A hardware security encryption method and system for driverless car terminal box

Abstract

The present invention discloses a hardware security encryption method and system for a driverless car terminal box. The encryption method mainly includes the following steps. Step 1, pre-make a secret key and burn it on the encryption chip; Step 2, weld the encryption chip on the driverless car terminal box hardware; Step 3, wake up the encryption chip, if the wake-up is successful, enter step 4, otherwise exit; Step 4, determine whether the serial number of the encryption chip can be read, if the reading is successful, go to step 5, otherwise the encryption chip enters step 6; Step 5, the encryption chip executes the authentication process; Step 6, the encryption chip enters a dormant state. Step 7: End. The system includes an encryption chip and a main control, and the main control is connected to the encryption chip via an I2C bus. The present invention prevents the present invention from being connected to an illegal center, effectively preventing the vehicle from being illegally controlled, and at the same time protects the copyright of the firmware of the present invention to prevent it from being cloned by criminals.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention relates to a hardware security encryption method and system for a driverless car terminal box. Background Art

[0002] The driverless car terminal box hardware is the vehicle-mounted TBOX hardware, which is a core component of the Internet of Vehicles system. It consists of four parts: the host, the vehicle-mounted TBOX hardware, the mobile phone APP and the background system. Among them, the host is mainly used for in-car audio-visual entertainment and vehicle information display, while the vehicle-mounted TBOX is mainly used to communicate with the background system and mobile phone APP to realize the vehicle information display and control of the mobile phone APP or the background.

[0003] The vehicle-mounted TBOX hardware is an important component that connects the vehicle and the mobile phone APP or background. It communicates with the background system to realize the vehicle information display and control of the mobile phone APP. Only with the vehicle-mounted TBOX hardware can the function of remotely controlling the vehicle be realized. However, there are problems with the existing vehicle-mounted TBOX hardware. The vehicle-mounted TBOX hardware is connected to an illegal center, and the vehicle is illegally controlled, causing traffic safety accidents: for example, the engine, throttle, ABS, air conditioning, doors and windows are illegally controlled. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the deficiencies in the prior art and provide a method and system for hardware security encryption of an unmanned vehicle terminal box.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0006] A method for hardware security encryption of a driverless car terminal box comprises the following steps:

[0007] Step 1: The encryption chip has a built-in hash calculation engine to determine whether the encryption chip is communicating normally. If it is normal, the pre-made secret key is burned into the encryption chip, otherwise the encryption chip is discarded;

[0008] Step 2: Solder the encryption chip to the driverless car terminal box hardware;

[0009] Step 3, the master controller wakes up the encryption chip through the I2C bus. If the wake-up is successful, go to step 4, otherwise exit. The I2C bus is the SCL line and the SDA line;

[0010] Step 4: Determine whether the serial number of the encryption chip can be read. If the reading is successful, go to step 5; otherwise, the encryption chip goes to step 6;

[0011] Step 5: The main control executes the authentication process. If the authentication is successful, the main control executes the TBOX service, and the encryption chip enters step 6 at the same time. Otherwise, the main control does not execute any service and enters a dead waiting state, and the encryption chip enters step 6;

[0012] Step 6: The encryption chip enters sleep mode;

[0013] Step 7: End.

[0014] Preferably, the length of the pre-made key is 32 bytes.

[0015] Preferably, whether the encryption chip is communicating normally is determined by the main control reading the serial number of the encryption chip. If the serial number can be read, the communication is normal, otherwise the communication fails.

[0016] Preferably, the length of the sequence number is 9 bytes.

[0017] Preferably, upon successful awakening, the encryption chip returns data 04 11 33 43 to the main control.

[0018] Preferably, the encryption chip performs the authentication process including the following steps:

[0019] Step a1, the master generates the firmware compilation date and time as the initial message;

[0020] Step a2: The master controller sends a Challenge command to the encryption chip via the I2C bus;

[0021] Step a3: After the encryption chip receives the Challenge command from the master, the encryption chip calculates the first summary information through the built-in hash calculation engine and the pre-programmed key;

[0022] Step a4, the encryption chip sends the first summary information to the main control as a response instruction;

[0023] Step a5: The master performs SHA-256 calculation on the initial message and the pre-made key to obtain the second summary information;

[0024] Step a6: The master controller compares the first summary information and the second summary information to see if they are the same. If they are the same, the authentication succeeds; otherwise, the authentication fails.

[0025] Preferably, the encryption chip is of model MOD208, and the main control adopts ARM Cortex main control.

[0026] As a preference, the TBOX service enables normal communication between the main control and the backend or mobile phone APP.

[0027] Preferably, the process of the master controller initiating a Challenge command to the encryption chip through the I2C bus is as follows: the SCL line is at the first clock pulse and the SDA line is at a high level as a start signal, and then the SDA line transmits the address for 8 SCL clocks. After the address is output, if SDA is at a low level, that is, the ACK signal, the SDA line continues to send 8-bit challenge command data under 8 SCL clocks until the SCL line is a pulse and the SDA line is at a high level, and the sending is completed.

