Secret management method, device and system

By using secret sharing and proxy re-encryption mechanisms in end-to-end encryption and entrusting the key to the service platform, the problem of unrecoverable keys after user device loss is solved, and the security and reliability of key management are achieved.

CN118921165APending Publication Date: 2024-11-08HUAWEI TECH CO LTD
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202310767705.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-05-06
Filing Date
2023-06-26
Publication Date
2024-11-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In end-to-end encryption, if a user device is lost or damaged, the key cannot be remembered by the user, resulting in the inability to decrypt data in the cloud and permanent data loss. How to properly store and manage the key becomes a critical issue.

Method used

Through a secret sharing mechanism and a proxy re-encryption mechanism, the key is entrusted to the service platform. The recovery contact party participates in secret recovery, and the service platform participates in secret custody. Only the secret custodian can obtain information based on the registered identity credentials, ensuring that only the custodian can recover the key.

Benefits of technology

It improves the confidentiality, security, and reliability of key management, prevents multiple recovery contacts from colluding on recovery keys, and ensures the security and reliability of data recovery.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN118921165A_ABST
    Figure CN118921165A_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The invention discloses a secret management method, device and system, and belongs to the field of information security. A secret hosting party obtains at least one hosting public key, the at least one hosting public key is obtained based on a plurality of recovery public and private key pairs, and the plurality of recovery public and private key pairs are from a plurality of recovery contact parties. And the secret trusteeship encrypts the target secret by using the at least one trusteeship public key to obtain a target ciphertext. And the secret escrow sends a secret escrow request to the service platform, wherein the secret escrow request comprises the identity credential and the target ciphertext of the secret escrow. According to the method, the decoupling principle of separating the secret recovery capability from the secret storage is applied, the recovery contact party participates in the secret recovery, and the service platform participates in the secret storage, so that the confidentiality, the safety and the reliability of secret management are improved.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

[0001] This application claims priority to Chinese patent application No. 202310503339.2, filed on May 6, 2023, and entitled “A method for processing security data”, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field

[0002] The present application relates to the field of information security, and in particular to a secret management method, device and system. Background Art

[0003] The so-called end-to-end encryption (E2EE) means that data is encrypted and decrypted on the user's device, and the key is only held by the user's device, so it can ensure that data leakage will not occur when the ciphertext is synchronized and backed up through the cloud. However, once the user's device is lost or damaged, and the key cannot be remembered by the user, the data in the cloud will not be decrypted, which is equivalent to the data being permanently lost. Therefore, how to properly store and manage the key is an urgent problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present application provides a secret management method, device and system.

[0005] In a first aspect, a secret management method is provided. The method includes: a secret escrow party obtains at least one escrow public key, the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, the m recovery public-private key pairs come from multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1. The secret escrow party uses the at least one escrow public key to encrypt the target secret to obtain a target ciphertext. The secret escrow party sends a secret escrow request to a service platform, the secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and the target ciphertext.

[0006] This application applies the decoupling principle of separating secret recovery capability from secret custody, with the recovery contact participating in secret recovery and the service platform participating in secret custody. Since the target ciphertext is stored on the service platform instead of being directly entrusted to multiple recovery contact parties, and only the secret escrow party can obtain the entrusted information from the service platform based on the registered identity credentials, even if the multiple recovery contact parties collude, they cannot recover the target secret. In this way, only the secret escrow party can recover the secret, which improves the confidentiality, security and reliability of secret management.

[0007] Optionally, the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, including but not limited to: the at least one escrow public key includes m public keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs. Alternatively, the at least one escrow public key includes a distributed key generation (DKG) public key, which is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs. Alternatively, the at least one escrow public key includes at least one DKG public key and at least one public key in the m recovery public-private key pairs, each DKG public key in the at least one DKG public key is calculated based on at least two private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs, wherein the union of the recovery public-private key pair to which the at least one public key belongs and the recovery public-private key pair to which the private key used to calculate the at least one DKG public key belongs is m recovery public-private key pairs. That is, the at least one escrow public key used to encrypt the target secret is provided by multiple recovery contact parties, and accordingly, the secret escrow party can recover the target secret only with the participation of multiple private keys of at least one recovery contact party. This application specifically performs secret hosting and recovery through an application proxy re-encryption scheme.

[0008] In a first possible implementation, the at least one escrow public key includes m public keys in m recovery public-private key pairs, and the secret escrow party uses at least one escrow key to encrypt the target secret to obtain the target ciphertext, including: the secret escrow party divides the target secret based on a secret sharing protocol to obtain n secret shares, where n is a positive integer greater than 1. The secret escrow party uses m public keys to encrypt the n secret shares to obtain p ciphertext fragments, and the target ciphertext includes p ciphertext fragments, wherein each of the p ciphertext fragments is obtained by encrypting at least one secret share of the n secret shares by at least one public key of the m public keys.

[0009] In this implementation mode, the secret custodian applies the secret sharing mechanism. Based on the secret sharing protocol, the secret custodian divides the target secret into multiple secret shares, and then encrypts and escrows the multiple secret shares according to their respective share allocation strategies, where the encryption key uses the public keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties.

[0010] Optionally, m=n=p, and the implementation method of the secret custodian using m public keys to encrypt n secret shares includes: the secret custodian uses different public keys among the m public keys to encrypt different secret shares among the n secret shares, and obtains p ciphertext shards. That is, the secret custodian uses m public keys to perform one-to-one encryption on the n secret shares, each secret share among the n secret shares exists in and only exists in one ciphertext shard, and different secret shares exist in different ciphertext shards.

[0011] In combination with the first possible implementation, the secret custodian may also obtain multiple re-encryption keys provided by multiple recovery contacts, each of which is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the secret custodian's identity public key, wherein all recovery public-private key pairs used to generate multiple re-encryption keys include at least a public key used to encrypt k secret shares out of n secret shares, 2≤k≤n. The secret custodian obtains k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares through the service platform, and each re-encrypted ciphertext fragment is re-encrypted using a re-encryption key pair from among multiple re-encryption keys using the public key corresponding to the private key used to generate the re-encryption key; the secret custodian uses the secret custodian's identity private key to decrypt the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments respectively to obtain k secret shares. The secret custodian restores the target secret based on the k secret shares.

[0012] The present application recovers at least k secret shares among n secret shares obtained by dividing the target secret by applying a proxy re-encryption scheme, thereby realizing recovery of the target secret.

[0013] Optionally, a method for implementing the secret escrow party to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to k secret shares through the service platform includes: the secret escrow party sends a re-encryption request to the service platform, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and multiple re-encryption keys. The secret escrow party receives a re-encryption response sent by the service platform, the re-encryption response includes the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0014] In this implementation mode, the service platform re-encrypts the ciphertext fragments hosted by the secret custodian to obtain re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0015] Optionally, the re-encryption request further includes a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on multiple re-encryption keys.

[0016] In this application, by carrying the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key in the re-encryption request, the service platform verifies the signature and can determine the authenticity of the re-encryption key. By carrying the signature of the information security manager on multiple re-encryption keys in the re-encryption request, the service platform verifies the signature and can determine whether the multiple re-encryption keys have been authorized by the information security manager. This application can adopt a double-signature mechanism, so that the service platform can provide the escrow information to the secret escrow party after determining that the re-encryption key is authentic and authorized by the information security manager, which can improve the security of secret recovery.

[0017] Optionally, another implementation method for the secret custodian to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to k secret shares through the service platform includes: the secret custodian sends a secret retrieval request to the service platform, and the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian. The secret custodian receives a secret retrieval response sent by the service platform, and the secret retrieval response includes p ciphertext fragments. The secret custodian uses multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt the corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments, respectively, to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0018] In this implementation mode, the secret custodian re-encrypts the escrowed ciphertext fragments to obtain re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0019] Optionally, the secret retrieval request also includes multiple re-encryption keys, and a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys.

[0020] In this application, by carrying multiple re-encryption keys in the secret retrieval request and the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key, the service platform verifies the signature and can determine the authenticity of the re-encryption key. By carrying the signature of the information security manager on multiple re-encryption keys in the secret retrieval request and the service platform verifies the signature and can determine whether the multiple re-encryption keys have been authorized by the information security manager. This application can adopt a double signature mechanism, so that the service platform can provide the escrow information to the secret escrow party after determining that the re-encryption key is authentic and authorized by the information security manager, which can improve the security of secret recovery.

[0021] Optionally, the implementation method of the secret escrow party obtaining multiple re-encryption keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties includes: the secret escrow party sends a secret retrieval trigger request to the service platform, the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party, and the secret retrieval trigger request is used to trigger the service platform to summon multiple recovery contact parties to provide re-encryption keys to the secret escrow party. The secret escrow party receives the re-encryption keys sent by the recovery contact parties.

[0022] In this application, the secret custodian can summon the recovery contact party through the service platform to trigger the recovery contact party to provide the secret recovery information to the secret custodian. In this process, the service platform can first authenticate the secret custodian, and then summon multiple recovery contact parties corresponding to the secret custodian after the authentication is passed. The recovery contact party can authenticate the secret custodian to the service platform and then provide the re-encryption key, thereby achieving end-to-end authentication to ensure that the user who retrieves the secret is authentic.

[0023] A second possible implementation method is that the at least one escrow public key includes a DKG public key, which is calculated based on m private keys in m recovery public-private key pairs, and the secret escrow party uses at least one escrow key to encrypt the target secret to obtain the target ciphertext, including: the secret escrow party uses the DKG public key to encrypt the target secret to obtain the target ciphertext.

[0024] In this implementation, multiple recovery contact parties apply a secret sharing mechanism. Based on the secret sharing protocol, multiple recovery contact parties calculate a common DKG public key according to their own private keys and the private key shares shared by other recovery contact parties. The secret custodian uses the DKG public key to encrypt and escrow the target secret.

[0025] In combination with the second possible implementation, the secret custodian may also obtain multiple re-encryption key shards provided by multiple recovery contact parties, each re-encryption key shard is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein the multiple re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs in m recovery public-private key pairs, 2≤t≤m. The secret custodian obtains the re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform, and the re-encrypted ciphertext is obtained by re-encrypting the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key, which is generated based on multiple re-encryption key shards. The secret custodian uses the identity private key of the secret custodian to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain the target secret.

[0026] This application recovers the target ciphertext to obtain the target secret by applying a proxy re-encryption scheme.

[0027] Optionally, an implementation method for the secret escrow party to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform includes: the secret escrow party sends a re-encryption request to the service platform, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and re-encryption key information, the re-encryption key information includes an indication of the re-encryption key. The secret escrow party receives a re-encryption response sent by the service platform, the re-encryption response includes the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0028] In this implementation mode, the service platform re-encrypts the target ciphertext hosted by the secret custodian to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0029] Optionally, another implementation method for the secret escrow party to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform includes: the secret escrow party sends a secret retrieval request to the service platform, and the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party. The secret escrow party receives a secret retrieval response sent by the service platform, and the secret retrieval response includes the target ciphertext. The secret escrow party re-encrypts the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0030] In this implementation mode, the secret escrow party re-encrypts the escrowed target ciphertext to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0031] Optionally, the secret escrow party may also send an identity update request to the service platform, where the identity update request includes the updated identity credentials of the secret escrow party, so that the service platform stores the correspondence between the updated identity credentials and the target ciphertext.

[0032] The secret custodian can send an identity update request to the service platform to re-register an identity credential after losing the old identity credential or old device. Alternatively, the secret custodian can also send an identity update request to the service platform to reset an identity credential based on the original identity if the secret custodian forgets the password or passcode for logging into the service platform. Afterwards, the service platform can authenticate the secret custodian based on the secret custodian's latest identity credential. After the service platform completes the identity authentication of the secret custodian, it uses the updated identity credential to update the corresponding relationship between the storage and the target ciphertext. In this way, even if the secret custodian loses the old identity credential or old device, it can still retrieve the escrow information by re-registering the identity credential with the service platform, thereby improving the reliability of secret recovery.

[0033] Optionally, the secret escrow party may also initiate a group session with multiple recovery contact parties, so that the multiple recovery contact parties re-authenticate themselves with respect to the updated identity public key of the secret escrow party. The updated identity public key is used to recover the target secret.

[0034] In this way, even if the secret escrow party loses the old identity credentials or old equipment, by re-bootstrapping the identity to multiple recovery contacts, the multiple recovery contacts can provide the secret escrow party with the re-encryption key corresponding to the new identity credentials, so that the secret escrow party can decrypt and recover the target secret based on the new identity credentials, thereby improving the reliability of secret recovery. In addition, since the multiple recovery contacts provide the re-encryption key to the secret escrow party only after the identity authentication of the secret escrow party, it can prevent other users from impersonating the secret escrow party to steal the secret, thereby improving the security of secret recovery.

[0035] In a second aspect, a secret management method is provided. The method includes: a service platform receives a secret escrow request sent by a secret escrow party, the secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and a target ciphertext, the target ciphertext is obtained by encrypting the target secret using at least one escrow public key, the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, the m recovery public-private key pairs come from multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1. The service platform stores the corresponding relationship between the identity credentials and the target ciphertext.

