Access control method based on dynamic stealth network
Through trust evaluation and encryption technology based on multi-dimensional attributes in dynamic stealth networks, the problems of insufficient equipment attribute protection and singleness of trust evaluation are solved, efficient and secure resource access control is achieved, and the concealment and security of the network are improved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410909380.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-08
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-08
AI Technical Summary
The prior art cannot fully protect the attributes submitted by resource access devices, resulting in attackers that may forge device identity through data analysis, and have single trust evaluation methods, large network overhead, and high energy consumption.
By uploading access attribute sequences in dynamic invisible networks for trust evaluation, calculating trust evaluation scores based on multi-dimensional attributes, and identity and attribute weight authentication is performed after the authentication is successful, and attribute information is hidden using algorithms such as encryption technology and hash functions to bind Resource access permissions and device properties.
It realizes comprehensive protection of device attributes, reduces communication overhead and energy consumption, improves the security and concealment of dynamic stealth networks, and has more fine-grained and flexible resource access control, and has low computational complexity.
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Figure CN119011148A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of network technology, and in particular to an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network. Background Art
[0002] Dynamic stealth networks are characterized by concealment and dynamism. Concealment means that devices need to be protected when they access the network, and other malicious devices cannot intercept relevant data; dynamism means that devices may frequently connect to and disconnect from the network. When a large number of frequent access authentications are performed, it may cause delays to the network and put pressure on the resource party.
[0003] In view of the concealment feature, the current method is to protect the device attributes in a concealed manner during the resource access device authentication process. The hidden scope of the resource access device attributes is mainly to protect key information such as the device identity ID. It does not consider the comprehensive protection of the attributes submitted by the resource access device, which may lead to attackers intercepting relevant attribute data in the network for data analysis, thereby inferring the identity of the resource access device for forgery. In view of the dynamic feature, the existing technology realizes dynamic access through device trust evaluation, but the attributes used in the existing trust evaluation are relatively single, and the evaluation methods are all machine learning methods, which have large network overhead and high energy consumption. Summary of the invention
[0004] The present invention provides an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network, which is used to solve the problems in the prior art that the attributes submitted by a resource access device cannot be fully protected, and the communication overhead and energy consumption are high.
[0005] The present invention provides an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network, comprising the following steps.
[0006] The resource access device uploads the access attribute sequence of this access to the authentication agency, and the access attribute sequence is used to instruct the authentication agency to calculate the trust evaluation score of the resource access device based on the access attribute sequence, and broadcast the evaluation threshold corresponding to the trust evaluation score in the dynamic stealth network.
[0007] When the trust assessment score reaches the assessment threshold, the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the certification authority, the secret key and the public key of the resource access device are received, and based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the certification authority is interacted with to perform identity and attribute weight authentication on the resource access device, where the access attribute sequence is a subset of the device attribute sequence.
[0008] In case of successful authentication, a first signature is calculated based on the key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, and the keyword of the resource to be requested.
[0009] A resource request is sent to the resource owning device, wherein the resource request includes: the identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the first signature, the keyword of the resource to be requested, and the trust evaluation score. The resource request is used to instruct the resource owning device to verify the trust evaluation score based on the evaluation threshold. When the trust evaluation score is greater than the evaluation threshold, the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence is verified based on the first signature and the public key of the resource access device to see whether it meets the requirement of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the resource to be requested. When the requirement is met, the ciphertext address link of the resource to be requested is sent to the resource access device.
[0010] The ciphertext of the resource to be requested is obtained based on the ciphertext address link and decrypted.
[0011] According to an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention, the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the certification authority, the secret key and the public key of the resource access device are received, and based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the certification authority is interacted with to perform identity and attribute weight authentication on the resource access device, including the following steps.
[0012] A device attribute sequence and a corresponding serial number set issued by the certification authority are received, and a first hidden attribute of an attribute in the access attribute sequence is calculated according to the serial number based on a first random positive integer.
[0013] A second signature is calculated based on the first random positive integer, the first hidden attribute, and a public key of the certification authority.
[0014] The identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the second signature, the first hidden attribute and its corresponding serial number are packaged into a first message and sent to the certification authority, so that the certification authority verifies the legitimacy of the identity based on the first message and the certification authority's key. If the verification is successful, the second hidden attribute is calculated based on the first hidden attribute, and the third signature is calculated based on the certification authority's private key and the attributes in the access attribute sequence. The third signature, the certification authority's public key and the second hidden attribute are packaged into a second message and sent to the resource access device.
