Secure access method and system of 6G full decoupling network

By establishing a trust relationship under the FD-RAN architecture through a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism, the security and efficiency issues of multi-base station cooperation are solved, and low-overhead multi-party access and efficient authentication are achieved.

CN118921662APending Publication Date: 2024-11-08NANJING UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410994127.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-24
Publication Date
2024-11-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Under the FD-RAN architecture, the security and efficiency of multi-base station cooperation are insufficient, the overhead of existing security solutions is too high under this architecture, and the security and efficiency of user terminals accessing multiple cooperating base stations are insufficient.

Method used

A lightweight, secret-sharing-based group key negotiation mechanism is adopted. Shared key generation information is transmitted through interpolation polynomials and binomials to establish trust relationships between user terminals, data base stations, and control base stations. Keys are generated independently using key derivation functions, reducing authentication overhead among multiple parties.

Benefits of technology

It achieves efficient, low-overhead, and secure access under multi-base station collaboration, avoids the waste of resources for mutual authentication among multiple parties, and ensures 0-RTT access authentication and session security for user terminals.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a secure access method and system for a 6G full-decoupling network, and provides an efficient multi-base-station cooperation and user access solution for future 6G full-decoupling wireless access network communication. Through a lightweight group key negotiation strategy based on secret sharing, an interpolation polynomial is constructed to transmit shared key generation information, a trust relationship among internal members of a data base station group is established, and a group leader base station is selected for the base station group, so that the negotiation efficiency of the base station group is improved; on the basis of completing base station group key negotiation, a binomial expression is constructed through a secret sharing technology, and a key for base station group access and session service is negotiated for a user. Compared with a traditional access authentication mechanism, the method has the advantages that efficient and low-overhead security key negotiation is performed on the user side and the base station side respectively, 0-RTT access authentication of the user to the data base station is achieved while various attacks are resisted, and therefore a full-decoupling network access scheme suitable for multi-party access and multi-base-station cooperation is established.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of wireless mobile communication security technology, and relates to group key negotiation and multi-base station security collaboration and user terminal security access in 6G access scenarios, and specifically to a 6G fully decoupled network security access method and system. Background Art

[0002] With the advent of the era of the Internet of Everything, the future network will face the communication connection needs of billions of people and hundreds of billions of connected devices, which puts higher requirements on the network architecture. The current communication network has the following problems: insufficient uplink coverage, difficult to ensure service quality, poor transmission resource scheduling performance, and single transmission mode. To solve these problems, there have been studies on the access network architecture of the sixth-generation mobile network (6G). Among them, the fully decoupled radio access network (FD-RAN) proposed by Academician Yu Quan and others in "A Fully-Decoupled RAN Architecture for 6G Inspired by Neurotransmission" is a novel and effective solution. Based on the existing fifth-generation mobile network (5G) access architecture, FD-RAN completely decouples the control plane from the data plane, and at the same time completely physically decouples the base station (BS) into an uplink data base station (UBS), a downlink data base station (DBS), and a control base station (CBS). In this way, the uplink coverage rate is improved through multi-base station collaboration, and resources such as spectrum and channels are scheduled, thereby ensuring service quality and user experience.

