Proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station hydrogen safety integrated protection method and system

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention provides a hydrogen safety integrated protection method and system for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station, and relates to the technical field of hydrogen energy safety. The protection method comprises the following steps: determining the composition and connection relationship of hydrogen production, compression, hydrogen storage and power generation systems in the fuel cell power station, and determining key nodes and key pipelines needing to be protected based on the composition and connection relationship in the fuel cell power station; collecting parameters of key nodes and key pipelines of the fuel cell power station in real time; performing risk assessment on the parameters; determining a security integrity level according to a risk assessment result; and matching corresponding protection actions according to different safety integrity levels. Real-time monitoring of multiple risk points in the whole process can be achieved, the risk response time is short, the response efficiency is high, the risk degree is reduced, seamless butt joint with an existing power station control system can be achieved, equipment does not need to be greatly transformed, and cost is saved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The application relates to the field of hydrogen energy safety, in particular to a hydrogen safety integrated protection method and system for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the advancement of the "double carbon" strategy, PEMFC (proton exchange membrane fuel cell) power stations are widely used in the megawatt power generation field due to their high efficiency and cleanliness, but hydrogen has strong leakage, a wide explosion limit (4%-75% vol), hydrogen embrittlement effect and other safety hazards, and the entire process of the power station has risks such as hydrogen leakage, over-temperature and over-pressure, and domino accidents.

[0003] The prior art mainly adopts single equipment level protection, and lacks a full system integrated protection design: firstly, the risk identification is not comprehensive, and the HAZOP (hazard and operability) analysis and domino effect assessment are not combined; secondly, the protection logic is simple, and a differentiated protection strategy is not matched according to the risk level; thirdly, the accident response is single, and it is difficult to contain the expansion of the accident. Therefore, it is urgent to build a hydrogen safety integrated protection strategy covering the entire process, hierarchical prevention and control, and precise response. SUMMARY

[0004] The purpose of the embodiments of the application is to provide a hydrogen safety integrated protection method and system for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station, which can realize real-time monitoring of multiple risk points in the entire process, combine hazard and operability analysis and domino effect assessment, have a short risk response time, high response efficiency, reduce the risk level, and can be seamlessly connected with the existing power station control system without the need for substantial modification of equipment, thereby saving costs.

[0005] In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, one embodiment of the application provides a hydrogen safety integrated protection method for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station, which comprises: determining the composition and connection relationship of the hydrogen production, compression, hydrogen storage and power generation systems in the fuel cell power station, and determining the key nodes and key pipelines that need to be protected based on the composition and connection relationship in the fuel cell power station; real-time acquisition of parameters of the key nodes and key pipelines of the fuel cell power station; risk assessment of the parameters; determination of the safety integrity level according to the risk assessment result; matching of the corresponding protection actions according to different safety integrity levels.

[0006] Optionally, the real-time acquisition of the parameters of the key nodes and key pipelines of the fuel cell power station comprises: dividing the power station into five nodes of a compressor unit, a hydrogen manifold, hydrogen transportation, a fuel cell and hydrogen backflow according to the process flow, and real-time acquisition of parameter deviations of pressure, temperature, flow rate and concentration.

[0007] Optionally, the risk assessment on the parameters comprises: identifying critical risk points according to the parameters acquired in real time, determining four types of disaster-causing modes of overpressure leakage, over-temperature out-of-control, hydrogen leakage and equipment corrosion, and performing risk assessment on chain accidents caused by core equipment failure in combination with the domino theory to obtain a risk impact weight.

[0008] Optionally, the safety integrity level is determined according to the result of the risk assessment, comprising: determining the safety integrity level according to the risk impact weight; The safety integrity level comprises: SIL3: key protection functions of hydrogen / oxygen concentration interlock of a hydrogen production system, hydrogen concentration interlock of a compression system, hydrogen concentration interlock of a power generation system, etc., aiming at high-risk consequences such as fire and explosion; SIL2: medium / high-pressure buffer tank pressure interlock, equipment temperature interlock of a hydrogen storage / power generation system, etc., aiming at the risk of equipment out-of-control and personnel injury; SIL1: electrolytic cell / compressor circulating water temperature interlock, etc., aiming at the risk of ordinary equipment damage.

