NFV-oriented intranet system line resource allocation method and device

Abstract

The invention discloses an NFV-oriented intranet system line resource allocation method and device, the function of an intranet system is deployed in a cloud through an NFV, a user calls the intranet system through a networking line, and the method comprises the following steps: constructing an incomplete information dynamic game model between the networking line and the user; constructing an expected utility of a networking line and an expected utility of a user; receiving a call request of a user for the intranet system, and gaming based on the incomplete information dynamic gaming model to obtain a gaming result of the user and a networking line; obtaining a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user; and solving the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function to obtain an optimal strategy of a networking line and a user. According to the method, the optimal configuration of the line resource of the user call response after the NFV of the intranet system can be realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a method and device for configuring line resources of an intranet system for NFV. Background Art

[0002] Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is a technology that implements the functions of traditional dedicated network devices through software. The key idea of ​​NFV is to softwareize, cloudify and programmably implement network functions, and decouple network functions from infrastructure.

[0003] The mainstream equipment of Intranet Management System (IMS) adopts dedicated hardware of ATCA (Advanced Telecom Computing Architecture) architecture, which is widely used in the existing network deployment of large telecom operators. Power grid companies focus on services for specific industries, with stable customer groups and relatively fixed and limited demands. There is an obvious mismatch between the actual needs of their administrative and dispatching switching networks and the above hardware architecture. The hardware equipment is idle and inefficient, resulting in unnecessary waste of resources and energy.

[0004] The IMS network uses NFV technology to achieve hardware and software decoupling and software upgrades, and realizes hardware resource pooling, elastic scaling and other functions. At this time, the IMS network function can be deployed on the cloud platform, and services can be provided to users through software debugging, achieving more efficient resource management and utilization. For example, patent document CN105978708A discloses a system and method for implementing vCPE virtualization enterprise network based on NFV, which includes a vCPE module and a ThinPE module. The vCPE module communicates with the network through a gateway, and the enterprise intranet terminal communicates with the vCPE module through the ThinPE module.

[0005] In the NFV-based IMS core network, a key feature of the service is that user calls and line connections have a clear order of precedence. In this network architecture, since the service process has a sequence, the later mover obtains information about the earlier mover by observing the behavior of the earlier mover, thereby confirming or correcting the judgment of the earlier mover. In this process, how to configure line resources while ensuring system load balancing and meeting safe operation conditions is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0006] The present invention provides an NFV-oriented intranet system line resource configuration method and device, which can realize the optimal configuration of line resources for user call response after the intranet system is NFVized.

[0007] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a method for configuring line resources of an intranet system for NFV is provided, wherein the functions of the intranet system are deployed in the cloud through NFV, and a user calls the intranet system through a networking line, and the method comprises:

[0008] Construct an incomplete information dynamic game model between networking lines and users;

[0009] The expected utility of building networking lines and the expected utility of users;

[0010] Receiving a call request from a user to the intranet system, conducting a game based on the incomplete information dynamic game model, and obtaining a game result of the user and the networking line;

[0011] Obtaining a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user;

[0012] Solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function to obtain the optimal strategy for networking lines and users.

[0013] Furthermore, the networking line includes network element nodes and lines.

[0014] Furthermore, the incomplete information dynamic game model includes information asymmetry between users and networking lines, the policy selection range of networking lines, conditions for generating excess profits on networking line loads, conditions for generating line deployment costs for transferring to a second network element node, the policy selection range of users, conditions for generating time costs for users waiting for responses from network element nodes, conditions for generating costs for scheduling lines to the first network element node, conditions for generating traffic compensation for transferring to a second network element node, and conditions for generating service quality losses when users fail to access available lines at network element nodes.

[0015] Furthermore, the expected utility of the networking line is the maximum value after deducting the cost of dispatching the line to the first network element node and the cost of deploying the line to the second network element node from the excess benefit of the networking line load;

[0016] The user's expected utility is the maximum value of the traffic compensation for switching to the second network element node minus the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond and the service quality loss caused by the user not accessing the available line of the network element node.

[0017] Further, the game is performed based on the incomplete information dynamic game model to obtain the game result of the user and the networking line, including:

[0018] The networking line makes a decision according to the policy selection range of the networking line: the networking line chooses to connect to the first network element node with a first probability x, or transfers to the second network element node with a second probability, wherein the second probability is 1-x, the first probability is the probability that the first network element node has a redundant line, and the second probability is the probability that the first network element node has no redundant line;

[0019] The user makes a decision according to the user's policy selection range: the user calls the third network element node normally with a third probability y, and hangs up the fourth network element node with a fourth probability, where the fourth probability is 1-y;

[0020] A game result is obtained according to the networking line and the user's decision, and the game result is one of the following:

[0021] The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives calls from the first network element node, and the user normally calls the third network element node;

[0022] The first network element node has a redundant line and a networking line to answer the first network element node, and the user hangs up the fourth network element node;

[0023] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is allocated to the first network element node;

[0024] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and no line is allocated to the first network element node;

[0025] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have redundant lines;

[0026] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines.