[0036] In a first possible implementation, the at least one escrow public key includes m public keys in m recovery public-private key pairs, the target ciphertext includes p ciphertext fragments, and the secret escrow request includes the correspondence between the p ciphertext fragments and the m public keys, wherein each of the p ciphertext fragments is encrypted by at least one of the m public keys to at least one of the n secret shares obtained by dividing the target secret, where n is a positive integer greater than 1. The service platform may also receive a re-encryption request sent by the secret escrow party, the re-encryption request including the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and multiple re-encryption keys, each re-encryption key is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret escrow party, wherein all the recovery public-private key pairs used to generate multiple re-encryption keys include at least public keys used to encrypt k secret shares in the n secret shares, 2≤k≤n. The service platform uses multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt the corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments, respectively, to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares. The service platform sends a re-encrypted response to the secret custodian, where the re-encrypted response includes k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0037] Optionally, the above-mentioned re-encryption request also includes the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or the signature of the information security management party on multiple re-encryption keys. Before the service platform sends a re-encryption response to the secret custodian, the service platform verifies all signatures in the re-encryption request.

[0038] In a second possible implementation, the at least one escrow public key includes a DKG public key, which is calculated based on m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs. The service platform may also receive a re-encryption request sent by the secret escrow party, the re-encryption request including the identity credentials and re-encryption key information of the secret escrow party, the re-encryption key information including an indication of a re-encryption key, the re-encryption key is generated based on multiple re-encryption key shards provided by multiple recovery contact parties, each re-encryption key shard is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret escrow party, wherein the multiple re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs in the m recovery public-private key pairs, 2≤t≤m. The service platform re-encrypts the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext. The service platform sends a re-encryption response to the secret escrow party, the re-encryption response including the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0039] Optionally, the service platform stores a correspondence between the secret escrow party and multiple recovery contact parties, and the service platform receives a secret retrieval trigger request sent by the secret escrow party, and the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party. The service platform sends a call-up command to the multiple recovery contact parties, and the call-up command is used to instruct the multiple recovery contact parties to provide the re-encryption key to the secret escrow party.

[0040] Optionally, the service platform may also receive an identity update request sent by the secret escrow party, the identity update request including the updated identity credentials of the secret escrow party. After completing identity authentication of the secret escrow party, the service platform uses the updated identity credentials to update the corresponding relationship between the storage and the target ciphertext.

[0041] Optionally, the service platform uses a transparent log to publish the request initiated by the secret custodian to the service platform. The request includes but is not limited to an identity update request, a re-encryption request, or a secret retrieval request. In this way, the recovery contact party can perceive in advance through the transparent log the need for the secret custodian to re-register the identity and / or retrieve the secret. Later, when the secret custodian requests to obtain the re-encryption key from the recovery contact party, the recovery contact party can provide the re-encryption key to the secret custodian based on the information published in the transparent log. In one possible scenario, if the new identity public key of the secret custodian is not published in the transparent log, the recovery contact party can refuse to provide the re-encryption key to the secret custodian, which can further ensure the security and reliability of secret recovery.

[0042] In a third aspect, a secret management device is provided, which can be applied to a secret trustee. The device includes multiple functional modules, which interact with each other to implement the method in the first aspect and its various embodiments. The multiple functional modules can be implemented based on software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware, and the multiple functional modules can be arbitrarily combined or divided based on the specific implementation.

[0043] In a fourth aspect, a secret management device is provided, which can be applied to a service platform. The device includes multiple functional modules, which interact with each other to implement the method in the second aspect and its respective embodiments. The multiple functional modules can be implemented based on software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware, and the multiple functional modules can be arbitrarily combined or divided based on specific implementations.

[0044] In a fifth aspect, a secret management system is provided, including: a service platform, a secret custodian, and multiple recovery contacts, the multiple recovery contacts are used to provide m recovery public-private key pairs, where m is a positive integer greater than 1. The secret custodian is used to execute the method in the first aspect and its various embodiments, and the service platform is used to execute the method in the second aspect and its various embodiments.

[0045] In a sixth aspect, a secret management device is provided, comprising: a processor and a memory. The memory is used to store a computer program, and the computer program includes program instructions. The processor is used to call the computer program to implement the method in the first aspect and its various embodiments or the method in the second aspect and its various embodiments.

[0046] In the seventh aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which instructions are stored. When the instructions are executed by a processor, the method in the above-mentioned first aspect and its various embodiments or the method in the above-mentioned second aspect and its various embodiments is implemented.

[0047] In an eighth aspect, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method in the above-mentioned first aspect and its various embodiments or the method in the above-mentioned second aspect and its various embodiments.

[0048] In the ninth aspect, a chip is provided, which includes a programmable logic circuit and / or program instructions. When the chip is running, it implements the method in the above-mentioned first aspect and its various embodiments or the method in the above-mentioned second aspect and its various embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0049] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of an application scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0050] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of a secret management method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0051] Figure 3 It is a flowchart of a secret management method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0052] Figure 4 It is a structural diagram of a secret management device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0053] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the structure of another secret management device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0054] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a secret management device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0055] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the implementation methods of the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0056] For many years, end-to-end encryption (E2EE) has been an integral part of various consumer messaging applications. The so-called end-to-end encryption means that data is encrypted and decrypted on the user's device, and the key is only held by the user's device, so that data leakage will not occur when the ciphertext is synchronized and backed up through the cloud. If we only consider the scenario where a single device encrypts the data and hosts it in the cloud for backup, the key can be generated on the device. As long as the key does not leave the device, the security of the ciphertext of the cloud data can be guaranteed. However, once the device is lost or damaged, and the key cannot be remembered by the user, the data in the cloud will not be decrypted, which is equivalent to permanent data loss. Obviously, this is unacceptable to users.

[0057] For individual users, end-to-end encryption can be used to achieve secure backup or storage of personal data. For example, some terminal devices currently support advanced data protection. Users can choose to save photos, network disks, memos, browsers, favorites and other data on the terminal device in the cloud using end-to-end encryption. These data protected by advanced data have high requirements for recoverability. There is no other channel to recover or reconstruct them except to retrieve them from the cloud and restore them to the terminal device for decryption and recovery. Therefore, once they cannot be decrypted, users will lose these data forever. In order to improve the recoverability of data, users will be required to set up recovery contacts or recovery keys before enabling the advanced data protection function. The recovery key is usually composed of multiple characters. The key is difficult to remember. It is generally recommended that users record it on paper documents and save it in a safe for use when recovering data, but this method has a poor user experience. In comparison, recovery contacts is a more friendly solution. It divides the key into multiple key shards, and saves some of the key shards on the friend's mobile phone, and the other key shards are saved in the cloud. When you need to recover data, you can seek the help of your friends. As long as the friend's mobile phone can still be used, the data protected by advanced data can be decrypted back. Since the friend and the cloud each only hold a part of the key shard, neither can independently recover the complete key, so neither the friend nor the cloud can independently decrypt the data.

[0058] For enterprises, using end-to-end encryption has at least the following three advantages: 1) End-to-end encryption provides a strong security option for enterprises that use cloud computing as a standard business model. Since E2EE stores encryption keys on user devices rather than servers, hackers cannot recover encrypted data in the cloud by attacking the server to obtain encryption keys. 2) End-to-end encryption ensures that control over encryption keys and the data itself is in the hands of the owner, providing enterprises with ultimate control over their data. E2EE ensures that the data itself is protected, and no third party can access end-to-end encrypted data regardless of where the data is stored. Therefore, E2EE can help enterprises meet strict data protection compliance requirements and reduce the risk of data leakage. 3) End-to-end encryption supports remote collaboration, adding an important layer of protection for remote collaboration. But at the same time, if the encryption key is lost, the enterprise data using end-to-end encryption will be permanently unrecoverable, which is obviously unbearable for enterprises. For example, in an end-to-end encrypted video conference, users record the end-to-end encrypted audio and video streams and store them securely on the conference recording and broadcasting server. The encryption key or password is known or held only by the user. The conference recording and broadcasting server and its conference system do not have the decryption capability. Once the user loses the encryption key or password, the encrypted data stored on the conference recording and broadcasting server will never be accessible for decryption.

[0059] Therefore, how to properly store and manage keys is the key to promoting the application of end-to-end encryption to secure communications.

[0060] Related art provides a method of using a secret sharing scheme (SSS) for secret storage and recovery. Among them, the Shamir linear secret sharing scheme (Shamir LSSS) is a threshold secret sharing scheme that is currently widely used and relatively mature. Shamir LSSS is implemented based on the Lagrange interpolation theorem. In a secret sharing scheme, there is usually a role responsible for splitting a secret value into multiple secret shares and distributing these secret shares to multiple participants, called a dealer, which can also be generally referred to as a trusted third party. Let t, n be positive integers, t≤n, n is the total number of participants in the secret sharing scheme, and n participants are recorded as P1,...,Pn, and t is the threshold value. In the (t,n) threshold scheme, the dealer splits a secret value into n secret shares and distributes each secret share (through a secure channel) to one of the n participants for safekeeping. Among them, any participants greater than or equal to t can cooperate to recover the secret value using their secret shares, while any participants less than or equal to t-1 cannot calculate the secret value.

[0061] However, directly applying the secret sharing scheme for key escrow cannot meet the end-to-end principle of secure recovery. In the scheme using the above secret sharing scheme for key escrow, the key custodian to be escrowed is the trader, the key to be escrowed is the secret value, and the above n participants are n key co-custodians. Since the n key co-custodians directly hold the key shares, based on the secret sharing mechanism, whether it is the key custodian or any other person, as long as any key shares that meet the (t, n) threshold are found, the key can be directly recovered. For example, as long as t key co-custodians collude, the key can be recovered.

[0062] Based on this, the present application provides a technical solution, which realizes the secure hosting and recovery of secrets by combining the secret sharing mechanism and the proxy re-encryption (PRE) mechanism. Proxy re-encryption is a special public key encryption mechanism. There are three roles in the scenario of proxy re-encryption, namely the principal, the trustee and the intermediary. The principal and the trustee each hold a public-private key pair, and the process of proxy re-encryption is as follows: the principal can generate a re-encryption key based on its own private key and the public key of the trustee, and hand over the re-encryption key to the intermediary; the intermediary can use the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted using the public key of the principal to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext; the trustee can use his own private key to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. When the technical solution provided by the present application applies the proxy re-encryption mechanism, the recovery contact party is the principal, the secret custodian is the trustee, and the service platform is the intermediary. Optionally, the present application can use PRE that supports fine-grained. The technical solution provided by the present application is as follows:

[0063] In the secret escrow stage, the secret escrow party obtains at least one escrow public key, and uses the at least one escrow public key to encrypt the target secret to obtain the target ciphertext. The secret escrow party then sends a secret escrow request to the service platform, and the secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and the target ciphertext. In this way, the secret escrow party can escrow and store the target ciphertext on the service platform. The identity credentials of the secret escrow party can be the identity credentials registered by the secret escrow party with the service platform, such as the identity public key of the secret escrow party. Among them, the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, and the m recovery public-private key pairs come from multiple recovery contact parties, that is, the at least one escrow public key used to encrypt the target secret is provided by multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1.

[0064] In the secret retrieval stage, the secret custodian obtains the re-encryption key provided by multiple recovery contact parties. The secret custodian can retrieve the managed target ciphertext from the service platform based on its own identity credentials, and then use the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the target ciphertext to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext, or the secret custodian can provide the service platform with a re-encryption key to request the service platform to re-encrypt the managed target ciphertext, and retrieve the re-encrypted ciphertext from the service platform based on its own identity credentials. Among them, the re-encryption key is generated based on the identity private key of the recovery contact party and the identity public key of the secret custodian. Afterwards, the secret custodian can use its own identity private key to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext to recover the target secret. In other words, in the process of decrypting the target ciphertext to recover the target secret, the participation of multiple recovery contact parties and the service platform is required.

[0065] In this application, since the target ciphertext is stored on the service platform instead of being directly entrusted to multiple recovery contacts, and only the secret escrow party can obtain the entrusted information from the service platform based on the registered identity credentials, even if the multiple recovery contacts collude, they cannot recover the target secret. This application applies the decoupling principle of separating secret recovery capability from secret custody, with the recovery contact party participating in secret recovery and the service platform participating in secret custody, so that only the secret escrow party can recover the secret, thereby improving the confidentiality, security and reliability of secret management.

[0066] During the secret retrieval phase, the secret escrow party can use the old identity credentials (the identity credentials carried in the secret escrow request) to retrieve the escrow information from the service platform. Alternatively, the secret escrow party can also re-register new identity credentials with the service platform and use the new identity credentials to retrieve the escrow information from the service platform.

[0067] If the secret custodian wants to use new identity credentials, the secret custodian needs to re-authenticate to the service platform so that the service platform can securely bind the new identity credentials of the secret custodian to the old identity credentials. Optionally, the secret custodian sends an identity update request to the service platform, which includes the updated identity credentials of the secret custodian, so that the service platform stores the correspondence between the updated identity credentials and the target ciphertext. After the service platform completes the identity authentication of the secret custodian, it uses the updated identity credentials to update the corresponding relationship between the storage and the target ciphertext. In this way, even if the secret custodian loses the old identity credentials or old equipment, it can still retrieve the escrow information by re-registering the identity credentials with the service platform, thereby improving the reliability of secret recovery.