[0009] Optionally, corresponding protection actions are matched according to different safety integrity levels, comprising: According to the parameters acquired in real time, the logic solving unit determines that the parameters are within a normal range, and the system maintains normal operation; When the parameters exceed the normal threshold and meet the safety integrity level of SIL1, a sound-light alarm is triggered to prompt the operator to pay attention; When the pressure of the medium-pressure buffer tank rises to a dangerous threshold and meets the safety integrity level of SIL2, a logic solving unit output instruction is triggered to open a pressure relief valve and close a hydrogen inlet valve; When the hydrogen concentration in the hydrogen storage area rises to the lower limit of explosion and meets the safety integrity level of SIL3, an emergency shutdown is triggered, all hydrogen inlet valves are closed, related equipment is shut down, and spraying cooling is started.

[0010] Optionally, the protection method further comprises: an interlock control strategy, by constructing an integrated architecture of “monitoring - solving - executing”, a monitoring unit acquires the parameters in real time, a logic solving unit determines the safety integrity level according to a preset safety logic, and an execution unit responds and completes the protection actions of cutting off, pressure relief, cooling and shutdown.

[0011] Optionally, the protection method further comprises: an accident mitigation strategy, for hydrogen combustion and explosion accidents, a combination of “source cutting + process pressure relief + end cooling” measures is adopted to contain the expansion of the accident and reduce the influence range of the domino effect.

[0012] Optionally, the monitoring unit monitors parameters of temperature, pressure, hydrogen concentration, liquid level, is arranged at the outlet of the electrolytic tank, the buffer tank, and the core risk area of the stack group; The execution unit comprises an explosion-proof cut-off valve, an independent pressure relief valve, a spraying cooling device, and an emergency shutdown mechanism, thereby ensuring the independence and reliability of actions.

[0013] Optionally, the accident mitigation strategy is directed to both instantaneous leakage and continuous leakage scenarios, and different protection action logics under different scenarios are preset in combination with environmental factors, thereby ensuring the pertinence of accident response.

[0014] In another aspect, the embodiment of the present application also provides a hydrogen safety integrated protection system for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station, wherein the protection system comprises a processor configured to execute the protection method according to any one of the above.

[0015] By the above technical solution, the present application provides a hydrogen safety integrated protection method and system for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station, wherein the composition and connection relationship of hydrogen production, compression, hydrogen storage, and power generation systems in the fuel cell power station are determined, the key nodes and key pipelines that need to be protected are determined based on the composition and connection relationship in the fuel cell power station, the parameters of the key nodes and key pipelines of the fuel cell power station are collected in real time, the parameters are risk evaluated, the safety integrity level is determined according to the result of the risk evaluation, and the corresponding protection action is matched according to different safety integrity levels. The present application can realize real-time monitoring of multiple risk points in the whole process, and can reduce the risk degree, shorten the risk response time, and improve the response efficiency in combination with the hazard and operability analysis and domino effect evaluation. Moreover, the present application can be seamlessly connected with the existing power station control system without the need of greatly modifying the equipment, thereby saving the cost.

