Honeypot confusion-based cheating defense method and system and readable storage medium

By using honeypot obfuscation methods in network protection, using honeypots to disguise information to deceive attackers, the problem of traditional honeypots being easily identified and evaded is solved, improving network defense effects and reducing security risks.

CN119011247APending Publication Date: 2024-11-22GUANGZHOU UNIVERSITY
View PDF 0 Cites 1 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411106214.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-13
Publication Date
2024-11-22

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional network protection technology avoids it because the attacker easily recognizes honeypots, resulting in greater network security risks.

Method used

Using the honeypot obfuscation method based on the game model, by obtaining and analyzing network traffic data packets, filtering out the traffic data that meets the service protocol of the target network, and inserting the honeypot disguised information into the response information, deceive the attacker and making it mistakenly think of the business. The service platform is a honeypot, thereby reducing the risk of attack.

Benefits of technology

It effectively improves the network defense effect, reduces network security risks, and makes attackers actively give up trying to continue attacks, improving network security.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN119011247A_ABST
    Figure CN119011247A_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The invention provides a network defense method and system based on a game model and a readable storage medium, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining a network flow data package related to the access of a plurality of user sides to a target network, and carrying out the analysis of the network flow data package, screening out first traffic data conforming to a service protocol of the target network from the network traffic data packet according to an analysis result; forwarding the first flow data to a business service platform, and receiving response information issued by the business service platform so as to insert honeypot camouflage information containing honeypot identification characteristics into the response information; and sending the response information to a user side corresponding to the first traffic data, so that a network attacker identifies the business service platform as a honeypot. According to the method and the device, the problem that a relatively large network potential safety hazard exists due to the fact that a target network can be directly attacked because an attacker easily recognizes a honeypot to avoid the honeypot in a traditional network protection technology can be solved.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of network security protection technology, and in particular to a deception defense method, system and readable storage medium based on honeypot obfuscation. Background Art

[0002] The attack observation function of the front-end MiTing mainly uses WAF that matches known attack patterns (labels) for defense. Once the attacker understands the defense mechanism of WAF, he can bypass the protection of WAF by manually mutating the attack payload and other methods.

[0003] Therefore, although defenders often use honeypots to analyze attack behaviors, capture vulnerabilities, and even counter attackers, attackers can use honeypot identification technology to discover and circumvent honeypots. Even experienced attackers can use anti-honeypot technology to promptly detect that this is a "trap" and exit early, thereby avoiding the honeypot and invading the target network, resulting in greater network security risks. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a network defense method, system and readable storage medium based on a game model, aiming to solve the problem that traditional network protection technology is circumvented because the attacker can easily identify the honeypot and then directly attack the target network, resulting in a large network security risk.

[0005] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation, which is applied to a front-end honeypot, and the method comprises:

[0006] Acquire network traffic data packets about multiple user terminals accessing a target network, and parse the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with a service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the parsing result;

[0007] Forwarding the first flow data to a business service platform, and receiving a response message issued by the business service platform for the first flow data that complies with the service agreement of the target network, so as to insert the honeypot disguise information containing the honeypot identification feature into the response message;

[0008] The response information after the honeypot disguise information is inserted is sent to the user end corresponding to the first traffic data, so that the network attacker can identify the business service platform as a honeypot.

[0009] In summary, according to the above-mentioned deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation, by inserting the traffic data of normal business services into honeypot disguised information with honeypot identification characteristics, the honeypot characteristics are used to deceive attackers, making it impossible for attackers to distinguish between normal proxy services and honeypots, and then making attackers believe that the front honey court is the honeypot, thereby achieving the purpose of making attackers actively give up continuing to attack attempts, thereby improving the network defense effect and reducing network security risks. Specifically, first, network traffic packets for accessing the target network are collected, and the network traffic packets involve a large number of user terminals. Then, the network traffic packets are parsed to screen out services that meet the service protocol of the target network based on the parsing results. The service protocol of the target network corresponds to the target network, and then normal access service traffic (first traffic data) is obtained. Then, the first traffic data is forwarded to the business service platform, so that the business service platform sends a response message, and then the front-end honey court inserts honeypot disguise information into the response message. The honeypot disguise information contains honeypot identification characteristics, and then the response message is sent to the user terminal to deceive the attacker and make him mistakenly believe that the business service platform is the honeypot, so that the attacker can attack the real service of the front-end honey court agent as little as possible, which helps to solve potential security risks.

