A secure and scalable ADS-B system based on signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain

By introducing the signature algorithm and fragmented blockchain technology in the ADS-B system, combining the identity-based broadcast signature and the Merkel tree algorithm, the problem of lack of authentication and single point of failure in the communication in the ADS-B system is solved, and the problem of "unless authentication" and "single-point failure" is realized. Efficient and secure information transmission and processing improves the scalability and security of the system.

CN118041529BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-26BEIHANG UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410239807.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-03-04
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
2044-03-04

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing ADS-B systems have problems with lack of message authentication, information leakage and single point of failure in ground-to-air and air-to-air communication, resulting in insufficient security and reliability.

Method used

Adopt a secure and scalable distributed ATC architecture based on signature algorithm and sharded blockchain, combining identity-based broadcast signature scheme and Merkel tree algorithm to achieve non-forgery and confidentiality protection of information, and improve it through sharding technology. System scalability and performance.

Benefits of technology

It realizes a decentralized, high-throughput, safe and reliable ADS-B system, enhances the scalability and security of aviation transactions, and reduces the burden of communication links and computing overhead.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a secure and scalable ADS-B system based on a signcryption algorithm and a sharded blockchain, belonging to the field of information security technology, including: a system for broadcasting a signcryption protocol based on an identity-based protocol (IP) e‑IBBSC Generates the ADS‑B message layer of the signcrypted information σ for use via protocol Π in‑shard Processing the information processing and transmission process of the ADS-B system in the slice before the aircraft flies, through the protocol cross‑shard The information processing and transmission process between different slices of the ADS-B system before the aircraft flies, through the protocol operate The ground management layer handles the operation of the ADS‑B system during the flight of the aircraft; the ground message transmission layer is used to realize the data interaction between the ADS‑B message layer and the ground management layer. The present invention realizes the characteristics of single point failure resistance, scalability, high throughput, low latency, etc. The designed broadcast signature scheme has high security and short ciphertext, which is suitable for the authentication and confidentiality protection of ADS‑B key information of short messages; the information capacity of ADS‑B is significantly improved under the premise of ensuring security.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of information security technology, and in particular relates to a secure and scalable ADS-B system based on a signcryption algorithm and a sharded blockchain. Background Art

[0002] With the development of air transportation, air traffic volume continues to increase, and the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system plays an increasingly important role in air traffic control. Today's mainstream ATM systems are mainly composed of communication systems, navigation systems and surveillance systems. With the in-depth research of air traffic control technology and the construction and use of new equipment, the control and surveillance capabilities will be further improved and enhanced. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is the latest generation of ATM surveillance system based on the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and air-to-air and ground-to-air data link communications. Each ADS-B participant retrieves its own position and speed by using an onboard GNSS receiver, and then the aircraft uses the ADS-B data link to automatically and continuously broadcast its ID, position and speed, as well as more information (intention or emergency code) through short message texts, to achieve information sharing between aircraft and between aircraft and the Air Traffic Control (ATC) center. Compared with radar surveillance technology, ADS-B data comes directly from airborne equipment. Therefore, ADS-B surveillance data has higher accuracy, update rate, and real-time performance. The price of ADS-B system equipment is also relatively low. The overall construction cost is only about one-tenth of that of radar. It can also provide surveillance services in areas without air traffic control radar coverage, greatly increasing airspace capacity.

[0003] Due to the excellent performance of the ADS-B system, countries around the world are promoting its application. Since 2017, Australia has required all instrument flight rules aircraft to install ADS-B equipment. From 2020, all aircraft that need to fly in European or American airspace will be equipped with ADS-B OUT devices. China has also achieved full airspace ADS-B OUT monitoring, and the next goal is to start implementing the ADS-IN operation plan in 2025. Other countries such as Japan, Singapore, and Canada have also responded on a large scale and actively deployed the ADS-B system.

[0004] However, the ADS-B system has the following security issues. First, there is a lack of message authentication between ground-to-air and air-to-air communications. Attackers can forge any participant in the ADS-B system and modify messages, causing ADS-B messages to be attacked by message integrity damage and identity forgery. Attackers can also forge a false management center to provide aircraft with incorrect monitoring and command signals, directly affecting flight safety. Through simple antenna equipment and laptops, a large number of false ADS-B messages can be generated or real ADS-B messages can be modified, seriously affecting the monitoring accuracy and safety of the control department. Second, key messages are transmitted in plain text and lack confidentiality protection. Adversaries can arbitrarily intercept, eavesdrop, and interfere with messages, causing key information leakage in the ADS-B system. Although some services legally use message interception functions to track air traffic, attackers can also eavesdrop and abuse ADS-B messages to launch some unexpected attacks. Some countries have enacted laws prohibiting unintended recipients from listening to ADS-B broadcast messages, but the technical reality that ADS-B broadcast messages are not encrypted makes these laws meaningless and data security cannot be effectively guaranteed. Third, the high concentration of air traffic control centers has led to a high single point of failure. With the increase in air passengers and flights, the volume of messages and aviation transactions in the ADS-airspace has also increased significantly, which has posed a great challenge to individual air traffic control nodes and increased the risk of single point failures.

[0005] Although there are some security protection methods for the ADS-B system, there are many problems with the current ADS-B system. The first is non-cryptographic protection, which mainly performs implicit authentication of the message by judging the physical validity of the position change displayed by the ADS-B message, but the message is still transmitted in plain text, which has information leakage and high risk of forgery, and the accurate position change cannot be confirmed. The second is to authenticate the message under symmetric key or asymmetric key, but the symmetric cryptographic system requires the sender and receiver to share the key, which makes key management difficult, and the asymmetric key requires the message to be digitally signed one by one, which has a large computational overhead, and the signature length is much longer than the message length. The message length required for security protection is much longer than the message itself, which has caused a great burden on the ADS-B communication link and poor practicality. Third, some schemes introduce blockchain technology to increase the fault tolerance of the ATC system, but the protection of the message is not considered and there are many consensus nodes, so the scalability is poor. None of them can meet the security requirements of the ADS-B system well.

