Cross-domain authentication method and system for fleet based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers

Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of vehicle network communication technology, and discloses a fleet cross-domain authentication method and system based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers. The method includes an initialization phase: an authentication agency uses lattice cryptography technology to generate a public-private key pair. Registration phase: a vehicle-mounted unit generates an anonymous credential and a private key of its own vehicle based on the public-private key pair, and at the same time, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a quantum random number to calculate the signature of its own vehicle. In-domain authentication phase: a session key is negotiated between any two vehicles in a fleet within each domain based on an anonymous credential and a private key. Cross-domain authentication phase: when the captain vehicle Vi of the initial domain needs to enter the target domain, Vi and the captain vehicle Vx in the target domain perform information verification based on the signature, and determine whether all vehicles in the fleet where Vi is located that need to enter the target domain are successfully verified. If so, vehicle Vx updates the session key of vehicle Vi. The present invention can reduce cross-domain communication overhead and improve communication security.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle networking communication technology, and specifically to a vehicle fleet cross-domain authentication method and system based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of communication technology, Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) are considered to be a powerful measure to ease urban traffic pressure and improve the transportation system capacity. Although VANET has performed well in promoting the advancement of transportation technology, when multiple vehicles need to enter different domains, how to prevent repeated authentication of vehicles and further reduce communication overhead is a current research hotspot.

[0003] In addition, when a vehicle establishes communication with other vehicles or servers, a large amount of information will be transmitted, and the confidentiality and integrity of the data, user privacy and security attacks will inevitably be attacked to a certain extent. At present, a public key cryptographic system based on computational complexity such as integer decomposition and discrete logarithm is usually used, that is, the sender uses the receiver's public key to encrypt the message, and the receiver uses the private key to decrypt the message. The public key is a publicly shared key. Anyone can obtain the public key and use it to encrypt the message. Only the corresponding private key can decrypt the message. Because traditional computers have limited computing power, they cannot break some classical cryptographic algorithms, but with the emergence of quantum computers, these classical cryptographic algorithms can be easily cracked, so communication security cannot be guaranteed. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to solve the technical problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a fleet cross-domain authentication method and system based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers. The present invention can reduce the communication overhead when multiple vehicles cross domains and improve the communication security.

[0005] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0006] The present invention discloses a cross-domain authentication method for a fleet based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers, comprising: an initialization phase, a registration phase, an intra-domain authentication phase and a cross-domain authentication phase.

[0007] Initialization phase: The certification authority uses lattice cryptography to generate a public-private key pair.

[0008] Registration phase: The on-board unit generates an anonymous credential and private key for its own vehicle based on the public-private key pair. At the same time, the on-board unit generates a quantum random number to calculate the signature of its own vehicle.

[0009] Intra-domain authentication phase: Any two vehicles in each intra-domain fleet negotiate session keys based on anonymous credentials and private keys to authenticate each other.

[0010] Cross-domain authentication phase: When the captain vehicle Vi of a convoy in the initial domain needs to enter the target domain, vehicle Vi and the captain vehicle Vx of any convoy in the target domain perform information verification based on signatures to determine whether all vehicles in the convoy where vehicle Vi is located that need to enter the target domain have been successfully verified. If so, vehicle Vx updates the session key of vehicle Vi, thereby completing the cross-domain authentication of the convoy.

[0011] As a further improvement of the above solution, the initialization phase includes the following specific processes:

[0012] The certification body chooses an odd prime number q , Safety parameters n as well as m , then 1 m , 1 n , q Input into the TrapGen algorithm, thus outputting the master public key matrix A∈ and the master private key matrix B∈ ;in, q >3,256≤ n ≤1024, m> 5n ·log q ; Indicates a n × m The matrix, whose elements belong to the model q Integer ring; matrices A and B satisfy: AB≡0 ( mod q ),and ≤ O ( n ·log q );≡ indicates a congruence relationship; AB≡0( mod q ) represents all pairs of elements in matrices A and B q The result after modulo is equal to 0; represents the norm of matrix B; O ( n ·log q ) represents an asymptotic upper bound; O is the notation used to describe asymptotic behavior.

