes reports of malicious users with low trust from CSS according to their attack types to achieve secure communication.

8. A vehicle networking system for anti-SSDF attack communication in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS, characterized in that: The communication method for resisting SSDF attack in unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS as described in any one of claims 1 to 6 is adopted for communication.

9. A computer device, characterized in that: It includes a processor and a memory, the memory is used to store a computer executable program, the processor reads part or all of the computer executable program from the memory and executes it, and when the processor executes part or all of the computer executable program, it can implement the anti-SSDF attack communication method in the unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: A computer program is stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the communication method for resisting SSDF attacks in an unknown signal-to-noise ratio CSS as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 can be implemented.