Decentralized Roollup sequencer construction method

Abstract

The invention discloses a decentralized Roollup sequencer construction method, and relates to the field of Roollup sequencer construction, and the method comprises the steps: deploying a plurality of intelligent contracts at an L1 layer of a decentralized Roollup sequencer; in the L2 layer, an improved WRR algorithm is adopted, the credible random number generated by the L1 layer is combined, a linear mapping technology is adopted, multiple putters are screened, transactions of the L2 layer are packaged and sorted, transaction blocks are determined, and the final putters are screened out through a competition process; submitting the transaction block generated by the final putter to the remaining putters for voting and auditing, and monitoring the operation conditions of all putters by a plurality of candidates; and when it is found that the transaction block submitted to the L2 layer by the final proposal is illegal, identifying the illegal transaction block by using a suspicious label mechanism, rolling back the transaction with the suspicious label to the L1 layer for examination, and enabling the candidate to initiate challenge to the final proposal through a challenge mechanism so as to improve the decentration degree of the whole system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of Rollup sequencer construction, and in particular to a decentralized Rollup sequencer construction method. Background Art

[0002] For off-chain expansion, the early solutions are state channels and side chains. Although these two solutions were born very early, they have developed slowly. The reason is ultimately the problem of data availability. Because whether it is a state channel or a side chain, the complete transaction records and witness data are only stored off-chain. When a transaction dispute occurs, if the participants do not provide the correct transaction and witness data in time, the security of the transaction cannot be guaranteed, resulting in the problem of "data unavailability". Rollup expansion can effectively solve the problem of data availability.

[0003] The basic principle of Rollup is to aggregate and package a large amount of transaction data originally scattered in the block into a transaction and publish it on the chain, thereby reducing the difficulty of verifying the validity of the transaction. The chain submits the packaged transaction data block as a parameter to the contract, and the contract verifies that the data is valid and then records it for each participant. This is equivalent to executing a batch of off-chain transactions at one time, but only executing one transaction on the chain. Although Rollup technology is an effective way to solve the scalability problem of blockchain, it still has great defects in decentralization. The decentralized nature is the core feature that distinguishes blockchain from Web2.0 networks, but most of the Rollup chains that have been launched currently use centralized sorters and zero-knowledge proof schemes that require trusted settings, resulting in insufficient system decentralization and a series of security issues, such as denial of service and single point failure. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a decentralized Rollup sorter construction method to solve the problem of insufficient decentralization of the system.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides the following solutions:

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a method for constructing a decentralized Rollup sorter, comprising:

[0007] Deploy multiple smart contracts on the L1 layer of the decentralized Rollup sorter; the smart contracts are used to perform transaction verification, generate trusted random numbers, manage challenges and reward mechanisms;

[0008] In the L2 layer of the decentralized Rollup sorter, an improved WRR algorithm is used, and in combination with the trusted random number generated by the L1 layer, a linear mapping technology is used to screen multiple proposers; the improved WRR algorithm introduces a pledge bucket mechanism as well as mapping and randomization factors;

[0009] Use multiple proposers to package and sort the L2 layer transactions, determine the transaction blocks, and select the final proposer through a competition process;

[0010] The transaction block generated by the final proposer is submitted to the remaining proposers for voting and review, and multiple candidates monitor the operations of all proposers;

[0011] When it is found that the transaction block submitted by the final proposer to the L2 layer is illegal, the suspicious label mechanism is used to identify the illegal transaction block, and the transaction with the suspicious label is rolled back to the L1 layer for review, so that the candidate can challenge the final proposer through the challenge mechanism.

[0012] In a second aspect, the present application provides a decentralized Rollup sorter construction device, including:

[0013] The L1 layer of the decentralized Rollup sequencer is used to deploy multiple smart contracts; the smart contracts are used to perform transaction verification, generate trusted random numbers, manage challenges and reward mechanisms;

[0014] The L2 layer of the decentralized Rollup sorter is used to adopt the improved WRR algorithm, and in combination with the trusted random number generated by the L1 layer, the linear mapping technology is used to screen multiple proposers; the improved WRR algorithm introduces the pledge bucket mechanism as well as mapping and randomization factors;

[0015] Use multiple proposers to package and sort the L2 layer transactions, determine the transaction blocks, and select the final proposer through a competition process;

[0016] The transaction block generated by the final proposer is submitted to the remaining proposers for voting and review, and multiple candidates monitor the operations of all proposers;

[0017] When it is found that the transaction block submitted by the final proposer to the L2 layer is illegal, the suspicious label mechanism is used to identify the illegal transaction block, and the transaction with the suspicious label is rolled back to the L1 layer for review, so that the candidate can challenge the final proposer through the challenge mechanism.