[0013] The certification body uses the unique identifier of each on-board unit ID OBU Calculate the public key of the onboard unit P pk ;in, Ppk = H ( ID OBU ), H (·) represents a hash function.

[0014] The certification body chooses a real number β , using the SampleD algorithm, A, B, P pk and β As input, the private key of the on-board unit is output P sk , while satisfying A P sk = P pk ( mod q ).

[0015] As a further improvement of the above scheme, the registration phase includes the following specific processes:

[0016] The vehicle-mounted unit receives the vehicle user password entered by the vehicle user PWD’ and the vehicle's unique identifier VID’ When checking the equation PWD’ = PWD and VID’ = VID Is it true? If so, calculate the vehicle's anonymous credentials. RID and private key sk v ;in, PWD and VID A predefined vehicle user password and a vehicle unique identifier, respectively; RID =A w , sk v = w + α P sk , α = H ( RID , T 0); T 0 is the timestamp generated when the onboard unit calculates the anonymous credentials and private key T 0, w is a random number chosen from a discrete Gaussian distribution.

[0017] The on-board unit also generates quantum random numbers QRNG , thereby calculating the vehicle's signature Sign , and { Sign ,t, α , QRNG , skv , w , RID} to store and complete the vehicle registration; among them, , for α The adjoint matrix of QRNG ×| α |,| α |For α The determinant of .

[0018] As a further improvement of the above scheme, for two vehicles Vi and Vj in the same fleet in the same domain, the domain authentication phase includes the following specific processes:

[0019] Vehicle Vi calculation message Msg i , using hash functions to calculate message authentication codes Mac i , send a first message body to vehicle Vj; wherein the first message body is { Msg 1, Mac 1, T 1}; Msg i ={ RID i ,t, Sign i , α}; Mac 1= H ( Msg 1); T 1 is the timestamp generated when vehicle Vi sends the first message body; RID i is the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vi; Sign i is the signature of vehicle Vi; t i and α i are t and α .

[0020] When vehicle Vj receives the first message body, it T 1 to determine whether it has timed out. If it has not timed out, calculate the message verification code Mac 1' to judge the message Msg 1 integrity, if the message Msg 1Complete calculation , and judge equation A ( Sign i )'=t i · α i -1 RIDi + t i · P pki Is it true? If the equation is true, vehicle Vj completes the identity authentication process for vehicle Vi; where,

[0021] Mac 1'= H ( Msg 1) If Mac 1= Mac 1' indicates a message Msg 1 Complete; sk vi is the private key of vehicle Vi; QRNG i The quantum random number generated by the on-board unit of vehicle Vi; P pki is the public key of the on-board unit of vehicle Vi.

[0022] Vehicle Vj calculates the session key with vehicle Vi , and then sends a second message body to vehicle Vi; wherein the second message body is { RID j , Z2, H ( ), T 2}; =Z1+A·Z2; Z1= H ( RID i , RID j , T 2); Z2= P skj + g ; g is a random number selected from a discrete Gaussian distribution; RID j is the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vj, and RID j =A. g ; T 2 is the timestamp generated when vehicle Vj calculates Z1; P skj is the private key of the on-board unit in vehicle Vj.

[0023] After receiving the second message body, vehicle Vi T 2 to determine whether it has timed out. If it has not timed out, calculate Z1= H ( RID i , RID j , T 2), then calculate =Z1+AZ2=Z1+ P pkj + RID j ;

[0024] when H ( )= H ( ), it means that the vehicle Vi has received the session key, and the vehicle authentication phase in the domain is completed; P pkj is the public key of the on-board unit in vehicle Vj.