[0027] Furthermore, the game result also includes the network line income and user income;

[0028] When the first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives a call from the first network element node and the user normally calls the third network element node, the revenue of the networking line is 0, and the user revenue is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0029] The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives the call from the first network element node, and when the user hangs up the fourth network element node, the profit of the networking line is 0, and the profit of the user is 0;

[0030] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user normally calls the third network element node and the line is allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the cost of scheduling the line by the first network element node, and the income of the user is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0031] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is not allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the difference between the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node and the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0032] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node, and other network element nodes have redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the negative value of the service quality loss of the available line of the user's failure to access the network element node;

[0033] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the excess income of the networking line load, and the user's income is 0.

[0034] Furthermore, the hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium function includes an optimal normal call probability function of a user and an optimal redundant line probability function of a first network element node of a networking line;

[0035] According to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function is obtained, including:

[0036] Establishing an expected utility function of the networking line according to the revenue of the networking line, the revenue of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the expected utility of the networking line in the game result;

[0037] Taking partial derivative of the expected utility function of the networking line to obtain the user's optimal normal call probability function;

[0038] Establishing the user's expected utility function according to the benefits of the networking lines in the game result, the benefits of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the user's expected utility;

[0039] The partial derivative of the expected utility function of the user is obtained to obtain a probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node.

[0040] Furthermore, the expected utility function of the networking line is:

[0041] U1=max[(1-x)(1-y)zE+xy(-Q)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-Z)(-P)+(1-x)y(-P)];

[0042] The user's expected utility function is:

[0043] U2=max[(1-x)y(RF)+xy(-2F)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-z)(-V)];

[0044] Among them, U1 is the expected utility function of the networking line, x is the first probability, y is the third probability, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling the line to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available line of the user who does not access the network element node, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond, and U2 is the user's expected utility function.

[0045] Furthermore, the user's optimal normal call probability function is:

[0046]

[0047] The probability function of the optimal configuration of redundant lines for the first network element node is:

[0048]

[0049] Among them, y * is the user's optimal normal call probability, x * is the probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling lines to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available lines of the network element node that the user does not access, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, and F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond.

[0050] According to a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided an NFV-oriented intranet system line resource configuration device applied to the above method, comprising:

[0051] Model building module, used to build an incomplete information dynamic game model between networking lines and users;

[0052] An expected utility building module is used to build the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user;

[0053] A game module, used for receiving a call request from a user to the intranet system, playing a game based on the incomplete information dynamic game model, and obtaining a game result of the user and the networking line;

[0054] An equilibrium calculation module, used to obtain a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user;

[0055] The optimal solution module is used to solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function to obtain the optimal strategy for networking lines and users.

[0056] Furthermore, the networking line includes network element nodes and lines.

[0057] Furthermore, the incomplete information dynamic game model includes information asymmetry between users and networking lines, the strategy selection range of networking lines, conditions for generating excess profit E for networking line loads, conditions for generating line deployment cost P for transferring to a second network element node, the strategy selection range of users, conditions for generating time cost F for users waiting for a response from a network element node, conditions for generating cost Q for scheduling lines to a first network element node, conditions for generating traffic compensation R for transferring to a second network element node, and conditions for generating quality of service loss V for users not accessing available lines at network element nodes.

[0058] Further, the expected utility of the networking line is the maximum value after deducting the cost of scheduling the line to the first network element node under the corresponding game result and the cost of transferring the line deployment to the second network element node under the corresponding game result from the excess benefit of the networking line load under the corresponding game result;

[0059] The user's expected utility is the maximum value after deducting the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond and the service quality loss of the user not accessing the available line of the network element node under the corresponding game result from the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node under the corresponding game result.

[0060] Furthermore, the game module performs a game based on the incomplete information dynamic game model to obtain a game result of the user and the networking line, including:

[0061] The networking line makes a decision according to the policy selection range of the networking line: the networking line chooses to connect to the first network element node with a first probability x, or transfers to the second network element node with a second probability, wherein the second probability is 1-x, the first probability is the probability that the first network element node has a redundant line, and the second probability is the probability that the first network element node has no redundant line;

[0062] The user makes a decision according to the user's policy selection range: the user calls the third network element node normally with a third probability y, and hangs up the fourth network element node with a fourth probability, where the fourth probability is 1-y;

[0063] A game result is obtained according to the networking line and the user's decision, and the game result is one of the following:

[0064] The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives calls from the first network element node, and the user normally calls the third network element node;

[0065] The first network element node has a redundant line and a networking line to answer the first network element node, and the user hangs up the fourth network element node;

[0066] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is allocated to the first network element node;

[0067] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and no line is allocated to the first network element node;

[0068] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have redundant lines;

[0069] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines.