[0018] In a third aspect, the present application provides a computer device, comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement any of the above-mentioned decentralized Rollup sorter construction methods.

[0019] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements any of the above-described decentralized Rollup sorter construction methods.

[0020] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements any of the above-mentioned decentralized Rollup sorter construction methods.

[0021] According to the specific embodiments provided in this application, this application discloses the following technical effects:

[0022] This application makes two improvements to the Weighted Round Robin (WRR) algorithm. The first is to establish a staking bucket, allowing each participant to stake his own tokens, and set a reasonable upper limit for the staking bucket to ensure that most users can participate in the block production process, thereby improving the system's level of decentralization and the enthusiasm of participants. Second, mapping and random elements are added to the WRR algorithm, random values ​​are introduced and user weights are mapped to a larger range, the probability of collision after weighting is reduced, and the unpredictability of the next round of elected candidates is increased, thereby greatly improving the degree of decentralization; the improved WRR algorithm is used, combined with the trusted random numbers generated by the L1 layer, and the linear mapping technology is used to screen multiple proposers to package and sort the transactions of the L2 layer, screen out the final proposer, and use the remaining proposers who have not been selected to vote and review the transaction blocks generated by the final proposer. In order to ensure the security and reliability of decentralization, other candidates monitor the operations of all proposers in real time, especially timeout behaviors, to prevent proposers from abusing their rights or submitting illegal transactions; when it is found that the transaction block submitted to the L2 layer by the final proposer is illegal, the suspicious label mechanism is used to identify the illegal transaction block, and the transaction with the suspicious label is rolled back to the L1 layer for review, thereby encouraging more candidates to actively challenge suspicious transactions, so that the candidates can challenge the final proposer through the challenge mechanism to ensure the transaction security of the L2 layer and the stable operation of the overall system. This application effectively utilizes the security and decentralization characteristics of the L1 layer through the two-layer architecture of the decentralized Rollup sorter, while realizing decentralized sorting capabilities at the L2 layer, thereby improving the overall decentralization of the system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0023] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0024] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a decentralized Rollup sorter construction method in one embodiment of the present application;

[0025] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the election phase process provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0026] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a WRR algorithm provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0027] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the execution phase flow chart provided for an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0029] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present application more obvious and easy to understand, the present application is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0030] The embodiment of the present application provides a method for constructing a decentralized Rollup sorter, which is executed by a computer device, and can be executed by a computer device such as a terminal or a server alone, or by a terminal and a server together. In the embodiment of the present application, Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps.

[0031] S1: Deploy multiple smart contracts on the L1 layer of the decentralized Rollup sorter; the smart contracts are used to perform transaction verification, generate trusted random numbers, manage challenges and reward mechanisms.

[0032] S2: In the L2 layer of the decentralized Rollup sorter, an improved WRR algorithm is adopted, and in combination with the trusted random number generated by the L1 layer, a linear mapping technology is used to screen multiple proposers; the improved WRR algorithm introduces a pledge bucket mechanism as well as mapping and randomization factors.

[0033] S3: Use multiple proposers to package and sort the L2 layer transactions, determine the transaction blocks, and select the final proposer through a competition process.

[0034] S4: The transaction block generated by the final proposer is submitted to the remaining proposers for voting and review, and multiple candidates monitor the operations of all proposers.

[0035] S5: When it is found that the transaction block submitted by the final proposer to the L2 layer is illegal, the illegal transaction block is identified by using a suspicious label mechanism, and the transaction with the suspicious label is rolled back to the L1 layer for review, so that the candidate can challenge the final proposer through a challenge mechanism.

[0036] In an exemplary embodiment, an improved WRR algorithm is adopted, and in combination with the trusted random number generated by the L1 layer, a linear mapping technology is adopted to screen multiple proposers, specifically including: in the election stage, a linear mapping technology is adopted to perform linear mapping processing on multiple groups of the pledge buckets to determine the current weights corresponding to the mapped pledge buckets; each group of pledge buckets includes the amount of tokens pledged by multiple candidates; in each round of consensus, in combination with the trusted random number, the current weight is updated according to the user's public key and the pledge bucket sequence, and the final weight corresponding to each group of pledge buckets is determined; the weight of each candidate is determined according to the final weight, and the candidate with the highest weight is selected as the proposer; the proposers include 3 persons.

