Authentication method for communication content between vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and intelligent domain controller

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of authentication methods of vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and intelligent domain controller communication content, adopt the encryption method of combination of asymmetric key and symmetric key, overcome the identity authentication and replay attack problem between car terminal system, and then can prevent the attack of malicious false information injection initiated using car end V2X-OBU;When the transmission times between intelligent domain controller and V2X-OBU reach predetermined threshold, send update key request to hardware encryption machine, increase the security of communication between intelligent domain controller and V2X-OBU by introducing periodic replacement key mechanism.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of intelligent connected vehicles, and particularly relates to an authentication method for communication content between an onboard V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller. Background Technology

[0002] Intelligent connectivity is a key technology for realizing highly automated driving intelligent vehicles. Through intelligent connectivity technology, intelligent vehicles can share perception and planning information with surrounding vehicles and intelligent infrastructure, greatly expanding their perception capabilities of the surrounding driving environment and thus enhancing their ability to cope with complex driving environments. As the information interaction between intelligent vehicles and the outside world expands, the information security design of the autonomous driving system also becomes more complex. Since the vehicle's planning decisions are based on external information acquired by the vehicle, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the information received by the vehicle is a crucial guarantee for the safety of the autonomous driving system. In the intelligent connected environment, direct communication based on V2X technology is an important means of information sharing between vehicles and between vehicles and intelligent infrastructure. When designing the vehicle's EE architecture, the information security of V2X messages must be fully considered.

[0003] The connectivity function of intelligent connected vehicles can be divided into two modes: transmission and reception. In transmission mode, the intelligent domain controller (IVC) fuses and analyzes sensor information to form planning decisions and generates V2X event messages according to design logic. The IVC then sends these V2X event messages to the V2X-OBU (V2X-OBU), which processes the received messages and broadcasts them to the surrounding area via the air interface. In reception mode, the V2X-OBU processes the messages received via the air interface and sends them to the IVC. The IVC uses the received V2X messages as the basis for forming planning decisions. In both modes, the accuracy of the V2X messages is crucial, so necessary protection measures need to be added to the message processing flow to ensure their authenticity. During communication between the IVC and the V2X-OBU, without an authentication mechanism for the communication content, attackers may use other signal sources to replace the IVC, causing the V2X-OBU to broadcast malicious false information generated by a fake signal source to the surrounding area via the air interface, creating a security vulnerability. This type of false information injection attack is as follows: Figure 1 As shown. Existing authentication mechanisms only exist between vehicles, such as authentication between OBUs. Therefore, it is necessary to add a communication content authentication mechanism to the communication protocol between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU to prevent spoofing attacks. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To address the problems existing in the prior art, the purpose of this application is to provide an authentication method for the communication content between the vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and the intelligent domain controller, which can prevent attacks that use the vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU to inject malicious false information.

[0005] According to a first aspect of the embodiments of this application, an authentication method for communication content between an on-board V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller is provided, comprising:

[0006] (1) Initialization: The hardware encryption machine uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate private and public keys for the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU, and sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU.

[0007] (2) Key authentication: The intelligent domain controller generates a symmetric encryption key through a symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts the symmetric encryption key based on its own private key and the public key of the V2X-OBU to form transmission ciphertext, and the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmission ciphertext and authenticate whether the symmetric encryption key is valid.

[0008] (3) Data transmission: The intelligent domain controller uses an effective symmetric encryption key to generate ciphertext for transmission data, and the V2X-OBU uses the effective symmetric encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext for transmission data to obtain the corresponding data packet;

[0009] (4) Automatic key update: When the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches a predetermined threshold, a key update request is sent to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new private and public keys for the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm, and sends the public key and the respective private key to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and returns to step (2) until the data transmission ends.

[0010] Furthermore, step (1) specifically involves:

[0011] The hardware encryption machine generates public and private keys for the intelligent domain controller, V2X-OBU, and hardware encryption machine based on an asymmetric algorithm. These keys are stored in the key registration list on which the hardware encryption machine is based. The public keys of the three are transmitted to the intelligent domain controller and V2X-OBU via the CAN bus protocol, and the private keys of each are transmitted to the intelligent domain controller and V2X-OBU respectively.

