Underwater sound safety communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation

By adopting orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation and artificial noise interference technology in underwater wireless sensor networks, the security problems of underwater networks under malicious eavesdropping are solved, and the confidential capacity and security performance evaluation of the channel are achieved, which improves the Network security.

CN119011033APending Publication Date: 2024-11-22SUZHOU VOCATIONAL UNIVERSITY (SUZHOU OPEN UNIVERSITY)
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411292654.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-09-14
Publication Date
2024-11-22

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The security of underwater wireless sensor networks under malicious eavesdropping attacks has been affected. Traditional encryption technology is complex in computing and has high communication overhead. Physical layer security technology has failed to effectively utilize the characteristics of water sound media to provide security guarantees.

Method used

The water acoustic safe communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation is adopted. The frequency-controlled array directional modulation technology transmits the signal to the receiving end at the transmitting end, and a directional modulation matrix is ​​designed between legal users. The artificial noise is in the zero-space direction. Interfere with the eavesdropping end and suppress eavesdropping.

Benefits of technology

The security of the underwater wireless sensor network is improved, and the confidential capacity and security performance evaluation of the channel are achieved through directional modulation and artificial noise interference, reducing the possibility of eavesdropping.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses an underwater acoustic safety communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation, a transmitting end transmits a signal to a receiving end by adopting a frequency control array directional modulation technology, and due to the fact that a frequency control array has correlation in two dimensions of distance and direction, even if an eavesdropping node is closer to a legal node, the eavesdropping node does not have correlation in two dimensions of distance and direction. Distances of the two signals are different relative to antenna array elements, and directional transmission of legal signals is guaranteed. Meanwhile, in order to prevent information from being eavesdropped by an eavesdropper due to characteristics of underwater sound propagation scattering, reflection and the like, an artificial noise technology is adopted to interfere the information leaked to an illegal receiving end direction so as to inhibit eavesdropping, and a secrecy capacity and secrecy interruption probability expression of the method is given to evaluate the safety performance of the system. The method is suitable for an underwater acoustic environment, and has good performance in frequency selective underwater acoustic communication under long time delay and multipath effects.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of communication security technology, and in particular relates to an underwater acoustic security communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, with the development of marine natural resources, exploration of oil and gas, and environmental monitoring, underwater wireless sensor networks (UWSNs) have received extensive research attention. UWSNs communicate through acoustic signals. Due to the limitations of their own characteristics and communication environment, underwater acoustic networks are often subject to malicious eavesdropping attacks, which affects network performance.

[0003] To ensure the security of underwater acoustic communication, traditional encryption technology has the problems of increased communication overhead and high computational complexity. In comparison, physical layer security (PLS) uses the incompleteness of wireless media (such as fading, interference and noise) to protect the security of confidential information, which is more suitable for UWSNs networks constrained by cost and energy. Directional modulation is an underwater acoustic physical layer security technology based on frequency-controlled array antenna arrays. Its principle is to achieve the automatic scanning function of the beam by using a small frequency difference between array elements. The frequency-controlled array can form a transmission beam with distance dependence and time variation. Even when the eavesdropping node is close to the legitimate node, there will be a difference in the distance between the two relative to the antenna array elements, thereby achieving secure communication. Therefore, the present invention proposes an underwater acoustic security communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation. The transmitting end uses frequency-controlled array directional modulation technology to transmit the signal to the receiving end to ensure the directional transmission of legitimate signals. At the same time, in order to prevent information from being eavesdropped by eavesdroppers due to the scattering and reflection characteristics of underwater acoustic propagation, artificial noise technology is used to interfere with the information leaked to the illegal receiving end, thereby suppressing eavesdropping. The confidentiality capacity and confidentiality interruption probability expressions of the proposed method are given to evaluate the security performance of the system. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to improve the security of underwater wireless sensor networks, this paper designs an underwater acoustic security communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation, and gives the expressions of confidentiality capacity and confidentiality interruption probability of the proposed method to evaluate the security performance of the system.