[0003] However, as a new access architecture, although FD-RAN brings many advantages, it also brings new security challenges. First, the FD-RAN framework leads to more base stations serving the same user terminal at the same time, which requires close collaboration between multiple base stations. However, these base stations are located outside, and the traditional base stations are completely decoupled, and their communication functions become decentralized and far away from the core network (CN). External attackers may target or destroy these decoupled base stations, which poses a major threat to the security of user data transmission and wastes communication network resources. To solve this problem, it is crucial to ensure the security of FD-RAN multi-base station collaboration and establish an efficient identification trust mechanism between UBS, DBS, CBS and CN, which needs to maintain the security and integrity of the FD-RAN architecture. In addition, due to its untrustworthiness, simplex communication and limited computing power, when the user terminal accesses the data base station, it requires assistance from the CBS and the control plane. This inherent challenge makes the existing 5G mobile communication technology authentication and key agreement (AKA) method proposed by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) not applicable to FD-RAN. Attempting to establish a multi-party trust relationship using 5G AKA will result in unsustainable authentication costs, which may lead to distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks if exploited by attackers. Therefore, FD-RAN needs a more suitable AKA to ensure access security. This mechanism must not only ensure secure and efficient cooperation between multiple base stations and CN, but also effectively ensure user secure access to FD-RAN. In an article titled "A lightweight and secure group key based handover authentication protocol for the software-defined space information network" published in IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications in 2020, K.Xue et al. proposed a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism based on secret value sharing technology, which effectively solved the security problem of user terminal authentication between different satellite nodes. However, its work focused on achieving better handover authentication, and did not conduct in-depth research on the interaction between UE and satellite groups within the satellite group.

[0004] In summary, the problems of the existing technology are as follows: (1) After the physical decoupling of traditional base stations, the security and efficiency of FD-RAN multi-base station collaboration are insufficient, and the overhead of the existing security solution under this architecture is too large. (2) When the user terminal accesses the FD-RAN architecture, the security and efficiency of accessing multiple collaborative base stations at the same time are insufficient, and the overhead of using the existing security solution to protect this process is too large. Summary of the invention

[0005] Purpose of the invention: The purpose of the present invention is to provide a secure access mechanism for a 6G fully decoupled network, using a lightweight group key negotiation strategy based on secret sharing to perform efficient and low-overhead security key negotiation on the user side and the base station side, respectively, thereby establishing a fully decoupled network access solution suitable for multi-party access and multi-base station collaboration.

[0006] Technical solution, in order to achieve the above-mentioned invention object, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network, comprising the following steps:

[0007] Through a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism based on secret sharing, an interpolation polynomial is constructed to transmit shared key generation information, a trust relationship is established between members within the data base station group, and a leader base station is selected for the group;

[0008] A binomial is constructed through secret sharing technology to negotiate key information for user terminals to access and serve multiple base stations. During the negotiation process, the key is independently generated by the user terminal and the data base station through a key derivation function.

[0009] Through the 5G AKA protocol, a trust relationship is established and transmitted between the user terminal and the control base station and data base station to complete the access work of the 6G fully decoupled wireless network.

[0010] Furthermore, through a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism based on secret sharing, an interpolation polynomial is constructed to transmit shared key generation information, including: n members in the group first send a set of values ​​with randomly selected points to the control base station connected to it; then, each control base station forwards the information it collects to the group manager in a secure manner; after receiving these n points, the group manager first verifies their legal identities, assuming that the number of points that pass the verification is N, and then selects a group key UK, and lets f(0) = UK; then, the group manager constructs an interpolation polynomial f(x) of order N, regenerates N points on the polynomial f(x), and returns them to each group member; subsequently, these group members obtain the group key UK by recovering the polynomial, and use the key UK for intra-group communication, thereby establishing a trust relationship between the base stations of the group members.

[0011] Furthermore, at the initial stage of the system, each data base station DBS i Authorized by the network management center with a group manager, and sharing a secret value (x i ,y i ).

[0012] Furthermore, in the group key negotiation phase, first, each data base station DBS in the group i First generate a random number R i and timestamp tsi , then calculate where h() is a hash function, is the data base station number; finally, the data base station DBS i By controlling the base station as a forward relay node, a group key negotiation request message is sent to the group manager:

[0013] Upon receiving the group key agreement request message After that, the group manager first authenticates the data source and data integrity of the received data; then the group manager authenticates the data base station DBS i Calculate the point (x i ,y i +R i ); Assume that the number of data base stations that have passed the authentication is N, thus including N points (x i ,y i +R i )(1≤i≤N); the group manager then randomly selects a group key UK and constructs an N-term interpolation polynomial f(x) through (N+1) points, where the N+1 points are (0, UK) and (x i ,y i +R i )(1≤i≤N); Next, the group manager selects N points for the N data base stations on f(x) And calculate Finally, the group manager broadcasts the key negotiation response message to all group members; The identity information of the group leader base station specified by the group manager; after receiving the response information, each group member DBS i First calculate the point (x i ,y i +R i ); followed by DBS i Through the point (x i ,y i +R i ) and other N received points Recover the polynomial f(x) to retrieve the group key UK=f(0); then, DBS i calculate And check With the received hash value Auth i Are they the same? If the two values ​​are the same, DBS i Believe that the group key is valid and accept it, otherwise, DBS iStop the group key negotiation protocol; after completing the group key agreement procedure, the member base stations in the data base station group will use the key UK as the shared group key.

[0014] Furthermore, according to the deployment of the group manager, a group leader base station is selected for the group. During the collaboration process, necessary information is sent to the group leader base station, thereby enabling more efficient packaging and transmission. In addition, secure interaction is also completed between the data base station group and the control base station / group manager through the negotiated group key UK, thereby establishing a trust relationship between the control base station / group manager and the data base station, as well as within the data base station group.

[0015] Furthermore, a trust relationship is established between the user terminal and the control base station through the AKA mechanism. At the same time, the user terminal sends an initial session key negotiation request to the group manager to negotiate the security key for access and session between the user terminal and the data base station. In the initial stage, each legitimate user terminal UE i Authorized by the network management center with a group manager, and sharing a secret value (m i ,n i ).

[0016] Furthermore, a binomial is constructed through secret sharing technology to negotiate key information for user terminals to access and serve multiple base stations, including: each user terminal UE with access requirements i First generate a random number and timestamp Then calculate where h() is a hash function, is the number; finally, the user terminal UE i By controlling the base station as a forward relay node, an initial session key negotiation request message is sent to the group manager:

[0017] Upon receiving the initial session key negotiation request message Afterwards, the group manager first performs data source authentication and data integrity authentication on the received data; then the group manager authenticates the user terminal UE that has passed the authentication. i Calculation Point Generate timestamp ts new , for the user terminal UE i Assign data base station groups and derive data base station group keys UK, obtain KDF represents the key derivation function and constructs the binomial U(x) through two points, which are (0,TUK i )as well as Next, the group manager sends a message to the user UE on U(x). i Select Point And calculate Finally, the group manager sends a key negotiation response message To the user terminal UE i , and at the same time Sent to the corresponding data base station group, ENC UK Indicates encryption using key UK The key can be obtained after the base station decrypts the data in the group After receiving the response information, the user terminal UE i First calculate the point (m i ,n i +R Ui ); then UE i Pass point And the received points Recover the binomial U(x) and thus retrieve the initial session key TUK i =U(0); then, UE i calculate And check With the received hash value Are they the same? If the two values ​​are the same, UE i Trust that the initial session key is valid and accept it, otherwise, the UE i Stop key negotiation; at this point, the user terminal UE i Complete access authentication and confirm the trust relationship with the control base station, and generate a key K on the user side to interact with the control base station gNB ; At the same time, the user terminal UE i With DBS i The two ends independently generate the initial session key TUK i .

[0018] Furthermore, DBS i By TUK i Confirm access to user terminal UE i identity, including:

[0019] UE i The key TUK is further derived by i get in UE i Generate a new random number and timestamp;

[0020] UE i Send access authentication request and session information to the data base station:

[0021] The data base station receives AC for the first time req After that, use the key TUK i Decryption Then combine and TUK i Perform key derivation and obtain the key By calculation Compare * and Whether to perform data source authentication and data integrity authentication, and use the key after authentication Decrypt and obtain session information Message u , thus completing the user UE i About UBS i Access authentication and security session, and access and session are carried out simultaneously; the data base station receives the user UE for the first time i AC req After receiving the information, perform key derivation and obtain the key This key is then used to communicate with the UE i Conduct a secure session.

[0022] Furthermore, the data base station DBS i Share a secret value (x i ,y i ), stored in the trusted hardware configured in the data base station, the user terminal UE i Share a secret value (m i ,n i ), which is stored in trusted hardware configured in the user terminal.