[0025] As a further improvement of the above solution, the cross-domain authentication stage includes the following specific processes:

[0026] Vehicle Vi calculation r = H (t, T 3) and s = H ( ),Will r and s Sent to the certification agency and uploaded to the blockchain for storage, then the vehicle Vi calculates the message Msg 2 and message verification code Mac 2, and send a third message body to the vehicle Vx;

[0027] in, T 3 is vehicle calculation r The timestamp generated when The signature information of all vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi belongs that need to cross the domain to enter the target domain; represents the product operation; , N is the total number of vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi is located that need to cross domains to enter the target domain; the third message body is { Msg 2, Mac 2, T 3}; Msg 2={ M},

[0028] M = r ⊕ Q , ⊕ represents the XOR operation; Mac 2= H ( Msg 2).

[0029] When the vehicle Vx receives the third message body, it T 3 to determine whether it has timed out. If it has not timed out, calculate the message verification code Mac2' to judge the message Msg 2 integrity, if the message Msg 2 If complete, send a query request to the certification body.

[0030] When the certification agency receives the query request, it finds the saved vehicle Vi in the blockchain. r and s And send it to vehicle Vx.

[0031] Vehicle Vx receives the r and s After that, calculate u = M ⊕ r , then determine the equation H ( u )= s Is it true? If the equation is true, it means that all vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi is located that need to enter the target domain have been successfully verified.

[0032] Vehicle Vx calculates session key And send a fourth message body to vehicle Vi; wherein the fourth message body is

[0033] { H ( ), Z4, T 4}; =Z3+AZ4; ; Z 4= P skx + f ; T 4 Calculate the session key for vehicle Vx The timestamp generated when P skx is the private key of the onboard unit in vehicle Vx; f is a random number selected from a discrete Gaussian distribution; the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vx is RID x ,and RID x =A. f .

[0034] When the vehicle Vi receives the fourth message body, according to the receiving time and T 4 time difference to determine whether it has timed out, if not, calculate , then calculate =Z3+AZ4=Z3+ P pkx + RID x ,

[0035] likeH ( )= H ( ), it means that vehicle Vi has received the updated session key; where, P pkx is the public key of the on-board unit in vehicle Vx.

[0036] As a further improvement of the above scheme, in the calculation of vehicle Vi r and s Previously, the cross-domain authentication phase also included the following specific processes:

[0037] When vehicle Vi needs to enter the target domain, it sends a cross-domain request message to the roadside unit of the target domain.

[0038] When receiving the cross-domain request information, the roadside unit of the target domain randomly selects a team leader vehicle, namely, vehicle Vx, in the domain for interaction with vehicle Vi.

[0039] The present invention also discloses a fleet cross-domain authentication system based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers, comprising a blockchain, a certification authority, a roadside unit and a vehicle; the fleet cross-domain authentication system applies the fleet cross-domain authentication method based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers as described above.

[0040] As a further improvement of the above solution, the number of roadside units and certification agencies corresponds one to one, and the communication method between each roadside unit and the corresponding certification agency is wired communication.

[0041] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0042] 1. The present invention discloses a cross-domain authentication method for a fleet. Based on the VANET framework, multiple rows of vehicles cooperate efficiently to ensure that multiple vehicles can complete rapid identity authentication when entering a new domain, thereby reducing communication overhead. On this basis, the public and private keys generated by the vehicle using the lattice password are used for intra-domain authentication and cross-domain authentication, ensuring that the communication process can resist quantum computer attacks. At the same time, the vehicle signature is generated using quantum random numbers to ensure that the vehicle signature has sufficient randomness and is not easily forged, thereby comprehensively improving the security of vehicle communication during cross-domain authentication.

[0043] 2. The present invention introduces blockchain technology. During the cross-domain authentication stage, the platoon leader uploads part of the information to the CA and stores it in the blockchain. The blockchain's characteristics of immutability and decentralized distribution are used to establish distributed trust, and cross-domain information is shared between multiple domains, ensuring the traceability and security of stored information. During the cross-domain authentication stage, the present invention simplifies the authentication process of the platoon member vehicles by means of aggregate signatures, further reducing the computational overhead in the authentication process. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0044] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the architecture of a fleet cross-domain authentication system based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0045] Figure 2 The present invention is a flowchart of a method for cross-domain authentication of a fleet based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0046] Figure 3 This is a signaling diagram of the registration phase in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0047] Figure 4 This is a signaling diagram of the intra-domain authentication phase in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0048] Figure 5 This is a signaling diagram of the cross-domain authentication phase in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0050] See also Figure 1 , this embodiment provides a fleet cross-domain authentication system based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers, including a blockchain (Block chain), a certification authority (CA, Certificate Authority), a road side unit (RSU, RoadSide Unit) and a vehicle.