[0068] Optionally, the secret custodian can send an identity update request to the service platform to re-register an identity credential after losing the old identity credential or old device. Alternatively, the secret custodian can also send an identity update request to the service platform to reset an identity credential based on the original identity if the secret custodian forgets the password or passcode for logging into the service platform. Afterwards, the service platform can authenticate the secret custodian based on the secret custodian's latest identity credential.

[0069] In addition, if the secret custodian wants to use a new identity public key, the secret custodian also needs to re-bootstrap a new identity to multiple recovery contact parties so that multiple recovery contact parties can determine that the user who retrieves the secret is real and that the user who retrieves the secret safely holds the new identity public key. Multiple recovery contact parties can verify the new identity public key of the secret custodian by out-of-band authentication. For example, the secret custodian can initiate a group session to multiple recovery contact parties so that multiple recovery contact parties can re-authenticate the identity public key updated by the secret custodian. For example, multiple recovery contact parties can perform end-to-end encrypted end-to-end authentication on the identity public key updated by the secret custodian. For example, the group session can be an E2EE video conference. After completing the secret custodian, the secret custodian can pre-define the secret recovery re-identity bootstrap ceremony to the service platform or conference system to ensure the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the ceremony, and then reuse the process of convening an E2EE video conference so that multiple recovery contact parties can complete end-to-end authentication on the identity public key updated by the secret custodian through the E2EE video conference. Optionally, the recovery contact party may use an out-of-band authentication (OOBA) method based on short authenticated strings (SAS) to authenticate the new identity of the secret escrow party. Optionally, in addition to multiple recovery contact parties, the group members participating in the group session may also include other personnel to jointly authenticate the secret escrow party. Other personnel include but are not limited to some supervisors, colleagues, information security specialists, etc. After multiple recovery contact parties complete end-to-end identity authentication of the secret escrow party, they may use the new identity public key of the secret escrow party to generate a re-encryption key so that the secret escrow party can use the corresponding new identity private key to recover the target secret. In this way, even if the secret escrow party loses the old identity credentials or old devices, by re-bootstrapping the identity to multiple recovery contact parties, the multiple recovery contact parties can provide the secret escrow party with the re-encryption key corresponding to the new identity credentials, so that the secret escrow party can decrypt and recover the target secret based on the new identity credentials, thereby improving the reliability of secret recovery. In addition, since multiple recovery contacts provide re-encryption keys to the secret escrow party only after identity authentication, it can prevent other users from impersonating the secret escrow party to steal secrets, thereby improving the security of secret recovery.

[0070] Optionally, the service platform uses a transparent log to publish requests initiated by the secret custodian to the service platform. For example, the service platform can use a transparent log to publish re-encryption requests, secret retrieval requests, or identity update requests initiated by the secret custodian to the service platform. In this way, the recovery contact party can perceive in advance through the transparent log that the secret custodian has re-registered its identity and / or needs to retrieve the secret. Later, when the secret custodian requests to obtain the re-encryption key from the recovery contact party, the recovery contact party can provide the re-encryption key to the secret custodian based on the information published in the transparent log. In one possible scenario, if the secret custodian's new identity public key is not published in the transparent log, the recovery contact party can refuse to provide the secret custodian with a re-encryption key, which can further ensure the security and reliability of secret recovery.

[0071] Optionally, the target secret can be any information that needs to be encrypted and stored, such as a key for encrypting data, a user account or a user password, etc. For example, by using the secret management method provided by the present application to manage the key for encrypting data, the key can be securely stored and restored, thereby achieving the security and reliability of end-to-end encryption of data.

[0072] Optionally, a recovery contact party may provide one or more identity public-private key pairs as recovery public-private key pairs. In one possible scenario, the m recovery public-private key pairs come from m recovery contact parties, and each recovery contact party provides an identity public-private key as a recovery public-private key pair. In another possible scenario, the m recovery public-private key pairs come from less than m recovery contact parties, and at least one recovery contact party provides two or more identity public-private key pairs as recovery public-private key pairs. The identity public-private key pair provided by the recovery contact party may be a long-term identity public-private key pair, or may be a temporary identity public-private key pair.

[0073] In one possible implementation, the at least one escrow public key includes m public keys of m recovery public-private key pairs. In other words, the secret escrow party can use multiple public keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties to encrypt the target secret. In this implementation, the secret escrow party applies a secret sharing mechanism. The secret escrow party divides the target secret into multiple secret shares based on the secret sharing protocol, and then uses multiple public keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties to encrypt the multiple secret shares to obtain multiple ciphertext fragments, and the target ciphertext includes multiple ciphertext fragments.

[0074] For example, if the m recovery public-private key pairs are 3 recovery public-private key pairs, namely public key 1 and private key 1, public key 2 and private key 2, and public key 3 and private key 3, then the at least one escrow public key includes public key 1, public key 2, and public key 3. The secret escrow party may divide the target secret into 3 secret shares, and use public key 1 to encrypt secret share 1 to obtain ciphertext share 1, use public key 2 to encrypt secret share 2 to obtain ciphertext share 2, and use public key 3 to encrypt secret share 3 to obtain ciphertext share 3. The target ciphertext includes ciphertext share 1, ciphertext share 2, and ciphertext share 3.

[0075] In another possible implementation, the at least one escrow public key includes a DKG public key, which is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs. In other words, the secret escrow party can use a DKG public key to encrypt the target secret. The generation process of the DKG public key is essentially secret sharing. In this implementation, the recovery contact party applies the secret sharing mechanism. Multiple recovery contact parties calculate a common DKG public key based on their own private keys and the private key shares shared by other recovery contact parties based on the secret sharing protocol.

[0076] In another possible implementation, the at least one escrow public key includes at least one DKG public key and at least one public key of m recovery public-private key pairs, and each DKG public key of the at least one DKG public key is calculated based on at least two private keys of the m recovery public-private key pairs. Among them, the union of the recovery public-private key pair to which the at least one public key belongs and the recovery public-private key pair to which the private key used to calculate the at least one DKG public key belongs is the m recovery public-private key pairs. In this implementation, the secret escrow party and the recovery contact party jointly apply the secret sharing mechanism. The secret escrow party divides the target secret into multiple secret shares based on the secret sharing protocol, and the recovery contact party calculates the DKG public key based on the secret sharing protocol.

[0077] For example, the m recovery public-private key pairs are three recovery public-private key pairs, namely public key 1 and private key 1, public key 2 and private key 2, and public key 3 and private key 3. The at least one escrow public key may include public key 1 and a DKG public key calculated based on private key 2 and private key 3; or, the at least one escrow public key includes public key 1, public key 2, and a DKG public key calculated based on private key 1 and private key 3; or, the at least one escrow public key includes public key 1, public key 2, public key 3, a DKG public key calculated based on private key 1 and private key 2, and another DKG public key calculated based on private key 2 and private key 3; and so on. As long as the condition that all public keys included in the at least one escrow public key are obtained based on three recovery public-private key pairs is met, it will be sufficient.

[0078] The following is a detailed introduction to the technical solution of this application from multiple perspectives, including application scenarios, method flow, software devices, hardware devices, and systems.

[0079] The following is an example of an application scenario of the embodiment of the present application.

[0080] The secret management method provided by this application can be widely used in various secure communications and password, key or secret recovery scenarios involving data security backup, including but not limited to video conferencing systems, cloud service conferencing systems or other cloud service data security backup scenarios. For example, Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of an application scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 As shown, the application scenario includes a service platform 101, a secret custodian 102, and multiple recovery contact parties 103A-103C (collectively referred to as recovery contact parties 103). The number of recovery contact parties in the figure is only used as an exemplary description and is not intended to limit the application scenario involved in the embodiments of the present application.

[0081] The service platform 101 can be a server, or a server cluster consisting of multiple servers, or a cloud platform. The service platform 101 is used to provide identity management services and secure storage services for the secret custodian 102. The identity management service function and the secure storage service function can be integrated in the same device, or can also be located in different devices. The service platform 101 is used to provide identity management services for the secret custodian 102, including but not limited to providing identity proof for the secret custodian 102, such as for managing and persistently storing the long-term identity credentials of the secret custodian 102, authenticating the identity of the secret custodian 102, and providing online credential retrieval functions. The service platform 101 can use a storage system such as the interplanetary file system (IPFS) to provide secure storage services to the secret custodian 102 to store the information requested by the secret custodian 102 for custody.

[0082] Optionally, the service platform 101 is also used to provide a proxy re-encryption (PRE) service. The service platform 101 can use the re-encryption key provided by the secret escrow party 102 to re-encrypt the information escrowed by the secret escrow party 102. The proxy re-encryption service function and the identity management service function can be integrated in the same device, or can also be set in different devices.

[0083] Optionally, the service platform 101 is also used to provide transparency services, including but not limited to public key identity management services and / or log transparency services. The service platform 101 is used to provide public key identity management services, including but not limited to maintaining the mapping relationship between the communication party (including the secret custodian 102 and the recovery contact party) and the identity public key. The service platform 101 is used to provide log transparency services, including but not limited to using transparent logs to publish the request initiated by the secret custodian 102 to the service platform 101, so that the recovery contact party 103 can judge the authenticity of the behavior of the secret custodian 102 according to the log published by the service platform 101, and then can distinguish the behavior of the secret custodian 102 and the attacker, avoid the recovery contact party 103 assisting the attacker to break the secret of the secret custodian, that is, the log transparency service is used to provide security auditing functions. The public key identity management service function and the log transparency service function can be integrated in the same device, or can also be divided in different devices.

[0084] For example, see Figure 1 The service platform 101 includes a credential management server (CMS), a proxy re-encryption server, a public key server (PKS), and a log transparency server. The CMS is used to provide identity management services and secure storage services for the secret custodian 102.

[0085] The secret custodian 102 includes users and devices. Figure 1 , the secret escrow party 102 includes a device A1. The device A1 is a device held by a user, and the user can use the device A1 for communication. The identity credentials used by the secret escrow party 102 when requesting the service platform 101 to escrow the secret can be the device identity credentials of the device A1 or the user identity credentials.

[0086] In the embodiment of the present application, the secret custodian 102 needs to complete identity registration and registration on the service platform 101 before hosting the secret to the service platform 101. For example, the secret custodian 102 performs identity registration on the CMS, and stores the public-private key pair held by the secret custodian 102 as the identity credential of the secret custodian 102 in the secret custodian 102 and / or the CMS. In the case where the secret custodian 102 uses the public-private key pair held by the user as the identity credential, the user can register the identity on the CMS through the identity authentication device, and store the public-private key pair held by the user as the identity credential of the secret custodian 102 in the identity authentication device and / or the CMS. Among them, the identity authentication device can be a terminal and an application (application, APP) installed on the terminal for applying for identity registration with the CMS, or it can be a universal serial bus (universal serial bus, USB) key (USB key), or it can also be other removable secure storage devices that can be used to store long-term identity credentials of users such as private keys and digital certificates. The identity verification device held by the user and the device A1 are distinguishable logical units, and the entities can be combined or independent, that is, the identity verification device held by the user and the device A1 can be the same physical device, or can also be two independent physical devices. The embodiment of the present application is described by taking the identity verification device held by the user and the device A1 as the same physical device as an example.

[0087] Optionally, the implementation method of the secret custodian 102 performing identity registration on the CMS includes: the secret custodian 102 creates a public-private key pair through the device A1, and registers the public key in the public-private key pair with the CMS based on the existing standard security protocol (including but not limited to the fast identity online (FIDO) 2 protocol), and the secret custodian 102 can use the challenge value to sign to prove the ownership of the private key in the public-private key pair to the CMS, thereby completing the identity authentication, and save the registered public-private key pair locally on the device A1. The private key can only be used after the local unlocking is completed. The secret custodian 102 can unlock the local key through friendly and secure operations, such as verifying fingerprints, entering a personal identification number (PIN), operating through a microphone voice, inserting a USB key or pressing a button. The FIDO 2 protocol is always designed around protecting the privacy of the secret custodian 102, and the protocol will not provide information that can be used to track the secret custodian 102 to online service providers. After the secret custodian 102 completes the identity registration on the CMS, the public key in the public-private key pair generated by device A1 is authenticated by the CMS, and the public-private key pair can be used as the long-term identity credential of the secret custodian 102. Furthermore, the CMS announces the public key in the public-private key generated by device A1 to the PKS. In addition, the secret custodian 102 can securely store the long-term identity credential representing the identity of the secret custodian 102 in the CMS based on the opaque protocol. In other words, the mapping relationship between the secret custodian 102 and the long-term identity credential can be stored on the CMS to complete the identity registration of the secret custodian 102. The long-term identity credential can be securely retrieved from the CMS to the device A1 based on the password held by the secret custodian 102. The Opaque protocol is an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol that can resist pre-computation attacks. It combines the asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) protocol and the oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF). By running the opaque protocol, the identity credentials of the secret custodian 102 can be encrypted and stored on the server side, and identity authentication can be completed without the password leaving the local computer, thereby ensuring that neither the server side nor the communication operator can obtain or crack the identity credentials of the secret custodian 102.

