Secure establishment method, communication method and device

CN119032628APending Publication Date: 2024-11-26GUANGDONG OPPO MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202280095092.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-09-30
Publication Date
2024-11-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

When the source user equipment and the target user equipment are far apart, the existing technology lacks a clear solution to securely establish an end-to-end communication link, especially with the assistance of relay user equipment.

Method used

The relay user equipment establishes communication links with the source user equipment and the target user equipment respectively, and after establishing communication links between the relay user equipment and the source user equipment, and between the relay user equipment and the target user equipment, forwarding End-to-end messages to ensure the establishment of a secure end-to-end communication link between the source user device and the target user device.

Benefits of technology

It implements an end-to-end security establishment process that is more compatible with existing protocols, avoids conflicts with existing protocols, and provides a clear solution to solve the secure end-to-end link problem in UE-to-UE relay communications. .

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention provides a security establishment method, a communication method and a communication device. The method comprises the following steps: a source UE establishes a communication link with a relay UE; and after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, the source UE and the target UE safely establish an end-to-end communication link. According to the scheme provided by the embodiment of the invention, a clear scheme is provided for safely establishing an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE. Besides, after the communication links between the relay UE and the source UE and between the relay UE and the target UE are established, the end-to-end communication links between the source UE and the target UE are safely established, so that the end-to-end safe establishment process is more compatible with the existing protocol, and conflicts with the existing protocol are avoided.
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Description

Security establishment method, communication method and device Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and more specifically, to a secure establishment method, a communication method, and a device. Background Art

[0002] When the source user equipment (UE) and the target UE are far apart, the source UE can communicate with the target UE through a relay UE. In this scenario, there is currently no clear solution for how to securely establish an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

[0003] Summary of the Invention

[0004] The present application provides a secure establishment method, a communication method, and an apparatus. The following introduces various aspects of the present application.

[0005] In a first aspect, a method for secure establishment is provided, comprising: a source UE establishing a communication link with a relay UE; after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, the source UE securely establishes an end-to-end communication link with the target UE.

[0006] In a second aspect, a communication method is provided, including: a target UE establishes a communication link with a relay UE; after the relay UE establishes communication links with a source UE and the target UE respectively, the target UE securely establishes an end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

[0007] In a third aspect, a communication method is provided, including: a relay UE establishes communication links with a source UE and a target UE respectively; after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, the relay UE forwards the end-to-end message between the source UE and the target UE, and the end-to-end message is used for the source UE and the target UE to securely establish an end-to-end communication link.

[0008] In a fourth aspect, a terminal device is provided, which is a source UE, and the terminal device includes: an establishment unit for establishing a communication link with a relay UE; the establishment unit is also used to: after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, securely establish an end-to-end communication link with the target UE.

[0009] In the fifth aspect, a terminal device is provided, which is a target UE, and the terminal device includes: an establishment unit for establishing a communication link with a relay UE; the establishment unit is also used to: after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, securely establish an end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

[0010] In the sixth aspect, a terminal device is provided, which is a relay UE, and the terminal device includes: an establishment unit for establishing communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively; a forwarding unit for forwarding end-to-end messages between the source UE and the target UE after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, and the end-to-end messages are used for the source UE and the target UE to securely establish an end-to-end communication link.

[0011] In a seventh aspect, a terminal device is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store a program, and the processor is used to call the program in the memory to execute the method described in any one of the first to third aspects.

[0012] In an eighth aspect, a device is provided, comprising a processor for calling a program from a memory to execute the method as described in any one of the first to third aspects.

[0013] In a ninth aspect, a chip is provided, comprising a processor for calling a program from a memory so that a device equipped with the chip executes the method described in any one of the first to third aspects.

[0014] In an eleventh aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a program is stored, wherein the program enables a computer to execute the method according to any one of the first to third aspects.

[0015] In a twelfth aspect, a computer program product is provided, comprising a program, wherein the program enables a computer to execute the method as described in any one of the first to third aspects.

[0016] In a thirteenth aspect, a computer program is provided, wherein the computer program enables a computer to execute the method as described in any one of the first to third aspects.

[0017] The embodiments of the present application provide a secure establishment method that, for UE-to-UE relay communication, provides a clear solution for securely establishing an end-to-end communication link between a source UE and a target UE. Furthermore, by securely establishing an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE after establishing the communication links between the relay UE and the source UE, and between the relay UE and the target UE, the end-to-end secure establishment process can be made more compatible with existing protocols, avoiding conflicts with existing protocols. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] FIG1 is an exemplary diagram of a communication system applicable to an embodiment of the present application.

[0019] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the key hierarchy provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0020] FIG3 is a schematic diagram of a process for establishing an end-to-end communication link.

[0021] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a process of establishing a shared key between UEs.

[0022] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of a process for establishing a secure connection between UEs.

[0023] FIG6 is a schematic diagram of a user plane protocol stack of a layer 2 relay.

[0024] FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a control plane protocol stack of a layer 2 relay.

[0025] FIG8 is a schematic diagram of a process of establishing an end-to-end communication link through a relay UE proposed in the related art.

[0026] FIG9 is a flow chart of a security establishment method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0027] FIG10 is a flow chart of establishing a shared key between UEs according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0028] FIG11 is a schematic diagram of a process for establishing a secure connection between UEs provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0029] FIG12 is a schematic diagram of another process of establishing a shared key between UEs provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0030] FIG13 is a schematic diagram of a process for establishing a secure connection between another UE provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0031] FIG14 is a schematic block diagram of a source UE provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0032] Figure 15 is a schematic block diagram of a target UE provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0033] FIG16 is a schematic block diagram of a relay UE provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0034] FIG17 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0035] The technical solution in this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0036] Figure 1 is a wireless communication system 100 used in an embodiment of the present application. The wireless communication system 100 may include a network device 110 and a user equipment (UE) 120. The network device 110 may be a device that communicates with the UE 120. The network device 110 may provide network coverage for a specific geographical area and may communicate with the UE 120 (such as UE1, UE2, and UE3 in Figure 1) located within the coverage area. The UE 120 may access a network (such as a wireless network) through the network device 110. Optionally, the wireless communication system 100 may also include other network entities such as a network controller and a mobility management entity, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.

[0037] It should be understood that the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as: fifth generation (5G) system or new radio (NR), long term evolution (LTE) system, LTE frequency division duplex (FDD) system, LTE time division duplex (TDD), etc. The technical solutions provided in this application can also be applied to future communication systems, such as the sixth generation mobile communication system, satellite communication system, etc.

[0038] The UE in the embodiments of the present application may also be referred to as a terminal device, an access terminal, a user unit, a user station, a mobile station, a mobile station (MS), a mobile terminal (MT), a remote station, a remote terminal, a mobile device, a user terminal, a terminal, a wireless communication device, a user agent, or a user apparatus. The UE in the embodiments of the present application may refer to a device that provides voice and / or data connectivity to a user and can be used to connect people, objects, and machines, such as a handheld device or an in-vehicle device with wireless connection capabilities. The UE in the embodiments of the present application can be a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a laptop computer, a PDA, a mobile internet device (MID), a wearable device, a virtual reality (VR) device, an augmented reality (AR) device, a wireless terminal in industrial control, a wireless terminal in self-driving, a wireless terminal in remote medical surgery, a wireless terminal in a smart grid, a wireless terminal in transportation safety, a wireless terminal in a smart city, a wireless terminal in a smart home, etc. Optionally, the UE can be used to act as a base station. For example, the UE can act as a scheduling entity that provides sidelink signals between UEs in V2X or D2D, etc. For example, a cellular phone and a car communicate with each other using sidelink signals. The cellular phone and smart home devices communicate without relaying the communication signal through a base station.

[0039] The network device in the embodiments of the present application may be a device for communicating with a UE, and may also be referred to as an access network device or a radio access network device. For example, the network device may be a base station. The network device in the embodiments of the present application may refer to a radio access network (RAN) node (or device) that connects a UE to a wireless network. A base station may broadly cover various names as follows, or be replaced with the following names, such as: NodeB, evolved NodeB (eNB), next generation NodeB (gNB), relay station, access point, transmitting and receiving point (TRP), transmitting point (TP), master station MeNB, secondary station SeNB, multi-standard radio (MSR) node, home base station, network controller, access node, wireless node, access point (AP), transmission node, transceiver node, baseband unit (BBU), remote radio unit (RRU), active antenna unit (AAU), remote radio head (RRH), central unit (CU), distributed unit (DU), positioning node, etc. A base station may be a macro base station, a micro base station, a relay node, a donor node, or the like, or a combination thereof.

[0040] Base stations can be fixed or mobile. For example, a helicopter or drone can be configured to act as a mobile base station, and one or more cells can move based on the location of the mobile base station. In other examples, a helicopter or drone can be configured to act as a device that communicates with another base station.

[0041] The network equipment and terminal devices can be deployed on land, including indoors or outdoors, handheld or vehicle-mounted; they can also be deployed on water; they can also be deployed in the air on aircraft, balloons, and satellites. The embodiments of this application do not limit the scenarios in which the network equipment and terminal devices are located.

[0042] It should also be understood that all or part of the functions of the communication device (such as a terminal device or a network device) in this application can also be implemented through software functions running on hardware, or through virtualization functions instantiated on a platform (such as a cloud platform).

[0043] The UEs shown in Figure 1 can communicate with each other via a sidelink (SL). Sidelink communication can also be called proximity services (ProSe) communication, unilateral communication, sidelink communication, device-to-device (D2D) communication, or end-to-end (E2E) communication.

[0044] UEs can communicate with each other via an interface that can be used for information transmission on the data plane and the control plane. The interface can be a proximity communication 5 (PC5) interface or a sidelink interface. For ease of description, the PC5 interface is used as an example for the following description.

[0045] A UE with ProSe capability can communicate directly with another UE with ProSe capability through the PC5 interface. A UE with ProSe capability can discover another UE with ProSe capability through the discovery process. For example, UE1 can broadcast information about the UE it wants to discover, such as service information (indicating that it wants to discover UEs that support this service), the user identity of the target UE at the application layer, etc. The frame structure of the data packet of the UE1 broadcast message can carry the link layer (i.e., layer 2) identity (ID) of UE1. UE2 determines that it is the UE that UE1 wants to discover by receiving the broadcast message, and obtains the layer 2 (layer 2, L2) ID of UE1. UE2 can send a response message to UE1, which carries UE2 information, such as service information supported by UE2, UE2 user identity at the application layer, etc. The frame structure of the response message sent by UE2 carries UE2's L2 ID, and UE1 learns the information of UE2 and UE2's L2 ID.

[0046] After obtaining the L2 ID of UE2, UE1 may send a direct communication request to UE2 to request establishment of a PC5 connection. The communication link established between UE1 and UE2 may be referred to as a unicast link or a single-hop link.

