An adaptive probability weighted voting method for decentralized autonomous organizations

Abstract

The present invention belongs to the field of blockchain technology and relates to a method for adaptive probability weighted voting in a decentralized autonomous organization. The user sets the proposal type, adds the proposal content and publishes it. The user votes for the proposal. If it is a financial proposal, the user can invest in the project. The system will record the voting time, otherwise it will only record the voting time. This process will record the importance of the proposal. If the proposal is classified as important, the proposal will be moved into the proposal list. The system will calculate the voting results and make them public. At this point, the contract completes a proposal. Different voting probabilities can be set according to the voting type, and attention weighting, time weighting and role weighting can be set for the vote to give different weights to the number of votes. While resisting voting attacks, it can meet more abundant voting scenarios and improve voting effectiveness and decision-making accuracy. This voting mechanism does not set participation parameters, because participation control can be realized in a variable manner by setting the rights of voters. From the perspective of flattening, complex number control parameters should no longer be set to improve DAO communication efficiency.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of blockchain and relates to an adaptive probability weighted voting method for a decentralized autonomous organization. Background Art

[0002] Voting is an important technical means for DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) to achieve decentralized governance. It is a consensus mechanism at the DApp user level. The voting mechanism carries the governance decision-making power and profit rights of the DAO platform. Based on the high programmability of blockchain technology and smart contracts, DAO has developed a variety of voting governance mechanisms in just a few years.

[0003] At present, the DAO voting mechanism is developing rapidly, but different voting mechanisms can only solve problems in vertical scenarios. Analysis shows that the main problems that need to be solved by the current voting mechanism are as follows:

[0004] (1) The contradiction between the expansion and reduction of voting rights. The contradiction in the setting of voting rights is that when the rights are set too high, the smaller the number of participants, the lower the credibility of the proposal; and when the rights are set too low, the professionalism of the decision-making will be reduced when the number of participants is large, which may lead to short-sighted DAO strategies, and these two situations usually occur at the same time. It is necessary to design more flexible voting permissions and voting weight distribution to improve the accuracy of community governance.

[0005] (2) Voting attention attack. If the number of proposals is not limited, anyone can dilute the voters' attention by sending a large number of proposals to the system, causing high-quality proposals to not be noticed. At the same time, if the votes are only arranged by time, key community proposals cannot be extracted. It is necessary to control the voting rights of users and effectively control the attention of users on high-quality proposals.

[0006] (3) The quadratic voting mechanism has the defect of group voting attack. The quadratic function X2 does not converge, and there is no limit when X approaches ∞. In addition, the crime cost in this mechanism is quadratically related to the number of participants. As the number of participants increases, the crime cost decreases significantly, and there is a risk of consortium matchmaking and monopolizing voting. A safer voting method is needed to balance the relationship between voting fairness and voice.

[0007] (4) Last-minute voting attack. Box voting has a clear voting settlement time. The last-minute attack mode is that users take advantage of the fact that the proposal is about to end and cast a large number of votes to influence the proposal result. It is necessary to increase the cost of users' last-minute voting attacks through voting weight design. Summary of the invention

[0008] In view of the defects of existing voting schemes, the present invention provides a decentralized autonomous organization adaptive probability weighted voting method.

[0009] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0010] A decentralized autonomous organization adaptive probability weighted voting method, including the following contents:

[0011] (1) Set user permissions, user account information, and voting parameters.

[0012] This voting mechanism has a user permission module. The user permission module is designed to allow the system to meet the usage needs of different organizations and balance the different requirements for decentralized and centralized permissions in the governance of different decentralized organizations. The user permission module can be personalized and expanded according to the needs of the DAO organization, but it must include: user permission list, proposal voting permission setting function, and proposal expert permission classification setting function.

[0013] This voting mechanism has a funding module. The DAO organization has a public funding pool to provide asset management functions for investment-related DAOs. Users have personal asset accounts, and users can trade with each other or invest funds in the public funding pool. The funding module can be customized according to the needs of the DAO organization, but it must include user accounts, public funding pool accounts, and transfer functions.