[0016] Other features and advantages of the embodiment of the present application will be described in detail in the following specific implementation part. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0017] The accompanying drawings are used to provide a further understanding of the embodiment of the present application, and constitute a part of the specification, and are used to explain the embodiment of the present application together with the following specific implementation, but do not constitute a limitation to the embodiment of the present application. In the drawings: Figure 1 is a flow chart of a hydrogen safety integrated protection method for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station according to an embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 is a control range schematic diagram of a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station according to an embodiment of the present application; Figure 3 is a matching corresponding protection action schematic diagram according to an embodiment of the present application; Figure 4This is a schematic diagram of the interlock logic for the circulating water outlet temperature of an electrolyzer according to one embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the hydrogen and oxygen concentration interlocking logic of a hydrogen production system according to one embodiment of the present invention; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the buffer tank pressure interlock logic according to one embodiment of the present invention; Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the hydrogen concentration interlocking logic of a compression system according to one embodiment of the present invention; Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the interlocking logic for the circulating water outlet temperature of a fuel cell stack according to one embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0018] The specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0019] In the embodiments of this application, certain software, components, models and other existing solutions in the industry may be mentioned. These should be regarded as exemplary and are only intended to illustrate the feasibility of implementing the technical solution of this application. However, they do not mean that the applicant has used or necessarily used the solution.

[0020] like Figure 1 The diagram shown is a flowchart of an integrated hydrogen safety protection method for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power plant according to one embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 In this context, the protection method may include: In step S1, the composition and connection relationship of the hydrogen production, compression, hydrogen storage and power generation systems in the fuel cell power station are determined, and based on the composition and connection relationship in the fuel cell power station, the key nodes and key pipelines that need to be protected are determined. In step S2, parameters of key nodes and key pipelines of the fuel cell power station are collected in real time; In step S3, a risk assessment is performed on the parameters; In step S4, the safety integrity level is determined based on the results of the risk assessment; In step S5, corresponding protective actions are matched according to different security integrity levels.

[0021] In such Figure 1 The method shown, step S1, can be used to determine the composition and connection relationships of the hydrogen production, compression, hydrogen storage, and power generation systems in a fuel cell power plant, and based on the composition and connection relationships in the fuel cell power plant, to determine the key nodes and key pipelines that need protection. For example... Figure 2The diagram illustrates the control range of a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power station. Based on the composition and connection relationships of the power station's hydrogen production, compression, storage, and power generation systems, the coverage of the protection strategy is defined, including core equipment and critical pipelines. Step S2 can be used to collect parameters of key nodes and critical pipelines of the fuel cell power station in real time. The specific method for acquiring these parameters can be of various forms known to those skilled in the art. In one example of this invention, the power station is divided into five nodes according to the process flow: compressor unit, hydrogen manifold, hydrogen transportation, fuel cell, and hydrogen recirculation. The HAZOP analysis method is used to acquire real-time deviations in parameters such as pressure, temperature, flow rate, and concentration. Based on these deviations, 59 key risk points are identified. Through HAZOP analysis and domino effect assessment, all 59 key risk points in the entire power station process are covered, avoiding the omission of hidden risks.

[0022] Step S3 can be used to conduct a risk assessment of the parameters. The specific method for conducting the risk assessment can be of various forms known to those skilled in the art. In one example of this invention, key risk points are identified based on real-time acquired parameters, determining four disaster-causing modes: overpressure leakage, overtemperature runaway, hydrogen leakage, and equipment corrosion. Combining this with domino theory, a probability model of equipment damage is established to conduct a risk assessment of cascading accidents caused by the failure of core equipment such as pressure pipelines and hydrogen storage tanks, clarifying the key propagation path of the first-order domino effect, and obtaining the risk impact weights.