[0012] Further, in step (2), the symmetric encryption key is encrypted using the user's private key and the V2X-OBU's public key to form the transmission ciphertext, including:

[0013] The intelligent domain controller uses its private key to sign and encrypt the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp, and uses the signature and timestamp as the ciphertext header; it uses the public key of the V2X-OBU to encrypt the randomly generated symmetric key to form the ciphertext content, and the ciphertext header and ciphertext content form the transmission ciphertext.

[0014] Further, in step (2), the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmitted ciphertext and authenticate whether the symmetric encryption key is valid, including:

[0015] V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller to decrypt the ciphertext header and compares it with the hash value of the timestamp. If they match, the authentication is successful. After successful authentication, V2X-OBU uses its own private key to decrypt the ciphertext content to generate a randomly generated symmetric key. If the randomly generated symmetric key is not in V2X-OBU's random generated symmetric key registration table, the key is considered valid.

[0016] Furthermore, step (3) specifically involves:

[0017] The intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU communicate with each other via the CAN bus. The transmitted data ciphertext consists of two parts: a ciphertext header and a ciphertext content. The intelligent domain controller uses a valid randomly generated symmetric key to sign and encrypt the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp. This signature and timestamp constitute the ciphertext header. The data packets transmitted by the intelligent domain controller are encrypted using a valid randomly generated symmetric key to form the ciphertext content.

[0018] After receiving the transmitted ciphertext, the V2X-OBU decrypts it using a valid randomly generated symmetric key. The signature in the ciphertext header is decrypted and compared with the timestamp. If the comparison is successful, the decrypted data packet is considered to be valid and trustworthy communication content.

[0019] Further, in step (4), when the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches a predetermined threshold, the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU send an update key request to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new public keys and new private keys corresponding to the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm. The hardware encryption machine transmits the new public keys and new private keys of the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU to the IDC via the CAN bus, and transmits the new public keys and new private keys of the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU to the OBU via the CAN bus. The intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU authenticate the received keys. After successful authentication, they return to step (2). The intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU use the new public and private key pairs to transmit data.

[0020] Furthermore, the ciphertext sent by the hardware encryption device to the intelligent domain controller includes a ciphertext header and ciphertext content. The hardware encryption device uses its existing private key to sign and encrypt the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp. The resulting signature and timestamp form the ciphertext header. The intelligent domain controller uses its existing public key to encrypt the new public keys of the hardware encryption device, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU, as well as the new private key of the IDC, to form the ciphertext content. The intelligent domain controller uses the hardware encryption device's existing public key to decrypt the signature and compare it with the hash value of the timestamp. If they match, the authentication is successful.

[0021] According to a second aspect of the embodiments of this application, an authentication device for communication content between an on-board V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller is provided, comprising:

[0022] Initialization module: The hardware encryption machine uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate private and public keys for the hardware encryption machine, intelligent domain controller, and V2X-OBU, and sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and V2X-OBU;

[0023] Key authentication module: The intelligent domain controller generates a symmetric encryption key through a symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts the symmetric encryption key based on its own private key and the public key of the V2X-OBU to form transmission ciphertext, and the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmission ciphertext and authenticate whether the symmetric encryption key is valid.

[0024] Data transmission module: The intelligent domain controller uses a valid symmetric encryption key to generate ciphertext for transmitting data, and the V2X-OBU uses the valid symmetric encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext for transmitting data to obtain the corresponding data packet;

[0025] Automatic Key Update Module: When the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches 80% of a predetermined threshold, an update key request is sent to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new private and public keys for the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm, sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and returns to the key authentication module until the data transmission ends.

[0026] According to a third aspect of the embodiments of this application, an electronic device is provided, comprising:

[0027] One or more processors;

[0028] Memory, used to store one or more programs;

[0029] When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors perform the method as described in the first aspect.

[0030] According to a fourth aspect of the embodiments of this application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided that stores computer instructions thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the method as described in the first aspect.

[0031] The technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application may include the following beneficial effects:

[0032] As can be seen from the above embodiments, this application adopts an encryption method that combines asymmetric and symmetric keys to overcome the problems of identity authentication and replay attacks between vehicle-mounted systems, thereby preventing attacks that use the vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU to launch malicious false information injection; when the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches 80% of a predetermined threshold, an update key request is sent to the hardware encryption machine. By introducing a periodic key replacement mechanism, the security of communication between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU is increased.