[0070] Furthermore, the game result also includes the network line income and user income;

[0071] When the first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives a call from the first network element node and the user normally calls the third network element node, the revenue of the networking line is 0, and the user revenue is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0072] The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives the call from the first network element node, and when the user hangs up the fourth network element node, the profit of the networking line is 0, and the profit of the user is 0;

[0073] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user normally calls the third network element node and the line is allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the cost of scheduling the line by the first network element node, and the income of the user is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0074] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is not allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the difference between the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node and the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0075] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node, and other network element nodes have redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the negative value of the service quality loss of the available line of the user's failure to access the network element node;

[0076] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the excess income of the networking line load, and the user's income is 0.

[0077] Furthermore, the hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium function includes an optimal normal call probability function of a user and an optimal redundant line probability function of a first network element node of a networking line;

[0078] The equilibrium calculation module obtains a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user, including:

[0079] Establishing an expected utility function of the networking line according to the revenue of the networking line, the revenue of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the expected utility of the networking line in the game result;

[0080] Taking partial derivative of the expected utility function of the networking line to obtain the user's optimal normal call probability function;

[0081] Establishing the user's expected utility function according to the benefits of the networking lines in the game result, the benefits of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the user's expected utility;

[0082] The partial derivative of the expected utility function of the user is obtained to obtain a probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node.

[0083] Furthermore, the expected utility function of the networking line is:

[0084] U1=max[(1-x)(1-y)zE+xy(-Q)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-Z)(-P)+(1-x)y(-P)];

[0085] The user's expected utility function is:

[0086] U2=max[(1-x)y(RF)+xy(-2F)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-

[0087] z)(-V)];

[0088] Among them, U1 is the expected utility function of the networking line, x is the first probability, y is the third probability, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling the line to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available line of the user who does not access the network element node, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond, and U2 is the user's expected utility function.

[0089] Furthermore, the user's optimal normal call probability function is:

[0090]

[0091] The probability function of the optimal configuration of redundant lines for the first network element node is:

[0092]

[0093] Among them, y * is the user's optimal normal call probability, x * is the probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling lines to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available lines of the network element node that the user does not access, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, and F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond.

[0094] The method and device for configuring intranet system line resources for NFV provided by the present invention have at least the following beneficial effects:

[0095] (1) The incomplete information dynamic game theory is used to analyze the call / answer trade-off between users and networking lines during the redundant configuration of the NFV-based intranet system networking lines. This is consistent with the actual action response logic of the scenario and provides a new research idea for the reasonable configuration of application network element nodes.

[0096] (2) Comprehensively consider the functional indicators of the NFV-based intranet system during the service process, such as waiting time, line resource availability, and system load, and provide a more comprehensive system assumption and cost analysis, which can efficiently adapt to the remote dual-network node networking test environment of the NFV-based intranet system;

[0097] (3) Based on game payment, the optimal strategy analysis of networking lines and users is given in a targeted manner, and the parameter correlation in the optimal strategy of networking lines and users is further clarified, which facilitates the adjustment and optimization of the performance indicators of a certain network element node in the future test environment. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0098] Figure 1 A flowchart of an embodiment of the NFV-oriented intranet system line resource configuration method provided by the present invention;

[0099] Figure 2 A flowchart of an embodiment of a game based on an incomplete information dynamic game model in the NFV-oriented intranet system line resource configuration method provided by the present invention;

[0100] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of an embodiment of a game behavior strategy in the NFV-oriented intranet system line resource configuration method provided by the present invention;

[0101] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of an embodiment of a game tree based on incomplete information dynamic game in the NFV-oriented intranet system line resource configuration method provided by the present invention;

[0102] Figure 5 A flowchart of an embodiment of obtaining a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function in the NFV-oriented intranet system line resource configuration method provided by the present invention;

[0103] Figure 6 A flowchart of an embodiment of an intranet system line resource configuration device for NFV provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0104] In order to better understand the above technical solution, the above technical solution will be described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0105] refer to Figure 1 In some embodiments, a method for configuring line resources of an intranet system for NFV is provided, wherein the functions of the intranet system are deployed in the cloud through NFV, and a user calls the intranet system through a networking line, and the method comprises:

[0106] S1. Construct an incomplete information dynamic game model between networking lines and users;

[0107] S2, the expected utility of building the networking line and the expected utility of the user;

[0108] S3, receiving a call request from a user to the intranet system, conducting a game based on the incomplete information dynamic game model, and obtaining a game result between the user and the networking line;

[0109] S4. Obtaining a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user;

[0110] S5. Solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function to obtain the optimal strategy for networking lines and users.