[0006] In the context of the above problems, in order to solve the problems existing in the ADS-B system, such as over-centralization of air traffic control agencies, low throughput, easy collapse due to single point failures, lack of identity authentication and data confidentiality, we aim to propose a secure and scalable ADS-B system by introducing signcryption and sharded blockchain technology. Summary of the invention

[0007] In view of this, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a secure and scalable ADS-B system based on a signcryption algorithm and a sharded blockchain, which has the characteristics of decentralization, high throughput, safety and reliability. The main purposes of the present invention are as follows:

[0008] First, in response to the problem that existing air traffic control agencies are too centralized and susceptible to single point failures, the present invention innovatively proposes a secure and scalable distributed ATC architecture based on sharded blockchain for the air traffic control system. Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus is run between multiple ATC nodes to ensure decentralization, strong consistency and low latency, and identity lists and key information are recorded on the blockchain to achieve immutability. Sharding technology is also introduced to divide ATC nodes in different regions into multiple shards to address the problem of insufficient performance of a single ATC committee in handling massive aviation affairs in the entire airspace, achieving high scalability and high performance.

[0009] Second, in response to the problems of plain text transmission, lack of confidentiality and authentication of information in the existing ADS-B system, the present invention combines the design of identity-based cryptographic technology to propose an improved identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme (enhanced identity-based broadcast signcryption, e-IBBSC), which protects the unforgeability and confidentiality of information in one step. Avoid using certificates in the authentication process to reduce the overhead during identity authentication. The design of the signcryption scheme combines virtual user technology and authentication vector encryption protection to reduce the ciphertext length and improve security. This scheme can not only adapt well to the ADS-B system, but also be widely applicable to other broadcast communication scenarios, and has broad prospects.

[0010] Third, the present invention combines the Merkle tree algorithm and the security classification concept to design an identity authentication method with high message utilization. First, ordinary plaintext messages are used as leaf nodes and batch processed using the Merkle tree. Only key information and the Merkle tree root are signed in the system. Compared with other cryptographic solutions, this method uses very little additional information for security protection, and can authenticate all messages, and simultaneously authenticate and encrypt key messages.

[0011] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention combines sharding blockchain technology, blockchain consensus algorithm, identity-based signcryption technology and Merkle tree algorithm, etc. The present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0012] The present invention provides a secure and scalable ADS-B system based on a signcryption algorithm and a sharded blockchain, comprising:

[0013] ADS-B message layer, the ADS-B message layer is used to compress the conventional ADS-B messages within a preset time into a Merkle tree, and the Merkle tree root and key ADS-B information m cr Use the identity-based private key and broadcast the signature protocol Π according to the identity-based e-IBBSC Generate the signcryption information σ, where the general information m com Direct broadcast;

[0014] A ground management layer of a secure and scalable distributed ATC architecture based on sharded blockchain, which is used to implement the ATC protocol through protocol Π in-shard Processing the information processing and transmission process of the ADS-B system in the slice before the aircraft flies, through the protocol Π cross-shard Processing the information processing and transmission process between different slices of the ADS-B system before the aircraft flies, through the protocol operate Processing the operation process of the ADS-B system of the aircraft during flight; the distributed ATC architecture divides the ATC nodes in different regions into u partitions using sharding technology, each partition contains n ATC nodes, and the ATC nodes maintain a consortium chain by running the BFT algorithm to record the aircraft ID list, verification messages and flight information. A trusted PKG node is also introduced in each shard to generate an identity base private key for the aircraft;

[0015] The ground message transmission layer is used to realize data interaction between the ADS-B message layer and the ground management layer, including receiving, decrypting and processing the ADS-B message m from the aircraft, sending messages to the distributed ATC nodes and receiving messages from the distributed ATC nodes, and sending the messages from the distributed ATC nodes to the aircraft through the ADS-B OUT link after verification.

[0016] Further, the identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme II e-IBBSC Includes identity-based signcryption initialization, key generation, signcryption, and decryption;

[0017] Among them, the initialization of the identity-based signcryption includes:

[0018] S1: Select a prime number q with a length of λ, and Select the secret parameter s from is the multiplication group;

[0019] S2: Select three cyclic groups G1, G2, G T , satisfying G1×G2→G T , and obtain the generator g1 of G1 and the generator g2 of G2;

[0020] S3: Select three hash functions that satisfy the following properties:

[0021] H1:

[0022] H2:

[0023] H3:G T →{0, 1} * ;

[0024] S4: Generate sub-algorithm 1 according to the initialization parameters to obtain the public key mpk and the master key msk;

[0025] Key generation includes:

[0026] After initialization is completed, all participating nodes in the network generate a private key for the signcryption scheme according to sub-algorithm 2, and the private key contains the identity ID of the node;

[0027] The signcryption process includes:

[0028] After all participating nodes have generated private keys, the identity list L of the message sender and the message receiver is determined. The sender encrypts the message according to sub-algorithm 3 and signs the message with its own private key. After the sign-encryption is completed, the ciphertext is sent to all nodes in L.

[0029] The decryption process includes:

[0030] After receiving the ciphertext from the sender, the receiver uses his own private key to decrypt the message and verify the sender's signature according to sub-algorithm 4. The receiver can only obtain the message when both the message and the signature are correct.

[0031] Further, the sub-algorithm 1 is calculated by the following steps:

[0032] Step 11, calculate the g1 parameters: Among them, g1 is the generator of G1, and s is the multiplication group Random Number

[0033] Step 12, calculate the bilinear pairing of g1 and g2: Among them, g2 is the generator of G2, It is a bilinear operation;

[0034] Step 13, calculate the g2 parameter list: Where n is the number of people who receive the signcrypted message;

[0035] Step 14, output the identity private key msk={g1, s};

[0036] Step 15: Output the public key Among them, G1, G2, G T is the cyclic group, q is the order of the cyclic group, LH A list of hash functions.

[0037] Further, the sub-algorithm 2 is calculated by the following steps:

[0038] Step 21, using the H1 function in the hash function list to calculate the hash value of the ID: H1(ID);

[0039] Step 22, Calculate s+H1(ID), where s is the multiplicative group Random number in;

[0040] Step 23, calculate the inverse of s+H1(ID):

[0041] Step 24, calculate and output Among them, g1 is the generator of G1.

