Wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection
By setting false command signals and gain matrix in the wireless sensor network, and using the Laplace matrix feature values, an induced attack on the network state is achieved, the problem of wireless sensor network security threat is solved, and the attack effect and controllability are improved .
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411234249.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-09-04
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-10
AI Technical Summary
Because of its broadcasting characteristics, wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to network attacks, resulting in security threats, and the prior art is difficult to effectively defend and control the attack effect.
By determining the maximum and minimum non-zero eigenvalues of system parameters and Laplace matrix in the wireless sensor network, setting false command signals and injecting them into the interactive link of sensor nodes, designing false state trajectories, and adjusting the gain matrix of sensor nodes to Implement network state-induced attacks.
The orderly and controllable induction of the wireless sensor network status is achieved, the probability of attack detection is reduced, the attack efficiency and fee ratio is improved, and the consistency of the network status is ensured.
Smart Images
Figure CN119110294A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of wireless sensor network attack countermeasures, and in particular to a wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection. Background Art
[0002] Each sensor in a wireless sensor network achieves state coordination of the entire network through distributed interconnection. It has excellent characteristics such as flexibility, scalability, real-time and robustness, and is widely used in the fields of intelligent environmental monitoring, intelligent traffic management, distributed power grid control, etc. However, due to the broadcast characteristics of wireless networks, distributed wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to network attacks and face a variety of security threats in practical applications. Summary of the invention
[0003] In order to overcome at least one deficiency in the prior art, the present application provides a wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection.
[0004] In a first aspect, a wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection is provided, comprising:
[0005] Step S1, determining the system parameters of the wireless sensor network through the real-time input and output information of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network; the system parameters include the system matrix and the input matrix;
[0006] Step S2, obtaining the interaction topology of the wireless sensor network, calculating the Laplace matrix corresponding to the interaction topology, and determining the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix;
[0007] Step S3, determining a gain matrix of the sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix;
[0008] Step S4, setting a false command signal of each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, and injecting the false command signal into the interactive link channel of the sensor node;
[0009] Step S5, setting a false state trajectory of the wireless sensor network after being attacked according to the false command signal;
[0010] Step S6, determining whether the states of the sensor nodes in the wireless sensor network after the induced attack remain coordinated and consistent; if so, executing step S7, if not, returning to step S4, resetting the false command signal of each sensor node;
[0011] Step S7, determining whether the coordinated state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory, if so, the induced attack on the wireless sensor network is achieved, if not, returning to step S4, resetting the false command signal of each sensor node.
[0012] In one embodiment, step S3, determining the gain matrix of the sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix, includes:
[0013] Set the condition matrix θ1-λ k θ2K, where θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, and λ k is the eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix corresponding to sensor node k, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes;
[0014] Determine λ k is the conditional matrix when the Laplace matrix has the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue, recorded as the first conditional matrix and the second conditional matrix. When the first conditional matrix and the second conditional matrix are both Hurwitz matrices, the corresponding K is the gain matrix of the determined sensor node.
[0015] In one embodiment, step S4, setting the false command signal of each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, includes:
[0016] Construct a spurious directive linear matrix inequality:
[0017]
[0018] Among them, υ1 and υ2 are adjustment parameters, θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, I n and I m are the unit matrices with dimensions of n and m respectively, E is a matrix variable, T represents transposition, ζ is the instruction weight matrix; λ k is the eigenvalue corresponding to sensor node k, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes;
[0019] Solving for λ k The two false instruction linear matrix inequalities when the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix are obtained, and the matrix variable E is obtained;
[0020] The characteristic matrix Q of the false command signal is determined according to the matrix variable E:
[0021]
[0022] The false command signal of each sensor node is set according to the characteristic matrix Q of the false command signal:
[0023]
[0024] Among them, t a To induce the attack start time, is the false command signal of sensor node k at time t, is the false command signal of sensor node k at t a The initial value of the moment.
[0025] In one embodiment, the false state trajectory is:
[0026]
[0027] in, is the false state trajectory at time t, θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, is the initial value of the state signal of sensor node k, k is the number of sensor nodes, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes, t a is the starting time of the induced attack, s is the integral term, Q is the characteristic matrix of the false command signal, is the initial false command signal of sensor node k.
