Integrated circuit configured to perform symmetric cryptographic operations without secret key transmission

Abstract

An integrated circuit configured to perform symmetric cryptographic operations without secret key transmission is described herein. An integrated circuit includes a secure hardware environment having a first input for receiving a key number. A key generation device generates a secret key based on the key number and a unique key. A signature generation device generates a signature associated with the key number. A second input of the secure hardware environment receives encrypted binary data. A decryption device operates to decrypt the received encrypted binary data using the secret key. A third input of the secure hardware environment receives an authentication signature. The authentication device authorizes the use of the secret key for decryption only if the signature generated by the signature generation device is identical to the authentication signature.

Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This application claims priority from French patent application No. 2000996, filed on January 31, 2020, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety to the maximum extent permitted by law. Technical Field

[0003] Embodiments and implementations are directed to integrated circuits configured to perform symmetric cryptographic operations. Background Art

[0004] Symmetric encryption makes it possible to encrypt and then decrypt binary data using a shared unique key. In order to keep the binary data confidential, you should ensure that the shared key is kept secret.

[0005] One known solution is to keep the key secret by encrypting it. The encrypted key can then be shared outside the secure environment.

[0006] The disadvantage of this solution is that although the secret key is encrypted, the secret key is provided to software outside the secure environment. Therefore, there is a risk that a malicious person will try to decrypt the shared secret key by brute force.

[0007] There is therefore a need in the art for a solution for encrypting binary data that enables avoiding the sharing of secret keys used to decrypt the encrypted binary data outside of a secure environment. Summary of the invention

[0008] In an embodiment, an integrated circuit includes a secure hardware environment, which includes a decryption system, which includes: a first input, configured to receive a key number; a key generation device, configured to generate a secret key from the key number and a unique key; a signature generation device, configured to generate a signature associated with the key number; a second input, configured to receive encrypted binary data; a decryption device, configured to decrypt the encrypted binary data by using the secret key generated by the key generation device; a third input, configured to receive an authentication signature; and an authentication device, configured to authorize the use of the secret key generated by the key generation device to decrypt the encrypted binary data if the signature generated by the signature generation device is the same as the authentication signature.

[0009] Preferably, the secure hardware environment also includes an encryption system, which includes: a first input, configured to receive a key number; a key generation device, configured to generate a secret key from the key number and a unique key, the key generation device being the same as the key generation device of the decryption system; a signature generation device, configured to irreversibly generate a signature associated with the key number, the signature generation device being the same as the signature generation device of the decryption system; a second input, configured to receive binary data; a symmetric encryption device, configured to encrypt the binary data by using a secret key generated by the key generation device; a first output, configured to transmit the binary data encrypted by the encryption device; and a second output, configured to transmit the signature generated by the signature generation device, the signature being configured to be used as an authentication signature by the authentication device.

[0010] Therefore, the decryption system uses the signature generated by the encryption system as the authentication signature.

[0011] Only the signature associated with the key number used for encryption can be manipulated outside of the secure hardware environment. The secret key cannot be used outside of the secure hardware environment.

[0012] Furthermore, the signature is generated irreversibly (ie, it is not possible to retrieve the unique key by knowing the signature and the key number).

[0013] The key number is unique for each secret key generated.

[0014] The secret key is unique to a given key number due to the fact that the secret key is generated using a unique key.

[0015] In particular, for a given key number and a given unique key, the same secret key is always obtained.

[0016] Specifically, if the key number is changed or if the unique key is different, the secret key obtained by the key generating device is different.

[0017] Therefore, if a key number and its associated signature are injected as input to the generation and authentication systems, where the unique key is different from the unique key used to generate the signature, then the use error will be detected. The authentication device then prevents the use of the secret key used to decrypt the encrypted binary data. Therefore, the signature makes it possible to link the key number with a single unique key.

[0018] Thus, the authentication signature makes it possible to authenticate the secret key generated by the decryption system.

[0019] The integrated circuit according to an embodiment enables avoiding the transmission of the secret key outside the secure hardware environment by communicating at its location a signature associated with a key number used to generate the secret key.

[0020] Thus, the integrated circuit according to an embodiment allows symmetrical encryption / decryption of binary data using a known secret key that can only be used in a secure hardware environment.

[0021] A secure hardware environment is secure "hardware".