[0037] Furthermore, the election stage, e.g. Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the core of Tendermint's WRR algorithm is that candidates are required to stake a certain amount of tokens first, and the weight of each candidate is determined based on the amount of tokens staked. In each round of consensus, the candidate with the highest weight will be selected as the proposer. For candidates who are not selected as proposers, their weights will be accumulated based on their own weights and the newly added amount of staked tokens to ensure that they have a greater chance of being selected in the next round, which can be expressed as:

[0038]

[0039] Among them, the amount of pledged tokens is Indicates that the weight is Indicates that the rotation examples of each round are as follows Figure 3 shown.

[0040] Although Tendermint's WRR algorithm can ensure the fairness of the election process, its strategy is too simple and can easily be used by malicious actors to predict the next winner, which may lead to attacks against the winner, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) attacks and eclipse attacks.

[0041] This application makes two optimizations to the WRR algorithm. The first is to introduce a pledge bucket mechanism, which divides the total pledge amount of an individual into multiple parts and processes each pledge separately. The second is to add mapping and randomization factors to the WRR algorithm.

[0042] First, in terms of the design of the pledge bucket, the Rollup network can achieve a higher degree of decentralization compared to the maximum number of candidates of 300 in the Cosmos network. This is mainly due to the security provided by the open architecture of Rollup and the on-chain challenge mechanism. Under this mechanism, each participant can pledge his own tokens and set a relatively reasonable upper limit of the pledge bucket, which is 4 to 5 times the cost of on-chain, for compensation and capital confiscation in the penalty phase. The pledge amount participating in the candidate needs to fill at least one pledge bucket, so that even if it is rolled back, a considerable part of the compensation can be paid after covering the cost. When the user's pledge amount exceeds this upper limit, the excess amount will be filled into the new pledge bucket until the remaining amount is insufficient to fill it again. Due to the lower cost of participation, more users can be encouraged to participate. Compared with the traditional scheme, only oligarchs with a lot of money can participate, and the degree of decentralization is improved.

[0043] This design ensures that most users can actually participate in the block generation process during the WRR process. Compared with a purely random mechanism, users have a higher expectation of being qualified, and this expectation will gradually increase as the number of rounds increases, further stimulating the enthusiasm of participants.

[0044] Accordingly, in order to ensure the effective operation of the system and the implementation of the penalty mechanism, a certain pledge lower limit is set, which must be three times higher than the cost of a Rollup transaction on the chain, as a necessary guarantee for the implementation of basic penalty measures. The detailed reward and punishment mechanism will be elaborated in detail in the subsequent penalty stage. This mechanism not only improves the level of decentralization of the system, but also ensures the stability and security of the system.

[0045] In view of the potential defects of Tendermint's WRR algorithm, in order to ensure the unpredictability of the next round of winners, we proposed an improvement plan, namely, introducing random values ​​into the algorithm. In addition, given that the introduction of the pledge bucket system and the low-threshold participation mechanism may lead to an increase in the number of participants in each round, in order to reduce the probability of collision after weighting, we map the user's weight to a larger range and then perform weight calculations. This random value will fluctuate within the range of 1 to 2 times the original weight. Because of the large floating range, there is a certain probability that the candidates with lower weights will exceed the candidates with higher weights after adding the random number, resulting in the result that the candidates with lower weight rankings will exceed the candidates with higher rankings after adding the random value. The seed of the random number is provided by the L1 layer.

[0046] The specific plan is as follows:

[0047] 1) Data mapping, assuming there is a set of pledge buckets and in The number of tokens in each staking bucket, and each corresponds to a real user. is the upper limit of the pledge bucket, we will Linear mapping to In the interval:

[0048]

[0049] The mapped data is stored in a new 256-bit space And it will save the Wheel weight Indicates the number of rounds, when When it is equal to 1, we have in, Indicates the current weight value corresponding to each pledge bucket. Indicates that the initial pledge bucket set is mapped to The corresponding value after the interval.