[0111] Specifically, the intranet system can be virtualized and deployed in the cloud through NFV technology. When the user's call target is a resource or service in the intranet system, an appropriate interface and protocol with the intranet system can be established through the networking line. The networking line includes network element nodes and lines. The network element node responds to the user who answers the call, and the transfer is allocated by the network element node.

[0112] Furthermore, in step S1, the incomplete information dynamic game model includes game subjects, information asymmetry between users and networking lines, a policy selection range of networking lines, conditions for generating excess benefits E of networking line load, conditions for generating line deployment cost P of transferring to the second network element node, policy selection range of users, conditions for generating time cost F of users waiting for network element node response, conditions for generating line scheduling cost Q to the first network element node, conditions for generating flow compensation R of transferring to the second network element node, and conditions for generating service quality loss V of users not accessing available lines of network element nodes. Among them, the first network element node is the receiving network element node, and the second network element node is the transferring network element node.

[0113] Specifically, the game subjects of the complete information dynamic game model are users and networking lines. The strategies chosen by both parties will depend on their own situation, the strategy of the game opponent, network delay and network element node availability.

[0114] Information asymmetry between users and networking lines: In the first game, the networking line only knows the type of strategy selected by the user, but is not clear about its probability. The user only knows the type of strategy selected by the networking line, but is not clear about its probability.

[0115] The strategy selection range of the networking line: The strategy selection range of the networking line is X{A,A'}, that is, the strategy of the networking line is to connect to the first network element node A with a first probability x or to transfer to the second network element node A' with a second probability (1-x). Among them, the first probability is the probability that the first network element node has a redundant line, and the second probability is the probability that the first network element node does not have a redundant line.

[0116] Conditions for generating excess profit E from the networking line load: If the user happens to hang up when the networking line chooses to transfer to the second network element node, and other network element nodes have no redundant lines to allocate, the network element node does not increase line deployment and does not undertake call services, then excess profit E from the networking line load will be generated.

[0117] Conditions for generating the line deployment cost P for transferring to the second network element node: If the networking line chooses to transfer to the second network element node, and the user makes a normal call or other network element nodes have redundant lines, the networking line must bear the line deployment cost P for transferring to the second network element node.

[0118] User's strategy selection range: The user's strategy selection range is Y{B,B'}, that is, the user calls the third network element node B normally, or hangs up the fourth network element node B'. The third probability of the user calling the third network element node B normally is y, and the fourth probability of hanging up is (1-y), where the third network element node is the network element node that the user calls normally, and the fourth network element node is the network element node that the user hangs up.

[0119] The condition for generating the time cost F of the user waiting for the network element node to respond is: when the networking line receives a call from the first network element node A or transfers to the second network element node A', and the user calls the third network element node B normally, the user needs to pay the time cost of waiting for the network element node to respond.

[0120] Conditions for generating the line cost Q for dispatching to the first network element node: Considering the ideal state, when the networking line is transferred to the second network element node A', if the user calls the third network element node B normally, since the first network element node A has no redundant lines available, call access is achieved in the following two situations. The first is that although the networking line is transferred to the second network element node A', the line resources are still allocated to the first network element node A by the networking line. At this time, there is no need to pay the line deployment cost P for transferring to the second network element node, but it is necessary to pay the line dispatching cost Q to the first network element node. The second is that the networking line deploys the line at the second network element node after the transfer, pays the corresponding line deployment cost P for transferring to the second network element node, and provides the user with traffic compensation R for transferring to the second network element node.

[0121] The condition for generating traffic compensation R for transferring to the second network element node: If the networking line transfers to the second network element node A', when the user calls the third network element node B normally and the line is deployed by the second transfer node, the user will obtain traffic compensation R for transferring to the second network element node, and the benefit must exceed the time cost F of the user waiting for the network element node to respond.

[0122] Conditions for causing a service quality loss V when the user fails to access the available line of the network element node: If the networking line is transferred to the second network element node A', the user hangs up the fourth network element node B' and other network element nodes have redundant lines, the user will suffer a service quality loss V due to not being able to access the available line due to hanging up midway.

[0123] Furthermore, in step S2, the network element node configures redundancy for the networking line, on the one hand, for the safe operation requirements of the NFV intranet system, and on the other hand, for the scheduling and allocation of sufficient line resources for user call requests to ensure service quality. During operation, in addition to connecting to user call requests, the networking line also needs to bear certain operating costs based on line transfer, deployment and scheduling.