[0028] In one embodiment, step S7, determining whether the cooperative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory, includes:
[0029] Observe the real-time coordination status of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network;
[0030] Calculate the state difference between the real-time collaborative state and the false state trajectory;
[0031] If the state difference is less than a certain threshold, it is determined that the collaborative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory.
[0032] In a second aspect, a wireless sensor network induced attack device based on false instruction injection is provided, comprising:
[0033] The system parameter determination module is used to determine the system parameters of the wireless sensor network through the real-time input and output information of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network; the system parameters include the system matrix and the input matrix;
[0034] The eigenvalue calculation module is used to obtain the interaction topology of the wireless sensor network, calculate the Laplace matrix corresponding to the interaction topology, and determine the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix;
[0035] The gain matrix determination module is used to determine the gain matrix of the sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix;
[0036] A false command signal injection module is used to set the false command signal of each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, and inject the false command signal into the interactive link channel of the sensor node;
[0037] A false state trajectory setting module, used to set a false state trajectory of the wireless sensor network after being attacked according to a false command signal;
[0038] The first judgment module is used to judge whether the states of the sensor nodes in the wireless sensor network after the induced attack remain coordinated and consistent; if so, the second judgment module is entered; if not, the false command signal injection module is entered to reset the false command signal of each sensor node;
[0039] The second judgment module is used to judge whether the collaborative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory. If so, the induced attack on the wireless sensor network is realized. If not, the false command signal injection module is entered to reset the false command signal of each sensor node.
[0040] In a third aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the above-mentioned wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection is implemented.
[0041] In a fourth aspect, a computer program product includes a computer program / instruction, and when the computer program / instruction is executed by a processor, the above-mentioned wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection is implemented.
[0042] Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following beneficial effects: the wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection of the present application utilizes the coordinated characteristics of distributed wireless sensors to achieve consistent states through network interconnection, designs false instruction signals and injects them into the control loops of some sensor nodes, and achieves the state induction effect on the entire wireless sensor network through the influence of some sensor nodes on the sensor network; the method can induce the real-time coordinated state of the entire wireless sensor network to the state range or space specified by the attacker, the state of each sensor in the wireless sensor network remains consistent, the probability of being detected by the target sensor network attack is low, the attack effect is orderly and controllable, and it has a high attack cost-effectiveness for distributed networks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0043] The present application may be better understood by referring to the following description given in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, which together with the following detailed description are included in this specification and form a part of this specification. In the drawings:
[0044] Figure 1 A flowchart of a wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection according to an embodiment of the present application is shown;
[0045] Figure 2 shows the wireless sensor network topology;
[0046] Figure 3 It shows the cooperative state trajectory of the wireless sensor network before and after the attack;
[0047] Figure 4 A structural block diagram of a wireless sensor network induced attack device based on false instruction injection according to an embodiment of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0048] The exemplary embodiments of the present application will be described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. For the sake of clarity and conciseness, not all features of the actual embodiments are described in the specification. However, it should be understood that many implementation-specific decisions can be made in the process of developing any such actual embodiments in order to achieve the specific goals of the developer, and these decisions may vary from embodiment to embodiment.
[0049] It is also necessary to explain here that, in order to avoid obscuring the present application due to unnecessary details, only the device structure closely related to the scheme according to the present application is shown in the drawings, while other details that are not closely related to the present application are omitted.
[0050] It should be understood that the present application is not limited to the described implementation forms due to the following description with reference to the accompanying drawings. In this article, where feasible, the embodiments can be combined with each other, features between different embodiments can be replaced or borrowed, and one or more features can be omitted in one embodiment.
[0051] The present invention provides a method for inducing attacks on wireless sensor networks based on false instruction injection. Figure 1 A flowchart of a wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection according to an embodiment of the present application is shown. Figure 1 , methods include:
[0052] Step S1, determining the system parameters of the wireless sensor network through the real-time input and output information of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network; the system parameters include a system matrix and an input matrix.
[0053] Here, the input and output information of each sensor node may vary according to actual conditions. The input information may be, for example, current or voltage information, and the output information may be measured state information.