[0050] 2) Generate random numbers, random number seeds Provided by the L1 layer, it is automatically refreshed after each block submission or timeout, and the seed will be saved for one week for verification. The user's public key and bucket sequence Related, it can be expressed as:

[0051]

[0052] The final remainder is to ensure that each increase value cannot exceed twice the initial weight. The maximum value can only be equal to

[0053] 3) Finally, for each bucket Get the final weight value:

[0054]

[0055] If the weights obtained are equal, their respective Substitute the value into step 2) Calculate again until no collision occurs.

[0056] This application lowers the threshold for participation. The more participants there are, the higher the degree of decentralization will be. It does not reduce security and ensures fairness.

[0057] Furthermore, this application will select three proposers instead of one during the election phase, and their roles will be reflected during the execution phase.

[0058] In an exemplary embodiment, multiple proposers are used to package and sort the transactions of the L2 layer respectively, determine the transaction blocks, and screen out the final proposer through a competition process, which specifically includes: Competition process: in the execution stage, three proposers are ordered to package and sort the transactions of the L2 layer respectively, determine the transaction blocks, and send the fair proof to the remaining proposers; the fair proof includes the public key of the proposer and the size of the corresponding transaction block; in the OP scheme, the proof is the state transition Merkle root; in the ZK scheme, the proof is a zero-knowledge proof; the transaction block with the largest number of transactions is used as the pre-submitted block, and the proposer corresponding to the pre-submitted block is used as the final proposer.

[0059] In an exemplary embodiment, the transaction block generated by the final proposer is submitted to the remaining proposers for voting and review, which specifically includes: voting and review process: the remaining proposers are required to verify the legitimacy of the transaction block generated by the final proposer and vote; during the voting process, if there is a negative vote, the transaction block generated by the final proposer is marked with a suspicious label, and the transaction with the suspicious label is rolled back to the L1 layer for review.

[0060] In view of the limitations of existing Rollup expansion technology, this application is committed to the research of decentralized sorters to enhance the decentralization of Rollup and ensure the integrity and reliability of data. Inspired by Tendermint and combined with the characteristics of Rollup itself, the decentralization of the sorter is realized in a clearer and simpler way. This application innovatively proposes the "suspicious label" function to support the rapid rollback of erroneous batches. This architecture aims to improve the overall efficiency of the L2 network, effectively make up for the shortcomings of the existing system in performance, and provide strong technical support for the further development of blockchain technology.

[0061] In an exemplary embodiment, the transaction block generated by the final proposer is submitted to the remaining proposers for voting and review, and then includes: if during the competition process, the proposer who packages and sorts the transactions of the L2 layer times out, the proposer is removed from the proposer queue, and the transactions corresponding to the proposer are packaged and sorted by the remaining two proposers; if during the voting and review process, if the remaining two proposers time out, the proposer is removed from the proposer queue.

[0062] Furthermore, in the execution phase, in the Tendermint consensus mechanism, a Proposer is usually elected, and other Validators are responsible for participating in the voting process. However, the Rollup solution does not need to follow this model in design, mainly because of the "double guarantee" provided by the on-chain challenge mechanism. Therefore, in the off-chain processing of Rollup, more attention should be paid to efficiency and decentralization. Usually, in order to achieve Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus, at least three proposers are required to participate in the consensus process.

[0063] The reason why three nodes are chosen instead of two or more is that we must remember that the essence of introducing Rollup is to expand capacity, which can effectively ensure that users can get better security with the least transaction fees. And three nodes produce blocks in parallel, which can ensure that the system can still maintain normal operation and consistency when some nodes may fail. The execution phase process is as follows Figure 4 shown.

[0064] Step 1): The three proposers package and sort the blocks respectively and send the proof to the other proposers. This proof is the state transition Merkle root in the optimistic (OP) scheme and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof in the ZK (Zero Knowledge) scheme.

[0065] The block with the largest number of transactions is used as the pre-submitted block. If the number is the same, the one with the highest weight in the election phase is selected. This kind of healthy competition can effectively increase the motivation of the proposer to include transactions. Of course, transactions that have not been included for multiple epochs will be forced to be included in the block. After that, the selector will add the public key of each proposer and the size of the corresponding included block in the pre-submitted block as a fair proof, and then send the pre-submitted block to all proposers.

[0066] Step 2): Since the selected proposer will not vote against the block he proposed, the other two proposers will mainly perform strict legitimacy verification on the block as validators and conduct voting procedures. If there are one or two negative votes during the voting process, the block will be labeled as "suspicious" and immediately submitted to the L1 layer for further review.