[0088] After the secret custodian 102 completes identity registration and enrollment on the service platform 101 through the device A1, the device A1 may request the service platform 101 for escrow information, and the service platform 101 may store the correspondence between the identity credentials of the secret custodian 102 and the escrowed information.

[0089] Optionally, see Figure 1 , the secret custodian 102 also includes device A2, which is a device different from device A1. Device A2 is also a device held by the user of the secret custodian 102, and the user can use device A2 to communicate. If the secret custodian 102 wants to use device A2 to retrieve the information that device A1 has entrusted to the service platform 101, then the secret custodian 102 needs to re-register and register its identity on the service platform 101 through device A2. The implementation process can refer to the above-mentioned process of the secret custodian 102 registering its identity on the service platform 101 through device A1. Afterwards, the CMS announces the public key in the public and private keys generated by device A2 to the PKS. The service platform 101 also updates the corresponding relationship between the identity credentials of the secret custodian 102 and the entrusted information accordingly. That is to say, in an embodiment of the present application, after the secret custodian 102 loses its identity credentials or device, it can still retrieve the entrusted information from the service platform 102 by replacing new identity credentials or new devices.

[0090] Optionally, multiple recovery contact parties 103 include but are not limited to trusted parties selected by the secret custodian 102 or recovery contact parties configured by the system administrator. Among them, the system administrator may be a person who manages the service platform 101. The recovery contact parties configured by the system administrator may include, for example, department heads, colleagues, information security specialists, etc. The system administrator may also configure the secret share allocation weights of each recovery contact party. In the embodiment of the present application, multiple recovery contact parties 103 may all be selected by the secret custodian 102, or may all be configured by the system administrator, or may be partially selected by the secret custodian 102 and partially configured by the system administrator. In addition, the system administrator may also configure the secret custodian to directly escrow part of the secret share to the service platform 101, such as escrow to a PRE server, at which time the secret share may be encrypted using the trusted identity public key of the PRE server. The purpose of this design is that even if all recovery contact parties lose their identity credentials, the service platform 101 can provide sufficient secret recovery shares to assist the secret custodian 102 in recovering the secret. This belongs to the secret sharing weight and access control strategy, which is a hybrid strategy, that is, the secret recovery share can be independently derived from the recovery contact's share, or it can be independently derived from the system share that must be authorized by the system administrator or information security specialist, or it can be a mixture of the two, providing sufficient flexibility. Optionally, multiple recovery contact parties 103 register their identities with the CMS respectively, and publish the identity public keys and signatures of multiple recovery contact parties 103 to the PKS. Alternatively, multiple recovery contact parties 103 jointly register DKG with the CMS and publish the DKG public key and its signature to the PKS.

[0091] Optionally, see Figure 1The application scenario also includes a multi-point control unit (MCU) 104. The MCU 104 has functions such as group management, call control, and media processing. For example, the secret escrow party 102 can request the MCU 104 to initiate a group session to multiple recovery contact parties 103, so that the multiple recovery contact parties 103 complete identity authentication of the secret escrow party 102 through out-of-band authentication.

[0092] For example, if Figure 1 The application scenario shown may be an E2EE conference data backup scenario. Figure 1 The secret trustee 102 shown is a participant, the user of the secret trustee 102 is a participant, device 1 is a conference terminal used by the participant, and device 2 is any terminal used by the participant except device 1. Among them, the conference terminal can be in the form of a dedicated physical device, or it can be a software program with a conference function. The software program can run on various computing devices, such as mobile phones, tablets, computers and other user terminals. In this case, the computing device running the software program can also be considered as a conference terminal. MCU 104 can be a conference service platform. The application scenario can also include an E2EE recording and broadcasting server. The secret trustee 102 uses a key to encrypt the conference content and store it on the E2EE recording and broadcasting server. The key is also the target secret that the secret trustee 102 needs to manage.

[0093] The following is an example of the method flow of the embodiment of the present application.

[0094] The embodiments of the present application provide two methods to implement secret management based on the secret sharing mechanism and the proxy re-encryption mechanism. In one implementation method, the secret custodian applies the secret sharing mechanism, and the secret custodian divides the target secret into multiple secret shares based on the secret sharing protocol, and then encrypts and escrows the multiple secret shares according to their respective share allocation strategies, wherein the encryption key uses the public keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties. In another implementation method, multiple recovery contact parties apply the secret sharing mechanism, and multiple recovery contact parties calculate a common DKG public key based on the secret sharing protocol according to their own private keys and the private key shares shared by other recovery contact parties, and the secret custodian uses the DKG public key to encrypt and escrow the target secret. Among them, the private key corresponding to the DKG public key is a secure aggregation of the private keys of multiple recovery contact parties. Of course, the above two implementation methods can also be used in combination, with the secret custodian and the recovery contact party jointly applying the secret sharing mechanism. The secret escrow party divides the target secret into multiple secret shares based on the secret sharing protocol, and the recovery contact party calculates the DKG public key based on the secret sharing protocol. Accordingly, the public key used to encrypt the secret share includes the public key provided by a single recovery contact party and the DKG public key provided by multiple recovery contact parties. The following embodiments of this application respectively illustrate the implementation process of the above two implementation methods.

[0095] In an optional embodiment of the present application, a secret sharing mechanism and a proxy re-encryption mechanism are combined. For example, Figure 2 Schematic diagram of a secret management method provided by an embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 As shown, the method includes but is not limited to the following steps 201 to 208. Among them, steps 201 to 204 show the process of the secret escrow by the secret escrow party, and steps 205 to 208 show the process of the secret escrow party recovering the secret. It is worth noting that the secret escrow process and the secret recovery process are decoupled. After the secret escrow party completes a secret escrow, it can subsequently recover the secret multiple times. That is to say, the above steps 201 to 204 and the above steps 205 to 208 can be executed independently. Optionally, Figure 2 The method shown can be applied to Figure 1 The application scenario shown.

[0096] Step 201: The secret custodian obtains m public keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties.

[0097] The m public keys are public keys in m recovery public-private key pairs from multiple recovery contact parties. Optionally, a recovery contact party can provide one or more identity public-private key pairs as recovery public-private key pairs. In one possible scenario, the m recovery public-private keys come from m recovery contact parties, and each recovery contact party provides an identity public-private key as a recovery public-private key pair. In another possible scenario, the m recovery public-private key pairs come from less than m recovery contact parties, and at least one recovery contact party provides two or more identity public-private pairs as recovery public-private key pairs.

[0098] Optionally, the public key server stores the identity public keys of the recovery contact parties that can be selected by the secret custodian. The secret custodian can obtain m public keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties from the public key server. In this implementation, before the secret custodian performs secret recovery, the recovery contact party is unaware of its participation in the secret custodian's secret management, thereby improving the security of secret management and reducing the risk of secret leakage.

[0099] Optionally, the public key server also stores the signature of the identity public key provided by the recovery contact party using the identity private key, which can be selected by the secret custodian. For each of the m public keys obtained by the secret custodian, the secret custodian can also obtain the signature of the public key provided by the recovery contact party using the private key corresponding to the public key. The secret custodian can complete the identity authentication of the recovery contact party and the integrity verification of the public key by verifying the signature.

[0100] For the convenience of readers to understand, here is a brief introduction to signature and signature verification. Signature, also known as digital signature, is a means of protecting the sender's data. The sender signs the message with the private key held by the sender. Any third party without the private key cannot forge the signature. Any third party with the public key corresponding to the private key held by the sender can verify the signature to confirm the source and integrity of the message. Signature verification is referred to as verification. After the recipient receives the data from the sender and the sender's signature on the data, the public key held by the sender is used to verify the signature and output a Boolean value, indicating that the signature is legal (verification passed) or illegal (verification failed). If the verification passes, it means that the data has not been tampered with. If the verification fails, it means that the data has been tampered with. Signature verification can be used to verify the integrity of the data (not tampered with) and the reliability of the data source (not false data or forged data). In the embodiment of the present application, the integrity of the verification data and the reliability of the data source are collectively referred to as the authenticity of the verification data.

[0101] Alternatively, the secret escrow party may also directly request the multiple contact recovery parties to obtain the identity public key of each contact recovery party and its signature on the identity public key. The embodiment of the present application does not limit the manner in which the secret escrow party obtains the m public keys provided by the multiple contact recovery parties.

[0102] Step 202: The secret escrow party divides the target secret based on the secret sharing protocol to obtain n secret shares.

[0103] Where n is a positive integer greater than 1. The secret custodian can set the secret recovery threshold to k, 2≤k≤n. That is, any secret share greater than or equal to k among the n secret shares can recover the target secret. The secret recovery threshold k can be adjusted according to actual needs to improve reliability and availability resilience.

[0104] Step 203: The secret custodian uses the m public keys to encrypt the n secret shares to obtain p ciphertext fragments.

[0105] Each of the p ciphertext fragments is obtained by encrypting at least one of the n secret shares by at least one of the m public keys. In the embodiment of the present application, one public key can encrypt one or more secret shares. One secret share can be encrypted by one or more public keys to obtain one or more ciphertext fragments. Wherein, p can be greater than n, or equal to n, or less than n.

[0106] Optionally, the secret custodian uses m public keys to encrypt n secret shares, including the following three implementation methods.

[0107] In the first implementation, m=n, the secret custodian can use one-to-one encryption, that is, different public keys in the m public keys encrypt different secret shares in the n secret shares respectively, and obtain p ciphertext shards. In this implementation, m=n=p, and the implementation of the above step 203 includes: the secret custodian uses different public keys in the m public keys to encrypt different secret shares in the n secret shares respectively, and obtains p ciphertext shards. That is, each secret share in the n secret shares exists in and only exists in one ciphertext shard, and different secret shares exist in different ciphertext shards.

[0108] In the second implementation, m>n, the secret custodian can use a many-to-one encryption scheme, that is, at least one secret share among the n secret shares is encrypted by at least two public keys among the m public keys, and at least two ciphertext shards are obtained. In this implementation, at least one secret share among the n secret shares exists in two or more ciphertext shards.

[0109] This implementation method can be understood as a redundant backup of the secret share. Since the same secret share is encrypted by the public keys of multiple recovery public-private key pairs, the secret share can be recovered as long as the recovery contact party has not lost all of the multiple recovery public-private keys, thereby improving the reliability of secret recovery.

[0110] In the third implementation method, where m < n, the secret trustee can adopt a one-to-many encryption scheme, that is, among the m public keys, one public key encrypts multiple secret shares among the n secret shares. For example, one public key can encrypt multiple secret shares separately to obtain multiple ciphertext shards, or one public key can also encrypt multiple secret shares in a bundled manner to obtain one ciphertext shard.

[0111] In this implementation method, when the secret trustee uses one public key to encrypt multiple secret shares, it can be understood as allocating more secret shares to the recovery contact party that provides the public key. If this public key encrypts k or more secret shares, then the secret trustee can recover the target secret only with the help of the recovery contact party that provides this public key, without the participation of other recovery contact parties. The secret trustee can set the secret share allocation weights of multiple recovery contact parties by itself, or the system administrator can also uniformly configure the secret share allocation weights of multiple recovery contact parties. This application embodiment does not make any limitations in this regard.

[0112] Optionally, after the secret trustee verifies each of the m public keys, step 203 is executed.

[0113] Step 204: The secret trustee sends a secret trusteeship request to the service platform. The secret trusteeship request includes the identity credentials of the secret trustee and p ciphertext shards.

[0114] Optionally, before sending the secret trusteeship request to the service platform, the secret trustee first performs end-to-end identity authentication on the service platform, such as performing end-to-end identity authentication on the service platform based on the opaque protocol. After receiving the secret trusteeship request sent by the secret trustee, the service platform stores the correspondence between the identity credentials of the secret trustee and the p ciphertext shards.

[0115] Optionally, the secret trusteeship request includes the correspondence between the p ciphertext shards and the m public keys, as well as the signatures of multiple recovery contact parties on the public keys they respectively provide. Accordingly, after the service platform verifies the signatures, it stores the correspondence between the p ciphertext shards and the m public keys. For example, the content stored in the service platform can be seen in Table 1.

[0116] Table 1

[0117]

[0118] Referring to Table 1, the service platform stores multiple ciphertext shards requested to be entrusted by the secret trustee with the identity credential of A1. Among them, ciphertext shard 1 is obtained by encrypting with public key 1, ciphertext shard 2 is obtained by encrypting with public key 2, and ciphertext shard 3 is obtained by encrypting with public key 3.