[0010] Furthermore, the step of obtaining network traffic data packets about multiple user terminals accessing the target network, and parsing the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with the service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the parsing results includes:

[0011] Parsing the network traffic packet to obtain a five-tuple corresponding to at least one piece of traffic data contained in the network traffic packet;

[0012] The preset switch flow table is traversed according to the five-tuple to determine one by one whether the data traffic included in the network traffic packet complies with the service agreement of the target network according to the traversal results.

[0013] Furthermore, after the step of obtaining network traffic data packets about multiple user terminals accessing the target network and parsing the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with the service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the parsing result, the step further includes:

[0014] Acquire second flow data that does not comply with the service protocol of the target network, and forward the second flow data to an obfuscator honeypot, so that the obfuscator honeypot generates a disguised response corresponding to the second flow, wherein the disguised response includes honeypot disguised information containing honeypot identification characteristics.

[0015] Further, the step of forwarding the first flow data to the business service platform, and receiving the response information sent by the business service platform for the first flow data that complies with the service agreement of the target network, so as to insert the honeypot disguise information containing the honeypot identification characteristics into the response information includes:

[0016] Forwarding the first traffic data to the Ngi nx server, and determining whether the first traffic data is malicious traffic;

[0017] If the first traffic data is malicious traffic, the first traffic data which is malicious traffic is redirected to the honeypot.

[0018] Furthermore, the step of forwarding the first traffic data to the Ngi nx server and determining whether the first traffic data is malicious traffic includes:

[0019] If the first traffic data is not malicious traffic, forwarding the first traffic data that is not malicious traffic to the business service platform to obtain the response information;

[0020] A plurality of honeypot characteristic fields are sent, and the plurality of honeypot characteristic fields are connected in series to obtain the honeypot disguise information, and the honeypot disguise information is inserted into the response information.

[0021] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation, which is applied to a front-end honey court. The deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation includes:

[0022] A traffic analysis module, used to obtain network traffic data packets about multiple user terminals accessing a target network, and analyze the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with a service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the analysis results;

[0023] A first response module, used for forwarding the first flow data to a business service platform, and receiving a response message issued by the business service platform for the first flow data that complies with the service agreement of the target network, so as to insert the honeypot disguise information containing the honeypot identification feature into the response message;

[0024] The disguised information forwarding module is used to send the response information after inserting the honeypot disguised information to the user end corresponding to the first traffic data, so that the network attacker can identify the business service platform as a honeypot.

[0025] Furthermore, the traffic analysis module includes:

[0026] A data parsing unit, used to parse the network traffic packet to obtain a five-tuple corresponding to at least one piece of traffic data contained in the network traffic packet;

[0027] The traversal unit is used to traverse the preset switch flow table according to the five-tuple, so as to judge one by one whether the data flow contained in the network flow packet complies with the service agreement of the target network according to the traversal results.

[0028] Furthermore, the honeypot obfuscation-based deception defense system further includes:

[0029] The second response module is used to obtain second flow data that does not comply with the service protocol of the target network, and forward the second flow data to the obfuscator honeypot, so that the obfuscator honeypot generates a disguised response corresponding to the second flow, and the disguised response includes honeypot disguise information containing honeypot identification characteristics.

[0030] In a third aspect, the present invention provides a readable storage medium, wherein the readable storage medium stores one or more programs, which, when executed by a processor, implement the above-mentioned deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation.