[0047] The above-mentioned UE1 may also be referred to as a source UE, and UE2 may also be referred to as a target UE.

[0048] To ensure the security of data transmission, an end-to-end secure communication link may be established between UE1 and UE2. The secure communication link may include a security context, which may be used to encrypt the communication data between UE1 and UE2.

[0049] Before introducing the security context, the key hierarchy involved in the embodiment of the present application is first introduced. Referring to Figure 2, the key hierarchy in the embodiment of the present application may include the following keys: security credentials, shared keys (available K D or K NRP Indicated by K below D For example, the session key (K D-sess or K NRP-sess Indicated by K below D-sess For example, the integrity protection key (K D-int Or NRPIK, hereinafter referred to as K D-int For example, the encryption key (K D-enc Or NRPEK, hereinafter referred to as K D-enc An encryption key may also be referred to as a confidentiality protection key.

[0050] The security credential is the root of security for the PC5 unicast link. The security credential between the source UE and the target UE can be a symmetric key, a public / private key pair, a password, etc., depending on the specific use case. The source UE and the target UE can generate a subordinate key K through interactive authentication signaling. D .

[0051] K D The key is at least 256 bits long and can be generated by the source UE and the target UE based on the key certificate during the authentication and key establishment process. In addition, the key can be updated by re-running the above authentication and key establishment process. D Can be used to generate the next level key K D-sess The key K can be saved even if there is no active communication session between the source UE and the target UE. D ID can be used to identify K D .

[0052] K D-sess The key length is at least 256 bits and is used to derive the next level of integrity protection key or encryption protection key. The key can be refreshed by re-running the security connection establishment process or the related key update process. D-sess ID can be used to identify K D-sess The key can be K D Derived using a key derivation algorithm such as HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SM3. D-sess In the process, the input key is K D The input parameters are the random number Nonce_1 and the random number Nonce_2. In addition, the length of the random number and other system settings can be used as optional input parameters.

[0053] K D-int The key length is at least 128 bits. This key can be used to protect the integrity of E2E data. D-sess Derived using a key derivation algorithm such as HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SM3. D-int In the process, the input key can be K D-sess , the input parameters may include the selected algorithm type identifier (such as "integrity protection algorithm" or set a specific value to identify) and the length of the identifier, the integrity protection algorithm and the length of the identifier. In addition, other system setting parameters may be used as optional input parameters. D-sess During auto-refresh, the key is automatically updated.

[0054] K D-enc The key length is at least 128 bits. This key can be used to encrypt E2E data. D-sess Derived using a key derivation algorithm such as HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SM3. D-enc In the process, the input key can be K D-sess , the input parameters may include the selected algorithm type identifier (such as "confidentiality protection algorithm" or set a specific value to identify) and the length of the identifier, the confidentiality protection algorithm and the length of the identifier. In addition, other system setting parameters can be used as optional input parameters. D-sess During auto-refresh, the key is automatically updated.

[0055] Depending on the key used by the UE for encryption, the UE's security state can be divided into configuration security, partial security and full security. For configuration security, the UE only has security credentials. For partial security, the UE has recently communicated with another UE and has a K shared with the other UE. D , but no other derived keys. For complete security, a UE and another UE actually communicate, having K D and the security context for each unicast link.

[0056] The UE can establish a security context for each unicast link. The security context may include one or more of the following: session keys, integrity protection keys, confidentiality protection keys, selected confidentiality and integrity algorithms, and Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) counters used for each bearer. When a unicast link is re-encrypted, the UE updates the security context associated with the unicast link. Once the unicast link is released, the UE deletes the security context associated with the unicast link.

[0057] The following describes the process of establishing a communication link between UEs in conjunction with FIG. 3 to FIG. 5 .

[0058] 3 , in step S310 , UE1 sends a direct communication request (DCR) message. The DCR message is allowed to be received by multiple UEs, for example, UE2, UE3, and UE4 in FIG3 can all receive the DCR message.

[0059] After receiving the DCR message in step S320, UE2, UE3 and UE4 can determine whether to respond to the DCR message. Assuming that UE2 chooses to respond to the DCR message, UE2 can perform a direct authentication and key establishment procedure with UE1 to generate a key K. D .

[0060] If there is a key K between UE1 and UE2 D , then step S320 may not be executed.

[0061] In step S330 , UE1 and UE2 execute a Direct Security Mode Command procedure to continue the connection establishment procedure.

[0062] If the connection is successfully established, the information sent by UE1 to other UEs may be included in a direct security mode complete message sent by UE1 and sent as part of the direct security mode process.

[0063] In step S340 , UE2 sends a direct communication response (DCA) message to UE1.

[0064] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a process of establishing a shared key between UE1 and UE2 according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0065] 4 , in step S410 , when UE1 determines to establish a PC5 connection with another UE, UE1 may send a DCR message, which is received by UE2.

[0066] In some embodiments, the DCR message may include Key_Est_Info. If UE1 does not require a signal integrity security policy, the DCR message may not include Key_Est_Info. Key_Est_Info can be understood as a universal container on the PC5 interface. Identity authentication can be performed within the Key_Est_Info. Key_Est_Info can contain various data required for key establishment. This data is transparent to the PC5 layer, meaning the PC5 layer does not need to understand the contents of Key_Est_Info.

[0067] In step S420a, UE2 sends a Direct Auth and Key Establish message to UE1. The Direct Auth and Key Establish message may include Key_Est_Info.

[0068] In step S420b, UE1 sends a Direct Auth and Key Establish Response message to UE2. The Direct Auth and Key Establish Response message may include Key_Est_Info.

[0069] In step S430, UE2 can calculate the key K D UE2 sends a direct security mode command message to UE1. The direct security mode command message may include Key_Est_Info and K D The most significant bit (MSB) of the ID. UE2 can choose K D The MSB of the ID to uniquely identify the K at UE2 D .

[0070] In step S440, after UE1 receives the direct security mode command message, UE1 can calculate K according to Key_Est_Info. D In addition, UE1 can also choose K D The least significant bit (LSB) of the ID is used to uniquely identify the K D UE1 can also receive K D The MSB of ID and its selected K D LSB of ID, generates K D ID, and the complete K D ID and K D Store together.

[0071] In step S450, UE1 sends a Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE2. The Direct Security Mode Complete message may include K D LSB of the ID.

[0072] After receiving the security mode completion message, UE2 can D The MSB of the ID and the received K D LSB of ID, generate complete K D In addition, UE2 can also convert the complete K D ID and K D Store together.

[0073] FIG5 is a schematic diagram showing a process of establishing an end-to-end secure connection between UE1 and UE2.

[0074] Before introducing Figure 5, the security policies involved in the embodiments of the present application are first introduced. The security policies in the embodiments of the present application can be set for different protection keys. The protection keys may include, for example, one or more of the following: a signal integrity protection key, a signal confidentiality protection key, a user plane integrity protection key, and a user plane privacy protection key.

[0075] The security policy can include one or more of the following: REQUIRED, PREFERRED, and NOT NEED. REQUIRED indicates that the UE should only accept a connection if a non-null confidentiality algorithm or a non-null integrity algorithm is used to protect the traffic. NOT NEED indicates that the UE can only establish a connection without security. PREFERRED indicates that the UE is allowed to attempt to establish a security connection but is allowed to accept a connection without security.

[0076] Referring to FIG. 5 , in step S510 , UE1 sends a DCR message to UE2.

[0077] The DCR message may include the security capabilities of UE1 and the signaling security policy of UE1. The security capabilities of UE1 may include a list of algorithms that UE1 will accept for this connection.

[0078] If the signaling integrity protection policy of UE1 is "REQUIRED" or "PREFERRED", the DCR message may also include Nonce_1 and K D sess The MSB of ID. Nonce_1 can be used to generate K D sess .

[0079] UE1 needs to select KD sess The MSB of the ID so that UE1 can use K D sess The ID locally identifies the security context created by this process.

[0080] If UE1 has K corresponding to UE2 D , then the DCR message can also include K D ID. If there is no K in the DCR message D ID, indicating that no K is generated between UE1 and UE2 D .

[0081] In addition, the DCR message may also include Key_Est_Info.

[0082] In step S520, UE2 initiates direct authentication and key establishment process initialization to UE1.

[0083] If UE1's signaling security policy is "NOT NEED" and UE2's security policy is "REQUIRED", UE2 should reject UE1's DCR. If UE1's signaling security policy is "REQUIRED" and UE2's security policy is "NOT NEED", UE2 should also reject UE1's DCR.

[0084] If UE2 does not have the K indicated in step S510 D and K D ID pair, and signaling is required to establish a key for a specific use case, UE2 needs to execute step S520.

[0085] If direct authentication and key establishment is initiated, UE1 and UE2 can authenticate each other using the information exchanged in Key_Est_Info. The authentication method used by UE1 and UE2 is application-specific. During direct authentication and key establishment, either UE is allowed to reject the authentication process.

[0086] In step S530, UE2 sends a Direct Security Mode Command message to UE1.

[0087] Unless UE2 selects the null integrity algorithm, the direct security mode command message needs to include K D The MSB of ID. If you want to generate a new K D , the security mode command message may also include Key_Est_Info.

[0088] In some embodiments, the security mode command message may also include an algorithm (choosen_alg) parameter selected by UE2. The algorithm here may be an integrity protection algorithm and / or a confidentiality protection algorithm. A non-null security algorithm in the selected algorithm indicates that the corresponding security protection is activated and the UE will use the security algorithm to protect the data in the message. A null security algorithm in the selected algorithm indicates that the corresponding security protection is not protected. If UE2's signaling integrity security policy is "NOT NEED" or "PREFERRED", the selected algorithm may only use the null integrity algorithm.

[0089] In some embodiments, the security mode command message may also include the security capabilities of UE1 and the signaling security policy of UE1 to provide protection against bid rejection attacks. In the case of selecting the null integrity algorithm, the null confidentiality algorithm should also be selected, and UE2 should set the K of the security context to D sess The ID is set to an all-zero value.

[0090] In some embodiments, when UE2 decides to activate at least the integrity security protection of this connection, the security mode command message may include Nonce_2 and K D sess The LSB of the ID. This Nonce_2 is used to calculate the session key. K D sess The LSB of the ID may be used by UE2 to locally identify the security context created by this procedure.

[0091] In some embodiments, UE2 can D , Nonce_1, and Nonce_2 to calculate the session key. UE2 can also derive the encryption key and / or integrity protection key based on the session key and the selected algorithm.

[0092] In some embodiments, UE2 may determine the K received in step S510. D sess The MSB of the ID and the K sent in step S530 D sess LSB of ID, generates K D sess ID.

[0093] In step S540, after receiving the direct security mode command message sent by UE2, UE1 may send a direct security mode command complete message to UE2.