[0023] Step S4 can be used to determine the safety integrity level based on the results of the risk assessment. The specific method for determining the safety integrity level can be of various forms known to those skilled in the art. In one example of the present invention, the safety integrity level can be determined based on the risk impact weight. Specifically, the safety integrity level includes: SIL3 level: critical protective functions such as hydrogen / oxygen concentration interlocking in the hydrogen production system, hydrogen concentration interlocking in the compression system, and hydrogen concentration interlocking in the power generation system, targeting high-risk consequences such as fire and explosion. Figure 5 The diagram shows the interlock logic for hydrogen and oxygen concentrations in a hydrogen production system. Based on the SIL3 level protection interlock logic, an exceedance signal is detected by a concentration transmitter, which then closes the raw material inlet valve and triggers the electrolyzer shutdown. Figure 7 The diagram shows the hydrogen concentration interlock logic of the compression system. Based on the SIL3 level protection interlock logic, an excessive signal is detected by the concentration transmitter, closing the medium-pressure buffer tank and the compressor inlet valve, triggering compressor shutdown. SIL2 level: This includes interlocks for medium / high pressure buffer tanks, temperature interlocks for hydrogen storage / power generation system equipment, etc., addressing risks of equipment malfunction and personnel injury. Figure 6The diagram shows the pressure interlock logic of the buffer tank. Based on the SIL2 level protection interlock logic, the pressure transmitter detects an overpressure signal, opens the pressure relief valve, closes the inlet valve, and triggers the shutdown of related equipment. Figure 8 The diagram shows the interlock logic for the circulating water outlet temperature of the fuel cell stack. Based on the SIL2 protection level interlock logic, an over-temperature signal is detected via a temperature transmitter, or manual triggering is used to execute a fuel cell stack shutdown and gas supply cutoff. SIL1 level: Electrolyzer / compressor circulating water temperature interlock, etc., addresses the risk of damage to ordinary equipment. For example... Figure 4 The diagram shows the interlock logic for the circulating water outlet temperature of the electrolyzer. Based on the SIL1 protection interlock logic, the electrolyzer shuts down upon detecting an over-temperature signal via a temperature transmitter or through manual triggering. Different safety integrity levels correspond to different protection actions to avoid over-protection or under-protection. This SIL-based tiered protection strategy, with a response time ≤2 seconds, reduces the probability of hydrogen leakage accidents from 9.868 × 10⁻⁶. -4 Reduced to 1.326×10 -5 This greatly reduces the scope of risk.

[0024] Step S5 can be used to match corresponding protective actions according to different safety integrity levels. By matching differentiated protective actions for different leakage scenarios and risk levels, the escalation of accidents can be effectively curbed, and the impact of the domino effect can be reduced. The specific method for determining the safety integrity level can be of various forms known to those skilled in the art. In one example of the present invention, step S5 may include, for example... Figure 3 The method shown. In this Figure 3 In this context, step S5 may further include the following steps: In step S11, based on the parameters acquired in real time, the logic calculation unit determines that the parameters are within the normal range, and the system maintains normal operation. In step S12, if the parameter exceeds the normal threshold and meets the SIL1 safety integrity level, an audible and visual alarm is triggered to alert the operator. In step S13, when the pressure in the medium-pressure buffer tank rises to the danger threshold and meets the safety integrity level of SIL2, the logic calculation unit is triggered to output an instruction to open the pressure relief valve and close the hydrogen inlet valve. In step S14, when the hydrogen concentration in the hydrogen storage area rises to the lower explosive limit and meets the safety integrity level of SIL3, an emergency shutdown is triggered, all hydrogen inlet valves are closed, related equipment is shut down, and spray cooling is started.

[0025] In Figure 3In the method shown, step S11 can be used to determine, based on the real-time acquired parameters, that the logic calculation unit is within the normal range, and the system maintains normal operation. Step S12 can be used to trigger an audible and visual alarm when the parameters exceed the normal threshold, meeting the SIL1 safety integrity level, prompting the operator to pay attention. The normal threshold can be set in various ways known to those skilled in the art. In one example of the present invention, the normal threshold can be the electrolyzer circulating water temperature rising to 75°C. Step S13 can be used to trigger the logic calculation unit to output a command to open the pressure relief valve and close the hydrogen inlet valve when the pressure in the medium-pressure buffer tank rises to the dangerous threshold, meeting the SIL2 safety integrity level. The dangerous threshold can be set in various ways known to those skilled in the art. In one example of the present invention, the medium-pressure buffer tank pressure rising to the dangerous threshold can be the medium-pressure buffer tank pressure rising to 3.5 MPa. Step S14 can be used to trigger an emergency shutdown when the hydrogen concentration in the hydrogen storage area rises to the lower explosive limit, meeting the SIL3 safety integrity level, closing all hydrogen inlet valves, shutting down related equipment, and starting spray cooling. The setting of the lower explosive limit can be one of several methods known to those skilled in the art. In one example of the present invention, the hydrogen concentration in the hydrogen storage area reaching the lower explosive limit can be achieved by the hydrogen concentration reaching 4% vol.