[0023] The present invention also provides a secure access system for a 6G fully decoupled network, wherein the 6G fully decoupled network includes an uplink data base station, a downlink data base station, a control base station, a network management center and a user terminal, wherein the network management center is provided with a group manager; the group manager and the uplink / downlink data base station use a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism based on secret sharing to construct an interpolation polynomial to transmit shared key generation information, establish a trust relationship between members within the data base station group, and select a group leader base station for the group; the group manager and the user terminal use a secret sharing technology to construct a binomial to negotiate key information for user terminals to access and serve multiple base stations and session services, and during the negotiation process, the key is independently generated by the user terminal and the data base station through a key derivation function; through the 5G AKA protocol, a trust relationship is established and transmitted between the user terminal and the control base station and the uplink / downlink data base station.

[0024] Beneficial effects: Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages: 1. The present invention provides an access solution for multi-party access and multi-base station collaboration under the FD-RAN architecture, avoiding the problem of resource overhead for mutual authentication between multiple parties under multi-base station collaboration. 2. The present invention implements a 6G fully decoupled network multi-base station collaboration security mechanism based on lightweight group secret sharing technology, which saves authentication overhead between multiple base stations and core networks while ensuring security. 3. The present invention uses secret value sharing technology and key derivation functions to perform efficient and low-overhead security key negotiation on the user side and the base station side respectively, realizing 0-RTT access authentication of users to data base stations while resisting various attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0025] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the security architecture adopted in the embodiment of the present invention.

[0026] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of FD-RAN access security according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0027] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram comparing the calculation overheads of different schemes when a single user accesses multiple base stations in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0028] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram comparing the calculation overhead of different schemes when multiple users access and cooperate with 20 base stations in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings: This embodiment is implemented on the premise of the technical solution of the present invention, and a detailed implementation method and a specific operation process are given. It should be understood that the specific examples described here are only used to explain the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments.

[0030] A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention includes the following steps:

[0031] Through a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism based on secret sharing, an interpolation polynomial is constructed to transmit shared key generation information, a trust relationship is established between members within the data base station group, and a group leader base station is selected for the group to improve the efficiency of data base station group negotiation;

[0032] The binomial is constructed through secret sharing technology to negotiate key information for user terminals to access and serve multiple base stations. During the negotiation process, the key is independently generated by the user terminal and the data base station through a key derivation function to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0033] Through the 5G AKA protocol, the trust relationship between the legitimate user terminal and the control base station and data base station is established and transmitted, thereby completing the access work of the 6G fully decoupled wireless network. 0-RTT access authentication is achieved between the user terminal and the data base station, reducing access overhead and improving authentication efficiency and session efficiency.

[0034] The embodiments of the present invention take into account Figure 1 The system model access scenario of the security architecture shown in the figure includes the uplink data base station, downlink data base station, control base station, network management center with group manager, and user terminal. It is assumed that the network management center will not be destroyed by any adversary and is trustworthy. The group manager is a trusted party integrated in the network management center. The control base station is responsible for collecting signaling messages from the data base station and forwarding the instructions of the network management center to the data base station. The control base station is completely trustworthy and forwards signaling between the data base station node and the network management center without error. The data base stations are untrustworthy, numerous, vulnerable to attack, and have limited computing resources. The data base stations in the system may be impersonated by malicious adversaries and then deceive other data base stations to provide access services for illegal users. The data base stations do not communicate directly with the group manager and do not establish RRC channels. Signaling can only be transmitted through forwarding by the control base station. Therefore, the trust relationship between the data base station and the group manager needs to provide additional support. The user terminal can be various types of terminals with limited computing power, untrustworthy, and do not trust the data base station. It is assumed that the adversary has the ability to modify, inject or interrupt interactive messages in the air and try to destroy the proposed solution. All data base stations may be attacked by viruses or even hijacked.

