Simulation platform for dynamic layout of road side units

By designing a simulation platform for dynamic layout of roadside units, using the mechanism of social vehicle incentives and multi-enterprise vehicle operation coupling, the cost and efficiency problems of roadside unit layout in intelligent networked environment are solved, and more efficient roadside units are achieved Scheduling decision making and system optimization.

CN119047613APending Publication Date: 2024-11-29UNIV OF SHANGHAI FOR SCI & TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410962801.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-18
Publication Date
2024-11-29

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In an intelligent connected environment, how to scientifically arrange roadside units to support the safe and efficient operation of the intelligent connected transportation system, especially under cost constraints, and the internal interaction mechanism of multiple decision-making entities needs to be considered to avoid local optimal decisions.

Method used

A simulation platform for roadside units dynamically arranged is designed, including individual action set module, enterprise action set module, income calculation module and simulation calculation module, and adopts social vehicle incentives, multi-enterprise vehicle operation and multi-enterprise vehicle operation-Social The roadside unit scheduling task response mechanism of vehicle excitation coupled, through simulation and optimization model solving, to verify the data-driven roadside unit dynamic layout optimization model and its training algorithm.

Benefits of technology

This simulation platform effectively takes into account the behavioral characteristics and interaction mechanism of the decision-making subject, reduces the roadside unit scheduling cost of traffic managers, increases the completion rate and system optimization of roadside unit scheduling tasks, and is suitable for roadside under different conditions Unit dynamic layout.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a simulation platform for dynamic layout of road side units, and relates to the technical field of operation planning optimization. The system comprises an individual action set module, an enterprise action set module, an income calculation module and a simulation calculation module. According to the simulation platform, behavior characteristics and interaction mechanisms of decision subjects related to an intelligent network connection traffic system are considered, and a road side unit scheduling task response mechanism based on social vehicle excitation, multi-enterprise vehicle operation and multi-enterprise vehicle operation-social vehicle excitation coupling is designed. The three mechanisms are suitable for different conditions. Under the condition that whether an enterprise taking response roadside unit scheduling as a main service enters the market or not is not determined, for a traffic manager, a roadside unit scheduling task response mechanism based on social vehicle excitation is a feasible mode for realizing a roadside unit scheduling decision. Compared with social vehicles, the enterprise vehicles have the advantages of higher driving route predictability, convenience in monitoring and management and the like.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of operations optimization technology, and in particular to a simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units. Background Art

[0002] With the development and application of IoT technology, urban transportation can provide efficient, flexible, and environmentally friendly travel solutions. However, urban transportation management and control services also face numerous challenges. Intelligent connected vehicle technology provides an opportunity for implementing refined traffic control and is a key means of improving traffic safety, alleviating traffic congestion, and reducing traffic pollution. The high-precision, high-frequency data on vehicle and infrastructure status generated in intelligent connected environments enables the transition from model-driven to data-driven refined traffic control. Roadside units are the core of intelligent road infrastructure and a crucial support for intelligent connected vehicle technology.

[0003] Roadside units and intelligent connected vehicles are two types of communication nodes in the intelligent connected environment. According to the different ways of information exchange, the communication mode in the intelligent connected environment can be divided into vehicle-to-vehicle communication and vehicle-to-road communication. Compared with the distributed vehicle-to-vehicle communication mode, the vehicle-to-road communication mode has lower construction costs and a wider range of information exchange, making traffic

[0004] A higher level of system optimization enhances the scalability of intelligent connected vehicles and provides managers with a data foundation for road network monitoring and control. Scientifically deploying roadside units within cost constraints to support the safe and efficient operation of intelligent connected transportation systems is a key issue in the development of intelligent road infrastructure. In an intelligent connected environment, traffic control strategies based on high-precision, high-frequency data, data-driven predictive control, and rolling optimization theory are superior to traditional traffic control strategies based on strong mathematical assumptions and predictive control methodologies based on system dynamic modeling.