[0124] In order to obtain more excess profits on the network line load, the network line will tend to reduce line redundancy to reduce line standby costs. At the same time, the lines with fewer user calls bear less traffic, which is conducive to system load balancing and improving resource utilization. However, when the user makes a normal call and there is no redundant line available on the network element node of the networking line, a certain scheduling and deployment cost is required to schedule the line resources for subsequent user access.

[0125] Further, in step S2, the expected utility of the networking line is the maximum value after deducting the cost of dispatching the line to the first network element node under the corresponding game result and the cost of transferring the line deployment to the second network element node under the corresponding game result from the excess benefit of the networking line load under the corresponding game result;

[0126] The user's expected utility is the maximum value of the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node under the corresponding game result minus the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond under the corresponding game result and the service quality loss of the user not accessing the available line of the network element node under the corresponding game result.

[0127] Specifically, let U1 represent the utility function of the networking line, then:

[0128] U1=max{Excess revenue of network line load under corresponding game result -

[0129] The cost of dispatching the line to the first network element node under the corresponding game result is -

[0130] The deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node under the corresponding game result}.

[0131] Let U2 represent the user's utility function, then:

[0132] U2 = max{the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node under the corresponding game result - the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond under the corresponding game result -

[0133] The service quality loss of the user not accessing the available lines of the network element node under the corresponding game result}.

[0134] Further, refer to Figures 2 to 4 In step S3, a game is conducted based on the incomplete information dynamic game model to obtain a game result of the user and the networking line, including:

[0135] S31, the networking line makes a decision according to the policy selection range of the networking line: the networking line chooses to connect to the first network element node with a first probability x, or transfers to the second network element node with a second probability, wherein the second probability is 1-x, the first probability is the probability that the first network element node has a redundant line, and the second probability is the probability that the first network element node has no redundant line;

[0136] S32. The user makes a decision according to the user's policy selection range: the user calls the third network element node normally with a third probability y, and hangs up the fourth network element node with a fourth probability, where the fourth probability is 1-y;

[0137] S33. Obtain a game result according to the networking lines and the user's decision.

[0138] The game result is one of the following:

[0139] The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives calls from the first network element node, and the user normally calls the third network element node;

[0140] The first network element node has a redundant line and a networking line to answer the first network element node, and the user hangs up the fourth network element node;

[0141] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is allocated to the first network element node;

[0142] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and no line is allocated to the first network element node;

[0143] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have redundant lines;

[0144] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines.

[0145] Furthermore, in step S33, the game result also includes the network line income and the user income;

[0146] When the first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives a call from the first network element node and the user normally calls the third network element node, the revenue of the networking line is 0, and the user revenue is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0147] The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives the call from the first network element node, and when the user hangs up the fourth network element node, the profit of the networking line is 0, and the profit of the user is 0;

[0148] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user normally calls the third network element node and the line is allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the cost of scheduling the line by the first network element node, and the income of the user is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0149] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is not allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the difference between the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node and the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0150] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node, and other network element nodes have redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the negative value of the service quality loss of the available line of the user's failure to access the network element node;

[0151] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the excess income of the networking line load, and the user's income is 0.

[0152] Specifically, the game matrix is ​​shown in Table 1:

[0153] Table 1

[0154]

[0155] Furthermore, the hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium function includes an optimal normal call probability function of a user and an optimal redundant line probability function of a first network element node of the group;

[0156] refer to Figure 5 In step S4, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function is obtained according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user, including:

[0157] S41, establishing an expected utility function of the networking line according to the revenue of the networking line, the revenue of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the expected utility of the networking line in the game result;

[0158] S42, taking partial derivative of the expected utility function of the networking line to obtain the user's optimal normal call probability function;

[0159] S43, establishing an expected utility function of the user according to the benefits of the networking lines in the game result, the benefits of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the expected utility of the user;

[0160] S44. Calculate the partial derivative of the expected utility function of the user to obtain a probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node.

[0161] Furthermore, in step S41, the expected utility function of the networking line is:

[0162] u1=max[(1-x)(1-y)zE+xy(-Q)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-Z)(-P)+(1-x)y(-P)];

[0163] Wherein, (1-x)(1-y)zE is the excess profit of the network line load under the corresponding game result, xy(-Q) is the cost of scheduling the line of the first network element node under the corresponding game result, (1-x) (1-y) (1-Z) (-P)+(1-x) y(-P) is the cost of deploying the line of the second network element node under the corresponding game result;

[0164] In step S42, the partial derivative of U1 with respect to x is obtained, and the optimal first-order condition for the expected utility of the networking line pair is obtained as follows:

[0165]

[0166] Let the above formula equal to 0, and obtain the user's optimal normal call probability function:

[0167]

[0168] In step S43, the user's expected utility function is:

[0169] U2=max[(1-x)y(RF)+xy(-2F)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-z)(-V)];

[0170] Among them, (1-x)y(RF) is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node under the corresponding game result, xy(-2F) is the time cost of the user waiting for the response of the network element node under the corresponding game result, and (1-x)(1-y)(1-z)(-V) is the service quality loss when the user fails to access the available line of the network element node under the corresponding game result.