[0042] Further, the sub-algorithm three is calculated by the following steps:

[0043] Step 31, from Randomly select temporary parameters α, β;

[0044] Step 32, calculate the temporary key K=v α , where v is the bilinear pairing of g1 and g2, which belongs to the identity public key;

[0045] Step 33, calculate the first ciphertext C1=g -α , where g is the g1 parameter, which is part of the identity public key, and C1 is part of the signcrypted ciphertext.

[0046] Step 34, calculate the second ciphertext Where ID s It is the ID of the message sender. C2 uses a random number β to hide the sender's identity private key, which is part of the signed ciphertext.

[0047] Step 35, calculate the third ciphertext where t is the length of the identity list L and s is the multiplicative group Random number, ID i is the ID of the i-th message receiver in the identity list; C3 includes all receiver IDs, which are used for subsequent receiver decryption and are part of the ciphertext; α is a secret random number;

[0048] Step 36, calculate the first temporary parameter w1=H2(m,C1,C2,K), where m is the message to be signed;

[0049] Step 37, calculate the second temporary parameter Among them, β and α are secret random numbers;

[0050] Step 38, calculate the fourth ciphertext C4=(m||w2)H3(K); C4 is a part of the ciphertext, and the temporary key K is used to hide m and w2;

[0051] Step 39, output σ = [C1, C2, C3, C4], where σ is the ciphertext.

[0052] Further, the sub-algorithm 4 is calculated by the following steps:

[0053] Step 41, calculate the intermediate parameter Δ h,r and Δ s,r :

[0054]

[0055]

[0056] Where t is the length of the identity list L, r is the position of the current receiver in L, and ID i is the ID of the i-th message receiver in the identity list;

[0057] Step 42, restore the plaintext information:

[0058]

[0059]

[0060] Among them, g2 is the generator of G2, is the current recipient's identity private key; K′ is the recovered temporary key, m′ is the recovered plaintext, and w′2 is the directly recovered temporary parameter

[0061] Step 43, verify the validity of the message:

[0062] w′1=H2(m′, C1, C2, K′)

[0063]

[0064] Step 44, if tmp=w′2, then output m′; otherwise, output ⊥, indicating that the message is invalid, where tmp is the w2 parameter calculated using other recovered parameters.

[0065] Furthermore, the ADS-B system has i The initialization process includes the following steps:

[0066] A1: Each ATC node S i .ATC generates the key pair (apk, ask) used in the consensus algorithm and initializes the alliance chain. The key pair will be used to generate the aggregate signature as proof;

[0067] A2: On-chip private key generator node S i .PKG RunΠ e--IBBSC The sub-algorithm in the first step is to initialize the system key, and the S in all slices i .PKG nodes share the same cryptographic parameters;

[0068] A3: Ground receiving node S within the shard i .GS uses a trusted channel to send the identity ID GS Sent to distributed air traffic control node S i .ATC;

[0069] A4:S i .ATC runs BFT to verify ID Gs Legal and recorded on the blockchain, and will be ID Gs Multi-signature proof of processing <ID Gs > i Send to S i .PKG;

[0070] A5:S i .PKG receives and verifies the i .ATC Proof <ID GS > i After it is legal, run the sub-algorithm 2 for S i .GS generates identity base private key sk Gs and sends it to S through a trusted channel i .GS, ID Gs and sk Gs Will be used to designcrypt messages from flight node AC during flight.

[0071] Further, in-shard The protocol includes the following information processing and transmission processes of the ADS-B system within the slice before the flight:

[0072] In the on-chip flight scenario, the flight performs the following steps to register the flight. The registration process is performed only once within the preset time period:

[0073] B1: The flight node AC generates and sends the flight node registration transaction TX to S1.ATC and S1.PKG through a trusted channel Req =<S1,AA,t> , where AA is the unique identification number of the flight;

[0074] B2: S1.ATC receives the information TX Req , register the aircraft information, and run BFT to generate proof for TX during registration <TX Req >1 and recorded on the chain. S1.ATC node sends the message <TXReq >1 sent to S1.PKG and AC;

[0075] B3: After receiving the message, S1.PKG node verifies <TX Req >1, if the verification is successful, a temporary aircraft ID is generated for AC, and the sub-algorithm 2 is called to generate the private key sk of AC AC ,Then, S1.PKG node returns it to AC through the trusted channel;

[0076] B4: AC receives and verifies <TX Req >1, store the private key sk AC , complete the registration;

[0077] In the film's flight scenario, the following steps are performed before takeoff to prepare for the flight. This process needs to be performed before each flight:

[0078] C1: AC generates and sends flight preparation transaction TX to S1.ATC FL = <Addr s ,Addr d ,AA,FL,t>; Among them, Addr s AC origin, Address d is the AC destination, FL is the flight number, and t is the timestamp;

[0079] C2: S1.ATC node runs BFT and processes TX FL And generate flight identity list and certification <acl>1, which includes the identity list and time of other flight nodes that the aircraft is expected to intersect during its flight. <acl>1 and recorded on the blockchain, S1.ATC node will <acl>1 is sent to AC;

[0080] C3: AC receives the information and verifies it <acl>1. If the authentication succeeds, the ACL is stored on the AC node.

[0081] Furthermore, Protocol H cross-shard The information processing and transmission process between different slices of the ADS-B system before the flight process includes:

[0082] In the on-chip flight scenario, the flight performs the following steps to register the flight. The registration process is performed only once within a preset time period:

[0083] D1: AC generates and sends flight node registration transaction TX to S1.ATC and S1.PKG through a trusted channel Req = <S1,…,S n ,AA,t>, where AA is the unique identification number of the flight;

[0084] D2: S1.ATC receives the information TX Req , register the aircraft information, and run BFT to generate proof for TX during registration <TX Req >1 and sent to all relevant shards S2.ATC,…,S n .ATC;

[0085] D3: After receiving the message, S i .ATC(i≠1) node runs BFT to process the registration request and sends the processing result <TX Req > i Send to S i .ATC;

[0086] D4: After collecting and verifying all the registration results, S1.ATC will register the completion results <TX Req >1 record is uploaded to the chain and sent to S1.PKG and AC;