[0033] It should be understood that the above general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only, and do not limit this application. Attached Figure Description

[0034] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application.

[0035] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a disinformation injection attack according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0036] Figure 2 This is an exemplary embodiment illustrating the architecture of an intelligent domain controller and a V2X-OBU.

[0037] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method for communication content between an onboard V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller, according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0038] Figure 4 This is a block diagram illustrating an authentication device for communication content between an onboard V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller, according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0039] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of an electronic device according to an exemplary embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0040] Exemplary embodiments will now be described in detail, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description relates to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numbers in different drawings represent the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with this application.

[0041] The terminology used in this application is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the application. The singular forms “a,” “the,” and “the” used in this application and the appended claims are also intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term “and / or” as used herein refers to and includes any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

[0042] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc., may be used in this application to describe various information, such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish information of the same type from one another. For example, without departing from the scope of this application, first information may also be referred to as second information, and similarly, second information may also be referred to as first information. Depending on the context, the word "if" as used herein may be interpreted as "when," "when," or "in response to determination."

[0043] In one type of automotive EE architecture, V2X functionality is implemented by a V2X-OBU independent of the intelligent domain controller, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the V2X-OBU interacts with the intelligent domain controller via Ethernet or CAN communication protocols. In another type of vehicle EE architecture, the V2X function is integrated into the intelligent domain controller. This application applies to the first type of case.

[0044] This application provides a method for authenticating the communication content between an onboard V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller. The communication content between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU can be authenticated using digital signatures to ensure the authenticity of the communication content. Figure 3 As shown, the method may include the following steps:

[0045] (1) Initialization: The hardware encryption machine uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate private and public keys for the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU, and sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU.

[0046] (2) Key authentication: The intelligent domain controller generates a symmetric encryption key through a symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts the symmetric encryption key based on its own private key and the public key of the V2X-OBU to form transmission ciphertext, and the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmission ciphertext and authenticate whether the symmetric encryption key is valid.

[0047] (3) Data transmission: The intelligent domain controller uses an effective symmetric encryption key to generate ciphertext for transmission data, and the V2X-OBU uses the effective symmetric encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext for transmission data to obtain the corresponding data packet;

[0048] (4) Automatic key update: When the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches 80% of the predetermined threshold, a key update request is sent to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new private and public keys for the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm, sends the public key and the respective private key to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and returns to step (2) until the data transmission ends.

[0049] In practice, the vehicle will complete the hardware installation of the Intelligent Domain Controller (IDC), Hardware Encryption Machine (HSM), and V2X On-Board Unit (V2X-OBU) in a trusted environment. The trusted environment includes officially authorized locations such as production lines and dealerships.

[0050] In the specific implementation of step (1), initialization: the hardware encryption machine uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate the private key and public key of the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU;

[0051] Specifically, intelligent domain controllers need to use some asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate a public-private key pair representing their identity and ensure that the private key portion is not leaked. This can be achieved using software or hardware. Typically, to ensure key security and improve encryption efficiency, a hardware encryption machine (HSM) is used to manage the keys of the vehicle's secure communication hardware units throughout their entire lifecycle.

[0052] In one embodiment, the HSM generates public and private keys corresponding to the IDC, OBU, and HSM based on the RSA asymmetric algorithm, and stores them in the HSM's key registration list. The HSM transmits the public keys of the three entities to the IDC and OBU devices via the CAN (Controller Area Network) bus protocol, and the private keys of each entity are transmitted to the IDC and OBU devices respectively. The initial distribution will be completed in a trusted environment.

[0053] It is necessary to ensure that the V2X-OBU only accepts legitimate public keys and cannot be configured to accept arbitrary public keys. This requires ensuring that users of the V2X-OBU only have access to the functions pre-configured for the OBU, and not the authority to modify the OBU settings, especially key-related settings. Therefore, the initial installation of the V2X-OBU must be completed on the vehicle production line or at a 4S dealership. During the initialization process, both the vehicle's intelligent domain controller key management permissions and the V2X-OBU key management permissions are required to inject the public key, and the entire process must be completed in a closed and trusted environment.

[0054] In the specific implementation of step (2), key authentication: the intelligent domain controller generates a symmetric encryption key through a symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts the symmetric encryption key based on its own private key and the public key of the V2X-OBU to form transmission ciphertext, and the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmission ciphertext and authenticate whether the symmetric encryption key is valid.