[0119] Furthermore, after the secret escrow party has entrusted the p ciphertext fragments to the service platform, the secret escrow party can recover the target secret with the cooperation of the recovery contact party and the service platform. For the specific implementation process, please refer to the following steps 205 to 208. Here, the secret escrow party can use the old identity credentials (the identity credentials in the secret escrow request) to recover the target secret. Alternatively, the secret escrow party can also update the identity credentials (such as replacing the device) and use the updated new identity credentials (different from the identity credentials in the secret escrow request) to recover the target secret. In this case, the service platform and multiple recovery contact parties need to re-authenticate the new identity of the secret escrow party. For the specific implementation method, please refer to the relevant description of the above embodiment.

[0120] Step 205: The secret custodian obtains multiple re-encryption keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties.

[0121] Each re-encryption key is generated based on the private key in one of the m recovery public-private key pairs and the identity public key of the secret custodian. Among them, all the recovery public-private key pairs used to generate the multiple re-encryption keys include at least the public key used to encrypt k secret shares out of the n secret shares. In other words, the multiple re-encryption keys can at least be used to help the secret custodian decrypt k secret shares out of the n secret shares. Here, the identity public key of the secret custodian used by the recovery contact party to generate the re-encryption key is the latest identity public key of the secret custodian. The recovery contact party can obtain the latest identity public key of the secret custodian from the public key server or the log transparency server.

[0122] Optionally, after completing the secret escrow, the secret custodian predefines a secret recovery re-identity bootstrap ceremony to the service platform. The implementation process of the above step 205 may include: the secret custodian sends a secret retrieval trigger request to the service platform, and the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian, and the secret retrieval trigger request is used to trigger the service platform to summon multiple recovery contact parties to provide re-encryption keys to the secret custodian. The service platform sends a summoning command to multiple recovery contact parties, and the summoning command is used to instruct the multiple recovery contact parties to provide re-encryption keys to the secret custodian. The secret custodian receives the re-encryption key sent by the recovery contact party. Optionally, the recovery contact party can send the generated re-encryption key and the recovery contact party's signature on the re-encryption key to the secret custodian, and the signature is used to provide authenticity protection and authorization for the re-encryption key.

[0123] In an embodiment of the present application, the secret custodian can summon the recovery contact party through the service platform to trigger the recovery contact party to provide the secret recovery information to the secret custodian. In this process, the service platform can first authenticate the secret custodian, and then summon multiple recovery contact parties corresponding to the secret custodian after the authentication is passed. The recovery contact party can authenticate the secret custodian to the service platform, and then provide a re-encryption key, thereby achieving end-to-end identity authentication to ensure that the user who retrieves the secret is real. If the secret custodian changes its identity credentials, the recovery contact party needs to obtain the latest identity public key of the secret custodian before providing the re-encryption key to the secret custodian, so as to generate a re-encryption key using the latest identity public key. Alternatively, the secret custodian can also directly request to obtain the re-encryption key from multiple recovery contact parties separately.

[0124] Optionally, the re-encryption key provided by the recovery contact party is a fine-grained re-encryption key.

[0125] Step 206: The secret custodian obtains k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to k secret shares among the n secret shares through the service platform, and each re-encrypted ciphertext fragment is re-encrypted using one of the multiple re-encryption keys to a ciphertext fragment encrypted using a public key corresponding to a private key used to generate the re-encryption key.

[0126] Optionally, in an implementation of the above step 206, the service platform re-encrypts the ciphertext fragments hosted by the secret escrow party to obtain re-encrypted ciphertext fragments. The specific implementation process of this implementation includes the following steps 2061A to 2063A.

[0127] In step 2061A, the secret custodian sends a re-encryption request to the service platform, where the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian and multiple re-encryption keys.

[0128] Optionally, the re-encryption request includes the identity public keys of the recovery contact party corresponding to multiple re-encryption keys, so that the service platform can use the re-encryption key provided by the recovery contact party to re-encrypt the ciphertext fragment encrypted using the identity public key of the recovery contact party.

[0129] Optionally, the re-encryption request also includes the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or the signature of the information security manager on the multiple re-encryption keys. After the service platform verifies all the signatures in the re-encryption request, it executes the following steps 2062A to 2063A. Among them, the signature of the information security manager on the multiple re-encryption keys may include the signature of the information security manager on the multiple re-encryption keys one by one, or may also include the packaged signature of the information security manager on the multiple re-encryption keys. Here, the information security manager acts as the authorizing party and authorizes the recovery contact party to provide the re-encryption key to the secret custodian.

[0130] In an embodiment of the present application, by carrying the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key in the re-encryption request, the service platform verifies the signature and can determine the authenticity of the re-encryption key. By carrying the signature of the information security manager on multiple re-encryption keys in the re-encryption request, the service platform verifies the signature and can determine whether the multiple re-encryption keys have been authorized by the information security manager. An embodiment of the present application can adopt a double signature mechanism, so that the service platform can provide the escrow information to the secret escrow party after determining that the re-encryption key is authentic and authorized by the information security manager, which can improve the security of secret recovery.

[0131] In step 2062A, the service platform uses the multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt the corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments respectively, and obtains k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares.

[0132] Among them, the ciphertext shard corresponding to a re-encryption key refers to the ciphertext shard obtained by encrypting the secret share using the identity public key corresponding to the identity private key of the recovery contact party to generate the re-encryption key. For example, referring to Table 1, assuming that the re-encryption request received by the service platform includes 3 re-encryption keys, where re-encryption key 1 corresponds to public key 1, re-encryption key 2 corresponds to public key 2, and re-encryption key 3 corresponds to public key 3, the service platform can use re-encryption key 1 to re-encrypt ciphertext shard 1, use re-encryption key 2 to re-encrypt ciphertext shard 2, and use re-encryption key 3 to re-encrypt ciphertext shard 3.

[0133] In step 2063A, the service platform sends a re-encrypted response to the secret custodian, where the re-encrypted response includes the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0134] Optionally, the service platform can send a re-encrypted response to the secret custodian in real time or out-of-band offline. For example, the embodiment of the present application can apply a delayed secret retrieval strategy. After receiving the re-encryption request sent by the secret custodian, the service platform can send a re-encrypted response to the secret custodian after a period of time (such as 1 day) so that real users have the opportunity to perceive the event through transparent logs before the secret custodian retrieves the secret, and have the opportunity to intervene in advance, which can reduce the risk of someone impersonating the secret custodian to steal secrets and further improve the security of secret management.

[0135] Optionally, in another implementation of the above step 206, the secret escrow party re-encrypts the escrowed ciphertext fragments to obtain re-encrypted ciphertext fragments. The specific implementation process of this implementation includes the following steps 2061B to 2063B.

[0136] In step 2061B, the secret escrow party sends a secret retrieval request to the service platform, and the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party.

[0137] Optionally, the secret retrieval request also includes the multiple re-encryption keys, and the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or the signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys. After all the signatures in the secret retrieval request are verified, the service platform performs the following step 2062B. This implementation method can refer to the relevant description in the above step 2061A, and the embodiment of the present application will not be repeated here.

[0138] In step 2062B, the service platform sends a secret retrieval response to the secret escrow party, where the secret retrieval response includes p ciphertext fragments.

[0139] Optionally, the service platform can send a secret retrieval response to the secret escrow party in real time or out-of-band offline. For example, the embodiment of the present application can apply a delayed secret retrieval strategy. After receiving the secret retrieval request sent by the secret escrow party, the service platform can send a secret retrieval response to the secret escrow party after a period of time (such as 1 day), so that the real user has the opportunity to perceive the event through the transparent log before the secret escrow party retrieves the secret, and has the opportunity to intervene in advance, which can reduce the risk of someone impersonating the secret escrow party to steal secrets and further improve the security of secret management.

[0140] Optionally, the secret retrieval request also includes the identity public keys of the recovery contact party corresponding to the multiple re-encryption keys. In this case, the service platform can only provide the ciphertext fragments corresponding to the multiple re-encryption keys to the secret custodian, that is, the secret retrieval response can only carry the ciphertext fragments corresponding to the multiple re-encryption keys, rather than all the ciphertext fragments custodied by the secret custodian. For example, referring to Table 1, assuming that the secret retrieval request received by the service platform includes public key 1 and public key 2, the secret retrieval response sent by the service platform to the secret custodian can include ciphertext fragment 1 and ciphertext fragment 2.

[0141] In step 2063B, the secret custodian uses multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt the corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments, and obtains k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0142] The implementation method of this step 2063B can refer to the implementation method of the above-mentioned step 2062A, and will not be repeated in this embodiment of the application.

[0143] Step 207: The secret custodian uses the secret custodian's identity private key to decrypt the k heavily encrypted ciphertext fragments respectively to obtain the k secret shares.

[0144] Here, the secret custodian's identity private key is the private key corresponding to the secret custodian's identity public key used by the recovery contact party to generate the re-encryption key in the above step 205. Since only the secret custodian holds its own identity private key, only the secret custodian can decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext fragment to obtain the plaintext, thereby achieving end-to-end secure secret recovery.

[0145] Step 208: The secret custodian restores the target secret based on the k secret shares.

[0146] In the embodiment of the present application, since the target secret is stored on the service platform in the form of multiple ciphertext fragments, rather than being directly entrusted to multiple recovery contact parties, and only the secret trustee can obtain the entrusted information from the service platform based on the registered identity credentials, even if the multiple recovery contact parties collude, they cannot recover the target secret. The embodiment of the present application applies the decoupling principle of separating the secret recovery capability from the secret custody, and the recovery contact party participates in the secret recovery, and the service platform participates in the secret custody, so that only the secret trustee can recover the secret, and there is no single point of leakage problem, which improves the confidentiality, security and reliability of secret management. In addition, since the embodiment of the present application applies the proxy re-encryption mechanism, even if the secret trustee loses the old identity credentials or the original equipment, the information originally entrusted to the service platform can be obtained by re-authenticating the identity to the service platform, and by re-bootstrapping the identity to multiple recovery contact parties, multiple recovery contact parties can provide the secret trustee with the re-encryption key corresponding to the new identity credentials, so that the secret trustee can decrypt and recover the target secret based on the new identity credentials, thereby improving the reliability of secret recovery.

[0147] In another optional embodiment of the present application, a secret sharing mechanism, a proxy re-encryption mechanism and a distributed key generation mechanism are combined and applied. Figure 3 Schematic diagram of a secret management method provided by an embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 As shown, the method includes but is not limited to the following steps 301 to 306. Among them, steps 301 to 303 show the process of the secret trustee performing secret trusteeship, and steps 304 to 306 show the process of the secret trustee performing secret recovery. It is worth noting that the secret trusteeship process and the secret recovery process are decoupled. After the secret trustee completes a secret trusteeship, the secret recovery can be performed multiple times in the future. That is to say, the above steps 301 to 303 and the above steps 304 to 306 can be executed independently. Optionally, Figure 3 The method shown can be applied to Figure 1 The application scenario shown.

[0148] Step 301: The secret custodian obtains the DKG public key jointly provided by multiple recovery contact parties.

[0149] Among them, the DKG public key is calculated based on m private keys of m recovery public-private key pairs provided by multiple recovery contact parties. In other words, the DKG public key is a common public key calculated by multiple parties based on the m private keys. The private key corresponding to the DKG public key (referred to as the DKG private key) is a secure aggregation of the m private keys. The generation process of the DKG public key essentially belongs to secret sharing. In the embodiment of the present application, the recovery threshold of the DKG private key can be set to t, 2≤t≤m. In other words, any private keys greater than or equal to t among the m private keys can recover the DKG private key. The recovery threshold t of the DKG private key can be adjusted according to actual needs to improve reliable and available resilience.

[0150] Optionally, the m recovery public-private key pairs are public-private key pairs generated by multiple recovery contact parties when running the DKG solution.

[0151] Optionally, a public key server stores DKG public keys generated by multiple recovery contact parties. The secret custodian can obtain the DKG public key from the public key server. Alternatively, the secret custodian sends a public key acquisition request to multiple recovery contact parties, and after receiving the public key acquisition request, the multiple recovery contact parties jointly generate a DKG public key and provide it to the secret custodian.

[0152] Step 302: The secret custodian uses the DKG public key to encrypt the target secret to obtain the target ciphertext.

[0153] Step 303: The secret escrow party sends a secret escrow request to the service platform. The secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and the target ciphertext.

[0154] Optionally, before sending a secret escrow request to the service platform, the secret escrow party first performs end-to-end identity authentication with the service platform, for example, performing end-to-end identity authentication with the service platform based on the opaque protocol. After receiving the secret escrow request sent by the secret escrow party, the service platform stores the corresponding relationship between the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and the target ciphertext.

[0155] Furthermore, after the secret escrow party escrows the target ciphertext to the service platform, the secret escrow party can recover the target secret with the cooperation of the recovery contact party and the service platform. For the specific implementation process, please refer to the following steps 304 to 306. Here, the secret escrow party can use the old identity credentials (the identity credentials in the secret escrow request) to recover the target secret. Alternatively, the secret escrow party can also update the identity credentials (such as replacing the device) and use the updated new identity credentials (different from the identity credentials in the secret escrow request) to recover the target secret. In this case, the service platform and multiple recovery contact parties need to re-authenticate the new identity of the secret escrow party. For the specific implementation method, please refer to the relevant description of the above embodiment.