[0087] D5: After receiving the message, S1.PKG node verifies <TX Req >1, if the verification is successful, a temporary aircraft ID is generated for AC, and the sub-algorithm 2 is called to generate the private key sk of AC AC ,Then, S1.PKG node returns it to AC through the trusted channel;

[0088] D6: AC receives and verifies <TX Req >1, store the private key sk AC , complete the registration;

[0089] In the cross-slice flight scenario, the following steps are performed before takeoff to prepare for the flight. This process needs to be performed before each flight:

[0090] E1: AC generates and sends flight preparation transaction TX to S1.ATC FL = <Addr s ,Addr d ,AA,FL,t>;

[0091] E2: S1.ATC node runs BFT and processes TX FL And generate flight preparation certificate <TX FL >1, sent to all relevant shards S2.ATC,…,S n .ATC;

[0092] E3: After receiving the message, S i .ATC(i≠1) node runs BFT to process flight preparation request and generate flight identity list and proof <ACL i > i , the list includes the S in the shard i The identities and times of other flight nodes that are expected to intersect during the AC flight. i .ATC node sends the message <ACL i > i Send to S1.ATC;

[0093] E4: After S1.ATC collects all relevant shard information, it runs BFT to summarize the preparation list. S1.ATC will summarize the list <acl>1Record on the blockchain and send the message <acl>1 is sent to AC;

[0094] E5: AC receives the information and verifies it <acl>1. If the authentication succeeds, the ACL is stored on the AC node.

[0095] Furthermore, Protocol II operate The operation process of the ADS-B system during the flight of an aircraft includes:

[0096] F1: During flight, the AC continuously broadcasts and stores general ADS-B information. com ;

[0097] F2: When AC and GS receive general ADS-B information com When verifying whether the identity information contained in the information is in the aircraft's ACL, if so, the information is analyzed and temporarily stored. i .GS to S i .ATC forwarding m com Information, S i .ATC stores messages permanently;

[0098] F3: At interval t com Afterwards, AC generates the Merkle root m based on the sent information list. cr , when the key information m cr When it is about to be sent, AC calls the sub-algorithm 3 to calculate the signature information σ and broadcast it according to the aircraft identity information list ACL and the ground station list GSL;

[0099] F4: S i After GS receives σ, it calls the sub-algorithm 4 to calculate the plaintext information m cr , and then send it to S i .ATC node, S i .ATC node stores the message permanently. When AC′ receives σ, it calls the sub-algorithm 4 to calculate the plaintext information m cr To verify the AC identity; if m cr is a Merkle root, then from the temporarily stored m com Reconstruct root′ and determine m cr Is it equal to root′? If the verification is successful, the AC is authenticated;

[0100] F5: When S i .ATC received m cr When running BFT processing m cr And write it into the blockchain, m cr The processing is carried out according to the following rules: If m cr is a Merkle root, then from the stored m com Reconstruct root′ and determine m cr Is it equal to root′? If they are equal, then authenticate AC and m com Otherwise, wait for the AC to land and then review the flight log messages on board. If m cr Not a Merkle root, for m cr response.

[0101] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0102] (1) The secure and scalable distributed ATC architecture based on sharded blockchain solves the performance bottleneck and single point failure problems caused by the highly centralized traditional ATC architecture. By dividing the distributed ATC nodes into shards according to regions, the ATC nodes only need to process aviation transactions related to the region and record them on the chain, greatly improving the throughput of the entire system. The present invention greatly improves the security and performance of the ATC system, and realizes the scalability, decentralization, strong consistency, low latency, and immutability of aviation transaction processing;

[0103] (2) The improved identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme realizes the encryption and authentication of key ADS-B information in one step without the need for a complex certificate authority, and the authentication process does not require the transmission of any additional information except the ciphertext. In addition, compared with other identity-based broadcast signcryption schemes, the e-IBBSC ciphertext is shorter and has higher security, and the computational delay remains at the same order of magnitude. The signcryption scheme designed by the present invention is lightweight and highly secure, which greatly enhances the security of ADS-B key information transmission;

[0104] (3) The proposed new ADS-B message authentication method has high efficiency and message utilization. The present invention compresses conventional ADS-B information within a period of time into a Merkle tree. Only the Merkle tree root and key ADS-B messages are sign-encrypted, which greatly reduces the number of ADS-B security messages sent by flight nodes for authenticating ADS-B messages, greatly reduces the link burden, and at the same time, greatly reduces the number of sign-encryption operations required for ADS-B message authentication, and greatly reduces the message authentication delay overhead. The applicability of the ADS-B system proposed by the present invention is greatly improved from the two aspects of communication and computing.

[0105] Other advantages, objectives and features of the present invention will be described in the following description and will be apparent to those skilled in the art to some extent, or those skilled in the art may be taught from the practice of the present invention. The objectives and other advantages of the present invention may be realized and obtained through the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0106] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and beneficial effects of the present invention clearer, the present invention provides the following drawings for illustration:

[0107] Figure 1 It is the overall system architecture diagram of the present invention;

[0108] Figure 2 This is the In-Shard protocol flow chart of the present invention;

[0109] Figure 3 The following is the flow chart of the Cross-Shard protocol. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0110] like Figures 1 to 3 As shown, the present invention provides a secure and scalable ADS-B system based on a signcryption algorithm and a sharded blockchain.

[0111] The system assumptions of the present invention are as follows:

[0112] Definition 1 (Adversary and Environment Model): The adversary and environment model (A, Z) is (N, Δ, ρ)-restricted with respect to the system Π if and only if each execution of EXECΠ(A, Z) satisfies the following condition:

[0113] (1) The total number of participating nodes is N, and the number of participating nodes in each shard i is n i ;

[0114] (2) The upper limit of A’s computing power is ρ, and A cannot forge the air traffic controller’s digital signature and signcryption;

[0115] (3) The network model is partially synchronous, the ability of adversary A to delay and reorder messages is limited, and all messages can arrive within Δ time;

[0116] (4) The number of malicious nodes controlled by adversary A in each shard i is f i , where f i Satisfy n i ≥ 3f i +1.