[0031] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer device, the computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein:

[0032] The memory is used to store computer programs;

[0033] When the processor is used to execute the computer program stored in the memory, the above-mentioned deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation is implemented. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0034] Figure 1 A flowchart of a deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation proposed in the first embodiment of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 2 A flowchart of a deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation proposed in the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0036] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation proposed in the third embodiment of the present invention.

[0037] The following specific implementation manner will further illustrate the present invention in conjunction with the above-mentioned drawings. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention. Unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms used herein should be understood by people with general skills in the field to which the present invention belongs. "Including" and similar words used in this article mean that the elements or objects appearing before the word include the elements or objects listed after the word and their equivalents, without excluding other elements or objects.

[0039] In the embodiment of the present application, the technical term "front honey court" is a front proxy connected in series between the user and the real service. As a technology that supports attack observation and analysis, the front honey court can observe and judge the traffic entering the system in advance, forward normal traffic to normal business services, and divert malicious traffic to the honey field. The honey field is a business simulation platform based on a network target range, which can be regarded as a honeypot system that supports different fidelity. The front honey court can provide false services so that attackers do not feel that they have not entered the real business system, and can also judge the access trajectory of attackers to form a hidden attack judgment capability. In the attack observation stage, a service proxy with the same appearance is constructed in the front honey court to establish a secure isolation channel with the real system, so as to eliminate malicious loads, improve the agent response speed, observe user behavior and collect data. In the attack identification stage, a trust model and user IP reputation judgment rules are constructed, that is, the traffic, commands, data, network connections and other behavioral data in the proxy service are detected and collected, and reported to the analysis and judgment center.

[0040] In addition, the attack observation function and reverse proxy function are both submodule functions of the front honey court. The reverse proxy and traffic forwarding functions of the front honey court are implemented through secondary development based on the Ngi nx open source tool. Ngi nx is a widely used Web server and reverse proxy server. Due to its high performance, high reliability and low memory usage, it is widely used in the Internet field and corporate internal networks.

[0041] The attack observation function of the front-end honey court is realized through secondary development based on the open source WAF tool Modsecurity. Modsecurity is a mature, cross-platform Web application firewall (WAF), which can be loaded into Ngi nx as a module to realize content anomaly detection and analysis of data packets based on application layer protocols, and output the detection results. For access behaviors with abnormal detection results, the front-end honey court will divert them to the honey field. The honey field is a business simulation platform based on the network target range, which can be regarded as a honeypot system that supports different levels of realism.

[0042] In the embodiments of the present application, the technical term "honeypot" is a type of security resource. It has no business use in itself. Its value is to attract attackers to use it illegally. Honeypot technology arranges some hosts, networks or information as bait to induce attackers to attack it. The attack tools and methods used by the attacker are judged based on the captured system logs and network connections and other information, and the attack intentions are inferred, so that security managers can respond to the attack in a timely manner to systems or services that may have security vulnerabilities in the system. By updating the system or patching the vulnerabilities, the system's security protection capabilities are enhanced and network information security is maintained. The honeypot is proposed to solve the problems that exist when deploying honeypots in large distributed networks, such as a series of problems such as the need for a large amount of manpower and time for deployment, management and maintenance. The working principle of the honey farm is relatively simple: all honeypots are deployed in an independent network, which becomes the center of the honey farm. The front-end honey court is deployed in front of the business services that need to be protected. When the front-end honey court detects malicious attack traffic, the front-end honey court will redirect the malicious traffic to the honey farm. The honey farm will select a honeypot to respond to the attack information and use some means to collect and analyze the attack information.

