Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system

Abstract

The invention relates to an instrumentation and control system for a nuclear power plant, comprising a KIC computer information and control system, a first RPS protection system, a second RPS protection system and a backup information and control system; the KIC computer information and control system is connected to non-safety-level field equipment; the first RPS protection system is connected to first safety-level field equipment; the backup information and control system is connected to second safety-level field equipment via the second RPS protection system; the backup information and control system is also connected to non-safety-level field equipment via the KIC computer information and control system; a dual RPS protection system based on a safety-level DCS platform is used as an architecture, two sets of completely independent field instruments and actuators are adopted, thereby avoiding the risk of simultaneous loss of diversified driving functions and protection system functions after failure of field equipment in the prior art; and simplifying the main control room system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of nuclear power, and in particular to a diversified instrumentation and control system for a nuclear power plant. Background Art

[0002] The main control room is the monitoring center of the nuclear power plant. It is equipped with a human-machine interface-workstation for operators to achieve reactor operation goals. Its main function is to monitor and control the reactor under various operating states and accident conditions to ensure the effective and safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0003] During the operation of nuclear power plants, the digital protection system (RPS) based on the safety-level DCS is mainly used to deal with design basis accidents. When the protection parameters reach or exceed the set values, the emergency shutdown is triggered and the dedicated safety facilities are started to make the reactor reach a stable and controllable or safe shutdown state. The monitoring of all safety-level equipment information in the unit must be realized through the protection system. Due to the centralized functions, shared software and extensive application of communication technology, the digital protection system is susceptible to common cause failures of the software. At this time, the main control room loses the means of monitoring all safety-level equipment information. In order to deal with this situation, a diversified drive system (DAS) independent of the protection system is set up to achieve minimized safety functions. The DAS system includes a diversified human-machine interface panel (DHP) located in the main control room. In the case of failure of the protection system and superimposed design basis accidents, the operator can realize the monitoring function through the DHP panel, which can bring the reactor to and maintain a safe shutdown state. The DAS system shares safety-level field instruments and actuators with the RPS system.

[0004] However, the above-mentioned existing technologies still have some imperfections. For example: 1) The function allocation of the cabinets set in the existing RPS system is not clear, which makes it difficult to find the corresponding cabinet for maintenance when a certain function fails in the RPS system; 2) The DAS system and the RPS system share safety-level field equipment, which makes it impossible to achieve functional diversity. If the safety-level field equipment fails, the DAS system and the RPS system will fail at the same time; 3) From the perspective of limiting scale, the DAS system minimizes the functions and can only monitor safety-level equipment; for non-safety-level functions that still need to be used after the accident or non-safety-level equipment information that still needs to be monitored, it still needs to be implemented through the main control room workstation, which requires the operator to move back and forth and operate between different operating panels, which not only reduces the operator's work efficiency, but also greatly increases human risk; 4) The configuration ratio of the main control room workstation is unreasonable, and some monitoring equipment is easily shelved, which fails to be maximized, wasting the space of the operating panel. Summary of the invention

[0005] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a diversified instrumentation and control system for a nuclear power plant.

[0006] The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problem is: constructing a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system, including a KIC computer information and control system based on a non-safety-level DCS platform, a first RPS protection system based on a first safety-level DCS platform, a second RPS protection system based on a second safety-level DCS platform and a backup information and control system;

[0007] The KIC computer information and control system is connected to the non-safety-level field equipment to monitor the non-safety-level field equipment information and to monitor the safety-level field equipment information;

[0008] The first RPS protection system is connected to the first safety level field equipment and is used to control the first safety level field equipment to bring the reactor into a safe shutdown state in response to a design basis accident;

[0009] The backup information and control system is connected to the second safety level field device through the second RPS protection system, and is used to control the second safety level field device to make the reactor reach a safe shutdown state after the first RPS protection system fails;

[0010] The backup information and control system is also connected to the non-safety-level field equipment through the KIC computer information and control system to monitor the non-safety-level field equipment information.

[0011] Preferably, the KIC computer information and control system includes a main control room workstation and an LDP screen for displaying comprehensive information of the power station; the first RPS protection system includes a first S-VDU safety-level control and display device for monitoring safety-level equipment information; the first S-VDU safety-level control and display device is arranged at the main control room workstation;

[0012] The main control room workstations include a nuclear island operator workstation, a conventional island operator workstation, a crew chief workstation, and a safety engineer workstation; each workstation is provided with a first NC-VDU non-safety level control display device for monitoring non-safety level equipment information.

[0013] Preferably, the KIC computer information and control system further comprises a first monitoring network, a server module, a first system network, an LCS field control cabinet, and a COMS communication cabinet;

[0014] The first NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device and the LDP screen are connected to the first monitoring network, the server module and the first system network respectively in sequence, and then connected to the first ends of the LCS field control cabinet and the COMS communication cabinet. The second ends of the LCS field control cabinet and the COMS communication cabinet are connected to the non-safety-level field equipment; the third ends of the LCS field control cabinet and the COMS communication cabinet are also connected to the backup information and control system respectively.

[0015] Preferably, the KIC computer information and control system is also connected to the first RPS protection system via a third gateway to send information of the first security level field device to the KIC computer information and control system;

[0016] And / or, the KIC computer information and control system is connected to the second RPS protection system via a fourth gateway to send the information of the non-safety-level field device to the second RPS protection system.