[0014] Voting parameter data includes the attention coefficient of important proposals, the influence coefficient of expert voting, the voting time decay coefficient, the basic passing ratio of proposals, and the minimum passing ratio of financial proposals. By setting voting parameters, voting can be more in line with various organizational governance scenarios.

[0015] (2) Set the proposal type. Select the type to be published from the decision-making proposal and financial proposal, then set the voting user permissions and expert weighting parameters, and finally set the voting deadline. The setting of these parameters will affect the vote calculation weight and the probability of the vote passing. The voting user permissions default to ordinary users can only choose to initiate a vote for all people to participate. Only users who support certain permission authentication can limit the permission types of users who can participate in the vote when initiating a vote. This design can separate the votes of different project groups and departments, and improve the verticality of user voting. The expert weighting parameter setting will determine the influence of the expert user's vote. Users can set their own permissions as the expert type for this vote. The proposal has no expert weighting by default.

[0016] (3) Add proposal content and publish it. Users complete the proposal content according to the selected proposal type, and the specific content of the proposal is expanded according to the needs of the DAO organization. In addition, users add corresponding proposal options according to different proposal types.

[0017] (3.1) The decision proposal is responsible for the allocation of authority within the DAO and voting on important development directions. This proposal has only two voting results: approval or rejection. You can choose to set a smart contract that can be executed after the proposal is passed to complete the DAO governance, and the voting parameters can also be adjusted through the decision contract.

[0018] (3.2) Financial proposals are responsible for financing-related scenarios within the DAO and decide investment strategies through voting. This proposal also only contains two voting results: approval and rejection. Financial proposals can add the amount of funds required for this investment and specify the user's payment address. The sources of funds for financial proposals are divided into two types: DAO fund pool and user private investment. The difficulty of passing the proposal will fluctuate according to the source of funds. The more private investment, the lower the difficulty of passing the proposal. After the proposal is passed, the fund module will be called to package the funds into a transaction and send it to the payment address. The receiving user can use the account funds to complete the investment strategy.

[0019] (4) Users vote for proposals. Users browse the proposal list and vote on proposals. Proposals are divided into two categories: important proposals and ordinary proposals. The design of important proposals is to save user attention and allow major proposals to be discovered in a timely manner. Users can also filter proposals by type and browse proposal information in a targeted manner.

[0020] (5) Users invest in projects. If the proposal type is a financial proposal, users can use their personal accounts to add funds to increase the chances of the proposal being passed during voting. Financial proposals will record the participants and investment data of this transaction and store them on the blockchain. The transaction records provide reliable evidence for subsequent investment returns.

[0021] (6) Record the user's voting time. After the vote is completed, the block transaction time of this vote will be stored. The voting time is the user's voting weight parameter. The relationship between the voting time and the proposal duration is established, so that the later the vote is, the lower the weight of the vote is, thereby resisting the last minute voting attack.

[0022] (7) Record the importance of proposals. Record the popularity of voting. The more users participate in voting, the higher the popularity of voting. When the popularity meets the screening conditions for entering important proposals, the proposal will be transferred from the ordinary proposal list to the important proposal list. The difficulty value of heat judgment is positively correlated with the number of proposals in the current important proposal list. This mechanism can control the user's attention within a certain range.

[0023] (8) Calculate the voting results of proposals. In the voting of decision proposals and financial proposals, the voting results are calculated based on parameters such as the number of voters, voting time, individual contribution amount, and user type.

[0024] (9) Execute the contract to complete the proposal. If the proposal is passed and there is a pending contract, the corresponding governance contract is executed and the proposal result is recorded; if there is no pending contract, the proposal result is recorded directly.

[0025] The present invention can set different voting probabilities according to the voting type, and set attention weighting, time weighting and role weighting for voting to give different weights to the number of votes, so as to meet more diverse voting scenarios and improve voting effectiveness and decision-making accuracy while resisting voting attacks. This voting mechanism does not set participation parameters, because participation control can be realized by setting the rights of voters in a variable manner. From the perspective of flattening, complex number control parameters should not be set to improve the communication efficiency of DAO. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0026] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the time influence weight coefficient of the present invention.

[0027] Figure 2(a) Schematic diagram of the traditional flat matrix organizational structure.