[0094] In some embodiments, after receiving the Direct Security Mode Command message, UE1 can check the algorithm selected by UE2. The Null Integrity Algorithm should only be accepted if UE1's signaling integrity protection security policy is NOT NEED or PREFERRED. If the Null Integrity Algorithm is selected for signaling integrity protection, UE2 can also check the UE1's security capabilities and the UE's signaling security policy returned by UE2 to prevent denial of service attacks.

[0095] In some embodiments, UE1 may use the K D sess The MSB of the ID and the K received in step S530 D sess LSB of ID, generates K D sess ID.

[0096] In some embodiments, UE1 may calculate the session key, the integrity protection key, and the confidentiality protection key in the same manner as UE2.

[0097] In some embodiments, UE1 may create a D sess In the subsequent communication process, UE1 can use the new security context to protect information and receive signaling messages using the new security context.

[0098] After UE1 sends the security mode command completion message to UE2, an end-to-end secure communication link is established between UE1 and UE2.

[0099] After a secure communication link is established between UE1 and UE2, signaling and data between the UEs can be protected at the PDCP layer. Once security is established for a connection, all signaling messages for that connection will be key-protected using the selected algorithm.

[0100] The least significant bits of the key ID and counter used in the data are carried in the PDCP header. If integrity protection is activated, the PDCP header may also carry a message authentication code (MAC) required for integrity protection.

[0101] Different target UEs can establish different security contexts with the source UE. If both UE2 and UE3 respond to UE1's DCR message, the security context established between UE1 and UE2 is different from the security context established between UE1 and UE3.

[0102] The UE1 described above may be referred to as a source UE, and the UE2 may be referred to as a target UE.

[0103] The source UE and target UE described above communicate directly. When the source UE and target UE are far apart, a relay UE can assist. The source UE can communicate with the target UE through the relay UE, and the target UE can communicate with the source UE through the relay UE.

[0104] Continuing to refer to FIG. 1 , UE1 and UE3 in FIG. 1 are far apart. UE1 and UE3 can communicate through UE2, and UE2 can serve as a relay UE between UE1 and UE3.

[0105] FIG1 shows a scenario in which UE1 and UE3 communicate through a relay UE (ie, UE2). The embodiments of the present application are not limited thereto, and UE1 and UE3 may also communicate through multiple relay UEs.

[0106] Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the user plane protocol stack and control plane protocol stack for Layer 2 relay, respectively. As can be seen from Figures 6 and 7, the source UE, relay UE, and target UE are all equipped with an adaptation layer, which can be used to relay data. This adaptation layer can be located above the radio link control (RLC) layer and below the PDCP layer.

[0107] There are currently no relevant provisions in the protocol on how to securely establish an end-to-end communication link between a source UE and a target UE communicating through a relay UE.

[0108] The related art provides a method for secure establishment, as shown in Figure 8. The following describes the various steps shown in Figure 8.

[0109] At step S802, the relay UE registers with the network and specifies its relay capability. The relay UE may use existing procedures described in TS 23.304 to provide relay policy parameters for UE-to-UE relaying using relay policy parameters from the network.

[0110] In step S804, the target UEs (ie, UE2, UE3, and UE4) may determine the target L2 ID (ie, broadcast layer 2 ID) for signaling reception for PC5 unicast link establishment according to section 6.4.3.1 of TS 23.304.

[0111] At step S806, on the source UE (i.e., UE1), the application layer provides application information to the ProSe layer for PC5 unicast communication. The application information may include ProSe service information and the application layer ID of the source UE. In some embodiments, the application information may also include the application layer ID of the target UE, as specified in TS 23.304, section 6.4.3.1.

[0112] The Prose layer can trigger the link establishment process by sending a DCR message containing the security parameters specified in TS 33.536 [9].

[0113] The DCR message is sent without an adaptation layer header. The DCR message can be used for direct and / or indirect link establishment. In some embodiments, the target UE that directly receives the DCR from UE1 can perform a link establishment process according to the existing technology process.

[0114] At step S808, after receiving the DCR message, the relay UE can verify whether it is configured to relay the application and compare the Prose service information with the relay policy / parameters it provides.

[0115] The relay UE can forward the DCR message using its own L2 ID as the source L2 ID and specify the target UE's L2 ID as the target L2 ID. The target L2 ID can be specified in the received DCR message, obtained during a previous discovery process between the relay UE and the target UE, or a broadcast L2 ID.

[0116] The relay UE may add an adaptation header that may include information identifying UE1. The DCR message forwarded by the relay UE may include its unique relay ID and K D-sess The relay UE may keep the K specified in the DCR message. D-sess The UE1MSB of the ID and the K specified in the forwarded DCR message D-sess Any subsequent E2E messages (i.e. PC5-S and data) can be forwarded based on the UE ID specified in the adaptation header.

[0117] In step S810, the target UE (i.e., UE3) receives the DCR message via the relay UE. UE3 is interested in the application sent by UE1, so UE3 can trigger the establishment of a PC5 unicast link with the relay UE. If a PC5 unicast link has not yet been established between UE3 and the relay UE, UE3 can trigger the establishment of a PC5 unicast link with the relay UE.

[0118] In step S812 , UE3 initiates a security process (ie, PC5 authentication and / or PC5 direct security mode process) through the selected relay UE (ie, through a direct PC5 link to the relay UE) to continue the E2E link establishment process.

[0119] UE3 can add an adaptation layer header, which can include the information identifying UE1 received together with the DCR message, KD-sess LSB of ID (LSB of K D-sess ID), UE3 identifier. UE3 can receive the K D-sess MSB of ID and its UE3K D-sess The LSB of the ID is associated with the LSB of the ID to create a security context for the extended link. The first message (i.e., Direct Link Authentication Request or Direct Security Mode Command) sent by UE3 to UE1 contains the Relay ID.

[0120] The relay UE forwards the message from UE3 to UE1, including relay-specific information identifying UE3 in the adaptation header. The relay UE may also specify the K associated with UE3 received with the DCR message. D-sess Relay-specific LSB and K of the ID D-sess In addition, the message forwarded by the relay UE to UE1 may include information identifying UE1 and associated with the DCR message. For example, the message may include the UE1 L2 ID used by UE1 when sending the DCR message.

[0121] The relay UE may use its L2 ID as the source ID and UE1 L2 ID as the target ID. The relay UE may keep the K specified in the message received from UE3. D-sess UE3 LSB of ID is associated with UE3 K D-sess The relay-specific LSB of the ID is associated.

[0122] At step S814, upon receiving the first message from UE3 via the relay UE, UE1 extracts the relay ID and verifies whether a PC5 unicast link has been established between UE1 and the relay UE. If a PC5 unicast link has been established between UE1 and the relay UE, UE1 triggers the PC5 unicast link establishment procedure using the relay UE and then continues the security procedure at step S812. UE1 tracks the K specified in the received message. D-sess LSB of ID (i.e. LSB K D-sess ID is associated to UE3) and uses K D-sess The LSB of the ID creates a security context for the extended link.

[0123] In step S816 , once the E2E link security establishment process is completed, UE3 may send a DCA message to UE1 via the relay UE to complete the E2E link establishment process.

[0124] At step S818, UE1 receives the DCA message. A secure "extended" unicast link is established between UE1 and UE3 via the relay UE. The extended link is end-to-end secure, meaning a security association is created between UE1 and UE3.

[0125] At step S820, UE1 and UE3 exchange E2E data using the header of the adaptation layer through the relay UE. The relay UE replaces a specified field in the adaptation header with a relay specific identifier.

[0126] For communication through the relay UE, the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE and the communication link between the relay UE and the target UE may be referred to as a per hop link.

[0127] The security establishment process shown in Figure 8, the end-to-end security process, that is, step S812 is executed during the establishment of the unicast link, that is, before the PC5 unicast link is established between UE1 and the relay UE, the end-to-end security process is executed first, which conflicts with the existing SA2 conclusion and process.

[0128] Based on this, the embodiments of the present application provide a secure establishment method that, for UE-to-UE relay communication, provides a clear solution for securely establishing an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE. In addition, by securely establishing an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE after establishing the communication links between the relay UE and the source UE, and between the relay UE and the target UE, the end-to-end secure establishment process can be made more compatible with existing protocols, avoiding conflicts with existing protocols.

[0129] The solution of the embodiment of the present application is described in detail below with reference to FIG9 .

[0130] In step S910, a source UE establishes a communication link with a relay UE, or a relay UE establishes a communication link with a source UE.

[0131] The communication link between the source UE and the relay UE can be a PC5 unicast communication link. This communication link can also be called a single-hop communication link. The process of establishing the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE will be described later in conjunction with Figures 10-13.

[0132] The communication link between the source UE and the relay UE can be a securely established communication link or a non-securely established communication link. Whether the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link can be determined based on the security method negotiated between the source UE and the target UE. If the source UE and the target UE negotiate to use per hop link security, the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link. The source UE and the relay UE can establish a PC5 unicast communication link and establish per hop link security. If the source UE and the target UE negotiate that per hop link security may not be used, the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE can be a non-securely established communication link.

[0133] The process of establishing a single-hop communication link between a source UE and a relay UE may include the following process: The source UE sends a first DCR message to the relay UE. After receiving the first DCR message, the relay UE may perform a first authentication and key establishment process with the source UE. The relay UE may send a first security mode command message to the source UE. After receiving the first security mode command message, the source UE may send a first security mode complete message to the relay UE.

[0134] In step S920, the target UE establishes a communication link with the relay UE, or the relay UE establishes a communication link with the target UE.

[0135] The communication link established between the target UE and the relay UE may be a PC5 unicast communication link. This communication link may also be referred to as a single-hop communication link. The process of establishing the communication link between the target UE and the relay UE will be described later.

[0136] The communication link between the target UE and the relay UE can be a securely established communication link or a non-securely established communication link. Whether the communication link between the target UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link can be determined based on the security method negotiated between the source UE and the target UE. If the source UE and the target UE negotiate to use single-hop link security, the communication link between the target UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link. The target UE and the relay UE can establish a PC5 unicast communication link and establish single-hop link security. If the source UE and the target UE negotiate that single-hop link security is not used, the communication link between the target UE and the relay UE can be a non-securely established communication link.

[0137] The process of establishing a single-hop communication link between the relay UE and the target UE may include the following process: The relay UE sends a second DCR message to the target UE. After receiving the second DCR message, the target UE may perform a second authentication and key establishment process with the relay UE. The target UE may send a second security mode command message to the relay UE. After receiving the second security mode command message, the relay UE may send a second security mode complete message to the target UE.

[0138] In some embodiments, the target UE may further send a second DCA message to the relay UE. After receiving the second DCA message, the relay UE may send the first DCA message to the source UE.

[0139] In step S930, after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, the source UE securely establishes an end-to-end communication link with the target UE, or the target UE securely establishes an end-to-end communication link with the source UE. The end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE may be an extended PC5 communication link.

