Signal deception identification method and device

Abstract

The present application relates to the field of communications, and provides a signal deception identification method and device. The method includes: obtaining the spatial coordinates of an observation satellite according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris; obtaining the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station; determining the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station; if the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold, determining that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a deception signal. The signal deception identification method provided in the embodiment of the present application can identify most of the deception signals that only tamper with the ephemeris, which is simple, fast, and has high identification efficiency.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a signal deception identification method and device. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, the application of GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) high-precision positioning services in my country's railway system has grown rapidly. The railway is building a CORS (Continuously Operating Reference Stations) network in the industry. Ensuring that it provides stable and reliable high-precision positioning services to railway users around the clock and in all regions has become an urgent need for the application and development of GNSS technology in railways. As the international situation intensifies, trade wars and technology wars between countries continue to ferment. As an important national infrastructure, the service capability and signal stability of the satellite navigation system are important contents related to the safe operation of key national infrastructure. Since the signal power of satellite navigation signals reaching the ground is low and the information of the civilian part is open, it is very easy to be affected by deceptive signals, resulting in the receiver calculating the wrong position, speed or time. In recent international military conflicts, interference and deception against GNSS signals have been observed many times. As an important infrastructure, while vigorously promoting the application of Beidou / GNSS technology, it is crucial to ensure that the satellite navigation positioning signals are accurate and not deceptive. For important war preparedness lines such as the Sichuan-Tibet Railway and the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, it is even more important to ensure the safe use of the lines in peacetime and wartime.

[0003] However, most existing deception identification methods are too complicated and have high requirements on software and hardware, which affects the efficiency of deception identification. Summary of the invention

[0004] The embodiments of the present application provide a signal deception identification method and device to solve the technical problems that the existing deception identification methods are too complicated and have high requirements on software and hardware, thus affecting the efficiency of deception identification.

[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a signal spoofing identification method, comprising:

[0006] The spatial coordinates of the observed satellite are obtained according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris;

[0007] Obtaining a spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station;

[0008] Determining the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station;

[0009] If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoofing signal.

[0010] In one embodiment, after determining the pseudo-range between the observation satellite and the reference station, the method further comprises:

[0011] If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is less than or equal to a set threshold, the actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna; the actual carrier phase difference is the actually measured carrier phase difference between different array elements, the sample carrier phase difference is the carrier phase difference between different array elements stored in the sample library, and the actual carrier phase difference between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference between different array elements of the same array antenna are both carrier phase differences obtained for the same observation satellite;

[0012] If the actual direction of arrival is inconsistent with the direction of arrival calculated in the ephemeris, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoof signal.

[0013] In one embodiment, determining the actual direction of arrival of the signal of the observation satellite according to the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna includes:

[0014] The actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the correlation coefficient matrix of the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna.

[0015] In one embodiment, determining the actual direction of arrival of the signal of the observation satellite according to the correlation coefficient matrix of the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna includes:

[0016] Determining an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna;

[0017] Performing correlation calculation on an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and a sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna to determine the correlation coefficient matrix;

[0018] The actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the correlation coefficient matrix.

[0019] In one embodiment, determining an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna includes:

[0020] Respectively performing orthogonal despreading on the observation satellite signals received by different array elements of the array antenna to obtain in-direction signals and orthogonal signals of the observation satellite signals received by the different array elements;

[0021] Determine the phase difference between the observation satellite signal received by the array element and the local pseudo code according to the arc tangent function of the ratio of the amplitude of the co-directional signal to the amplitude of the orthogonal signal of each array element;

[0022] According to the difference in phase difference between the observation satellite signal received by the different array elements and the local pseudo code, an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna is determined.

[0023] In one embodiment, determining the actual direction of arrival of the signal of the observation satellite according to the correlation coefficient matrix includes:

[0024] The actual arrival direction of the signal from the observation satellite is determined according to the actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix.

[0025] In one embodiment, determining the actual direction of arrival of the signal of the observation satellite according to the actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix includes:

[0026] Determining a quantitative relationship between the actual carrier phase difference and the actual direction of arrival according to the spacing between the different array elements and the signal wavelength of the observation satellite;

[0027] The actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix is ​​substituted into the quantitative relationship to determine the actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite.