[0005] One approach to solving the problem of optimizing roadside unit placement in a stochastic and dynamic traffic environment is to model it as a stochastic program, seeking a static roadside unit placement solution that optimizes the mean of a given objective. Compared to optimal static roadside unit placement solutions based on stochastic programming, optimal dynamic roadside unit placement solutions are more flexible and effective in adapting to the stochastic and time-varying traffic flow of a road network, offering significant advantages in improving network performance and reducing project costs. Designing a response mechanism for roadside unit scheduling tasks is fundamental to solving the problem of dynamic roadside unit placement optimization. This task response involves numerous decision-makers and a complex decision-making environment. Failure to consider the inherent interactions among these decision-makers can lead traffic managers' roadside unit scheduling decisions to local optimality or even become infeasible. The stochastic, dynamic, and multi-decision-agent coupled nature of the dynamic roadside unit placement optimization problem suggests that solving it requires innovative optimization model formulations and solution algorithms. The existence and optimality of the corresponding solutions remain to be explored. Therefore, this problem presents a significant theoretical challenge, both valuable and challenging.

[0006] To address these issues, various models and algorithms need to be designed and validated. However, due to the complexity and uncertainty of real-world scenarios, as well as the cost of actual testing, relying solely on theoretical analysis and mathematical modeling is insufficient. A simulation platform and method capable of simulating real-world operational scenarios are needed to effectively test and evaluate algorithms. To address these issues, the inventors have proposed a simulation platform for the dynamic deployment of roadside units. Summary of the Invention

[0007] In order to solve the problem that relying solely on theoretical analysis and mathematical modeling is not enough due to the complexity and uncertainty of real-world scenarios and the cost of actual testing, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a simulation platform for the dynamic deployment of roadside units.

[0008] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions: a simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units, an individual action set module, an enterprise action set module, a revenue calculation module, and a simulation calculation module.

[0009] Preferably, a feasible quotation set of social vehicles is established, including the lower limit of the quotation of social vehicles for roadside unit scheduling tasks and the upper limit of the task quotation set by the traffic manager.

[0010] Preferably, a corporate action set is established, including vehicle size, driving route, departure time and quotation for roadside unit scheduling tasks.

[0011] Preferably, the analytically prioritized roadside unit dynamic deployment optimization model under different roadside unit scheduling task response mechanisms is solved, and the efficiency of the data-driven roadside unit dynamic deployment optimization model and its training algorithm is verified.

[0012] Preferably, three roadside unit dispatching task response mechanisms based on social vehicle incentives, multi-enterprise vehicle operations, and multi-enterprise vehicle operations-social vehicle incentive coupling are simulated.

[0013] Preferably, the benefit of the social vehicle is evaluated based on the difference between the income obtained by the social vehicle from completing the roadside unit dispatching task and the additional travel time cost caused by completing the task.

[0014] Preferably, the difference between the vehicle operating costs and revenue incurred by the enterprise to complete the roadside unit dispatch task is evaluated. Vehicle operating costs include vehicle purchase costs, maintenance costs, and driving costs.

[0015] Optimally, the spatiotemporal probability distribution of road network traffic status is fitted to generate the optimal operation plan for enterprise vehicles and compare the mechanisms.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0017] 1. The simulation platform of the present invention takes into account the behavioral characteristics and interaction mechanisms of the decision-making entities involved in the intelligent connected transportation system, and designs roadside unit scheduling task response mechanisms based on social vehicle incentives, multi-enterprise vehicle operations, and multi-enterprise vehicle operations-social vehicle incentive coupling. These three mechanisms are applicable to different conditions. In the case of uncertainty as to whether enterprises whose main business is to respond to roadside unit scheduling will enter the market, for traffic managers, the roadside unit scheduling task response mechanism based on social vehicle incentives is a feasible way to implement roadside unit scheduling decisions. Compared with social vehicles, enterprise vehicles have the advantages of higher predictability of driving routes and are easier to monitor and manage. The mechanism based on multi-enterprise vehicle operations can ensure a high completion rate of roadside unit scheduling tasks. This is especially important when the traffic density at the initial position of the roadside unit with scheduling needs is sparse. Compared with the first two, there are more competing entities participating in the roadside unit scheduling task response under the multi-enterprise vehicle operation-social vehicle incentive coupling mechanism, which can reduce the roadside unit scheduling costs of traffic managers;

