Maritime satellite telephone security authentication method based on embedded message authentication code

Abstract

The invention discloses a maritime satellite telephone security authentication method based on an embedded message authentication code, which belongs to the technical field of maritime satellite telephone security authentication, and comprises the following steps: based on a security authentication protocol of the embedded message authentication code, realizing low-traffic identity security authentication between maritime satellite telephones, effectively improving the security of the communication process, and ensuring the security of the maritime satellite telephones. And the maritime satellite telephone can accurately identify the legal user and return the message without interference. According to the invention, the user equipment is supported to access the satellite network, and bidirectional authentication and session key negotiation between the user equipment and the satellite control center are realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of maritime satellite phone security authentication, and in particular relates to a maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on an embedded message authentication code. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of Inmarsat technology and services, the wide application of maritime satellite telephones in certain fields has had an increasing impact on public safety and national defense security. In addition, since the development of modern maritime satellite telephones and technologies is closely related to modern computer technology and communication network technology, the network security risks of maritime satellite telephones have become increasingly prominent in recent years. First, since maritime satellite telephones use open wireless channels to transmit information and lack a trusted domain and a stable network structure, sensitive information such as personal privacy and commercial secrets are vulnerable to malicious behaviors such as eavesdropping, counterfeiting, forgery and man-in-the-middle attacks. Second, maritime satellite telephones have extremely high requirements for real-time performance, but in emergency situations such as natural disasters, the time cost of information processing and calculation may seriously affect the effectiveness of mission execution. Third, the large amount of data transmission and bandwidth consumption of maritime satellite telephones has made the available communication broadband resources tight. In addition, the lack of an integrated radio management system has led to a lag in broadband resource planning and management, further exacerbating the shortage of communication broadband resources. Therefore, the authentication and key negotiation protocol in the communication process is crucial for the use of maritime satellite calls. Summary of the invention

[0003] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention proposes a maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on an embedded message authentication code to solve the problems existing in the above prior art.

[0004] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on an embedded message authentication code, comprising:

[0005] Obtaining a message authentication code from the message data based on a message authentication code generation algorithm;

[0006] Based on the ciphertext domain reversible information hiding technology, the authentication code of the message is hidden in the message data to generate a ciphertext carrying the message authentication code;

[0007] The sender and the receiver perform communication authentication between users. After the authentication is successful, the sender sends the message authentication code ciphertext to the receiver. After the receiver obtains the message authentication code ciphertext, it calculates the message authentication code ciphertext through an extraction algorithm to obtain the corresponding plaintext and the decrypted message authentication code;

[0008] The decrypted message authentication code is compared with the authentication code of the message to generate a comparison result, and whether the message has been tampered with is determined based on the comparison result.

[0009] Preferably, the process further includes: the user sending a registration request to the satellite control center, the process including:

[0010] The user inputs the user's real identity, and based on the user's real identity, a ciphertext with an embedded information hash value is obtained and transmitted to the satellite control center;

[0011] The satellite control center verifies the time of the ciphertext of the embedded information hash value, and if the verification is successful, verifies the hash value. If the hash value verification is successful, the satellite control center generates a certificate and distributes it to the user;

[0012] The user decrypts the certificate based on the private key of the satellite control center to generate registration parameters, performs credibility verification on the public-private key pair and the temporary identity based on the registration parameters, and outputs a registration result based on the result of the credibility verification.

[0013] Preferably, the communication authentication between users performed by the sender and the receiver includes: co-trusted domain communication authentication, cross-trusted domain passive communication authentication and cross-trusted domain active communication authentication.

[0014] Preferably, the process of the mutually trusted domain communication authentication includes:

[0015] The sender sends the sender temporary identity and the receiver temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the receiver's certificate;

[0016] The satellite control center verifies the sender's identity and sends the receiver's certificate to the sender;

[0017] The sender decrypts and verifies the recipient's certificate. If the verification is successful, the recipient's certificate is deemed to be credible.

[0018] The sender constructs a ciphertext based on the recipient's certificate and sends it to the recipient. The recipient verifies the validity of the ciphertext. After the verification is successful, the sender and the recipient begin communicating.