[0028] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a signal spoofing identification device, comprising:

[0029] The spatial coordinate acquisition module is used to obtain the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris;

[0030] A spatial distance calculation module, used to obtain the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station;

[0031] A pseudorange determination module is used to: determine the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station;

[0032] The first spoofing signal determination module is used to determine that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoofing signal if the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold.

[0033] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, including a processor and a memory storing a computer program, wherein when the processor executes the program, the steps of the signal deception identification method described in the first aspect are implemented.

[0034] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the signal deception identification method described in the first aspect.

[0035] The signal deception identification method and device provided in the embodiments of the present application obtain the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris, and then calculate the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station. By comparing the error between the pseudorange and the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station, it is determined whether the signal sent by the observation satellite is a deception signal. If the error is large, it is determined to be a deception signal. The method provided in the embodiments of the present application can identify most of the deception signals that only tamper with the ephemeris. It is simple, fast and has high identification efficiency. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present application or the prior art, a brief introduction will be given below to the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0037] Figure 1 This is one of the flow charts of the signal deception identification method provided in the embodiment of the present application;

[0038] Figure 2 This is the second flow chart of the signal deception identification method provided in the embodiment of the present application;

[0039] Figure 3 This is the third flow chart of the signal deception identification method provided in the embodiment of the present application;

[0040] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of a signal deception identification device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0041] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of this application clearer, the technical solutions in this application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of this application, not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0043] Figure 1 This is one of the flow charts of the signal deception identification method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 , the present application embodiment provides a signal deception identification method, which may include:

[0044] 101. Obtain the spatial coordinates of the observed satellite according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris;

[0045] Ephemeris refers to the precise position or trajectory table of celestial bodies over time in GPS measurement. It is a function of time and can accurately calculate, predict, depict and track the time, position, speed and other operating conditions of satellites and flying objects; it can express the precise parameters of celestial bodies, satellites, spacecraft, missiles, space debris and other flying objects; it can place flying objects in three-dimensional space; it can use time to depict the past, present and future of celestial bodies in three dimensions, and can be applied to the prediction, positioning, orbit, tracking and measurement of military, astronomy, aerospace and spacecraft, and the calculation, prediction, depiction and tracking of space debris.

[0046] 102. Obtaining a spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station;

[0047] The base station is a fixed ground observation station that conducts long-term continuous observation of satellite navigation signals and transmits the observation data in real time or at a fixed time to the data center through communication facilities.

[0048] Assume that the spatial coordinates of the reference station are the coordinates of the Earth-centered Earth-fixed coordinate system (X S ,Y S ,Z S ), the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite i are the coordinates of the Earth-centered Earth-fixed coordinate system (X i ,Y i ,Z i ), the theoretical spatial distance between the two can be calculated as:

[0049]

[0050] 103. Determine the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station;

[0051] Pseudorange refers to the distance between the measuring station and the satellite, which contains clock errors and atmospheric refraction delays, measured using the correlation technology of the pseudo-random code broadcast by the satellite and the receiver's replica code when the global positioning system is used for navigation and positioning.

[0052] 104. If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudo-range is greater than a set threshold, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a deceptive signal.

[0053] It should be noted that, in actual applications, there is no strict timing relationship between step 101 and step 103; that is, they can be executed simultaneously, or any one step can be executed first, depending on actual needs and is not limited here, but step 102 must be executed after step 101.

[0054] The signal deception identification method provided in this embodiment obtains the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris, and then calculates the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station. By comparing the error between the pseudorange and the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station, it is determined whether the signal sent by the observation satellite is a deception signal. If the error is large, it is determined to be a deception signal. The method provided in the embodiment of the present application can identify most of the deception signals that only tamper with the ephemeris. It is simple, fast and has high identification efficiency.

[0055] Figure 2 This is the second flow chart of the signal deception identification method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 In one embodiment, if the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudo-range is less than or equal to a set threshold, the spoofing signal can be identified by the following method, including:

[0056] 201. Determine an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna;

[0057] The actual carrier phase difference is the carrier phase difference between different array elements actually measured. This step measures and calculates the actual carrier phase difference between two different array elements in the same array antenna, and forms an actual carrier phase difference matrix with the actual carrier phase differences between all two different array elements in the same array.

[0058] 202. Perform correlation calculation on an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of an array antenna and a sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna to determine a correlation coefficient matrix;

[0059] The sample carrier phase difference is the carrier phase difference between different array elements stored in the sample library. The actual carrier phase difference between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference between different array elements of the same array antenna are both carrier phase differences obtained for the same observation satellite.