[0140] For a relay UE, the relay UE can forward the end-to-end message between the source UE and the target UE, and the end-to-end message can be used to securely establish an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE. The securely established end-to-end communication link can also be called an end-to-end secure communication link.

[0141] The embodiments of the present application do not specifically limit the manner in which the source UE and the target UE securely establish an end-to-end communication link. As an example, the secure establishment of an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE may include one or more of the following: a shared key for establishing an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE; a session key for establishing an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE; an integrity protection key for establishing an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE; or an encryption key for establishing an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

[0142] Integrity protection keys and encryption keys can be used to protect control plane signaling (such as PC5-S, PCS-RRC) and user plane data.

[0143] The embodiments of the present application do not specifically limit the manner of triggering the establishment of communication links between the relay UE and the source UE, and between the relay UE and the target UE. For example, under the triggering of the source UE, the relay UE can establish communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively. Under the triggering of the source UE, establishing a communication link can be more compatible with the existing protocol, and the changes to the protocol are relatively small. Of course, in some embodiments, under the triggering of the target UE, the relay UE can establish communication links with the source UE and the target EU respectively. The following takes the example of the relay UE establishing communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively under the triggering of the source UE to introduce the process of establishing the communication link.

[0144] In some embodiments, under the triggering of the source UE, the embodiments of the present application may first establish a communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, and after the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is established, the communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is established. Alternatively, under the triggering of the source UE, the embodiments of the present application may also simultaneously establish a communication link between the source UE and the relay UE and a communication link between the relay UE and the target UE. In other words, the communication link between the relay UE and the target UE may be established during the process of establishing the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE.

[0145] In some embodiments, the relay UE may establish a communication link with the source UE and / or the relay UE may establish a communication link with the target UE under the triggering of the first direct communication request message sent by the source UE.

[0146] The source UE may send a first direct communication request message to the relay UE. The first direct communication request message may be used to trigger the relay UE to establish a communication link with the source UE. After receiving the first direct communication request message, the relay UE and the source UE perform a first security mode command (SMC) procedure. In some embodiments, the first security mode command procedure may include: the relay UE sending a first security mode command message to the source UE, and the source UE sending a first security mode complete message to the relay UE. In some embodiments, the first security mode command procedure may be referred to as a direct security mode command procedure.

[0147] After the first security mode command procedure completes, the relay UE may send a second direct communication request message to the target UE. This second direct communication request message may be used to trigger the target UE to establish a communication link with the relay UE. In response to the second direct communication request message, the target UE and the relay UE perform a second security mode command procedure. In some embodiments, the second security mode command procedure may include: the target UE sending a second security mode command message to the relay UE, and the relay UE sending a second security mode complete message to the target UE. In some embodiments, the second security mode command procedure may be referred to as a direct security mode command procedure.

[0148] In response to the second security mode command procedure ending, the target UE sends a second direct communication accept message to the relay UE for the second direct communication request message. In response to the second direct communication accept message, the relay UE sends a first direct communication accept message to the source UE for the first direct communication request message.

[0149] In some embodiments, securely establishing an end-to-end communication link between a source UE and a target UE may include: the source UE and the target UE executing a third security mode command procedure. The third security mode command procedure may include: the source UE sending a third security mode command message to the target UE, and the target UE sending a third security mode command complete message to the source UE. In some embodiments, the third security mode command procedure may be referred to as a direct security mode command procedure. Given that communication between the source UE and the target UE needs to be forwarded by a relay UE, the third security mode command procedure may also be referred to as an indirect security mode command procedure.

[0150] In some embodiments, the source UE and the target UE may execute a third security mode command procedure upon triggering the first direct communication request. In other embodiments, the source UE and the target UE may also execute a third security mode command procedure upon triggering the third direct communication request. The following describes the execution of the third security mode command procedure by the source UE and the target UE upon triggering the third direct communication request.

[0151] Before the source UE and the target UE perform the third security mode command procedure, the source UE may send a third direct communication request to the relay UE. The third direct communication request is used to trigger the relay UE to send a fourth direct communication request to the target UE. In response to the third direct communication request, the relay UE sends a fourth direct communication request to the target UE. The fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

[0152] The third direct communication request may include information required for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link. In some embodiments, the third direct communication request may include one or more of the following information: instruction information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and security data required for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link.

[0153] In some embodiments, the source UE may send a third direct communication request to the relay UE after receiving the first direct communication acceptance message. In some embodiments, the source UE may send the third direct communication request to the relay UE if the security negotiation result indicates that end-to-end security needs to be established or the source UE chooses to establish end-to-end security.

[0154] The end-to-end communication link in the embodiments of the present application can be established in a secure manner based on negotiation between the source UE and the target UE. In some embodiments, the source UE and the target UE can negotiate whether to perform a secure establishment procedure for the communication link. If a secure establishment procedure is required for a communication link, the source UE and the target UE need to perform a secure establishment procedure for the communication link. If a secure establishment procedure is not required for a communication link, the source UE and the target UE may not perform a secure establishment procedure for the communication link, but instead perform a normal communication link establishment.

[0155] The embodiments of the present application do not specifically limit the security negotiation process. For example, the security negotiation process may be included in the mutual authentication process of the source UE, relay UE, and target UE. For another example, the security negotiation process may be included in the discovery and relay selection process.

[0156] The security methods in the embodiments of the present application may include one or more of the following: performing a security establishment process on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE, performing a security establishment process on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE. The single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE may include a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE and / or a single-hop communication link between the relay UE and the target UE.

[0157] The embodiments of the present application do not specifically limit the manner in which the secure negotiation results are carried, as long as the secure negotiation results are carried before the end-to-end communication link is established. For example, the secure negotiation results may be carried in one or more of the following: a direct communication request message, a direct communication acceptance message, a relay service code, and security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

[0158] The relay service code (RSC) in the embodiment of the present application can be understood as an identifier, or a temporary authorization code, such as a token or a key. It may also be called other names in other scenarios, and the embodiment of the present application does not limit it. The relay service code can correspond to the identification of the application. A relay service code can correspond to the identification of one or more applications. The embodiment of the present application can carry the negotiation results of the security method in the RSC.

[0159] The security data required to securely establish an end-to-end communication link is also called end-to-end security material and can be represented by E2E_sec_Info. E2E_sec_Info can include the security capabilities of the source UE and the security policy of the source UE. In this embodiment of the application, the negotiation results of the security mode can be carried in E2E_sec_Info.

[0160] In some embodiments, the negotiation result of the security mode may be carried in the first direct communication request message described above, or may also be carried in the second direct communication request message.

[0161] In some embodiments, the negotiation result of the security mode may be carried in the first direct communication accept message described above, or may also be carried in the second direct communication accept message.

[0162] Of course, in some embodiments, the negotiation result of the security mode may also be carried in the messages during the discovery and relay selection process.

[0163] In some embodiments, security protection of the end-to-end communication link can be performed in the PDCP layer. This method is the same as the security protection method of the existing PC5 unicast link, and the changes to the protocol are relatively small. In other embodiments, security protection of the end-to-end communication link can be performed in the adaptation layer. Since the source UE, target UE and relay UE are all provided with an adaptation layer, referring to the protocol stack shown in Figures 6 and 7, the relay UE and the source UE and target UE are connected through the adaptation layer. Therefore, the end-to-end communication link can be securely protected by the adaptation layer. The adaptation layer can carry one or more of end-to-end PC5 signaling (PC5-signalling, PC5-S) messages, PC5 radio resource control (PC5-RRC) signaling, and PC5-U data.

[0164] The solution of the embodiment of the present application is described in detail below with reference to Figures 10 to 13.

[0165] FIG10 is a schematic flow chart showing a process of establishing a shared key between a source UE and a target UE for an end-to-end communication link. In this process, there is no shared key K between the source UE and the target UE. D , the source UE needs to exchange authentication signaling with the target UE and generate a shared key K through security credentials D .

[0166] As shown in FIG. 10 , at step S1002 , the source UE, the relay UE, and the target UE perform a discovery and relay selection process.

[0167] During the discovery process, keys for the discovery process are established between the source UE and the relay UE, and between the relay UE and the target UE, respectively, to protect announcement messages and solicitation messages in the discovery process, as well as DCR messages.

[0168] In step S1004, the source UE sends a first DCR message to the relay UE. The first DCR message may include one or more of the following information: RSC, E2E security indication, end-to-end key establishment material Key_Est_Info, and security material for establishing a per-hop link security between the source UE and the relay UE. Key_Est_Info may include the security capabilities of the source UE and the security policy of the source UE.

[0169] In some embodiments, the first DCR message may include an E2E security indication and / or a security credential identifier (Security Credentials ID). In some embodiments, the E2E security indication and / or the security credential identifier may be carried in E2E_sec_Info, Key_Est_Info, or RSC. The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether single-hop link security is established and / or whether end-to-end security (i.e., E2E security) is established.

[0170] In some embodiments, the first DRC message may not carry the E2E security indication. For example, if the source UE has not yet negotiated an E2E security mode with the target UE when sending the first DRC message, the first DRC message may not carry the E2E security indication.

[0171] In some embodiments, if there is no key K between the source UE and the target UE D , or the source UE wants to update the key K D , then the first DCR message may include a security credential identifier. If there is a key K between the source UE and the target UE D And the source UE does not want to update the key K D , then the first DCR message may not include the security credential identifier.

[0172] The security credentials in the embodiments of the present application may be one or more of a symmetric key, a public / private key pair, and a password.

[0173] If the security credential is a symmetric key, the key may be generated by the network device during the discovery process and then sent to the source UE and relay UE by the network device. The network device may be, for example, one or more of the 5G PKMF, 5G DDNMF, and AUSF. The first DCR (Key_Est_Info or E2E_sec_Info in the first DCR) message may include the key identifier.

[0174] If the security credential is a public / private key pair, the first DCR (Key_Est_Info or E2E_sec_Info in the first DCR) message may include the public key of the source UE.

[0175] At step S1006, the source UE and the relay UE perform a first authentication and key establishment process. For example, the relay UE may send a first authentication and key establishment message to the source UE, and the source UE may send a first authentication and key establishment response message to the relay UE. The first authentication and key establishment message and the first authentication and key establishment response message may include Key_Est_Info.

[0176] In step S1008, the relay UE sends a first security mode command message to the source UE.

[0177] In step S1010, the source UE sends a first security mode command complete message to the relay UE.

[0178] In step S1012, the relay UE sends a second DCR message to the target UE. The second DCR message may include one or more of the following: security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the relay UE and the target UE, and end-to-end key establishment materials Key_Est_Info.

[0179] In some embodiments, the content included in the second DCR message is substantially consistent with the content included in the first DCR message.