[0019] Preferably, the process of cross-trusted domain passive communication authentication includes:

[0020] After the sender sends the sender's temporary identity and the receiver's temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the receiver's certificate but fails, the receiver sends the sender's temporary identity and the receiver's temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the sender's certificate;

[0021] The satellite control center verifies the identity of the receiver and sends the sender's certificate to the receiver;

[0022] The receiver decrypts and verifies the sender's certificate. If the verification is successful, the sender's certificate is deemed to be credible.

[0023] The receiver constructs a ciphertext based on the sender's certificate and sends it to the sender. The sender verifies the validity of the ciphertext. After the verification is successful, the sender and the receiver start communicating.

[0024] Preferably, the process of active communication authentication across trusted domains includes:

[0025] After the sender sends the sender's temporary identity and the receiver's temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the receiver's certificate but fails, and the receiver sends the sender's temporary identity and the receiver's temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the sender's certificate but fails, the sender sends the sender's certificate to the receiver;

[0026] The receiver obtains the sender's public key and the time when the sender sent the message based on the sender's certificate, and verifies the sender's certificate based on the sender's public key and the time when the sender sent the message. If the verification is successful, the sender's certificate is deemed to be credible;

[0027] The receiver constructs a ciphertext based on the sender's certificate and sends it to the sender. The sender verifies the validity of the ciphertext. After the verification is successful, the sender and the receiver start communicating.

[0028] Preferably, the authentication code of the message is hidden in the message data based on the ciphertext domain reversible information hiding technology, and the process of generating the ciphertext carrying the message authentication code further includes: the sender and the receiver share a secret key through a secret channel;

[0029] The process of sharing the secret key includes: the sender and the receiver exchange random numbers and generate a secret key based on the random numbers;

[0030] The secret key is verified based on the authentication vector, and the validity of the secret key is determined based on the verification result.

[0031] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages and technical effects:

[0032] 1) Support user equipment to access the satellite network and realize two-way authentication and session key negotiation between user equipment and satellite control center.

[0033] 2) Through the reversible information hiding technology in the ciphertext domain, the message authentication code is hidden in the transmitted data, and an authentication communication protocol with an embedded message authentication code is constructed, which effectively reduces the data transmission volume and achieves a low communication volume effect.

[0034] 3) Use informal analysis and ban logic formal analysis methods to verify the security of the protocol. Describe the authentication protocol in a formal language, establish the initial assumptions and the expected goals of the protocol, and then use the BAN logic reasoning rules to deduce the expected goals of the protocol based on the initial assumptions, thus proving the security and effectiveness of the protocol. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0035] The drawings constituting a part of the present application are used to provide a further understanding of the present application. The illustrative embodiments and descriptions of the present application are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0036] Figure 1 This is a framework diagram of a message authentication code model based on a ciphertext domain reversible information hiding technology according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of the authentication communication protocol registration of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 3 A diagram of a common trusted domain communication authentication process according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 4 This is a diagram of a process of cross-trusted domain passive communication authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 5 This is a diagram of the cross-trusted domain active communication authentication process of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 6 This is a diagram of the formal communication process between users in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other. The present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in combination with the embodiments.

[0043] It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowcharts of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer executable instructions, and that, although a logical order is shown in the flowcharts, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0044] Embodiment 1

[0045] This embodiment provides a maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on an embedded message authentication code, including:

[0046] The framework of the message authentication code model based on reversible information hiding technology in the ciphertext domain is as follows: Figure 1As shown in the figure, the key in the encryption module is agreed to be shared by both parties of the message transmission through a secret channel. The encryption module applies the encryption algorithm to realize the encryption and decryption functions of the transmitted plaintext message; the authentication module applies the message authentication code generation algorithm to realize the generation and authentication functions of the message authentication code; the reversible embedding module applies the reversible embedding algorithm to realize the embedding and extraction functions of the message authentication code.