[0028] Figure 2(b) Schematic diagram of a decentralized matrix organizational structure.

[0029] Figure 3 This is a flow chart of the adaptive probability weighted voting of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0030] The specific implementation of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and technical solutions.

[0031] Example 1: Description of related algorithms

[0032] An adaptive probability weighted voting method for decentralized autonomous organizations includes three mechanisms: a proposal attention mechanism, a weighted voting mechanism, and a flexible proposal judgment mechanism based on financial differences.

[0033] (1) Proposal Attention Mechanism

[0034] In order to increase users' attention to popular projects and reduce attention dilution, the proposal list is divided into two categories: important proposal list and general proposal list. All proposals are initially ordinary proposals. The proposal popularity is calculated after each vote, and proposals with higher attention will be transferred to the important proposal list. The discriminant formula for proposal importance is:

[0035]

[0036] Among them, L imp is the number of important proposals, α is the transfer difficulty coefficient, V n is the total voting value of users in the current proposal. Where α>1, the mechanism has an impact on the number of important proposals P imp The reliance on α ensures the ability to defend against dilution of voter attention. DAO organizations can set appropriate community attention management based on community capacity and community purpose by adjusting α to control the number of important voting lists.

[0037] (2) Weighted Voting Mechanism Voting basis calculation methods are generally divided into three types: one token one vote (one yuan one vote), one person one vote, and quadratic voting. One yuan one vote over-concentrates privileged interests and poses a serious monopoly risk. In the currently popular quadratic voting, the cost of crime is quadratically related to the number of participants. As the number of participants increases, the cost of crime decreases significantly, and there is a risk of consortiums monopolizing voting. This voting mechanism will add a weighted and elastic probability design to the one person one vote (1T1V) mechanism to balance the contradiction between power concentration and decentralization, and use adjustable parameters to adapt to different DAO usage scenarios.

[0038] The one-person-one-vote mechanism can ensure the absolute decentralization of power, but in actual use, the decision-making accuracy will be reduced due to the excessive decentralization of power. This voting algorithm uses a weighted voting mechanism to control the influence weight of each vote, thereby flexibly controlling the voting influence of each person.

[0039] Voting designs expert voting influence, flexibly controls the importance of each person's vote to increase the influence of experts on decision-making in proposals; designs time influence, controls the time of participation in voting to solve the problem of last-minute voting. In addition, both influence weight algorithms provide adjustment parameters, and different DAO organizations can control the importance of influence through adjustment parameters to adapt to different organizational scenarios.

[0040] Define the user voting value V i Initially it is 1, and the weight coefficient of expert voting influence is W pt When initiating a proposal, you can set the expert user authority category required for the proposal, and judge different users through the authority module. When the user authority is an expert, the default value is 1.25, and when the user authority is an ordinary user, the value is 1. The expert authority value (greater than or equal to 1) can be modified according to the DAO vote, so that it can adapt to the degree of dependence of different DAO scenarios on expert decisions.

[0041] Time influence weight coefficient W t The calculation method is composed of a constant equation and an elliptic standard equation, such as Figure 1 As shown, the formula is:

[0042]

[0043] In the formula, T n T is the confirmation time of this vote on the blockchain. d is the proposal deadline, φ, (0<φ≤1) is the voting time decay coefficient, the default value is 0.5, which means that the importance of voting will gradually decrease when the proposal deadline is halfway through. The second function is derived from the standard equation of an ellipse with the major axis as y. The voting time decay coefficient is a variable parameter. By changing the voting time decay coefficient through DAO voting, the tolerance of the organization to the voting time can be adjusted. In summary, each user vote value Vi The calculation method is:

[0044] V i =W pf ·W t (3)

[0045] (3) Flexible proposal judgment mechanism based on financial gap

[0046] This proposal judgment mechanism is applicable to financial proposals and decision-making proposals, and the formula (4) is used to judge whether the proposal is passed. n Indicates the total voting value of the current user, which is the personal voting value V i U all Indicates the total number of people who can vote for this proposal. pass Indicates the basic approval rate of proposals. The default value is 0.5, which means that all proposals need 50% of the voters to agree to be effective. base Indicates the minimum passing rate of the proposal. The default value is 0.2, which means that in the case of private investment, the proposal will be valid only if at least 20% of the voters agree. goal Indicates the amount of investment required for this proposal in the financial proposal. private represents the ratio of private investment in financial proposals (F private Less than F goal ), where F private The larger the value, the easier it is for a proposal to be passed. * When it is 0, it can be used to judge the validity of the decision proposal.