[0028] A hardware security encryption system for a driverless car terminal box includes an encryption chip and a main control. The main control is connected to the encryption chip via an I2C bus. The encryption chip has a built-in hash calculation engine and is burned with a pre-made secret key.

[0029] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: the present invention performs encryption operations on the encryption chip and the main control, and the secret key is unique and not public, and an authentication process is performed, so it cannot be cracked. Only after successful authentication can the security encryption system of the present invention be connected, so that other controllers cannot be connected to the security encryption system, and the present invention is prevented from being connected to an illegal center, effectively preventing the vehicle from being illegally controlled, greatly improving security, and protecting the copyright of the firmware of the present invention to prevent it from being cloned by criminals. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0030] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the encryption method;

[0031] Figure 2 It is the module connection diagram of the encryption system;

[0032] Figure 3 Execute authentication flow chart for encryption chip;

[0033] Figure 4 This is the timing diagram of the master controller sending a challenge command to the encryption chip. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] The technical solution of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings:

[0035] like Figure 1 As shown, a method for hardware security encryption of a driverless car terminal box includes the following steps:

[0036] Step 1. The encryption chip 2 has a built-in hash calculation engine to determine whether the encryption chip 2 communicates normally. If it is normal, the pre-made secret key is burned on the encryption chip 2, otherwise the encryption chip 2 is discarded; the method of burning the secret key is to place the unburned encryption chip 2 on a dedicated burner, and then turn on the host computer, where you can read the SN value to determine whether the chip communicates normally, then click Personalization, select Load Burn File, and then click Burn Encryption Core. The OK display will be displayed if the burning is successful. Note that once the configuration area and data area of ​​the host computer are locked, they cannot be changed. Only the locked encryption chip and the pre-made key will not be lost. Then remove the chip with the burned key and weld it to the hardware of the driverless car terminal box.

[0037] Step 2: Solder the encryption chip 2 to the driverless car terminal box hardware, and the length of the pre-made secret key is 32 bytes;

[0038] Step 3: The master control 1 wakes up the encryption chip 2 through the I2C bus. If the wake-up is successful, go to step 4, otherwise exit. If the wake-up is successful, the encryption chip 2 returns the data of the master control 1 04 11 33 43. The I2C bus is the SCL line and the SDA line.

[0039] Step 4: Determine whether the serial number of the encryption chip 2 can be read. The length of the serial number is 9 bytes. If the reading is successful, go to step 5, otherwise the encryption chip goes to step 6; each encryption chip has a unique serial number. If the serial number is read successfully, authentication will be performed, otherwise the encryption chip will enter sleep mode.

[0040] Step 5: The main control 1 executes the authentication process. If the authentication is successful, the main control 1 executes the TBOX service, and the encryption chip 2 enters step 6 at the same time. Otherwise, the main control 1 does not execute any service and enters a dead waiting state, and the encryption chip 2 enters step 6; The TBOX service is for the main control 1 to communicate normally with the background or mobile phone APP, so that the background or mobile phone APP can remotely control the main control 1.

[0041] Step 6: The encryption chip 2 enters the sleep state;

[0042] Step 7: End.

[0043] The determination of whether the encryption chip 2 is communicating normally is performed by the main control 1 reading the serial number of the encryption chip 2. If the serial number can be read, the communication is normal, otherwise the communication fails.

[0044] like Figure 3 As shown, the authentication process performed by the encryption chip 2 includes the following steps:

[0045] Step a1, the master control 1 generates the firmware compilation date and time as the initial message;

[0046] Step a2, the master control 1 sends a challenge command to the encryption chip 2 through the I2C bus;

[0047] Step a3: After the encryption chip 2 receives the Challenge instruction from the main control 1, the encryption chip 2 calculates the first summary information through the built-in hash calculation engine and the previously burned pre-made key;

[0048] Step a4, the encryption chip 2 sends the first summary information to the main control 1 as a response;

[0049] Step a5: The master controller 1 performs SHA-256 calculation on the initial message and the pre-made key to obtain the second summary information;

[0050] Step a6: The master control 1 compares the first summary information and the second summary information to see if they are the same. If they are the same, the authentication succeeds; otherwise, the authentication fails.

[0051] The model of the encryption chip 2 is MOD208, and the main control 1 adopts the ARM Cortex main control 1.

[0052] like Figure 2 As shown, a hardware security encryption system for a driverless car terminal box includes:

[0053] The encryption chip 2 and the main control 1 are connected to the encryption chip 2 via an I2C bus. The encryption chip 2 has a built-in hash calculation engine and is burned with a pre-made secret key.