[0060] Assume that N different actual carrier phase differences between each pair of elements are selected from the M elements of the array antenna, where N ≤ M(M-1). For the i-th observation satellite, let is the matrix composed of these N actual carrier phase differences, is the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different elements of the same array antenna, where q is the number of search angles, and q = 1, 2, ..., Q, Q ≥ 1, then the correlation coefficient matrix is ​​calculated according to the following formula:

[0061]

[0062] Among them, ρ iq It is the correlation coefficient matrix between the actual carrier phase difference matrix and the sample carrier phase difference matrix of the signal of the i-th observation satellite received by different array elements of the array antenna at the q-th search angle, and there are Q correlation coefficient values ​​in the matrix.

[0063] 203. Determine a quantitative relationship between an actual carrier phase difference and an actual direction of arrival according to the spacing between the different array elements and the signal wavelength of the observation satellite;

[0064] The direction of arrival refers to the direction of arrival of the spatial signal, that is, the directional angle of each signal arriving at the reference element of the array.

[0065] According to the interferometer angle measurement principle, the relationship between the signal incident direction (i.e., wave arrival direction) and the carrier phase difference can be obtained as follows:

[0066]

[0067] in, is the actual carrier phase difference of the signal received by array element k and array element m from the i-th observation satellite, and k≠m, λ is the signal wavelength of the i-th observation satellite, d is the spacing between array element k and array element m, θ i is the actual arrival direction of the signal from the i-th observation satellite.

[0068] By measuring The actual direction of arrival θ of the signal from the i-th observation satellite can be determined i When the array element spacing meets half wavelength, the measured It changes monotonically between (-π,π). Since the unambiguous range of the actual carrier phase difference measurement is (-π,π), the unambiguous range of the actual wave arrival direction is ±90° in the normal direction.

[0069] 204. Substitute the actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix into the quantitative relationship to determine the actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite;

[0070] The actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the maximum value of the Q correlation coefficient values Substituting into formula (2-1), we can get the actual arrival direction θ of the signal from the i-th observation satellite: i .

[0071] 205. If the actual arrival direction is inconsistent with the arrival direction calculated in the ephemeris, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a deceptive signal.

[0072] It should be noted that, in actual applications, there is no strict timing relationship between step 202 and step 203; that is, they can be executed simultaneously, or any one step can be executed first, depending on actual needs and is not limited here.

[0073] This embodiment calculates the actual carrier phase difference matrix of the same signal received by different array elements of the same array, and calculates the correlation matrix between the actual carrier phase difference matrix and the sample carrier phase difference matrix, then draws on the principle of correlation interferometer to obtain the quantitative relationship between the carrier phase difference and the wave arrival direction, selects the wave arrival direction corresponding to the actual carrier phase difference with the largest correlation as the actual wave arrival direction of the received signal, and finally compares it with the satellite direction calculated by ephemeris to realize the detection and identification of deception, improve the accuracy of deception signal identification, and can effectively identify GNSS deception signals appearing in the railway high-precision positioning service area, and then notify the users in the domain through broadcasting, network, correction number and other methods, so as to avoid the adverse effects of GNSS deception interference signals on normal railway operations and ensure the safe and stable operation of the railway system.

[0074] Figure 3 This is the third flow chart of the signal deception identification method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 In one embodiment, determining an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of an array antenna may include:

[0075] 301. Perform orthogonal despreading on observation satellite signals received by different array elements of the array antenna respectively to obtain in-direction signals and orthogonal signals of the observation satellite signals received by the different array elements;

[0076] 302. Determine the phase difference between the observation satellite signal received by the array element and the local pseudo code according to the arc tangent function of the ratio of the amplitude of the in-direction signal to the amplitude of the orthogonal signal of each array element;

[0077]

[0078] in, is the phase difference between the i-th observation satellite signal received by array element m and the local pseudo code, A 1,im A is the amplitude of the same-direction signal of the i-th observation satellite signal received by array element m, 2,imThe amplitude of the orthogonal signal of the i-th observation satellite signal received by array element m.

[0079] Actual phase difference In the range of [-90°,90°], the result can be considered as a linear solution.

[0080] 303. Determine an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna according to the difference in phase difference between the observation satellite signal received by the different array elements and the local pseudo code.