[0055] More specifically, when the car starts and power is supplied, the IDC randomly generates a symmetric encryption key using the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm. The transmitted ciphertext consists of two parts: a ciphertext header and a ciphertext content. The IDC's private key signs and encrypts the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp; this signature and timestamp form the ciphertext header. The OBU's public key encrypts the randomly generated symmetric key to form the ciphertext content.

[0056] The IDC transmits the encrypted message to the OBU via the CAN bus. The OBU decrypts the signature using the IDC's public key and compares it with the hash value of the timestamp. If they match, authentication is successful. After successful authentication, the OBU uses its private key to decrypt the encrypted content to obtain the AES key. If this AES key is not in the OBU's AES key registry, it is considered valid. When the car is turned off and the power is disconnected, the key loses its validity and is stored in the OBU's registry.

[0057] In the specific implementation of step (3), data transmission: the intelligent domain controller uses an effective symmetric encryption key to generate ciphertext for transmission data, and the V2X-OBU uses the effective symmetric encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext for transmission data to obtain the corresponding data packet;

[0058] Specifically, the IDC and V2X-OBU communicate with each other via a CAN bus, and the transmitted encrypted data consists of two parts: a ciphertext header and ciphertext content. The IDC uses a valid AES key to sign and encrypt the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp, and this signature and timestamp form the ciphertext header; the IDC uses a valid AES key to encrypt the data packets transmitted by the IDC, forming the ciphertext content.

[0059] After the V2X-OBU receives the transmitted encrypted data, it decrypts it using a valid AES key, decrypts the signature in the ciphertext header, and compares it with the timestamp. If the comparison is successful, the decrypted data packet is considered valid and trustworthy communication content.

[0060] In the specific implementation of step (4), the key is automatically updated: when the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches a predetermined threshold, both the IDC and the OBU will send a key update request to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new private and public keys for the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm, sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and returns to step (2) until the data transmission ends.

[0061] Specifically, when the number of transmissions between the IDC and OBU reaches 80% of a fixed threshold, an update key request will be sent to the HSM. Taking the IDC as an example, the IDC's existing private key is used to sign and encrypt the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp, and this signature and timestamp form the ciphertext header; the HSM's existing public key is used to encrypt the update request to form the ciphertext content, and the combination of the ciphertext header and the ciphertext content constitutes the update key request.

[0062] After receiving the encrypted request from the IDC, the HSM decrypts the signature using the IDC's existing public key and compares it with the hash value of the timestamp. If they match, authentication is successful. The HSM then decrypts the update request content using its own existing private key and triggers the update procedure.

[0063] When the number of transmissions between the IDC and OBU reaches a fixed threshold, the asymmetric public and private key pairs of both will automatically become invalid and be destroyed internally.

[0064] The HSM generates new public and private keys for the IDC, OBU, and HSM based on the RSA asymmetric algorithm, and stores them in the HSM's key registration list. The HSM then transmits the new public and private keys for the IDC, OBU, and HSM, along with the new private key for the IDC, to the IDC via the CAN bus. Similarly, the HSM transmits the new public and private keys for the IDC, OBU, and HSM, along with the new private key for the OBU, to the OBU via the CAN bus. The transmitted ciphertext consists of two parts (taking the IDC as an example):

[0065] Cipherhead: The HSM's existing private key signs and encrypts the sha256 hash of the system timestamp; this signature and timestamp form the cipherhead.

[0066] Ciphertext content: The ciphertext content is composed of the new public keys of IDC, OBU and HSM and the new private key of IDC, which are encrypted using the existing public key of IDC.

[0067] The HSM transmits the encrypted message to the IDC via the CAN bus. The IDC decrypts the signature using the HSM's existing public key and compares it with the hash value of the timestamp. If they match, authentication is successful. The IDC then decrypts the encrypted message using its existing private key, obtaining new public keys for the IDC, OBU, and HSM, as well as a new private key for the IDC. The new key pair takes effect immediately, and the IDC's asymmetric public-private key pair automatically becomes invalid and is internally destroyed. This completes the asymmetric key update and upgrade for the IDC.

[0068] The asymmetric key update for OBU is similar and will not be elaborated here.