[0054] like Figure 4 As shown, the process of the master control 1 initiating a Challenge command to the encryption chip 2 through the I2C bus is as follows: the SCL line is at the first clock pulse and the SDA line is at a high level as a start signal, and then the SDA line transmits the address for 8 SCL clocks. After the address is output, if SDA is at a low level, that is, an ACK signal, the SDA line continues to send 8-bit challenge command data under 8 SCL clocks until the SCL line is a pulse and the SDA line is at a high level, and the sending is completed.

[0055] The present invention performs encryption operations on the encryption chip and the main control, and the encryption is performed by hardware, and the secret key is unique and not public, and an authentication process is performed, so it cannot be cracked. Only after successful authentication can the security encryption system of the present invention be connected, so that other controllers cannot be connected to the security encryption system, and the present invention is prevented from being connected to an illegal center, effectively preventing the vehicle from being illegally controlled, greatly improving security, and protecting the copyright of the firmware of the present invention to prevent cloning by criminals.

[0056] It should be noted that the above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention. Obviously, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiment, and there may be many variations. In short, all variations that can be directly derived or associated with the content disclosed by ordinary technicians in this field should be considered as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A hardware security encryption method for an unmanned vehicle terminal box, characterized in that: The steps include: Step 1, the encryption chip (2) has a built-in hash calculation engine, which determines whether the encryption chip (2) is communicating normally. If it is normal, the pre-made secret key is burned into the encryption chip (2); otherwise, the encryption chip (2) is discarded; Step 2: Solder the encryption chip (2) to the driverless car terminal box hardware; Step 3, the master control (1) wakes up the encryption chip (2) via the I2C bus. If the wake-up is successful, go to step 4, otherwise exit. The I2C bus is the SCL line and the SDA line. Step 4: Determine whether the serial number of the encryption chip can be read. If the reading is successful, go to step 5; otherwise, the encryption chip goes to step 6; Step 5: The main control executes the authentication process. If the authentication is successful, the main control executes the TBOX service, and the encryption chip enters step 6 at the same time. Otherwise, the main control does not execute any service and enters a dead waiting state, and the encryption chip enters step 6; Step 6: The encryption chip enters sleep mode; Step 7: End, the master control (1) executes the authentication process including the following steps: Step a1, the master control (1) generates the firmware compilation time as an initial message; Step a2, the master control (1) sends a Challenge command to the encryption chip (2) via the I2C bus; Step a3: After the encryption chip (2) receives the Challenge instruction from the main control (1), the encryption chip (2) calculates the first summary information using the built-in hash calculation engine and the pre-programmed key; Step a4, the encryption chip (2) sends the first summary information to the main control (1) as a response Response instruction; Step a5, the master control (1) performs SHA-256 calculation on the initial message and the pre-made key to obtain the second summary information; Step a6, the master control (1) compares whether the first summary information and the second summary information are the same. If they are the same, the authentication is successful, otherwise the authentication fails. The master control (1) initiates a Challenge instruction to the encryption chip (2) through the I2C bus. The process is as follows: the SCL line is at the first clock pulse and the SDA line is at a high level as a start signal, and then the SDA line transmits the address for 8 SCL clocks. After the address is output, if SDA is at a low level, that is, an ACK signal, the SDA line continues to send 8 bits of challenge instruction data under 8 SCL clocks until the SCL line is a pulse and the SDA line is at a high level, and the sending is completed.

2. According to claim 1, a method for hardware security encryption of a driverless car terminal box is characterized in that: The length of the pre-made key is 32 bytes.

3. According to claim 1, a method for hardware security encryption of a driverless car terminal box is characterized in that: The determination of whether the encryption chip (2) is communicating normally is performed by the main control (1) reading the serial number of the encryption chip (2); if the serial number can be read, the communication is normal; otherwise, the communication fails.

4. According to the hardware security encryption method for an unmanned vehicle terminal box as described in claim 3, the length of the serial number is 9 bytes.

5. According to claim 1, a method for hardware security encryption of a driverless car terminal box is characterized in that: The successful awakening means that the encryption chip (2) returns the data 04 11 33 43 to the main control (1).

6. According to claim 1, a method for hardware security encryption of a driverless car terminal box is characterized in that: The model of the encryption chip (2) is MOD208, and the main control (1) adopts an ARM Cortex main control (1).

7. According to claim 1, a method for hardware security encryption of a driverless car terminal box is characterized in that: The TBOX service is a normal communication between the main control (1) and the background or mobile phone APP.

8. A hardware security encryption system for driverless car terminal box, characterized in that: The driverless car terminal box hardware security encryption system is used to refer to any one of claims 1 to 7, comprising an encryption chip (2) and a main control (1), wherein the main control (1) is connected to the encryption chip (2) via an I2C bus, and the encryption chip (2) has a built-in hash calculation engine and is burned with a pre-made secret key.

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