[0047] In the embedded message authentication code model, before transmitting the ciphertext and the message authentication code, the message authentication code is embedded in the ciphertext, and then the ciphertext with the message authentication code is transmitted, which ensures the security of the message authentication code during the transmission process. If the ciphertext with the message authentication code is stolen during the transmission process, the attacker who steals the information cannot easily discover the existence of the message authentication code and intercept it. The embedded message authentication code model has three specific steps:

[0048] 1) Alice and Bob, the two parties in the message transmission, share the key K through a secret channel.

[0049] 2) Alice calculates MAC = H(m), c = Enc K (m), c'=Emb(c,MAC). A→B;

[0050] 3) After receiving c', Bob uses the extraction algorithm to obtain MAC. Calculate m = Dec K (c), MAC' = H'(m). Compare MAC and MAC'. If they are the same, it means m has not been tampered with. If they are different, it can be determined that the plaintext message m has been tampered with or the plaintext message is not from the real and legitimate sender.

[0051] In the above process, the authenticity, integrity and accuracy of the transmitted message will not be damaged. At the same time, unauthorized parties who intercept the transmitted data cannot perceive the existence of the message authentication code and cannot cut out the message authentication code therein.

[0052] The embedded message authentication code not only retains the authentication function of the traditional message authentication code, but also strengthens the confidentiality of the transmitted message. Therefore, the embedded message authentication code can be applied to the design of the authentication protocol and the process of information interaction. This embodiment mainly studies the application of the embedded message authentication code in the maritime satellite phone communication protocol, designs an authentication communication protocol based on the embedded message authentication code, and is mainly suitable for identity authentication and information interaction between maritime satellite phones and between maritime satellite phones and background control terminals.

[0053] The authentication communication protocol based on embedded message authentication code is mainly divided into two processes: one is the registration process between the maritime satellite phone equipment and the satellite control center, and the other is the process of mutual communication between maritime satellite phones, including identity authentication before communication, session key negotiation, and the sending and security authentication of session content.

[0054] Registration process:

[0055] The new user U of the maritime satellite phone sends a registration request to the satellite control center (hereinafter referred to as the collection of low-level and high-level satellite control centers) and the SCC saves the new user's identity information, makes a digital certificate and distributes it to the user. Figure 2 As shown:

[0056] (The user generates a random number N and calculates the temporary key That is, it is obtained by bit-by-bit XOR operation of the user's real identity and the random number)

[0057] ①User enters ID U ,calculate h=H(ID U ||K temp ||T), c'=Emb(c,h).U→SCC.

[0058] ② After receiving c', SCC calculates Verify the validity of T. If valid, calculate h'=H'(ID U ||K temp ||T), verify whether h' and h match. If they do, SCC is assigned to A's public-private key pair (PK A , S.K. A ) and PID A , and set the parameter (ID A PID A ,PK A ) is encrypted and stored in the database.

[0059] ③SCC prepares and issues a certificate to A, calculating h0=H(PID A ||PK A ), h=H(PID A ||PK A ||SK A ||T1), c'=Emb(c,sig A ||h), send c' to user A.

[0060] ④After receiving c', A uses SK A Decrypt to get PID A , Ktemp, PK A SK A and T1, verify the validity of T1, if valid, calculate h0'=H'(PID A ||PK A ), If the output p=0, the registration fails. If the output p=1, h'=H'(PID A ||PK A ||SK A ||T1), verify whether h' and h match. If they match, the public-private key pair (PK A , S.K. A ) and temporary identity PID A Credible, registration successful.

[0061] Communication authentication process between users:

[0062] The authentication communication process between users can be divided into three cases, namely, communication authentication in a mutually trusted domain, passive communication authentication across trusted domains, and active communication authentication across trusted domains. These three cases will be analyzed below.

[0063] Case 1: Common trusted domain communication authentication:

[0064] When A communicates well with the satellite control center, A sends a message to the SCC to request the certificate for B, so as to achieve mutual identity recognition with B. The specific process is as follows Figure 3 Shown

[0065] ①A will PID A and B's PID B Sent to SCC to request B's certificate, successful.

[0066] ② After SCC verifies A's identity, it sends B's certificate to A and calculates Calculate h1=H(PK B ||T2) connected in Then they are embedded into the ciphertext c1' and sent to A.