[0117] The system architecture of the present invention is divided into three layers, as follows:

[0118] The first layer is the ADS-B message layer. The nodes in this layer are aircraft nodes with ADS-B transmitters. Aircraft nodes continuously broadcast their flight status information m through the ADS-B OUT link. The general information is represented by m com and broadcast directly, while the key information is represented by m cr , and uses the identity-based private key to generate the signcrypted information σ according to the proposed identity-based broadcast signcryption (e-IBBSC) scheme to ensure information integrity, confidentiality, and authentication. The aircraft also receives information from other aircraft or ADS-B ground stations through the ADS-BIN link.

[0119] The second layer is the ground message transport layer. The ground transport layer is crucial for data exchange between the ADS-B message layer and the ground management layer. This layer mainly includes ADS-B ground stations and some other receiving nodes, such as ADS-B receiving vehicles. The entities in this layer receive, decrypt and process ADS-B messages m from aircraft. After sending messages to distributed ATC nodes, they also receive messages from possible distributed ATC nodes, verify them and send them to the aircraft through the ADS-B OUT link.

[0120] The third layer is the ground management layer. The distributed air traffic control system is divided into u shards according to different areas, which are called shard1,..., shard u Each partition contains n ATC nodes. The ATC nodes run the BFT algorithm to maintain a consortium chain, record the aircraft ID list, verify messages and flight information, and introduce a trusted PKG node in each shard to generate an identity base private key for the aircraft.

[0121] If a shard receives a shard request TX in For example, when an aircraft completes the identity registration for the trip in a single shard area, the distributed ATC node in the shard directly calls the BFT algorithm to process the request and records it on the blockchain BC:, and returns a result that all honest ATC nodes agree on. The processing proof CC is sent to the aircraft node.

[0122] If a cross-shard request occurs, for example, when an aircraft needs to fly across shards, it will send a request message to request some flight information from the air traffic control node in the registration shard. Through the cross-shard processing mechanism, all relevant shards can process the request, record it on the blockchain BC, and return a result without conflict between shards. The processing proof CC is sent to the aircraft node.

[0123] The complete protocol of the present invention is SS-ADS-B =(Π e-IBBSC ,Π sys-init ,Π in-shard ,Π cross-shard ,Π operate ) indicates that, where Π e-IBBSC Including identity-based signcryption initialization, key generation, signcryption and decryption process; sys-init Including the system initialization process, Π in-shard and Π cross-shard They are used to process the information processing and transmission process of the ADS-B system within a slice and between different slices before the aircraft flies. operate It is used to handle the operation process of the ADS-B system during the flight of the aircraft. The following article will elaborate on the design of the identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme, the system initialization process, the intra-chip system process, the inter-chip system process, and the system operation.

[0124] 1. Design of an improved identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme

[0125] The present invention designs an improved identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme II e-IBBSC =(InitGen,KeyGen,Sign crypt,Unsigncrypt), including four sub-algorithms: initialization, key generation, signcryption and designcryption.

[0126] The initialization process is as follows:

[0127] (1) Select a prime number q with a length of λ, and calculate the Select the secret parameter s from .

[0128] (2) Select three cyclic groups G1, G2, G T , satisfying G1×G2→G T , and obtain the generator g1 of G1 and the generator g2 of G2.

[0129] (3) Select three hash functions that satisfy the following properties:

[0130] ①H1:

[0131] ②H2:

[0132] ③H3:G f →{0, 1} * ;

[0133] (4) According to the initialization parameter generation algorithm (sub-algorithm 1), the public key mpk and the master key msk are obtained.

[0134]

[0135] After initialization is completed, all participating nodes in the network need to generate a private key for the signcryption scheme according to the key generation algorithm (sub-algorithm 2), and the private key needs to contain the node's identity ID.

[0136]

[0137] After all participating nodes have generated private keys, the message sender and message receiver identity list L is determined. The sender encrypts the message according to the signcryption algorithm (sub-algorithm 3) and signs the message with its own private key. After the signcryption is completed, the ciphertext is sent to all nodes in L.

[0138]

[0139]

[0140] After receiving the ciphertext from the sender, the receiver uses its own private key to decrypt the message and verify the sender's signature according to the signcryption verification algorithm (sub-algorithm 4). The receiver can only obtain the message when both the message and the signature are correct.

[0141]

[0142] 2. System initialization process

[0143] In the present invention, the system is designed to have a i The initialization process, the steps are described as follows:

[0144] (1) Each ATC node S i .ATC generates the key pair (apk, ask) used in the consensus algorithm and initializes the consortium chain. The key pair will be used to generate the aggregate signature as proof.

[0145] (2) On-chip private key generator node S i .PKG RunΠ e-IBBSC The sub-algorithm InitGen in the shard is used to initialize the system key. i .PKG nodes share the same cryptographic parameters.

[0146] (3) Ground receiving node S within the slice i .GS uses a trusted channel to send the identity ID GS Sent to distributed air traffic control node S i .ATC.

[0147] (4)S i .ATC runs BFT to verify ID GS Legal and recorded on the blockchain, and will be ID GS Multi-signature proof of processing <ID GS > i Send to S i .PKG.

[0148] (5)S i .PKG receives and verifies the i .ATC Proof <ID GS > i After it is legal, run Π e-IBBSC .KeyGen generates the identity base private key sk for S.GS GS and sends it to S through a trusted channel i .GS.ID GS and sk GS Will be used to designcrypt messages from flight node AC during flight.

[0149] The process is shown in Sub-Protocol 1.

[0150]

[0151] 3. On-chip system flow

[0152] The sub-protocol In-shard describes the process of aircraft registration and flight preparation within a shard. The main steps are described as follows: In the intra-shard flight scenario, the aircraft performs the following steps to register for flight. The registration process is performed only once within a longer period of time.

[0153] (1) AC generates and sends the flight node registration transaction TX to S1.ATC and S1.PKG through a trusted channel Req =<S1,AA,t> . AA is the unique identification number of the flight.

[0154] (2) S1.ATC receives the information TX Req , register the aircraft information. During registration, run BFT to generate proof for TX <TX Req >1 and recorded on the chain. S1.ATC node sends the message <TX Req )1 is sent to S1.PKG and AC.

