Anonymous authentication method, third-party authentication center, user node and edge server

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of information security and technology, in particular to an anonymous authentication method, a third-party authentication center, a user node and an edge server. Comprising the following steps: initializing a power anonymous authentication system entity, and generating a third-party security parameter, an edge server public key and an edge server private key; receiving a registration request sent by a user node; generating a user security parameter and a user node private key according to the third-party security parameter; and sending the third-party security parameter, the edge server public key, the user security parameter and the user node private key to the user node, sending the edge server private key to the edge server, and storing the real identity identifier of the user in the registration request, the user node private key and the relationship between the real identity identifier and the user node private key in a database to complete registration. The user node completes registration, mutual authentication with the edge server, revocation and reconnection with the edge server, anonymity and authenticity of the user are achieved, and real identity information of the user is effectively protected.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security and technology, and in particular to an anonymous authentication method, a third-party authentication center, a user node and an edge server. Background Art

[0002] With the in-depth application of emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things and big data in the smart grid industry, a new power system with new energy as the main body has emerged. Power grid companies have concentrated data assets and business access to data external services. Data external services need to connect to a large number of data sources, and ensuring the authenticity of data without tampering has become a major challenge. The power system uses an identity authentication mechanism to resist security attacks and protect sensitive data. However, during the user authentication process, the transmission of real identity information will reduce the privacy of the system and easily cause the leakage of sensitive data. Traditional solutions authenticate users by designing security protocols such as symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption to prevent illegal users from obtaining sensitive data. However, during the authentication process, the security of data before transmission to the cloud server and after the ciphertext is decrypted by the recipient is weak, and it is usually subject to complex attacks. In cloud-based power systems, the identity data transmitted during the authentication process is usually stored on the cloud server, and operations such as data processing, storage, management and data analysis are often performed in the cloud server. Therefore, user security and privacy are increasingly dependent on third-party cloud service providers. However, third-party cloud service providers may have major security vulnerabilities, and malicious insiders may cause third-party cloud service providers to leak sensitive identity data. Research has found that anonymous protection for users who need to be authenticated is one of the most effective and direct means to prevent identity information leakage.

[0003] At present, smart grids widely use authentication key negotiation protocols to ensure communication security in public channels and realize identity authentication and key negotiation between the two communicating parties. The authentication and key management protocol based on the combination of symmetric key technology and elliptic curve public key technology has the advantages of strong scalability, strong fault tolerance, strong accessibility, and high efficiency, but the protocol cannot resist man-in-the-middle attacks. The authentication and key distribution protocol based on a trusted third party can resist man-in-the-middle attacks, but the protocol only relies on the security of the underlying cryptographic algorithm and cannot resist unknown key sharing attacks and counterfeit attacks. It can be seen that due to the complexity and diversity of smart grids, smart grids have different security requirements for different environments, and therefore an anonymous authentication method that can solve user privacy issues is urgently needed. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to overcome the above-mentioned defects, the present invention is proposed to provide an anonymous authentication method, a third-party authentication center, a user node and an edge server that solve or at least partially solve the technical problem that user privacy is easily leaked in a complex power grid environment.

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is achieved by adopting the following technical solutions:

[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides an anonymous authentication method, the method comprising:

[0007] Initialize the power anonymous authentication system entity and generate third-party security parameters, edge server public key and edge server private key;

[0008] Receive a registration request sent by a user node;

[0009] Generate user security parameters and user node private key according to the third-party security parameters;

[0010] The third-party security parameters, edge server public key, user security parameters and user node private key are sent to the user node, the edge server private key is sent to the edge server, the real identity of the user in the registration request, the user node private key and the relationship between the two are stored in the database to complete the registration.

[0011] Preferably, the user security parameters include secret parameters and private key parameters; and generating the user security parameters and the user node private key according to the third-party security parameters includes:

[0012] Randomly select and generate multiple secret parameters according to the third-party security parameters;

[0013] Randomly select two of the multiple secret parameters as private key parameters, and generate a user node private key according to the private key parameters.

[0014] Preferably, the secret parameters include α1 and α2, and the acquisition method of α1 and α2 is as follows:

[0015]

[0016]

[0017] Among them, l1, l2 and n are third-party security parameters.

[0018] Preferably, the private key parameters include f1 and f2, and the expression formulas of f1 and f2 are as follows:

[0019]

[0020]

[0021] The calculation method of the user node private key is as follows:

[0022] USK=(f1,f2);

[0023] Among them, USK is the user node private key.

[0024] Preferably, the third-party security parameter also includes a, the secret parameter also includes x, x∈[0,a]; the third-party security parameter also includes e, and e is a prime number.

[0025] Preferably, it also includes:

[0026] A revocation application sent by a user node is received, and according to the user node private key in the revocation application, the user node private key and the corresponding real identity identifier are deleted from the database.

[0027] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a third-party authentication center, the third-party authentication center comprising:

[0028] An initialization module, used to initialize the power anonymous authentication system entity and generate third-party security parameters, edge server public key and edge server private key;

[0029] A registration request receiving module, used to receive a registration request sent by a user node;

[0030] A private key generation module, used to generate user security parameters and user node private keys according to the third-party security parameters;

[0031] The storage module is used to send the third-party security parameters, edge server public key, user security parameters and user node private key to the user node, send the edge server private key to the edge server, store the user's real identity identifier in the registration request, the user node private key and the relationship between the two in the database to complete the registration.

[0032] In a third aspect, the present invention provides an anonymous authentication method, the method comprising:

[0033] Sending a registration request to a third-party authentication center, wherein the registration request includes the user's real identity identifier;

[0034] Receive third-party security parameters, user security parameters and user node private key sent by a third-party authentication center, calculate evidence based on the third-party security parameters and user security parameters, and save the user node private key;

[0035] Receive the edge server public key sent by the third-party authentication center, obtain an encrypted signature using an elliptic curve encryption algorithm based on the evidence and the edge server public key, and send the encrypted signature to the edge server;

[0036] Receive the authentication information sent by the edge server, decrypt the authentication information, and if the decryption is successful, complete the mutual authentication.