[0171] In step S44, the partial derivative of U2 with respect to y is obtained, and the optimal first-order condition for the user's expected utility is obtained as follows:

[0173]

[0174] Let the above formula equal to 0, and obtain the probability function of the optimal configuration of redundant lines for the first network element node:

[0175]

[0176] Among them, U1 is the expected utility function of the networking line, x is the first probability, y is the third probability, U2 is the expected utility function of the user, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling the line to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available line of the user who has not accessed the network element node, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, and F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond.

[0177] That is, the final mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function is:

[0178]

[0179] In step S5, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function is solved to obtain the optimal strategy for the networking line and the user, that is, to obtain the optimal normal call probability for the user and the optimal configuration of redundant lines for the first network element node. The game between the networking line and the user reaches equilibrium when the above formula is taken, and the final result is: the first network element node of the networking line will be x * The user will answer with probability y * This is the optimal choice for networking lines and users.

[0180] The optimal strategy is analyzed as follows:

[0181] Regardless of whether the line resources of the first network element node of the networking line are sufficiently redundant, as long as the current line chooses to answer, the probability of transfer is 1-x * =0, then for the user, calling B normally is the optimal strategy for the user game, and the probability of the user hanging up in the middle is 1-y * ,refer to Figure 4 , the combination of game strategies of both parties is G1 in the game tree.

[0182] When the game between the networking lines and users reaches equilibrium, users The probability of choosing a normal call is:

[0183] α=zE-(1-z)P;

[0184] β = PQ;

[0185] Where α means the utility value after deducting the deployment cost of the transfer line from the excess revenue of the network line load, then:

[0186]

[0187] It can be seen that whether the user chooses to call or hang up depends on the excess profit E of the networking line load minus the cost P of the transfer line deployment, and the cost P of the transfer line deployment is positively correlated with the probability y of the user's call, and the excess profit E of the networking line load is negatively correlated with the probability y of the user's call.

[0188] The optimal strategy for users: When the game between the networking line and the user reaches equilibrium, the networking line is The probability of choosing to answer the call is:

[0189] γ=R+(1-z)V, then:

[0190]

[0191] It can be seen that whether the first network element node of the networking line is configured with a redundant line, that is, whether the networking line is answered, depends on the traffic compensation R obtained by the user due to the switching node, the time cost F of the user waiting for the network element node to respond, and the service quality loss V of the user's failure to access the available line of the network element node, and the user's switching node traffic compensation R and the service quality loss V of the user's failure to access the available line of the network element node are negatively correlated with the probability x that the first network element node has a redundant line.

[0192] refer to Figure 6 In some embodiments, a NFV-oriented intranet system line resource configuration device applied to the above method is provided, comprising:

[0193] Model building module 201, used to build an incomplete information dynamic game model between networking lines and users;

[0194] An expected utility building module 202 is used to build the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user;

[0195] The game module 203 is used to receive a call request from a user to the intranet system, conduct a game based on the incomplete information dynamic game model, and obtain a game result of the user and the networking line;

[0196] An equilibrium calculation module 204, configured to obtain a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user;

[0197] The optimal solution module 205 is used to solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function to obtain the optimal strategy for networking lines and users.

[0198] Furthermore, the networking line includes network element nodes and lines.

[0199] Furthermore, the incomplete information dynamic game model includes information asymmetry between users and networking lines, the strategy selection range of networking lines, conditions for generating excess profit E for networking line loads, conditions for generating line deployment cost P for transferring to a second network element node, the strategy selection range of users, conditions for generating time cost F for users waiting for a response from a network element node, conditions for generating cost Q for scheduling lines to a first network element node, conditions for generating traffic compensation R for transferring to a second network element node, and conditions for generating quality of service loss V for users not accessing available lines at network element nodes.

[0200] Further, the expected utility of the networking line is the maximum value after deducting the cost of scheduling the line to the first network element node under the corresponding game result and the cost of transferring the line deployment to the second network element node under the corresponding game result from the excess benefit of the networking line load under the corresponding game result;

[0201] The user's expected utility is the maximum value after deducting the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond and the service quality loss of the user not accessing the available line of the network element node under the corresponding game result from the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node under the corresponding game result.