[0005] The technical solution of the present invention is as follows:

[0006] An underwater acoustic safety communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation, the steps of which are as follows:

[0007] Step 1: Set up the system model. The legal transmitting node Alice transmits with power A data packet is sent to the legitimate receiving node Bob at time slot t. During the communication, the eavesdropper Eve tries to intercept the information.

[0008] Step 2: Based on the directional modulation technology of the frequency-controlled array, the transmitter and receiver models are set up using a frequency-controlled array structure with a linear frequency deviation, and the phase shift and frequency offset of each array element are controlled, so that the transmitted signal is synthesized into a specific signal point in the expected direction and distance and transmitted to the receiver;

[0009] Step 3: Add artificial noise to the transmitted signal, design a directional modulation matrix between legitimate users, and set the artificial noise in the null space direction of the directional modulation matrix of the legitimate users, so that the artificial noise interferes with the eavesdropping end to ensure the security of communication.

[0010] Preferably, the specific steps of step 1 are as follows:

[0011] 1.1 The system adopts a three-point communication model; in time slot t, the legal transmitting node Alice transmits with a transmission power of Send a data packet to the legitimate receiving node Bob. During the communication, the eavesdropper Eve tries to intercept the information;

[0012] 1.2 The channel between legitimate users Alice and Bob is h AB , the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropping node is h AE ;

[0013] 1.3 Let the distance and direction between legal users be D AB ,θ AB , the distance and direction between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropper are D AE ,θ AE .

[0014] Preferably, the specific steps of step 2 are as follows:

[0015] 2.1 Design the communication transmitter. The steps are as follows:

[0016] 2.1.1 Assume that the symbol m is sent k When the N-dimensional complex weight vector is w k , the frequency offset is

[0017] Δf k ,k=0,1,2,3;

[0018] 2.1.2 Let vector w k The nth element in is w kn ,n=0,1,2,....,N-1;

[0019] 2.1.3 Transmit a symbol m in time slot t k, k=0,1,2,3, then when sending symbol m k The carrier frequency f of the nth array element is kn for

[0020] f kn =f0+nΔf kn ,n=0,1,...,N-1; (1)

[0021] Where f0 is the reference frequency;

[0022] 2.1.4 Assume that the angle between the transmitter and the array normal is The distance from the reference array element is r, and the amplitude attenuation and noise caused by air propagation are ignored;

[0023] 2.1.5 Based on the far-field assumption of the target position, the complex weight vector w k and frequency offset nΔf k As an independent variable, the frequency domain expression of the signal that the target can receive is b(t,θ,B,w k ,Δf k )for

[0024]

[0025] in, T represents transpose, B is the distance from the reference array element to the target position, c is the speed of sound, ⊙ represents the Hadamard product, and satisfies

[0026] w k =[w k0 ,w k1 ,…,w k(N-1) ] T ,

[0027]

[0028]

[0029]

[0030] Among them, τ is the time delay from the transmitter to the receiver, s(t) is the transmitted confidential signal, and b t (t), b R (B), b θ (θ) is the array steering vector matrix of the multi-carrier frequency-controlled array, and f0 represents the reference frequency;

[0031] 2.2 Design the communication receiving end, the steps are as follows:

[0032] 2.2.1 For the received signal b(t,θ,B,w k ,Δf k) to down-convert and remove the carrier

[0033] 2.2.2 The obtained baseband signal is processed through N channels respectively to obtain the output result y of the i∈{0,1,...,N-1}th channel i for

[0034]

[0035]

[0036] Where Δf is the frequency offset and T is the period;

[0037] 2.2.3 The signal point received at (θ,B) is

[0038]

[0039] 2.2.4 The baseband signal s(t) does not carry information. Assume that s(t) = 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.

[0040] 2.2.5 Combining (2)(3)(4), the signal received at (θ, B) is

[0041]

[0042] 2.2.6 Final estimated transmitted signal for

[0043]

[0044] Among them, s k is a predetermined symbol m k The corresponding signal point.