[0022] The encryption system and the decryption system may be combined or at least partially separated. When they are combined, the key generation device of the encryption system and the key generation device of the decryption system are formed by the same device. Similarly, the signature generation device of the encryption system and the signature generation device of the decryption system are formed by the same device. In addition, the encryption device and the decryption device are formed by the same device.

[0023] In addition, preferably, the encryption system can also use a third input configured to receive the authentication signature and include an authentication device. If the signature generated by the signature generation device is the same as the authentication signature, the authentication device can then be configured to authorize the use of the secret key generated by the key generation device to encrypt the binary data.

[0024] Therefore, if an incorrect authentication signature is injected as input to the encryption system, the signature generated by the encryption system from the injected key number will be different from the authentication signature. The authentication device then detects that the authentication signature is not the expected authentication signature and then prevents the use of the secret key used to encrypt the binary data.

[0025] The authentication signature then makes it possible to authenticate the secret key generated by the encryption system.

[0026] In an advantageous embodiment, the secure hardware environment comprises a key registry, in which each secret key generated by a key generation device of the decryption system can be recorded. The key registry is configured to transmit the recorded secret key to the decryption device to decrypt the encrypted binary data, and the authentication device is configured to authorize the recording of the secret key only if the signature generated by the signature generation device of the decryption system is identical to the authentication signature.

[0027] Therefore, the secret key cannot be read by software, but once the secret key is recorded in the key registry, the secret key can be used by the software.

[0028] In an advantageous embodiment, the unique key is a unique hardware key recorded in a secure hardware environment.The unique key may also be made unique by taking into account the execution context.

[0029] In an advantageous embodiment, the encryption device for binary data and the decryption device for encrypted binary data are configured to execute the same AES encryption / decryption algorithm in order to encrypt or decrypt the binary data.

[0030] In an advantageous embodiment, the key generation devices of the encryption system and the decryption system are configured to perform the AES algorithm according to CCM mode (ie counter mode with CBC-MAC) in order to generate the key from the key number and the unique key.

[0031] Alternatively, the key generation devices of the encryption system and the decryption system are configured to implement the AES algorithm according to mode GCM (for "Galois / Counter Mode") in order to generate the secret key from the key number and the unique key.

[0032] In an embodiment, a method for decrypting encrypted binary data in a secure hardware environment includes: receiving a key number; generating a secret key from the key number and a unique key; generating a signature associated with the key number; receiving the encrypted binary data; receiving an authentication signature; if the generated signature is the same as the authentication signature, decrypting the encrypted binary data by using the secret key; and transmitting the decrypted binary data outside the secure hardware environment.

[0033] In an embodiment, a method for encrypting binary data in a secure hardware environment includes: receiving a key number; generating a secret key from the key number and a unique key; irreversibly generating a signature associated with the key number; receiving the binary data; encrypting the binary data using the secret key; transmitting the encrypted binary data outside the secure hardware environment; and transmitting the signature associated with the key number outside the secure hardware environment, the signature being suitable for use as an authentication signature in a decryption method such as that described above.

[0034] The decryption method therefore uses as an authentication signature a signature generated during an encryption method such as described above. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0035] Other advantages and features of the embodiments will appear when examining the detailed description of non-limiting embodiments and implementations and the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0036] Figure 1 and Figure 2 A secure hardware environment EMS including an encryption system is shown;

[0037] Figure 3 The method of operation is shown;

[0038] Figure 4 and Figure 5 A secure hardware environment EMS including a decryption system is shown; and

[0039] Figure 6 The operation method is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0040] The integrated circuit according to the embodiment comprises a secure hardware environment EMS, the secure hardware environment EMS comprising Figure 1 The encryption system SCH shown in Figure 4 The decryption system SDCH shown in.

[0041] The encryption system SCH comprises a first input configured to receive a key number in a portion of an initialization vector IV used by the AES algorithm according to CCM or GCM mode (acronym for "Galois / Counter Mode"), as described below. By definition, the key number is unique for each key generated.

[0042] The encryption system SCH further comprises a key generation device SK_GEN1. The key generation device SK_GEN1 is configured to generate a secret key SK from a key number and a unique key.

[0043] The unique key may be a unique hardware key HUK recorded in the secure hardware environment EMS. The unique hardware key HUK may be obtained through a physically unclonable function (also referred to by the acronym “PUF”).

[0044] Alternatively, the unique key may be a software secret key locked in a protection register.The unique key may be linked to a given execution context.