[0035] A group of nodes in the same area, such as data base stations, can negotiate a shared group key with the assistance of a control base station. The n members in the group first send a set of values ​​with randomly selected points to the control base station to which they are connected. Then, each control base station forwards the information it collects to the group manager in a secure manner. After receiving these n points, the group manager first verifies their legal identity, assuming that the number of points that pass the verification is N, and then selects a group key UK, and lets f(0) = UK. Then, the group manager constructs an interpolation polynomial f(x) of order N, regenerates N points on the polynomial f(x), and returns them to each group member. Subsequently, these group members obtain the group key UK by recovering the polynomial, and use the key UK for intra-group communication, thereby establishing a trust relationship between the member base stations in the group. In addition, the data base station group and the group manager can also interact securely through the key UK.

[0036] In the initial stage of the system, each data base station DBS i Authorized by the network management center acting as the group manager, sharing a secret value (x i ,yi ). From a security perspective, these secret values ​​will be stored in trusted hardware configured in the data base station, and the data stored in it cannot be read by an adversary.

[0037] In the group key negotiation phase, first, each data base station SBS in the group i First generate a random number R i and timestamp ts i , and then put this data into the configured trusted secure hardware. Trusted hardware module calculation And feed it back to the data base station DBS i , where h() is a hash function. Finally, the data base station DBS i By controlling the base station as a forward relay node, a group key agreement request message is sent to the group manager:

[0038] Upon receiving the group key agreement request message After that, the group manager first performs data source authentication and data integrity authentication on the received data: In this process, the group manager uses the locally stored x i With the received parameters calculate Compare h i Is it equal to the calculated h? * After that, the group manager will verify the DBS data base station. i Calculate the point (x i ,y i +R i For the convenience of description, it is assumed that the number of authenticated data base stations is N, thus containing N points (x i ,y i +R i )(1≤i≤N). The group manager then randomly selects a group key UK and constructs an N-term interpolation polynomial f(x) through (N+1) points, where the N+1 points are (0, UK) and (x i ,y i +R i )(1≤i≤N). Next, the group manager selects N points on f(x) for the N data base stations And calculate i≤N). Finally, the group manager broadcasts the key negotiation response message To all group members. The group leader base station identity information specified by the group manager. After receiving the response information, each group member DBS i First, the point (x i ,y i +R i). Then DNS i Through the point (x i ,y i +R i ) and other N received points The polynomial f(x) can be recovered to retrieve the group key UK=f(0). Then, DBS i calculate And check With the received hash value Auth i Are they the same? If the two values ​​are the same, DBS i Believe that the group key is valid and accept it, otherwise, DBS i Stop the group key negotiation protocol. After completing the group key agreement procedure, the member base stations in the data base station group will use the key UK as the shared group key to protect data security in subsequent group communications. As the leader of the group, during the collaboration process, necessary information can be sent to the leader base station, thereby more efficiently packaging and transmitting. In addition, the data base station group and the control base station / group manager can also complete secure interaction through the key UK. This establishes a trust relationship between the control base station / group manager and the data base station, as well as within the data base station group.

[0039] A trust relationship is established between the user terminal and the control base station through the AKA mechanism. At the same time, the user terminal sends an initial session key negotiation request to the group manager to negotiate the security key for access and session between the user terminal and the data base station. In the initial stage, each legitimate user terminal UE i Also authorized by the network management center, and share a secret value (m i ,n i ). From a security perspective, these secret values ​​will be stored in the UE i The trusted hardware is configured so that data stored in it cannot be read by an adversary.