[0045] Preferably, the specific steps of step 3 are as follows:

[0046] 3.1 Assume that in the OFDM system, T D is the signal delay, T cp is the cyclic prefix length, and the entire OFDM block length is T d =T D +T cp , f c is the center frequency; in OFDM time slot t, the nth transmission data is

[0047]

[0048] Where J is the number of carriers, m k (n) is legal data, t is time slot, g(t) is rectangular pulse function;

[0049]

[0050] 3.2 Underwater acoustic channel model

[0051]

[0052] Among them, α p (t) and τ p (t) is the amplitude and delay factor of the pth path, respectively

[0053] τ p (t)≈τ p -d p t (10)

[0054] α p (t)≈α p (11)

[0055] 3.3 Since the underwater acoustic communication channel has a uniform Doppler factor, equation (9) can be rewritten as

[0056]

[0057] Where a is the consistent Doppler factor;

[0058] 3.4 For the array transmission steering vector at azimuth θ and distance D,

[0059]

[0060] in, d is the distance between array elements, c is the speed of sound, T is transposed;

[0061] 3.5 The positions of the transmitting node Alice, the receiving node Bob and the eavesdropping node Eve are (θ A ,D A ),(θ B ,D B ),(θ E ,D E ),r(θ AB ,D AB ) is the directional transmission steering vector between Alice and Bob, r(θ AE ,D AE ) is the eavesdropping steering vector of the eavesdropping end;

[0062] 3.6 Assuming that the underwater acoustic channel is a multipath consistent Doppler Rayleigh fading channel, the array transmit steering vector is

[0063]

[0064] 3.7 The transmitted signal after adding AN is expressed as

[0065] s=Nw+z (15) Among them, z is subject to mean 0 and covariance is Additive white Gaussian noise vector of ;

[0066] 3.8 Design w=r(θ AB ,D AB ) is the directional modulation matrix between legitimate users, and the artificial noise is in the null space direction of w, that is,

[0067] r H (θ AB ,D AB )′z=0 (16)

[0068] r H (θ AE ,D AE )′z≠0 (17)

[0069] 3.9 The signal received by Bob is

[0070] y B =h AB r H (θ AB ,D AB )′s+n AB (t) = h AB r H (θ AB ,D AB )′Mw+h AB r H (θ AB ,D AB )′z+n AB (t) = h AB M+n AB (t) (18)

[0071] Assume that n AB (t) The power spectral density of the noise follows a Gaussian distribution, that is, And obey zero mean and variance The symbol energy of the subcarrier is P s ;

[0072] 3.10 Bob's output SNR is expressed as

[0073]

[0074] in,

[0075] 3.11 The channel capacity between Alice and Bob is

[0076]

[0077] 3.12 The communication between Alice and Bob is controlled by directional modulation. The direction of the eavesdropping user Eve is illegal; the information will be interfered, and the signal received by the eavesdropping end is

[0078]

[0079]

[0080] 3.13 The eavesdropper is affected by the transmitter AN, n AE (t) is additive AWGN and has zero mean and variance Right now

[0081] 3.14 The output SNR of the eavesdropping end Eve is

[0082]

[0083] 3.15 The channel capacity of the eavesdropping end is

[0084]

[0085] 3.16 When the system meets the requirements of confidential communication, C0 satisfies

[0086]

[0087] At this time, the instantaneous confidentiality rate of the system is

[0088]

[0089] 3.17 When the main and stealth channels all obey independent and identically distributed Rayleigh fading, the channel gain obeys the same distribution with zero mean of Ω AB and Ω AE The exponential distribution of the channel between legitimate users is

[0090]

[0091] 3.18 The probability of a non-zero safety capacity of the system is

[0092]

[0093] in, is the average signal-to-noise ratio of the channel between legitimate users, is the average signal-to-noise ratio between the legitimate user and the eavesdropping end;

[0094] 3.18 Average signal-to-noise ratio of the channel between legitimate users When When , the channels of the legitimate user and the eavesdropping user are very different, and the probability of confidential communication approximately approaches 1, otherwise the probability of confidential communication approaches 0;

[0095] 3.19 The probability of confidentiality interruption is when the instantaneous safety capacity of the system is lower than the target safety capacity threshold L (L>0); the probability of confidentiality interruption of the system is

[0096] BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0097] Figure 1 is the system model;

[0098] Figure 2 This is the principle diagram of OFDM multi-element directional modulation; DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0099] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions in this application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application are clearly and completely described below. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of this application, not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of this application.