[0015] The attribute weights of the attributes in the access attribute sequence are calculated based on the second message and the first random positive integer, and the legitimacy of the attribute weights is verified based on the sum of the attribute weights, the third signature and the public key of the certification authority. If the legitimacy is verified, the identity and attribute weight authentication of the resource access device at the certification authority is completed.
[0016] According to an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention, the first hidden attribute and the second signature are calculated according to the following formula: .
[0017] .
[0018] .
[0019] in, Indicates resource access device The first in the access attribute sequence of r Attributes The first hidden attribute of Indicates resource access device The first random positive integer corresponding to Represents the public key of the certification authority, express The hash function of for The additive group on elliptic curves of order , ,for The generator of represents a cyclic group, and || represents data concatenation.
[0020] According to an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention, the authentication agency verifies the legitimacy of the identity based on the first message and the key of the authentication agency in the following manner.
[0021] calculate .
[0022] Verify that the following two equations hold.
[0023] .
[0024] .
[0025] in, Indicates resource access device Identity ID, represents the key of the certification authority, Indicates resource access device The public key of is the intermediate variable, express The hash function of .
[0026] When both equations hold, the authentication is legal.
[0027] According to an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention, the authentication agency calculates the second hidden attribute based on the first hidden attribute, and calculates the third signature according to the private key of the authentication agency and the attributes in the access attribute sequence as follows.
[0028] For each attribute Choose a second random positive integer , calculate the second hidden attribute as: .
[0029] The third signature is calculated as follows: .
[0030] in, Indicates the key of the certification authority, for different resource access devices and Any attribute of and ,like ,but .
[0031] According to an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention, the attribute weights of the attributes in the access attribute sequence are calculated based on the second message and the first random positive integer, and the legitimacy of the attribute weights is verified based on the sum of the attribute weights, the third signature and the public key of the certification authority, including: calculating the attribute weights of the attributes in the access attribute sequence according to the following formula.
[0032] .
[0033] The sum of the attribute weights is: .
[0034] In the equation If the condition is established, the legality of the attribute weight is determined, and the resource access device is obtained. Each attribute of Attribute weight ,in, express The bilinear map of express The multiplicative group on elliptic curves of order .
[0035] According to an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention, the reference attribute weight is set by the resource owning device in the following manner.
[0036] Resource Owned Equipment RO u Get a collection of attributes for all devices from a certification authority , the resource has the device calculation attribute weight: .
[0037] in, Represents a random number.
[0038] Resource Owned Equipment RO u Randomly select encryption parameters , calculate the resources you have m Encryption Key .
[0039] Resource Owned Equipment RO u Encryption v Resources , get resources The ciphertext , Represents the exclusive-or operation.
[0040] For access to resources Required t Different reference attribute weights, the corresponding attribute serial number is ,choose Random numbers , construct polynomial .
[0041] .
[0042] Resource Owned Equipment RO u The hash value of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the attribute serial number Input to polynomial middle, Output t function values .
[0043] No. u Resources have devices RO u Will Public, for access by resource access devices, where: The plaintext keyword representing the resource to be shared, the ciphertext Stored in the database of the resource owning device, Indicates that the resource has a device RO u Identity ID, express The hash function of for The additive group on elliptic curves of order , ,for The generator of .
[0044] According to an access control method based on a dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention, a first signature is calculated based on a key of a resource access device, a serial number of an attribute in an access attribute sequence, and a keyword of a resource to be requested, including: calculating the first signature in the following manner: .
[0045] .
[0046] Indicates resource access device The key of express The hash function of Indicates resource access device The first in the access attribute sequence of t The serial number of the attribute.
[0047] The resource request is: .
[0048] Resource Owned Equipment RO u Verify whether the attribute weights corresponding to the attributes in the access attribute sequence meet the requirements of the reference attribute weights corresponding to the requested resource as follows.
[0049] The resource request With resources to have equipment RO u Public serial number to make a match.
[0050] Resource Owned Equipment RO u calculate , in equation If it is established, determine that the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence satisfies the reference attribute weight corresponding to the requested resource, where: express The bilinear map of express The multiplicative group on elliptic curves of order .
[0051] Obtaining and decrypting the ciphertext of the resource to be requested based on the ciphertext address link, including: using the public attribute serial number and resource access devices Corresponding attribute weight , using Lagrange polynomials to recover .
[0052] .
[0053] .
[0054] Resource Access Device Decryption key for computing resource ciphertext ,by Decrypting resource ciphertext Get resource plaintext .