[0026] In this embodiment, the protection method also includes an interlocking control strategy. By constructing an integrated "monitoring-calculation-execution" architecture, the monitoring unit collects the parameters in real time, the logic calculation unit determines the safety integrity level according to preset safety logic, and the execution unit responds and completes protective actions such as cut-off, pressure relief, cooling, and shutdown. Specifically, the monitoring unit is distributed in the core risk area, collecting temperature, pressure, hydrogen concentration, and liquid level parameters to ensure full coverage of risk points, and the data is transmitted to the logic calculation unit in real time. The logic calculation unit, based on a PLC controller, has a built-in HAZOP risk identification model and hierarchical protection logic. After receiving the monitoring data, it determines the risk level within 1-2 seconds and outputs control commands. The execution unit includes a cut-off mechanism (explosion-proof solenoid valve), a pressure relief mechanism (pressure relief valve independent of the basic process control system), a cooling mechanism (zoned spray valve), and a shutdown mechanism (emergency shutdown valve), which executes combined protective actions according to commands to ensure reliable operation.

[0027] In this embodiment, the protection method also includes an accident mitigation strategy. For hydrogen combustion and explosion accidents, a combination of measures—"source cutoff + process depressurization + terminal cooling"—is adopted to curb the expansion of the accident and reduce the impact range of the domino effect. This accident mitigation strategy addresses both instantaneous and continuous leakage scenarios, taking into account environmental factors such as atmospheric stability and wind speed, and pre-setting protective action logic for different scenarios to ensure targeted accident response. Specifically, for instantaneous leakage (such as a hydrogen storage tank rupture): the gas source is immediately cut off, the pressure relief valve is opened to release pressure, and regional spray cooling is initiated to curb the spread of the gas cloud; for continuous leakage (such as a pipeline leak): the gas source is partially cut off, the depressurization intensity is dynamically adjusted, and the spray range is optimized based on environmental factors such as wind speed to reduce the risk of combustion and explosion; for domino accidents, key equipment such as high-pressure hydrogen storage tanks and pressure pipelines are protected, and explosion-proof isolation zones are set up to block the accident propagation path.

[0028] On the other hand, embodiments of the present invention also provide an integrated hydrogen safety protection system for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power plant, the protection system including a processor for executing the protection method as described in any of the above.

[0029] Through the above technical solution, this invention provides an integrated hydrogen safety protection method and system for proton exchange membrane fuel cell power plants. By determining the composition and connection relationships of the hydrogen production, compression, storage, and power generation systems in the fuel cell power plant, and based on these relationships, the invention identifies key nodes and pipelines requiring protection. It collects parameters of these key nodes and pipelines in real time, performs risk assessments on these parameters, determines the safety integrity level based on the assessment results, and matches corresponding protective actions to different safety integrity levels. This invention enables real-time monitoring of multiple risk points throughout the entire process. Combining hazard and operability analysis and domino effect assessment, it achieves short risk response time, high response efficiency, and reduced risk levels. Furthermore, it seamlessly integrates with existing power plant control systems without significant modifications to existing equipment. Safety upgrades are achieved through optimized protection methods and interlocking logic, making it suitable for the modular design of megawatt-scale PEMFC power plants.

[0030] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of this application can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, this application can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, this application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0031] This application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of this application. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart... Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0032] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0033] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0034] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPU), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0035] Memory may include non-persistent memory in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of computer-readable media.

[0036] Computer-readable media includes both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can store information using any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile optical disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transferable medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transient computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0037] It should also be noted that the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Unless otherwise specified, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes that element.