[0051] The number of roadside units and certification agencies corresponds one to one, and wired communication can be used between each roadside unit and the corresponding certification agency. Wireless communication is used between roadside units and vehicles, and all vehicles in the domain can also achieve intra-domain communication through wireless means.

[0052] The fleet cross-domain authentication system may apply a fleet cross-domain authentication method based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers. Some symbol definitions involved in this embodiment are shown in Table 1.

[0053] Table 1: Definition of relevant symbols

[0054] ;

[0055] In order to solve the problem of repeated authentication when multiple vehicles enter different domains, resulting in high communication overhead, the present invention introduces communication technology between multiple teams, that is, in a team, the team members' vehicles send their own identity information to the team leader's vehicle. The present invention believes that the team leader of each team is a trustworthy entity. The team leader exchanges the vehicle identity authentication information of his own team with the captain of another team, thereby further reducing the communication overhead and preventing each team member vehicle from having repeated identity authentication when entering the domain for the first time.

[0056] See also Figure 2 The cross-domain authentication method of the fleet includes: an initialization phase, a registration phase, an intra-domain authentication phase and a cross-domain authentication phase, namely S1~S4.

[0057] S1. Initialization phase: The certification authority uses lattice cryptography to generate a public-private key pair.

[0058] In this embodiment, the initialization stage may include the following specific processes, namely S11 to S13.

[0059] S11. The certification body selects an odd prime number q , Safety parameters n as well as m , then 1 m , 1 n , q Input into the TrapGen algorithm, thus outputting the master public key matrix A∈ and the master private key matrix B∈ ;in, q >3,256≤ n ≤1024, m >5n ·log q ; Indicates a n × m The matrix, whose elements belong to the model q Integer ring; matrices A and B satisfy: AB≡0 ( mod q ),and ≤ O ( n ·log q );≡ indicates a congruence relationship; AB≡0( mod q ) represents all pairs of elements in matrices A and B q The result after modulo is equal to 0; represents the norm of matrix B; O ( n ·log q ) represents an asymptotic upper bound; O is the notation used to describe asymptotic behavior.

[0060] S12. The certification body shall use the unique identifier of each on-board unit ID OBU Calculate the public key of the onboard unit P pk ;in, P pk = H ( ID OBU ), H (·) represents a hash function.

[0061] S13. The certification body selects a real number β , using the SampleD algorithm, A, B, P pk and β As input, the private key of the on-board unit is output P sk , while satisfying A P sk = P pk ( mod q ).

[0062] Among them, the SampleD algorithm is a sampling algorithm used in lattice-based cryptography (especially in the LWE problem), which is mainly used to generate lattice points that meet specific conditions.

[0063] The present invention uses lattice cryptography to generate public and private keys. Compared with traditional public key encryption algorithms, the advantage of lattice cryptography in resisting quantum attacks lies in the complexity of its mathematical structure and the difficulty of resisting quantum computer cracking. Currently, there is no known efficient quantum algorithm that can solve the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and the Closest Vector Problem (CVP). Vehicles use the public and private keys generated by lattice cryptography for intra-domain and cross-domain authentication, ensuring that the communication process can resist quantum computer attacks.

[0064] S2, Registration phase: The on-board unit generates the anonymous credentials and private key of the vehicle it is in based on the public-private key pair, and at the same time generates a quantum random number to calculate the signature of the vehicle it is in. Random numbers can be generated using discrete Gaussian distribution and quantum random number chips to ensure that the random numbers are sufficiently random and cannot be easily forged.

[0065] See also Figure 3 In this embodiment, the registration stage may include the following specific processes, namely S21~S22.