[0067] ③A receives c1' and uses SK A Decrypt to get PK B , T2, verify the validity of T2, if valid, calculate h0'=H'(PID B ||PK B ), If the output p=0, the registration fails. If the output p=1, h1'=H'(PK B ||T2), verify whether h1' and h1 match. If they do, the certificate of B received by A and sent by SCC is credible.

[0068] ④A uses PK B Encrypted Calculate the hash value h2 = H(PK A ||T3) Connect to Then they are embedded into the ciphertext c2' and sent to user B.

[0069] ⑤After receiving c2', user B uses SK B Decrypt to get PK A , T3, verify the validity of T3, if it is effective to calculate h0'=H'(PID A ||PK A ), If the output p=0, it is invalid. If the output p=1, calculate h2'=H'(PK A ||T3), verify whether h2' and h2 match, and if they do, start communication.

[0070] Case 2: Passive communication authentication across trusted domains:

[0071] When communication between user A and the satellite control center fails, user B needs to send a message to the SCC to request the certificate of user A to be contacted, so as to conduct identity mutual recognition. The specific process is as follows Figure 4 As shown:

[0072] ①A will PID A and B's PID B Sent to SCC to obtain B's certificate, failed.

[0073] ②A will PID A Sent to B, requesting B to ask SCC for A's certificate.

[0074] ③B will PID B and the PID of A A Sent to SCC to obtain A's certificate, successful.

[0075] ④ After SCC verifies B's identity, it sends A's certificate to B: Calculation Calculate h1=H(PK A ||T2) connected in Then they are embedded into the ciphertext c1' and sent to B.

[0076] ⑤B uses SK B Decrypt c1' to get PK A , T2, verify the validity of T2, if valid, calculate h0'=H'(PID A ||PK A ), If the output p=0, the registration fails. If the output p=1, h1'=H'(PK A ||T2), verify whether h1' and h1 match. If they do, the certificate of A sent by SCC and received by B is credible.

[0077] ⑥B will send time T3 to connect PK B Use PK AEncrypted Calculate the hash value h2 = H(PK B ||T3) Connect to Then they are embedded into the ciphertext c2' and sent to A.

[0078] ⑦After A receives c2', he uses SK A Decrypt to get PK B , T3, verify the validity of T3, if valid, calculate h0'=H'(PID B ||PK B ), use PK C Calculate and verify signature function If the output p=0, the authentication fails. If the output p=1, h2'=H'(PK B ||T3), verify whether h2' and h2 match. If they do, the certificate of user B received by user A is credible, the identity authentication is successful, and communication begins.

[0079] Case 3: Passive communication authentication across trusted domains:

[0080] If neither user A nor user B can contact the satellite control center, user A will send his certificate directly to user B. The specific process is as follows Figure 5 As shown:

[0081] ①A will PID A and B's PID B Sent to SCC to obtain B's certificate, failed.

[0082] ②A will PID A Sent to B, requesting B to ask SCC for A's certificate.

[0083] ③B will PID B and the PID of A A Sent to SCC to obtain A's certificate, failed.

[0084] ④A directly sends the certificate to B and calculates m=(PK A || T2), calculate the hash value h1 = H(PK A ||T2) connected in Then it is embedded into the plaintext m to get m' and sent to B.

[0085] ⑤After receiving m', B obtains A's public key PK A , A sends information at time T2, verifies the validity of T2, if valid, calculates h0'=H'(PID A ||PK A ), If the output p=0, the registration fails. If the output p=1, h1'=H'(PK A||T2), verify whether h1' and h1 match. If they do, the certificate of A received by B is credible.

[0086] ⑥B uses A's public key PK A calculate Calculate the hash value h2 = H(PK B ||T3) Connect to Then they are embedded into the ciphertext c1' and sent to A.

[0087] ⑦After receiving c1', A decrypts it and obtains the public key PK of user B B , T3, verify the validity of T3, if valid, calculate h0'=H'(PID B ||PK B ), If the output p=0, the identity authentication fails. If the output p=1, h2'=H'(PK B ||T3), verify h2' and h2. If they match, the certificate of B received by A is credible, the identity authentication is successful, and communication begins.