[0037] Preferably, the user security parameters include secret parameters and private key parameters; the evidence is calculated as follows:

[0038] w∈[0,2 e a-1],

[0039]

[0040]

[0041] A3=r1 w mod n;

[0042] C=H(A1||A2||R e );

[0043] E=wf1+f2+Cx;

[0044] E1=β1+Cα1;

[0045] E2=β2+Cα2;

[0046] proof = (C, E, E1, E2);

[0047] Wherein, l1, l2, e, n, a are third-party security parameters, and l1, l2, e and a are prime numbers, n is a composite number that cannot be decomposed by the user node and the server, r1 and r2 are high-order elements randomly selected in the first multiplication cycle group, t1 is a discrete logarithm with r1 as the base, and t2 is a discrete logarithm with r2 as the base; w, β1 and β2 are random numbers selected by the user node according to the third-party security parameters; f1 and f2 are private key parameters, f1 is the first private key parameter, and f2 is the second private key parameter; α1, α2 and x are secret parameters, x∈[0,a]; A1, A2 and A3 are user node encryption parameters, where A1 is the first encryption parameter, A2 is the second encryption parameter, and A3 is the third encryption parameter; H(·) is the selected hash function; R e is the edge random number; C, E, E1 and E2 are evidence parameters, evidence parameter C is the hash value, evidence parameters E, E1 and E2 are the evidence information encrypted by the user node; proof is the evidence.

[0048] Preferably, the step of obtaining an encrypted signature based on the evidence and the edge server public key by using an elliptic curve encryption algorithm comprises:

[0049] Randomly select a session key in the second multiplication cycle group;

[0050] An encrypted signature is calculated based on the session key, evidence, edge server public key and user node encryption parameters.

[0051] Preferably, the encryption signature is calculated as follows:

[0052] σ=Enc PK (K s ,proof,A3);

[0053] Among them, σ is the encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; PK is the public key of the edge server; K s is the session key.

[0054] Preferably, after completing the mutual authentication, the method further comprises:

[0055] A revocation application is sent to a third-party authentication center, wherein the revocation application includes the user node private key.

[0056] Preferably, it also includes:

[0057] When the connection with the edge server is disconnected, randomly selecting a new session key in the second multiplication cycle group, generating a new encrypted signature based on the new session key, and sending the new encrypted signature to the edge server;

[0058] Receive new authentication information sent by the edge server, and decrypt the new authentication information. If the decryption is successful, it means that the user node is reconnected with the edge server.

[0059] Preferably, the new encrypted signature is calculated as follows:

[0060] σ'=Enc PK (K s ,K n ,proof,N d );

[0061] Among them, σ' is the new encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; N d is the new edge random number; K n For the new session key

[0062] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a user node, the user node comprising:

[0063] A registration request sending module, used to send a registration request to a third-party authentication center, wherein the registration request includes the user's real identity identification;

[0064] The evidence calculation module is used to receive the third-party security parameters and user security parameters sent by the third-party authentication center, and calculate the evidence according to the third-party security parameters and user security parameters;

[0065] The encrypted signature acquisition module is used to receive the edge server public key sent by the third-party authentication center, obtain the encrypted signature based on the evidence and the edge server public key using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm, and send the encrypted signature to the edge server;

[0066] The authentication information decryption module is used to receive the authentication information sent by the edge server and decrypt the authentication information. If the decryption is successful, the mutual authentication is completed.

[0067] In a fifth aspect, the present invention provides an anonymous authentication method, the method comprising:

[0068] Receive the edge server private key sent by the third-party certification center;

[0069] Receive the encrypted signature sent by the user node;

[0070] Decrypt the encrypted signature according to the edge server private key to obtain evidence, and verify whether the evidence is legal by using a zero-knowledge proof algorithm;

[0071] If yes, the pre-encrypted information is encrypted, authentication information is generated, and sent to the user node.

[0072] Preferably, the use of a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to verify whether the evidence is legal includes:

[0073] Verify whether the evidence parameters in the evidence satisfy the following equation:

[0074]

[0075]

[0076] in, N is a commitment calculated with (r1, t1) as the base, and M is a commitment calculated with (r2, t2) as the base; A1 and A2 are both user node encryption parameters, and A1 is the first encryption parameter and A2 is the second encryption parameter; r1, r2, t1 and t2 are high-order elements, r1 and r2 are high-order elements randomly selected in the first multiplication cycle group, t1 and t2 are discrete logarithms with r1 and r2 as the bases respectively; n is a third-party security parameter; α1, α2 and x are secret parameters, x∈[0,a]; C, E, E1 and E2 are evidence parameters, evidence parameter C is a hash value, and evidence parameters E, E1 and E2 are evidence information encrypted by the user node;

[0077] If yes, it means the evidence is correct, and we continue to verify whether the evidence parameters satisfy the following equation:

[0078]

[0079] Where H(·) is the hash function; R e is the edge random number;

[0080] If so, it means the evidence is legal.

[0081] Preferably, it also includes:

[0082] When the connection with the user node is disconnected, receiving a new encrypted signature sent by the user node, and querying whether the disconnected user node has been authenticated according to the new encrypted signature;

[0083] If so, the pre-encrypted information is encrypted based on the new encrypted signature, new authentication information is generated, and the new authentication information is sent to the user node.