[0100] A method for underwater acoustic security communication based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation, the specific steps are as follows:

[0101] Step 1: Set up the system model, such as Figure 1 As shown, the legitimate transmitting node Alice transmits with power A data packet is sent to the legitimate receiving node Bob at time slot t. During the communication, the eavesdropper Eve tries to intercept the information.

[0102] Step 2: Based on the directional modulation technology of the frequency-controlled array, the transmitter and receiver models are set up using a frequency-controlled array structure with a linear frequency deviation, and the phase shift and frequency offset of each array element are controlled, so that the transmitted signal is synthesized into a specific signal point in the expected direction and distance and transmitted to the receiver;

[0103] Step 3: Add artificial noise to the transmitted signal, design a directional modulation matrix between legitimate users, and set the artificial noise in the null space direction of the directional modulation matrix of the legitimate users, so that the artificial noise interferes with the eavesdropping end to ensure the security of communication.

[0104] Preferably, the specific steps of step 1 are as follows:

[0105] 1.1 The system adopts a three-point communication model; in time slot t, the legal transmitting node Alice transmits with a transmission power of Send a data packet to the legitimate receiving node Bob. During the communication, the eavesdropper Eve tries to intercept the information;

[0106] 1.2 The channel between legitimate users Alice and Bob is h AB , the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropping node is h AE ;

[0107] 1.3 Let the distance and direction between legal users be D AB ,θ AB , the distance and direction between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropper are D AE ,θ AE .

[0108] Preferably, the specific steps of step 2 are as follows:

[0109] 2.1 Design the communication transmitter. The steps are as follows:

[0110] 2.1.1 Assume that the symbol m is sent k When the N-dimensional complex weight vector is w k , the frequency offset is Δf k ,k=0,1,2,3;

[0111] 2.1.2 Let vector w k The nth element in is w kn ,n=0,1,2,....,N-1;

[0112] 2.1.3 Transmit a symbol m in time slot t k , k=0,1,2,3, then when sending symbol m k The carrier frequency f of the nth array element is kn for

[0113] f kn =f0+nΔf kn ,n=0,1,...,N-1; (1)

[0114] Where f0 is the reference frequency;

[0115] 2.1.4 Assume that the angle between the transmitter and the array normal is The distance from the reference array element is r, and the amplitude attenuation and noise caused by air propagation are ignored;

[0116] 2.1.5 Based on the far-field assumption of the target position, the complex weight vector w k and frequency offset nΔf k As an independent variable, the frequency domain expression of the signal that the target can receive is b(t,θ,B,wl,Δf k )for

[0117]

[0118] in, T represents transpose, B is the distance from the reference array element to the target position, c is the speed of sound, ⊙ represents the Hadamard product, and satisfies

[0119] w k =[w k0 ,w k1 ,…,w k(N-1) ] T ,

[0120]

[0121]

[0122]

[0123] Among them, τ is the time delay from the transmitter to the receiver, s(t) is the transmitted confidential signal, and b t (t), b R (B), b θ (θ) is the array steering vector matrix of the multi-carrier frequency-controlled array, and f0 represents the reference frequency;

[0124] 2.2 Design the communication receiving end, the steps are as follows:

[0125] 2.2.1 For the received signal b(t,θ,B,w k ,Δf k ) to down-convert and remove the carrier

[0126] 2.2.2 The obtained baseband signal is processed through N channels respectively to obtain the output result y of the i∈{0,1,...,N-1}th channel i for

[0127]

[0128] Where Δf is the frequency offset and T is the period;

[0129] 2.2.3 The signal point received at (θ,B) is

[0130]

[0131] 2.2.4 The baseband signal s(t) does not carry information. Assume that s(t) = 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.

[0132] 2.2.5 Combining (2)(3)(4), the signal received at (θ, B) is

[0133]

[0134] 2.2.6 Final estimated transmitted signal for

[0135]

[0136] Among them, s k is a predetermined symbol m k The corresponding signal point.