[0017] Preferably, the first RPS protection system includes a first monitoring module and a first control module connected to the first monitoring module; wherein the first monitoring module includes the first S-VDU safety level control display device (112), the first CIC equipment interface cabinet, the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet, the first SRC safety-related cabinet and the first safety bus; the first S-VDU safety level control display device is connected to the first SRC safety-related cabinet through the first safety bus, the other end of the first SRC safety-related cabinet is respectively connected to the first ends of the first CIC equipment interface cabinet and the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet, and the second ends of the first CIC equipment interface cabinet and the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet are respectively connected to the first safety level field device.

[0018] Preferably, the first control module includes a first RPC reactor protection cabinet, a first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet, a first DTC data transmission cabinet, a first safety-level system bus and a first gateway;

[0019] The first end of the first RPC reactor protection cabinet is respectively connected to the first ends of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet and the first DTC data transmission cabinet; the second ends of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet and the first DTC data transmission cabinet are connected to the first safety bus; the second end of the first RPC reactor protection cabinet and the third end of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet are connected to the third end of the first CIC equipment interface cabinet through hard wiring.

[0020] Preferably, the backup information and control system includes a BUP backup disk and an ECP emergency shutdown disk;

[0021] The BUP backup panel is respectively provided with a safety level display instrument, a non-safety level display instrument, a safety level switch, a non-safety level switch, an alarm light sign and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen; the second RPS protection system includes a second S-VDU safety level control and display device; the second S-VDU safety level control and display device is arranged on the BUP backup panel;

[0022] The ECP emergency shutdown panel is provided with a second safety level hard manual operation for the operator to manually shutdown the reactor and manually start the dedicated safety facilities in an emergency.

[0023] Preferably, the second RPS protection system includes a second monitoring module and a second control module connected to the second monitoring module; the second monitoring module and the second control module are respectively connected to the BUP backup disk; the second control module is also connected to the ECP emergency shutdown disk;

[0024] The second monitoring module comprises the second S-VDU safety level control display device (33), the second CIC device interface cabinet, the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet, the second SRC safety related cabinet and the second safety bus; the second S-VDU safety level control display device is connected to the first end of the second SRC safety related cabinet through the second safety bus, the second end of the second SRC safety related cabinet is respectively connected to the first ends of the second CIC device interface cabinet and the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet, the second ends of the second CIC device interface cabinet and the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet are respectively connected to the second safety level field device; the third end of the second SRC safety related cabinet is connected to the BUP backup disk.

[0025] Preferably, the second control module includes a second RPC reactor protection cabinet, a second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet, a second DTC data transmission cabinet and a second safety-level system bus;

[0026] The first end of the second RPC reactor protection cabinet is respectively connected to the first ends of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet and the second DTC data transmission cabinet; the second ends of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet and the second DTC data transmission cabinet are connected to the second safety bus; the second end of the second RPC reactor protection cabinet and the third end of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet are respectively connected to the third end of the second CIC equipment interface cabinet, the BUP backup disk and the ECP emergency shutdown disk through hard wiring; the third ends of the second RPC reactor protection cabinet and the second DTC data transmission cabinet are connected to the second safety level system bus.

[0027] Preferably, the second RPS protection system also includes an alarm processing cabinet and a second gateway, the first ends of the alarm processing cabinet and the second gateway are respectively connected to the second safety level system bus, the second end of the alarm processing cabinet is connected to the alarm light sign, and the second end of the second gateway is connected to the post-accident parameter monitoring screen.

[0028] The implementation of the present invention has the following beneficial effects: the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system in the present invention is based on a dual RPS protection system based on a safety-level DCS platform as an architecture, and adopts two sets of completely independent field instruments and actuators; under the premise of not changing the scale of the original backup information and control system equipment, by designing another set of safety-level DCS platform, the original DAS system is replaced to realize diversified driving functions, thereby avoiding the risk of losing the diversified driving functions and the protection system functions at the same time after the field equipment fails in the prior art; the main control room cancels the entire DHP diversified human-machine interface disk, simplifies the main control room system, and reduces the scale of the main control room; the backup information and control system can not only cope with the workstation failure condition, but also cope with the common cause failure of the protection system, and can also monitor the non-safety-level field equipment information, thereby solving the problem in the prior art that when the protection system fails, it is necessary to move back and forth and operate between the DHP disk and the workstation, thereby improving the work efficiency of the operator and reducing the human risk. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments, in which:

[0030] Figure 1 It is a simplified structural block diagram of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system of the present invention;

[0031] Figure 2 It is a structural schematic diagram of a workbench in a main control room of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system of the present invention;

[0032] Figure 3It is a schematic diagram of the structure of the connection between the KIC computer information and control system and the first RPS protection system in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system of the present invention;

[0033] Figure 4 It is a structural schematic diagram of the connection between the second RPS protection system and the BUP backup disk in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system of the present invention;

[0034] Figure 5 It is a structural schematic diagram of the SIC severe accident instrument system in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0035] In order to have a clearer understanding of the technical features, purposes and effects of the present invention, the specific embodiments of the present invention are now described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the following description, it should be understood that the directions or positional relationships indicated by "front", "back", "up", "down", "left", "right", "longitudinal", "horizontal", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inside", "outside", "head", "tail", etc. are based on the directions or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings, are constructed and operated in a specific direction, and are only for the convenience of describing the present technical solution, rather than indicating that the device or element referred to must have a specific direction, and therefore cannot be understood as a limitation to the present invention.