[0066] S21, the vehicle-mounted unit receives the vehicle user password input by the vehicle user PWD’and the vehicle's unique identifier VID’ When checking the equation PWD’ = PWD and VID’ = VID Is it true? If so, calculate the vehicle's anonymous credentials. RID and private key sk v ;in, PWD and VID A predefined vehicle user password and a vehicle unique identifier, respectively;

[0067] RID =A w , sk v = w + αP sk , α = H ( RID , T 0); T 0 is the timestamp generated when the onboard unit calculates the anonymous credentials and private key T 0, w is a random number chosen from a discrete Gaussian distribution.

[0068] S22, the on-board unit also generates quantum random numbers QRNG , thereby calculating the vehicle's signature Sign , and { Sign ,t, α , QRNG , sk v , w , RID}Store and complete vehicle registration;

[0069] in, , For the matrix α The adjoint matrix of QRNG ×| α |,| α | is a matrix α The determinant of .

[0070] S3, intra-domain authentication phase: Any two vehicles in each intra-domain fleet negotiate session keys based on anonymous credentials and private keys to perform mutual authentication.

[0071] See also Figure 4 In this embodiment, taking two vehicles Vi and Vj in the same fleet in the same domain as an example, the intra-domain authentication stage includes the following specific processes, namely S31~S34.

[0072] S31, vehicle Vi calculation message Msg i , using hash functions to calculate message authentication codes Mac i , send a first message body to vehicle Vj; wherein the first message body is { Msg 1, Mac 1, T 1}; Msg i ={ RID i ,t, Sign i , α};

[0073] Mac 1= H ( Msg 1); T 1 is the timestamp generated when vehicle Vi sends the first message body; RID i is the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vi; Sign i is the signature of vehicle Vi; t i and α i are t and α .

[0074] S32: When the vehicle Vj receives the first message body, according to the receiving time T 1' and T 1 time difference to determine whether it has timed out, that is, whether it meets T 1'- T 1≤Δ T If it is satisfied, it means that it has not timed out, and the message verification code is calculated Mac 1' to judge the message Msg 1 integrity, if the message Msg 1Complete calculation , and determine the equation

[0075] A( Sign i )'=t i · α i -1 RID i +t i · P pki Is it true? If the equation is true, vehicle Vj completes the identity authentication process for vehicle Vi; where, Mac 1'= H ( Msg 1) IfMac 1= Mac 1' indicates a message Msg 1 Complete; sk vi is the private key of vehicle Vi; Δ T is the preset time difference threshold; QRNG i The quantum random number generated by the on-board unit of vehicle Vi; P pki is the public key of the on-board unit of vehicle Vi.

[0076] S33, vehicle Vj calculates the session key between itself and vehicle Vi , then sends a second message body to vehicle Vi;

[0077] The second message body is { RID j , Z2, H ( ), T 2}; =Z1+A·Z2; Z1= H ( RID i , RID j , T 2); Z2= P skj + g ; g is a random number selected from a discrete Gaussian distribution; RID j is the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vj, and RID j =A. g ; T 2 is the timestamp generated when vehicle Vj calculates Z1; P skj is the private key of the on-board unit in vehicle Vj.

[0078] S34, after receiving the second message body, the vehicle Vi T The time difference of 2 determines whether it has timed out, that is, whether it meets T 2'- T 2≤Δ T If it is satisfied, it means that it has not timed out, and calculate Z1= H ( RID i , RID j , T 2), then calculate =Z1+AZ2, according to the above formula A Psk = P pk ( mod q ), formula Z2= P skj + g ,formula RID j =A. g ; Combined, we can deduce =Z1+AZ2=Z1+ P pkj + RID j .when H ( )= H ( ), it means that the vehicle Vi has received the session key, and the vehicle authentication phase in the domain is completed; P pkj is the public key of the on-board unit in vehicle Vj.