[0180] The relay UE usually does not modify the Key_Est_Info received from the source UE. The relay UE can change the header of the packet containing the Key_Est_Info. For example, the relay UE can change the source L2 ID to the relay UE L2 ID and the destination L2 ID to the target UE L2 ID.

[0181] At step S1014, the relay UE and the target UE perform a second authentication and key establishment process. For example, the target UE may send a second authentication and key establishment message to the relay UE, and the relay UE may send a second authentication and key establishment response message to the target UE. The second authentication and key establishment message and the first authentication and key establishment response message may include Key_Est_Info.

[0182] In step S1016, the target UE sends a second security mode command message to the relay UE.

[0183] In step S1018, the relay UE sends a second security mode command completion message to the target UE.

[0184] In step S1020, the target UE sends a second DCA message to the relay UE, and the PC5 communication link between the target UE and the relay UE is established.

[0185] In some embodiments, the second DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication and a Key_Est_Info. The Key_Est_Info may be the Key_Est_Info from the target UE. The Key_Est_Info may include the security capabilities and / or security policy of the source UE. In some embodiments, the E2E security indication may also be carried in the Key_Est_Info.

[0186] In step S1022, the relay UE sends a first DCA message to the source UE, and the PC5 communication link between the relay UE and the source UE is established. In some embodiments, the first DCA message may include Key_Est_Info from the relay UE.

[0187] In some embodiments, the second DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication and Key_Est_Info. The Key_Est_Info may be the Key_Est_Info from the relay UE. The Key_Est_Info may include the security capabilities and / or security policy of the source UE. In some embodiments, the E2E security indication may also be carried in the Key_Est_Info.

[0188] In step S1024, after the communication links between the source UE and the relay UE, and between the relay UE and the target UE, are established, the source UE may perform an authentication and key establishment process with the target UE. For example, the source UE may send an authentication and key establishment message to the target UE, and the target UE may send an authentication and key establishment response message to the source UE.

[0189] In some embodiments, the authentication and key establishment message may include Key_Est_Info. In some embodiments, the authentication and key establishment message may include an E2E security indication. For example, if the first DCR message does not carry an E2E security indication, the authentication and key establishment message may include an E2E security indication.

[0190] In some embodiments, after the authentication and key establishment process is completed, the source UE and the target UE may generate a key K D .

[0191] In step S1026, the target UE sends a third security mode command message to the source UE via the relay UE. The third security mode command message may be referred to as a direct security mode command. In some embodiments, the third security mode command message may also be referred to as an indirect security mode command, given that the message needs to be sent via the relay UE.

[0192] In some embodiments, the third security mode command message may include Key_Est_Info. In some embodiments, Key_Est_Info may include K D In some embodiments, if the source UE and the target UE do not generate the key K in step S1024 D , then Key_Est_Info may include the D Other E2E security parameters.

[0193] In step S1028, the source UE may send a third security mode command complete message to the target UE through the relay UE.

[0194] In some embodiments, the source UE may select K D The third security mode command completion message includes K D LSB of the ID.

[0195] In some embodiments, if K is not generated in step S1024 D , the source UE can generate K based on other E2E security parameters D .

[0196] The following describes the E2E connection and security establishment process in an embodiment of the present application in conjunction with FIG11 .

[0197] In this process, the source UE and the target UE have a shared key K D and K D ID.

[0198] 11 , in step S1102 , the source UE, the relay UE, and the target UE perform a discovery and relay selection process, which is similar to step S1002 in FIG10 .

[0199] During the discovery process, keys for the discovery process are established between the source UE and the relay UE, and between the relay UE and the target UE, respectively, to protect announcement messages and solicitation messages during the discovery process, as well as DCR messages.

[0200] In step S1104, the source UE sends a first DCR message to the relay UE. The first DCR message may include one or more of the following information: RSC, end-to-end security information (E2E_sec_Info), and security information for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E_sec_Info may include the security capabilities of the source UE and the security policy of the source UE.

[0201] In some embodiments, the first DCR message may include an E2E security indication. The E2E security indication may be used to indicate a secure connection method between the source UE and the target UE. In some embodiments, the E2E security indication may be carried in Key_Est_Info, E2E_sec_Info, or RSC.

[0202] In some embodiments, the first DRC message may not carry an E2E security indication. For example, if the source UE has not yet negotiated an E2E security method when sending the first DRC message, the first DRC message may not carry an E2E security indication. The E2E security indication may indicate that E2E security needs to be established.

[0203] In some embodiments, if there is a key K between the source UE and the target UE D , then the first DCR message may include one or more of the following information: K D ID, nonce 1, K D-sess The MSB of nonce 1 can be used to generate or update K D-sess .

[0204] The following steps S1106 to S1118 are similar to steps S1006 to S1018 in FIG. 10 .

[0205] At step S1106, the source UE and the relay UE perform a first authentication and key establishment process. For example, the relay UE may send a first authentication and key establishment message to the source UE, and the source UE may send a first authentication and key establishment response message to the relay UE. The first authentication and key establishment message and the first authentication and key establishment response message may include Key_Est_Info.

[0206] In step S1108, the relay UE sends a first security mode command message to the source UE.

[0207] In step S1110 , the source UE sends a first security mode command complete message to the relay UE.

[0208] In step S1112, the relay UE sends a second DCR message to the target UE. The second DCR message may include one or more of the following: security material for establishing a single-hop security link between the relay UE and the target UE, and end-to-end security material E2E_sec_Info.

[0209] In some embodiments, the content included in the second DCR message is substantially consistent with the content included in the first DCR message.

[0210] The relay UE usually does not modify the Key_Est_Info received from the source UE. The relay UE can change the header of the packet containing the Key_Est_Info. For example, the relay UE can change the source L2 ID to the relay UE L2 ID and the destination L2 ID to the target UE L2 ID.

[0211] At step S1114, the relay UE and the target UE perform a second authentication and key establishment process. For example, the target UE may send a second authentication and key establishment message to the relay UE, and the relay UE may send a second authentication and key establishment response message to the target UE. The second authentication and key establishment message and the first authentication and key establishment response message may include Key_Est_Info.

[0212] In step S1116, the target UE sends a second security mode command message to the relay UE.

[0213] In step S1118, the relay UE sends a second security mode command completion message to the target UE.

[0214] In step S1120 , the target UE sends a second DCA message to the relay UE, and the PC5 communication link between the target UE and the relay UE is established.

[0215] In some embodiments, the second DCA message may include one or more of the following: the selected algorithm, the security capability of the source UE, the security policy of the source UE, nonce 2, K D-sess LSB, MAC.

[0216] In some embodiments, if the E2E security indication received by the target UE indicates that only single-hop link security is established, the second DCA message sent by the target UE to the relay UE may not include end-to-end security information (E2E_sec_Info).

[0217] In some embodiments, if the E2E security indication received by the target UE indicates to establish E2E security, the target UE may carry E2E_sec_Info in the second DCA message, or carry E2E_sec_Info in the third security mode command in step S1126.

[0218] In some embodiments, the target UE can select a security algorithm (chosen_alg) based on the security capabilities of the source UE. The target UE can also determine the E2E protection method based on the security policy of the source UE, such as whether to use integrity protection or encryption protection. The second DCA message may include the selected algorithm. To defend against bidding attacks, the second DCA message may also include the security capabilities and security policy of the source UE.

[0219] In some embodiments, the source UE may select a random number nonce 2 and generate a key K based on the nonce 2. D-sess The target UE can also select K D-sess The target UE can also generate a lower-level key K according to the security policy of the source UE. D-int and K D-enc , respectively used to protect the integrity and confidentiality of end-to-end data between the source UE and the target UE.

[0220] After the target UE is generated, the integrity protection of E2E data can be started, that is, K D-int Calculate the checksum MAC of E2E_sec_Info.

[0221] In step S1122, the relay UE sends a first DCA message to the source UE, and the PC5 communication link between the relay UE and the source UE is established. The first DCA message may include E2E_sec_Info from the relay UE.

[0222] The content included in the first DCA message is substantially the same as the content included in the second DCA message. In some embodiments, the first DCA message may include one or more of the following: the selected algorithm, the security capability of the source UE, the security policy of the source UE, nonce 2, K D-sess LSB, MAC.

[0223] In step S1124, after the communication links between the source UE and the relay UE, and between the relay UE and the target UE, are established, the source UE may perform an authentication and key establishment process with the target UE. For example, the source UE may send an authentication and key establishment message to the target UE, and the target UE may send an authentication and key establishment response message to the source UE.

[0224] In some embodiments, the source UE and the target UE may not perform the process in step S1124.

[0225] In step S1126, the target UE sends a third security mode command message to the source UE via the relay UE. The third security mode command message may be referred to as a direct security mode command. In some embodiments, the third security mode command message may also be referred to as an indirect security mode command, given that the message needs to be sent via the relay UE.

[0226] In some embodiments, the third security mode command message may include E2E_sec_Info. The third security mode command message may include one or more of the following: the selected algorithm, the security capability of the source UE, the security policy of the source UE, nonce 2, K D-sess LSB, MAC.

[0227] In step S1128, the source UE may send a third security mode command complete message to the target UE through the relay UE.

[0228] In some embodiments, the source UE may generate K D-sess , K D-int and K D-enc In addition, the source UE can also use K D-int Verify the MAC. After successful verification, the source UE can start encrypting and integrity protecting the E2E data according to the security policy.

[0229] After receiving the third security mode command completion message, the target UE may start to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the E2E data according to the security policy.

[0230] Figures 10 and 11 illustrate that after the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, or between the relay UE and the target UE, is established, the source UE and the target UE can directly perform the authentication and / or key establishment process or the security mode command process. In some embodiments, after the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, or between the relay UE and the target UE, is established, the source UE and the target UE can first transmit a DCR message before performing the authentication and / or key establishment process or the security mode command process. This is shown in Figures 12 and 13.

[0231] FIG12 shows another method for establishing a shared key K DFlowchart. The steps in Figure 12 are similar to those in Figure 10 , with the following differences: Figure 12 adds steps S1023a, S1023b, S1029a, and S1029b; and steps S1004, S1012, S1020, and S1022 in Figure 12 differ slightly from the corresponding steps in Figure 10 . To simplify the description, only these differences are described below; for other details, please refer to the previous description.

[0232] In the solution shown in Figure 12, the first DCR message in step S1004 may include only the information required to establish a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, but not the information required to establish an end-to-end link between the source UE and the target UE. For example, the first DCR message may include one or more of the following information: an RSC, an E2E security indication, and security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E security indication may only indicate whether to establish single-hop link security, but not whether to establish end-to-end security.

[0233] In some embodiments, the first DCR message may not include an E2E security indication.

[0234] In some embodiments, the first DCR message may not include the end-to-end key establishment material Key_Est_Info.