[0047]

[0048] Among them, P pass and P base The difference between represents the financial difference of the financial proposal. The financial difference represents the degree of influence of the user's private investment on the probability of the proposal passing, which mainly affects the probability of the financial proposal passing. Its purpose is to ensure the fairness of voting while increasing the passing rate of private investment proposals, so that the financial proposal can take into account fairness while leaving a certain amount of flexible negotiation space for private investment. Parameter P pass and P base For adjustable parameters, parameter values ​​can be changed through DAO voting. Changing the value can indirectly change the influence of the organization's proposals on the proposals through difficulty and private investment.

[0049] Example 2: Voting system demonstration

[0050] According to the voting model proposed in this patent, a specific application demonstration is given. This application demonstration includes permission module, fund module and voting module.

[0051] Permission module.

[0052] The permission module is built to make the system meet the usage needs of different organizations and balance the different requirements of decentralized organizations for decentralized and centralized permissions when building communities. The permission module issues different permissions to users to implement DAO organization member management, and can generate forms that adapt to different decentralized organizations according to the business composition of different organizations.

[0053] The matrix organizational structure can improve the shortcomings of poor horizontal connection and lack of structural flexibility under vertical functional division. It is an organizational form formed by adding a horizontal leadership system on the basis of the vertical organizational system. This organizational structure is mobile and flexible, and can be organized or disbanded with the development and completion of the project. It is very suitable for the personnel management needs of DAO's free entry and exit.

[0054] like Figure 1 As shown, the structure of the permission module refers to the matrix organizational structure model of the flat company structure in management, and the decentralized matrix organizational structure is designed through improvement. Based on the company-type flat matrix organization, the decentralized matrix organizational structure is improved. In the improvement, the two leadership positions of CEO and project leader in the original structure are removed, and a new permission type of non-position member is added to represent members who do not join the field but belong to the organization in the DAO. Permissions are divided into field permissions and project permissions. Field permissions represent the specific departments that users join in this organization. According to different DAO construction rules, the required number of fields can be established; project permissions represent the project group of the organization construction. According to the design of different DAO rules, users can join multiple fields and participate in multiple projects at the same time. In addition, members can not belong to any field or project at all.

[0055] By setting different permissions to plan member activity rules, transactions within the DAO system will implement different access restrictions based on permissions. The scope of domain permissions is larger than that of project permissions. Both permissions can be used to control users who can vote on proposals. Domain permissions can also control which users can participate in community rule-making. If the DAO system does not set control permissions for community rule-making, all users must participate in voting consensus to modify the community rules.

[0056] Anyone can initiate any type of proposal, but when setting what permissions users can hold to vote on this proposal, the scope of permissions that can be selected will change according to the permissions held by the proposer. When a user initiates a transaction proposal or a decision proposal, he or she can choose the scope of permissions that can participate in the vote. He or she can choose a proposal that everyone can participate in, or he or she can choose some members of the same permission type as the user to participate in this proposal. When initiating a decision proposal to determine whether a user can join or exit a certain field, voters can only be members within the corresponding permissions or all members of the community; members with other permissions cannot vote individually to determine whether a user obtains another permission.

[0057] The relevant affairs involved in this module are:

[0058] Set the domain permission type that can publish announcement information;

[0059] Set domain and project permissions to vote on general affairs proposals and decision proposals;

[0060] (Optional) Set the domain permission type that allows voting on investment proposals;

[0061] (Optional) Set the domain permission type that can vote on the user's admission conditions to join the organization;

[0062] (Optional) Set the domain permission type that can vote on the proposal of new permission type;

[0063] (Optional) Sets the domain permission type that can vote on proposals to change organizational governance parameters;

[0064] If the permission settings of the above optional types are empty, it is assumed that the relevant operations can only be modified by consensus voting of all community members through global proposals.