[0045] For example, Figure 2 As shown in , the key generation device SK_GEN1 is configured to perform the AES algorithm according to the CCM mode (i.e., the counter mode with CBC-MAC) to generate the secret key SK from the key number and the unique key HUK. The key number can be integrated into the initialization vector IV. The key number can be retrieved using the mask applied on the initialization vector IV.

[0046] In particular, the secret key SK is generated from a key number incremented by a counter CTR and by a unique key, such as a unique hardware key HUK.The key generating device SK_GEN1 comprises a first encryption device SK_CH1 and a second encryption device SK_CH2.

[0047] The first encryption device SK_CH1 is configured to generate the most significant bits MSB SK of the secret key SK. The second encryption device SK_CH2 is configured to generate the least significant bits LSB SK of the secret key SK.

[0048] More specifically, the first encryption device SK_CH1 takes as input the unique key HUK and the key number incremented for the first time by the counter CTR1. For example, the first encryption device SK_CH1 may implement an AES encryption algorithm.

[0049] The second encryption device SK_CH2 takes as input the unique key HUK and the key number incremented a second time by the counter CTR2. For example, the second encryption device SK_CH2 may perform an AES encryption algorithm.

[0050] The most significant bits MSB SK of the secret key SK and the least significant bits LSB SK of the secret key SK are then combined in such a way as to form the secret key SK, which may then be recorded in the key registration table SK_REG1.

[0051] The cryptographic system SCH further comprises a signature generation device TAG_GEN1. The signature generation device TAG_GEN1 is configured to irreversibly generate a signature TAG associated with a received key number as input to the secure hardware environment EMS. Since the signature TAG is generated in an irreversible manner, this means that it is impossible to retrieve a unique key from the key number and the signature TAG.

[0052] For example, Figure 2 As shown in , the signature generation device TAG_GEN1 includes three encryption devices TAG_CH1, TAG_CH2 and TAG_CH3.

[0053] The first encryption device TAG_CH1 is configured to encrypt the key number by using the unique key HUK.

[0054] The second encryption device TAG_CH2 is configured to encrypt the output of the first encryption device TAG_CH1 by using the unique key HUK.

[0055] The third encryption device TAG_CH3 is configured to encrypt the output of the second encryption device TAG_CH2 by using the unique key HUK.

[0056] For example, the three encryption devices TAG_CH1, TAG_CH2, and TAG_CH3 can execute the AES encryption algorithm.

[0057] The signature TAG is obtained by performing an exclusive OR function (XOR) on the outputs of the encryption devices TAG_CH1 and TAG_CH3 as inputs.

[0058] The cryptographic system SCH further comprises an output configured to transfer the signature TAG generated by the signature generation device TAG_GEN1 to a first output register DOUT1 outside the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0059] The signature TAG can then be operated by software from the first output register DOUT1.

[0060] The encryption system SCH also comprises a second input configured to receive binary data DAT to be encrypted recorded in an input register DIN1 outside the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0061] The encryption system SCH comprises a symmetric encryption device CH for encrypting binary data DAT from an input register DIN1. In particular, the symmetric encryption device CH is configured to encrypt said binary data DAT by using a secret key SK generated by a key generation device SK_GEN1 and recorded in a key registration register SK_REG1.

[0062] Preferably, the binary data encryption device CH is configured to execute an AES encryption algorithm for encrypting the binary data DAT by using a secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN1.

[0063] The encryption system SCH also comprises an output configured to transmit binary data E_DAT encrypted by the encryption device to a second output register DOUT2 outside the secure hardware environment.

[0064] According to an embodiment, in Figure 3 A method for encrypting binary data DAT in a secure hardware environment is shown in . The encryption method comprises a step 10 of receiving a key number in the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0065] The encryption method then comprises a step 11 of generating a secret key SK, wherein the secret key SK is generated by a key generation device SK_GEN1 of the encryption system SCH by using the received key number and a unique key, in particular a unique hardware key HUK. In particular, for a given key number and a given unique key, the same secret key SK is always obtained.

[0066] The secret key SK is then recorded in the key registration table SK_REG1.

[0067] The encryption method also comprises a step 12 of generating a signature TAG associated with the key number. In this step 12, the signature TAG is irreversibly generated by a signature generation device TAG_GEN1 of the encryption system SCH.

[0068] The encryption method also comprises a step 13 of receiving binary data DAT to be encrypted. In particular, the binary data DAT originate from an input register DIN1 outside the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0069] The encryption method then comprises a step 14 of encrypting the received binary data DAT. In this step 14 of encryption, the binary data DAT are encrypted by the encryption device CH by using the secret key SK recorded in the key registration table SK_REG1.