[0202] Furthermore, the game module 203 performs game based on the incomplete information dynamic game model to obtain the game result of the user and the networking line, including:

[0203] The networking line makes a decision according to the policy selection range of the networking line: the networking line chooses to connect to the first network element node with a first probability x, or transfers to the second network element node with a second probability, wherein the second probability is 1-x, the first probability is the probability that the first network element node has a redundant line, and the second probability is the probability that the first network element node has no redundant line;

[0204] The user makes a decision according to the user's policy selection range: the user calls the third network element node normally with a third probability y, and hangs up the fourth network element node with a fourth probability, where the fourth probability is 1-y;

[0205] A game result is obtained according to the networking line and the user's decision, and the game result is one of the following:

[0206] The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives calls from the first network element node, and the user normally calls the third network element node;

[0207] The first network element node has a redundant line and a networking line to answer the first network element node, and the user hangs up the fourth network element node;

[0208] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is allocated to the first network element node;

[0209] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and no line is allocated to the first network element node;

[0210] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have redundant lines;

[0211] The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines.

[0212] Furthermore, the game result also includes the network line income and user income;

[0213] When the first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives a call from the first network element node and the user normally calls the third network element node, the revenue of the networking line is 0, and the user revenue is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0214] The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives the call from the first network element node, and when the user hangs up the fourth network element node, the profit of the networking line is 0, and the profit of the user is 0;

[0215] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user normally calls the third network element node and the line is allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the cost of scheduling the line by the first network element node, and the income of the user is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0216] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is not allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the difference between the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node and the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond;

[0217] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node, and other network element nodes have redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the negative value of the service quality loss of the available line of the user's failure to access the network element node;

[0218] When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the excess income of the networking line load, and the user's income is 0.

[0219] Furthermore, the hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium function includes an optimal normal call probability function of a user and an optimal redundant line probability function of a first network element node of a networking line;

[0220] The equilibrium calculation module 204 obtains a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user, including:

[0221] Establishing an expected utility function of the networking line according to the revenue of the networking line, the revenue of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the expected utility of the networking line in the game result;

[0222] Taking partial derivative of the expected utility function of the networking line to obtain the user's optimal normal call probability function;

[0223] Establishing the user's expected utility function according to the benefits of the networking lines in the game result, the benefits of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the user's expected utility;

[0224] The partial derivative of the expected utility function of the user is obtained to obtain a probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node.

[0225] Furthermore, the expected utility function of the networking line is:

[0226] U1=max[(1-x)(1-y)zE+xy(-Q)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-Z)(-P)+(1-x)y(-P)];

[0227] The user's expected utility function is:

[0228] U2=max[(1-x)y(RF)+xy(-2F)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-Z)(-V)];

[0229] Among them, U1 is the expected utility function of the networking line, x is the first probability, y is the third probability, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling the line to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available line of the user who does not access the network element node, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond, and U2 is the user's expected utility function.

[0230] Furthermore, the user's optimal normal call probability function is:

[0231]

[0232] The probability function of the optimal configuration of redundant lines for the first network element node is:

[0233]

[0234] Among them, y * is the user's optimal normal call probability, x * is the probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling lines to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available lines of the network element node that the user does not access, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, and F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond.

[0235] The above-mentioned embodiments provide a method and device for configuring line resources of an intranet system for NFV, which have at least the following beneficial effects:

[0236] (1) The incomplete information dynamic game theory is used to analyze the call / answer trade-off between users and networking lines during the redundant configuration of the NFV-based intranet system networking lines. This is consistent with the actual action response logic of the scenario and provides a new research idea for the reasonable configuration of application network element nodes.

[0237] (2) Comprehensively consider the functional indicators of the NFV-based intranet system during the service process, such as waiting time, line resource availability, and system load, and provide a more comprehensive system assumption and cost analysis, which can efficiently adapt to the remote dual-network node networking test environment of the NFV-based intranet system;

[0238] (3) Based on game payment, the optimal strategy analysis of networking lines and users is given in a targeted manner, and the parameter correlation in the optimal strategy of networking lines and users is further clarified, which facilitates the adjustment and optimization of the performance indicators of a certain network element node in the future test environment.