[0067] For proposers who fail to respond within the specified time, they will enter the penalty process. For those who time out in step 1), they will be removed from the proposer queue and will not enter step 2. The block generation will be completed by the remaining proposers. The processing for step 2 is similar, but since the proposer who pre-submitted the block in step 1 may have timed out, in addition to removing the proposer who has timed out, the voting process needs to be re-executed. If the last chaining process times out or the three proposers all time out in the first two responses, a new round of block proposer election process will be started immediately after the penalty to ensure the continuous operation and stability of the system.

[0068] In an exemplary embodiment, during the challenge phase of the OP solution, blocks with a "suspicious" label can effectively motivate participants to challenge. Such problematic blocks are usually challenged in the shortest possible time. Once the challenge is successful, the penalty process for the proposer will be initiated, and the L2 layer transaction will be rolled back. However, if the challenge fails or no challenge occurs after the seven-day challenge period, the penalty process for the participants who voted against will be initiated.

[0069] The challenge will occur in the L1 smart contract. If the challenge interface is called, the transaction Merkle root provided by the L2 layer will be used to simulate the transaction process. If the execution result is inconsistent with the submitted content, the proposer is considered to have acted maliciously, and the challenge is successful. Otherwise, the challenge is considered to have failed.

[0070] In an exemplary embodiment, the candidate is made to challenge the final proposer through a challenge mechanism, and then further comprises: triggering a penalty phase in the execution phase and the challenge phase; wherein, in the execution phase, punishing the proposer with timeout behavior, including: destroying all the pledges of the proposer with timeout behavior, and adding users whose pledge amount is less than the upper limit of the pledge bucket to the blacklist; confiscating the pledge tokens of users whose pledge amount is greater than the upper limit of the pledge bucket, and the penalty amount increases linearly with the accumulation of timeouts.

[0071] During the challenge phase, if the challenger succeeds in the challenge, the staked tokens of the proposer of the pre-submitted block and the proposer who voted in favor will be confiscated, and the confiscated staked tokens will be used to pay the fees of the L1 layer and distributed to the challenger and the proposer who voted against. If the challenger fails in the challenge or no challenge occurs after the challenge period, the staked tokens of the proposer who voted against will be confiscated.

[0072] Furthermore, the penalty phase is mainly triggered during the execution phase and the challenge phase. In the execution phase, when a response timeout occurs, the penalty process will be triggered. For users who time out in the first and second steps, all their stakes will be destroyed, and for users whose stake amount is less than Users with a pledge amount greater than Users will be fined The penalty amount increases linearly with the accumulation of timeouts. If the last on-chain process is overdue, half of the pledge amount will be confiscated, and the other half will be used as compensation for the other two proposers' computing costs and weight reduction.

[0073] During the challenge phase, once the challenge is successful, the proposer of the block and the participants who voted in favor will face the confiscation of the staked tokens, which will be used to pay the fees of the first layer. Half of the remaining will be distributed to the challenger and the participants who voted against, and the other half will be confiscated. For challenge failures or no challenge after the seven-day challenge period, the participants who voted against will face the confiscation of the staked tokens, and the confiscated tokens will be distributed to the proposer and the participants who voted in favor.

[0074] In the ZK solution, after the on-chain verification process is completed, the above-mentioned reward and punishment measures can be directly implemented according to the verification status. This economic incentive mechanism is designed to encourage honest participants to continue to participate, maintain community vitality, and effectively prevent witch attacks while ensuring the degree of decentralization.

[0075] In scenarios such as data trading, supply chain finance, and data element circulation, the decentralized Rollup sorter construction method of this application, that is, the decentralized expansion method, can significantly improve system performance and decentralization. In traditional processes, transactions often require centralized operators to collect, sort, and package, which can easily form a centralized bottleneck in a blockchain environment, bringing risks such as delayed processing and arbitrage operations. Through the second-layer expansion technology, this application will greatly reduce the entry threshold for direct participation in transactions, attract more participants, and ensure the fairness and diversity of transaction nodes. At the same time, relying on the distributed ledger and multi-node verification architecture of blockchain as the underlying technology, the expansion plan can more effectively support the needs of multiple business systems, thereby better serving decentralized applications such as data exchange and financial settlement, improving overall security and enhancing community activity.