[0054] The wireless sensor network consists of N sensor nodes, and the dynamic characteristics of each sensor node can be described as:
[0055]
[0056] in, is the state signal of sensor node k at time t, for The derivative of θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, K is the gain matrix of the sensor node, and a ki is the interaction weight between sensor nodes k and i. If there is interaction between sensor nodes k and i, then a ki =1, otherwise, a ki =0;ψ k is the neighbor set of sensor node k, that is, the set of sensor nodes that have edge connections with sensor node k in topological interaction. is the state signal of sensor node i at time t.
[0057] Step S2, obtaining the interaction topology of the wireless sensor network, calculating the Laplace matrix corresponding to the interaction topology, and determining the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix.
[0058] Here, network synchronization or reconstruction methods can be used to identify the interaction topology of the wireless sensor network.
[0059] Step S3, determining a gain matrix of the sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix;
[0060] Step S4, setting a false command signal for each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, and injecting the false command signal into the interactive link channel of the sensor node;
[0061] Step S5, setting a false state trajectory of the wireless sensor network after being attacked according to the false command signal;
[0062] Step S6, determining whether the states of the sensor nodes in the wireless sensor network after the induced attack remain coordinated and consistent; if so, executing step S7, if not, returning to step S4, resetting the false command signal of each sensor node;
[0063] Step S7, determining whether the coordinated state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory, if so, the induced attack on the wireless sensor network is achieved, if not, returning to step S4, resetting the false command signal of each sensor node.
[0064] The wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection of this embodiment utilizes the coordinated characteristics of distributed wireless sensors to achieve consistent states through network interconnection, designs false instruction signals and injects them into the control loops of some sensor nodes, and achieves the state induction effect on the entire wireless sensor network through the influence of some sensor nodes on the sensor network; this method can induce the real-time coordinated state of the entire wireless sensor network to the state range or space specified by the attacker, the state of each sensor in the wireless sensor network remains consistent, the probability of being detected by the target sensor network attack is low, the attack effect is orderly and controllable, and it has a high attack cost-effectiveness for distributed networks.
[0065] In one embodiment, step S3, determining the gain matrix of the sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix, includes:
[0066] Set the condition matrix θ1-λ k θ2K, where θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, and λ k is the eigenvalue corresponding to sensor node k, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes; for example, when k=2, λ2 is the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix, and when k=N, λ N is the largest non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix;
[0067] Determine λ k is the conditional matrix when the Laplace matrix has the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue, recorded as the first conditional matrix and the second conditional matrix. When the first conditional matrix and the second conditional matrix are both Hurwitz matrices, the corresponding K is the gain matrix of the determined sensor node.
[0068] In this embodiment, when the conditional matrices corresponding to the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue are Hurwitz matrices, it can be ensured that the conditional matrices corresponding to all non-zero eigenvalues are Hurwitz matrices, thereby determining the gain matrix of the sensor node. Here, the gain matrix of each sensor node is considered to be the same.
[0069] In one embodiment, step S4, setting the false command signal of each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, includes:
[0070] Construct a spurious directive linear matrix inequality:
[0071]
[0072] Among them, υ1 and υ2 are adjustment parameters, θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, I n and I m are the unit matrices with dimensions of n and m respectively, E is a matrix variable, T represents transposition, ζ is the instruction weight matrix; λ k is the eigenvalue corresponding to sensor node k, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes;
[0073] Solving for λ using a feasible solution of linear matrix inequality solver k The two false directive linear matrix inequalities when the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix are obtained, and the matrix variable E is obtained; here, the matrix variable E makes λ k The two false linear matrix inequalities hold simultaneously for the largest non-zero eigenvalue and the smallest non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix.
[0074] The characteristic matrix Q of the false command signal is determined according to the matrix variable E:
[0075]
[0076] The false command signal of each sensor node is set according to the characteristic matrix Q of the false command signal:
[0077]
[0078] Among them, t a To induce the attack start time, is the false command signal of sensor node k at time t, is the false command signal of sensor node k at t a The initial value of the moment.
[0079] It should be noted that when the false command signal of each sensor node needs to be reset in step S6 and step S7, the false command signal of each sensor node can be reset by resetting the adjustment parameters υ1 and υ2, and / or the command weight matrix ζ and / or the false command signal of the sensor node k at t a Initial value of time To reset the false command signal of each sensor node.