[0081] The actual carrier phase difference between different elements of the array antenna is calculated according to the following formula:

[0082]

[0083] in, is the actual carrier phase difference of the signal received by array element k and array element m from the i-th observation satellite, is the phase difference between the i-th observation satellite signal received by array element k and the local pseudo code, is the phase difference between the i-th observation satellite signal received by array element m and the local pseudo code.

[0084] An actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna is obtained according to a combination of multiple actual carrier phase differences.

[0085] This embodiment can calculate the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna according to the characteristics of the phase difference between the received signal and the local pseudo code.

[0086] The signal deception identification device provided in an embodiment of the present application is described below. The signal deception identification device described below and the signal deception identification method described above can be referenced to each other.

[0087] Figure 4 Schematic diagram of the structure of the signal deception identification device provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 , the embodiment of the present application provides a signal deception identification device, which may include:

[0088] The spatial coordinate acquisition module 401 is used to obtain the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris;

[0089] The spatial distance calculation module 402 is used to obtain the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station;

[0090] The pseudorange determination module 403 is used to: determine the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station;

[0091] The first spoofing signal determination module 404 is configured to determine that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoofing signal if the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold.

[0092] The signal deception identification device provided in this embodiment obtains the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris, and then calculates the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station. By comparing the error between the pseudorange and the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station, it is determined whether the signal sent by the observation satellite is a deception signal. If the error is large, it is determined to be a deception signal. The method provided in the embodiment of the present application can identify most of the deception signals that only tamper with the ephemeris. It is simple, fast and has high identification efficiency.

[0093] In one embodiment, a second fraud signal determination module (not shown) is further included, which is used to:

[0094] If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is less than or equal to a set threshold, the actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna; the actual carrier phase difference is the actually measured carrier phase difference between different array elements, the sample carrier phase difference is the carrier phase difference between different array elements stored in the sample library, and the actual carrier phase difference between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference between different array elements of the same array antenna are both carrier phase differences obtained for the same observation satellite;

[0095] If the actual direction of arrival is inconsistent with the direction of arrival calculated in the ephemeris, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoof signal.

[0096] In one embodiment, the second fraud signal determination module is specifically configured to:

[0097] The actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the correlation coefficient matrix of the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna.

[0098] In one embodiment, the second fraud signal determination module is specifically configured to:

[0099] Determining an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna;

[0100] Performing correlation calculation on an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and a sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna to determine the correlation coefficient matrix;

[0101] The actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the correlation coefficient matrix.

[0102] In one embodiment, the second fraud signal determination module is specifically configured to:

[0103] Respectively performing orthogonal despreading on the observation satellite signals received by different array elements of the array antenna to obtain in-direction signals and orthogonal signals of the observation satellite signals received by the different array elements;

[0104] Determine the phase difference between the observation satellite signal received by the array element and the local pseudo code according to the arc tangent function of the ratio of the amplitude of the co-directional signal to the amplitude of the orthogonal signal of each array element;

[0105] According to the difference in phase difference between the observation satellite signal received by the different array elements and the local pseudo code, an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna is determined.

[0106] In one embodiment, the second fraud signal determination module is specifically configured to:

[0107] The actual arrival direction of the signal from the observation satellite is determined according to the actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix.

[0108] In one embodiment, the second fraud signal determination module is specifically configured to:

[0109] Determining a quantitative relationship between the actual carrier phase difference and the actual direction of arrival according to the spacing between the different array elements and the signal wavelength of the observation satellite;

[0110] The actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix is ​​substituted into the quantitative relationship to determine the actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite.

[0111] Figure 5 An example of a physical structure diagram of an electronic device is shown in FIG. Figure 5 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 510, a communication interface 520, a memory 530 and a communication bus 540, wherein the processor 510, the communication interface 520 and the memory 530 communicate with each other through the communication bus 540. The processor 510 may call a computer program in the memory 530 to execute the steps of the signal deception identification method, for example including:

[0112] The spatial coordinates of the observed satellite are obtained according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris;

[0113] Obtaining a spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station;

[0114] Determining the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station;

[0115] If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoofing signal.

[0116] In addition, the logic instructions in the above-mentioned memory 530 can be implemented in the form of a software functional unit and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when it is sold or used as an independent product. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application can be essentially or partly embodied in the form of a software product that contributes to the prior art, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several instructions to enable a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk.