[0079] S4, cross-domain authentication stage: When the captain vehicle Vi of a convoy in the initial domain needs to enter the target domain, vehicle Vi and the captain vehicle Vx of any convoy in the target domain perform information verification based on signature to determine whether all vehicles in the convoy where vehicle Vi is located that need to enter the target domain have been successfully verified. If so, vehicle Vx updates the session key of vehicle Vi, thereby completing the cross-domain authentication of the convoy.

[0080] See also Figure 5 In this embodiment, the cross-domain authentication stage may include the following specific processes, namely S41~S48.

[0081] S41. When the vehicle Vi needs to enter the target domain, it sends a cross-domain request message to the roadside unit of the target domain.

[0082] S42. When receiving the cross-domain request information, the roadside unit of the target domain randomly selects a team leader vehicle, namely, vehicle Vx, in the domain for interacting with vehicle Vi.

[0083] S43, vehicle Vi calculation r = H (t, T 3) and s = H ( ),Will r and s Sent to the certification agency and uploaded to the blockchain for storage, then the vehicle Vi calculates the message Msg 2 and message verification code Mac 2, and send a third message body to vehicle Vx; wherein, T 3 is vehicle calculationr The timestamp generated when The signature information of all vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi belongs that need to cross the domain to enter the target domain; represents the product operation; , N is the total number of vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi is located that need to cross domains to enter the target domain; the third message body is { Msg 2, Mac 2, T 3}; Msg 2={ M}, M = r ⊕ , ⊕ represents the XOR operation; Mac 2= H ( Msg 2).

[0084] S44, when the vehicle Vx receives the third message body, T The time difference of 3 determines whether it has timed out, that is, whether it meets T 3'- T 3≤Δ T If it is satisfied, it means that it has not timed out, and the message verification code is calculated Mac 2' to judge the message Msg 2 integrity, if the message Msg 2 If complete, send a query request to the certification body.

[0085] S45. When the certification body receives the query request, it searches the blockchain for the saved vehicle Vi. r and s And send it to vehicle Vx.

[0086] S46: Vehicle Vx receives the signal from vehicle Vi. r and s After that, calculate u = M ⊕ r , then determine the equation H ( u )= s Is it true? If the equation is true, it means that all vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi is located that need to enter the target domain have been successfully verified.

[0087] S47, vehicle Vx calculates session key And send a fourth message body to vehicle Vi; wherein the fourth message body is { H ( ), Z4, T 4}; =Z3+AZ4; ;Z 4= P skx + f ; T 4 Calculate the session key for vehicle Vx The timestamp generated when P skx is the private key of the onboard unit in vehicle Vx; f is a random number selected from a discrete Gaussian distribution; the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vx is RID x ,and RID x =A. f .

[0088] S48, when the vehicle Vi receives the fourth message body, according to the receiving time and T The time difference of 4 determines whether it has timed out, that is, whether it meets T 4'- T 4≤Δ T If it is satisfied, it means that it has not timed out, and the calculation , then calculate =Z3+AZ4=Z3+ P pkx + RID x ,like H ( )= H ( ), it means that vehicle Vi has received the updated session key; where, P pkx is the public key of the on-board unit in vehicle Vx.

[0089] In the subsequent process after vehicle Vi receives the updated session key, Vi will distribute the session key to its team members' vehicles. The purpose of the session key is to facilitate the information exchange between the team members and the team leader in another domain.

[0090] In the cross-domain authentication stage, the present invention allows the team leader's vehicle to upload part of its information to the CA and store it in the blockchain, using the blockchain's tamper-proof and decentralized distribution characteristics to establish distributed trust, share cross-domain information between multiple domains, and ensure the traceability and security of stored information. In the cross-domain authentication stage, the present invention simplifies the authentication process of team members' vehicles by means of aggregate signatures, further reducing the computational overhead in the authentication process.