[0055] The present invention also provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the program, the access control method based on the dynamic stealth network as described in any one of the above is implemented.
[0056] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the access control method based on a dynamic stealth network as described in any one of the above is implemented.
[0057] The present invention also provides a computer program product, including a computer program, wherein when the computer program is executed by a processor, the access control method based on a dynamic stealth network as described above is implemented.
[0058] The access control method based on the dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention uploads an access attribute sequence through a resource access device, the sequence includes multiple attributes, and the trust evaluation of the device is based on the multi-dimensional attributes. The threshold is set according to the trust score to achieve early trust screening of the device before authentication, thereby improving the security of the dynamic stealth network; all access attributes submitted by the device are hidden, and in combination with the characteristics of the dynamic stealth network environment, the attribute access control of the device concealment is achieved, which can not only achieve the purpose of device access in the dynamic stealth network environment, but also ensure that the attributes and privacy of the device are not leaked; by presetting reference attribute weights for resources, and then binding resource access rights with device attributes, resource access control rights are allocated through device attributes, so that resource access control is more fine-grained and more flexible. Compared with the access control model in the traditional network environment, the calculation complexity is low, the calculation time is short, the communication overhead is small, and the energy consumption is low. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0059] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present invention or the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.
[0060] Picture 1 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a dynamic stealth network.
[0061] Picture 2 It is a flow chart of the access control method based on dynamic stealth network provided by the present invention.
[0062] Picture 3 It is a structural schematic diagram of the electronic device provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0063] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0064] The dynamic stealth network includes: a resource access device, an authentication agency and a resource ownership device. The access control method based on the dynamic stealth network of the embodiment of the present invention is applied to the resource access device, such as Picture 1 As shown, steps S210 to S250 are included.
[0065] Step S210: The resource access device uploads the access attribute sequence of this access to the certification authority, and the access attribute sequence is used to instruct the certification authority to calculate the trust evaluation score of the resource access device based on the access attribute sequence, and broadcast the evaluation threshold corresponding to the trust evaluation score in the dynamic stealth network. Among them, the access attribute sequence includes multiple dimensions, such as network environment attributes (device access IP address, device network status, data transmission delay and device traffic, etc.), device hardware attributes (physical hardware address), device software attributes and device security attributes, etc.
[0066] Step S220: When the trust assessment score reaches the assessment threshold, the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the certification authority, the secret key and the public key of the resource access device are received, and based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the certification authority is interacted with to perform identity and attribute weight authentication on the resource access device, where the access attribute sequence is a subset of the device attribute sequence.
[0067] Step S230: When the authentication is successful, a first signature is calculated based on the key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, and the keyword of the resource to be requested.
[0068] Step S240: Send a resource request to the resource-owning device, the resource request includes: the identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the first signature, the keyword of the resource to be requested and the trust evaluation score, the resource request is used to instruct the resource-owning device to verify the trust evaluation score based on the evaluation threshold, and if the trust evaluation score is greater than the evaluation threshold, verify whether the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence meets the requirements of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the resource to be requested based on the first signature and the public key of the resource access device. If the requirements are met, send the ciphertext address link of the resource to be requested to the resource access device. It should be noted that the resource-owning device will set the access rights of the resource in advance according to the confidentiality level of the resource, and bind the access rights with the device attributes, which can be understood as specifying the access rights of the resource through the device attributes, and setting the weight of the specific device attribute of the access resource as the reference attribute weight. And calculate the ciphertext of the resource encryption key and the reference attribute weight, encrypt the resource through the encryption key to obtain the resource ciphertext, and finally upload the resource ciphertext and the corresponding description information to the resource storage platform for storage.
[0069] Step S250: Obtain the ciphertext of the resource to be requested based on the ciphertext address link and decrypt it.
[0070] The access control method based on the dynamic stealth network of this embodiment uploads an access attribute sequence through a resource access device, the sequence includes multiple attributes, and the device trust evaluation is based on multi-dimensional attributes. The threshold is set according to the trust score to achieve early trust screening of the device before authentication, thereby improving the security of the dynamic stealth network; all access attributes submitted by the device are hidden, and in combination with the characteristics of the dynamic stealth network environment, attribute access control of the device concealment is achieved, which can not only achieve the purpose of device access in the dynamic stealth network environment, but also ensure that the attributes and privacy of the device are not leaked; by presetting reference attribute weights for resources, and then binding resource access rights with device attributes, resource access control rights are allocated through device attributes, making resource access control more fine-grained and flexible. Compared with the access control model in the traditional network environment, the calculation complexity is low, the calculation time is short, the communication overhead is small, and the energy consumption is low.