[0137] Preferably, if Figure 2 As shown, the specific steps of step 3 are as follows:

[0138] 3.1 Assume that in the OFDM system, T D is the signal delay, T cp is the cyclic prefix length, and the entire OFDM block length is T d =T D +T cp , f c is the center frequency; in OFDM time slot t, the nth transmission data is

[0139]

[0140] Where J is the number of carriers, m k (n) is legal data, t is time slot, g(t) is rectangular pulse function;

[0141]

[0142] 3.2 Underwater acoustic channel model

[0143]

[0144] Among them, α p (t) and τ p (t) is the amplitude and delay factor of the pth path, respectively

[0145] τ p (t)≈τ p -d p t (10)

[0146] α p (t)≈α p (11)

[0147] 3.3 Since the underwater acoustic communication channel has a uniform Doppler factor, equation (9) can be rewritten as

[0148]

[0149] Where a is the consistent Doppler factor;

[0150] 3.4 For the array transmission steering vector at azimuth θ and distance D,

[0151]

[0152] in, d is the distance between array elements, c is the speed of sound, T is transposed;

[0153] 3.5 The positions of the transmitting node Alice, the receiving node Bob and the eavesdropping node Eve are (θ A ,D A ),(θ B ,D B ),(θ E ,D E ),r(θ AB ,D AB ) is the directional transmission steering vector between Alice and Bob, r(θ AB ,D AE ) is the eavesdropping steering vector of the eavesdropping end;

[0154] 3.6 Assuming that the underwater acoustic channel is a multipath consistent Doppler Rayleigh fading channel, the array transmit steering vector is

[0155]

[0156] 3.7 The transmitted signal after adding AN is expressed as

[0157] s=Mw+z (15) Among them, z is subject to mean 0 and covariance is Additive white Gaussian noise vector of ;

[0158] 3.8 Design w=r(θ AB ,D AB ) is the directional modulation matrix between legitimate users, and the artificial noise is in the null space direction of w, that is,

[0159] r H (θ AB ,D AB )′z=0 (16)

[0160] r H (θ AE ,D AE )′z≠0 (17)

[0161] 3.9 The signal received by Bob is

[0162] y B =h AB rH (θ AB ,D AB )′s+n AB (t) = h AB r H (θ AB ,D AB )′Mw+h AB r H (θ AB ,D AB )′z+n AB (t) = h AB M+n AB (t) (18)

[0163] Assume that n AB (t) The power spectral density of the noise follows a Gaussian distribution, that is, And obey zero mean and variance The symbol energy of the subcarrier is P s ;

[0164] 3.10Bob output SNR is expressed as

[0165]

[0166] in,

[0167] 3.11The channel capacity between Alice and Bob is

[0168]

[0169] 3.12 The communication between Alice and Bob is controlled by directional modulation. The direction of the eavesdropping user Eve is illegal; the information will be interfered, and the signal received by the eavesdropping end is

[0170]

[0171] 3.13 The eavesdropper is affected by the transmitter AN, n AE (t) is additive AWGN and has zero mean and variance Right now

[0172] 3.14 The output SNR of the eavesdropping end Eve is

[0173]

[0174] 3.15 The channel capacity of the eavesdropping end is

[0175]

[0176] 3.16 When the system meets the requirements of confidential communication, C0 satisfies

[0177]

[0178] At this time, the instantaneous confidentiality rate of the system is

[0179]

[0180] 3.17 When the main and stealth channels all obey independent and identically distributed Rayleigh fading, the channel gain obeys the same distribution with zero mean of Ω AB and Ω AE The exponential distribution of the channel between legitimate users is

[0181]

[0182] 3.18 The probability of a non-zero safety capacity of the system is

[0183]

[0184] in, is the average signal-to-noise ratio of the channel between legitimate users, is the average signal-to-noise ratio between the legitimate user and the eavesdropping end;

[0185] 3.18 Average signal-to-noise ratio of the channel between legitimate users When , P(C0>0)>0; When , the channels of the legitimate user and the eavesdropping user are very different, and the probability of confidential communication approximately approaches 1, otherwise the probability of confidential communication approaches 0;

[0186] 3.19 The probability of confidentiality interruption is when the instantaneous safety capacity of the system is lower than the target safety capacity threshold L (L>0); the probability of confidentiality interruption of the system is

[0187]

[0188] The methods mentioned in the present invention are all conventional technical means mastered by those skilled in the art, and therefore are not described in detail.