[0091] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can make equivalent replacements or changes according to the technical scheme and inventive concept of the present invention within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, which should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A cross-domain authentication method for a fleet based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers, characterized in that: include: Initialization phase: The certification authority uses lattice cryptography to generate a public and private key pair; The initialization phase includes the following specific processes: The certification body chooses an odd prime number q , Safety parameters n as well as m , then 1 m , 1 n , q Input into the TrapGen algorithm, thus outputting the master public key matrix A∈ and the master private key matrix B∈ ;in, q >3,256≤ n ≤1024, m>5n ·log q ; Indicates a n × m The matrix, whose elements belong to the model q Integer ring; matrices A and B satisfy: AB≡0( mod q ),and ≤ O ( n ·log q );≡ indicates a congruence relationship;AB≡0( mod q ) represents all pairs of elements in matrices A and B q The result after modulo is equal to 0; represents the norm of matrix B; O ( n ·log q ) represents an asymptotic upper bound; O is the notation used to describe asymptotic behavior; The certification body uses the unique identifier of each on-board unit ID OBU Calculate the public key of the onboard unit P pk ;in, P pk = H ( ID OBU ), H (·) represents a hash function; The certification body chooses a real number β , using the SampleD algorithm, A, B, P pk and β As input, the private key of the on-board unit is output P sk , while satisfying A P sk = P pk ( mod q ); Registration phase: The on-board unit generates an anonymous certificate and private key for its own vehicle based on the public-private key pair. At the same time, the on-board unit generates a quantum random number to calculate the signature of its own vehicle. The registration phase includes the following specific processes: The vehicle-mounted unit receives the vehicle user password entered by the vehicle user PWD' and the vehicle's unique identifier VID' When checking the equation PWD' = PWD and VID' = VID Is it true? If so, calculate the vehicle's anonymous credentials. RID and private key sk v ;in, PWD and VID A predefined vehicle user password and a vehicle unique identifier, respectively; RID =A w , sk v = w + αP sk , α = H ( RID , T 0); T 0 is the timestamp generated when the onboard unit calculates the anonymous credential and private key T 0, w is a random number selected from a discrete Gaussian distribution; The on-board unit also generates quantum random numbers QRNG , thereby calculating the vehicle's signature Sign , and { Sign ,t, α , QRNG , sk v , w , RID } to store and complete the vehicle registration; among them, , for α The adjoint matrix of QRNG ×| α |,| α |For α The determinant of ; Intra-domain authentication phase: Any two vehicles in each intra-domain fleet negotiate session keys based on anonymous credentials and private keys to perform mutual authentication; Cross-domain authentication phase: When the captain vehicle Vi of a convoy in the initial domain needs to enter the target domain, vehicle Vi and the captain vehicle Vx of any convoy in the target domain perform information verification based on signatures to determine whether all vehicles in the convoy where vehicle Vi is located that need to enter the target domain have been successfully verified. If so, vehicle Vx updates the session key of vehicle Vi, thereby completing the cross-domain authentication of the convoy.

2. The cross-domain authentication method for a fleet based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers according to claim 1 is characterized in that: For two vehicles Vi and Vj in the same fleet in the same domain, the domain authentication phase includes the following specific processes: Vehicle Vi calculation message Msg i , using hash functions to calculate message authentication codes Mac i , send a first message body to vehicle Vj; wherein the first message body is { Msg 1, Mac 1, T 1}; Msg i ={ RID i ,t i , Sign i , α i }; Mac 1= H ( Msg 1); T 1 is the timestamp generated when vehicle Vi sends the first message body; RID i is the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vi; Sign i is the signature of vehicle Vi; t i and α i are t and α ; When vehicle Vj receives the first message body, it T 1 to determine whether it has timed out. If it has not timed out, calculate the message verification code Mac 1' to judge the message Msg 1 integrity, if the message Msg 1Complete calculation , and judge equation A( Sign i )'=t i · α i -1 RID i +t i · P pki Is it true? If the equation is true, vehicle Vj completes the identity authentication process for vehicle Vi; where, Mac 1'= H ( Msg 1) If Mac 1= Mac 1' indicates a message Msg 1 Complete; sk vi is the private key of vehicle Vi; QRNG i The quantum random number generated by the on-board unit of vehicle Vi; P pki is the public key of the onboard unit of vehicle Vi; Vehicle Vj calculates the session key ∂ between itself and vehicle Vi, and then sends a second message body to vehicle Vi; the second message body is { RID j ,Z2, H (∂), T 2}; ∂ = Z1 + A·Z2; Z1 = H ( RID i , RID j , T 2); Z2 = P skj + g ; g is a random number selected from a discrete Gaussian distribution; RID j is the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vj, and RID j =A. g ; T 2 is the timestamp generated when vehicle Vj calculates Z1; P skj is the private key of the onboard unit in vehicle Vj; After receiving the second message body, vehicle Vi T 2 to determine whether it has timed out. If it has not timed out, calculate Z1= H ( RID i , RID j , T 2), then calculate ∂'=Z1+AZ2=Z1+ P pkj + RID j ;when H (∂')= H (∂), it means that the vehicle Vi has received the session key, and the vehicle authentication phase in the domain is completed; P pkj is the public key of the on-board unit in vehicle Vj.