[0038] The above are merely embodiments of this application and are not intended to limit the scope of this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of the claims of this application.

Claims

1. A hydrogen safety integrated protection method for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power plant, characterized by, The protection method comprises: determining the composition and connection relationship of the hydrogen production, compression, hydrogen storage and power generation system in the fuel cell power station, and determining the key nodes and key pipelines that need to be protected based on the composition and connection relationship in the fuel cell power station; real-time acquisition of parameters of key nodes and key pipelines of the fuel cell power station; risk assessment on the parameters; determining the safety integrity level according to the result of risk assessment; matching corresponding protection actions according to different safety integrity levels.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, Real-time acquisition of parameters of key nodes and key pipelines of the fuel cell power station comprises: dividing the power station into five nodes of compressor group, hydrogen bus, hydrogen transportation, fuel cell and hydrogen backflow according to the process flow, and real-time acquisition of parameter deviation of pressure, temperature, flow rate and concentration.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, Risk assessment on the parameters comprises: identifying key risk points according to the real-time acquired parameters, determining four types of disaster causing modes of overpressure leakage, overtemperature loss of control, hydrogen leakage and equipment corrosion, and risk assessment on the chain accidents caused by core equipment failure according to the Domino theory to obtain risk impact weight.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, Determining the safety integrity level according to the result of risk assessment comprises: determining the safety integrity level according to the risk impact weight; The safety integrity level comprises: SIL3 level: key protection functions of hydrogen / oxygen concentration interlock of hydrogen production system, hydrogen concentration interlock of compression system and hydrogen concentration interlock of power generation system, aiming at high-risk consequences such as fire and explosion; SIL2 level: medium / high pressure buffer tank pressure interlock, hydrogen storage / power generation system equipment temperature interlock, etc., aiming at equipment out of control and personnel injury risk; SIL1 level: electrolytic cell / compressor circulating water temperature interlock, etc., aiming at ordinary equipment damage risk.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein, Matching corresponding protection actions according to different safety integrity levels comprises: According to the real-time acquired parameters, the logical calculation unit determines that the parameters are in the normal range, and the system maintains normal operation; When the parameters exceed the normal threshold and meet the SIL1 level of safety integrity, trigger the sound and light alarm to prompt the operator to pay attention; When the medium pressure buffer tank pressure rises to the dangerous threshold and meets the SIL2 level of safety integrity, trigger the logical calculation unit to output instructions to open the pressure relief valve and close the hydrogen inlet valve; When the hydrogen concentration in the hydrogen storage area rises to the lower limit of explosion and meets the SIL3 level of safety integrity, trigger the emergency shutdown, close all hydrogen inlet valves, shut down related equipment, and start the spray cooling.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein, The protection method further comprises: interlock control strategy, by constructing a "monitoring-calculation-execution" integrated architecture, the monitoring unit acquires the parameters in real time, the logical calculation unit determines the safety integrity level according to the preset safety logic, and the execution unit responds and completes the protection actions of cutting off, pressure relief, cooling and shutdown.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein, The protection method further comprises: accident mitigation strategy, for hydrogen explosion accident, adopt "source cut-off + process pressure relief + end cooling" combined measures to contain the accident expansion and reduce the influence range of domino effect.

8. The method of claim 6, wherein, The monitoring unit monitors the parameters of temperature, pressure, hydrogen concentration and liquid level, and is arranged in the core risk area of electrolytic cell outlet, buffer tank and stack group. The execution unit comprises an explosion-proof cut-off valve, an independent pressure relief valve, a spraying cooling device and an emergency stop mechanism, thereby ensuring action independence and reliability.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein, The accident mitigation strategy is aimed at both instantaneous leakage and continuous leakage scenes, and different scene protection action logics are preset in combination with environmental factors, thereby ensuring the pertinence of accident response.

10. A hydrogen safety integrated protection system for a proton exchange membrane fuel cell power plant, characterized by, The protection system comprises a processor configured to execute the protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 9.

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