[0071] In some embodiments, the authentication authority calculates the trust assessment score of the resource access device for the current access as follows.
[0072] set up are two real numbers, , , represents the set of real numbers, Used to represent a range. Indicates the first Visit No. The attribute value of the item attribute, the attribute is the evaluation indicator, Indicates the resource access device is in the process of collecting attributes. The minimum value of the item attribute, Indicates the resource access device is in the process of collecting attributes. The maximum value of the attribute. Item Properties Use for the interval According to the collected data reflecting the device attributes, the data is classified according to different attributes. First, the relationship between the attribute and the device trust score is established to generate a decision matrix. The decision matrix X reflecting multiple attributes of device behavior is constructed as follows.
[0073] .
[0074] in, s Indicates the number of devices. m Indicates the number of times the device has been accessed so far. n Indicates the number of attributes.
[0075] For the attributes in the decision matrix X, the normalization formula is as follows.
[0076] .
[0077] The decision matrix X is normalized to obtain the following formula.
[0078] .
[0079] Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) can solve the fuzzy and difficult to quantify device behavior indicators. Therefore, this paper uses FAHP to establish the weight system of the hierarchical model. According to the "0.1-0.9" ratio method, the attributes of the access behavior are compared to obtain the membership degree (the degree of correlation between the attributes) between the attributes. , for the Visits to establish the fuzzy judgment matrix of device attributes as follows.
[0080] .
[0081] Membership degree of fuzzy judgment matrix The relationship between different attributes is quantified based on the actual collected data, which is suitable for calculating the weights of multiple attributes. In order to calculate the weights of equipment attributes, a fuzzy judgment matrix weight formula is constructed. Indicates the resource access device The first visit The weight of an attribute is calculated as follows.
[0082] .
[0083] in, Represents the number of resource access device attributes, , Indicates the resource access device The member degree of the corresponding fuzzy judgment matrix is accessed for the first time. Finally, the computing device i The weight set of all attributes visited times is used to obtain the attribute weight matrix . Attribute weight matrix Provides weights for trust evaluation.
[0084] Indicates The trust evaluation score for a resource access device is calculated as follows:
[0085] .
[0086] in, for Middle The first visit The attribute value of an attribute, For resource access device The first visit The weight of an attribute.
[0087] In this embodiment, by evaluating the trust of devices with multi-dimensional attributes, determining whether a device is a trusted device based on an evaluation threshold, and implementing early trust screening of devices before authentication, thereby improving network security and avoiding subsequent invalid authentication.
[0088] In some embodiments, receiving the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the authentication authority, the key and the public key of the resource access device, and interacting with the authentication authority based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence to authenticate the identity and attribute weight of the resource access device, including: A device attribute sequence and a corresponding serial number set issued by the certification authority are received, and a first hidden attribute of an attribute in the access attribute sequence is calculated according to the serial number based on a first random positive integer.
[0089] A second signature is calculated based on the first random positive integer, the first hidden attribute, and a public key of the certification authority.
[0090] The identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the second signature, the first hidden attribute and its corresponding serial number are packaged into a first message and sent to the certification authority, so that the certification authority verifies the legitimacy of the identity based on the first message and the certification authority's key. If the verification is successful, the second hidden attribute is calculated based on the first hidden attribute, and the third signature is calculated based on the certification authority's private key and the attributes in the access attribute sequence. The third signature, the certification authority's public key and the second hidden attribute are packaged into a second message and sent to the resource access device.
[0091] The attribute weights of the attributes in the access attribute sequence are calculated based on the second message and the first random positive integer, and the legitimacy of the attribute weights is verified based on the sum of the attribute weights, the third signature and the public key of the certification authority. If the legitimacy is verified, the identity and attribute weight authentication of the resource access device at the certification authority is completed.
[0092] It should be noted that the certification authority generates public and private key pairs for participants in the network. , generate a public key and a private key pair for the resource owner device (RO) and each resource access device connected to the network, and distribute them to each device through a secure channel. Resource Access Device , the public and private key pairs are , , Represents a cyclic group, a public key and a private key pair of the certification authority , , the resource has the public and private key pair of the device , .