[0235] The second DCR message in step S1012 may also include only the information required to establish a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, without including the information required to establish an end-to-end link between the source UE and the target UE. For example, the second DCR message may include one or more of the following information: an RSC, an E2E security indication, and security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E security indication may only indicate whether to establish single-hop link security, without indicating whether to establish end-to-end security.

[0236] In some embodiments, the second DCR message may not include an E2E security indication.

[0237] In some embodiments, the second DCR message may not include the end-to-end key establishment material Key_Est_Info.

[0238] In some embodiments, the content in the first DCR message may be consistent with the content in the second DCR message.

[0239] The second DCA message in step S1020 may also include only the information required to establish a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, without including the information required to establish an end-to-end link between the source UE and the target UE. For example, the second DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication, and security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E security indication may only indicate whether to establish single-hop link security, without indicating whether to establish end-to-end security.

[0240] In some embodiments, the second DCA message may not include an E2E security indication.

[0241] The first DCA message in step S1022 may also include only the information required to establish a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, without including the information required to establish an end-to-end link between the source UE and the target UE. For example, the first DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication, and security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E security indication may only indicate whether to establish single-hop link security, without indicating whether to establish end-to-end security.

[0242] In some embodiments, the first DCA message may not include an E2E security indication.

[0243] In some embodiments, the content in the first DCA message may be consistent with the content in the second DCA message.

[0244] In step S1023a, the source UE sends a third DCR message to the relay UE. The third DCR message may include data required to establish an end-to-end communication link. For example, the third DCR message may include one or more of the following information: RSC, E2E security indication, and end-to-end key establishment material Key_Est_Info. Key_Est_Info may include the source UE's security capabilities and the source UE's security policy. The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0245] In some embodiments, the third DCR message may further include one or more of the following information: RSC, user information ID of source UE (User Info ID of Source UE), user information ID of relay UE (User Info ID of UE-to-UE relay), user information ID of target UE (User Info ID of Target UE), and L2 ID.

[0246] In step S1023b, the relay UE sends a fourth DCR message to the target UE. The fourth DCR message may include data required to establish an end-to-end communication link. For example, the content included in the fourth DCR message may be consistent with the content included in the third DCR message. For example, the fourth DCR message may include one or more of the following information: RSC, E2E security indication, and end-to-end key establishment material Key_Est_Info. Key_Est_Info may include the security capabilities of the source UE and the source UE's security policy. The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0247] In some embodiments, the third DCR message may further include one or more of the following information: RSC, user information ID of source UE (User Info ID of Source UE), user information ID of relay UE (User Info ID of UE-to-UE relay), user information ID of target UE (User Info ID of Target UE), and L2 ID.

[0248] In step S1029a, the target UE sends a fourth DCA message to the relay UE. The fourth DCA message may include data required to establish an end-to-end communication link. For example, the fourth DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication and end-to-end key establishment material (Key_Est_Info). The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0249] In some embodiments, the fourth DCR message may further include one or more of the following information: RSC, user information ID of source UE (User Info ID of Source UE), user information ID of relay UE (User Info ID of UE-to-UE relay), user information ID of target UE (User Info ID of Target UE), and L2 ID.

[0250] In step S1029b, the relay UE sends a third DCA message to the source UE. The third DCA message may include data required to establish an end-to-end communication link, such as security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link. For example, the third DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication and end-to-end key establishment material (Key_Est_Info). The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0251] Figure 13 shows another schematic diagram of the process for establishing a secure connection. The steps in Figure 13 are similar to those in Figure 11, except that Figure 13 adds steps S1123a, S1123b, S1129a, and S1129b. Steps S1104, S1112, S1120, and S1122 in Figure 13 differ slightly from the corresponding steps in Figure 11. For simplicity, only these differences are described below; for other details, please refer to the previous description.

[0252] In the solution shown in Figure 13, the first DCR message in step S1104 may include only the information required to establish a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, and does not include the information required to establish an end-to-end link between the source UE and the target UE. For example, the first DCR message may include one or more of the following information: an RSC, an E2E security indication, and security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E security indication may only indicate whether to establish single-hop link security, and does not indicate whether to establish end-to-end security.

[0253] In some embodiments, the first DCR message may not include an E2E security indication.

[0254] In some embodiments, the first DCR message may not include the end-to-end key establishment material Key_Est_Info.

[0255] The second DCR message in step S1112 may also include only the information required to establish a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, without including the information required to establish an end-to-end link between the source UE and the target UE. For example, the second DCR message may include one or more of the following information: an RSC, an E2E security indication, and security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E security indication may only indicate whether to establish single-hop link security, without indicating whether to establish end-to-end security.

[0256] In some embodiments, the second DCR message may not include an E2E security indication.

[0257] In some embodiments, the second DCR message may not include the end-to-end key establishment material Key_Est_Info.

[0258] In some embodiments, the first DCR message and / or the second DCR message may not include one or more of the following information: D ID, nonce 1, K D-sessFor example, the E2E_sec_Info in the first DCR message and / or the second DCR message may not include one or more of the following information: D ID, nonce 1, K D-sess MSB.

[0259] In some embodiments, the content in the first DCR message may be consistent with the content in the second DCR message.

[0260] The second DCA message in step S1120 may include only the information required to establish a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, and may not include the information required to establish an end-to-end link between the source UE and the target UE. For example, the second DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication and security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E security indication may only indicate whether to establish single-hop link security, and may not indicate whether to establish end-to-end security.

[0261] In some embodiments, the second DCA message may not include an E2E security indication.

[0262] The first DCA message in step S1122 may include only the information required to establish a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the relay UE, and does not include the information required to establish an end-to-end link between the source UE and the target UE. For example, the first DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication, and security materials for establishing a single-hop secure link between the source UE and the relay UE. The E2E security indication is used only to indicate whether single-hop link security is established, and does not indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0263] In some embodiments, the first DCA message may not include an E2E security indication.

[0264] In step S1123a, the source UE sends a third DCR message to the relay UE. The third DCR message may include data required to establish an end-to-end communication link. For example, the third DCR message may include one or more of the following information: RSC, E2E security indication, and end-to-end security information (E2E_sec_Info). E2E_sec_Info may include the source UE's security capabilities and the source UE's security policy. The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0265] In some embodiments, the third DCR message may include one or more of the following information: D ID, nonce 1, K D-sessFor example, the E2E_sec_Info in the third DCR message may include one or more of the following information: D ID, nonce 1, K D-sess MSB.

[0266] In some embodiments, the third DCR message may further include one or more of the following information: RSC, user information ID of source UE (User Info ID of Source UE), user information ID of relay UE (User Info ID of UE-to-UE relay), user information ID of target UE (User Info ID of Target UE), and L2 ID.

[0267] In step S1123b, the relay UE sends a fourth DCR message to the target UE. The fourth DCR message may include data required to establish an end-to-end communication link. For example, the content included in the fourth DCR message may be consistent with the content included in the third DCR message. For example, the fourth DCR message may include one or more of the following information: RSC, E2E security indication, and E2E_sec_Info. Key_Est_Info may include the security capabilities of the source UE and the source UE's security policy. The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0268] In some embodiments, the fourth DCR message may include one or more of the following information: D ID, nonce 1, K D-sess For example, the E2E_sec_Info in the fourth DCR message may include one or more of the following information: D ID, nonce 1, K D-sess MSB.

[0269] In some embodiments, the fourth DCR message may further include one or more of the following information: RSC, user information ID of source UE (User Info ID of Source UE), user information ID of relay UE (User Info ID of UE-to-UE relay), user information ID of target UE (User Info ID of Target UE), and L2 ID.

[0270] At step S1129a, the target UE sends a fourth DCA message to the relay UE. The fourth DCA message may include data required to establish an end-to-end communication link. For example, the fourth DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication and end-to-end security materials. The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0271] At step S1129b, the relay UE sends a third DCA message to the source UE. The third DCA message may include data required to establish an end-to-end communication link. For example, the third DCA message may include one or more of the following information: an E2E security indication and end-to-end security materials. The E2E security indication may be used to indicate whether end-to-end security is established.

[0272] The process of establishing a single-hop link and an end-to-end link in the embodiment of the present application may be performed without network coverage, that is, without the assistance of a core network.

[0273] The method embodiment of the present application is described in detail above in conjunction with Figures 1 to 13. The device embodiment of the present application is described in detail below in conjunction with Figures 14 to 17. It should be understood that the description of the method embodiment corresponds to the description of the device embodiment. Therefore, for parts not described in detail, reference can be made to the above method embodiment.

[0274] FIG14 is a schematic block diagram of a terminal device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The terminal device may be the source UE or UE1 described above. The terminal device 1400 may include an establishing unit 1410.

[0275] The establishing unit 1410 is configured to establish a communication link with the relay UE.

[0276] The establishing unit 1410 is further configured to securely establish an end-to-end communication link with the target UE after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

[0277] Optionally, in some embodiments, the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or the communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

[0278] Optionally, in some embodiments, the source UE and the target UE securely establish an end-to-end communication link, including one or more of the following: the source UE and the target UE establish a shared key for the end-to-end communication link; the source UE and the target UE establish a session key for the end-to-end communication link; the source UE and the target UE establish an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link; and the source UE and the target UE establish an encryption key for the end-to-end communication link.

[0279] Optionally, in some embodiments, the establishing unit 1410 is used to: trigger the relay UE to establish communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

[0280] Optionally, in some embodiments, the establishing unit 1410 is used to: send a first direct communication request message to the relay UE, wherein the first direct communication request message is used to trigger the relay UE to establish a communication link with the source UE; execute a first security mode command process with the relay UE; and after the first security mode command process and the second security mode command process between the relay UE and the target UE are completed, receive a first direct communication acceptance message sent by the relay UE for the first direct communication request message.

[0281] Optionally, in some embodiments, the establishing unit 1410 is used to: perform a third security mode command process with the target UE.

[0282] Optionally, in some embodiments, the terminal device further includes: a sending unit 1420, used to send a third direct communication request to the relay UE, the third direct communication request being used to trigger the relay UE to send a fourth direct communication request to the target UE, and the fourth direct communication request being used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

[0283] Optionally, in some embodiments, the third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: indication information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and security data required for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link.

[0284] Optionally, in some embodiments, it also includes: a negotiation unit 1430, used to negotiate a security method with the target UE, and the security method includes one or more of the following: performing a security establishment process on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; and performing a security establishment process on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

[0285] Optionally, in some embodiments, the negotiation result of the security mode carries one or more of the following: a direct communication request message; a direct communication acceptance message; a relay service code; and security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

[0286] Optionally, in some embodiments, security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in a Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer or an adaptation layer.

[0287] FIG15 is a schematic block diagram of another terminal device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The terminal device may be any target UE or UE2 described above. The terminal device 1500 may include an establishing unit 1510.