[0239] Although preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, additional changes and modifications may be made to these embodiments by those skilled in the art once the basic inventive concepts are known. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the present invention. Obviously, those skilled in the art may make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A method for configuring line resources of an intranet system for NFV, characterized in that: The functions of the intranet system are deployed in the cloud through NFV, and the user calls the intranet system through a networking line. The method includes: Construct an incomplete information dynamic game model between networking lines and users; The expected utility of building networking lines and the expected utility of users; Receiving a call request from a user to the intranet system, conducting a game based on the incomplete information dynamic game model, and obtaining a game result of the user and the networking line; Obtaining a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user; Solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function to obtain the optimal strategy for networking lines and users.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The networking line includes network element nodes and lines.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The incomplete information dynamic game model includes information asymmetry between users and networking lines, the policy selection range of networking lines, conditions for generating excess benefits on networking line loads, conditions for generating line deployment costs for switching to a second network element node, the policy selection range of users, conditions for generating time costs for users waiting for responses from network element nodes, conditions for generating costs for scheduling lines to the first network element node, conditions for generating traffic compensation for switching to a second network element node, and conditions for generating service quality losses when users fail to access available lines at network element nodes.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The expected utility of the networking line is the maximum value of the excess benefit of the networking line load under the corresponding game result minus the cost of dispatching the line to the first network element node under the corresponding game result and the cost of transferring the line deployment to the second network element node under the corresponding game result; The user's expected utility is the maximum value after deducting the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond and the service quality loss of the user not accessing the available line of the network element node under the corresponding game result from the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node under the corresponding game result.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The game is performed based on the incomplete information dynamic game model to obtain the game result of the user and the networking line, including: The networking line makes a decision according to the policy selection range of the networking line: the networking line chooses to connect to the first network element node with a first probability x, or transfers to the second network element node with a second probability, wherein the second probability is 1-x, the first probability is the probability that the first network element node has a redundant line, and the second probability is the probability that the first network element node has no redundant line; The user makes a decision according to the user's policy selection range: the user calls the third network element node normally with a third probability y, and hangs up the fourth network element node with a fourth probability, where the fourth probability is 1-y; A game result is obtained according to the networking line and the user's decision, and the game result is one of the following: The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives calls from the first network element node, and the user normally calls the third network element node; The first network element node has a redundant line and a networking line to answer the first network element node, and the user hangs up the fourth network element node; The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is allocated to the first network element node; The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and no line is allocated to the first network element node; The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have redundant lines; The first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The game results also include network line benefits and user benefits; When the first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives a call from the first network element node and the user normally calls the third network element node, the revenue of the networking line is 0, and the user revenue is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond; The first network element node has a redundant line, the networking line receives the call from the first network element node, and when the user hangs up the fourth network element node, the profit of the networking line is 0, and the profit of the user is 0; When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user normally calls the third network element node and the line is allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the cost of scheduling the line by the first network element node, and the income of the user is the negative value of the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond; When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user calls the third network element node normally and the line is not allocated to the first network element node, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the difference between the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node and the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond; When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node, and other network element nodes have redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the negative value of the deployment cost of the line transferred to the second network element node, and the user's income is the negative value of the service quality loss of the available line of the user's failure to access the network element node; When the first network element node has no redundant lines, the networking line is transferred to the second network element node, the user hangs up the fourth network element node and other network element nodes have no redundant lines, the income of the networking line is the excess income of the networking line load, and the user's income is 0.

7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function includes an optimal normal call probability function for users and an optimal redundant line probability function for the first network element node of the networking line; According to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function is obtained, including: Establishing an expected utility function of the networking line according to the revenue of the networking line, the revenue of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the expected utility of the networking line in the game result; Taking partial derivative of the expected utility function of the networking line to obtain the user's optimal normal call probability function; Establishing the user's expected utility function according to the benefits of the networking lines in the game result, the benefits of the user, the first probability, the second probability, the third probability, the fourth probability, the probability that other network element nodes have redundant lines, and the user's expected utility; The partial derivative of the expected utility function of the user is obtained to obtain a probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The expected utility function of the networking line is: U1=max[(1-x)(1-y)zE+xy(-Q)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-Z)(-P)+(1-x)y(-P)]; The user's expected utility function is: U2=max[(1-x)y(RF)+xy(-2F)+(1-x)(1-y)(1-z)(-V)]; Among them, U1 is the expected utility function of the networking line, x is the first probability, y is the third probability, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling the line to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available line of the user who does not access the network element node, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond, and U2 is the user's expected utility function.

9. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that: The user's optimal normal call probability function is: The probability function of the optimal configuration of redundant lines of the first network element node is: Among them, y * is the user's optimal normal call probability, x * is the probability function of optimally configuring redundant lines for the first network element node, z is the probability that other network element nodes have no redundant lines, P is the line deployment cost of transferring to the second network element node, E is the excess profit of the networking line load, Q is the cost of scheduling lines to the first network element node, V is the service quality loss of the available lines of the network element node that the user does not access, R is the traffic compensation for transferring to the second network element node, and F is the time cost of the user waiting for the network element node to respond.

10. An intranet system line resource configuration device for network function virtualization NFV applied to the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that: include: Model building module, used to build an incomplete information dynamic game model between networking lines and users; An expected utility building module is used to build the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user; A game module, used for receiving a call request from a user to the intranet system, playing a game based on the incomplete information dynamic game model, and obtaining a game result of the user and the networking line; An equilibrium calculation module, used to obtain a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function according to the game result, the expected utility of the networking line and the expected utility of the user; The optimal solution module is used to solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium function to obtain the optimal strategy for networking lines and users.

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