[0043] In addition, the applicant found in actual research that Web application firewalls are widely used to defend against common Web attacks, such as SQL injection attacks, cross-site scripting attacks, etc. However, the essence of relying on rules for defense is to defend against known threats. In the game of attack and defense, for unknown attacks, such as 0day, WAF has no way to intercept, and attackers can manually mutate attack payloads to bypass WAF protection. Common payload compilation methods include case flipping, equivalent substitution, and encoded payloads. Although security vendors will continuously update the WAF rule base with captured attack traffic, it is difficult for attackers to find a universal payload compilation method. However, for WAFs from different vendors, attackers can still bypass WAFs by mutating attack payloads in a targeted manner. In addition, the widespread use of honeypots has brought great constraints to attackers in carrying out attacks. Therefore, more attackers have begun to study anti-honeypot technology so that they can avoid honeypots after identifying them. Although honeypots use various hiding technologies, they have their own characteristics, such as fingerprints. Fingerprints are the most direct way to identify the category of business systems, and honeypots generally leave their unique fingerprint information. In order to protect copyright issues or for publicity purposes, the developers of source programs generally leave copyright identity information, or leave feature information when using certain other open source programs. Most open source honeypots have unified return information, so it is relatively simple to identify directly deployed open source honeypots. In addition to open source honeypots, some commercial honeypots also leave fingerprint information, and some honeypots will capture the attack payload used by attackers in order to obtain detailed attack behaviors, even 0day. Usually, this type of honeypot will return a large amount of feature information in fields such as server, header, and title, making this type of honeypot easy to identify. Experienced attackers can identify honeypots based on these honeypot features, thereby bypassing the honeypot to invade the target network.

[0044] Based on this, the present invention uses SDN to redirect traffic. When external traffic flows through the front-end honey court, it will first pass through the Openf l ow switch with pre-configured flow table rules. The switch identifies and parses the traffic data packet to obtain the five-tuple information, and searches the Openf l ow switch flow table item according to the five-tuple content to filter out the first traffic data that meets the service agreement, and then forwards the first traffic data to the business service platform. The business service platform will return a response message. After the response message arrives at the Openf l ow switch, the front-end honey court will insert the honeypot fingerprint (honeypot disguise information containing honeypot identification characteristics) into the response message to use the honeypot identification characteristics to deceive attackers, so that attackers cannot distinguish between the normal service and the honeypot of the front-end honey court agent.

[0045] The following specific examples further illustrate the present application, but should not be construed as limiting the present application. Without departing from the spirit and substance of the present application, modifications or replacements made to the methods, steps or conditions of the present application are within the scope of the present application.

[0046] Embodiment 1

[0047] See also Figure 1 , which is a flow chart of a deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation provided by the first embodiment of the present invention, the method comprises steps S101 to S103, wherein:

[0048] Step S101: obtaining network traffic data packets about multiple users accessing a target network, and parsing the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with a service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the parsing result;

[0049] It should be pointed out that in the actual data traffic collection process, the user end includes users who visit normally, users who enter by mistake, and attackers who launch malicious attacks. That is to say, the network traffic data packet generally includes three types of traffic. Based on this, in order to add honeypot disguise information to the business services of normal visitors, the network traffic packet needs to be parsed to filter out the first traffic data that complies with the service protocol in the target network.

[0050] Step S102: forwarding the first flow data to the business service platform, and receiving response information issued by the business service platform for the first flow data that complies with the service agreement of the target network, so as to insert honeypot disguise information containing honeypot identification characteristics into the response information;

[0051] In this step, after parsing the normal access service-related traffic in the network traffic data packet, the first traffic data is uploaded to the business service platform to achieve honeypot disguise for the normal business service.

[0052] Step S103: sending the response information after inserting the honeypot disguise information to the user end corresponding to the first traffic data, so that the network attacker can identify the business service platform as a honeypot.