[0040] Each user terminal UE that has access requirements i First generate a random number and timestamp This data is then placed into the configured trusted secure hardware. And feed it back to the user terminal UE i , where h() is a hash function. Finally, the user terminal UE i By controlling the base station as a forward relay node (following the AKA mechanism), an initial session key negotiation request message is sent to the group manager:

[0041] Upon receiving the initial session key negotiation request message After that, the group manager first authenticates the data source and data integrity of the received data: In this process, the group manager uses the locally stored m i With the received parameters calculate Compare h i Is it equal to the calculated h? * For the convenience of description, it is assumed that the user terminal UE i The authentication is passed. Then the group manager authenticates the user terminal UE i Calculation Point Generate ts new , for the user terminal UE i Assign data base station groups and derive data base station group keys UK, obtain And construct the binomial U(x) through two points, the two points are (0,TUK i )as well as Next, the group manager sends a message to the user UE on U(x). i Select Point And calculate Finally, the group manager sends a key negotiation response message To the user terminal UE i , and at the same time Send to the corresponding data base station group, the data base station in the group can obtain the key TUK after decryption i After receiving the response information, the user terminal UE i First, the point is calculated through the trusted hardware module Then UE i Pass point And the received points The binomial U(x) can be recovered to retrieve the initial session key TUK i =U(0). Then, UE i calculate And check With the received hash value Are they the same? If the two values ​​are the same, then UE i Trust that the initial session key is valid and accept it, otherwise, the UE i Stop key negotiation. After this process, the user terminal UE i Complete access authentication and confirm the trust relationship with the control base station, and generate a key K on the user side to interact with the control base station gNB At the same time, the user terminal UE i With DBS i The two ends independently generate the initial session key TUK i Next, DBS i By TUK iConfirm access to user terminal UE i identity and complete the secure session.

[0042] Given below Figure 2 The security process of the user terminal accessing the FD-RAN data base station shown in the figure, wherein step 1 is the data base station group key negotiation process, step 2 is the key negotiation process of the user equipment accessing multiple FD-RAN base stations, and step 3 is the session key negotiation process between the user equipment and the data base station. In the specific session and access process, the user terminal UE i Between the data base station (Data BS) group, use the key TUK i Complete access authentication and secure session. Since the uplink and downlink processes are similar, the uplink process is used as an example. i Different from UBS i Different keys are required between the two, and the key TUK is further derived i To complete: in UE i Generate a new random number and timestamp. i , generate a key Random number Different, so the corresponding keys After that, the user UE i UBS i Send access authentication request and session information at the same time: UBS i First AC received req After that, use the key TUK i Decryption Then combine and TUK i Perform key derivation and obtain the key By calculation Compare * and Whether to perform data source authentication and data integrity authentication, and use the key after authentication Decrypt and obtain session information Message u . Thus completing the user UE i About UBS i Access authentication and secure session, and access and session are carried out simultaneously, realizing 0-RTT access authentication. UBS i First received user UE i AC req After receiving the information, perform key derivation and obtain the key This key is then used to communicate with the UE iConduct a secure session.

[0043] The following introduces the results of simulation and comparison of the proposed scheme and some existing schemes. The performance comparison includes computational overhead and communication overhead: For computational overhead, the access authentication overhead is defined as the time cost of the encryption operation involved in the proposed scheme. The time cost of the original encryption operation using the OpenSSL library on the 13th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-13900HX 2.20GHz processor is studied, and the settlement overhead of each scheme is counted and plotted. For a single UE, as the number of Data BSs providing services increases, the overhead generated during the access process of each scheme is as follows: Figure 3 As shown in Figure 2, for 20 collaborative Data BSs, as the number of UEs that need to access services increases, the overhead generated during the access process of each solution is as follows: Figure 4 As shown. Scheme 1 is the scheme proposed by J.Cao et al. in the article entitled “UGHA: Uniform group-based handover authentication for MTC within E-UTRAN in LTE-A network” published in 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications; Scheme 2 is the scheme proposed by K.Xue et al. in the article entitled “A lightweight and secure group key based handover authentication protocol for the software-defined space information network” published in 2020 IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications; Scheme 3 is the scheme proposed by R.Ma et al. in the article entitled “FTGPHA: Fixed-trajectory group pre-handover authentication mechanism for mobile relays in 5G high-speed rail networks” published in 2019 IEEE transactions on vehicular technology; Scheme 4 is the scheme in the article entitled “5G: Security architecture and procedures for 5G system (3GPP Standard TS33.501V17.12.0Rel.17)” published by 3GPP in 2023.