[0084] In a sixth aspect, the present invention provides an edge server, the edge server comprising:

[0085] A private key receiving module, used to receive the edge server private key sent by a third-party authentication center;

[0086] The encrypted signature receiving module is used to receive the encrypted signature sent by the user node;

[0087] A verification module, used to decrypt the encrypted signature according to the edge server private key to obtain evidence, and use a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to verify whether the evidence is legal; if so, transfer to an authentication information generation module;

[0088] The authentication information generation module is used to encrypt the pre-encrypted information, generate authentication information, and send it to the user node.

[0089] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0090] 1. The present invention combines the zero-knowledge proof algorithm and the elliptic curve encryption algorithm to design an anonymous encryption mechanism, realizes the registration of user nodes and the mutual authentication between the edge server and the user node, so as to complete the anonymous authentication of the power anonymous authentication system, realizes the anonymity and authenticity of the user, and effectively protects the real identity information of the user;

[0091] 2. The present invention also designs a revocation mechanism. When the user node exits the power anonymous authentication system, the relevant information of the user node in the database is deleted to ensure the security of the user's privacy information. The present invention also designs a cache mechanism. When the user node is disconnected from the edge server, the user node is reconnected to the edge server under the premise of protecting the user's privacy information and reducing the overhead. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0092] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of the present invention;

[0093] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of the main steps of an identity-based anonymous authentication method applied to a third-party authentication center according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0094] Figure 3 is a main structural block diagram of a third-party authentication center according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0095] Figure 4 It is a flowchart of the main steps of an identity-based anonymous authentication method applied to a user center according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0096] Figure 5 It is a main structural block diagram of a user center according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0097] Figure 6 It is a flowchart of main steps of an identity-based anonymous authentication method applied to an edge server according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0098] Figure 7 It is a main structural block diagram of an edge server according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0099] The specific implementation modes of the present invention are further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0100] In an application scenario of the present invention, Figure 1 As shown, an anonymous authentication mechanism is provided, which includes a registration phase and a mutual authentication phase. In the registration phase, the third-party authentication center first initializes the power anonymous authentication system entity, generates third-party security parameters, edge server public keys, and edge server private keys. The user node sends a registration request to the third-party authentication center, which receives the registration request and stores the real identity of the user in the registration request in the database. The third-party authentication center generates user security parameters and user node private keys based on the third-party security parameters, and sends the third-party security parameters, edge server public keys, user security parameters, and user node private keys to the user node. The user node receives the third-party security parameters, edge server public keys, user security parameters, and user node private keys and saves the user node private keys. The third-party authentication center stores the user node private key and the relationship between the user node private key and the real identity in the database, and the registration phase is completed.

[0101] In the mutual authentication phase, the user node calculates evidence based on the third-party security parameters and the user security parameters, generates an encrypted signature based on the evidence and the edge server public key using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm (ECC encryption algorithm), and sends the encrypted signature to the edge server. The third-party authentication center sends the edge server private key to the edge server, the edge server receives the edge server private key and the encrypted signature, decrypts the encrypted signature using the edge server private key, obtains the evidence, and uses the zero-knowledge proof algorithm to verify whether the evidence is legal; if not, the authentication terminates; if so, the pre-encrypted information is encrypted, authentication information is generated, and the authentication information is sent to the user phase, the user node receives the authentication information sent by the edge server, decrypts the authentication information, and if the decryption is successful, the mutual authentication is completed.

[0102] The present invention also provides a revocation mechanism. Specifically, when a user wants to exit the anonymous power authentication system, the user node sends a revocation application to a third-party authentication center. The third-party authentication center receives the revocation application and deletes the corresponding user node private key and real identity identifier in the database based on the user node private key in the revocation application.

[0103] Based on the mobility characteristics of user nodes, the stability of user node connection is poor, and disconnection from the edge server often occurs. In this case, it is generally necessary to update the session key to ensure the security of the session, but obtaining the session key requires mutual authentication again, which is costly and increases the communication delay. In order to reduce system overhead, the present invention also proposes a cache mechanism. Specifically, when the user node is disconnected from the edge server, the user node randomly selects a new session key in the second multiplication cycle group, generates a new encryption signature based on the new session key and sends the encryption signature to the edge server. The edge server queries whether the disconnected user node has been authenticated based on the new encryption signature; if not, the reconnection is terminated; if so, the pre-encrypted information is encrypted based on the new encryption signature, and new authentication information is generated, and the new authentication information is sent to the user node, and the user node decrypts the new authentication information; if the decryption is successful, it indicates that the user node is reconnected to the edge server; if not, it indicates that the reconnection fails.

[0104] Embodiment 1:

[0105] The anonymous authentication method provided by the present invention is applied to a third-party authentication center. The flowchart is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, including:

[0106] Step 101: Initialize the power anonymous authentication system entity and generate third-party security parameters, edge server public key and edge server private key.

[0107] Step 102: Receive a registration request sent by a user node.

[0108] Step 103: Generate user security parameters and user node private key according to the third-party security parameters.

[0109] In this embodiment, the user security parameters include secret parameters and private key parameters. Among them, multiple secret parameters are randomly selected and generated according to the third-party security parameters, and the secret parameters include α1 and α2, and α1 and α2 are randomly selected and generated according to the following formula:

[0110]

[0111]

[0112] Wherein, l1, l2 and n are third-party security parameters, and l1 and l2 are prime numbers, wherein n is a composite number, and n is a sufficiently large composite number that cannot be decomposed by the user node and the edge server.

[0113] Furthermore, the secret parameter also includes x, x∈[0,a], a is a third-party security parameter, and a is a prime number; the third-party security parameter also includes e, e is a prime number.

[0114] Randomly select two of the multiple secret parameters as private key parameters, and generate the user node private key according to the private key parameters. Among them, the private key parameters include f1 and f2, f1 is the first private key parameter, f2 is the second private key parameter, and the expression formulas of f1 and f2 are as follows:

[0115]

[0116]

[0117] The calculation method of the user node private key USK is as follows:

[0118] USK=(f1,f2).