[0093] The authentication authority also stores a sequence of attributes of devices that can access a resource, represented as After all resource access devices collect attributes, they are collected and sent to the certification agency, which normalizes the attributes and ensures , , represents a set of natural numbers, and the corresponding attribute set for access is . Resource Access Device The attribute sequence is , z Indicates the number of resource access devices, and the corresponding ordered attribute set is ,( ). Accessing devices on behalf of resources The number of attributes in the access attribute sequence.
[0094] In some embodiments, receiving the device attribute sequence and its corresponding serial number set issued by the certification authority, that is, the attribute sequence set and the corresponding serial number sent by the certification authority to the resource access device , Represents attributes, Representation attributes The corresponding serial number.
[0095] For every ordered set of attributes Resource access device The first hidden attribute and the second signature are calculated as follows By calculating the first hidden attribute for the access attribute, the access attribute is hidden.
[0096] .
[0097] .
[0098] in, Indicates resource access device The first in the access attribute sequence of r Attributes The first hidden attribute of Indicates resource access device The first random positive integer corresponding to Represents the public key of the certification authority, express The hash function of for The additive group on elliptic curves of order , ,for The generator of , || represents data concatenation.
[0099] After calculating the first hidden attribute and the second signature, the resource access device packages the identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the second signature, the first hidden attribute and its corresponding sequence number into a first message , and sent to the certification body.
[0100] In some embodiments, the authentication authority verifies the legitimacy of the identity based on the first message and the authentication authority's key in the following manner.
[0101] calculate .
[0102] Verify that the following two equations hold.
[0103] .
[0104] .
[0105] in, Indicates resource access device Identity ID, represents the key of the certification authority, Indicates resource access device The public key of is the intermediate variable, express The hash function of .
[0106] When both equations hold, the authentication is legal.
[0107] When the legality of the identity is verified, the certification authority calculates the second hidden attribute based on the first hidden attribute, and calculates the third signature according to the private key of the certification authority and the attributes in the access attribute sequence as follows.
[0108] For each attribute Choose a second random positive integer , calculate the second hidden attribute as: , further hiding the access attributes and improving the network's concealment of attributes.
[0109] The third signature is calculated as follows: .
[0110] in, Indicates the key of the certification authority, for different resource access devices and Any attribute of and ,like ,but .
[0111] After calculating the third signature, the third signature, the public key of the certification authority and the second hidden attribute are packaged into a second message And sent to the resource access device .
[0112] In some embodiments, the attribute weights of the attributes in the access attribute sequence are calculated based on the second message and the first random positive integer, and the legitimacy of the attribute weights is verified based on the sum of the attribute weights, the third signature and the public key of the certification authority, including: calculating the attribute weights of the attributes in the access attribute sequence according to the following formula.
[0113] .
[0114] The sum of the attribute weights is: .
[0115] In the equation If the condition is established, the legality of the attribute weight is determined, and the resource access device is obtained. Each attribute of Attribute weight ,in, express The bilinear map of express The multiplicative group on elliptic curves of order .
[0116] In this embodiment, a legal set of device attributes is established in the authentication agency, which avoids frequent interactions in the authentication process, reduces the communication overhead in the authentication process, meets the dynamic requirements of the dynamic stealth network, and ultimately achieves terminal access security in the network dynamic stealth scenario.
[0117] In some embodiments, the resource-owning device needs to set corresponding access rights in advance according to the security level of the shared resource. Specifically, the access rights are bound to the device attributes, that is, the device attribute weight for accessing the resource is set as the reference attribute authority, and the reference attribute authority is used as the resource access right. In this embodiment, the reference attribute weight is set by the resource-owning device in the following manner.
[0118] Resource Owned Equipment RO u Get a collection of attributes for all devices from a certification authority , the resource has the device calculation attribute weight: .
[0119] in, Represents a random number.
[0120] Resource Owned Equipment RO u Randomly select encryption parameters , calculate the resources you have m Encryption Key .
[0121] Resource Owned Equipment RO u Encryption v Resources , get resources The ciphertext , Represents the exclusive-or operation.
[0122] For access to resources Required t Different reference attribute weights, the corresponding attribute serial number is ,choose Random numbers , construct polynomial .
[0123] .
[0124] Resource Owned Equipment ROu The hash value of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the attribute serial number Input to polynomial middle, Output t function values .
[0125] The above process realizes the binding of resource permissions and attribute weights to form reference attribute weights, and encrypts the reference attribute weights to ensure the concealment of the attribute weights.