[0288] The establishing unit 1510 is configured to establish a communication link with the relay UE.

[0289] The establishing unit 1510 is further configured to securely establish an end-to-end communication link with the source UE after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

[0290] Optionally, in some embodiments, the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or the communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

[0291] Optionally, in some embodiments, the target UE and the relay UE establish a communication link including one or more of the following: the target UE and the source UE establish a shared key for the end-to-end communication link; the target UE and the source UE establish a session key for the end-to-end communication link; the source UE and the target UE establish an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link; and the source UE and the target UE establish an encryption key for the end-to-end communication link.

[0292] Optionally, in some embodiments, the establishing unit 1510 is configured to: establish a communication link with the relay UE under the triggering of the source UE.

[0293] Optionally, in some embodiments, the establishing unit 1510 is used to: after the execution of the first security mode command process between the source UE and the relay UE is completed, receive a second direct communication request message sent by the relay UE, the second direct communication request message being used to trigger the target UE to establish a communication link with the relay UE; in response to the second direct communication request message, execute a second security mode command process with the relay UE; in response to the completion of the second security mode command process, send a second direct communication acceptance message for the second direct communication request message to the relay UE.

[0294] Optionally, in some embodiments, the establishing unit 1510 is used to: perform a third security mode command process with the source UE.

[0295] Optionally, in some embodiments, the terminal device further includes: a receiving unit 1520, configured to receive a fourth direct communication request sent by the relay UE after the relay UE receives the third direct communication request sent by the source UE, wherein the fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

[0296] Optionally, in some embodiments, the third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: indication information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and security data required for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link.

[0297] Optionally, in some embodiments, it also includes: a negotiation unit 1530, used to negotiate a security method with the source UE, and the security method includes one or more of the following: performing a security establishment process on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; and performing a security establishment process on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

[0298] Optionally, in some embodiments, the negotiation result of the security mode carries one or more of the following: a direct communication request message; a direct communication acceptance message; a relay service code; and security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

[0299] Optionally, in some embodiments, security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in a Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer or an adaptation layer.

[0300] FIG16 is a schematic block diagram of another terminal device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The terminal device may be any of the relay UEs described above. The terminal device 1600 may include an establishing unit 1610 and a forwarding unit 1620.

[0301] The establishing unit 1610 is configured to establish communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

[0302] The forwarding unit 1620 is used to forward the end-to-end message between the source UE and the target UE after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, and the end-to-end message is used for the source UE and the target UE to securely establish an end-to-end communication link.

[0303] Optionally, in some embodiments, the communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or the communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

[0304] Optionally, in some embodiments, the source UE and the target UE securely establish an end-to-end communication link, including one or more of the following: the source UE and the target UE establish a shared key for the end-to-end communication link; the source UE and the target UE establish a session key for the end-to-end communication link; the source UE and the target UE establish an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link; and the source UE and the target UE establish an encryption key for the end-to-end communication link.

[0305] Optionally, in some embodiments, the establishing unit 1610 is used to: establish communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively under the triggering of the source UE.

[0306] Optionally, in some embodiments, the establishing unit 1610 is used to: receive a first direct communication request message sent by the source UE, the first direct communication request message being used to trigger the relay UE to establish a communication link with the source UE; perform a first security mode command process with the source UE; after the first security mode command process ends, send a second direct communication request message to the target UE, the second direct communication request message being used to trigger the target UE to establish a communication link with the relay UE; perform a second security mode command process with the target UE; after the second security mode command process ends, receive a second direct communication acceptance message for the second direct communication request message from the target UE; and in response to the second direct communication acceptance message, send a first direct communication acceptance message for the first direct communication request message to the source UE.

[0307] Optionally, in some embodiments, the source UE and the target UE securely establish an end-to-end communication link, including: the source UE and the target UE execute a third security mode command process.

[0308] Optionally, in some embodiments, the terminal device further includes: a receiving unit 1630, which receives a third direct communication request sent by the source UE before the source UE and the target UE execute a third security mode command process; a sending unit 1640, which is used to send a fourth direct communication request to the target UE in response to the third direct communication request, and the fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE and the source UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

[0309] Optionally, in some embodiments, the third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: instruction information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and

[0310] Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

[0311] Optionally, in some embodiments, the end-to-end communication link is established based on a security method negotiated between the source UE and the target UE, and the security method includes one or more of the following: performing a security establishment process on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; and performing a security establishment process on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

[0312] Optionally, in some embodiments, the negotiation result of the security mode carries one or more of the following: a direct communication request message; a direct communication acceptance message; a relay service code; and security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

[0313] Optionally, in some embodiments, security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in the PDCP layer or the adaptation layer.

[0314] Figure 17 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present application. The dashed lines in Figure 17 indicate that the unit or module is optional. Apparatus 1700 may be used to implement the method described in the above method embodiment. Apparatus 1700 may be a chip or terminal device, such as the source UE, relay UE, or target UE described above.

[0315] The device 1700 may include one or more processors 1710. The processor 1710 may support the device 1700 to implement the method described in the method embodiment above. The processor 1710 may be a general-purpose processor or a special-purpose processor. For example, the processor may be a central processing unit (CPU). Alternatively, the processor may be another general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware component, etc. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor, etc.

[0316] The apparatus 1700 may further include one or more memories 1720. The memories 1720 store programs that can be executed by the processor 1710, causing the processor 1710 to perform the methods described in the above method embodiments. The memories 1720 may be independent of the processor 1710 or integrated into the processor 1710.

[0317] The apparatus 1700 may further include a transceiver 1730. The processor 1710 may communicate with other devices or chips via the transceiver 1730. For example, the processor 1710 may transmit and receive data with other devices or chips via the transceiver 1730.

[0318] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a program. The computer-readable storage medium can be applied to a terminal or network device provided in the present application, and the program enables a computer to execute the method performed by the terminal or network device in each embodiment of the present application.

[0319] The present application also provides a computer program product. The computer program product includes a program. The computer program product can be applied to a terminal or network device provided in the present application, and the program causes a computer to execute the method performed by the terminal or network device in each embodiment of the present application.

[0320] The embodiments of the present application also provide a computer program. The computer program can be applied to the terminal or network device provided in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program enables a computer to execute the method performed by the terminal or network device in each embodiment of the present application.

[0321] It should be understood that in the embodiments of the present application, "B corresponding to A" means that B is associated with A and B can be determined based on A. However, it should also be understood that determining B based on A does not mean determining B based solely on A, but B can also be determined based on A and / or other information.

[0322] It should be understood that the term "and / or" in this document simply describes a relationship between related objects, indicating that three possible relationships exist. For example, "A and / or B" can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, or B exists alone. Furthermore, the character " / " in this document generally indicates that the related objects are in an "or" relationship.

[0323] It should be understood that in the various embodiments of the present application, the size of the serial numbers of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0324] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely schematic. For example, the division of the units is merely a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0325] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of these units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0326] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

[0327] In the above embodiments, it can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, it can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is generated in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server or data center to another website, computer, server or data center via a wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) method. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be read by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media integrated therein. The available medium may be a magnetic medium (eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (eg, a digital versatile disc (DVD)), or a semiconductor medium (eg, a solid state disk (SSD)).

[0328] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included in the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for secure establishment, characterized in that include: The source user equipment UE establishes a communication link with the relay UE; After the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, the source UE securely establishes an end-to-end communication link with the target UE.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or The communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that The source UE securely establishing an end-to-end communication link with the target UE includes one or more of the following: The source UE and the target UE establish a shared key for the end-to-end communication link; The source UE and the target UE establish a session key for the end-to-end communication link; The source UE establishes an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link with the target UE; as well as The source UE and the target UE establish an encryption key for the end-to-end communication link.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that The source UE establishes a communication link with the relay UE, including: The source UE triggers the relay UE to establish communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The source UE triggering the relay UE to establish communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively includes: The source UE sends a first direct communication request message to the relay UE, where the first direct communication request message is used to trigger the relay UE to establish a communication link with the source UE; The source UE and the relay UE perform a first security mode command process; After the first security mode command procedure and the second security mode command procedure between the relay UE and the target UE are completed, the source UE receives a first direct communication accept message sent by the relay UE in response to the first direct communication request message.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The source UE securely establishing an end-to-end communication link with the target UE, including: The source UE and the target UE perform a third security mode command process.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that Before the source UE and the target UE perform a third security mode command procedure, the method further includes: The source UE sends a third direct communication request to the relay UE, where the third direct communication request is used to trigger the relay UE to send a fourth direct communication request to the target UE, where the fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: Instruction information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that Also includes: The source UE negotiates a security mode with the target UE, where the security mode includes one or more of the following: Performing a security establishment procedure on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; as well as A security establishment procedure is performed on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The negotiation result of the security mode is carried in one or more of the following: Direct communication request message; Direct communication to receive messages; Relay service code; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, characterized in that The security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in the Packet Data Convergence Protocol PDCP layer or the adaptation layer.

12. A communication method, characterized in that: include: The target user equipment UE establishes a communication link with the relay UE; After the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, the target UE securely establishes an end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

13. The method according to claim 12, wherein: The communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or The communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

14. The method according to claim 12 or 13, characterized in that The target UE and the relay UE establish a communication link including one or more of the following: The target UE establishes a shared key for the end-to-end communication link with the source UE; The target UE establishes a session key for the end-to-end communication link with the source UE; The source UE establishes an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link with the target UE; as well as The source UE and the target UE establish an encryption key for the end-to-end communication link.

15. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 14, characterized in that The target UE establishes a communication link with the relay UE, including: Under the triggering of the source UE, the target UE establishes a communication link with the relay UE.

16. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that The target UE establishing a communication link with the relay UE under the triggering of the source UE includes: After the first security mode command process between the source UE and the relay UE is completed, the target UE receives a second direct communication request message sent by the relay UE, where the second direct communication request message is used to trigger the target UE to establish a communication link with the relay UE; In response to the second direct communication request message, the target UE and the relay UE perform a second security mode command procedure; In response to the second security mode command procedure ending, the target UE sends a second direct communication accept message to the relay UE in response to the second direct communication request message.

17. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 16, characterized in that The target UE securely establishing an end-to-end communication link with the source UE, comprising: The target UE and the source UE perform a third security mode command process.

18. The method according to claim 17, characterized in that The method further comprises: After the relay UE receives the third direct communication request sent by the source UE, the target UE receives a fourth direct communication request sent by the relay UE, where the fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

19. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that The third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: Instruction information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

20. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 19, characterized in that Also includes: The target UE negotiates a security mode with the source UE, where the security mode includes one or more of the following: Performing a security establishment procedure on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; as well as A security establishment procedure is performed on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

21. The method according to claim 20, characterized in that The negotiation result of the security mode is carried in one or more of the following: Direct communication request message; Direct communication to receive messages; Relay service code; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

22. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 21, characterized in that The security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in the Packet Data Convergence Protocol PDCP layer or the adaptation layer.