[0070] The encryption method further comprises a step 15 of transmitting, outside the secure hardware environment EMS, the encrypted binary data E_DAT and the signature TAG generated in association with the key number used to encrypt the binary data DAT.

[0071] In particular, the transmitted signature is recorded in the output register DOUT1, and the encrypted binary data E_DAT is recorded in the output register DOUT2.

[0072] The software can then retrieve the signature TAG and encrypted binary data E_DAT recorded in the output registers DOUT1 and DOUT2.

[0073] In particular, the software may use the retrieved signature TAG in order to be able to use it to subsequently decrypt the retrieved encrypted binary data E_DAT.

[0074] Figure 4 and Figure 5 A decryption system SDCH according to an embodiment is shown.

[0075] The decryption system SDCH comprises a first input configured to receive a key number.

[0076] The decryption system SDCH further comprises a key generation device SK_GEN2. The key generation device SK_GEN2 is configured to generate a secret key SK using a unique key (particularly a unique hardware key HUK) and a key number received from the first input of the decryption system. The unique key is the same as the unique key used by the encryption system SCH.

[0077] The key generating device SK_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH is identical to the key generating device SK_GEN1 of the encryption system SCH. Preferably, a single device is used to form the two key generating devices SK_GEN1, SK_GEN2. Alternatively, two separate key generating devices SK_GEN1, SK_GEN2 may be provided.

[0078] For example, the key generation device SK_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH is configured to execute the AES algorithm according to the CCM mode.

[0079] The decryption system SDCH further comprises a key registry SK_REG2, which is configured to record the secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH. The key registry SK_REG2 of the decryption system SDCH may be the same as the key registry SK_REG1 of the encryption system SCH.

[0080] The decryption system SDCH also comprises a signature generation device TAG_GEN2. The signature generation device TAG_GEN2 is configured to generate a signature TAG associated with a key number received as input from the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0081] The signature generation device TAG_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH is identical to the signature generation device TAG_GEN1 of the encryption system SCH. Preferably, a single device is used to form the two signature generation devices TAG_GEN1, TAG_GEN2. Alternatively, two separate signature generation devices TAG_GEN1, TAG_GEN2 may be provided.

[0082] The decryption system SDCH further comprises a second input configured to receive encrypted binary data E_DAT from an input register DIN2 outside the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0083] The decryption system SDCH also comprises a decryption device DCH of encrypted binary data E_DAT. The decryption device DCH is configured to decrypt the encrypted binary data E_DAT received by the second input by using a secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN2 and recorded in the key registration table SK_REG2.

[0084] The decryption device DCH implements the same encryption / decryption algorithm as the encryption device CH of the encryption system SCH, for example the AES algorithm. Preferably, the same device forms the encryption device CH of the encryption system SCH and the decryption device DCH of the decryption system SDCH.

[0085] The decryption system SDCH also comprises a third input configured to receive an authentication signature EXP_TAG from an input register DIN3 outside the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0086] The decryption system SDCH further comprises an authentication device AUT. The authentication device AUT comprises a switch INT having a first terminal connected to the output of the key generation device SK_GEN2 and a second terminal connected to the key registration table SK_REG2. The switch INT can be controlled to be in an open state or a closed state. When the switch INT is controlled to be in a closed state, the switch INT allows the secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN2 to be recorded in the key registration table SK_REG2. When the switch INT is controlled to be in an open state, the switch INT prevents the secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN2 from being recorded in the key registration table SK_REG2.

[0087] For example, the switch INT may be formed of a transistor.

[0088] The authentication device AUT further comprises a comparator COMP for controlling the switch INT.

[0089] The comparator COMP is configured to compare the signature TAG generated by the signature generation device TAG_GEN2 with the authentication signature EXP_TAG.

[0090] If the generated signature TAG is identical to the authentication signature EXP_TAG, the comparator is configured to control the switch INT to be in a closed state, in such a way that the secret key SK generated by the key generation device of the decryption system can be recorded in the key registration table SK_REG2.

[0091] If the generated signature TAG is different from the authentication signature EXP_TAG, the comparator COMP is configured to control the switch INT to be in an off state, in this way preventing the secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH from being recorded in the key registration table SK_REG2. In this case, the authentication device AUT is configured to transmit an error signal SK_ERR.