[0069] The advantage of this encryption method, which combines asymmetric and symmetric keys, is that it can resist replay attacks and increases the security of communication between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU by introducing a periodic key replacement mechanism.

[0070] Corresponding to the aforementioned embodiments of the authentication device and method for communication content between the vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and the intelligent domain controller, this application also provides embodiments of the authentication device for communication content between the vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and the intelligent domain controller.

[0071] Figure 4 This is a block diagram illustrating an authentication device for communication between an onboard V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller, according to an exemplary embodiment. (Refer to...) Figure 4 The device may include:

[0072] Initialization module 21: The hardware encryption machine uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate private and public keys for the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU, and sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU.

[0073] Key authentication module 22: The intelligent domain controller generates a symmetric encryption key through a symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts the symmetric encryption key based on its own private key and the public key of the V2X-OBU to form transmission ciphertext, and the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmission ciphertext and authenticate whether the symmetric encryption key is valid.

[0074] Data transmission module 23: The intelligent domain controller uses a valid symmetric encryption key to generate ciphertext for transmitting data, and the V2X-OBU uses the valid symmetric encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext for transmitting data to obtain the corresponding data packet;

[0075] Key Automated Update Module 24: When the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches 80% of a predetermined threshold, an update key request is sent to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new private and public keys for the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm, sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and returns to the key authentication module until the data transmission ends.

[0076] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0077] For the device embodiments, since they basically correspond to the method embodiments, the relevant parts can be referred to in the description of the method embodiments. The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this application according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without creative effort.

[0078] Accordingly, this application also provides an electronic device, including: one or more processors; a memory for storing one or more programs; and, when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, causing the one or more processors to implement the authentication device method for communication content between the vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and the intelligent domain controller as described above. Figure 5 The diagram shown is a hardware structure diagram of any device with data processing capabilities, used in an embodiment of the present invention to authenticate the communication content between a vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller. Except for... Figure 5 In addition to the processor, memory, and network interface shown, any data processing device in the embodiment may also include other hardware depending on the actual function of the data processing device, which will not be described in detail here.

[0079] Accordingly, this application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implement the authentication device method for communication between the vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and the intelligent domain controller as described above. The computer-readable storage medium can be an internal storage unit of any data-processing device as described in any of the foregoing embodiments, such as a hard disk or memory. The computer-readable storage medium can also be an external storage device, such as a plug-in hard disk, smart media card (SMC), SD card, flash card, etc., equipped on the device. Furthermore, the computer-readable storage medium can include both internal storage units of any data-processing device and external storage devices. The computer-readable storage medium is used to store the computer program and other programs and data required by the data-processing device, and can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.

[0080] Other embodiments of this application will readily occur to those skilled in the art upon consideration of the specification and practice of the disclosure herein. This application is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of this application that follow the general principles of this application and include common knowledge or customary techniques in the art not disclosed herein.

[0081] It should be understood that this application is not limited to the precise structure described above and shown in the accompanying drawings, and various modifications and changes can be made without departing from its scope.