[0088] User A and B jointly agree on the session key K

[0089] Process 1: User A and user B exchange random numbers and negotiate the session key K for normal communication. The specific process is as follows: Figure 6 As shown:

[0090] ①A generates a random number N A After connecting with the sending time T4, use PK B Encrypted to get ciphertext Send c3 to user B.

[0091] ② User B generates a random number N B , and then connect with the sending time T5 and use PK A Encrypted Send c4 to user A. At the same time, after receiving the ciphertext c3, first use SK B Decrypt to get the random number N A Send time T4 to user A, then verify the timestamp, and calculate Δt=T4'-T4 according to the current system time T4'. If Δt exceeds the specified threshold, it means that the message timeliness is at risk of being destroyed, the verification fails, and the random number N is discarded. A And restart the random number exchange process; if the timestamp verification passes, keep the random number N A , and calculate Get the key K B .

[0092] ③After receiving the ciphertext c4, user A first uses SK A Decrypt to get the random number NB Send time T5 to user B, then verify the timestamp, and calculate Δt=T5'-T5 according to the current system time T5'. If Δt exceeds the specified threshold, it means that the message timeliness is at risk of being destroyed, the verification fails, and the random number N is discarded. B And restart the random number exchange process; if the timestamp verification passes, keep the random number N B , and calculate Get the key K A .

[0093] Process 2: Verify the availability of the key. The specific process is as follows:

[0094] ① Let the authentication vector be AV=m||T6, where m is a simple verification phrase (such as "hello!") and T6 is the time when user A sends the authentication vector. A Encrypted Then calculate the hash value h3=H(AV)=H(m||T6), embed h3 into the ciphertext c4 to obtain c4'=Emb(c4,h3), and send c4' to user B.

[0095] ②After receiving the embedded ciphertext c4', user B first uses the key K B Solve to get the authentication vector AV = m||T6, then verify the timestamp, and calculate Δt = T6'-T6 according to the current system time T6'. If Δt exceeds the specified threshold, it means that the message timeliness is damaged and there is a risk of verification failure, and the key verification is restarted; if the timestamp verification passes, calculate h3' = H'(AV), and perform character matching with h3 extracted from the ciphertext c4', and compare h3' and h3. If they do not match, it means that the message integrity is damaged and the key verification fails. If they match, then K B =K A , authentication is successful, and the negotiated key is available.

[0096] ③ Similarly, user B connects the sending time T7 to the same authentication vector AV and uses K B Encrypted Then calculate the hash value h4 = H(AV||T7) = H(m||T6||T7), embed h4 into c5 to get c5' = Emb(c5,h4) and send it to user A. After receiving c5', user A decrypts and verifies it. If the timestamp and hash value are verified successfully and the received trusted AV is the same as the original one, it can be proved that K A =K B , we can get the commonly agreed key K = K A =K B .

[0097] A communicates normally with B;

[0098] ① User A concatenates the sending time T8 to the secret message m and encrypts it with the key K to obtain c6, calculates the hash value h5=H(m||T8), embeds h5 into c6 to obtain c6', and sends it to user B.

[0099] ② User B receives the embedded ciphertext c6', first decrypts the information m and time T8 with the key K, then verifies the timestamp, and calculates Δt=T8'-T8 based on the current system time T8'. If Δt exceeds the specified threshold, it means that there is a risk of message timeliness being violated, verification fails, and identity authentication fails. If the timestamp verification passes, calculate h5'=H'(m||T8), and perform character matching with h5 extracted from the ciphertext c6'. Compare h5' and h5. If they do not match, it means that the message integrity is destroyed. If they match, the message is delivered successfully.

[0100] The symbols used in the communication protocol of this embodiment are shown in Table 1, and the related functions used are defined in Table 2.

[0101] Table 1

[0102]

[0103]

[0104] Table 2

[0105]

[0106] Embodiment 2

[0107] This embodiment provides a maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on an embedded message authentication code, including:

[0108] BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic is the most typical formal analysis tool and is a belief-based modal logic. In the reasoning process of BAN logic, the beliefs of the subjects participating in the protocol change and develop with the development of message exchange. When using BAN logic to analyze the protocol, the following three steps should be followed:

[0109] (1) Determine the expected goals of the protocol, describe the initial state of the protocol in logical language, and make reasonable initial assumptions based on the specific situation.