[0076] The technical features of the above embodiments may be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0077] This article uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method and core ideas of this application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the ideas of this application, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as limiting this application.

Claims

1. A decentralized Rollup sequencer construction method, characterized in that: The decentralized Rollup sequencer construction method includes: Deploy multiple smart contracts on the L1 layer of the decentralized Rollup sorter; the smart contracts are used to perform transaction verification, generate trusted random numbers, manage challenges and reward mechanisms; In the L2 layer of the decentralized Rollup sorter, an improved WRR algorithm is used, and in combination with the trusted random number generated by the L1 layer, a linear mapping technology is used to screen multiple proposers; the improved WRR algorithm introduces a pledge bucket mechanism as well as mapping and randomization factors; Use multiple proposers to package and sort the L2 layer transactions, determine the transaction blocks, and select the final proposer through a competition process; The transaction block generated by the final proposer is submitted to the remaining proposers for voting and review, and multiple candidates monitor the operations of all proposers; When it is found that the transaction block submitted by the final proposer to the L2 layer is illegal, the suspicious label mechanism is used to identify the illegal transaction block, and the transaction with the suspicious label is rolled back to the L1 layer for review, so that the candidate can challenge the final proposer through the challenge mechanism.

2. The decentralized Rollup sequencer construction method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The improved WRR algorithm is used in combination with the trusted random number generated by the L1 layer, and the linear mapping technology is used to screen multiple proposers, including: In the election phase, linear mapping technology is used to perform linear mapping processing on multiple groups of pledge buckets to determine the current weights corresponding to the mapped pledge buckets; each group of pledge buckets includes the amount of tokens pledged by multiple candidates; In each round of consensus, the current weight is updated according to the user's public key and the pledge bucket sequence in combination with the trusted random number to determine the final weight corresponding to each group of pledge buckets; The weight of each candidate is determined according to the final weight, and the candidate with the highest weight is used as the proposer; the proposers include 3 persons.

3. The decentralized Rollup sequencer construction method according to claim 2, characterized in that: Multiple proposers are used to package and sort the L2 layer transactions, determine the transaction blocks, and select the final proposer through a competitive process, including: Competition process: In the execution phase, three proposers are ordered to package and sort the L2 layer transactions respectively, determine the transaction block, and send the fair proof to the remaining proposers; the fair proof includes the proposer's public key and the size of the corresponding transaction block; in the OP scheme, the proof is the state transition Merkle root; in the ZK scheme, the proof is a zero-knowledge proof; The transaction block with the largest number of transactions is taken as the pre-submitted block, and the proposer corresponding to the pre-submitted block is taken as the final proposer.

4. The decentralized Rollup sequencer construction method according to claim 3 is characterized in that: Submit the transaction block generated by the final proposer to the remaining proposers for voting and review, including: Voting review process: The remaining proposers are required to verify the legitimacy of the transaction block generated by the final proposer and vote; During the voting process, if there is a negative vote, the transaction block generated by the final proposer will be marked with a suspicious label, and the transaction with the suspicious label will be rolled back to the L1 layer for review.

5. The decentralized Rollup sequencer construction method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The transaction block generated by the final proposer is submitted to the remaining proposers for voting and review, followed by: If, during the competition process, a proposer who packages and sorts the transactions at the L2 layer times out, the proposer will be removed from the proposer queue, and the transactions corresponding to the proposer will be packaged and sorted by the remaining two proposers; If during the voting review process, the remaining two proposers have timed out, the proposer will be removed from the proposer queue.

6. The decentralized Rollup sequencer construction method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The candidate initiates a challenge to the final proposer through a challenge mechanism, and then includes: The penalty phase is triggered during the execution phase and the challenge phase; in the execution phase, the proposer with timeout behavior is punished, including: destroying all the pledges of the proposer with timeout behavior, and adding users whose pledge amount is less than the upper limit of the pledge bucket to the blacklist; confiscating the pledged tokens of users whose pledge amount is greater than the upper limit of the pledge bucket, and the penalty amount increases linearly with the accumulation of timeouts; During the challenge phase, if the challenger succeeds in the challenge, the staked tokens of the proposer of the pre-submitted block and the proposer who voted in favor will be confiscated, and the confiscated staked tokens will be used to pay the fees of the L1 layer and distributed to the challenger and the proposer who voted against. If the challenger fails in the challenge or no challenge occurs after the challenge period, the staked tokens of the proposer who voted against will be confiscated.

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