[0119] Step 104: Send the third-party security parameters, edge server public key, user security parameters and user node private key to the user node, send the edge server private key to the edge server, store the user's real identity in the registration request, the user node private key and the relationship between the two in the database, and complete the registration.

[0120] Further, a high-order element is randomly selected in the first multiplication cycle group, the high-order element is sent to the user node, and the high-order element, the third-party security parameter and the secret parameter are sent to the edge server. The first multiplication cycle group refers to the multiplication group of the finite field.

[0121] The user node public key is calculated based on the high-order elements and sent to the user node. The calculation formula of the user node public key is as follows:

[0122]

[0123]

[0124] UPK=(N,M);

[0125] Among them, UPK is the public key of the user node; r1, r2, t1 and t2 are high-order elements; N is the commitment calculated with (r1, t1) as the base, and M is the commitment calculated with (r2, t2) as the base. The two commitments hide the same secret value x, and the user node cannot know the discrete logarithms of r1 and t1, r2 and t2 with each other as the base, that is, the user node cannot know value.

[0126] Furthermore, a mutual authentication request is received from a user node, and a query is made in the revocation list whether there is a user node private key that is the same as the user node private key in the mutual authentication request; if so, it means that the user node has been revoked and the mutual authentication is terminated; if not, the edge server private key is sent to the edge service.

[0127] Furthermore, after receiving the revocation application sent by the user node, the user node private key and the corresponding real identity are deleted from the database according to the user node private key in the revocation application. Specifically, according to the user node private key in the revocation application, the corresponding user node private key is queried in the database; the user node encryption parameters sent by the user node are received, and the user node private key in the database is verified to be the user node private key in the revocation application according to the user node encryption parameters, high-order elements, third-party security parameters and the user node private key in the database, based on the following verification formula:

[0128]

[0129] In the formula, A1 and A3 are both user node encryption parameters, among which A1 is the first encryption parameter and A3 is the third encryption parameter.

[0130] If the above formula is true, it means that the user node private key in the database is the user node private key in the revocation application, and the corresponding user node private key is deleted from the database. And according to the corresponding relationship between the user node private key and the real identity identifier, the real identity identifier of the user node is queried in the database and the real identity identifier is deleted. If the above formula is not true, the verification is terminated.

[0131] Furthermore, while deleting the user node private key and the corresponding real identity identifier in the database, the user node private key is also added to the revocation list.

[0132] Embodiment 2:

[0133] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention also provides a third-party authentication center, the structural diagram of which is shown in FIG. Figure 3 As shown, it includes: an initialization module, a registration request receiving module, a private key generation module and a storage module.

[0134] An initialization module, used to initialize the power anonymous authentication system entity and generate third-party security parameters, edge server public key and edge server private key;

[0135] A registration request receiving module, used to receive a registration request sent by a user node;

[0136] A private key generation module, used to generate user security parameters and user node private keys based on third-party security parameters;

[0137] The storage module is used to send the third-party security parameters, edge server public key, user security parameters and user node private key to the user node, send the edge server private key to the edge server, store the user's real identity in the registration request, the user node private key and the relationship between the two in the database to complete the registration.

[0138] Among them, the user security parameters include secret parameters and private key parameters; the private key generation module is specifically used to: randomly select and generate multiple secret parameters according to the third-party security parameters; randomly select two of the multiple secret parameters as private key parameters, and generate the user node private key according to the private key parameters.

[0139] The secret parameters include α1 and α2, and the methods of obtaining α1 and α2 are as follows:

[0140]

[0141]

[0142] Among them, l1, l2, and n are third-party security parameters.

[0143] The private key parameters include f1 and f2. The expression formulas of f1 and f2 are as follows:

[0144]

[0145]

[0146] The calculation method of the user node private key is as follows:

[0147] USK=(f1,f2);

[0148] Among them, USK is the user node private key.

[0149] Furthermore, the third-party security parameter also includes a, the secret parameter also includes x, x∈[0,a]; the third-party security parameter also includes e, and e is a prime number.

[0150] Furthermore, the system further comprises a first revocation module, which is used to receive a revocation application sent by a user node, and delete the user node private key and the corresponding real identity in the database according to the user node private key in the revocation application.

[0151] Example 3

[0152] The present invention provides an anonymous authentication method, which is applied to a user node. The flowchart is as follows: Figure 4 As shown, including:

[0153] Step 201: Send a registration request to a third-party authentication center, where the registration request includes the user's real identity.

[0154] Step 202: Receive third-party security parameters, user security parameters and user node private key sent by the third-party authentication center, calculate evidence based on the third-party security parameters and user security parameters, and save the user node private key.

[0155] In this embodiment, high-order elements sent by a third-party authentication center and edge random numbers sent by an edge server are received; evidence is calculated based on the high-order elements, third-party security parameters, user security parameters and edge random numbers; wherein the user security parameters include secret parameters and private key parameters.

[0156] The proof is calculated using the equal protocol based on FO commitment (Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment), which is calculated as follows:

[0157] w∈[0,2 e a-1],

[0158]

[0159]

[0160] A3=r1 w modn;

[0161] C=H(A1||A2||R e );

[0162] E=wf1+f2+Cx;

[0163] E1=β1+Cα1;

[0164] E2=β2+Cα2;

[0165] proof = (C, E, E1, E2);

[0166] Wherein, w, β1 and β2 are random numbers selected by the user node according to the third-party security parameters; l1, l2, e and n are third-party security parameters, and l1, l2 and e are prime numbers, wherein n is a composite number, and n is a composite number that is large enough to be decomposed by the user node and the edge server; A1, A2 and A3 are user node encryption parameters, wherein A1 is the first encryption parameter, A2 is the second encryption parameter, and A3 is the third encryption parameter; r1 and r2 are high-order elements randomly selected in the first multiplication cyclic group, t1 is the discrete logarithm with r1 as the base, and t2 is the discrete logarithm with r2 as the base; f1 is the first private key parameter, and f2 is the second private key parameter; H(·) is the selected hash function; R e is the edge random number; C, E, E1 and E2 are evidence parameters, evidence parameter C is the hash value, evidence parameters E, E1 and E2 are the evidence information encrypted by the user node; α1, α2 and x are secret parameters, x∈[0,a]; proof is the evidence.