[0189] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables one skilled in the art to implement or use the present invention. Modifications to these embodiments will be apparent to one skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention will not be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but rather to the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A method for underwater acoustic safety communication based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation, characterized in that: The steps include: Step 1: Set up the system model. The legal transmitting node Alice transmits with power A data packet is sent to the legitimate receiving node Bob at time slot t. During the communication, the eavesdropper Eve tries to intercept the information. Step 2: Based on the directional modulation technology of the frequency-controlled array, the transmitter and receiver models are set up using a frequency-controlled array structure with a linear frequency deviation, and the phase shift and frequency offset of each array element are controlled, so that the transmitted signal is synthesized into a specific signal point in the expected direction and distance and transmitted to the receiver; Step 3: Add artificial noise to the transmitted signal, design a directional modulation matrix between legitimate users, and set the artificial noise in the null space direction of the directional modulation matrix of the legitimate users, so that the artificial noise interferes with the eavesdropping end to ensure the security of communication.

2. According to claim 1, a method for underwater acoustic safety communication based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation is characterized in that: The specific steps of step 1 are as follows: 1.1 The system adopts a three-point communication model; in time slot t, the legal transmitting node Alice transmits with a transmission power of Send a data packet to the legitimate receiving node Bob. During the communication, the eavesdropper Eve tries to intercept the information; 1.2 The channel between legitimate users Alice and Bob is h AB , the channel between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropping node is h AE ; 1.3 Let the distance and direction between legal users be D AB ,θ AB , the distance and direction between the legitimate transmitting node and the eavesdropper are D AE ,θ AE .

3. The underwater acoustic safety communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The specific steps of step 2 are as follows: 2.1 Design the communication transmitter. The steps are as follows: 2.1.1 Assume that the symbol m is sent k When the N-dimensional complex weight vector is w k , the frequency offset is Δf k ,k=0,1,2,3; 2.1.2 Let vector w k The nth element in is w kn ,n=0,1,2,....,N-1; 2.1.3 Transmit a symbol m in time slot t k , k=0,1,2,3, then when sending symbol m k The carrier frequency f of the nth array element is kn for f kn =f0+nΔf kn ,n=0,1,...,N-1; (1) in, f0 is the reference frequency; 2.1.4 Assume that the angle between the transmitter and the array normal is The distance from the reference array element is r, and the amplitude attenuation and noise caused by air propagation are ignored; 2.1.5 Based on the far-field assumption of the target position, the complex weight vector w k and frequency offset nΔf k As an independent variable, the frequency domain expression of the signal that the target can receive is b(t,θ,B,w k ,Δf k )for in, T represents transpose, B is the distance from the reference array element to the target position, c is the speed of sound, ⊙ represents the Hadamard product, and satisfies In k =[in k0 ,In k1 ,…,In k(N-1) ] T , Among them, τ is the time delay from the transmitter to the receiver, s(t) is the transmitted confidential signal, and b t (t), b R (B), b θ (θ) is the array steering vector matrix of the multi-carrier frequency-controlled array, and f0 represents the reference frequency; 2.2 Design the communication receiving end, the steps are as follows: 2.2.1 For the received signal b(t,θ,B,w k ,Δf k ) to down-convert and remove the carrier in, f n is the carrier frequency transmitted by the nth array element; 2.2.2 The obtained baseband signal is processed through N channels respectively to obtain the output result y of the i∈{0,1,...,N-1}th channel i for in, Δf is the frequency offset, T is the period; 2.2.3 The signal point received at (θ,B) is 2.2.4 The baseband signal s(t) does not carry information. Assume that s(t) = 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. 2.2.5 Combining (2)(3)(4), the signal received at (θ, B) is 2.2.6 Final estimated transmitted signal for in, s k is a predetermined symbol m k The corresponding signal point.