[0036] It should also be noted that, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the terms such as "installed", "connected", "connected", "fixed", "set" and the like should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral one; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be directly connected or indirectly connected through an intermediate medium, it can be the internal connection of two elements or the interaction relationship between two elements. When an element is referred to as being "on" or "under" another element, the element can be "directly" or "indirectly" located on the other element, or there may be one or more intermediate elements. The terms "first", "second", "third", etc. are only for the convenience of describing the present technical solution, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Therefore, the features defined as "first", "second", "third", etc. can explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. For those of ordinary skill in the art, the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood according to the specific circumstances.

[0037] In the following description, specific details such as specific system structures, technologies, etc. are provided for the purpose of illustration rather than limitation, so as to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the present invention. However, it should be clear to those skilled in the art that the present invention may be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other cases, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted to prevent unnecessary details from obstructing the description of the present invention.

[0038] It should be noted that the field equipment mentioned below includes field instruments and actuators; the first safety level field equipment 700 and the second safety level field equipment 800 are different instruments for measuring parameters of the same nuclear power unit or different actuators for realizing the same function, and are independent.

[0039] like Figure 1-Figure 5 As shown, a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system in the present invention includes a KIC computer information and control system 100 based on a non-safety-level DCS platform, a first RPS protection system 200 based on a first safety-level DCS platform, a second RPS protection system 400 based on a second safety-level DCS platform, and a backup information and control system 300; the KIC computer information and control system 100 is connected to a non-safety-level field device 600 to monitor the non-safety-level field device information and the safety-level field device information; the first RPS protection system 200 is connected to the first safety-level field device 600 to monitor the safety-level field device information; The backup information and control system 300 is connected to the second safety level field device 800 through the second RPS protection system 400, and is used to control the second safety level field device 800 to bring the reactor into a safe shutdown state after the first RPS protection system 200 fails; the backup information and control system 300 is also connected to the non-safety level field device 600 through the KIC computer information and control system 100, and is used to monitor the non-safety level field device information.

[0040] Understandably, in the face of the problems in the prior art such as unclear cabinet function allocation in the RPS system, shared field equipment between the DAS system and the RPS system, and the need for operators to move back and forth and operate between different panels after the RPS system fails and an accident occurs, the present invention uses a dual RPS protection system based on a safety-level DCS platform as an architecture to re-establish the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system. When the first RPS protection system 200 fails, the workstation loses the means of monitoring the safety-level equipment information. At this time, the operator transfers to the BUP backup disk 301 in the backup information and control system 300 for monitoring. When a design basis accident occurs, the BUP backup disk 301 can be used to bring the reactor to and maintain a safe shutdown state. Based on the requirements for the prevention of common cause failures of the protection system in the regulatory standards, the BUP backup disk 301 can be used as a backup means for the failure of the first RPS protection system 200, replacing the DAS system in the original technology to achieve diversified drive functions.

[0041] like Figure 2 As shown, the KIC computer information and control system 100 based on the non-safety-level DCS platform includes a main control room workstation 11 (OWP), and the main control room workstation 11 includes a nuclear island operator workstation, a conventional island operator workstation, a crew chief workstation, and a safety engineer workstation; the above four workstations have the same configuration, and any workstation is provided with a first NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device 111 and a first S-VDU safety-level control display device 112. It should be noted that the first S-VDU safety-level control display device 112 belongs to the first RPS protection system 200, but it is set in the main control room workstation 11 for the convenience of operator monitoring. Among them, the NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device is used to monitor non-safety-level equipment information and monitor safety-level equipment information, and the S-VDU safety-level control display device is used to monitor safety-level equipment information. Preferably, in order to feedback the device information as completely as possible, three first NC-VDU non-safety-level control and display devices 111 and two first S-VDU safety-level control and display devices 112 are provided on any workstation.

[0042] Each workstation is managed by an operator in the corresponding position. The four workstations are redundant but have different management authorities. Under normal operating conditions, the nuclear island operator and the conventional island operator operate at the corresponding nuclear island operator workstation and the conventional island operator workstation to monitor the safety and non-safety level systems and equipment in the nuclear power plant, while the crew chief workstation and the safety engineer workstation are in monitoring mode and have no operating authority. The crew chief and the safety engineer are mainly responsible for monitoring the status of the power plant and making judgments on the safety status of the power plant, and making operational and handling suggestions; when the nuclear island or conventional island operator workstation fails, the corresponding operator retreats to the crew chief workstation or the safety engineer workstation, logs in to enter the operating mode, and continues to monitor the safety and non-safety level systems and equipment.