Claims

1. A method for authenticating communication content between a vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller, characterized in that, include: (1) Initialization: The hardware encryption machine uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate the private and public keys of the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and sends the public key and the respective private key to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU. (2) Key authentication: The intelligent domain controller generates a symmetric encryption key through a symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts the symmetric encryption key based on its own private key and the public key of the V2X-OBU to form transmission ciphertext, and the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmission ciphertext and authenticate whether the symmetric encryption key is valid. (3) Data transmission: The intelligent domain controller uses a valid symmetric encryption key to generate ciphertext for transmission data, and the V2X-OBU uses the valid symmetric encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext for transmission data to obtain the corresponding data packet; (4) Automatic key update: When the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches a predetermined threshold, a key update request is sent to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new private and public keys for the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm, sends the public key and the respective private key to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and returns to step (2) until the data transmission ends. In step (2), the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmitted ciphertext and authenticate the validity of the symmetric encryption key, including: V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller to decrypt the ciphertext header and compares it with the hash value of the timestamp. If they match, the authentication is successful. After successful authentication, V2X-OBU uses its own private key to decrypt the ciphertext content to generate a randomly generated symmetric key. If the randomly generated symmetric key is not in V2X-OBU's random generated symmetric key registration table, the key is considered valid.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step (1) is as follows: The hardware encryption machine generates public and private keys for the intelligent domain controller, V2X-OBU, and hardware encryption machine respectively based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm. These keys are stored in the hardware encryption machine's key registration list. The public keys of the three are transmitted to the intelligent domain controller and V2X-OBU via the CAN bus protocol, and the private keys of each are transmitted to the intelligent domain controller and V2X-OBU respectively.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step (2), the symmetric encryption key is encrypted using the user's private key and the V2X-OBU's public key to form the transmission ciphertext, including: The intelligent domain controller uses its private key to sign and encrypt the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp, and uses the signature and timestamp as the ciphertext header; it uses the public key of the V2X-OBU to encrypt the randomly generated symmetric key to form the ciphertext content, and the ciphertext header and ciphertext content form the transmission ciphertext.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step (3) is as follows: The intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU communicate with each other via the CAN bus. The transmitted data ciphertext consists of two parts: a ciphertext header and a ciphertext content. The intelligent domain controller uses a valid randomly generated symmetric key to sign and encrypt the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp. This signature and timestamp constitute the ciphertext header. The data packets transmitted by the intelligent domain controller are encrypted using a valid randomly generated symmetric key to form the ciphertext content. After receiving the transmitted ciphertext, the V2X-OBU decrypts it using a valid randomly generated symmetric key. The signature in the ciphertext header is decrypted and compared with the timestamp. If the comparison is successful, the decrypted data packet is considered to be valid and trustworthy communication content.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step (4), when the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches a predetermined threshold, the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU send an update key request to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new public keys and new private keys corresponding to the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm. The hardware encryption machine transmits the new public keys and new private keys of the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU to the intelligent domain controller IDC via the CAN bus, and transmits the new public keys and new private keys of the hardware encryption machine, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU to the OBU via the CAN bus. The intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU authenticate the received keys. After successful authentication, they return to step (2). The intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU use the new public and private key pairs to transmit data.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The ciphertext sent from the hardware encryption device to the intelligent domain controller includes a ciphertext header and ciphertext content. The hardware encryption device uses its existing private key to sign and encrypt the SHA256 hash value of the system timestamp. The resulting signature and timestamp form the ciphertext header. The intelligent domain controller uses its existing public key to encrypt the new public keys of the hardware encryption device, the intelligent domain controller, and the V2X-OBU, as well as the new private key of the IDC, to form the ciphertext content. The intelligent domain controller uses the hardware encryption device's existing public key to decrypt the signature and compare it with the hash value of the timestamp. If they match, authentication is successful.

7. An authentication device for communication content between a vehicle-mounted V2X-OBU and an intelligent domain controller, characterized in that, include: Initialization module: The hardware encryption machine uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate private and public keys for the hardware encryption machine, intelligent domain controller, and V2X-OBU, and sends the public key and their respective private keys to the intelligent domain controller and V2X-OBU; Key authentication module: The intelligent domain controller generates a symmetric encryption key through a symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts the symmetric encryption key based on its own private key and the public key of the V2X-OBU to form transmission ciphertext, and the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmission ciphertext and authenticate whether the symmetric encryption key is valid. Data transmission module: The intelligent domain controller uses a valid symmetric encryption key to generate ciphertext for transmitting data, and the V2X-OBU uses the valid symmetric encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext for transmitting data to obtain the corresponding data packet; Automatic Key Update Module: When the number of transmissions between the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU reaches 80% of a predetermined threshold, a key update request is sent to the hardware encryption machine. The hardware encryption machine generates new private and public keys for the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm, sends the public key and the respective private key to the intelligent domain controller and the V2X-OBU, and returns to the key authentication module until the data transmission ends. In the key authentication module, the V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller and its own private key to decrypt the transmitted ciphertext and authenticate the validity of the symmetric encryption key, including: V2X-OBU uses the public key of the intelligent domain controller to decrypt the ciphertext header and compares it with the hash value of the timestamp. If they match, the authentication is successful. After successful authentication, V2X-OBU uses its own private key to decrypt the ciphertext content to generate a randomly generated symmetric key. If the randomly generated symmetric key is not in V2X-OBU's random generated symmetric key registration table, the key is considered valid.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: One or more processors; Memory, used to store one or more programs; When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions thereon, characterized in that, When executed by the processor, this instruction implements the steps of the method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

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