[0117] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, the computer program product including a computer program, the computer program may be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer can perform the steps of the signal spoofing identification method provided in the above embodiments, for example, including:

[0118] The spatial coordinates of the observed satellite are obtained according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris;

[0119] Obtaining a spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station;

[0120] Determining the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station;

[0121] If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoofing signal.

[0122] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present application further provides a processor-readable storage medium, wherein the processor-readable storage medium stores a computer program, wherein the computer program is used to enable the processor to execute the steps of the methods provided in the above embodiments, for example, including:

[0123] The spatial coordinates of the observed satellite are obtained according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris;

[0124] Obtaining a spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station;

[0125] Determining the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station;

[0126] If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoofing signal.

[0127] The processor-readable storage medium can be any available medium or data storage device that can be accessed by the processor, including but not limited to magnetic storage (such as floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes, magneto-optical disks (MO), etc.), optical storage (such as CD, DVD, BD, HVD, etc.), and semiconductor storage (such as ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, non-volatile memory (NANDFLASH), solid-state drive (SSD)), etc.

[0128] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment. Ordinary technicians in this field can understand and implement it without paying creative labor.

[0129] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solution is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a disk, an optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.

[0130] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, rather than to limit it. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A signal deception identification method, characterized in that: include: The spatial coordinates of the observed satellite are obtained according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris; Obtaining a spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station; Determining the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station; If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoofing signal.

2. The signal deception identification method according to claim 1, characterized in that: After the pseudo-range between the observation satellite and the reference station is determined, the method further comprises: If the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is less than or equal to a set threshold, the actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna; the actual carrier phase difference is the actually measured carrier phase difference between different array elements, the sample carrier phase difference is the carrier phase difference between different array elements stored in the sample library, and the actual carrier phase difference between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference between different array elements of the same array antenna are both carrier phase differences obtained for the same observation satellite; If the actual direction of arrival is inconsistent with the direction of arrival calculated in the ephemeris, it is determined that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoof signal.

3. The signal deception identification method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The determining the actual direction of arrival of the signal of the observation satellite according to the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna comprises: The actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the correlation coefficient matrix of the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna.

4. The signal deception identification method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The determining the actual direction of arrival of the signal of the observation satellite according to the correlation coefficient matrix of the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and the sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna comprises: Determining an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna; Performing correlation calculation on an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna and a sample carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the same array antenna to determine the correlation coefficient matrix; The actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite is determined according to the correlation coefficient matrix.

5. The signal deception identification method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The determining of the actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna comprises: Respectively performing orthogonal despreading on the observation satellite signals received by different array elements of the array antenna to obtain in-direction signals and orthogonal signals of the observation satellite signals received by the different array elements; Determine the phase difference between the observation satellite signal received by the array element and the local pseudo code according to the arc tangent function of the ratio of the amplitude of the co-directional signal to the amplitude of the orthogonal signal of each array element; According to the difference in phase difference between the observation satellite signal received by the different array elements and the local pseudo code, an actual carrier phase difference matrix between different array elements of the array antenna is determined.

6. The signal deception identification method according to claim 4, characterized in that: Determining the actual direction of arrival of the signal of the observation satellite according to the correlation coefficient matrix includes: The actual arrival direction of the signal from the observation satellite is determined according to the actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix.

7. The signal deception identification method according to claim 6, characterized in that: Determining the actual direction of arrival of the signal of the observation satellite according to the actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix includes: Determining a quantitative relationship between the actual carrier phase difference and the actual direction of arrival according to the spacing between the different array elements and the signal wavelength of the observation satellite; The actual carrier phase difference corresponding to the correlation coefficient with the largest value in the correlation coefficient matrix is ​​substituted into the quantitative relationship to determine the actual arrival direction of the signal of the observation satellite.

8. A signal deception identification device, characterized in that: include: The spatial coordinate acquisition module is used to obtain the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite according to the orbital parameters in the ephemeris; A spatial distance calculation module, used to obtain the spatial distance between the observation satellite and the reference station according to the spatial coordinates of the observation satellite and the spatial coordinates of the reference station; A pseudorange determination module is used to: determine the pseudorange between the observation satellite and the reference station; The first spoofing signal determination module is used to determine that the signal sent by the observation satellite is a spoofing signal if the absolute value of the difference between the spatial distance and the pseudorange is greater than a set threshold.

9. An electronic device comprising a processor and a memory storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the signal spoofing identification method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the signal spoofing identification method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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