[0080] In one embodiment, the false state trajectory is:
[0081]
[0082] in, is the false state trajectory at time t, θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, is the initial value of the state signal of sensor node k, k is the number of sensor nodes, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes, t a is the starting time of the induced attack, s is the integral term, Q is the characteristic matrix of the false command signal, is the initial false command signal of sensor node k.
[0083] In one embodiment, step S7, determining whether the cooperative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory, includes:
[0084] Observe the real-time coordination status of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network;
[0085] Calculate the state difference between the real-time collaborative state and the false state trajectory;
[0086] If the state difference is less than a certain threshold, it is determined that the collaborative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory.
[0087] In one embodiment, a wireless sensor network consisting of 6 sensor nodes is considered, and the system parameters are set as follows:
[0088]
[0089] Figure 2 The topology of the wireless sensor network is shown, and the interaction weights between nodes are 0 or 1. The initial values of the state signals of each sensor node are:
[0090]
[0091]
[0092] The gain matrix is set as:
[0093]
[0094] Assume that the start time of the induced attack is t a =5s, the initial false command signal at the beginning of the induced attack is:
[0095]
[0096]
[0097] The characteristic matrix of the designed false command signal is:
[0098]
[0099] Set the total simulation time to 15s. Figure 3 The collaborative state trajectory of the wireless sensor network before and after the attack is shown; let the collaborative state of the wireless sensor network before and after the attack be c Λl (t) and where c Λl (t) and The trajectory is represented by dashed and solid lines, the initial state of the wireless sensor network and the location of the attack injection are marked with hexagons and boxes, and the final state with and without attack is represented by a five-pointed star. Figure 3 It can be seen that at the moment of the false command signal injection, the state of the wireless sensor network became chaotic, but then it returned to consistency. At the same time, the coordinated state of the wireless sensor network under the induced attack gradually deviated from the original state trajectory c Λl (t), the final and false state trajectories Overlapping realizes the induced attack effect of distributed network.
[0100] Using the same inventive concept as the wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection, this embodiment also provides a corresponding wireless sensor network induced attack device based on false instruction injection. Figure 4 The structure diagram of the wireless sensor network induced attack device based on false instruction injection according to the embodiment of the present application is shown in FIG. Figure 4 , the device comprises:
[0101] The system parameter determination module 41 is used to determine the system parameters of the wireless sensor network through the real-time input and output information of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network; the system parameters include the system matrix and the input matrix;
[0102] The eigenvalue calculation module 42 is used to obtain the interaction topology of the wireless sensor network, calculate the Laplace matrix corresponding to the interaction topology, and determine the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix;
[0103] A gain matrix determination module 43, used to determine the gain matrix of the sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix;
[0104] A false command signal injection module 44 is used to set a false command signal for each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, and inject the false command signal into the interactive link channel of the sensor node;
[0105] A false state trajectory setting module 45, used to set a false state trajectory of the wireless sensor network after being attacked according to the false command signal;
[0106] The first judgment module 46 is used to judge whether the states of the sensor nodes in the wireless sensor network after the induced attack remain coordinated and consistent; if so, the second judgment module is entered; if not, the false command signal injection module is entered to reset the false command signal of each sensor node;
[0107] The second judgment module 47 is used to judge whether the collaborative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory. If so, the induced attack on the wireless sensor network is realized. If not, the false command signal injection module is entered to reset the false command signal of each sensor node.
[0108] The wireless sensor network induced attack device based on false instruction injection of this embodiment has the same inventive concept as the wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection mentioned above. Therefore, the specific implementation method of the device can be seen in the embodiment part of the wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection mentioned above, and its technical effect corresponds to the technical effect of the above method, which will not be repeated here.
[0109] An embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the above-mentioned wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection is implemented.
[0110] An embodiment of the present application provides a computer program product, including a computer program / instruction. When the computer program / instruction is executed by a processor, the above-mentioned wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection is implemented.