[0167] Further, the user node encryption parameters and hash function are sent to the edge server.

[0168] Step 203: Receive the edge server public key sent by the third-party authentication center, obtain the encrypted signature using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm based on the evidence and the edge server public key, and send the encrypted signature to the edge server.

[0169] In this embodiment, a session key is randomly selected from the second multiplication cyclic group, where the second multiplication cyclic group is a multiplication group of a finite field, and the first multiplication cyclic group and the second multiplication cyclic group are different; an encrypted signature is calculated based on the session key, evidence, edge server public key, and user node encryption parameter, and the calculation formula is as follows:

[0170] σ=Enc PK (K s ,proof,A3);

[0171] Among them, σ is the encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; PK is the public key of the edge server; K s is the session key; proof is the evidence; A3 is the third encryption parameter; Enc PK (K s ,proof,A3) indicates that the session key, evidence and the third encryption parameter are encrypted using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm using the edge server public key.

[0172] Step 204: Receive the authentication information sent by the edge server, decrypt the authentication information, and if the decryption is successful, the mutual authentication is completed.

[0173] In this embodiment, the calculation formula for decrypting the authentication information is as follows:

[0174]

[0175] Among them, msg is the pre-encrypted information obtained after decryption; Dec is the decryption by the elliptic curve decryption algorithm; K s is the session key; s For authentication information; Indicates that the authentication information is decrypted using the session key and the elliptic curve decryption algorithm.

[0176] Furthermore, when exiting the anonymous power authentication system, a revocation application is sent to a third-party authentication center, and the revocation application includes the user node private key.

[0177] Furthermore, when the connection with the edge server is disconnected, a new encrypted signature is generated and sent to the edge server. Specifically, a new edge random number sent by the edge server is received; a new session key is randomly selected in the second multiplication loop group; a new encrypted signature is calculated based on the session key, the new session key, the evidence, the new edge random number and the edge server public key. The specific calculation formula is as follows:

[0178] σ'=Enc PK (K s ,K n ,proof,N d );

[0179] Among them, σ' is the new encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; K s is the session key; K n is the new session key; proof is the evidence; N d is the new edge random number; To indicate the use of the edge server public key, the session key, the new session key, the evidence, and the new edge random number are encrypted using the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm.

[0180] After sending the new encrypted signature to the edge server, the new authentication information sent by the edge server is received and decrypted. The decryption formula is as follows:

[0181]

[0182] Among them, msg is the pre-encrypted information obtained after decryption; Dec is the decryption by the elliptic curve decryption algorithm; K n is the new session key; s 'For new authentication information; Indicates using the new session key and the elliptic curve decryption algorithm to decrypt the new authentication information.

[0183] If the decryption is successful, it means that the user node is reconnected to the edge server; if the decryption fails, it means that the user node is not reconnected to the edge server.

[0184] Embodiment 4:

[0185] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention also provides a user node, the structural diagram of which is as follows: Figure 5 As shown, it includes: a registration request sending module, an evidence calculation module, an encryption signature acquisition module and an authentication information decryption module.

[0186] A registration request sending module is used to send a registration request to a third-party authentication center, where the registration request contains the user's real identity;

[0187] The evidence calculation module is used to receive the third-party security parameters and user security parameters sent by the third-party authentication center, and calculate the evidence according to the third-party security parameters and user security parameters;

[0188] The encryption signature acquisition module is used to receive the edge server public key sent by the third-party authentication center, obtain the encryption signature based on the evidence and the edge server public key using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm, and send the encryption signature to the edge server;

[0189] The authentication information decryption module is used to receive the authentication information sent by the edge server and decrypt the authentication information. If the decryption is successful, the mutual authentication is completed.

[0190] Among them, the user security parameters include secret parameters and private key parameters; the evidence calculation module is specifically used to:

[0191] The evidence is calculated as follows:

[0192] w∈[0,2 e a-1],

[0193]

[0194]

[0195] A3=r1 w mod n;

[0196] C=H(A1||A2||R e );

[0197] E=wf1+f2+Cx;

[0198] E1=β1+Cα1;

[0199] E2=β2+Cα2;

[0200] proof = (C, E, E1, E2);

[0201] Wherein, l1, l2, e, n, a are third-party security parameters, and l1, l2, e and a are prime numbers, n is a composite number that cannot be decomposed by the user node and the server, r1, r2, t1 and t2 are high-order elements, wherein r1 and r2 are high-order elements randomly selected in the first multiplication cycle group, t1 is a discrete logarithm with r1 as the base, and t2 is a discrete logarithm with r2 as the base; w, β1 and β2 are random numbers selected by the user node according to the third-party security parameters; f1 and f2 are private key parameters, f1 is a first private key parameter, and f2 is a second private key parameter; α1, α2 and x are secret parameters, x∈[0,a]; A1, A2 and A3 are user node encryption parameters, wherein A1 is a first encryption parameter, A2 is a second encryption parameter, and A3 is a third encryption parameter; H(·) is a selected hash function; R e is the edge random number; C, E, E1 and E2 are evidence parameters, evidence parameter C is the hash value, evidence parameters E, E1 and E2 are the evidence information encrypted by the user node; proof is the evidence.

[0202] The encryption signature acquisition module is specifically used to: randomly select a session key in the second multiplication cycle group; and calculate the encryption signature according to the session key, evidence, edge server public key and user node encryption parameter.