[0018] 2. The simulation platform of this invention considers the design of a response mechanism for roadside unit (RSU) dispatch tasks based on multi-enterprise vehicle operations. Driven by the revenue generated by RSU dispatch tasks, multiple enterprises will emerge in the transportation system whose primary business is to perform RSU dispatch tasks. Under this RSU dispatch task response mechanism, traffic managers issue dispatch tasks to vehicles within their communication range via RSUs with dispatch requirements. Upon receiving the task information, enterprise vehicles determine their bids based on the task value and potential bids from other enterprise vehicles. The vehicle with the lowest bid wins the task, transports the RSU from its initial location to its target location, and receives the corresponding reward. If the RSU's target location is not within the vehicle's path, the vehicle will not bid for the task. Therefore, this mechanism cannot guarantee that all RSU dispatch requirements are met. The key to this mechanism design lies in constructing an enterprise vehicle operation optimization model. A mathematical expression for vehicle operating costs is derived based on the mapping of vehicle purchase and maintenance costs to vehicle size, and vehicle operating costs to travel time and frequency. An analytical relationship is established between enterprise revenue, the revenue generated from completing RSU dispatch tasks, and vehicle operating costs. On this basis, we consider the spatiotemporal probability distribution of roadside unit dispatching demands, the random and time-varying nature of traffic conditions in the road network, and the possible vehicle operation decisions made by other enterprises. With the goal of maximizing the average enterprise's own revenue, we construct a multi-enterprise vehicle operation optimization model using vehicle size, driving routes, and departure schedules as decision variables. We design an efficient model solution algorithm to address the model's discreteness, randomness, and multiple decision-making entities.

[0019] 3. The simulation platform of the present invention considers the design of a response mechanism for roadside unit dispatch tasks based on social vehicle incentives. Leveraging the profit-seeking nature of social vehicles traveling on the road network and incentivizing them to transport roadside units to target locations by paying them rewards is a feasible approach to completing roadside unit dispatch tasks. To reduce the roadside unit dispatch costs for traffic managers, a response mechanism for roadside unit dispatch tasks based on social vehicle incentives is designed: Traffic managers use roadside units with dispatching requirements to publish dispatch task messages to social vehicles within their communication range. Receiving social vehicles aim to obtain this task and determine their own bids, taking into account their own benefits and potential bids for this roadside unit dispatch task from other vehicles. The social vehicle with the lowest bid wins the roadside unit dispatch task and the corresponding reward. A social vehicle benefit function is established, taking into account the rewards social vehicles receive for completing the roadside unit dispatch task and the additional travel time required to complete the task. A social vehicle action set is established based on the roadside unit task value perceived by social vehicles and the task price cap set by traffic managers to prevent the profit-seeking nature of social vehicles from causing task bids to exceed the acceptable range. Based on the social vehicle revenue function and action set, the bidding behavior of social vehicles for roadside unit scheduling tasks is characterized. In this bidding process, whether there is a steady state between the bids and results of social vehicles is studied, and the quantitative relationship between the steady-state bids of social vehicles and the number of participating vehicles and the upper and lower limits of bids is analyzed.

[0020] 4. The simulation platform of this invention considers the design of a roadside unit (ROU) dispatch task response mechanism for a multi-enterprise vehicle operation coupled with social vehicle incentives. In this design, a RSU with dispatching requirements issues dispatch tasks to both enterprise vehicles and social vehicles within its communication range. Both enterprise and social vehicles bid for the dispatch tasks, and the vehicle with the lowest bid wins the task and the corresponding reward. A mathematical expression for social vehicle revenue is established, taking into account the revenue earned by social vehicles completing RSU dispatch tasks and the additional travel time cost incurred by completing these tasks. To maximize their own revenue, vehicles (including enterprise and social vehicles) determine their own bids based on the potential bids of other vehicles for RSU dispatch tasks. A quantitative inter-vehicle game relationship is established to characterize this competitive relationship. The bid decisions of enterprise and social vehicles for dispatch tasks affect enterprise revenue, which in turn influences enterprise vehicle operational decisions. Enterprise vehicle operational decisions determine the travel paths of enterprise vehicles, which in turn influence their bid decisions for tasks. The decision-making objectives of enterprises and social vehicles are inconsistent. A quantitative inter-vehicle game relationship is studied to quantitatively describe this decision-making interaction mechanism. Based on the quantitative relationships between vehicles, between companies and vehicles, and between companies, we constructed an optimization model for multi-company vehicle operations and heterogeneous vehicle bidding for roadside unit dispatch tasks. To address the impact of inconsistent decision-making objectives among various entities on decision-making outcomes, we investigated the existence of equilibrium solutions to this optimization model and designed a model-solving algorithm based on the model's stochastic nature. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0021] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0022] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the interactive mechanism structure of multi-enterprise vehicle operation and heterogeneous vehicle task quotation decision-making provided by the simulation platform of the present invention.