[0044] The comparison results show that the proposed scheme has a lower computational overhead in the FD-RAN multi-base station cooperative access scenario. For the communication overhead, the authentication message size of the proposed access authentication scheme is evaluated compared with the above existing schemes. The communication overhead of each scheme is shown in Table 1:

[0045] Table 1

[0046] plan Communication overhead / bits Solution 1 19456 Solution 2 4130 Option 3 5376 Option 4 4520 This program 3968

[0047] It can be seen that the communication overhead of the proposed scheme is low.

[0048] The simulation experiments and comparison results that have been conducted show that the solution proposed in this embodiment can ensure the security of the FD-RAN architecture with high efficiency and low overhead.

[0049] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions and improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Through a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism based on secret sharing, an interpolation polynomial is constructed to transmit shared key generation information, a trust relationship is established between members within the data base station group, and a leader base station is selected for the group; A binomial is constructed through secret sharing technology to negotiate key information for user terminals to access and serve multiple base stations. During the negotiation process, the key is independently generated by the user terminal and the data base station through a key derivation function. Through the 5G AKA protocol, a trust relationship is established and transmitted between the user terminal and the control base station and data base station to complete the access work of the 6G fully decoupled wireless network.

2. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Through a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism based on secret sharing, an interpolation polynomial is constructed to transmit shared key generation information, including: n members in the group first send a set of values ​​with randomly selected points to the control base station connected to it; then, each control base station forwards the information it collects to the group manager in a secure manner; after receiving these n points, the group manager first verifies their legal identities, assuming that the number of points that pass the verification is N, and then selects a group key UK, and lets f(0) = UK; then, the group manager constructs an interpolation polynomial f(x) of order n, regenerates N points on the polynomial f(x), and returns them to each group member; subsequently, these group members obtain the group key UK by recovering the polynomial, and use the key UK for intra-group communication, thereby establishing a trust relationship between the base stations of the group members.

3. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network according to claim 2, characterized in that: In the initial stage of the system, each data base station DBS i Authorized by the network management center with a group manager, and sharing a secret value (x i ,y i ).

4. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network according to claim 3, characterized in that: In the group key negotiation phase, first, each data base station DBS in the group i First generate a random number R i and timestamp ts i , then calculate where h() is a hash function, is the data base station number; finally, the data base station DBS i By controlling the base station as a forward relay node, a group key negotiation request message is sent to the group manager: Upon receiving the group key agreement request message After that, the group manager first authenticates the data source and data integrity of the received data; then the group manager authenticates the data base station DBS i Calculate the point (x i ,y i +R i ); Assume that the number of data base stations that have passed the authentication is N, thus including N points (x i ,y i +R i )(1≤i≤N); the group manager then randomly selects a group key UK and constructs an N-term interpolation polynomial f(x) through (N+1) points, where the N+1 points are (0, UK) and (x i ,y i +R i )(1≤i≤N); Next, the group manager selects N points for the N data base stations on f(x) And calculate Finally, the group manager broadcasts the key negotiation response message to all group members; among them, The identity information of the group leader base station specified by the group manager; after receiving the response information, each group member DBS i First calculate the point (x i ,y i +R i ); followed by DBS i Through the point (x i ,y i +R i ) and other N received points Recover the polynomial f(x) to retrieve the group key UK=f(0); then, DBS i calculate And check With the received hash value Auth i Are they the same? If the two values ​​are the same, DBS i Believe that the group key is valid and accept it, otherwise, DBS i Stop the group key negotiation protocol; after completing the group key agreement procedure, the member base stations in the data base station group will use the key UK as the shared group key.

5. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network according to claim 1, characterized in that: According to the deployment of the group manager, a group leader base station is selected for the group. During the collaboration process, necessary information is sent to the group leader base station, thereby making packaging and transmission more efficient. In addition, secure interaction is also completed between the data base station group and the control base station / group manager through the negotiated group key UK, thereby establishing a trust relationship between the control base station / group manager and the data base station, as well as within the data base station group.

6. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network according to claim 1, characterized in that: A trust relationship is established between the user terminal and the control base station through the AKA mechanism. At the same time, the user terminal sends an initial session key negotiation request to the group manager to negotiate the security key for access and session between the user terminal and the data base station. In the initial stage, each legitimate user terminal UE i Authorized by the network management center with a group manager, and sharing a secret value (m i ,n i ).

7. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network according to claim 6, characterized in that: The binomial is constructed by secret sharing technology to negotiate key information for user terminals to access and serve multiple base stations, including: each user terminal UE with access requirements i First generate a random number and timestamp Then calculate where h() is a hash function, is the number; finally, the user terminal UE i By controlling the base station as a forward relay node, an initial session key negotiation request message is sent to the group manager: Upon receiving the initial session key negotiation request message Afterwards, the group manager first performs data source authentication and data integrity authentication on the received data; then the group manager authenticates the user terminal UE that has passed the authentication. i Calculation Point Generate timestamp ts new , for the user terminal UE i Assign data base station groups and derive data base station group keys UK, obtain KDF represents the key derivation function and constructs the binomial U(x) through two points, which are (0,TUK i )as well as Next, the group manager sends a message to the user UE on U(x). i Select Point And calculate Finally, the group manager sends a key negotiation response message To the user terminal UE i , and at the same time Sent to the corresponding data base station group, ENC UK Indicates encryption using key UK The key can be obtained after the base station decrypts the data in the group After receiving the response information, the user terminal UE i First calculate the point Then UE i Pass point And the received points Recover the binomial U(x) and thus retrieve the initial session key TUK i =U(0); then, UE i calculate And check With the received hash value Are they the same? If the two values ​​are the same, UE i Trust that the initial session key is valid and accept it, otherwise, the UE i Stop key negotiation; at this point, the user terminal UE i Complete access authentication and confirm the trust relationship with the control base station, and generate a key K on the user side to interact with the control base station gNB ; At the same time, the user terminal UE i With DBS i The two ends independently generate the initial session key YUK i .

8. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network according to claim 7, characterized in that: DBS i By YUK i Confirm access to user terminal UE i identity, including: UE i The key YUK is further derived by i get in UE i Generate a new random number and timestamp; UE i Send access authentication request and session information to the data base station: The data base station receives AC for the first time req After that, use the key TUK i Decryption Then combine and TUK i Perform key derivation and obtain the key By calculation Compare h* with Whether to perform data source authentication and data integrity authentication, and use the key after authentication Decrypt and obtain session information Message u , thus completing the user UE i About UBS i Access authentication and security session, and access and session are carried out simultaneously; the data base station receives the user UE for the first time i AC req After receiving the information, perform key derivation and obtain the key This key is then used to communicate with the UE i Conduct a secure session.

9. A secure access method for a 6G fully decoupled network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Data Base Station DBS i Share a secret value (x i ,y i ), stored in the trusted hardware configured in the data base station, the user terminal UE i Share a secret value (m i ,n i ), which is stored in trusted hardware configured in the user terminal.

10. A secure access system for a 6G fully decoupled network, wherein the 6G fully decoupled network includes an uplink data base station, a downlink data base station, a control base station, a network management center, and a user terminal, characterized in that: The network management center is provided with a group manager; the group manager and the uplink / downlink data base station use a lightweight group key negotiation mechanism based on secret sharing to construct an interpolation polynomial to transmit shared key generation information, establish a trust relationship between members within the data base station group, and select a group leader base station for the group; the group manager and the user terminal use a secret sharing technology to construct a binomial to negotiate key information for user terminals to access and serve multiple base stations and session services. During the negotiation process, the key is independently generated by the user terminal and the data base station through a key derivation function; through the 5G AKA protocol, a trust relationship is established and transmitted between the user terminal and the control base station and the uplink / downlink data base station.