[0110] (2) Establish an idealized protocol model and convert the actual formula of the protocol into a formula that can be recognized by BAN logic.

[0111] (3) Use the logical reasoning rules of BAN logic and based on the idealized protocol and initial assumptions to infer and analyze the protocol.

[0112] The BAN logic symbols and their meanings of this embodiment are shown in Table 3-4;

[0113] Table 3

[0114]

[0115] Table 4

[0116]

[0117]

[0118] The following is the ban logic proof:

[0119] Proof of registration process:

[0120] The satellite control center SCC receives the registration request from A.

[0121] SCC compares T with T', if Vt < 5s, it is valid;

[0122]

[0123] SCC prepares and issues a certificate to user A (registration feedback).

[0124]

[0125] PID A ||PK A Hash, get h'0 = H (PID A ||PK A );

[0126] PID A ||PK A ||SK A ||T1 performs hashing, h'=H(PID A ||PK A ||SK A ||T1); A compares h0 with h'0, h with h', if they match;

[0127] Then the registration feedback package is not destroyed;

[0128]

[0129] A compares T1 with T1'. If Vt < 5s, it is valid.

[0130]

[0131] Registration successful;

[0132] Proof of identity authentication process (three cases);

[0133] Case 1: Common trusted domain communication authentication;

[0134] A requests B's certificate from SCC and receives:

[0135]

[0136] Calculate the receiving time T2'-T2 = Vt < 5s, then the time is valid; calculate h1' = H (PK B ||T2), compare h1' with h1, if they match, then PK B ||T2 is the complete message sent by SCC.

[0137]

[0138] Calculate h1'=H(PK B ||T2), h'0=H(PID B ||PK B );

[0139] Match h1 with h1', h0 with h'0, if they are equal,

[0140] Then the message integrity is not compromised;

[0141] Then A|≡K B →B;

[0142] B receives A's certificate.

[0143]

[0144] Calculate T3'-T3=Vt<5s, then the time is valid;

[0145] B will Extract it,

[0146]

[0147] Calculate h'0 = H(PID A ||PK A ), h'2=H(PK A ||T3);

[0148] Match h2 with h'2, h0 with h'0, if they are equal, then PK A ||T3 is the complete message sent by SCC;

[0149] Mutual authentication successful.

[0150] Case 2: Passive communication authentication across trusted domains;

[0151] B asks SCC for A's certificate and receives:

[0152]

[0153] Calculate the receiving time T2'-T2 = Δt < 5s, then the time is valid and the message is fresh;

[0154] B will Extract it,

[0155]

[0156] B calculates h1'=H(PK A ||T2),h0'=H(PID A ||PK A ), compare h1 with h1', h0 with h0',

[0157] If it matches;

[0158] Then the PK received by B A ||T2 is the complete message sent by SCC;

[0159] B sends to A,

[0160]

[0161] Calculate the receiving time T3'-T3 = Δt < 5s, then the time is valid;

[0162]

[0163] A calculates h2'=H(PK B ||T3),h0'=H(PID B ||PK B ), compare h2 with h2', h0 with h0', if they match;

[0164] Then the PK received by A is B ||T3 is the complete message sent by SCC;

[0165] The identities of both parties are authenticated successfully.

[0166] Case 3: Active communication authentication across trusted domains;

[0167] B receives the certificate from A.

[0168]

[0169] Calculate the receiving time T2'-T2 = Δt < 5s, then the time is valid;

[0170]

[0171]

[0172] B calculates h1'=H(PK A ||T2),h0'=H(PID A ||PK A ), compare h1 with h1', h0 with h0', if they match;

[0173] Then the PK received by B A ||T2 is the complete message sent by SCC;

[0174]

[0175] Calculate the receiving time T3'-T3 = Δt < 5s, then the time is valid;

[0176]

[0177] A calculates h2'=H(PK B ||T3),h0'=H(PID B ||PK B ), compare h2 with h2', h0 with h0', if they match

[0178] Then the PK received by A is B ||T3 is the complete message sent by SCC;

[0179] The identities of both parties are authenticated successfully.