[0203] Furthermore, the encrypted signature is calculated as follows:

[0204] σ=Enc PK (K s ,proof,A3);

[0205] Among them, σ is the encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; PK is the public key of the edge server; K s is the session key.

[0206] Furthermore, it also includes a second revocation module, which is located after the authentication information decryption module. The second revocation module is used to send a revocation application to a third-party authentication center, and the revocation application includes the user node private key.

[0207] The system also includes a first reconnection module. The first reconnection module is used to randomly select a new session key from the second multiplication cycle group when the connection with the edge server is disconnected, generate a new encryption signature based on the new session key, and send the new encryption signature to the edge server; receive new authentication information sent by the edge server, decrypt the new authentication information, and if the decryption is successful, it indicates that the user node is reconnected with the edge server.

[0208] Among them, the calculation method of the new encrypted signature is as follows:

[0209] σ'=Enc PK (K s ,K n ,proof,N d );

[0210] Among them, σ' is the new encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; N d is the new edge random number; K n is the new session key.

[0211] Example 5

[0212] The anonymous authentication method provided by the present invention is applied to an edge server, and the flow chart is as follows: Figure 6 As shown, including:

[0213] Step 301: Receive the edge server private key sent by a third-party authentication center.

[0214] Step 302: Receive the encrypted signature sent by the user node.

[0215] Furthermore, after receiving the encrypted signature sent by the user node, an edge random number is randomly selected in the second multiplication cycle group and sent to the user node, and high-order elements, third-party security parameters, secret parameters sent by the third-party authentication center and A1, A2 and hash function sent by the user node are received.

[0216] Step 303: Decrypt the encrypted signature according to the edge server private key to obtain evidence, and use the zero-knowledge proof algorithm to verify whether the evidence is legal; if so, proceed to step 304.

[0217] Before decrypting the encrypted signature according to the edge server private key and obtaining the evidence, it also includes: if the edge server is legal, the edge server decrypts the encrypted signature according to the edge server private key after receiving the encrypted signature; if the edge server is illegal, it means that the encrypted signature cannot be successfully decrypted and the mutual authentication phase is terminated.

[0218] Among them, whether the edge server is legal depends on whether it can complete the verification of evidence. If the verification evidence is legal, the edge server is legal. If the verification evidence is illegal, the edge server is illegal. If the edge server is legal, it can be calculated and decrypted through the user node public key and the sent evidence. If the edge server is illegal, it cannot be.

[0219] In this embodiment, the zero-knowledge proof algorithm refers to Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment, and its specific application is to verify whether the evidence is legal based on high-order elements, third-party security parameters, secret parameters, A1, A2 and hash functions, as follows:

[0220]

[0221]

[0222] in, N is a commitment calculated with base (r1, t1), and M is a commitment calculated with base (r2, t2); A1 and A2 are both encryption parameters of user nodes, and A1 is the first encryption parameter and A2 is the second encryption parameter; r1, r2, t1 and t2 are high-order elements, r1 and r2 are high-order elements randomly selected in the first multiplication cycle group, t1 and t2 are discrete logarithms with base r1 and r2 respectively; n is a third-party security parameter; α1, α2 and x are secret parameters, x∈[0,a]; C, E, E1 and E2 are evidence parameters, evidence parameter C is a hash value, and evidence parameters E, E1 and E2 are evidence information encrypted by the user node.

[0223] Verify whether the evidence parameters in the evidence satisfy the above equations 1 and 2; if so, it means that the evidence is correct, then verify whether the evidence parameters satisfy the following equation 3; if so, it means that the evidence is legal; if not, the authentication terminates.

[0224]

[0225] Where H(·) is the hash function; R e is the edge random number.

[0226] It is worth noting that in equation 3, the C on both sides of the equation are the hash values ​​in the evidence. If the C on the left side of the equation is equal to the C on the right side of the equation The calculated value is equal to the value on the right side of the equation. If the calculated value is equal to , then the equation does not hold, indicating that the evidence is legal.

[0227] Step 304: Encrypt the pre-encrypted information, generate authentication information, and send it to the user node.

[0228] In this embodiment, the encrypted signature is decrypted according to the edge server private key to obtain the session key; the pre-encrypted information is encrypted according to the session key to generate the authentication information. The calculation formula of the authentication information is as follows:

[0229]

[0230] Among them, σ sis the authentication information; Enc is the encryption by elliptic curve encryption algorithm; K s is the session key; msg is the pre-encrypted information; Indicates that the pre-encrypted information is encrypted using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm using the session key.

[0231] Furthermore, the evidence and session key obtained by decrypting the encrypted signature are recorded in the user chain list.

[0232] Furthermore, when the connection with the user node is disconnected, a new encrypted signature sent by the user node is received, and a query is made based on the new encrypted signature whether the disconnected user node has been authenticated; if so, the pre-encrypted information is encrypted based on the new encrypted signature, new authentication information is generated, and the new authentication information is sent to the user node.

[0233] Among them, the specific method of querying whether the disconnected user node has been authenticated based on the new encrypted signature is: decrypt the new encrypted signature to obtain the evidence and session key in the new encrypted signature; compare the evidence and session key in the new encrypted signature with the evidence and session key in the user list respectively; if they are the same, it means that the disconnected user node has been authenticated.

[0234] The specific method of encrypting the pre-encrypted information and generating new authentication information is as follows: decrypting the new encrypted signature to obtain a new session key; using the new session key to encrypt the pre-encrypted information to generate new authentication information. The calculation formula for the new authentication information is as follows:

[0235]

[0236] Among them, σ' is the new encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; K n is the new session key; msg is the pre-encrypted message; Indicates that the pre-encrypted information is encrypted using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm with a new session key.