[0053] In summary, according to the above-mentioned deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation, by inserting the traffic data of normal business services into honeypot disguised information with honeypot identification characteristics, the honeypot characteristics are used to deceive attackers, making it impossible for attackers to distinguish between normal proxy services and honeypots, and then making attackers believe that the front honey court is the honeypot, thereby achieving the purpose of making attackers actively give up continuing to attack attempts, thereby improving the network defense effect and reducing network security risks. Specifically, first, network traffic packets for accessing the target network are collected, and the network traffic packets involve a large number of user terminals. Then, the network traffic packets are parsed to screen out services that meet the service protocol of the target network based on the parsing results. The service protocol of the target network corresponds to the target network, and then normal access service traffic (first traffic data) is obtained. Then, the first traffic data is forwarded to the business service platform, so that the business service platform sends a response message, and then the front-end honey court inserts honeypot disguise information into the response message. The honeypot disguise information contains honeypot identification characteristics, and then the response message is sent to the user terminal to deceive the attacker and make him mistakenly believe that the business service platform is the honeypot, so that the attacker can attack the real service of the front-end honey court agent as little as possible, which helps to solve potential security risks.

[0054] Embodiment 2

[0055] See also Figure 2 , which is a flow chart of a deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation in a second embodiment of the present invention, applied to a front honeypot, the method includes steps S201 to S205, wherein:

[0056] Step S201: parsing the network traffic packet to obtain a five-tuple corresponding to at least one piece of traffic data contained in the network traffic packet;

[0057] It should be noted that after obtaining the network traffic packet, the traffic is parsed according to the Openflow switch in the front-end honey court. The five-tuple refers to the source IP address SIP, the destination IP address DIP, the source port SPort, the destination port DPort, and the protocol type Protocol.

[0058] Step S202: traversing the preset switch flow table according to the five-tuple, so as to determine whether the data flow contained in the network flow packet complies with the service agreement of the target network according to the traversal results;

[0059] In this step, the preset switch flow table is searched according to the parsed quintuple to confirm whether it complies with the service agreement of the target network.

[0060] In addition, in some embodiments, second traffic data that does not comply with the service protocol of the target network is obtained, and the second traffic data is forwarded to an obfuscator honeypot, so that the obfuscator honeypot generates a disguised response corresponding to the second traffic, and the disguised response includes honeypot disguised information containing honeypot identification characteristics.

[0061] In addition, in this embodiment, one of the design goals of the OpenF l ow switch is to separate the control function and forwarding function of the network device, and then mainly concentrate the control function on the remote controller, while the OpenF l ow switch is responsible for forwarding data locally according to the flow table rules. The preset switch flow table is the core mechanism for the OpenF l ow switch to perform data packet forwarding, and accurately manages network traffic by matching elements such as fields, priorities, and actions. The switch will match and process data packets according to the flow table rules issued by the controller, such as performing forwarding, modification, or discarding operations. This architecture enables the OpenF l ow switch to implement complex network functions, such as flow control, security filtering, and service quality management, and is an important part of software-defined networking (SDN) technology.

[0062] Specifically, the data traffic packet first enters the switch and is mirrored to the DPI (deep packet inspection) engine. The DPI engine identifies the application layer protocol of the data packet, such as DNS, SMTP or HTTPS, and passes the identification result to the SDN controller. The SDN controller marks the data packet with a specific protocol tag based on the DPI analysis results, and generates corresponding flow table rules based on this, and then sends these rules to the switch. The switch matches different types of traffic based on the protocol fields in these flow table rules to filter out data traffic that meets the service protocol and does not meet the service protocol based on the type.

[0063] For example, traffic identified as HTTPS will be marked as protocol = 0x01, and then the traffic marked as protocol = 0x01 will be forwarded to port 2, and DNS and SMTP traffic marked as protocol = 0x02 and protocol = 0x03 will be forwarded to port 1.

[0064] In addition, it should be pointed out that traditional virtual honeypots are usually built based on behavioral scripts and virtual machines. The present invention splits the virtual honeypot (obfuscator honeypot) into a collection of services, and each service node provides a single service, such as FTP service and Telnet service. Through the software-defined network environment built by Openf l ow, each service is organized and forwarded through flow table rules, and virtual service resources are integrated, which is displayed as a unified honeypot to the outside world. However, it is physically composed of separate services. When an attacker captures a honeypot host, due to the separate service design, the attacker cannot completely capture the obfuscator honeypot. The network address (IP and MAC address) presented by the virtual honeypot to the outside world is different from the network address of the real node that carries its running service. The IP address and MAC address are mapped and modified through the Openf l ow switch to achieve normal data transmission and reception.