23. A communication method, characterized in that: include: The relay user equipment UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively; After the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, the relay UE forwards the end-to-end message between the source UE and the target UE, where the end-to-end message is used for the source UE and the target UE to securely establish an end-to-end communication link.

24. The method according to claim 23, wherein: The communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or The communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

25. The method according to claim 23 or 24, characterized in that The secure establishment of an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE includes one or more of the following: The source UE and the target UE establish a shared key for the end-to-end communication link; The source UE and the target UE establish a session key for the end-to-end communication link; The source UE establishes an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link with the target UE; as well as The source UE and the target UE establish an encryption key for the end-to-end communication link.

26. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 25, characterized in that The relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, including: Under the triggering of the source UE, the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

27. The method according to claim 26, characterized in that The step of establishing, by the relay UE, communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively under the triggering of the source UE includes: The relay UE receives a first direct communication request message sent by the source UE, where the first direct communication request message is used to trigger the relay UE to establish a communication link with the source UE; The relay UE and the source UE perform a first security mode command process; After the first security mode command process ends, the relay UE sends a second direct communication request message to the target UE, where the second direct communication request message is used to trigger the target UE to establish a communication link with the relay UE; The relay UE and the target UE perform a second security mode command process; After the second security mode command process ends, the relay UE receives a second direct communication accept message for the second direct communication request message from the target UE; In response to the second direct communication accept message, the relay UE sends a first direct communication accept message to the source UE in response to the first direct communication request message.

28. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 27, characterized in that The source UE securely establishing an end-to-end communication link with the target UE, including: The source UE and the target UE perform a third security mode command process.

29. The method according to claim 28, characterized in that Before the target UE and the source UE perform a third security mode command procedure, the method further includes: Before the source UE and the target UE perform a third security mode command procedure, the relay UE receives a third direct communication request sent by the source UE; In response to the third direct communication request, the relay UE sends a fourth direct communication request to the target UE, where the fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

30. The method according to claim 29, wherein The third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: Instruction information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

31. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 30, characterized in that The end-to-end communication link is established based on a security method negotiated between the source UE and the target UE, where the security method includes one or more of the following: Performing a security establishment procedure on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; as well as A security establishment procedure is performed on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

32. The method according to claim 31, characterized in that The negotiation result of the security mode is carried in one or more of the following: Direct communication request message; Direct communication to receive messages; Relay service code; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

33. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 32, characterized in that The security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in the Packet Data Convergence Protocol PDCP layer or the adaptation layer.

34. A terminal device, characterized in that: The terminal device is a source user equipment UE, and the terminal device includes: An establishing unit, configured to establish a communication link with a relay UE; The establishing unit is further configured to securely establish an end-to-end communication link with the target UE after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

35. The terminal device according to claim 34, characterized in that: The communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or The communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

36. The terminal device according to claim 34 or 35, characterized in that: The source UE securely establishing an end-to-end communication link with the target UE includes one or more of the following: The source UE and the target UE establish a shared key for the end-to-end communication link; The source UE and the target UE establish a session key for the end-to-end communication link; The source UE establishes an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link with the target UE; as well as The source UE and the target UE establish an encryption protection key for the end-to-end communication link.

37. The terminal device according to any one of claims 34 to 36, characterized in that: The establishing unit is used for: The relay UE is triggered to establish communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

38. The terminal device according to claim 37, characterized in that The establishing unit is used for: Sending a first direct communication request message to the relay UE, where the first direct communication request message is used to trigger the relay UE to establish a communication link with the source UE; performing a first security mode command procedure with the relay UE; After the first security mode command process and the second security mode command process between the relay UE and the target UE are completed, a first direct communication accept message sent by the relay UE in response to the first direct communication request message is received.

39. The terminal device according to any one of claims 34 to 38, characterized in that: The establishing unit is used for: Perform a third security mode command procedure with the target UE.

40. The terminal device according to claim 39, characterized in that The terminal device further includes: A sending unit is configured to send a third direct communication request to the relay UE, where the third direct communication request is used to trigger the relay UE to send a fourth direct communication request to the target UE, where the fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

41. The terminal device according to claim 40, characterized in that The third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: Instruction information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

42. The terminal device according to any one of claims 34 to 41, characterized in that: Also includes: a negotiating unit, configured to negotiate a security mode with the target UE, where the security mode includes one or more of the following: Performing a security establishment procedure on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; as well as A security establishment procedure is performed on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

43. The terminal device according to claim 42, characterized in that The negotiation result of the security mode is carried in one or more of the following: Direct communication request message; Direct communication to receive messages; Relay service code; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

44. The terminal device according to any one of claims 34 to 43, characterized in that: The security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in the Packet Data Convergence Protocol PDCP layer or the adaptation layer.

45. A terminal device, characterized in that: The terminal device is a target user equipment UE, and the terminal device includes: An establishing unit, configured to establish a communication link with a relay UE; The establishing unit is further configured to securely establish an end-to-end communication link with the source UE after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

46. ​​The terminal device according to claim 45, characterized in that: The communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or The communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

47. The terminal device according to claim 45 or 46, characterized in that The target UE and the relay UE establish a communication link including one or more of the following: The target UE establishes a shared key for the end-to-end communication link with the source UE; The target UE establishes a session key for the end-to-end communication link with the source UE; The source UE establishes an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link with the target UE; as well as The source UE and the target UE establish an encryption protection key for the end-to-end communication link.

48. The terminal device according to any one of claims 45 to 47, characterized in that: The establishing unit is used for: Under the triggering of the source UE, a communication link is established with the relay UE.

49. The terminal device according to claim 48, characterized in that The establishing unit is used for: After the first security mode command process between the source UE and the relay UE is completed, receiving a second direct communication request message sent by the relay UE, where the second direct communication request message is used to trigger the target UE to establish a communication link with the relay UE; performing, in response to the second direct communication request message, a second security mode command procedure with the relay UE; In response to the second security mode command procedure being completed, a second direct communication accept message in response to the second direct communication request message is sent to the relay UE.

50. The terminal device according to any one of claims 45 to 49, characterized in that: The establishing unit is used for: Perform a third security mode command procedure with the source UE.

51. The terminal device according to claim 50, characterized in that The terminal device further includes: A receiving unit is configured to receive a fourth direct communication request sent by the relay UE after the relay UE receives the third direct communication request sent by the source UE, where the fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

52. The terminal device according to claim 51, characterized in that The third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: Instruction information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

53. The terminal device according to any one of claims 45 to 52, characterized in that: Also includes: a negotiating unit, configured to negotiate a security mode with the source UE, where the security mode includes one or more of the following: Performing a security establishment procedure on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; as well as A security establishment procedure is performed on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

54. The terminal device according to claim 53, characterized in that The negotiation result of the security mode is carried in one or more of the following: Direct communication request message; Direct communication to receive messages; Relay service code; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

55. The terminal device according to any one of claims 45 to 54, characterized in that: The security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in the Packet Data Convergence Protocol PDCP layer or the adaptation layer.

56. A terminal device, characterized in that: The terminal device is a relay user equipment UE, and the terminal device includes: An establishing unit, configured to establish communication links with a source UE and a target UE respectively; A forwarding unit is used to forward the end-to-end message between the source UE and the target UE after the relay UE establishes communication links with the source UE and the target UE respectively, wherein the end-to-end message is used for the source UE and the target UE to securely establish an end-to-end communication link.

57. The terminal device according to claim 56, characterized in that: The communication link between the source UE and the relay UE is a securely established communication link; and / or The communication link between the relay UE and the target UE is a securely established communication link.

58. The terminal device according to claim 56 or 57, characterized in that: The secure establishment of an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE includes one or more of the following: The source UE and the target UE establish a shared key for the end-to-end communication link; The source UE and the target UE establish a session key for the end-to-end communication link; The source UE establishes an integrity protection key for the end-to-end communication link with the target UE; as well as The source UE and the target UE establish an encryption protection key for the end-to-end communication link.

59. The terminal device according to any one of claims 56 to 58, characterized in that: The establishing unit is used for: Under the triggering of the source UE, communication links are established with the source UE and the target UE respectively.

60. The terminal device according to claim 59, characterized in that The establishing unit is used for: receiving a first direct communication request message sent by the source UE, where the first direct communication request message is used to trigger the relay UE to establish a communication link with the source UE; performing a first security mode command procedure with the source UE; After the first security mode command process ends, sending a second direct communication request message to the target UE, where the second direct communication request message is used to trigger the target UE to establish a communication link with the relay UE; performing a second security mode command procedure with the target UE; After the second security mode command procedure ends, receiving a second direct communication accept message in response to the second direct communication request message from the target UE; In response to the second direct communication accept message, a first direct communication accept message for the first direct communication request message is sent to the source UE.

61. The terminal device according to any one of claims 56 to 60, characterized in that: The source UE securely establishing an end-to-end communication link with the target UE, including: The source UE and the target UE perform a third security mode command process.

62. The terminal device according to claim 61, characterized in that The terminal device further includes: a receiving unit, configured to receive a third direct communication request sent by the source UE before the source UE and the target UE perform a third security mode command procedure; A sending unit is configured to send a fourth direct communication request to the target UE in response to the third direct communication request, where the fourth direct communication request is used to trigger the target UE to securely establish the end-to-end communication link with the source UE.

63. The terminal device according to claim 60, characterized in that The third direct communication request and / or the fourth direct communication request includes one or more of the following information: Instruction information for securely establishing the end-to-end communication link; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

64. The terminal device according to any one of claims 56 to 63, characterized in that: The end-to-end communication link is established based on a security method negotiated between the source UE and the target UE, where the security method includes one or more of the following: Performing a security establishment procedure on a single-hop communication link between the source UE and the target UE; as well as A security establishment procedure is performed on an end-to-end communication link between the source UE and the target UE.

65. The terminal device according to claim 64, characterized in that The negotiation result of the security mode is carried in one or more of the following: Direct communication request message; Direct communication to receive messages; Relay service code; and Security data required to securely establish the end-to-end communication link.

66. The terminal device according to any one of claims 56 to 65, characterized in that: The security protection of the end-to-end communication link is performed in the Packet Data Convergence Protocol PDCP layer or the adaptation layer.

67. A terminal device, characterized in that: The system comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store a program, and the processor is used to call the program in the memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 33.

68. A device, characterized in that The device comprises a processor configured to call a program from a memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 33.

69. A chip, characterized in that The device comprises a processor configured to call a program from a memory so that a device equipped with the chip executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 33.

70. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that A program is stored thereon, and the program causes a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 33.

71. A computer program product, characterized in that The method comprises a program for causing a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 33.

72. A computer program, characterized in that The computer program causes a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 33.