[0111] The above are only various implementations of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art who is familiar with the present technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection, characterized in that: include: Step S1, determining the system parameters of the wireless sensor network through the real-time input and output information of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network; The system parameters include a system matrix and an input matrix; Step S2, obtaining the interaction topology of the wireless sensor network, calculating the Laplace matrix corresponding to the interaction topology, and determining the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix; Step S3, determining a gain matrix of a sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix; Step S4, setting a false command signal of each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, and injecting the false command signal into the interactive link channel of the sensor node; Step S5, setting a false state trajectory of the wireless sensor network after being attacked according to the false command signal; Step S6, determining whether the states of the sensor nodes in the wireless sensor network after the induced attack remain coordinated and consistent; if so, executing step S7, if not, returning to step S4, resetting the false command signal of each sensor node; Step S7, determining whether the coordinated state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory, if so, the induced attack on the wireless sensor network is achieved, if not, returning to step S4, resetting the false command signal of each sensor node.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Step S3, determining a gain matrix of a sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix, comprising: Set the condition matrix θ1-λ k θ2K, where θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, and λ k is the eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix corresponding to sensor node k, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes; Determine λ k is the conditional matrix when the Laplace matrix has the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue, recorded as the first conditional matrix and the second conditional matrix, and the corresponding K when the first conditional matrix and the second conditional matrix are both Hurwitz matrices is solved, which is the gain matrix of the determined sensor node.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Step S4, setting a false command signal of each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, including: Construct a spurious directive linear matrix inequality: Among them, υ1 and υ2 are adjustment parameters, θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, I n and I m are the unit matrices with dimensions of n and m respectively, E is a matrix variable, T represents transposition, ζ is the instruction weight matrix; λ k is the eigenvalue corresponding to sensor node k, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes; Solving for λ k The two false instruction linear matrix inequalities when the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix are obtained, and the matrix variable E is obtained; The characteristic matrix Q of the false command signal is determined according to the matrix variable E: The false command signal of each sensor node is set according to the characteristic matrix Q of the false command signal: Among them, t a To induce the attack start time, is the false command signal of sensor node k at time t, is the false command signal of sensor node k at t a The initial value of the moment.
4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The false state trajectory is: in, is the false state trajectory at time t, θ1 is the system matrix, θ2 is the input matrix, is the initial value of the state signal of sensor node k, k is the number of sensor nodes, 1≤k≤N, N is the number of sensor nodes, t a is the starting time of the induced attack, s is the integral term, Q is the characteristic matrix of the false command signal, is the initial false command signal of sensor node k.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Step S7, determining whether the cooperative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory, includes: Observe the real-time coordination status of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network; Calculating a state difference between the real-time collaborative state and the false state trajectory; If the state difference is less than a certain threshold, it is determined that the cooperative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory.
6. A wireless sensor network induced attack device based on false instruction injection, characterized in that: include: The system parameter determination module is used to determine the system parameters of the wireless sensor network through the real-time input and output information of each sensor node in the wireless sensor network; The system parameters include a system matrix and an input matrix; An eigenvalue calculation module is used to obtain the interaction topology of the wireless sensor network, calculate the Laplace matrix corresponding to the interaction topology, and determine the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix; A gain matrix determination module, used to determine the gain matrix of the sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network, the maximum non-zero eigenvalue and the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplace matrix; A false command signal injection module, used to set a false command signal of each sensor node according to the system parameters of the wireless sensor network and the gain matrix of the sensor node, and inject the false command signal into the interactive link channel of the sensor node; A false state trajectory setting module, used to set a false state trajectory of the wireless sensor network after being attacked according to the false command signal; The first judgment module is used to judge whether the states of the sensor nodes in the wireless sensor network after the induced attack remain coordinated and consistent; if so, the second judgment module is entered; if not, the false command signal injection module is entered to reset the false command signal of each sensor node; The second judgment module is used to judge whether the collaborative state of the wireless sensor network after the induced attack is consistent with the false state trajectory. If so, the induced attack on the wireless sensor network is realized. If not, the false command signal injection module is entered to reset the false command signal of each sensor node.
7. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for induced attack on a wireless sensor network based on false instruction injection as described in any one of claims 1 to 5 is implemented.
8. A computer program product, characterized in that It includes a computer program / instruction, which, when executed by a processor, implements the wireless sensor network induced attack method based on false instruction injection as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.