[0065] In addition, in some embodiments, in order to increase the authenticity of the Obfuscator honeypot, a fake traffic server is used to periodically send requests to the Obfuscator honeypot to generate a large amount of fake traffic, making the Obfuscator honeypot look like a normally operating system, thereby improving the credibility of the Obfuscator honeypot.

[0066] Step S203: forwarding the first traffic data to the Ngi nx server, and determining whether the first traffic data is malicious traffic;

[0067] It should be noted that the traffic that is not forwarded to the obfuscator honeypot by the Openflow switch will be forwarded to Ngi nx, which may also contain malicious traffic. Therefore, the traffic flowing through Ngi nx will be diverted secondary through the Modsecurity anomaly detection module. If it is normal traffic, it will be forwarded to normal business services. If it is abnormal traffic, it will be diverted to the honeypot.

[0068] Specifically, if the first traffic data is malicious traffic, the first traffic data that is malicious traffic is redirected to the honeypot.

[0069] Step S204: if the first traffic data is not malicious traffic, forwarding the first traffic data that is not malicious traffic to the business service platform to obtain the response information;

[0070] After receiving the response information, the front honey court sends multiple honeypot characteristic fields, and concatenates the multiple honeypot characteristic fields to obtain the honeypot disguise information, and inserts the honeypot disguise information into the response information; illustratively, the honeypot will generate characteristic information. For example, the response information returned by accessing the Cown honeypot will contain honeypot characteristic fields "xff", "xfd", and "x1f log in", and then the honeypot characteristic fields are concatenated to obtain "\xff\xfd\x1f log in", so as to insert the honeypot disguise information obtained by concatenating the honeypot characteristic fields into the response information. The response information is actually the interface information that pops up when the user accesses the target network, so that the inserted response information has the honeypot identification characteristics. The attacker can use these unique characteristics of the honeypot as the basis to identify it as a honeypot, that is, make the attacker identify the normal service as a honeypot, so as to achieve the effect of deceiving the attacker.

[0071] Step S205: sending the response information after inserting the honeypot disguise information to the user end corresponding to the first traffic data, so that the network attacker can identify the business service platform as a honeypot.

[0072] Compared with the prior art, the embodiments of the present invention have the following advantages:

[0073] 1. The front-end honey garden system forwards the attacker's detection traffic to the obfuscator honeypot through the traffic controller based on the Openf l ow switch, and the response data packet returned by the normal business service will be inserted with the honeypot fingerprint after arriving at the Openf l ow switch. The honeypot characteristics are used to deceive the attacker, making it impossible for the attacker to distinguish between the normal proxy service and the honeypot, making the attacker believe that the front-end honey garden is the honeypot, thereby achieving the purpose of making the attacker actively give up the attack attempt.

[0074] 2. The front honeypot has the ability to handle malicious traffic. When malicious traffic that the front honeypot does not support the protocol is detected, the malicious traffic will be forwarded to the obfuscator honeypot for isolation and processing. The traffic forwarded to Ngi nx will also be diverted through the ModSecurity anomaly detection module to redirect the detected malicious traffic to the honeypot. This mechanism increases the security of the network and allows network administrators to respond to new threats and attacks more flexibly.

[0075] Embodiment 3

[0076] See also Figure 3 , a deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation in the third embodiment of the present invention is shown, which is applied to the front honey court. The deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation includes:

[0077] The traffic analysis module 10 is used to obtain network traffic data packets about multiple user terminals accessing the target network, and analyze the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that meets the service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the analysis results;

[0078] Furthermore, in some optional embodiments, the traffic analysis module 10 further includes:

[0079] A data parsing unit, used to parse the network traffic packet to obtain a five-tuple corresponding to at least one piece of traffic data contained in the network traffic packet;

[0080] The traversal unit is used to traverse the preset switch flow table according to the five-tuple, so as to judge one by one whether the data flow contained in the network flow packet complies with the service agreement of the target network according to the traversal results.