[0023] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the interactive mechanism structure of dynamic deployment of roadside units, vehicle operation, and scheduling task quotation decision-making provided by the simulation platform of the present invention.

[0024] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the multi-agent definition structure of the roadside unit dynamic deployment task under the multi-enterprise vehicle operation-social vehicle incentive coupling mechanism provided by the simulation platform of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0025] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0026] Example: Figure 1-3 As shown, the present invention provides a technical solution: a simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units, an individual action set module, an enterprise action set module, a revenue calculation module, and a simulation calculation module.

[0027] Establish a set of feasible quotations for social vehicles, including the lower limit of quotations for roadside unit dispatching tasks by social vehicles and the upper limit of task quotations set by traffic managers.

[0028] By adopting the aforementioned technical solutions, this simulation platform considers the behavioral characteristics and interaction mechanisms of the decision-makers involved in intelligent connected transportation systems and designs three roadside unit dispatching task response mechanisms: those based on social vehicle incentives, those based on multi-enterprise vehicle operations, and those based on a coupling of multi-enterprise vehicle operations and social vehicle incentives. These three mechanisms are applicable to different conditions.

[0029] Establish a set of enterprise actions, including vehicle size, driving routes, departure times and quotes for roadside unit dispatch tasks.

[0030] By adopting the above technical solution, a RSU dispatch task response mechanism based on social vehicle incentives is a viable approach for traffic managers to make RSU dispatch decisions, given the uncertainty surrounding the entry of companies primarily focused on responding to RSU dispatches. Compared to social vehicles, company vehicles offer advantages such as more predictable routes and easier monitoring and management. A mechanism based on multi-company vehicle operations ensures a high completion rate for RSU dispatch tasks. This is particularly important when traffic density is low at the initial location of the RSU requiring dispatch. Compared to the previous two approaches, the multi-company vehicle operation-social vehicle incentive mechanism allows for more competitive participation in RSU dispatch task responses, reducing RSU dispatch costs for traffic managers.

[0031] The analytically prioritized roadside unit dynamic deployment optimization model under different roadside unit scheduling task response mechanisms is solved, and the efficiency of the data-driven roadside unit dynamic deployment optimization model and its training algorithm is verified.

[0032] By adopting the above technical solutions, this simulation platform takes into account the design of a roadside unit dispatch task response mechanism based on social vehicle incentives. Taking advantage of the profit-seeking nature of social vehicles traveling on the road network, paying them a reward to incentivize them to transport the roadside unit to the target location is a feasible way to complete the roadside unit dispatch task. In order to reduce the roadside unit dispatch costs of traffic managers, a roadside unit dispatch task response mechanism based on social vehicle incentives is designed: traffic managers use roadside units with dispatch requirements to publish dispatch task messages to social vehicles within their communication range. The social vehicles that receive the message aim to obtain this task, consider their own benefits and the possible quotes for this roadside unit dispatch task from other vehicles, and determine their own quotes. The social vehicle with the lowest quote obtains this roadside unit dispatch task and the corresponding reward.

[0033] Three roadside unit dispatching task response mechanisms based on social vehicle incentives, multi-enterprise vehicle operations, and multi-enterprise vehicle operations-social vehicle incentives coupling are simulated.

[0034] By employing the aforementioned technical solution, a social vehicle benefit function is established, taking into account the compensation earned by social vehicles for completing roadside unit dispatch tasks and the additional travel time required to complete the tasks. A social vehicle action set is then established based on the roadside unit task value perceived by social vehicles and the task price cap set by traffic managers to prevent social vehicles from pursuing profits and resulting in task bids exceeding the acceptable range.