[0180] Agree on a key K;

[0181] If K is the secret key agreed upon by A and B,

[0182]

[0183] B hashes AV, H'=Hash(AV), and compares H' with H(AV). If they are equal, it can be considered that AV has not been destroyed during the transmission process;

[0184] AV=m||T6, calculate the receiving time T6'-T6=Δt<5s, so the time is valid

[0185] B then sends the AV to A.

[0186]

[0187] A hashes AV, H'=Hash(AV), and compares H' with H(AV). If they are equal, it can be considered that AV has not been destroyed during the transmission process.

[0188] AV=m||T7, calculate the receiving time T7'-T7=Δt<5s, so the time is valid

[0189] A compares the AV with the AV it sent. If they are equal, A and B have successfully negotiated the key.

[0190] The process of transmitting ciphertext;

[0191]

[0192] B hashes M||T1, H'=Hash(M||T1), and compares H' with H(M||T1). If they are equal, it can be considered that M||T1 has not been destroyed during the transmission process;

[0193]

[0194] B compares T1 with T1'. If Δt < 0.1s, the time is valid, B|≡#(T1);

[0195] B hashes M||T1, H'=Hash(M||T1), and compares H' with H(M||T1). If they are equal, it can be considered that M||T1 has not been destroyed during the transmission process;

[0196]

[0197]

[0198] This embodiment also uses a non-formal method to perform security analysis on the authentication communication protocol and discusses the ability of the protocol to resist various types of attacks.

[0199] 1) Two-way authentication. In the authentication communication process of the above protocol, two-way identity authentication can be achieved between the user equipment and the satellite control center. The satellite control center uses a temporary identity identifier PID U Corresponding to the real identity ID U The user equipment verifies the identity of the satellite control center by verifying the time T1 and comparing MAC1 with HMAC1, thus achieving two-way identity authentication.

[0200] 2) Privacy protection. Privacy protection is mainly divided into two aspects: one is to achieve anonymity of the identity of the user device, and the other is to improve the security of the session key and the confidentiality of the message. During the registration process, the user device obtains a temporary identity identifier PID assigned by the satellite control center. U, realizing the anonymity of the user device identity during the authentication communication process. During the message transmission process, the reversible embedding of the message authentication code makes it impossible for attackers to detect the existence of the message authentication code from the intercepted data and intercept it, thus making it impossible to conduct key speculation attacks. The embedded message authentication code in the protocol implements the authentication function while ensuring and improving the security of the shared session key and the confidentiality of the message communication.

[0201] 3) Traceability and unlinkability. Temporary identity PID of user device U and the corresponding real identity ID U Stored locally in the satellite control center, so through PID U , the satellite control center can query the real identity of the user, and after discovering malicious behavior, it can trace the source of the malicious behavior. Since authentication and communication are in an open channel, attackers can easily intercept the transmitted data. However, in this protocol, even if the attacker intercepts the transmitted message multiple times, he cannot use the temporary identity intercepted from it to know the corresponding real identity, and then pretend to be or link to a legitimate user device entity. In the above protocol interaction process, because the transmitted authentication message is updated in each step, the temporary identity carried is also constantly updated and changed. For the attacker, the authentication message and identity are completely random, so the attacker cannot associate the entity identity from the message.

[0202] 4) Resist replay attacks. In the authentication communication process of the above protocol, the authentication request H(M||T1) sent by the user equipment UE contains a timestamp, which ensures the freshness of the message during the interaction. The detection of the timestamp can help the communicating parties identify the attacker's attack behavior. Therefore, the above protocol can resist replay attacks.

[0203] 5) Forward and backward security. In the above protocol, the session key is randomly generated by the satellite control center. Each session key is independent of each other. At the same time, the sharing process of the session key is encrypted using the public key system and the relevant message authentication code is embedded in the ciphertext. Therefore, the attacker cannot infer the key used in the ongoing session and the key used in the non-session process, and cannot parse the communication content by analyzing and comparing the previous and next session data. Therefore, the above protocol can ensure the security of the previous and next sessions.