[0081] The first response module 20 is used to forward the first flow data to the business service platform, and receive the response information sent by the business service platform for the first flow data, so as to insert the honeypot disguise information containing the honeypot identification characteristics into the response information;

[0082] Further, in some optional embodiments, the first response module 20 further includes:

[0083] A flow detection unit, configured to forward the first flow data to the Ngi nx server and determine whether the first flow data is malicious flow;

[0084] a redirecting unit, configured to redirect the first traffic data, which is malicious traffic, to a honeypot if the first traffic data is malicious traffic;

[0085] a forwarding execution unit, configured to forward the first traffic data which is not malicious traffic to the business service platform to obtain the response information if the first traffic data is not malicious traffic;

[0086] The feature generation unit is used to send a plurality of honeypot feature fields, connect the plurality of honeypot feature fields in series, obtain the honeypot disguise information, and insert the honeypot disguise information into the response information.

[0087] The disguised information forwarding module 30 is used to send the response information after inserting the honeypot disguised information to the user end corresponding to the first traffic data, so that the network attacker can identify the business service platform as a honeypot.

[0088] Furthermore, in some optional embodiments, the system further comprises:

[0089] The second response module is used to obtain second flow data that does not comply with the service protocol of the target network, and forward the second flow data to the obfuscator honeypot, so that the obfuscator honeypot generates a disguised response corresponding to the second flow, and the disguised response includes honeypot disguise information containing honeypot identification characteristics.

[0090] In summary, according to the above-mentioned deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation, by inserting the traffic data of normal business services into honeypot disguised information with honeypot identification characteristics, the honeypot characteristics are used to deceive attackers, making it impossible for attackers to distinguish between normal proxy services and honeypots, and then making attackers believe that the front honey court is the honeypot, so as to achieve the purpose of making attackers actively give up further attack attempts, thereby improving the network defense effect and reducing network security risks.

[0091] Another aspect of the present invention further provides a readable storage medium on which one or more programs are stored, and when the programs are executed by a processor, the above-mentioned deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation is implemented.

[0092] On the other hand, the present invention further proposes a computer device, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store computer programs, and the processor is used to execute the computer programs stored in the memory to implement the above-mentioned deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation.

[0093] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or otherwise described herein, for example, may be considered as an ordered list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and may be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus (such as a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other system that can fetch instructions from an instruction execution system, device or apparatus and execute instructions), or in conjunction with such instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses. For purposes of this specification, "computer-readable medium" may be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate or transmit a program for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus, or in conjunction with such instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses.

[0094] More specific examples of computer-readable media (a non-exhaustive list) include the following: an electrical connection with one or more wires (electronic device), a portable computer disk case (magnetic device), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber device, and a portable compact disk read-only memory (CDROM). In addition, the computer-readable medium may even be a paper or other suitable medium on which the program is printed, since the program may be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other medium, followed by editing, deciphering or, if necessary, processing in another suitable manner, and then stored in a computer memory.

[0095] It should be understood that the various parts of the present invention can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the above-mentioned embodiments, a plurality of steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented by hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented by any one of the following technologies known in the art or a combination thereof: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function for a data signal, a dedicated integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0096] Although the embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above, it is obvious to those skilled in the art that various modifications and variations can be made to these embodiments. However, it should be understood that such modifications and variations are within the scope and spirit of the present invention as described in the claims. Moreover, the present invention described herein may have other embodiments and may be implemented or realized in a variety of ways.

Claims

1. A deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation, applied to the front honeypot, characterized in that: The method comprises: Acquire network traffic data packets about multiple user terminals accessing a target network, and parse the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with a service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the parsing result; Forwarding the first flow data to a business service platform, and receiving response information issued by the business service platform in response to the first flow data, so as to insert honeypot disguise information containing honeypot identification characteristics into the response information; The response information after the honeypot disguise information is inserted is sent to the user end corresponding to the first traffic data, so that the network attacker can identify the business service platform as a honeypot.