[0156] Step 304: The secret custodian obtains multiple re-encryption key shards provided by multiple recovery contact parties.

[0157] Each re-encryption key shard is generated based on the private key in one of the m recovery public-private key pairs and the identity public key of the secret custodian. The multiple re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs among the m recovery public-private key pairs. In other words, the multiple re-encryption key shards include re-encryption key shards calculated based on the private keys in at least t recovery public-private key pairs. Since at least t private keys can recover the DKG private key, the multiple re-encryption key shards calculated based on the at least t private keys can be combined into a complete re-encryption key to re-encrypt the target ciphertext encrypted using the DKG public key. Here, the identity public key of the secret custodian used by the recovery contact party to generate the re-encryption key shards is the latest identity public key of the secret custodian. The recovery contact party can obtain the latest identity public key of the secret custodian from the public key server or the log transparency server.

[0158] Optionally, after completing the secret escrow, the secret custodian predefines a secret recovery re-identity bootstrap ceremony to the service platform. The implementation process of the above step 304 may include: the secret custodian sends a secret retrieval trigger request to the service platform, and the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian, and the secret retrieval trigger request is used to trigger the service platform to summon multiple recovery contact parties to provide re-encryption key fragments to the secret custodian. The service platform sends a summoning command to multiple recovery contact parties, and the summoning command is used to instruct the multiple recovery contact parties to provide re-encryption key fragments to the secret custodian. The secret custodian receives the re-encryption key fragments sent by the recovery contact party. Optionally, the recovery contact party can send the generated re-encryption key fragment and the recovery contact party's signature on the re-encryption key fragment to the secret custodian, and the signature is used to provide authenticity protection and authorization for the re-encryption key fragment.

[0159] In an embodiment of the present application, the secret custodian can summon the recovery contact party through the service platform to trigger the recovery contact party to provide the secret recovery information to the secret custodian. In this process, the service platform can first authenticate the secret custodian, and then summon multiple recovery contact parties corresponding to the secret custodian after the authentication is passed. The recovery contact party can authenticate the secret custodian to the service platform, and then provide the re-encryption key shards, thereby achieving end-to-end identity authentication to ensure that the user who retrieves the secret is real. If the secret custodian changes its identity credentials, the recovery contact party needs to obtain the latest identity public key of the secret custodian before providing the re-encryption key shards to the secret custodian, so as to generate the re-encryption key shards using the latest identity public key. Alternatively, the secret custodian can also directly request to obtain the re-encryption key from multiple recovery contact parties separately.

[0160] Optionally, the re-encryption key shards provided by the recovery contact party are fine-grained re-encryption keys.

[0161] Step 305: The secret custodian obtains the re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform. The re-encrypted ciphertext is obtained by re-encrypting the target ciphertext using a re-encryption key, and the re-encryption key is generated based on multiple re-encryption key shards.

[0162] Optionally, in an implementation of the above step 305, the service platform re-encrypts the target ciphertext hosted by the secret escrow party to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext. The specific implementation process of this implementation includes the following steps 3051A to 3053A.

[0163] In step 3051A, the secret custodian sends a re-encryption request to the service platform, the re-encryption request including the identity credentials of the secret custodian and re-encryption key information, the re-encryption key information including an indication of the re-encryption key.

[0164] Optionally, the re-encryption key information includes multiple re-encryption key fragments, and the service platform combines the multiple re-encryption key fragments into a complete re-encryption key. Alternatively, the re-encryption key information includes the re-encryption key, and the secret custodian combines the multiple re-encryption key fragments into a complete re-encryption key.

[0165] Optionally, the re-encryption request also includes the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key fragments and / or the signature of the information security manager on the multiple re-encryption key fragments. After the service platform verifies all the signatures in the re-encryption request, it executes the following steps 3052A to 3053A. Among them, the signature of the information security manager on the multiple re-encryption keys may include the signature of the information security manager on the multiple re-encryption key fragments one by one, or may also include the packaged signature of the information security manager on the multiple re-encryption key fragments. Here, the information security manager acts as the authorizing party and authorizes the recovery contact party to provide the re-encryption key fragments to the secret custodian.

[0166] In an embodiment of the present application, by carrying the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key fragment in the re-encryption request, the service platform verifies the signature and can determine the authenticity of the final re-encryption key. By carrying the signature of the information security manager on multiple re-encryption key fragments in the re-encryption request, the service platform verifies the signature and can determine whether the multiple re-encryption key fragments have been authorized by the information security manager. An embodiment of the present application can adopt a double signature mechanism, so that the service platform can provide the escrow information to the secret escrow party after determining that the re-encryption key is authentic and authorized by the information security manager, which can improve the security of secret recovery.

[0167] In step 3052A, the service platform uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the target ciphertext to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0168] In step 3053A, the service platform sends a re-encrypted response to the secret escrow party, where the re-encrypted response includes the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0169] Optionally, the service platform can send a re-encrypted response to the secret custodian in real time or out-of-band offline. For example, the embodiment of the present application can apply a delayed secret retrieval strategy. After receiving the re-encryption request sent by the secret custodian, the service platform can send a re-encrypted response to the secret custodian after a period of time (such as 1 day) so that real users have the opportunity to perceive the event through transparent logs before the secret custodian retrieves the secret, and have the opportunity to intervene in advance, which can reduce the risk of someone impersonating the secret custodian to steal secrets and further improve the security of secret management.

[0170] Optionally, in another implementation of the above step 305, the secret escrow party re-encrypts the escrowed target ciphertext to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext. The specific implementation process of this implementation includes the following steps 3051B to 3053B.

[0171] In step 3051B, the secret escrow party sends a secret retrieval request to the service platform, and the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party.

[0172] Optionally, the secret retrieval request also includes the multiple re-encryption key fragments, the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key fragments, and / or the signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption key fragments. After the service platform verifies all signatures in the secret retrieval request, the following step 3052B is executed. This implementation method can refer to the relevant description in the above step 3051A, and the embodiment of the present application will not be repeated here.

[0173] In step 3052B, the service platform sends a secret retrieval response to the secret escrow party, where the secret retrieval response includes the target ciphertext.

[0174] Optionally, the service platform can send a secret retrieval response to the secret escrow party in real time or out-of-band offline. For example, the embodiment of the present application can apply a delayed secret retrieval strategy. After receiving the secret retrieval request sent by the secret escrow party, the service platform can send a secret retrieval response to the secret escrow party after a period of time (such as 1 day), so that the real user has the opportunity to perceive the event through the transparent log before the secret escrow party retrieves the secret, and has the opportunity to intervene in advance, which can reduce the risk of someone impersonating the secret escrow party to steal secrets and further improve the security of secret management.

[0175] In step 3053B, the secret custodian uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the target ciphertext to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0176] Step 306: The secret custodian uses the secret custodian's identity private key to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain the target secret.

[0177] In the embodiment of the present application, since the target secret is stored on the service platform in the form of a target ciphertext, multiple recovery contact parties do not directly store the ciphertext fragments corresponding to the target secret, and only the secret escrow party can obtain the escrow information from the service platform based on the registered identity credentials, so even if the multiple recovery contact parties collude, they cannot recover the target secret. The embodiment of the present application applies the decoupling principle of separating the secret recovery capability from the secret custody, and the recovery contact party participates in the secret recovery, and the service platform participates in the secret custody, so that only the secret escrow party can recover the secret, and there is no single point of leakage problem, which improves the confidentiality, security and reliability of secret management. In addition, since the embodiment of the present application applies a proxy re-encryption mechanism, even if the secret escrow party loses the old identity credentials or the original device, the information originally escrowed on the service platform can be obtained by re-authenticating the identity to the service platform, and by re-bootstrapping the identity to multiple recovery contact parties, multiple recovery contact parties can provide the secret escrow party with the re-encryption key fragments corresponding to the new identity credentials, so that the secret escrow party can decrypt and recover the target secret based on the new identity credentials, thereby improving the reliability of secret recovery.

[0178] The sequence of steps of the secret management method provided in the embodiment of the present application can be adjusted appropriately, and the steps can be increased or decreased accordingly according to the situation. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of a change within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, and all of them should be included in the protection scope of the present application. For example, the present application can also combine the DKG solution with Figure 2 In the illustrated method embodiment, for example, the secret custodian divides the target secret into multiple secret shares, and then uses multiple DKG public keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties to encrypt the multiple secret shares respectively, or uses DKG public keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties and the identity public key of at least one recovery contact party to encrypt the multiple secret shares respectively, and the multiple ciphertext fragments obtained after encryption are hosted on the service platform. The embodiments of the present application will not be described one by one here.

[0179] The following is an example of the software device in the embodiment of the present application.

[0180] For example, Figure 4 Schematic diagram of a secret management device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The device is applied to a secret trustee. Figure 4As shown, the device 400 includes but is not limited to an acquisition module 401 , a processing module 402 and a transceiver module 403 .

[0181] The acquisition module 401 is used to acquire at least one escrow public key, where the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, where the m recovery public-private key pairs come from multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1.

[0182] The processing module 402 is used to encrypt the target secret using at least one escrow public key to obtain a target ciphertext.

[0183] The transceiver module 403 is used to send a secret escrow request to the service platform, where the secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and the target ciphertext.

[0184] Optionally, at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, including: at least one escrow public key includes m public keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs; or, at least one escrow public key includes a DKG public key, and the DKG public key is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs; or, at least one escrow public key includes at least one DKG public key and at least one public key in the m recovery public-private key pairs, and each DKG public key in the at least one DKG public key is calculated based on at least two private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs, wherein the union of the recovery public-private key pair to which at least one public key belongs and the recovery public-private key pair to which the private key used to calculate the at least one DKG public key belongs is m recovery public-private key pairs.

[0185] Optionally, at least one escrow public key includes m public keys of m recovery public-private key pairs, and the processing module 402 is used to: divide the target secret based on a secret sharing protocol to obtain n secret shares, where n is a positive integer greater than 1; use m public keys to encrypt the n secret shares to obtain p ciphertext fragments, and the target ciphertext includes p ciphertext fragments, wherein each ciphertext fragment in the p ciphertext fragments is obtained by encrypting at least one secret share in the n secret shares by at least one public key in the m public keys.

[0186] Optionally, m=n=p, and the processing module 402 is used to: respectively use different public keys among the m public keys to encrypt different secret shares among the n secret shares to obtain p ciphertext fragments.

[0187] Optionally, the acquisition module 401 is further used to obtain multiple re-encryption keys provided by multiple recovery contact parties, each re-encryption key is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein all recovery public-private key pairs used to generate multiple re-encryption keys include at least a public key used to encrypt k secret shares out of n secret shares, 2≤k≤n. The processing module 402 and / or the transceiver module 403 are further used to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares through the service platform, each re-encrypted ciphertext fragment is re-encrypted using a re-encryption key pair from among multiple re-encryption keys using a public key corresponding to the private key used to generate the re-encryption key. The processing module 402 is further used to decrypt the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments using the identity private key of the secret custodian, respectively, to obtain k secret shares. The processing module 402 is further used to restore the target secret based on the k secret shares.

[0188] Optionally, the transceiver module 403 is used to send a re-encryption request to the service platform, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian and multiple re-encryption keys, and receive a re-encryption response sent by the service platform, the re-encryption response includes k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0189] Optionally, the re-encryption request further includes a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on multiple re-encryption keys.

[0190] Optionally, the transceiver module 403 is used to send a secret retrieval request to the service platform, the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party, and receive a secret retrieval response sent by the service platform, the secret retrieval response includes p ciphertext fragments. The processing module 402 is used to use multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0191] Optionally, the secret retrieval request also includes multiple re-encryption keys, and a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys.

[0192] Optionally, the transceiver module 403 is also used to: send a secret retrieval trigger request to the service platform, the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian, and the secret retrieval trigger request is used to trigger the service platform to summon multiple recovery contact parties to provide re-encryption keys to the secret custodian; and receive the re-encryption key sent by the recovery contact party.

[0193] Optionally, at least one escrow public key includes a DKG public key, which is calculated based on m private keys in m recovery public-private key pairs. The processing module 402 is used to: encrypt the target secret using the DKG public key to obtain a target ciphertext.

[0194] Optionally, the acquisition module 401 is further used to obtain multiple re-encryption key shards provided by multiple recovery contact parties, each re-encryption key shard is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein the multiple re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs among m recovery public-private key pairs, 2≤t≤m. The processing module 402 and / or the transceiver module 403 are further used to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform, the re-encrypted ciphertext is obtained by re-encrypting the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key, and the re-encryption key is generated based on the multiple re-encryption key shards. The processing module 402 is also used to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext using the identity private key of the secret custodian to obtain the target secret.

[0195] Optionally, the transceiver module 403 is used to send a re-encryption request to the service platform, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian and the re-encryption key information, the re-encryption key information includes an indication of the re-encryption key, and receive a re-encryption response sent by the service platform, the re-encryption response includes the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0196] Optionally, the transceiver module 403 is used to send a secret retrieval request to the service platform, the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party, and receive a secret retrieval response sent by the service platform, the secret retrieval response includes the target ciphertext. The processing module 402 is used to re-encrypt the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0197] Optionally, the transceiver module 403 is further used to send an identity update request to the service platform, where the identity update request includes the updated identity credentials of the secret escrow party, so that the service platform stores the corresponding relationship between the updated identity credentials and the target ciphertext.