[0126] No. u Resources have devices RO u Will , Public, for access by resource access devices, where: The plaintext keyword representing the resource to be shared, the ciphertext Stored in the database of the resource owning device, Indicates that the resource has a device RO u Identity ID, express The hash function of for The additive group on elliptic curves of order , ,for The generator of .
[0127] Through the resource reference attribute permission setting process above, only the attribute set The resource access device can access the resource , Represents a collection of resources.
[0128] In some embodiments, calculating the first signature based on the key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, and the keyword of the resource to be requested includes: calculating the first signature as follows .
[0129] .
[0130] Indicates resource access device The key of express The hash function of Indicates resource access device The first in the access attribute sequence of t The serial number of the attribute.
[0131] The resource request is: .
[0132] Resource Owned Equipment RO u Upon receiving a resource request M After that, first verify the device trust evaluation score ,in, is the minimum trust score of the device access that the resource to be accessed can tolerate, that is, the evaluation threshold. After the verification is passed, the resource-owning device verifies whether the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence meets the requirements of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the resource to be requested in the following way.
[0133] The resource request With resources to have equipment RO u Public serial number to make a match.
[0134] Resource Owned Equipment RO u calculate , in equation If it is established, determine that the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence satisfies the reference attribute weight corresponding to the requested resource, where: express The bilinear map of express The multiplicative group on elliptic curves of order .
[0135] Obtaining and decrypting the ciphertext of the resource to be requested based on the ciphertext address link, including: using the public attribute serial number and resource access devices Corresponding attribute weight , using Lagrange polynomials to recover .
[0136] .
[0137] .
[0138] Resource Access Device Decryption key for computing resource ciphertext ,by Decrypting resource ciphertext Get resource plaintext .
[0139] In this embodiment, resource access rights are bound to device attributes, and resource access control rights are allocated through device attributes, making resource access control more fine-grained and flexible. Compared with the access control model in the traditional network environment, this model has low computational complexity, short computation time and low communication overhead.
[0140] Picture 3 An example of a physical structure diagram of an electronic device is shown in FIG. Picture 3 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 310, a communication interface 320, a memory 330 and a communication bus 340, wherein the processor 310, the communication interface 320 and the memory 330 communicate with each other through the communication bus 340. The processor 310 may call the logic instructions in the memory 330 to execute the access control method based on the dynamic stealth network, including the following steps.
[0141] The resource access device uploads the access attribute sequence of this access to the authentication agency, and the access attribute sequence is used to instruct the authentication agency to calculate the trust evaluation score of the resource access device based on the access attribute sequence, and broadcast the evaluation threshold corresponding to the trust evaluation score in the dynamic stealth network.
[0142] When the trust assessment score reaches the assessment threshold, the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the certification authority, the secret key and the public key of the resource access device are received, and based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the certification authority is interacted with to perform identity and attribute weight authentication on the resource access device, where the access attribute sequence is a subset of the device attribute sequence.
[0143] In case of successful authentication, a first signature is calculated based on the key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, and the keyword of the resource to be requested.
[0144] A resource request is sent to the resource owning device, wherein the resource request includes: the identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the first signature, the keyword of the resource to be requested, and the trust evaluation score. The resource request is used to instruct the resource owning device to verify the trust evaluation score based on the evaluation threshold. When the trust evaluation score is greater than the evaluation threshold, the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence is verified based on the first signature and the public key of the resource access device to see whether it meets the requirement of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the resource to be requested. When the requirement is met, the ciphertext address link of the resource to be requested is sent to the resource access device.
[0145] The ciphertext of the resource to be requested is obtained based on the ciphertext address link and decrypted.
[0146] In addition, the logic instructions in the above-mentioned memory 330 can be implemented in the form of a software functional unit and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when it is sold or used as an independent product. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk, etc. Various media that can store program codes.
[0147] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program. The computer program can be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer can execute the access control method based on the dynamic stealth network provided by the above methods, including the following steps.
[0148] The resource access device uploads the access attribute sequence of this access to the authentication agency, and the access attribute sequence is used to instruct the authentication agency to calculate the trust evaluation score of the resource access device based on the access attribute sequence, and broadcast the evaluation threshold corresponding to the trust evaluation score in the dynamic stealth network.
[0149] When the trust assessment score reaches the assessment threshold, the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the certification authority, the secret key and the public key of the resource access device are received, and based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the certification authority is interacted with to perform identity and attribute weight authentication on the resource access device, where the access attribute sequence is a subset of the device attribute sequence.
[0150] In case of successful authentication, a first signature is calculated based on the key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, and the keyword of the resource to be requested.