[0237] Furthermore, before receiving the new encrypted signature sent by the user node, a new edge random number is randomly selected in the second multiplication cycle group, and the new edge random number is sent to the user node.

[0238] Example 6

[0239] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention also provides an edge server, the structural diagram of which is shown in FIG. Figure 7 As shown, it includes: a private key receiving module, an encrypted signature receiving module, a verification module and an authentication information generating module.

[0240] A private key receiving module, used to receive the edge server private key sent by a third-party authentication center;

[0241] The encrypted signature receiving module is used to receive the encrypted signature sent by the user node;

[0242] The verification module is used to decrypt the encrypted signature according to the edge server private key, obtain evidence, and use the zero-knowledge proof algorithm to verify whether the evidence is legal; if so, it will be transferred to the authentication information generation module;

[0243] The authentication information generation module is used to encrypt the pre-encrypted information, generate authentication information, and send it to the user node.

[0244] The verification module is specifically used for:

[0245] Verify whether the evidence parameters in the evidence satisfy the following equation:

[0246]

[0247]

[0248] in, N is a commitment calculated with (r1, t1) as the base, and M is a commitment calculated with (r2, t2) as the base; A1 and A2 are both user node encryption parameters, and A1 is the first encryption parameter and A2 is the second encryption parameter; r1, r2, t1 and t2 are high-order elements, r1 and r2 are high-order elements randomly selected in the first multiplication cycle group, t1 and t2 are discrete logarithms with r1 and r2 as the bases respectively; n is a third-party security parameter; α1, α2 and x are secret parameters, x∈[0,a]; C, E, E1 and E2 are evidence parameters, evidence parameter C is a hash value, and evidence parameters E, E1 and E2 are evidence information encrypted by the user node;

[0249] If yes, it means the evidence is correct. We continue to verify whether the evidence parameters satisfy the following equation:

[0250]

[0251] Where H(·) is the hash function; R e is the edge random number;

[0252] If so, it means the evidence is legal.

[0253] The second reconnection module is also included. The second reconnection module is used to receive a new encrypted signature sent by the user node when the connection with the user node is disconnected, and query whether the disconnected user node has been authenticated according to the new encrypted signature; if so, encrypt the pre-encrypted information based on the new encrypted signature, generate new authentication information, and send the new authentication information to the user node.

[0254] Example 7

[0255] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention also provides a computer device, which includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store a computer program, the computer program includes program instructions, and the processor is used to execute the program instructions stored in the computer storage medium. The processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. It is the computing core and control core of the terminal, which is suitable for implementing one or more instructions, and is specifically suitable for loading and executing one or more instructions in the computer storage medium to implement the corresponding method flow or corresponding functions, so as to implement the steps of an anonymous authentication method in the above embodiment.

[0256] Example 8

[0257] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention also provides a storage medium, specifically a computer-readable storage medium (Memory), which is a memory device in a computer device for storing programs and data. It can be understood that the computer-readable storage medium here can include both built-in storage media in a computer device and, of course, an extended storage medium supported by the computer device. The computer-readable storage medium provides a storage space, which stores the operating system of the terminal. In addition, one or more instructions suitable for being loaded and executed by a processor are also stored in the storage space, and these instructions can be one or more computer programs (including program codes). It should be noted that the computer-readable storage medium here can be a high-speed RAM memory or a non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk memory. The processor can load and execute one or more instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium to implement the steps of an anonymous authentication method in the above embodiment.

[0258] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0259] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0260] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0261] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process in the computer or other programmable device. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0262] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit its protection scope. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, ordinary technicians in the field should understand that after reading the present invention, those skilled in the art can still make various changes, modifications or equivalent substitutions to the specific implementation methods of the application, but these changes, modifications or equivalent substitutions are all within the protection scope of the claims to be approved.

Claims

1. An anonymous authentication method, characterized in that: The method comprises: Initialize the power anonymous authentication system entity and generate third-party security parameters, edge server public key and edge server private key; Receive a registration request sent by a user node; Generate user security parameters and user node private key according to the third-party security parameters; The third-party security parameters, edge server public key, user security parameters and user node private key are sent to the user node, the edge server private key is sent to the edge server, the real identity of the user in the registration request, the user node private key and the relationship between the two are stored in the database to complete the registration.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The user security parameters include secret parameters and private key parameters; and generating the user security parameters and the user node private key according to the third-party security parameters includes: Randomly select and generate multiple secret parameters according to the third-party security parameters; Randomly select two of the multiple secret parameters as private key parameters, and generate a user node private key according to the private key parameters.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The secret parameters include α1 and α2, and the acquisition method of α1 and α2 is as follows: Among them, l1, l2 and n are third-party security parameters.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The private key parameters include f1 and f2, and the expression formulas of f1 and f2 are as follows: The calculation method of the user node private key is as follows: USK=(f1,f2); Among them, USK is the user node private key.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The third-party security parameter also includes a, the secret parameter also includes x, x∈[0,a]; the third-party security parameter also includes e, and e is a prime number.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that Also includes: A revocation application sent by a user node is received, and according to the user node private key in the revocation application, the user node private key and the corresponding real identity identifier are deleted from the database.

7. A third-party authentication center, characterized in that: The third-party authentication centers include: An initialization module, used to initialize the power anonymous authentication system entity and generate third-party security parameters, edge server public key and edge server private key; A registration request receiving module, used to receive a registration request sent by a user node; A private key generation module, used to generate user security parameters and user node private keys according to the third-party security parameters; The storage module is used to send the third-party security parameters, edge server public key, user security parameters and user node private key to the user node, send the edge server private key to the edge server, store the user's real identity identifier in the registration request, the user node private key and the relationship between the two in the database to complete the registration.