[0092] The authentication device AUT is therefore configured to authorize the use of the secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN2 to decrypt said encrypted binary data E_DAT if the signature TAG generated by the signature generation device TAG_GEN2 is identical to the authentication signature EXP_TAG.

[0093] Figure 6 A method for decrypting encrypted binary data E_DAT in a secure hardware environment EMS is shown in . The method comprises a step 20 of receiving a key number as input to the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0094] The decryption method also comprises a step 23 of receiving encrypted binary data E_DAT. In particular, the encrypted binary data E_DAT comes from an input register DIN2 outside the secure hardware environment EMS.

[0095] The decryption method also comprises a step 24 of receiving, in the secure hardware environment EMS, an authentication signature EXP_TAG from the input register DIN3.

[0096] In particular, the authentication signature EXP_TAG is associated with a key number previously used to generate a secret key SK for encrypting binary data DAT according to an encryption method such as described above, so as to obtain encrypted binary data E_DAT. It is this encrypted binary data E_DAT that is received as input during the decryption method.

[0097] The decryption method then comprises a step 21 of generating a secret key SK, wherein the secret key SK is generated by a key generating device SK_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH by using the received key number and a unique key, for example a unique hardware key HUK.

[0098] The decryption method also comprises a step 22 of generating a signature TAG associated with the received key number. In this step 22, the signature TAG is generated by a signature generation device TAG_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH.

[0099] The decryption method further comprises a step of authentication 25, in which the signature TAG generated by the signature generation device TAG_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH is compared with the authentication signature EXP_TAG. In particular, the authentication step 25 is implemented by the authentication device AUT. The comparator COMP determines whether the generated signature TAG is identical to the authentication signature EXP_TAG.

[0100] If the generated signature TAG is identical to the authentication signature EXP_TAG, the comparator COMP controls the switch INT to be in a closed state, in such a way that the secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH is recorded in the key registration table SK_REG2.

[0101] If the generated signature TAG is different from the authentication signature EXP_TAG, the comparator COMP controls the switch INT in the off state, in this way preventing the secret key SK generated by the key generation device SK_GEN2 of the decryption system SDCH from being recorded in the key registration table SK_REG2. The authentication device AUT then transmits an error signal SK_ERR.

[0102] If during the authentication step 25 the comparator COMP determines that the generated signature TAG is identical to the authentication signature EXP_TAG, the decryption method then comprises a step 26 of decrypting the received encrypted binary data E_DAT.

[0103] In this decryption step 26, the encrypted binary data E_DAT is decrypted by the decryption device DCH by using the secret key SK recorded in advance in the key registration table SK_REG2.

[0104] The decryption method then comprises a step 27 of transmitting the decrypted binary data DAT outside the secure hardware environment EMS. In particular, the decrypted binary data DAT are recorded in an output register DOUT3.

[0105] The encryption method and the decryption method enable communication outside the secure hardware environment EMS of an authentication signature EXP_TAG associated only with a key number used to generate a secret key SK for encrypting binary data DAT. The secret key SK is therefore known and can be used only in the secure hardware environment EMS. The encryption method and the decryption method thus enable secure management of the secret key SK that cannot be read outside the secure hardware environment EMS to be ensured.

[0106] Thus, if a key number and its associated signature EXP_TAG are injected as input to the generation and authentication systems, where the unique key HUK is different from the unique key used to generate the signature, a usage error will be detected. The authentication device AUT then prevents the use of the secret key SK for decrypting the encrypted binary data. The signature thus makes it possible to link the key number with a single unique key HUK.

[0107] Furthermore, if an incorrect key number is injected as input to the decryption system SDCH for decrypting the encrypted binary data E_DAT, the signature TAG associated with the incorrect key number will be different from the authentication signature EXP_TAG associated with the key number used to encrypt the binary data DAT. The authentication device AUT then detects that the injected key number is not the expected key number and then prevents the decryption of the encrypted binary data E_DAT.

[0108] Preferably, the encryption system SCH may also use an input and an authentication device configured to receive the authentication signature EXP_TAG. This input and this authentication device may be identical to the input and authentication device of the decryption system. The authentication device AUT may then be configured to authorize the use of a secret key generated by the key generation device SK_GEN1 of the encryption system SCH to encrypt said binary data if the signature generated by the signature generation device TAG_GEN1 is identical to the authentication signature EXP_TAG.