[0155] (3) After receiving the message, S1.PKG node verifies <TX Req >1. If the verification is successful, a temporary aircraft ID is generated for AC and Π is called e--IBBSC .KeyGen generates AC's private key sk AC Then, the S1.PKG node returns it to the AC through the trusted channel.

[0156] (4) AC receives and verifies <TX Req >1, store the private key sk AC to complete the registration.

[0157] In the film's flight scene, the following steps are performed before takeoff to prepare for the flight. This process needs to be performed before each flight.

[0158] (1) AC generates and sends flight preparation transaction TX to S1.ATC FL = <Addr s ,Addr d ,AA,FL,t>.

[0159] (2) S1.ATC node runs BFT and processes TX FL And generate flight identity list and certification <acl>1, which includes the identity list and time of other flight nodes that the aircraft is expected to intersect during its flight. <acl>1 and recorded on the blockchain. S1.ATC node sends the message <acl>1 is sent to AC.

[0160] (3) AC receives the information and verifies it <acl>1. If the authentication is successful, the ACL is stored on the AC node.

[0161] The complete description of the on-chip flight pre-takeoff preparation protocol is shown in sub-protocol 2:

[0162]

[0163]

[0164] 4. Inter-chip system flow

[0165] The sub-protocol Cross-shard describes the process of aircraft registration and flight preparation within a shard. The main steps are described as follows: In the intra-shard flight scenario, the aircraft performs the following steps to register for flight. The registration process is performed only once within a longer period of time.

[0166] (1) AC generates and sends the flight node registration transaction TX to S1.ATC and S1.PKG through a trusted channel Req = <S1,…,S n ,AA,t>. AA is the unique identification number of the flight.

[0167] (2) S1.ATC receives the information TX Req , register the aircraft information. During registration, run BFT to generate proof for TX <TX Req >1 and sent to all relevant shards S2.ATC,…,S n .ATC.

[0168] (3) After receiving the message, S i .ATC(i≠1) node runs BFT to process the registration request and sends the processing result <TX Req > i Send to S i .ATC.

[0169] (4) After collecting and verifying all the registration results, S1.ATC will register the completion results <TX Req >1 record on chain and send to S1.PKG and AC

[0170] (5) After receiving the message, S1.PKG node verifies <TX Req >1. If the verification is successful, a temporary aircraft ID is generated for AC and Π is called e-IBBSC .KeyGen generates AC's private key sk AC Then, the S1.PKG node returns it to the AC through the trusted channel.

[0171] (6) AC receives and verifies <TX Req >1, store the private key sk AC to complete the registration.

[0172] In the cross-slice flight scenario, perform the following steps to prepare for the flight before takeoff. This process needs to be performed before each flight.

[0173] (1) AC generates and sends flight preparation transaction TX to S1.ATC FL = <Addr s ,Addr d ,AA,FL,t>.

[0174] (2) S1.ATC node runs BFT and processes TX FL And generate flight preparation certificate <TX FL >1, sent to all relevant shards S2.ATC,…,S n .ATC.

[0175] (3) After receiving the message, S i .ATC(i≠1) node runs BFT to process flight preparation request and generate flight identity list and proof <ACL i > i , the list includes the S in the shard i The identities and times of other flight nodes that are expected to intersect during the AC flight. i .ATC node sends the message <ACL i > i Send to S1.ATC.

[0176] (4) After S1.ATC collects all relevant shard information, it runs BFT to summarize the prepared list. <acl>1Record on the blockchain and send the message <acl>1 is sent to AC.

[0177] (5) AC receives the information and verifies it <acl>1. If the authentication is successful, the ACL is stored on the AC node.

[0178] The complete description of the on-chip flight pre-takeoff preparation protocol is shown in sub-protocol 3:

[0179]

[0180]

[0181] 5. Flight system operation process

[0182] The sub-protocol Operate describes the operation process of the ADS-B system during the flight of the aircraft. The main steps are described as follows:

[0183] (1) During flight, the AC continuously broadcasts and stores general ADS-B information. com .

[0184] (2) When AC and GS receive general ADS-B information m com When the information is received, the identity information contained in the information is verified to be in the aircraft's ACL. If so, the information is analyzed and temporarily stored. i .GS to S i .ATC forwarding m com Information, S i .ATC stores messages permanently.

[0185] (3) In the interval t com Afterwards, AC generates the Merkle root m based on the sent information list. cr When key information cr When the Merkle root information and other key information are about to be sent, AC calls Π according to the aircraft identity information list ACL and the ground station list GSL. e-IBBSC .Signcrypt calculates the signcryption information σ and broadcasts it.

[0186] (4)S i After GS receives σ, it calls Π e-IBBSC .UnSigncrypt calculates the plaintext information m cr , and then send it to S i .ATC Node. S i .ATC node stores the message permanently. When AC′ receives σ, it calls Π e-IBBSC .Unsigncrypt calculates the plaintext information m cr To verify the AC identity. cr is a Merkle root, then from the temporarily stored m com Reconstruct root′ and determine m cr Is it equal to root′? If the verification is successful, the AC is authenticated.

[0187] (5) When S i .ATC received m cr When running BFT processing m cr And write it into the blockchain. cr The processing is carried out according to the following rules: If m cr is a Merkle root, then from the stored m com Reconstruct root′ and determine m cr Is it equal to root′? If they are equal, then AC and m are authenticated. com Otherwise, wait for the AC to land and then review the flight log messages on board. cr Not a Merkle root, for m cr response.