8. An anonymous authentication method, characterized in that: The method comprises: Sending a registration request to a third-party authentication center, wherein the registration request includes the user's real identity identifier; Receive third-party security parameters, user security parameters and user node private key sent by a third-party authentication center, calculate evidence based on the third-party security parameters and user security parameters, and save the user node private key; Receive the edge server public key sent by the third-party authentication center, obtain an encrypted signature using an elliptic curve encryption algorithm based on the evidence and the edge server public key, and send the encrypted signature to the edge server; Receive the authentication information sent by the edge server, decrypt the authentication information, and if the decryption is successful, complete the mutual authentication.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The user security parameters include secret parameters and private key parameters; the evidence is calculated as follows: A3=r1 w modern; C=H(A1||A2||R e ); E=wf1+f2+Cx; E1=β1+Cα1; E2=β2+Cα2; proof = (C, E, E1, E2); Wherein, l1, l2, e, n, a are third-party security parameters, and l1, l2, e and a are prime numbers, n is a composite number that cannot be decomposed by the user node and the server, r1, r2, t1 and t2 are high-order elements, wherein r1 and r2 are high-order elements randomly selected in the first multiplication cycle group, t1 is a discrete logarithm with r1 as the base, and t2 is a discrete logarithm with r2 as the base; w, β1 and β2 are random numbers selected by the user node according to the third-party security parameters; f1 and f2 are private key parameters, f1 is a first private key parameter, and f2 is a second private key parameter; α1, α2 and x are secret parameters, x∈[0,a]; A1, A2 and A3 are user node encryption parameters, wherein A1 is a first encryption parameter, A2 is a second encryption parameter, and A3 is a third encryption parameter; H(·) is a selected hash function; R e is the edge random number; C, E, E1 and E2 are evidence parameters, evidence parameter C is the hash value, evidence parameters E, E1 and E2 are the evidence information encrypted by the user node; proof is the evidence.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The method of obtaining an encrypted signature based on the evidence and the edge server public key by using an elliptic curve encryption algorithm includes: Randomly select a session key in the second multiplication cycle group; An encrypted signature is calculated based on the session key, evidence, edge server public key and user node encryption parameters.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The encryption signature is calculated as follows: σ=Enc PK (K s ,proof,A3); Among them, σ is the encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; PK is the public key of the edge server; K s is the session key.

12. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 11, characterized in that After the mutual authentication is completed, the method further includes: A revocation application is sent to a third-party authentication center, wherein the revocation application includes the user node private key.

13. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that Also includes: When the connection with the edge server is disconnected, randomly selecting a new session key in the second multiplication cycle group, generating a new encrypted signature based on the new session key, and sending the new encrypted signature to the edge server; Receive new authentication information sent by the edge server, and decrypt the new authentication information. If the decryption is successful, it means that the user node is reconnected with the edge server.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that The new encrypted signature is calculated as follows: σ'=Enc PK (K s ,K n ,proof,N d ); Among them, σ' is the new encrypted signature; Enc is the encryption algorithm of elliptic curve encryption; N d is the new edge random number; K n is the new session key.

15. A user node, characterized in that: The user node comprises: A registration request sending module, used to send a registration request to a third-party authentication center, wherein the registration request includes the user's real identity identification; The evidence calculation module is used to receive the third-party security parameters and user security parameters sent by the third-party authentication center, and calculate the evidence according to the third-party security parameters and user security parameters; The encrypted signature acquisition module is used to receive the edge server public key sent by the third-party authentication center, obtain the encrypted signature based on the evidence and the edge server public key using the elliptic curve encryption algorithm, and send the encrypted signature to the edge server; The authentication information decryption module is used to receive the authentication information sent by the edge server and decrypt the authentication information. If the decryption is successful, the mutual authentication is completed.

16. An anonymous authentication method, characterized in that: The method comprises: Receive the edge server private key sent by the third-party certification center; Receive the encrypted signature sent by the user node; Decrypt the encrypted signature according to the edge server private key to obtain evidence, and verify whether the evidence is legal by using a zero-knowledge proof algorithm; If yes, the pre-encrypted information is encrypted, authentication information is generated, and sent to the user node.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that The use of a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to verify whether the evidence is legal includes: Verify whether the evidence parameters in the evidence satisfy the following equation: in, N is a commitment calculated with (r1, t1) as the base, and M is a commitment calculated with (r2, t2) as the base; A1 and A2 are both user node encryption parameters, and A1 is the first encryption parameter and A2 is the second encryption parameter; r1, r2, t1 and t2 are high-order elements, r1 and r2 are high-order elements randomly selected in the first multiplication cycle group, t1 and t2 are discrete logarithms with r1 and r2 as the bases respectively; n is a third-party security parameter; α1, α2 and x are secret parameters, x∈[0,a]; C, E, E1 and E2 are evidence parameters, evidence parameter C is a hash value, and evidence parameters E, E1 and E2 are evidence information encrypted by the user node; If yes, it means the evidence is correct, and we continue to verify whether the evidence parameters satisfy the following equation: Where H(·) is the hash function; R e is the edge random number; If so, it means the evidence is legal.

18. The method according to claim 16 or 17, characterized in that Also includes: When the connection with the user node is disconnected, receiving a new encrypted signature sent by the user node, and querying whether the disconnected user node has been authenticated according to the new encrypted signature; If so, the pre-encrypted information is encrypted based on the new encrypted signature, new authentication information is generated, and the new authentication information is sent to the user node.

19. An edge server, characterized in that: The edge server comprises: A private key receiving module, used to receive the edge server private key sent by a third-party authentication center; The encrypted signature receiving module is used to receive the encrypted signature sent by the user node; A verification module, used to decrypt the encrypted signature according to the edge server private key to obtain evidence, and use a zero-knowledge proof algorithm to verify whether the evidence is legal; if so, transfer to an authentication information generation module; The authentication information generation module is used to encrypt the pre-encrypted information, generate authentication information, and send it to the user node.

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