[0065] The key data fields included in the permission module are domain permission field and project permission field.

[0066] The functions of the permission module include:

[0067] (1)Add new domain / project permissions.

[0068] (2) Set user domain / project permissions.

[0069] (3) Revoke user domain / project permissions.

[0070] (4) Query all users within a certain field / project authority.

[0071] (5) Determine whether the user has certain permissions.

[0072] (6) View a user's permission matrix.

[0073] (7) View all permission matrix types for the organization.

[0074] Funding module:

[0075] The DAO organization has a public fund pool to provide asset management functions for investment-related DAOs. Users have personal asset accounts, and users can trade with each other or invest funds in the public fund pool. The assets in the public fund pool belong to the members of the DAO. Public fund investment decisions are made by the community members through the initiation of financial proposals. The user rights that can participate in financial proposals can be set in the DAO rules. Asset transactions in public chain DAOs are usually circulated by the main chain token currency as a voucher. Some DAOs allow the issuance of internal token currencies to give internal currency circulation value through the main chain token currency pledge, but these solutions are not suitable for alliance chain scenarios. The system design uses the off-chain asset oracle and the token currency in the DAO to tightly bind to stabilize the value of digital tokens and eliminate financial market-making risks.

[0076] The ERC20 protocol is used to implement virtual property management. The functions included in the module are as follows:

[0077] (1) The user recharges the account with cash.

[0078] (2) The user withdraws funds from the account and clears the tokens.

[0079] (3) The user transfers funds to a private account.

[0080] (4) The user transfers funds to the public fund pool account.

[0081] (5) View my account information.

[0082] (6) Smart contract calls transfer - the public account votes and transfers the funds to the designated account.

[0083] (7) Smart contract transfer call - multi-signature transfer from a public account to a designated account.

[0084] Voting module:

[0085] The voting module is responsible for the development decision-making and community affairs governance of DAO. The community reaches consensus through proposal voting to determine the development strategy of the organization. The design of the voting module determines the fairness and availability of DAO and is the core part of the DAO architecture. Users use this module to initiate multiple types of proposals, vote, and execute voting results. The module implements authority judgment, voting records, and decision judgment functions. In addition, it also provides a voting parameter adjustment interface to adjust the probability of passing the voting mechanism by initiating proposals, further expanding the application scenarios of voting.

[0086] Traditional proposal calculations only make one-way decision proposals on voting matters, which are used to directly promote community development behavior. The expensive transaction fees on the public chain make the contract design as simple as possible, with a single voting mode. More complex voting uses off-chain methods to implement cheating space. This voting module is based on a private chain, with low on-chain governance costs, and batch modification through contract design further reduces transaction costs.

[0087] The voting module functionally implements three general proposal methods: one-way decision proposal, financial proposal, and transaction processing proposal. The module combines the advantages of various current voting mechanisms and analyzes the shortcomings of current voting, and proposes adaptive probability weighted voting to achieve multi-parameter consensus decision-making that can be flexibly set for transactions. This method improves the selectivity, effectiveness, and anti-attack of voting. The functions included in the module are as follows:

[0088] (1) Publish a proposal.

[0089] (2) View all proposals.

[0090] (3) Review the content of the proposal.

[0091] (4)User voting

[0092] (5) Users view votes.

[0093] (6) Set voting control parameters.

[0094] The voting process demonstrated in this application is as follows Figure 3 As shown, the specific steps are as follows:

[0095] (1) Set the user permissions in the permission module, the user account information in the fund module, and the voting parameters in the voting module as shown in this application scenario.

[0096] (2) Set the proposal type. In this step, you need to select the type of proposal you want to publish from the three types of proposals: decision-making proposals and financial proposals. Then set the voting user permissions and expert weighting parameters, and finally set the voting deadline. The setting of these parameters will affect the vote calculation weight and the probability of vote passing. By default, the voting user permissions allow ordinary users to only choose to initiate a vote for all people to participate. Only users who support certain permission authentication can limit the permission types of users who can participate in the vote when initiating a vote. This design can separate the votes of different project groups and departments, and improve the verticality of user voting. The expert weighting parameter setting will determine the influence of the expert user's vote. Users can set their own permissions as the expert type for this vote. By default, proposals do not have expert weighting.