[0204] The above are only preferred specific implementations of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily thought of by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present application should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on an embedded message authentication code, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Obtaining a message authentication code from the message data based on a message authentication code generation algorithm; Based on the ciphertext domain reversible information hiding technology, the authentication code of the message is hidden in the message data to generate a ciphertext carrying the message authentication code; The sender and the receiver perform communication authentication between users. After the authentication is successful, the sender sends the message authentication code ciphertext to the receiver. After the receiver obtains the message authentication code ciphertext, it calculates the message authentication code ciphertext through an extraction algorithm to obtain the corresponding plaintext and the decrypted message authentication code; The decrypted message authentication code is compared with the authentication code of the message to generate a comparison result, and whether the message has been tampered with is determined based on the comparison result.

2. The maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on embedded message authentication code according to claim 1, characterized in that: Also includes: The user sends a registration request to the satellite control center. The process includes: The user inputs the user's real identity, and based on the user's real identity, a ciphertext with an embedded information hash value is obtained and transmitted to the satellite control center; The satellite control center verifies the time of the ciphertext of the embedded information hash value, and if the verification is successful, verifies the hash value. If the hash value verification is successful, the satellite control center generates a certificate and distributes it to the user; The user decrypts the certificate based on the private key of the satellite control center to generate registration parameters, performs credibility verification on the public-private key pair and the temporary identity based on the registration parameters, and outputs a registration result based on the result of the credibility verification.

3. The maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on embedded message authentication code according to claim 1, characterized in that: The communication authentication between users performed by the sender and the receiver includes: communication authentication in a common trusted domain, passive communication authentication across trusted domains, and active communication authentication across trusted domains.

4. The maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on embedded message authentication code according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The process of the mutually trusted domain communication authentication includes: The sender sends the sender temporary identity and the receiver temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the receiver's certificate; The satellite control center verifies the sender's identity and sends the receiver's certificate to the sender; The sender decrypts and verifies the recipient's certificate. If the verification is successful, the recipient's certificate is deemed to be credible. The sender constructs a ciphertext based on the recipient's certificate and sends it to the recipient. The recipient verifies the validity of the ciphertext. After the verification is successful, the sender and the recipient begin communicating.

5. The maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on embedded message authentication code according to claim 3, characterized in that: The process of cross-trusted domain passive communication authentication includes: After the sender sends the sender's temporary identity and the receiver's temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the receiver's certificate but fails, the receiver sends the sender's temporary identity and the receiver's temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the sender's certificate; The satellite control center verifies the identity of the receiver and sends the sender's certificate to the receiver; The receiver decrypts and verifies the sender's certificate. If the verification is successful, the sender's certificate is deemed to be credible. The receiver constructs a ciphertext based on the sender's certificate and sends it to the sender. The sender verifies the validity of the ciphertext. After the verification is successful, the sender and the receiver start communicating.

6. The maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on embedded message authentication code according to claim 3, characterized in that: The process of cross-trusted domain active communication authentication includes: The sender sends the sender's temporary identity and the receiver's temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the receiver's certificate but fails, and the receiver sends the sender's temporary identity and the receiver's temporary identity to the satellite control center to request the sender's certificate but fails, and the sender sends the sender's certificate to the receiver; The receiver obtains the sender's public key and the time when the sender sent the message based on the sender's certificate, and verifies the sender's certificate based on the sender's public key and the time when the sender sent the message. If the verification is successful, the sender's certificate is deemed to be credible; The receiver constructs a ciphertext based on the sender's certificate and sends it to the sender. The sender verifies the validity of the ciphertext. After the verification is successful, the sender and the receiver start communicating.

7. The maritime satellite phone security authentication method based on embedded message authentication code according to claim 1, characterized in that: The authentication code of the message is hidden in the message data based on the ciphertext domain reversible information hiding technology, and the process of generating the ciphertext carrying the message authentication code also includes: the sender and the receiver share a secret key through a secret channel; The process of sharing the secret key includes: the sender and the receiver exchange random numbers and generate a secret key based on the random numbers; The secret key is verified based on the authentication vector, and the validity of the secret key is determined based on the verification result.

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