[0043] The KIC computer information and control system 100 also includes an LDP screen 12. Preferably, in order to fully feedback the equipment information, four LDP screens 12 can be provided and placed in front of the main control room workstation 11. It can be understood that the display device on the main control room workstation 11 in the prior art has not been fully utilized, unless it is under a specific working condition where multiple data needs to be displayed, and the rest of the time it is generally shelved. In order to reduce the volume of the workstation, the first NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device 111 that is easily shelved is cancelled, and the four LDP screens 12 are used together with the nuclear island operator workstation and the conventional island operator workstation. Specifically, under normal circumstances, the operator can basically monitor the reactor through the three NC-VDU non-safety-level control display devices and two S-VDU safety-level control display devices on the workstation. At this time, the LDP screen 12 is used to display the comprehensive information of the main safety parameters of the power plant, the status of the main equipment and the alarm of the safety system, and provide the main control room personnel with an overall overview of the power plant status and provide a reference for information exchange when the unit is changing shifts. However, when an accident occurs or when executing digital procedures, the three NC-VDU non-safety-level control and display devices on the workstation are not sufficient to support the operator in completing the task. At this time, the LDP screen 12 can be used to monitor the reactor. At this time, the LDP screen 12 serves as a redundant means for the NC-VDU non-safety-level control and display device. Since the crew chief and safety engineer have no operating authority, their main task is to monitor the power plant status and make judgments on the safety status of the power plant, and to make operational and handling suggestions. Under normal operating conditions and accident conditions, the three NC-VDU non-safety-level control and display devices on the workstation can ensure the realization of functions. When the nuclear island or conventional island operator workstation fails, the operator retreats to the crew chief or safety engineer workstation, logs in and enters the operating mode, and can also use the LDP screen 12 to achieve the monitoring function.

[0044] The KIC computer information and control system 100 also includes a first monitoring network 13, a server module 14, a first system network 15, an LCS field control cabinet 16, and a COMS communication cabinet 17. The first NC-VDU non-security level control display device 111 and the LDP screen 12 are connected to the first monitoring network 13, the server module 14, and the first system network 15 in sequence, and then connected to the first ends of the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 respectively, and the second ends of the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 are connected to the non-security level field device 600; the third ends of the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 are also connected to the backup information and control system 300 respectively; specifically, the third ends of the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 are respectively connected to the BUP backup disk 301 in the backup information and control system 300.

[0045] Furthermore, the server module 14 includes a real-time server, a history server and a computing server. Among them, the real-time server serves as a connecting bridge between the first monitoring network 13 and the first system network 15, and can be used to collect process data from the LCS field control cabinet 16 or the COMS communication cabinet 17 in real time, transmit it to the computing server for processing, and send the operator's command to the LCS field control cabinet 16 or the COMS communication cabinet 17. The computing server can be used to receive all information from the real-time server, organize and save it, and also has alarm information management, procedure management and global calculation functions. The history server can be used to receive alarms and log information from the computing server, organize and store historical data for a long time, and maintain the historical database. The LCS field control cabinet 16 is used to complete the acquisition and output of IO signals, control operations, and can communicate with other control stations or communication stations; the COMS communication cabinet 17 is mainly responsible for completing the data communication function between the non-safety-level DCS platform and the third-party instrumentation and control system, and has control operation capabilities.

[0046] It can be understood that after the information of the non-safety-level field equipment 600 is collected and processed by the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17, it is transmitted to the first NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device 111 and the LDP screen 12 through the first system network 15, the server module 14 and the first monitoring network 13, or is sent to the non-safety-level display instrument 36 on the BUP backup disk 301 by the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 through hard wiring, and fed back to the operator; at the same time, the operator can use the first NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device 111 to issue manual operation instructions, which are transmitted to the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 through the first monitoring network 13, the server module 14, and the first system network 15 in turn; the operator can also use the non-safety-level hard manual operation on the BUP backup disk 301 to issue manual operation instructions, which are directly transmitted to the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 through hard wiring, thereby controlling the non-safety-level field equipment 600.

[0047] The KIC computer information and control system 100 is also connected to the first RPS protection system 200 through the third gateway, and the two ends of the third gateway are respectively connected to the first system network 15 and the first RPS protection system 200, so as to send the information of the first security level field device 700 to the KIC computer information and control system 100; it can be understood that sending to the KIC computer information and control system 100 refers to the first NC-VDU non-security level control display device transmitted to the main control room workstation 11, and the NC-VDU can monitor the security level device information in addition to monitoring the non-security level device information. Optionally, the two ends of the third gateway are respectively connected to the first system network 15 and the first gateway; and / or, the KIC computer information and control system 100 is connected to the second RPS protection system 400 through the fourth gateway; the two ends of the fourth gateway are respectively connected to the first system network 15 and the second RPS protection system 400; so as to send the information of the non-security level field device 600 to the second RPS protection system 400; optionally, the two ends of the fourth gateway are respectively connected to the first system network 15 and the second gateway.

[0048] like Figure 3 As shown, the first RPS protection system 200 based on the first safety level DCS platform includes a first monitoring module 201 and a first control module 202 connected to the first monitoring module 201 .

[0049] Further, the first monitoring module 201 includes a first S-VDU safety-level control display device 112, a first CIC device interface cabinet 28, a first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 27, a first SRC safety-related cabinet 26 and a first safety bus 25. Further, the first S-VDU safety-level control display device 112 set in the main control room workstation 11 is connected to the first SRC safety-related cabinet 26 through the first safety bus 25, and the other end of the first SRC safety-related cabinet 26 is respectively connected to the first ends of the first CIC device interface cabinet 28 and the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 27, and the second ends of the first CIC device interface cabinet 28 and the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 27 are respectively connected to the first safety-level field device 700. Among them, the first CIC device interface cabinet 28 can be used to collect the status feedback signal of the safety-level field device and send it to the main control room for display; at the same time, a first isolation module is provided therein, which is responsible for realizing the priority management function and driving function of the safety-level field device. The first SPC signal preprocessor is provided with a first conditioning module, which can be used to realize the functions of conditioning, isolating and distributing signals. The first SRC safety-related cabinet 26 can collect analog and digital signals from field equipment and send them to the main control room for display.