[0097] (3) Add proposal content and publish it. In this step, users need to complete the corresponding proposal content according to the selected proposal type. First, users need to fill in the proposal title, proposal description, and proposal attachment file (optional) included in all proposal types. The proposal title and description are saved in the transaction block to be published. The original file content of the proposal attachment file is sent to the IPFS module and the file index Hash is saved in the transaction block. The proposal attachment file is an extension of the proposal. The saved file has properties such as non-tamperability and authentication. Next, add corresponding proposal options according to different proposal types.

[0098] (3.1) Transaction proposals are responsible for common complex transaction decisions within the DAO. This proposal has two transaction modes: single-choice and multiple-choice. The results of this type of proposal are displayed in a list format, showing user voting participation and voting data. Transaction proposals represent daily transaction processing within the DAO, so there is no option to pass the proposal. The other two types of voting represent DAO organizational development decisions, so they will calculate whether the proposal is passed.

[0099] (3.2) The decision proposal is responsible for the allocation of rights within the DAO and voting on important development directions. This proposal has only two voting results: approval or rejection. You can choose to set a smart contract that can be executed after the proposal is passed, thereby adjusting the parameters within the DAO. The smart contract execution can call the permission module to adjust user parameters, such as: adding department permissions, adding project permissions, and modifying user permissions; it can also call the contract events in this module to change the voting calculation parameters. The decision proposal implements the execution of smart contracts by calling, providing an extended interface for voting on complex DAO contracts, and improving the diversity and scalability of the proposal execution contract.

[0100] (3.3) Financial proposals are responsible for financing-related scenarios within the DAO, and decide on the organization's investment strategy through voting. This proposal also only contains two voting results: approval and rejection. Financial proposals can add the amount of funds required for this investment and specify the user's payment address. The sources of funds for financial proposals are divided into two types: DAO fund pool and user private investment. The difficulty of passing the proposal will fluctuate according to the source of funds. The more private investment, the lower the difficulty of passing the proposal. After the proposal is passed, the fund module will be called to package the funds into a transaction and send it to the payment address. The receiving user can use the account funds to complete the investment strategy.

[0101] (4) Users vote for proposals. In this stage, users browse the proposal list and vote on proposals. Proposals are divided into two categories: important proposals and ordinary proposals. The design of important proposals is to save user attention and allow major proposals to be discovered in a timely manner. Users can also filter proposals by type and browse proposal information in a targeted manner.

[0102] (5) Users invest in projects. If the proposal type is a financial proposal, users can use their personal accounts to add funds to increase the chances of the proposal being passed during voting. Financial proposals will record the participants and investment data of this transaction and store them on the blockchain. The transaction records provide reliable evidence for subsequent investment returns.

[0103] (6) Record the user's voting time. After the vote is completed, the block transaction time of this vote will be stored. The voting time is the user's voting weight parameter. The relationship between the voting time and the proposal duration is established, so that the later the vote is, the lower the weight of the vote is, thereby resisting the last minute voting attack.

[0104] (7) Record the importance of proposals. This step records the popularity of voting. The more users participate in voting, the higher the popularity of voting. When the popularity meets the screening conditions for entering important proposals, the proposal will be transferred from the ordinary proposal list to the important proposal list. The value of the difficulty of heat judgment is positively correlated with the number of proposals in the current important proposal list. This mechanism can control the user's attention within a certain range.

[0105] (8) Calculate the voting results of proposals. In the voting of decision proposals and financial proposals, the voting results are calculated based on the number of voters, voting time, individual contribution amount, user type and other parameters; in the voting of transaction proposals, the voting results are displayed based on the voting content and user type. Transaction proposals are responsible for handling daily voting, and their results do not have proposal validity judgment parameters.

[0106] (9) Execute the contract to complete the proposal. If the proposal is passed and there is a pending contract, the corresponding governance contract will be executed and the proposal result will be recorded; if there is no pending contract, the proposal result will be recorded directly.