[0188] The complete on-chip flight operation protocol is shown in Sub-Protocol 4:

[0189]

[0190]

[0191] Finally, it should be noted that the above preferred embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail through the above preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that various changes can be made in form and details without departing from the scope defined by the claims of the present invention.< / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl> < / acl>

Claims

1. A secure and scalable ADS-B system based on a signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain, characterized in that: include: ADS-B message layer, the ADS-B message layer is used to compress the conventional ADS-B messages within a preset time into a Merkle tree, and the Merkle tree root and key ADS-B information m cr Use the identity-based private key and broadcast the signature protocol Π according to the identity-based e-IBBSC Generate the signcryption information σ, where the general information m com Direct broadcast; A ground management layer of a secure and scalable distributed ATC architecture based on sharded blockchain, which is used to implement the ATC protocol through protocol Π in-shard Processing the information processing and transmission process of the ADS-B system in the slice before the aircraft flies, through the protocol Π cross-shard Processing the information processing and transmission process between different slices of the ADS-B system before the aircraft flies, through the protocol operate Processing the operation process of the ADS-B system of the aircraft during flight; the distributed ATC architecture divides the ATC nodes in different regions into u partitions using sharding technology, each partition contains n ATC nodes, and the ATC nodes maintain a consortium chain by running the BFT algorithm to record the aircraft ID list, verification messages and flight information. A trusted PKG node is also introduced in each shard to generate an identity base private key for the aircraft; A ground message transmission layer, which is used to realize data interaction between the ADS-B message layer and the ground management layer, including receiving, decrypting and processing ADS-B messages m from aircraft, sending messages to distributed ATC nodes and receiving messages from distributed ATC nodes, and sending messages from distributed ATC nodes to aircraft through ADS-B OUT links after verification; The identity-based broadcast signcryption protocol II e-IBBSC Includes identity-based signcryption initialization, key generation, signcryption, and decryption; Among them, the initialization of the identity-based signcryption includes: S1: Select a prime number q with a length of λ, and Select the secret parameter s from is the multiplication group; S2: Select three cyclic groups G1, G2, G T , satisfying G1×G2→G T , and obtain the generator g1 of G1 and the generator g2 of G2; S3: Select three hash functions that satisfy the following properties: H3:G T →{0,1} * ; S4: Generate sub-algorithm 1 according to the initialization parameters to obtain the public key mpk and the master key msk; Key generation includes: After initialization is completed, all participating nodes in the network generate a private key for the signcryption scheme according to sub-algorithm 2, and the private key contains the identity ID of the node; The signcryption process includes: After all participating nodes have generated private keys, the identity list L of the message sender and the message receiver is determined. The sender encrypts the message according to sub-algorithm 3 and signs the message with its own private key. After the sign-encryption is completed, the ciphertext is sent to all nodes in L. The decryption process includes: After receiving the ciphertext from the sender, the receiver uses his own private key to decrypt the message and verify the sender's signature according to sub-algorithm 4. The receiver can only obtain the message when both the message and the signature are correct.

2. The secure and scalable ADS-B system based on the signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain according to claim 1, characterized in that: The sub-algorithm 1 is calculated by the following steps: Step 11, calculate the g1 parameters: Among them, g1 is the generator of G1, and s is the multiplication group Random Number Step 12, calculate the bilinear pairing of g1,g2: Among them, g2 is the generator of G2, It is a bilinear operation; Step 13, calculate the g2 parameter list: Where n is the number of people who receive the signcrypted message; Step 14, output the identity private key msk = {g1, s}; Step 15: Output the public key Among them, G1, G2, G T is the cyclic group, q is the order of the cyclic group, L H A list of hash functions.

3. The secure and scalable ADS-B system based on the signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain according to claim 2, characterized in that: The sub-algorithm 2 is calculated by the following steps: Step 21, using the H1 function in the hash function list to calculate the hash value of the ID: H1(ID); Step 22, Calculate s+H1(ID), where s is the multiplicative group Random number in; Step 23, calculate the inverse of s+H1(ID): Step 24, calculate and output Among them, g1 is the generator of G1.

4. The secure and scalable ADS-B system based on the signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain according to claim 3, characterized in that: The sub-algorithm 3 is calculated by the following steps: Step 31, from Randomly select secret random numbers α, β; Step 32, calculate the temporary key K=v α , where v is the bilinear pairing of g1 and g2, which belongs to the identity public key; Step 33, calculate the first ciphertext C1=g -α , where g is the g1 parameter, which is part of the identity public key, and C1 is part of the signcrypted ciphertext. Step 34, calculate the second ciphertext Where ID s It is the ID of the message sender. C2 uses a random number β to hide the sender's identity private key, which is part of the signed ciphertext. Step 35, calculate the third ciphertext where t is the length of the identity list L and s is the multiplicative group Random number, ID i is the ID of the i-th message receiver in the identity list; C3 includes all receiver IDs, which are used for subsequent receiver decryption and are part of the ciphertext; α is a secret random number; Step 36, calculate the first temporary parameter w1=H2(m,C1,C2,K), where m is the message to be signed; Step 37, calculate the second temporary parameter Among them, β and α are secret random numbers; Step 38, calculate the fourth ciphertext C4=(m||w2)H3(K); C4 is a part of the ciphertext, and the temporary key K is used to hide m and w2; Step 39, output σ = [C1, C2, C3, C4], where σ is the ciphertext.

5. The secure and scalable ADS-B system based on the signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain according to claim 4, characterized in that: The sub-algorithm 4 is calculated by the following steps: Step 41, calculate the intermediate parameter Δ t,r and Δ s,r : Where t is the length of the identity list L, r is the position of the current receiver in L, and ID i is the ID of the i-th message receiver in the identity list; Step 42, restore the plaintext information: Among them, g2 is the generator of G2, is the current recipient's identity private key; K′ is the recovered temporary key, m′ is the recovered plaintext, and w′2 is the directly recovered temporary parameter Step 43, verify the validity of the message: w′1=H2(m′,C1,C2,K′) Step 44, if tmp=w′2, then output m′; otherwise, output ⊥, indicating that the message is invalid, where tmp is the w2 parameter calculated using other recovered parameters.

6. The secure and scalable ADS-B system based on the signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain according to claim 5, characterized in that: The ADS-B system is installed in each slice S i The initialization process includes the following steps: A1: Each ATC node S i .ATC generates the key pair (apk, ask) used in the consensus algorithm and initializes the alliance chain. The key pair will be used to generate the aggregate signature as proof; A2: On-chip private key generator node S i .PKG RunΠ e-IBBSC The sub-algorithm in the first step is to initialize the system key, and the S in all slices i .PKG nodes share the same cryptographic parameters; A3: Ground receiving node S within the shard i .GS uses a trusted channel to send the identity ID GS Sent to distributed air traffic control node S i .ATC; A4:S i .ATC runs BFT to verify ID GS Legal and recorded on the blockchain, and will be ID GS Multi-signature proof of processing <ID GS > i Send to S i .PKG; A5:S i .PKG received and verified from S i .ATC Proof <ID GS > i After it is legal, run the sub-algorithm 2 for S i .GS generates identity base private key sk GS and sends it to S through a trusted channel i .GS, ID GS and sk GS Will be used to designcrypt messages from flight node AC during flight.