4. The underwater acoustic safety communication method based on orthogonal frequency division multiplexing directional modulation according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The specific steps of step 3 are as follows: 3.1 Assume that in the OFDM system, T D is the signal delay, T cp is the cyclic prefix length, and the entire OFDM block length is T d =T D +T cp , f c is the center frequency; in OFDM time slot t, the nth transmission data is in, J is the number of carriers, m k (n) is legal data, t is time slot, g(t) is rectangular pulse function; 3.2 Underwater acoustic channel model Among them, α p (t) and τ p (t) is the amplitude and delay factor of the pth path, respectively τ p (t)≈τ p -d p t (10) α p (t)≈α p (11) 3.3 Since the underwater acoustic communication channel has a uniform Doppler factor, equation (9) can be rewritten as in, a is the consistent Doppler factor; 3.4 For the array transmission steering vector at azimuth θ and distance D, in, d is the distance between array elements, c is the speed of sound, T is transposed; 3.5 The positions of the transmitting node Alice, the receiving node Bob and the eavesdropping node Eve are (θ A ,D A ),(θ B ,D B ),(θ E ,D E ),r(θ AB ,D AB ) is the directional transmission steering vector between Alice and Bob, r(θ AE ,D AE ) is the eavesdropping steering vector of the eavesdropping end; 3.6 Assuming that the underwater acoustic channel is a multipath consistent Doppler Rayleigh fading channel, the array transmit steering vector is 3.7 The transmitted signal after adding AN is expressed as s=Mw+z (15) Among them, z is subject to mean 0 and covariance is Additive Gaussian white noise vector; 3.8 Design w=r(θ AB ,D AB ) is the directional modulation matrix between legitimate users, and the artificial noise is in the null space direction of w, that is, r H (θ AB ,D AB )′z=0 (16) r H (i AE ,D AE )′z≠0 (17) 3.9 The signal received by Bob is y B =h AB r H (θ AB , D AB )′s+n AB (t) = h AB r H (θ AB , D AB )′Mw+h AB r H (θ AB , D AB )′z+n AB (t) = h AB M+n AB (t)(18) in, Assume that n AB (t) The power spectral density of the noise obeys Gaussian distribution, that is, And obey zero mean and variance The symbol energy of the subcarrier is P s ; 3.10 Bob's output SNR is expressed as in, 3.11 The channel capacity between Alice and Bob is 3.12 The communication between Alice and Bob is controlled by directional modulation. The direction of the eavesdropping user Eve is illegal; the information will be interfered, and the signal received by the eavesdropping end is yE =h AE r H (θ AE , D AE )′s+n AE (t) =h AE r H (θ AE , D AE )′Mw+h AE r H (θ AE , D AE )′z+n AE (t) =h AE r H (θ AE , D AE )′Mr H (θ AE , D AB )′+h AE r H (θ AE , D AE )′z+n AE (t). (21) 3.13 The eavesdropper is affected by the transmitter AN, n AE (t) is additive AWGN and has zero mean and variance Right now 3.14 The output SNR of the eavesdropping end Eve is 3.15 The channel capacity of the eavesdropping end is 3.16 When the system meets the requirements of confidential communication, C0 satisfies At this time, the instantaneous confidentiality rate of the system is 3.17 When the main and stealth channels all obey independent and identically distributed Rayleigh fading, the channel gain obeys the same distribution with zero mean of Ω AB and Ω AE The exponential distribution of the channel between legitimate users is 3.18 The probability of a non-zero safety capacity of the system is in, is the average signal-to-noise ratio of the channel between legitimate users, is the average signal-to-noise ratio between the legitimate user and the eavesdropping end; 3.18 Average signal-to-noise ratio of the channel between legitimate users When , P(C0>0)>0; When , the channels of the legitimate user and the eavesdropping user are very different, and the probability of confidential communication approximately approaches 1, otherwise the probability of confidential communication approaches 0; 3.19 The probability of confidentiality interruption is when the instantaneous safety capacity of the system is lower than the target safety capacity threshold L (L>0); the probability of confidentiality interruption of the system is