Claims

1. A decentralized autonomous organization adaptive probability weighted voting method, characterized by: (1) Set user permissions, user account information, and voting parameters The user authority module is designed to enable the system to meet the usage needs of different organizations and balance the different requirements for decentralized and centralized authority in the governance of different decentralized organizations. The user authority module is customized and expanded according to the needs of the DAO organization, but must include: user authority list, proposal voting authority setting function, and proposal expert authority classification setting function; Users have personal asset accounts, and they can trade with each other and invest their funds in a public fund pool; The funding module can be customized according to the needs of the DAO organization, but it must include user accounts, public funding pool accounts and transfer functions; Voting parameter data includes the attention coefficient of important proposals, the influence coefficient of expert voting, the voting time decay coefficient, the basic passing ratio of proposals, and the minimum passing ratio of financial proposals. By setting voting parameters, voting can be made more suitable for various organizational governance scenarios. (2) Set the proposal type Select the type to be published from the decision proposal and financial proposal, then set the voting user permissions and expert weighting parameters, and finally set the voting deadline; the setting of these parameters will affect the vote calculation weight and the probability of voting passing; the voting user permissions default to ordinary users can only choose to initiate a vote for all people to participate, and only users with certain permission authentication can limit the permission types of users who can participate in the vote when initiating a vote; the expert weighting parameter setting will determine the influence of the expert user's vote. The user sets the permissions he or she has as the expert type for this vote, and the proposal has no expert weighting by default; (3) Add proposal content and publish (3.1) The decision proposal is responsible for the allocation of authority within the DAO and voting on important development directions. The proposal has only two voting results: approval or rejection. The smart contract that can be executed after the proposal is passed is selected to complete the DAO governance. The voting parameters can also be adjusted through the decision contract. (3.2) Financial proposals are responsible for financing-related scenarios within the DAO and decide investment strategies through voting. This proposal also only contains two voting results: approval and rejection. The financial proposal adds the amount of funds required for this investment and specifies the user's payment address. The sources of funds for financial proposals are divided into two types: the DAO fund pool and user private investment. The difficulty of passing the proposal will fluctuate according to the source of funds. The more private investment, the lower the difficulty of passing the proposal. After the proposal is passed, the fund module will be called to package the funds into a transaction and send it to the payment address. The receiving user can use the account funds to complete the investment strategy. (4) Users vote for proposals Users browse the proposal list and vote on proposals. Proposals are divided into two categories: important proposals and ordinary proposals. Users can also filter proposals by type to browse proposal information in a targeted manner. (5) Users invest in projects If the proposal type is a financial proposal, you can use your personal account to add funds during voting to increase the chances of the proposal being passed. Financial proposals will record the participants and investment data of this transaction and store them on the blockchain. The transaction records provide reliable evidence for subsequent investment returns. (6) Record user voting time After the vote is completed, the block transaction time of this vote will be stored. The voting time is the user's voting weight parameter. The relationship between the voting time and the proposal duration is established, so that the later the vote is, the lower the weight of the vote is, thereby resisting the last minute voting attack; (7) Record the importance of the proposal Record the popularity of voting. The more users participate in voting, the higher the popularity of voting. When the popularity meets the screening conditions for entering important proposals, the proposal will be transferred from the ordinary proposal list to the important proposal list. The difficulty value of heat judgment is positively correlated with the number of proposals in the current important proposal list. This mechanism can control user attention within a certain range. (8) Calculate the voting results of the proposal In the voting of decision proposals and financial proposals, the voting results are calculated based on the number of voters, voting time, individual contribution amount, and user type parameters; (9) Execute the contract to complete the proposal If the proposal is passed and there is a pending contract, the corresponding governance contract will be executed and the proposal result will be recorded; if there is no pending contract, the proposal result will be recorded directly.