[0151] A resource request is sent to the resource owning device, wherein the resource request includes: the identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the first signature, the keyword of the resource to be requested, and the trust evaluation score. The resource request is used to instruct the resource owning device to verify the trust evaluation score based on the evaluation threshold. When the trust evaluation score is greater than the evaluation threshold, the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence is verified based on the first signature and the public key of the resource access device to see whether it meets the requirement of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the resource to be requested. When the requirement is met, the ciphertext address link of the resource to be requested is sent to the resource access device.
[0152] The ciphertext of the resource to be requested is obtained based on the ciphertext address link and decrypted.
[0153] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the access control method based on the dynamic stealth network provided by the above methods is implemented, including the following steps.
[0154] The resource access device uploads the access attribute sequence of this access to the authentication agency, and the access attribute sequence is used to instruct the authentication agency to calculate the trust evaluation score of the resource access device based on the access attribute sequence, and broadcast the evaluation threshold corresponding to the trust evaluation score in the dynamic stealth network.
[0155] When the trust assessment score reaches the assessment threshold, the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the certification authority, the secret key and the public key of the resource access device are received, and based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the certification authority is interacted with to perform identity and attribute weight authentication on the resource access device, where the access attribute sequence is a subset of the device attribute sequence.
[0156] In case of successful authentication, a first signature is calculated based on the key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, and the keyword of the resource to be requested.
[0157] A resource request is sent to the resource owning device, wherein the resource request includes: the identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the first signature, the keyword of the resource to be requested, and the trust evaluation score. The resource request is used to instruct the resource owning device to verify the trust evaluation score based on the evaluation threshold. When the trust evaluation score is greater than the evaluation threshold, the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence is verified based on the first signature and the public key of the resource access device to see whether it meets the requirement of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the resource to be requested. When the requirement is met, the ciphertext address link of the resource to be requested is sent to the resource access device.
[0158] The ciphertext of the resource to be requested is obtained based on the ciphertext address link and decrypted.
[0159] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment. Ordinary technicians in this field can understand and implement it without paying creative labor.
[0160] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solution is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a disk, an optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.
[0161] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. An access control method based on a dynamic stealth network, characterized in that: include: The resource access device uploads the access attribute sequence of this access to the authentication authority, wherein the access attribute sequence is used to instruct the authentication authority to calculate the trust evaluation score of the resource access device based on the access attribute sequence, and broadcast the evaluation threshold corresponding to the trust evaluation score in the dynamic stealth network; In the case where the trust evaluation score reaches the evaluation threshold, receiving the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the certification authority, the secret key and the public key of the resource access device, and interacting with the certification authority based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence to perform identity and attribute weight authentication on the resource access device, wherein the access attribute sequence is a subset of the device attribute sequence; If the authentication is successful, a first signature is calculated based on the key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, and the keyword of the resource to be requested; Send a resource request to the resource-owning device, the resource request including: the identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence, the first signature, the keyword of the resource to be requested, and the trust evaluation score, the resource request is used to instruct the resource-owning device to verify the trust evaluation score based on the evaluation threshold, and if the trust evaluation score is greater than the evaluation threshold, verify whether the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence meets the requirement of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the resource to be requested based on the first signature and the public key of the resource access device, and if the requirement is met, send the ciphertext address link of the resource to be requested to the resource access device; The ciphertext of the resource to be requested is obtained based on the ciphertext address link and decrypted.
2. The access control method based on dynamic stealth network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Receiving the serial number of the attribute in the device attribute sequence issued by the certification authority, the key and public key of the resource access device, and interacting with the certification authority based on the identity ID and the serial number of the attribute in the access attribute sequence to perform identity and attribute weight authentication on the resource access device, including: Receive a device attribute sequence and a corresponding serial number set issued by the certification authority, and calculate a first hidden attribute of an attribute in the access attribute sequence according to the serial number based on a first random positive integer; Calculate a second signature based on the first random positive integer, the first hidden attribute, and the public key of the certification authority; The identity ID, the public key of the resource access device, the second signature, the first hidden attribute and the corresponding serial number are packaged into a first message and sent to the certification authority, so that the certification authority verifies the legitimacy of the identity based on the first message and the key of the certification authority. If the verification is successful, the second hidden attribute is calculated based on the first hidden attribute, and the third signature is calculated according to the private key of the certification authority and the attribute in the access attribute sequence, and the third signature, the public key of the certification authority and the second hidden attribute are packaged into a second message and sent to the resource access device; The attribute weights of the attributes in the access attribute sequence are calculated based on the second message and the first random positive integer, and the legitimacy of the attribute weights is verified based on the sum of the attribute weights, the third signature and the public key of the certification authority. If the legitimacy is verified, the identity and attribute weight authentication of the resource access device at the certification authority is completed.