[0050] It can be understood that the information of the first safety level field device 700 is collected and processed by the first CIC equipment interface cabinet 28, the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 27 and the first SRC safety-related cabinet 26, and then transmitted to the first S-VDU safety level control display device 112 through the first safety bus 25 and fed back to the operator.

[0051] Further, the first control module 202 includes a first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22, a first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23, a first DTC data transmission cabinet 24, a first safety level system bus 21 and a first gateway; the first end of the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 is respectively connected to the first ends of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23 and the first DTC data transmission cabinet 24; the second ends of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23 and the first DTC data transmission cabinet 24 are connected to the first safety bus 25. The second end of the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 and the third end of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23 are connected to the third end of the first CIC device interface cabinet 28 through hard wiring. Among them, the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 is used to collect and process process signals and generate protection shutdown instructions. The first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23 is used to collect and process process signals and generate system-level dedicated instructions; the first DTC data transmission cabinet 24 can be used to transmit information such as system status, field equipment status, intermediate calculation results, and operation instructions within the first RPS protection system 200.

[0052] It can be understood that when a design basis accident occurs, the information of the first safety level field device 700 is sent by the first CIC equipment interface cabinet 28 to the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 and the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23 through hard wiring, or is collected and processed in sequence by the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 27, the first SRC safety related cabinet 26, the first safety bus 25 and the first DTC data transmission cabinet 24, and then transmitted to the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 and the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23; the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 and the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23 receive the information of the first safety level field device 700 and perform logical processing The first S-VDU safety level control display device 112 can be used to issue manual operation instructions. Instructions of different functions are sent to the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23 and the first SRC safety related cabinet 26 through the first safety bus 25, or to the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 through the first DTC data transmission cabinet 24. After logical processing, the instructions are sent to the first CIC equipment interface cabinet 28 through the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 23, the first SRC safety related cabinet 26, and the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 through hard wiring, thereby controlling the first safety level field equipment 700. The clear allocation and setting of each function of the RPS protection system cabinet can avoid the technical problem that it is difficult to find the corresponding cabinet for maintenance when a certain function fails in the RPS system.

[0053] Furthermore, the third end of the first RPC reactor protection cabinet 22 and the third end of the first DTC data transmission cabinet 24 are respectively connected to the first system network 15 through the first safety-level system bus 21 and the first gateway and the third gateway, thereby sending the information of the first safety-level field device 700 to the KIC computer information and control system 100; in other words, the information of the first safety-level field device 700 is sent to the first NC-VDU non-safety-level control and display device 111. In addition to monitoring the non-safety-level device information, the NC-VDU non-safety-level control and display device can also monitor the safety-level device information.

[0054] like Figure 4As shown, the backup information and control system 300 includes a BUP backup disk 301 and an ECP emergency shutdown disk 302 located in the main control room. The BUP backup disk 301 is respectively provided with a safety level display instrument 37, a non-safety level display instrument 36, a safety level switch 35, a non-safety level switch 34, an alarm light sign 32 and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen 31. The BUP backup disk 301 is also provided with a second S-VDU safety level control display device 33. It should be noted that the second S-VDU safety level control display device 33 belongs to the second RPS protection system 400, but in order to facilitate the operator to monitor it together, it is set on the BUP backup disk 301. The BUP backup disk 301 has a monitoring means for safety level and non-safety level equipment information, and has post-accident parameter monitoring and light sign alarm functions. Preferably, the safety level switch 35 can be a first safety level hard manual operation, and the non-safety level switch 34 can be a non-safety level hard manual operation. The ECP emergency shutdown panel 302 is provided with a second safety level hard manual operation for the operator to manually shutdown the reactor and manually start the dedicated safety facilities in an emergency; preferably, the ECP emergency shutdown panel 302 is provided between the nuclear island operator workstation and the conventional island operator workstation.

[0055] Under normal circumstances, the operator monitors the unit through the workstation 11. When the workstation 11 in the main control room is unavailable, the BUP backup disk 301 can be used to maintain the steady-state operation of the unit for several hours. If the workstation is still not restored after several hours, the reactor can be brought to and maintained in a safe shutdown state. In a sense, the BUP backup disk 301 can be used as a backup means for the failure of the workstation in a short period of time. The difference is that the monitoring of all safety-level equipment information on the workstation is realized by the first RPS protection system 200 based on the first safety-level DCS platform, and the monitoring of all safety-level equipment information on the BUP backup disk 301 and the ECP emergency shutdown disk 302 is realized by the second RPS protection system 400 based on the second safety-level DCS platform, and the first RPS protection system 200 and the second RPS protection system 400 use safety-level field devices that are independent of each other. After the failure of the first RPS protection system 200, the operator can use the BUP backup disk 301 to realize diversified driving functions.

[0056] like Figure 4 As shown, the second RPS protection system 400 based on the second safety level DCS platform includes a second monitoring module 401 and a second control module 402 connected to the second monitoring module 401; the second monitoring module 401 and the second control module 402 are respectively connected to the BUP backup disk 301; the second control module 402 is also connected to the ECP emergency shutdown disk 302.