2. The method for adaptive probability weighted voting of a decentralized autonomous organization as described in claim 1 is further characterized by: The decentralized autonomous organization adaptive probability weighted voting method includes three mechanisms: proposal attention mechanism, weighted voting mechanism and elastic proposal judgment mechanism based on financial difference; (1) Proposal Attention Mechanism All proposals are initially common proposals. The popularity of proposals is calculated after each vote. Proposals with higher popularity will be transferred to the list of important proposals. The discriminant formula for proposal importance is: Among them, L imp is the number of important proposals, α is the transfer difficulty coefficient, V n is the total voting value of users in the current proposal; where α>1, the mechanism has an impact on the number of important proposals P imp The reliance on α ensures the ability to defend against dilution of voter attention; DAO organizations can control the number of important voting lists by adjusting α to set appropriate community attention management for community capacity and community purpose; (2) Weighted voting mechanism The voting basis calculation method is generally divided into three types: one token one vote, one person one vote and quadratic voting. One yuan one vote over-concentrates privileged interests and poses a serious monopoly risk. This voting mechanism will add weighted and flexible probability design to the one person one vote mechanism to balance the contradiction between power concentration and decentralization, and use adjustable parameters to adapt to different DAO usage scenarios. The one-person-one-vote mechanism ensures absolute decentralization of power, but in actual use, the decision-making accuracy will be reduced due to excessive decentralization of power. This voting algorithm uses a weighted voting mechanism to control the influence weight of each vote, thereby flexibly controlling the voting influence of each person; Voting is designed to influence expert votes, and the importance of each person's vote is flexibly controlled to increase the influence of experts on decision-making in proposals; time influence is designed to control the time of participation in voting to solve the problem of last-minute voting; and both influence weight algorithms provide adjustment parameters, and different DAO organizations can control the importance of influence through adjustment parameters to adapt to different organizational scenarios; Define the user voting value V i Initially it is 1, and the weight coefficient of expert voting influence is w pf ; When initiating a proposal, you can set the expert user authority category required for the proposal, and judge different users through the authority module; when the user authority is an expert, the default value is 1.25, and when the user authority is an ordinary user, the value is assigned to 1, where the expert authority value is greater than or equal to 1 and can be modified according to DAO voting, so that it can adapt to the degree of dependence of different DAO scenarios on expert decisions; Time influence weight coefficient W t The calculation method is composed of a constant equation and an elliptic standard equation, and the formula is: In the formula, T n T is the confirmation time of this vote on the blockchain. d is the proposal deadline, φ, (0<φ≤1) is the voting time decay coefficient, the default value is 0.5, which means that the importance of voting will gradually decrease when the proposal deadline is halfway through; the second function is derived from the standard equation of an ellipse with the major axis v; the voting time decay coefficient is a variable parameter, and changing the voting time decay coefficient through DAO voting can adjust the organization's tolerance for voting time; in summary, the calculation method for each user's voting value Vi is: V i =W pf ·W t (3) (3) Flexible proposal judgment mechanism based on financial gap This proposal judgment mechanism is applicable to financial proposals and decision-making proposals. Formula (4) is used to judge whether a proposal is passed. In the formula, V n Indicates the total voting value of the current user, which is the personal voting value V i U all Indicates the number of people who can vote for this proposal; P pass Indicates the basic approval rate of the proposal. The default value is 0.5, which means that all proposals need 50% of the voters to agree to be effective. base Indicates the minimum passing rate of the proposal. The default value is 0.2, which means that in the case of private investment, the proposal will be valid only if at least 20% of the voters agree. goal Indicates the amount of investment required for this proposal in a financial proposal; F private represents the ratio of private investment in financial proposals, F private Less than F goal , in the formula F private The larger the value, the easier it is for the proposal to be passed. * When it is 0, it can be used to judge the validity of the decision proposal; Among them, P pass and P base The difference between represents the financial difference of the financial proposal; the financial difference represents the degree of influence of the user's private investment on the probability of the proposal passing, which mainly affects the probability of the financial proposal passing; its purpose is to ensure the fairness of voting while increasing the passing rate of private investment proposals, so that the financial proposal can take into account fairness while leaving a certain amount of flexible negotiation space for private investment; the parameter P pass and P base For adjustable parameters, the parameter value can be changed through DAO voting. Changing the value indirectly changes the influence of the organization's proposal on the proposal through difficulty and private investment.

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