2. The deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of obtaining network traffic data packets about multiple users accessing the target network, and parsing the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with the service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the parsing results includes: Parsing the network traffic packet to obtain a five-tuple corresponding to at least one piece of traffic data contained in the network traffic packet; The preset switch flow table is traversed according to the five-tuple to determine one by one whether the data traffic included in the network traffic packet complies with the service agreement of the target network according to the traversal results.

3. The deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation according to claim 1 is characterized in that: After the step of obtaining network traffic data packets about multiple users accessing the target network and parsing the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with the service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the parsing results, the method further includes: Acquire second flow data that does not comply with the service protocol of the target network, and forward the second flow data to an obfuscator honeypot, so that the obfuscator honeypot generates a disguised response corresponding to the second flow, wherein the disguised response includes honeypot disguised information containing honeypot identification characteristics.

4. The deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of forwarding the first flow data to the business service platform, and receiving the response information sent by the business service platform for the first flow data that complies with the service agreement of the target network, so as to insert the honeypot disguise information containing the honeypot identification characteristic into the response information includes: Forwarding the first traffic data to the Nginx server, and determining whether the first traffic data is malicious traffic; If the first traffic data is malicious traffic, the first traffic data which is malicious traffic is redirected to the honeypot.

5. The method for preventing fraud based on honeypot obfuscation according to claim 4, characterized in that: The step of forwarding the first traffic data to the Nginx server and determining whether the first traffic data is malicious traffic includes: If the first traffic data is not malicious traffic, forwarding the first traffic data that is not malicious traffic to the business service platform to obtain the response information; A plurality of honeypot characteristic fields are sent, and the plurality of honeypot characteristic fields are connected in series to obtain the honeypot disguise information, and the honeypot disguise information is inserted into the response information.

6. A deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation, applied to the front honeypot, characterized in that: The deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation includes: A traffic analysis module, used to obtain network traffic data packets about multiple user terminals accessing a target network, and analyze the network traffic data packets to filter out first traffic data that complies with a service agreement of the target network from the network traffic data packets according to the analysis results; A first response module, used for forwarding the first flow data to a business service platform, and receiving a response message issued by the business service platform for the first flow data that complies with the service agreement of the target network, so as to insert the honeypot disguise information containing the honeypot identification feature into the response message; The disguised information forwarding module is used to send the response information after inserting the honeypot disguised information to the user end corresponding to the first traffic data, so that the network attacker can identify the business service platform as a honeypot.

7. The deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation according to claim 6, characterized in that: The traffic analysis module includes: A data parsing unit, used to parse the network traffic packet to obtain a five-tuple corresponding to at least one piece of traffic data contained in the network traffic packet; The traversal unit is used to traverse the preset switch flow table according to the five-tuple, so as to judge one by one whether the data flow contained in the network flow packet complies with the service agreement of the target network according to the traversal results.

8. The deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation according to claim 6, characterized in that: The deception defense system based on honeypot obfuscation also includes: The second response module is used to obtain second flow data that does not comply with the service protocol of the target network, and forward the second flow data to the obfuscator honeypot, so that the obfuscator honeypot generates a disguised response corresponding to the second flow, and the disguised response includes honeypot disguise information containing honeypot identification characteristics.

9. A readable storage medium, characterized in that: The readable storage medium stores one or more programs, which, when executed by a processor, implement the deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

10. A computer device, characterized in that: The computer device comprises a memory and a processor, wherein: The memory is used to store computer programs; When the processor is used to execute a computer program stored in the memory, the deception defense method based on honeypot obfuscation described in any one of claims 1 to 5 is implemented.

Citation Information

Cited By

  • Industrial control honey pot concealment detection method and system

    CN119743329A