[0057] Further, the second monitoring module 401 includes a second CIC device interface cabinet 48, a second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 49, a second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 and a second safety bus 46. Furthermore, the second S-VDU safety-level control display device 33 provided on the BUP backup disk 301 is connected to the first end of the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 through the second safety bus 46, the second end of the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 is respectively connected to the first ends of the second CIC device interface cabinet 48 and the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 49, and the second ends of the second CIC device interface cabinet 48 and the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 49 are respectively connected to the second safety-level field device 800. The third end of the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 is connected to the BUP backup disk 301. Among them, the second CIC equipment interface cabinet 48 can be used to collect the status feedback signal of the second safety level field equipment 800 and send it to the main control room for display; at the same time, it is provided with a second isolation module, which is responsible for realizing the priority management function and driving function of the second safety level field equipment 800. The second SPC signal preprocessor is provided with a second conditioning module, which can be used to realize the functions of conditioning, isolating and distributing the signal. The second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 can collect analog and digital signals from the second safety level field equipment 800 and send them to the main control room for display; at the same time, the manual control signal of the BUP backup disk 301 can be sent to the second CIC equipment interface cabinet 48.

[0058] It can be understood that the information of the second safety level field device 800 is collected and processed by the second CIC equipment interface cabinet 48, the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 49 and the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47, and then transmitted to the second S-VDU safety level control and display device 33 through the second safety bus 46, or is sent by the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 through hard wiring to the safety level display instrument 37 on the BUP backup disk 301, and fed back to the operator.

[0059] Further, the second control module 402 includes a second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43, a second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44, a second DTC data transmission cabinet 45 and a second safety level system bus 42; the first end of the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 is respectively connected to the first ends of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44 and the second DTC data transmission cabinet 45; the second ends of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44 and the second DTC data transmission cabinet 45 are connected to the second safety bus 46. The second end of the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 and the third end of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44 are respectively connected to the third end of the second CIC device interface cabinet 48, the BUP backup disk 301 and the ECP emergency shutdown disk 302 through hard wiring. The second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 and the third ends of the second DTC data transmission cabinet 45 are connected to the second safety level system bus 42. The second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 is used to collect and process process signals and generate protection shutdown instructions. The second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44 is used to collect and process process signals and generate system-level dedicated instructions. The second DTC data transmission cabinet 45 can be used to transmit information such as system status, field equipment status, intermediate calculation results, and operation instructions within the second RPS protection system 400.

[0060] Optionally, the safety level display instrument 37 provided on the BUP backup disk 301 can also be connected to the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 to feed back the information of the second safety level field equipment 800 to the BUP backup disk 301; the non-safety level display instrument 36 is also respectively connected to the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 to feed back the information of the non-safety level field equipment 700 to the BUP backup disk 301; the safety level switch 35 can also be respectively connected to the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44, the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 and the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 to issue manual operation instructions to control the second safety level field equipment 800; the non-safety level switch 34 can also be respectively connected to the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17 to issue manual operation instructions to control the non-safety level field equipment 600.

[0061] It can be understood that when the first RPS protection system 200 fails and a design basis accident occurs, the information of the second safety level field equipment 800 is sent from the second CIC equipment interface cabinet 48 to the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 and the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44 through hard wiring, or is collected and processed in sequence by the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 49, the second SRC safety related cabinet 47, the second safety bus 46 and the second DTC data transmission cabinet 45, and then transmitted to the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 and the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44; the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 and the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44 receive the information of the second safety level field equipment 800 and perform logical processing to generate automatic protection shutdown instructions and system-level dedicated instructions; at the same time, the operator can use the second S-VDU safety level control cabinet set on the BUP backup disk 301 The display device 33 issues manual operation instructions, and instructions of different functions are sent to the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44, the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 through the second safety bus 46, or sent to the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 through the second DTC data transmission cabinet 45; the operator can also use the safety-level hard manual operation on the BUP backup disk 301 and the ECP emergency shutdown disk 302 to issue manual operation instructions, and instructions of different functions are directly sent to the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44, the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 and the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 through hard wiring; the instructions after logical processing are then sent to the second CIC equipment interface cabinet 48 by the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 44, the second SRC safety-related cabinet 47 and the second RPC reactor protection cabinet 43 through hard wiring, thereby controlling the second safety-level field equipment 800.

[0062] The second RPS protection system 400 also includes an alarm processing cabinet 41 and a second gateway. The first ends of the alarm processing cabinet 41 and the second gateway are respectively connected to the second safety level system bus 42. The second end of the alarm processing cabinet 41 is connected to the alarm light sign 32 on the BUP backup disk 301. The second end of the second gateway is connected to the post-accident parameter monitoring screen 31 on the BUP backup disk 301. Among them, the alarm light sign 32 is used to feed back the alarm signal from the instrumentation and control system to the operator, prompting the operator that there is an abnormality in the unit; the alarm processing cabinet 41 is used to collect the alarm condition signal from the second RPS protection system 400, and generate a light sign alarm after logical processing. The post-accident parameter monitoring screen 31 is used to display and record the post-accident parameters, and also has the functions of alarm recording, trend display, etc. It can be understood that when the operator is monitoring on the BUP backup disk 301, the alarms related to the non-safety-level DCS platform are logically processed by the LCS cabinet and sent to the alarm light sign 32 through hard wiring, and the alarms related to the second safety-level DCS platform are logically processed by the alarm processing cabinet 41 and sent to the alarm light sign 32 or sent to the post-accident parameter monitoring screen 31 through the second safety-level system bus 42 and the second gateway for recording; the non-safety-level post-accident parameters are sent to the post-accident parameter monitoring screen 31 through the first system network 15, the fourth gateway and the second gateway, and the safety-level post-accident parameters are sent to the post-accident parameter monitoring screen 31 through the second DTC data transmission cabinet 45, the second safety-level system bus 42 and the second gateway.