[0198] Optionally, the transceiver module 403 is further configured to initiate a group session to the multiple restored contact parties, so that the multiple restored contact parties can re-authenticate their identities based on the updated identity public key of the secret escrow party.

[0199] For example, Figure 5 Schematic diagram of another secret management device provided in the embodiment of the present application. The device is applied to the service platform. Figure 5 As shown, the device 500 includes but is not limited to a transceiver module 501 and a processing module 502 .

[0200] The transceiver module 501 is used to receive a secret escrow request sent by a secret escrow party. The secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and a target ciphertext. The target ciphertext is obtained by encrypting a target secret using at least one escrow public key. The at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs. The m recovery public-private key pairs come from multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1.

[0201] The processing module 502 is used to store the corresponding relationship between the identity credentials and the target ciphertext.

[0202] Optionally, at least one escrow public key includes m public keys in m recovery public-private key pairs, the target ciphertext includes p ciphertext fragments, and the secret escrow request includes the correspondence between the p ciphertext fragments and the m public keys, wherein each of the p ciphertext fragments is obtained by encrypting at least one of the n secret shares obtained by dividing the target secret using at least one of the m public keys, where n is a positive integer greater than 1. The transceiver module 501 is also used to receive a re-encryption request sent by the secret escrow party, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and multiple re-encryption keys, each re-encryption key is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret escrow party, wherein all the recovery public-private key pairs used to generate multiple re-encryption keys include at least public keys used to encrypt k secret shares in the n secret shares, 2≤k≤n. The processing module 502 is also used to use multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt the corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments, respectively, to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares. The transceiver module 501 is also used to send a re-encrypted response to the secret trustee, where the re-encrypted response includes k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

[0203] Optionally, the re-encryption request also includes the signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or the signature of the information security management party on multiple re-encryption keys. The processing module 502 is also used to verify that all signatures in the re-encryption request are passed before the service platform sends a re-encryption response to the secret custodian.

[0204] Optionally, at least one escrow public key includes a DKG public key, and the DKG public key is calculated based on m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs. The transceiver module 501 is also used to receive a re-encryption request sent by the secret escrow party, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials and re-encryption key information of the secret escrow party, the re-encryption key information includes an indication of the re-encryption key, the re-encryption key is generated based on multiple re-encryption key shards provided by multiple recovery contact parties, each re-encryption key shard is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret escrow party, wherein the multiple re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs in the m recovery public-private key pairs, 2≤t≤m. The processing module 502 is also used to re-encrypt the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext. The transceiver module 501 is also used to send a re-encryption response to the secret escrow party, and the re-encryption response includes the re-encrypted ciphertext.

[0205] Optionally, the service platform stores the correspondence between the secret custodian and multiple recovery contact parties. The transceiver module 501 is also used to receive a secret retrieval trigger request sent by the secret custodian, the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian, and send a convening command to multiple recovery contact parties, the convening command is used to instruct multiple recovery contact parties to provide re-encryption keys to the secret custodian.

[0206] Optionally, the transceiver module 501 is further used to receive an identity update request sent by the secret escrow party, the identity update request including the updated identity credentials of the secret escrow party. The processing module 502 is further used to update the corresponding relationship between the storage and the target ciphertext using the updated identity credentials after completing the identity authentication of the secret escrow party.

[0207] Optionally, the processing module 502 is further configured to publish the request initiated by the secret escrow party to the service platform in a transparent log.

[0208] Regarding the device in the above embodiment, the specific manner in which each module performs operations has been described in detail in the embodiment of the method, and will not be elaborated here.

[0209] The following is an illustration of the hardware device of the embodiment of the present application.

[0210] For example, Figure 6 1 is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a secret management device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The secret management device can be applied to the secret escrow party in the above embodiment, for example, it can be a conference terminal. Alternatively, the secret management device can be applied to the service platform in the above embodiment. Figure 6 As shown, the secret management device 600 includes a processor 601 and a memory 602, and the memory 601 and the memory 602 are connected via a bus 603. Figure 6 The processor 601 and the memory 602 are described as being independent of each other. Optionally, the processor 601 and the memory 602 are integrated together. Optionally, the secret management device is applied to the secret trustee in the above embodiment, in combination with Figure 1 Come and see, Figure 6 The secret management device 600 in may be Figure 1 Device A1 or device A2 shown.

[0211] The memory 602 is used to store computer programs, including operating systems and program codes. The memory 602 is a storage medium of various types, such as read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), flash memory, optical storage, register, optical disk storage, optical disk storage, magnetic disk or other magnetic storage devices.

[0212] The processor 601 is a general-purpose processor or a special-purpose processor. The processor 601 may be a single-core processor or a multi-core processor. The processor 601 includes at least one circuit to execute the actions performed by the secret escrow party or the service platform in the above method provided in the embodiment of the present application.

[0213] Optionally, the secret management device 600 further includes a network interface 604, which is connected to the processor 601 and the memory 602 via the bus 603. The network interface 604 enables the secret management device 600 to communicate with other devices. For example, the processor 601 can interact with other devices via the network interface 604, such as the secret escrow party interacting with the service platform via the network interface 604 to upload or download escrow information.

[0214] Optionally, the secret management device 600 further includes an input / output (I / O) interface 605, which is connected to the processor 601 and the memory 602 via the bus 603. The processor 601 can receive input commands or data, etc. through the I / O interface 605. The I / O interface 605 is used for the secret management device 600 to connect input devices, such as a keyboard, a mouse, etc. Optionally, in some possible scenarios, the above-mentioned network interface 604 and the I / O interface 605 are collectively referred to as a communication interface.

[0215] Optionally, the secret management device 600 further includes a display 606, which is connected to the processor 601 and the memory 602 via the bus 603. The display 606 can be used to display the intermediate results and / or final results generated by the processor 601 executing the above method. In a possible implementation, the display 606 is a touch display screen to provide a human-computer interaction interface.

[0216] The bus 603 is any type of communication bus for interconnecting the internal devices of the secret management device 600. For example, a system bus. The embodiment of the present application takes the interconnection of the above-mentioned devices inside the secret management device 600 through the bus 603 as an example. Optionally, the above-mentioned devices inside the secret management device 600 are connected to each other in a communication manner other than the bus 603, for example, the above-mentioned devices inside the secret management device 600 are interconnected through a logical interface inside the secret management device 600.

[0217] The above devices may be arranged on independent chips, or at least partially or completely on the same chip. Whether to arrange each device independently on different chips or to integrate them on one or more chips often depends on the needs of product design. The embodiments of the present application do not limit the specific implementation form of the above devices.

[0218] Figure 6 The secret management device 600 shown is merely exemplary. During implementation, the secret management device 600 includes other components, which are not listed one by one in this article. Figure 6 The secret management device 600 shown can implement secret management by executing all or part of the steps of the method provided in the above embodiment.

[0219] The embodiment of the present application also provides a secret management system, including: a service platform, a secret custodian, and multiple recovery contacts, wherein the multiple recovery contacts are used to provide m recovery public-private key pairs, where m is a positive integer greater than 1. The secret custodian is used to perform the actions performed by the secret custodian in the above method, and the service platform is used to perform the actions performed by the service platform in the above method.

[0220] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which instructions are stored. When the instructions are executed by a processor, the actions performed by the secret custodian or service platform in the above method are implemented.

[0221] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the actions performed by the secret custodian or service platform in the above method.

[0222] A person skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps to implement the above embodiments may be accomplished by hardware or by instructing related hardware through a program, and the program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and the above-mentioned storage medium may be a read-only memory, a disk or an optical disk, etc.

[0223] In the embodiments of the present application, the terms “first”, “second” and “third” are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0224] The term "and / or" in this application is only a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships. For example, A and / or B can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, the character " / " in this article generally indicates that the associated objects before and after are in an "or" relationship.

[0225] It should be noted that the information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.), data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) and signals involved in this application are all authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, use and processing of relevant data must comply with relevant laws, regulations and standards of relevant countries and regions.

[0226] The above description is only an optional embodiment of the present application and is not intended to limit the present application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the concept and principle of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A secret management method, characterized in that: The method comprises: The secret escrow party obtains at least one escrow public key, where the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, where the m recovery public-private key pairs come from multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1; The secret escrow party encrypts the target secret using the at least one escrow public key to obtain a target ciphertext; The secret escrow party sends a secret escrow request to the service platform, wherein the secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and the target ciphertext.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, including: The at least one escrow public key includes m public keys of the m recovery public-private key pairs; or, The at least one escrow public key includes a distributed key generation DKG public key, and the DKG public key is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs; or The at least one escrow public key includes at least one DKG public key and at least one public key of the m recovery public-private key pairs, each DKG public key of the at least one DKG public key is calculated based on at least two private keys of the m recovery public-private key pairs, wherein the union of the recovery public-private key pair to which the at least one public key belongs and the recovery public-private key pair to which the private key used to calculate the at least one DKG public key belongs is the m recovery public-private key pairs.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The at least one escrow public key includes m public keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs, and the secret escrow party encrypts the target secret using the at least one escrow key to obtain a target ciphertext, including: The secret trustee divides the target secret based on the secret sharing protocol to obtain n secret shares, where n is a positive integer greater than 1; The secret custodian uses the m public keys to encrypt the n secret shares to obtain p ciphertext fragments, and the target ciphertext includes the p ciphertext fragments, wherein each ciphertext fragment of the p ciphertext fragments is obtained by encrypting at least one secret share of the n secret shares with at least one public key of the m public keys.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that m=n=p, the secret custodian uses the m public keys to encrypt the n secret shares, including: The secret custodian uses different public keys among the m public keys to encrypt different secret shares among the n secret shares to obtain the p ciphertext fragments.

5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The secret custodian obtains a plurality of re-encryption keys provided by the plurality of recovery contacts, each of the re-encryption keys being generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein all the recovery public-private key pairs used to generate the plurality of re-encryption keys include at least a public key used to encrypt k secret shares out of the n secret shares, 2≤k≤n; The secret custodian obtains k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares through the service platform, and each of the re-encrypted ciphertext fragments is re-encrypted using one of the multiple re-encryption keys to encrypt a ciphertext fragment encrypted using a public key corresponding to a private key used to generate the re-encryption key; The secret custodian uses the identity private key of the secret custodian to decrypt the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments respectively to obtain k secret shares; The secret escrow party restores the target secret according to the k secret shares.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The secret custodian obtains, through the service platform, k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares, including: The secret escrow party sends a re-encryption request to the service platform, wherein the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and the multiple re-encryption keys; The secret custodian receives the re-encrypted response sent by the service platform, where the re-encrypted response includes the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The re-encryption request further includes a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys.

8. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The secret custodian obtains, through the service platform, k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares, including: The secret escrow party sends a secret retrieval request to the service platform, wherein the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party; The secret escrow party receives a secret retrieval response sent by the service platform, wherein the secret retrieval response includes the p ciphertext fragments; The secret custodian uses the multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt the corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments respectively to obtain the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The secret retrieval request also includes the multiple re-encryption keys, and a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys.

10. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 9, characterized in that: The secret escrow party obtains a plurality of re-encryption keys provided by the plurality of recovery contact parties, including: The secret escrow party sends a secret retrieval trigger request to the service platform, the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party, and the secret retrieval trigger request is used to trigger the service platform to summon the multiple recovery contacts to provide the re-encryption key to the secret escrow party; The secret custodian receives the re-encryption key sent by the contact recovery party.

11. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The at least one escrow public key includes a DKG public key, the DKG public key is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs, and the secret escrow party encrypts the target secret using the at least one escrow key to obtain a target ciphertext, including: The secret custodian uses the DKG public key to encrypt the target secret to obtain the target ciphertext.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The method further comprises: The secret custodian obtains multiple re-encryption key shards provided by the multiple recovery contact parties, each of the re-encryption key shards is generated based on a private key in the recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein the multiple re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs in the m recovery public-private key pairs, 2≤t≤m; The secret escrow party obtains a re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform, wherein the re-encrypted ciphertext is obtained by re-encrypting the target ciphertext using a re-encryption key, wherein the re-encryption key is generated based on the multiple re-encryption key shards; The secret custodian uses the secret custodian's identity private key to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain the target secret.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that The secret escrow party obtains the re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform, including: The secret escrow party sends a re-encryption request to the service platform, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and re-encryption key information, and the re-encryption key information includes an indication of the re-encryption key; The secret escrow party receives the re-encrypted response sent by the service platform, where the re-encrypted response includes the re-encrypted ciphertext.

14. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that The secret escrow party obtains the re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform, including: The secret escrow party sends a secret retrieval request to the service platform, wherein the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party; The secret escrow party receives a secret retrieval response sent by the service platform, wherein the secret retrieval response includes the target ciphertext; The secret escrow party re-encrypts the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.

15. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 14, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The secret escrow party sends an identity update request to the service platform, wherein the identity update request includes the updated identity credentials of the secret escrow party, so that the service platform stores the corresponding relationship between the updated identity credentials and the target ciphertext.

16. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that The method further comprises: The secret custodian initiates a group session with the multiple recovery contact parties, so that the multiple recovery contact parties re-authenticate their identities with respect to the updated identity public key of the secret custodian.

17. A secret management method, characterized in that: The method comprises: The service platform receives a secret escrow request sent by a secret escrow party, wherein the secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and a target ciphertext, wherein the target ciphertext is obtained by encrypting a target secret using at least one escrow public key, wherein the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, wherein the m recovery public-private key pairs come from multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1; The service platform stores the corresponding relationship between the identity credentials and the target ciphertext.

18. The method according to claim 17, characterized in that The at least one escrow public key includes m public keys of the m recovery public-private key pairs, the target ciphertext includes p ciphertext fragments, and the secret escrow request includes a correspondence between the p ciphertext fragments and the m public keys, wherein each ciphertext fragment of the p ciphertext fragments is obtained by encrypting at least one secret share of n secret shares obtained by dividing the target secret with at least one public key of the m public keys, where n is a positive integer greater than 1; the method further includes: The service platform receives a re-encryption request sent by the secret custodian, wherein the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian and a plurality of re-encryption keys, each of the re-encryption keys is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein all the recovery public-private key pairs used to generate the plurality of re-encryption keys include at least a public key used to encrypt k secret shares out of the n secret shares, 2≤k≤n; The service platform uses the multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments respectively, to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares; The service platform sends a re-encrypted response to the secret custodian, where the re-encrypted response includes the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

19. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that The re-encryption request further includes a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys. Before the service platform sends a re-encryption response to the secret escrow party, the method further includes: The service platform verifies all signatures in the re-encryption request.

20. The method according to claim 17, characterized in that The at least one escrow public key includes a distributed key generation DKG public key, and the DKG public key is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs; the method further includes: The service platform receives a re-encryption request sent by the secret custodian, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials and re-encryption key information of the secret custodian, the re-encryption key information includes an indication of a re-encryption key, the re-encryption key is generated based on a plurality of re-encryption key shards provided by the plurality of recovery contact parties, each of the re-encryption key shards is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein the plurality of re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs among the m recovery public-private key pairs, 2≤t≤m; The service platform re-encrypts the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext; The service platform sends a re-encrypted response to the secret escrow party, where the re-encrypted response includes the re-encrypted ciphertext.

21. The method according to any one of claims 18 to 20, characterized in that: The service platform stores a correspondence between the secret escrow party and the plurality of contact recovery parties, and the method further includes: The service platform receives a secret retrieval trigger request sent by the secret escrow party, wherein the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party; The service platform sends a call-out command to the multiple contact recovery parties, where the call-out command is used to instruct the multiple contact recovery parties to provide the re-encryption key to the secret custodian.

22. The method according to any one of claims 17 to 21, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The service platform receives an identity update request sent by the secret custodian, wherein the identity update request includes the updated identity credentials of the secret custodian; After completing the identity authentication of the secret escrow party, the service platform uses the updated identity credentials to update the corresponding relationship between the storage and the target ciphertext.

23. The method according to claim 22, characterized in that The method further comprises: The service platform uses a transparent log to publish the request initiated by the secret custodian to the service platform.

24. A secret management device, characterized in that: The device is applied to a secret trustee, and comprises: An acquisition module, configured to acquire at least one escrow public key, wherein the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, wherein the m recovery public-private key pairs are from multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1; A processing module, configured to encrypt a target secret using the at least one escrow public key to obtain a target ciphertext; The transceiver module is used to send a secret escrow request to the service platform, wherein the secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and the target ciphertext.

25. The device according to claim 24, characterized in that The at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, including: The at least one escrow public key includes m public keys of the m recovery public-private key pairs; or, The at least one escrow public key includes a distributed key generation DKG public key, and the DKG public key is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs; or The at least one escrow public key includes at least one DKG public key and at least one public key of the m recovery public-private key pairs, each DKG public key of the at least one DKG public key is calculated based on at least two private keys of the m recovery public-private key pairs, wherein the union of the recovery public-private key pair to which the at least one public key belongs and the recovery public-private key pair to which the private key used to calculate the at least one DKG public key belongs is the m recovery public-private key pairs.

26. The device according to claim 24 or 25, characterized in that The at least one escrow public key includes m public keys of the m recovery public-private key pairs, and the processing module is used to: The target secret is divided based on a secret sharing protocol to obtain n secret shares, where n is a positive integer greater than 1; The n secret shares are encrypted using the m public keys to obtain p ciphertext fragments, and the target ciphertext includes the p ciphertext fragments, wherein each ciphertext fragment of the p ciphertext fragments is obtained by encrypting at least one secret share of the n secret shares with at least one public key of the m public keys.

27. The device according to claim 26, characterized in that m=n=p, the processing module is used for: Different public keys among the m public keys are respectively used to encrypt different secret shares among the n secret shares to obtain the p ciphertext fragments.

28. The device according to claim 26 or 27, characterized in that The acquisition module is further used to acquire multiple re-encryption keys provided by the multiple recovery contact parties, each of the re-encryption keys is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and an identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein all the recovery public-private key pairs used to generate the multiple re-encryption keys include at least a public key used to encrypt k secret shares out of the n secret shares, 2≤k≤n; The processing module and / or the transceiver module is further configured to obtain, through the service platform, k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares, each of the re-encrypted ciphertext fragments being re-encrypted using one of the multiple re-encryption keys to obtain a ciphertext fragment encrypted using a public key corresponding to a private key used to generate the re-encryption key; The processing module is further used to use the identity private key of the secret custodian to decrypt the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments respectively to obtain k secret shares; The processing module is further used to restore the target secret according to the k secret shares.

29. The device according to claim 28, characterized in that The transceiver module is used to send a re-encryption request to the service platform, wherein the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian and the multiple re-encryption keys, and receive a re-encryption response sent by the service platform, wherein the re-encryption response includes the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

30. The device according to claim 29, characterized in that The re-encryption request further includes a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys.

31. The device according to claim 29, characterized in that The transceiver module is used to send a secret retrieval request to the service platform, the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party, and receive a secret retrieval response sent by the service platform, the secret retrieval response includes the p ciphertext fragments; The processing module is used to use the multiple re-encryption keys to re-encrypt corresponding ciphertext fragments in the p ciphertext fragments respectively to obtain the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

32. The device according to claim 31, characterized in that The secret retrieval request also includes the multiple re-encryption keys, and a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys.

33. The device according to any one of claims 28 to 32, characterized in that The transceiver module is also used for: Sending a secret retrieval trigger request to the service platform, wherein the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party, and the secret retrieval trigger request is used to trigger the service platform to summon the multiple recovery contacts to provide the re-encryption key to the secret escrow party; The re-encryption key sent by the contact recovery party is received.

34. The device according to claim 24 or 25, characterized in that The at least one escrow public key includes a DKG public key, and the DKG public key is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs. The processing module is used to: The target secret is encrypted using the DKG public key to obtain the target ciphertext.

35. The device according to claim 34, characterized in that The acquisition module is further used to acquire multiple re-encryption key shards provided by the multiple recovery contact parties, each of the re-encryption key shards is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein the multiple re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs in the m recovery public-private key pairs, 2≤t≤m; The processing module and / or the transceiver module is further configured to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext through the service platform, wherein the re-encrypted ciphertext is obtained by re-encrypting the target ciphertext using a re-encryption key, wherein the re-encryption key is generated based on the multiple re-encryption key fragments; The processing module is further used to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext using the identity private key of the secret custodian to obtain the target secret.

36. The device according to claim 35, characterized in that The transceiver module is used to send a re-encryption request to the service platform, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian and re-encryption key information, the re-encryption key information includes an indication of the re-encryption key, and receive a re-encryption response sent by the service platform, the re-encryption response includes the re-encrypted ciphertext.

37. The device according to claim 35, characterized in that The transceiver module is used to send a secret retrieval request to the service platform, the secret retrieval request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party, and receive a secret retrieval response sent by the service platform, the secret retrieval response includes the target ciphertext; The processing module is used to re-encrypt the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.

38. The device according to any one of claims 24 to 37, characterized in that The transceiver module is also used to send an identity update request to the service platform, wherein the identity update request includes the updated identity credentials of the secret custodian, so that the service platform stores the corresponding relationship between the updated identity credentials and the target ciphertext.

39. The device according to claim 38, characterized in that The transceiver module is further used to initiate a group session to the multiple restored contact parties, so that the multiple restored contact parties perform re-identity authentication based on the updated identity public key of the secret escrow party.

40. A secret management device, characterized in that: The device is applied to a service platform, and comprises: a transceiver module, configured to receive a secret escrow request sent by a secret escrow party, wherein the secret escrow request includes the identity credentials of the secret escrow party and a target ciphertext, wherein the target ciphertext is obtained by encrypting a target secret using at least one escrow public key, wherein the at least one escrow public key is obtained based on m recovery public-private key pairs, wherein the m recovery public-private key pairs come from multiple recovery contact parties, and m is a positive integer greater than 1; A processing module is used to store the corresponding relationship between the identity credential and the target ciphertext.

41. The device according to claim 40, characterized in that The at least one escrow public key includes m public keys of the m recovery public-private key pairs, the target ciphertext includes p ciphertext shards, and the secret escrow request includes a correspondence between the p ciphertext shards and the m public keys, wherein each ciphertext shard of the p ciphertext shards is obtained by encrypting at least one secret share of n secret shares obtained by dividing the target secret with at least one public key of the m public keys, where n is a positive integer greater than 1; The transceiver module is further used to receive a re-encryption request sent by the secret custodian, wherein the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian and multiple re-encryption keys, each of the re-encryption keys is generated based on a private key in the recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein all the recovery public-private key pairs used to generate the multiple re-encryption keys include at least a public key used to encrypt k secret shares out of the n secret shares, 2≤k≤n; The processing module is further configured to respectively re-encrypt corresponding ciphertext fragments among the p ciphertext fragments using the multiple re-encryption keys to obtain k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments corresponding to the k secret shares; The transceiver module is also used to send a re-encrypted response to the secret trustee, wherein the re-encrypted response includes the k re-encrypted ciphertext fragments.

42. The device according to claim 41, characterized in that The re-encryption request further includes a signature of the recovery contact party on the provided re-encryption key and / or a signature of the information security management party on the multiple re-encryption keys. The processing module is further configured to verify that all signatures in the re-encryption request have passed before the service platform sends a re-encryption response to the secret custodian.

43. The device according to claim 40, characterized in that The at least one escrow public key includes a distributed key generation DKG public key, and the DKG public key is calculated based on the m private keys in the m recovery public-private key pairs; The transceiver module is further used to receive a re-encryption request sent by the secret custodian, the re-encryption request includes the identity credentials and re-encryption key information of the secret custodian, the re-encryption key information includes an indication of a re-encryption key, the re-encryption key is generated based on a plurality of re-encryption key shards provided by the plurality of recovery contact parties, each of the re-encryption key shards is generated based on a private key in a recovery public-private key pair and the identity public key of the secret custodian, wherein the plurality of re-encryption key shards are obtained based on at least t recovery public-private key pairs among the m recovery public-private key pairs, 2≤t≤m; The processing module is further configured to re-encrypt the target ciphertext using the re-encryption key to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext; The transceiver module is further used to send a re-encrypted response to the secret trustee, wherein the re-encrypted response includes the re-encrypted ciphertext.

44. The device according to any one of claims 41 to 43, characterized in that The service platform stores the corresponding relationship between the secret escrow party and the multiple contact recovery parties, The transceiver module is also used to receive a secret retrieval trigger request sent by the secret custodian, the secret retrieval trigger request includes the identity credentials of the secret custodian, and send a convening command to the multiple recovery contact parties, the convening command is used to instruct the multiple recovery contact parties to provide the re-encryption key to the secret custodian.

45. The device according to any one of claims 40 to 44, characterized in that The transceiver module is further used to receive an identity update request sent by the secret escrow party, wherein the identity update request includes the updated identity credentials of the secret escrow party; The processing module is also used to update the corresponding relationship between the storage and the target ciphertext using the updated identity credentials after completing the identity authentication of the secret escrow party.

46. ​​The device according to claim 45, characterized in that The processing module is further used to publish the request initiated by the secret custodian to the service platform using a transparent log.

47. A secret management system, characterized in that: include: A service platform, a secret custodian, and multiple recovery contact parties, wherein the multiple recovery contact parties are used to provide m recovery public-private key pairs, where m is a positive integer greater than 1; The secret custodian is used to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 16, and the service platform is used to execute the method according to any one of claims 17 to 23.

48. A secret management device, characterized in that: include: Processor and memory; The memory is used to store a computer program, wherein the computer program includes program instructions; The processor is used to call the computer program to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 23.

49. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions are executed by the processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 23 is implemented.

50. A computer program product, characterized in that The method comprises a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 23.