[0109] Therefore, if an incorrect authentication signature EXP_TAG is injected as input to the encryption system SCH, the signature generated by the encryption system from the injected key number will be different from the authentication signature EXP_TAG. The authentication device then detects that the authentication signature EXP_TAG is not the expected authentication signature and then prevents the use of the secret key to decrypt the binary data.

[0110] The authentication signature then makes it possible to authenticate the secret key generated by the encryption system.

Claims

1. An integrated circuit, comprising: Secure hardware environment, including decryption system; The decryption system comprises: a first input configured to receive a key code; a key generating device configured to generate a secret key based on the key number and a unique key; a signature generating device configured to irreversibly generate a signature based on the key number and the unique key; a second input configured to receive encrypted binary data; a decryption device configured to decrypt the encrypted binary data by using the secret key generated by the key generation device; a third input configured to receive an authentication signature; and An authentication device configured to authorize the use of the secret key generated by the key generation device to decrypt the encrypted binary data if the signature generated by the signature generation device is identical to the authentication signature.

2. The integrated circuit of claim 1 , wherein the secure hardware environment further comprises: a key registry configured to record the secret key generated by the key generating device, and a switch controlled to transfer the secret key to the key registry; The authentication device is configured to control the switch to transfer the secret key to the key registry for recording only when the signature generated by the signature generation device of the decryption system is identical to the authentication signature.

3. The integrated circuit of claim 2, wherein the output of the key registry transmits the recorded secret key to the decryption device to decrypt the encrypted binary data. 4 . The integrated circuit of claim 1 , wherein the unique key is a unique hardware key recorded in the secure hardware environment.

5. The integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein the decryption device is configured to perform an AES decryption algorithm.

6. The integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein the key generation device is configured to perform an AES algorithm according to a counter mode with CBC-MAC to generate the secret key according to the key number and the unique key.

7. The integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the key generation device is configured to implement the AES algorithm according to mode GCM in order to generate the secret key according to the key number and the unique key.

8. The integrated circuit of claim 1 , wherein the secure hardware environment further comprises a cryptographic system, the cryptographic system comprising: a fourth input configured to receive binary data; a symmetric encryption device configured to encrypt the binary data by using the secret key generated by the key generation device; a first output configured to transmit the binary data encrypted by the symmetric encryption device; as well as A second output is configured to transmit the signature generated by the signature generation device.

9. The integrated circuit of claim 8, wherein the encryption system further comprises: A first input is configured to receive a key code, another key generation device configured to generate the secret key based on the key number and the unique key; as well as Another signature generation device is configured to irreversibly generate the signature based on the key number and the unique key.

10. An integrated circuit according to claim 9, wherein the further signature generation device of the encryption system is identical to the signature generation device of the decryption system.

11. The integrated circuit of claim 9, wherein the further key generating device of the encryption system is identical to the key generating device of the decryption system.

12. The integrated circuit of claim 9, wherein the secure hardware environment further comprises: a first key registration table configured to record the secret key generated by the key generation device; as well as The second key registration table is configured to record the secret key generated by the other key generating device.

13. The integrated circuit of claim 9, wherein the decryption device is configured to perform an AES decryption algorithm and the symmetric encryption device is configured to perform an AES encryption algorithm.

14. The integrated circuit of claim 9, wherein the key generation device and the further key generation device are each configured to perform an AES algorithm according to a counter mode with CBC-MAC to generate the secret key according to the key number and the unique key.

15. The integrated circuit according to claim 9, wherein the key generation device and the further key generation device are each configured to implement an AES algorithm according to mode GCM in order to generate the secret key from the key number and the unique key.

16. A method for decrypting encrypted binary data in a secure hardware environment, comprising: receiving a key number; generating a secret key based on the key number and the unique key; irreversibly generating a signature based on the key number and the unique key; receiving the encrypted binary data; Receive authentication signature; If the generated signature is identical to the authentication signature, decrypting the encrypted binary data by using the secret key; The decrypted binary data is transmitted outside of the secure hardware environment.

17. A method for encrypting binary data in a secure hardware environment, comprising: receiving a key number; generating a secret key based on the key number and the unique key; irreversibly generating a signature based on the key number and the unique key; receiving the binary data; encrypting the binary data by using the secret key; transmitting the encrypted binary data outside of the secure hardware environment; as well as The signature associated with the key number is transmitted outside of the secure hardware environment, the signature being suitable for use as an authentication signature in a decryption method.

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