[0063] like Figure 5 As shown, the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system also includes a SIC severe accident instrumentation and control system 500 based on a non-safety-level DCS platform; it is used to display the main parameters and the actions of some key actuators in the event of a power outage and a severe accident in the entire plant, so as to achieve the mitigation function after the severe accident occurs. The SIC severe accident instrumentation and control system 500 includes a SAP severe accident panel 51, a SAC severe accident processing cabinet 55, a second system network 54, a second server 53 and a second monitoring network 52; the SAP severe accident panel 51 is located in the main control room, and is provided with a second NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device, a non-safety-level hard manual operation and a display instrument for SAP.

[0064] Furthermore, the second NC-VDU non-safety level control display device is connected to the second monitoring network 52, the second server 53 and the second system network 54 in sequence, and then connected to the first end of the SAC serious accident processing cabinet 55. The second end of the SAC serious accident processing cabinet 55 is respectively connected to the fourth end of the first CIC equipment interface cabinet 28, the third end of the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 27, the third ends of the LCS field control cabinet 16 and the COMS communication cabinet 17, and the third end of the SAC serious accident processing cabinet 55 is connected to the SAP serious accident disk 51.

[0065] It can be understood that in the event of a power outage in the entire plant and a serious accident, the information of the relevant non-safety-level field equipment 600 is sent to the SAC serious accident processing cabinet 55 by the LCS field control cabinet 16 or the COMS communication cabinet 17 through hard wiring, and the information of the relevant safety-level field equipment is sent to the SAC serious accident processing cabinet 55 by the first CIC equipment interface cabinet 28 or the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet 27 through hard wiring. The relevant safety-level and non-safety-level information is collected and processed by the SAC serious accident cabinet, and then sent to the display instrument on the SAP serious accident disk 51 through hard wiring, or is sent to the second NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device on the SAP serious accident disk 51 through the second system network 54, the server, and the second monitoring network 52 in sequence, and fed back to the operator. The operator can use the hard manual operation on the SAP serious accident disk 51 to issue manual operation instructions, which are sent to the SAC serious accident cabinet through hard wiring; at the same time, the operator can also use the second NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device to issue manual operation instructions, which are sent to the SAC serious accident cabinet through the second monitoring network 52, the server, and the second system network 54 in sequence. The control instructions of the non-safety-level field equipment 600 are sent from the SAC serious accident cabinet to the LCS field control cabinet 16 or the COMS communication cabinet 17 through hard wiring, and then the non-safety-level field equipment 600 is controlled; the control instructions of the safety-level field equipment are sent from the SAC serious accident cabinet to the first CIC equipment interface cabinet 28 through hard wiring, and then the safety-level field equipment is controlled.

[0066] The nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system of the present invention is based on a dual RPS protection system based on a safety-level DCS platform as the architecture, and adopts two sets of completely independent field instruments and actuators. Under the premise of not changing the scale of the original BUP backup disk 301 equipment, by designing another set of safety-level DCS platform, the BUP backup disk 301 can replace the original DAS system to realize diversified driving functions, and avoid the risk of losing the diversified driving functions and the protection system functions at the same time after the field equipment fails in the prior art; the main control room cancels the entire DHP diversified human-machine interface disk, and the LDP screen 12 is shared with the workstation, which simplifies the main control room system and reduces the scale of the main control room; the BUP backup disk 301 can cope with both the workstation failure condition and the common cause failure of the protection system, and because the BUP backup disk 301 is also provided with a non-safety-level conventional instrument 36, it can monitor the non-safety-level equipment information, which solves the problem of the prior art that when the protection system fails, it is necessary to move back and forth and operate between the DHP disk and the workstation, thereby improving the work efficiency of the operator and reducing the human risk.

[0067] It can be understood that the above embodiments only express the preferred implementation modes of the present invention, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the patent scope of the present invention. It should be pointed out that, for ordinary technicians in this field, the above technical features can be freely combined without departing from the concept of the present invention, and several deformations and improvements can be made, which all belong to the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, all equivalent changes and modifications made to the scope of the claims of the present invention should belong to the coverage of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system, characterized in that: It comprises a KIC computer information and control system (100) based on a non-safety-level DCS platform, a first RPS protection system (200) based on a first safety-level DCS platform, a second RPS protection system (400) based on a second safety-level DCS platform, and a backup information and control system (300); The KIC computer information and control system (100) is connected to the non-safety-level field device (600) to monitor the non-safety-level field device information and to monitor the safety-level field device information; The first RPS protection system (200) is connected to the first safety level field device (700) and is used to control the first safety level field device (700) to enable the reactor to reach a safe shutdown state when responding to a design basis accident; The backup information and control system (300) is connected to the second safety level field device (800) via the second RPS protection system (400), and is used to control the second safety level field device (800) to bring the reactor into a safe shutdown state after the first RPS protection system (200) fails; The backup information and control system (300) is also connected to the non-safety-level field device (600) via the KIC computer information and control system (100) to monitor non-safety-level field device information; The KIC computer information and control system (100) comprises a main control room workstation (11) and an LDP screen (12) for displaying comprehensive information of the power station; the first RPS protection system (200) comprises a first S-VDU safety-level control and display device (112) for monitoring safety-level equipment information; the first S-VDU safety-level control and display device (112) is arranged on the main control room workstation (11); The main control room workstation (11) includes a nuclear island operator workstation, a conventional island operator workstation, a unit crew chief workstation, and a safety engineer workstation; each workstation is provided with a first NC-VDU non-safety level control display device (111) for monitoring non-safety level equipment information; The first RPS protection system (200) comprises a first monitoring module (201) and a first control module (202) connected to the first monitoring module (201); wherein the first monitoring module (201) comprises the first S-VDU safety-level control display device (112), a first CIC device interface cabinet (28), a first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet (27), a first SRC safety-related cabinet (26) and a first safety bus (25); the first S-VDU safety-level control display device (112) is connected to the first SRC safety-related cabinet (26) via the first safety bus (25); the other end of the first SRC safety-related cabinet (26) is respectively connected to the first ends of the first CIC device interface cabinet (28) and the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet (27); and the second ends of the first CIC device interface cabinet (28) and the first SPC signal preprocessing cabinet (27) are respectively connected to the first safety-level field device (700).