3. The access control method based on dynamic stealth network according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The first hidden attribute and the second signature are calculated as follows : ; ; in, Indicates resource access device The first in the access attribute sequence of r Attributes The first hidden attribute of Indicates resource access device The corresponding first random positive integer, Represents the public key of the certification authority, express The hash function of for The additive group on elliptic curves of order , ,for The generator of represents a cyclic group, and || represents data concatenation.
4. The access control method based on dynamic stealth network according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The authentication method of the authentication authority to verify the legitimacy of the identity based on the first message and the authentication authority's key is as follows: calculate ; Verify that the following two equations hold: ; ; in, Indicates resource access device Identity ID, represents the key of the certification authority, Indicates resource access device The public key of is the intermediate variable, express Hash function of When both equations hold, the authentication is legal.
5. The access control method based on dynamic stealth network according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The certification authority calculates the second hidden attribute based on the first hidden attribute, and calculates the third signature according to the certification authority's private key and the attributes in the access attribute sequence as follows: For each attribute Choose a second random positive integer , calculate the second hidden attribute as: ; The third signature is calculated as follows: ; in, Indicates the key of the certification authority, for different resource access devices and Any attribute of and ,like ,but .
6. The access control method based on dynamic stealth network according to claim 5 is characterized in that: Calculating the attribute weight of the attribute in the access attribute sequence based on the second message and the first random positive integer, and verifying the legitimacy of the attribute weight based on the sum of the attribute weights, the third signature, and the public key of the certification authority, including: calculating the attribute weight of the attribute in the access attribute sequence according to the following formula: ; The sum of the attribute weights is: ; In the equation If the condition is established, the legality of the attribute weight is determined, and the resource access device is obtained. Each attribute of Attribute weight ,in, express The bilinear map of express The multiplicative group on elliptic curves of order .
7. The access control method based on a dynamic stealth network according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: The reference attribute weight is set by the resource owning device as follows: Resource Owned Equipment RO u Get a collection of attributes for all devices from a certification authority , the resource has the device calculation attribute weight: ; in, Represents a random number; Resource Owned Equipment RO u Randomly select encryption parameters , calculate the resources you have m Encryption Key ; Resource Owned Equipment RO u Encryption v Resources , get resources The ciphertext , Represents XOR operation; For access to resources Required t Different reference attribute weights, the corresponding attribute serial number is ,choose Random numbers , construct polynomial : ; Resource Owned Equipment RO u The hash value of the reference attribute weight corresponding to the attribute serial number Input to polynomial middle, Output t function values ; No. u Resources have devices RO u Will Public, so as to be accessible by a resource access device, wherein: The plaintext keyword representing the resource to be shared, the ciphertext Stored in the database of the resource owning device, Indicates that the resource has a device RO u Identity ID, express The hash function of for The additive group on elliptic curves of order , ,for The generator of .
8. The access control method based on dynamic stealth network according to claim 7 is characterized in that: Calculating a first signature based on a key of a resource access device, a serial number of an attribute in an access attribute sequence, and a keyword of a resource to be requested, including: calculating the first signature as follows : ; Indicates resource access device The key of express The hash function of Indicates resource access device The first in the access attribute sequence of t The serial number of the attribute; The resource request is: ; Resource Owned Equipment RO u Verify whether the attribute weights corresponding to the attributes in the access attribute sequence meet the requirements of the reference attribute weights corresponding to the requested resource as follows: The resource request With resources to have equipment RO u Public serial number Make a match; Resource Owned Equipment RO u calculate , in equation If it is established, determine that the attribute weight corresponding to the attribute in the access attribute sequence satisfies the reference attribute weight corresponding to the requested resource, where: express The bilinear map of express Multiplication groups on elliptic curves of order ; Obtaining and decrypting the ciphertext of the resource to be requested based on the ciphertext address link includes: Using public attribute serial number and resource access devices Corresponding attribute weight , using Lagrange polynomials to recover ; ; ; Resource Access Device Decryption key for computing resource ciphertext ,by Decrypting resource ciphertext Get resource plaintext .
9. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the program, the access control method based on a dynamic stealth network as described in any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.
10. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the access control method based on a dynamic stealth network as described in any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.
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