3. The cross-domain authentication method for a fleet based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The cross-domain authentication phase includes the following specific processes: Vehicle Vi calculation r = H (t, T 3) and s = H ( ),Will r and s Sent to the certification agency and uploaded to the blockchain for storage, then the vehicle Vi calculates the message Msg 2 and message verification code Mac 2, and send a third message body to vehicle Vx; wherein, T 3 is vehicle calculation r The timestamp generated when The signature information of all vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi belongs that need to cross the domain to enter the target domain; represents the product operation; , N is the total number of vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi is located that need to cross domains and enter the target domain; the third message body is { Msg 2, Mac 2, T 3}; Msg 2={ M }, M = r ⊕ , ⊕ represents the XOR operation; Mac 2= H ( Msg 2); When the vehicle Vx receives the third message body, it T 3 to determine whether it has timed out. If it has not timed out, calculate the message verification code Mac 2' to judge the message Msg 2 integrity, if the message Msg 2. If complete, send a query request to the certification body; When the certification agency receives the query request, it finds the saved vehicle Vi in the blockchain. r and s And send it to vehicle Vx; Vehicle Vx receives the r and s After that, calculate u = M ⊕ r , then determine the equation H ( u )= s Is it true? If the equation is true, it means that all vehicles in the fleet where vehicle Vi is located that need to enter the target domain have been successfully verified; Vehicle Vx calculates the session key ℇ and sends a fourth message body to vehicle Vi; wherein the fourth message body is { H (ℇ),Z4, T 4}; ℇ = Z3 + AZ4; ; Z 4= P skx + f ; T 4 is the timestamp generated when the vehicle Vx calculates the session key ℇ; P skx is the private key of the onboard unit in vehicle Vx; f is a random number selected from a discrete Gaussian distribution; the unique vehicle identifier of vehicle Vx is RID x ,and RID x =A. f ; When the vehicle Vi receives the fourth message body, according to the receiving time and T 4 time difference to determine whether it has timed out, if not, calculate , then calculate ℇ'=Z3+AZ4=Z3+ P pkx + RID x ,like H (ℇ')= H (ℇ), it means that vehicle Vi has received the updated session key; where, P pkx is the public key of the on-board unit in vehicle Vx.

4. The cross-domain authentication method for a fleet based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers according to claim 3 is characterized in that: Calculation of vehicle Vi r and s Previously, the cross-domain authentication phase also included the following specific processes: When vehicle Vi needs to enter the target domain, it sends a cross-domain request message to the roadside unit of the target domain; When receiving the cross-domain request information, the roadside unit of the target domain randomly selects a team leader vehicle, namely, vehicle Vx, in the domain for interaction with vehicle Vi.

5. A fleet cross-domain authentication system based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers, characterized in that: It includes a blockchain, a certification body, a roadside unit and a vehicle; the fleet cross-domain authentication system applies a fleet cross-domain authentication method based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers as described in any one of claims 1 to 4.

6. The fleet cross-domain authentication system based on lattice cryptography and quantum random numbers according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The number of roadside units and certification agencies corresponds one to one, and the communication method between each roadside unit and the corresponding certification agency is wired communication.

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