2. The nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The KIC computer information and control system (100) further comprises a first monitoring network (13), a server module (14), a first system network (15), an LCS field control cabinet (16), and a COMS communication cabinet (17); The first NC-VDU non-safety-level control display device (111) and the LDP screen (12) are respectively connected to the first monitoring network (13), the server module (14) and the first system network (15) in sequence, and then connected to the first ends of the LCS field control cabinet (16) and the COMS communication cabinet (17); the second ends of the LCS field control cabinet (16) and the COMS communication cabinet (17) are connected to the non-safety-level field device (600); and the third ends of the LCS field control cabinet (16) and the COMS communication cabinet (17) are also respectively connected to the backup information and control system (300).

3. The nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The KIC computer information and control system (100) is also connected to the first RPS protection system (200) via a third gateway to send information of the first security level field device (700) to the KIC computer information and control system (100); And / or, the KIC computer information and control system (100) is connected to the second RPS protection system (400) via a fourth gateway to send information of the non-safety-level field device (600) to the second RPS protection system (400).

4. The nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first control module (202) comprises a first RPC reactor protection cabinet (22), a first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (23), a first DTC data transmission cabinet (24), a first safety-level system bus (21) and a first gateway; The first end of the first RPC reactor protection cabinet (22) is respectively connected to the first ends of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (23) and the first DTC data transmission cabinet (24); the second ends of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (23) and the first DTC data transmission cabinet (24) are connected to the first safety bus (25); the second end of the first RPC reactor protection cabinet (22) and the third end of the first ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (23) are connected to the third end of the first CIC equipment interface cabinet (28) through hard wiring.

5. The nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The backup information and control system (300) comprises a BUP backup disk (301) and an ECP emergency shutdown disk (302); The BUP backup disk (301) is provided with a safety level display instrument (37), a non-safety level display instrument (36), a safety level switch (35), a non-safety level switch (34), an alarm light sign (32) and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen (31); the second RPS protection system (400) includes a second S-VDU safety level control and display device (33); the second S-VDU safety level control and display device (33) is arranged on the BUP backup disk (301); The ECP emergency shutdown panel (302) is provided with a second safety level hard manual operation, which is used by the operator to manually shutdown the reactor and manually start the dedicated safety facilities in an emergency.

6. The nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system according to claim 5, characterized in that: The second RPS protection system (400) comprises a second monitoring module (401) and a second control module (402) connected to the second monitoring module (401); the second monitoring module (401) and the second control module (402) are respectively connected to the BUP backup disk (301); the second control module (402) is also connected to the ECP emergency shutdown disk (302); The second monitoring module (401) comprises the second S-VDU safety level control display device (33), the second CIC device interface cabinet (48), the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet (49), the second SRC safety related cabinet (47) and the second safety bus (46); the second S-VDU safety level control display device (33) is connected to the first end of the second SRC safety related cabinet (47) through the second safety bus (46); the second end of the second SRC safety related cabinet (47) is respectively connected to the first ends of the second CIC device interface cabinet (48) and the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet (49); the second ends of the second CIC device interface cabinet (48) and the second SPC signal preprocessing cabinet (49) are respectively connected to the second safety level field device (800); the third end of the second SRC safety related cabinet (47) is connected to the BUP backup disk (301).

7. The nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system according to claim 6, characterized in that: The second control module (402) comprises a second RPC reactor protection cabinet (43), a second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (44), a second DTC data transmission cabinet (45) and a second safety-level system bus (42); The first end of the second RPC reactor protection cabinet (43) is respectively connected to the first ends of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (44) and the second DTC data transmission cabinet (45); the second ends of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (44) and the second DTC data transmission cabinet (45) are connected to the second safety bus (46); the second end of the second RPC reactor protection cabinet (43) and the third end of the second ESFAC dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (44) are respectively connected to the third end of the second CIC equipment interface cabinet (48), the BUP backup disk (301) and the ECP emergency shutdown disk (302) through hard wiring; the third ends of the second RPC reactor protection cabinet (43) and the second DTC data transmission cabinet (45) are connected to the second safety level system bus (42).

8. The nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The second RPS protection system (400) further comprises an alarm processing cabinet (41) and a second gateway, wherein first ends of the alarm processing cabinet (41) and the second gateway are respectively connected to the second safety level system bus (42), a second end of the alarm processing cabinet (41) is connected to the alarm light sign (32), and a second end of the second gateway is connected to the post-accident parameter monitoring screen (31).

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