7. The secure and scalable ADS-B system based on the signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain according to claim 6, characterized in that: Π in-shard The protocol includes the following information processing and transmission processes of the ADS-B system within the slice before the flight: In the on-chip flight scenario, the flight performs the following steps to register the flight. The registration process is performed only once within the preset time period: B1: The flight node AC generates and sends the flight node registration transaction TX to S1.ATC and S1.PKG through a trusted channel Req =<S1,AA,t> , where AA is the unique identification number of the flight; B2: S1.ATC receives the information TX Req , register the aircraft information, and run BFT to generate proof for TX during registration <TX Req >1 and recorded on the chain, S1.ATC node will <TX Req >1 sent to S1.PKG and AC; B3: After receiving the message, S1.PKG node verifies <TX Req >1, if the verification is successful, a temporary aircraft ID is generated for AC, and the sub-algorithm 2 is called to generate the private key sk of AC AC ,Then, S1.PKG node returns it to AC through the trusted channel; B4: AC receives and verifies <TX Req >1, store the private key sk AC , complete the registration; In the film's flight scenario, the following steps are performed before takeoff to prepare for the flight. This process needs to be performed before each flight: C1: AC generates and sends flight preparation transaction TX to S1.ATC FL = <Addr s ,Addr d ,AA,FL,T>; Among them, Addr s AC origin, Address d is the AC destination, FL is the flight number, and T is the timestamp; C2: S1.ATC node runs BFT and processes TX FL And generate flight identity list and certification <acl>1. This list includes the identities and times of other flight nodes that the aircraft is expected to intersect during its flight. <acl>1 and recorded on the blockchain, S1.ATC node will <acl> 1 is sent to AC;< / acl> < / acl> < / acl> C3: AC receives the information and verifies it <acl> 1. If the authentication succeeds, the ACL is stored on the AC node.< / acl> 8. The secure and scalable ADS-B system based on the signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain according to claim 7, characterized in that: Protocol cross-shard The information processing and transmission process between different slices of the ADS-B system before the flight process includes: In the on-chip flight scenario, the flight performs the following steps to register the flight. The registration process is performed only once within a preset time period: D1: AC generates and sends flight node registration transaction TX to S1.ATC and S1.PKG through a trusted channel Req = <S1,…,S n ,AA,t>, where AA is the unique identification number of the flight; D2: S1.ATC receives the information TX Req , register the aircraft information, and run BFT to generate proof for TX during registration <TX Req >1 and sent to all relevant shards S2.ATC,…,S n .ATC; D3: After receiving the message, S i .ATC node runs BFT to process registration request, where i≠1, and processes the result <TX Req > i Send to S i .ATC; D4: After collecting and verifying all the registration results, S1.ATC will register the completion results <TX Req >1 record is uploaded to the chain and sent to S1.PKG and AC; D5: After receiving the message, S1.PKG node verifies <TX Req >1, if the verification is successful, a temporary aircraft ID is generated for AC, and the sub-algorithm 2 is called to generate the private key sk of AC AC ,Then, S1.PKG node returns it to AC through the trusted channel; D6: AC receives and verifies <TX Req >1, store the private key sk AC , complete the registration; In the cross-slice flight scenario, the following steps are performed before takeoff to prepare for the flight. This process needs to be performed before each flight: E1: AC generates and sends flight preparation transaction TX to S1.ATC FL = <Addr s ,Addr d ,AA,FL,t>; E2: S1.ATC node runs BFT and processes TX FL And generate flight preparation certificate <TX FL >1, send to all relevant shards S2.ATC,…,S n .ATC; E3: After receiving the message, S i .ATC node runs BFT to process flight preparation requests and generate flight identity lists and certificates <ACL i > i , where i≠1, and the list includes S in the shard i The identities and times of other flight nodes that are expected to intersect during the AC flight, S i .ATC node sends the message <ACL i > i Send to S1.ATC; E4: After S1.ATC collects all relevant shard information, it runs BFT to summarize the preparation list. S1.ATC will summarize the list <acl>1Record on the blockchain and send the message <acl> 1 is sent to AC;< / acl> < / acl> E5: AC receives the information and verifies it <acl> 1. If the authentication succeeds, the ACL is stored on the AC node.< / acl> 9. The secure and scalable ADS-B system based on the signcryption algorithm and sharded blockchain according to claim 8, characterized in that: Protocol operate The operation process of the ADS-B system during the flight of an aircraft includes: F1: During flight, the AC continuously broadcasts and stores general ADS-B information. com ; F2: When AC and GS receive general ADS-B information com When verifying whether the identity information contained in the information is in the aircraft's ACL, if so, the information is analyzed and temporarily stored. i .GS to S i .ATC forwarding m com Information, S i .ATC stores messages permanently; F3: At interval t com Afterwards, AC generates the Merkle root m based on the sent information list. cr , when the key information m cr When it is about to be sent, AC calls the sub-algorithm 3 to calculate the signature information σ and broadcast it according to the aircraft identity information list ACL and the ground station list GSL; F4: S i After GS receives σ, it calls the sub-algorithm 4 to calculate the plaintext information m cr , and then send it to S i .ATC node, S i The ATC node stores the message permanently. When another flight node AC′ receives σ, it calls the sub-algorithm 4 to calculate the plaintext information m cr To verify the AC identity; if m cr is a Merkle root, then from the temporarily stored m com Reconstruction com The corresponding Merkle root root′, and determine m cr Is it equal to root′? If the verification is successful, the AC is authenticated; F5: When S i .ATC received m cr When running BFT processing m cr And write it into the blockchain, m cr The processing is carried out according to the following rules: If m cr is a Merkle root, then from the stored n com Reconstruction com The corresponding Merkle root root′, and determine m cr Is it equal to root′? If so, then authenticate AC and n com Otherwise, wait for the AC to land and then review the flight log messages on board. If m cr Not a Merkle root, for m cr response.