[0035] The benefits of social vehicles are evaluated based on the difference between the income obtained by social vehicles from completing the roadside unit dispatching task and the additional travel time cost caused by completing the task.

[0036] By employing this technical solution, we characterize the bidding behavior of social vehicles for roadside unit dispatch tasks based on their revenue function and action set. We investigate whether there is a steady state between the bids and results of social vehicles in this bidding process, and analyze the quantitative relationship between the steady-state bids of social vehicles and the number of participating vehicles and the upper and lower bid limits.

[0037] Evaluate the difference between the vehicle operating costs and revenue incurred by the enterprise to complete roadside unit dispatch tasks. Vehicle operating costs include vehicle purchase costs, maintenance costs, and driving costs.

[0038] By adopting the above technical solution, in the design of the roadside unit scheduling task response mechanism that couples the operation of multiple enterprise vehicles with the incentives of social vehicles, the roadside unit with scheduling needs publishes scheduling tasks to the enterprise vehicles and social vehicles within its communication range. Both enterprise vehicles and social vehicles participate in the bidding for scheduling tasks, and the vehicle with the lowest bid obtains the task and corresponding remuneration.

[0039] Fitting the spatiotemporal probability distribution of road network traffic conditions, generating optimal operation plans for enterprise vehicles, and comparing mechanisms.

[0040] By employing the above technical solution, a mathematical expression for social vehicle revenue is established, considering the revenue earned by social vehicles from completing roadside unit dispatch tasks and the additional travel time cost incurred by completing these tasks. Vehicles (including enterprise and social vehicles) aim to maximize their own revenue and determine their own bids based on the potential bids of other vehicles for roadside unit dispatch tasks. A quantitative inter-vehicle game relationship is established to characterize this competitive relationship. The bidding decisions of enterprise and social vehicles for dispatch tasks affect enterprise revenue, which in turn influences enterprise vehicle operation decisions. Enterprise vehicle operation decisions determine enterprise vehicle travel paths, which in turn influence vehicle bid decisions for tasks. The decision-making objectives of enterprises and social vehicles are inconsistent. A quantitative inter-vehicle game relationship is studied to quantitatively describe this decision-making interaction mechanism. Based on the quantitative inter-vehicle, enterprise-vehicle, and inter-enterprise game relationships, an optimization model for multi-enterprise vehicle operation and heterogeneous vehicle bidding for roadside unit dispatch tasks is constructed.

[0041] Obviously, those skilled in the art may make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if such changes and modifications fall within the scope of the claims and their equivalents, the present invention is intended to include such changes and modifications.

Claims

1. A simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units, characterized by: Individual action set module, enterprise action set module, profit calculation module, simulation calculation module.

2. A simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Establish a set of feasible quotations for social vehicles, including the lower limit of quotations for roadside unit dispatching tasks by social vehicles and the upper limit of task quotations set by traffic managers.

3. A simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Create a collection of enterprise actions, including vehicle size, driving routes, departure times, and quotes for roadside unit dispatch tasks.

4. A simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The analytically prioritized roadside unit dynamic deployment optimization model under different roadside unit scheduling task response mechanisms is solved, and the efficiency of the data-driven roadside unit dynamic deployment optimization model and its training algorithm is verified.

5. A simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Three roadside unit dispatching task response mechanisms based on social vehicle incentives, multi-enterprise vehicle operations, and multi-enterprise vehicle operations-social vehicle incentive coupling are simulated.

6. A simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The benefits of social vehicles are evaluated based on the difference between the income obtained by social vehicles from completing the roadside unit dispatching task and the additional travel time cost caused by completing the task.

7. A simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Evaluate the difference between the vehicle operating cost and revenue of the enterprise to complete the roadside unit dispatching task. Vehicle operating cost includes vehicle purchase cost, maintenance cost and driving cost.

8. The simulation platform for dynamic deployment of roadside units as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Fit the spatiotemporal probability distribution of road network traffic status, generate the optimal operation plan for enterprise vehicles, and compare mechanisms.